Academic literature on the topic 'Mada (African people)'

AbstractThe communication revolution has made texts and languages available to people who, it is here suggested, might not have the cultural components needed to use them in the same way as native speakers. Introduced languages have in much of Africa eclipsed indigenous knowledge from opportunity for home grown development. Africans flocking to Western languages supported by numerous Western subsidies, leaves African ways of life concealed from the West. Western languages can be used to undermine the West. The inadequacy of English in Africa is illustrated by the contrast between the holistic and dualistic worldviews; English being dualistic is a poor means for expressing African holism. This makes the use of English in and for Africa inherently confusing. It is proposed that indigenous development be encouraged through challenging and encouraging African theology on its own terms, by encouraging some Western missionaries to use African languages and resources in their task.

It was during my early years in high school (in Kenya), that I was first exposed to the idea that far away in the Americas lived people who were black. I was greatly fascinated by this idea. Until then, history was just another mundane class that focused on Europeans colonizing Africa and large parts of the rest of the world. Because the syllabus did not include the stories of the real makers of African History—the Africans themselves—as a young African student I found the learning experience to be fairly alienating. Part of the materials covered in class included David Livingstone’s three missionary journeys. No effort was made to bring to the student’s awareness that the caravans of the so-called “slaves” that Livingstone stumbled on in the interior of Africa were Africans like ourselves.

This paper contends that in Africa, the belief in the reality of the spirit world is a persistent phenomenon, which occupies a significant place in their religiosity. By building their theologies around the existential needs of the African people, the prophetic and deliverance ministries represent a contextual approach to Christianity in Africa. Nevertheless, an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of these ministries reveal that their approach may fit well into the African cultural milieu, but their emphasis is a threat to the progress of Christian discipleship in Africa and among Africans in the diaspora. Despite their rapid numerical growth, the deliverance ministries cannot bring the African out of the fear of witchcraft and other supernatural powers. The paper concludes that to be able to mitigate the challenges of these ministries, pragmatic solutions being discussed at the academic levels must be made accessible to grassroots prophets.

This paper examines the role of colonisation in the conquering of the Being of Africans. It is pointed out that the colonisation of Africa became possible only because the church − particularly the Catholic Church and the Protestants − gave backing to it. Colonialism and Christianity are often associated because Catholicism and Protestanism were the religions of the colonial powers. Thus Christianity gave moral and ethical foundation to the enslavement of Africans. Colonisation is a concept which involves the idea of organising and arranging, which etymologically means to cultivate or to design. Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that this organising and arranging of colonies had a dire impact on the Being of the African people. Colonisation manifests itself through land dispossession (which in South Africa was given theological backing by the Dutch Reformed Church), epistemicide and proselytisation. Colonisation was informed by the idea of the scramble for Africa, which was blessed and commissioned particularly by the Catholic Church; and the notion of geopolitics of space, according to which the world has been divided by Europeans into two − namely the centre (occupied by the Europeans) and the periphery (occupied by non-Europeans). This division was informed by the articulation that ‘I conquer; therefore I am the sovereign’. Therefore, following the ego conquiro (i.e. I conquer), which was followed by the Cartesian ego Cogito (i.e. I think) then those who possess both the ego conquiro and ego cogito felt justified to colonise those who lacked these. This was felt in Africa through land dispossession, and Africans were forced to go through a violent process which alienated them from their ancestral land. Land is ancestral in the Being of the African people, and therefore any disturbance to the relation between the land and the Africans will result in them losing their Being (or self) − becoming pariahs in their ancestral land. This made them a conquered people and empty shells that accepted everything coming their way. It is against this background that the paper will explore the role of colonisation in the conquering of the Being of Africans through land dispossession, epistemicide and proselytisation.

