Academic literature on the topic 'Majority Rule'
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Journal articles on the topic "Majority Rule"
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Novak, Stéphanie. "Majority Rule." Philosophy Compass 9, no. 10 (October 2014): 681–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12164.
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Balinski, Michel, and Rida Laraki. "Majority judgment vs. majority rule." Social Choice and Welfare 54, no. 2-3 (July 2, 2019): 429–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x.
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Berend, Daniel, Yuri Chernyavsky, and Luba Sapir. "Ranking of Weighted Majority Rules." Journal of Applied Probability 45, no. 4 (December 2008): 994–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1239/jap/1231340229.
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A decision-making body may utilize a wide variety of different strategies when required to make a collective decision. In principle, we would like to use the most effective decision rule, that is, the rule yielding the highest probability of making the correct decision. However, in reality we often have to choose a decision rule out of some restricted family of rules. Therefore, it is important to be able to rank various families of rules. In this paper we consider three classes of decision rules: (i) balanced expert rules, (ii) the so-called single expert rules, and (iii) restricted majority rules. For the first two classes, we show that, as we deviate from the best rule in the family, the effectiveness of the decision rule decreases. For the last class, we obtain a very different phenomenon: any inner ranking is possible.
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Berend, Daniel, Yuri Chernyavsky, and Luba Sapir. "Ranking of Weighted Majority Rules." Journal of Applied Probability 45, no. 04 (December 2008): 994–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021900200004939.
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A decision-making body may utilize a wide variety of different strategies when required to make a collective decision. In principle, we would like to use the most effective decision rule, that is, the rule yielding the highest probability of making the correct decision. However, in reality we often have to choose a decision rule out of some restricted family of rules