Africana people in America have relied upon the utilization of political participation in order to address the economic and societal ills that plague its community. Africana people have made strides at all levels of the American government. Africana people were a vital voting block that helped to elect the first American President of African descent. However, studies have shown that the conditions of Africana people in America have not substantially changed since the Voting Rights Act of 1 965 was enacted. Africana political participation has not equated to socioeconomic equality on a large scale for the Africana community. Utilizing Feagin's Systemic Racism Theory, this project looks to examine why solely relying upon the American political system is symptomatic of disagency for Africana people and argues that this dis-agency does not empower our people to seek solutions. It places the power to liberate in the oppressor's hands, thus maintaining the inequality that continues to exist in America. This article also argues for Africana people to look to themselves as the avenue for addressing the societal ills that it faces. It also argues that Africana people must be their own mechanism for liberation. In addition, the terms Africana and Black will be used interchangeably in the project because those terms are most readily identifiable to people of African descent living in America.

A critique of the investment made by Western resource people as teachers in African Bible schools is provided by means of a specific case study: the request from the Africa Brotherhood Church for a partnership program in equipping equippers, preparing people who can replace missionaries. African fascination with Western theological education and Western misgivings about it provided the cultural backdrop for an experiment. The singular challenge of the resulting Certificate in Ministry program was the delivery of quality theological education which was contextually sensitive to people and normative to the rapidly growing African church.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is controversial, acutely so in Africa. The first thirty-nine people it indicted were all African. It did not open any formal investigations outside Africa until the 2016 decision to investigate conduct related to the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. The first three notifications of withdrawal from the ICC Statute, each made in 2016, were by Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia. While South Africa and Zambia reversed their initial intentions, Burundi in fact became the first state party to withdraw from the ICC in October 2017. These maneuvers are closely connected to country-specific political and legal considerations, but they overlap with concerns expressed by governments in other countries including Kenya and Namibia. Among these concerns is that “the ICC has become the greatest threat to Africa's sovereignty, peace and stability,” and that “the ICC is a colonial institution under the guise of international justice.”

BackgroundTo lower the risk of diabetes and heart disease in Africa, identification of African-centred thresholds for inexpensive biomarkers of insulin resistance (IR) is essential. The waist circumference (WC) thresholds that predicts IR in African men and women have not been established, but investigations recently conducted in Africa using indirect measures of IR suggest IR is predicted by WC of 80–95 cm in men and 90–99 cm in women. These WC cannot be used for guidelines until validated by direct measurements of IR and visceral adipose tissue (VAT). Therefore, we determined in a group of African-born black people living in America (A) the WC, which predicts IR and (B) the influence of abdominal fat distribution on IR.MethodsThe 375 participants (age 38±10 years (mean±SD), 67% men) had IR determined by HOMA-IR and Matsuda index. VAT and subcutaneous adipose tissue (SAT) were measured by abdominal CT scans. Optimal WC for the prediction of IR was determined in sex-specific analyses by area under the receiver operating characteristic (AUC-ROC) and Youden index.ResultsWomen had more SAT (203±114 vs 128±74 cm2) and less VAT than men (63±48 vs 117±72 cm2, p<0.001). Optimal WC for prediction of IR in men and women were: 91 cm (AUC-ROC: 0.80±0.03 (mean±SE)) and 96 cm (AUC-ROC: 0.81±0.08), respectively. Regression analyses revealed a significant sex–VAT interaction (p<0.001). Therefore, for every unit increase in VAT, women had a 0.94 higher unit increase in SAT and 0.07 higher unit increase in WC than men.ConclusionWorking with a group of African-born black people living in America, we accessed technology, which validated observations made in Africa. Higher SAT at every level of VAT explained why the WC that predicted IR was higher in women (96 cm) than men (91 cm). For Africans to benefit from WC measurements, convening a panel of experts to develop evidence-based African-centred WC guidelines may be the way forward.

The conduct of regular elections at pre-determined time is a hallmark of liberal democracy. Most African countries now conduct regular elections. However, it is generally agreed that liberal democracy is not measured only by the conduct of elections but by a consistent commitment to certain democratic and constitutional ethos. The practice of liberal democracy is a commitment to the rule of law, free, fair and credible elections, transparency and good governance among others. In Africa today, it is generally agreed that despite majority of the countries achieving democracies, bad governance, lack of development, inequalities, exacerbation of internal conflicts, and human suffering are pervasive. Scholars have argued that African countries have generally not enjoyed complete freedom despite the periodic conduct of seeming elections in many African countries. The practice of democracy in Africa has been characterized by hooliganism, banditry and citizen frustrations, leading some commentators and scholars to question the suitability of liberal democratic norms within the African space, while some other scholars advance arguments for the justification of hybrid regimes as a variant of democracy suited for the African space. This research therefore seeks to interrogate the factors exacerbating hybrid regimes in Africa, examines the suitability or otherwise of hybrid governments in Africa, the implications of hybrid regimes for constitutional development, inclusive development and further seek the reconciliation of formal democratic practices with substantive democratic practices in Africa. Enquires will be made on how democratic institutions can synergize with democratic government to deliver the dividends of democracy to the people, how democracy can impact the people and how democracy can deliver good governance and create commonwealth for the citizenry. This paper acknowledges the difficulties of seeking a uniform constitutional template that promotes liberal democracies across African states. However, this paper suggests basic constitutional democratic baseline that has the potential of meeting the fundamental aspirations of the African people.

Social security is a corner stone for the socio-economic and even political development of many countries in the world today. Developed countries like Germany, Britain and many western countries have developed and made use of theories propounded by founders of the concept of social security like Otto von Bismarck and Lord Beveridge to develop their societies. But the unfortunate thing is that all along their stay in Africa, these colonial powers did not border to institute and impregnate Africans with the concept, thus, living Africans completely ignorant of the concept of social security. Studies have proven that the application of this concept in Africa, especially south of the Sahara is still a nightmare. Africans are unable to put into place a veritable social security scheme, yet most of them aspire to emerge by 2035. With the example of Cameroon, the causes of this failure are attributed to the colonial masters and poor governance in post-colonial Africa. As a remedy to this situation, results of this research demand that African governments must show prove of good governance and elaborate an inclusive social protection scheme. Besides, specialize United Nations agencies like the International Labour organization (ILO) and the Human Rights Commission must stand by these countries with their technical knowhow to help develop a meaningful social protection scheme in Africa. As an alert to those countries warming up for emergence, it is an illusion if the welfare of these people is not put at the center of every development action.

Masai Mara, a large nature reserve in south-western Kenya, was created in the midst of semi-arid agropastoralist rangelands to protect wildlife. Wildlife and indigenous people co-existed for many years, usually with limited conflict; but in recent years, the conflict has intensified, mainly due to increasing human population, changing land use patterns, and altered perceptions of wildlife. This study examines the causes and nature of wildlife-human conflict in the Masai rangelands of Kenya, and considers how wildlife conservation and human development needs can best be integrated.
Findings indicate that common conflicts are livestock depredation and crop damage, human deaths or injuries, transmission of diseases, and competition for resources. Land surrounding the reserve can be divided into two distinct topographic and agroclimatic regions. The degree of conflict is spatially varied within the region. Upland ranches have high land use potential, high human and livestock population densities, and more development of agriculture. They experience limited conflict with wildlife. Lowland ranches are more arid, have lower human population density and little agriculture, but have high wildlife and livestock population densities and experience a high degree of conflict. These conflicts vary seasonally, and with distance from the protected area.
Perceptions of wildlife and attitudes towards conservation are related to past experience with wildlife. The degree of loss, effectiveness of damage control, fairness of government compensation, and involvement in wildlife tourism affect the degree of tolerance for wildlife conflict. Various socio-economic factors including level of education, knowledge of conservation priorities, and system of land ownership are related to attitudes towards wildlife. As human activity increases in the region, wildlife is more likely to be displaced. Because most animals are migratory, conflict in the land surrounding the reserve puts the viability of animal population in the protected area in question.
A two-phase program for integrating wildlife conservation with human needs is proposed. The first phase involves designation of the region into four zones: Zone A--the protected area, Zone B--the peripheral area, Zone C--multiple use, and Zone D--agriculture. The second phase of the program is the integration of the wildlife conservation with human interests through: community wildlife-damage-control, compensation for loss, sharing of tourism benefits with local people, conservation education, and local participation in wildlife conservation policy. The program provides a framework within which operational decisions can be made, and serves broader natural resource management and community development objectives in the rangelands.

This chapter considers the New Afrikan Independence Movement beyond the PG-RNA. It highlights some of the organizations and parties that struggled for New Afrikan independence alongside the Obadele-led formation. Groups such as the New Afrikan People’s Organization shared varying, though similar, interpretations of what New Afrikans could achieve. These included helping to build the reparations movement in America. New Afrikans’ unique approach connected the reparations claim to questions about the Fourteenth Amendment and how the federal government applied it to people of African descent. Another distinction was the PG-RNA’s interpretation of UN language about national self-determination for historically oppressed groups. From its foundations in the RNA Declaration of Independence, the New Afrikan reparations claim eventually made its way into the formation of the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America in 1989. Therefore, this chapter shows how New Afrikan politics have informed certain aspects of the broader black political agenda into the twenty-first century.

Solving Africa’s central concerns of the mid-twenty-first century—how to grow economically as its population surges and how to create more and more jobs for its burgeoning labor force—relies on China. Likewise, enabling Africa to improve its human security and human welfare in most of its component nations depends on China. Third, strengthening Africa’s infrastructural architecture depends mostly on China. Without steady domestic Chinese economic growth and the behemoth’s consequent continued need for primary resources derived from Africa, however, prospects for many of the latter continent’s nation-states are, at best, problematic. Chinese demand drives African prosperity, raises world prices for primary products, and has made it possible for a number of the polities of Africa to accumulate wealth, to uplift their peoples, and to begin to play larger roles on the world’s stage. In this decade, and later, Africa and China are bound together synergistically in ways that cannot readily be replaced by trade, aid, or attention from the United States, India, Russia, Brazil, or Europe.

South Africa is a multi-lingual country with a population of about 40.5 million people. South Africa has more official languages at a national level than any other country in the world. Over and above English and Afrikaans, the eleven official languages include the indigenous languages: Southern Sotho, Northern Sotho, Tswana, Zulu, Xhosa, Swati, Ndebele, Tsonga, and Venda (Pretorius & Bosch, 2003). Figure 1 depicts the breakdown of the South African official languages as mother tongues for South African citizens. Although English ranks fifth (9%) as a mother tongue, there is a tendency among national leaders, politicians, business people, and officials to use English more frequently than any of the other languages. In a national survey on language use and language interaction conducted by the Pan South African Language Board (Language Use and Board Interaction in South Africa, 2000), only 22% of the respondents indicated that they fully understand speeches and statements made in English, while 19% indicated that they seldom understand information conveyed in English. The rate of electrification in South African is 66.1%. The total number of people with access to electricity is 28.3 million, and the total number of people without access to electricity is 14.5 million (International Energy Agency, 2002). Although the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” is narrowing, a significant portion of the South African population is still without the basic amenities of life. This unique environment sets the tone for a creative research agenda for HCI researchers and practitioners in South Africa.

Chapter two places European intervention in its historical context, as current political decisions are taken by leaders situated within colonial history. It analyses the first two waves of intervention by European actors. Motivated by security and greed, European states colonized and enslaved African people and exploited resources. The second wave took place after decolonization, and the move of African states to independence. Britain and France, operating in the wider context of the Cold War, had different motives. The United Kingdom made sure its former colonies did not turn to communism, and then it withdrew from Africa. France remained active in African states for motives of security and economic benefit, and to gain or retain prestige with Africa, the United States and the international community.

Following the disappointing outcomes of the implementation of Western liberal democracy and decentralization, some observers have argued that the reason for these failures was because African countries have not yet developed the necessary culture for a successful democracy and democratic institutions. But are democracy and decentralization strange to Africa? The purpose of this chapter is to show that democracy and decentralization are not alien to Africa. Using the Yoruba culture of West Africa as a case study, and Afrocentricity as the theoretical framework, the chapter brings to the fore the principles of African cultural democracy that guarantee responsiveness and representativeness as well as ensure welfare improvement among these indigenous people. Suggestions are made on how these cultural democratic principles can be incorporated into formal governance to achieve more responsive governments in Africa.

Most of the African research participants in northern New Jersey and the Washington DC metropolitan area told stories of deliberate humiliation or diminishment in which their place of origin or Blackness was used against them. Through these interactions and stories about these interactions, African care workers were becoming familiar with American racial categories, in which they were Black, mixed in with stereotypes about Africans as non-human and about immigrants stealing jobs from citizens. These insults incorporated them into American racial categories as “Blacks” and “people of color,” social categories of person that made little sense in their home countries. As a result, African care workers were becoming more sensitive to the experiences of African-Americans. Care workers take stories of racism to be paradigmatic of their experiences in the United States.

Chapter 2 examines Cuban responses to Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, focusing on Communists and people of African descent. Distinctions between the two groups as well as their overlap introduce the diversity of Cuban antifascism. The chapter analyses the impact of shifting Comintern policy, asserting that the Cuban Communist Party’s response to the Ethiopian invasion was a barometer of change. It explores antifascism in the African diaspora, Cuban participation in this transnational network, and attempts by Cubans of color to reconcile the diaspora with their Cuban nationalism in the context of antifascist struggle. It concludes with a look at how black Cubans made a gradual and troubled transition from supporting the Ethiopian cause to supporting the Spanish Republican cause.

The fifth chapter, on products, deals with the global urban literatures around infrastructure, including both physical infrastructure and the economic understanding of infrastructural interconnections of the global urban system. While physical infrastructure dominates in Chinese investments in the global South, southern urban theory has turned attention to people-as-infrastructure. Books and articles about infrastructure in the global South for a decade or more have argued for seeing infrastructure as vital, lively, or alive, including human and nonhuman agency, and this chapter seeks to connect with this trend. It concentrates on trade and foreign direct investment from China in Africa, with a detailed case study of Zanzibar. It then examines the experiences and socio-material infrastructures of African traders in Guangzhou and the PRD.

Aim/Purpose: [This Proceedings paper was revised and published in the 2018 issue of the Interdisciplinary Journal of e-Skills and Lifelong Learning, Volume 14] The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of awareness, perceived benefits, types of data collected and perceived control on the privacy concerns of digital natives living in what is considered the smart city of Cape Town, South Africa. Background: Smart city projects have been known to bring benefits such as sustainable economic development to cities. However one may wonder what and how certain factors influence the privacy concerns that come along with the implementation of smart cities particularly in the African context. In a time when information can be easily transferred, accessed and even shared, it is no surprise that people may have inclinations to be very protective of their personal information. Methodology: The study is quantitative in nature. Data has been collected using an online survey and analysed statistically. Contribution: This study contributes to scientific literature by detailing the impact of specific factors on the privacy concerns of citizens living in an African city Findings: The findings reveal that the more impersonal data is collected by the Smart City of Cape Town, the lower the privacy concerns of the digital natives. The findings also show that higher the need of the digital natives to be aware of the security measure put in place by the city, the higher their privacy concerns Recommendations for Practitioners: Practitioners (i.e. policy makers) should ensure that it is a legal requirement to have security measures in place to protect the privacy of the citizens while col-lecting data within the smart city of Cape Town. These regulations should be made public to appease any apprehensions from its citizens towards smart city implementations. Less personal data should also be collected on the citizens. Recommendation for Researchers: Researchers should further investigate issues related to privacy concerns in the context of African developing countries as they have unique cultural and philosophical perspectives that might influence how people perceive privacy. Impact on Society: Cities are becoming “smarter” and in developing world context like Africa, privacy issues might not have as a strong influence as is the case in the developing world. Future Research: Further qualitative studies should be conducted to better understand issues related to perceived benefits, perceived control, awareness of how data is collected and level of privacy concerns of digital natives in developing countries.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.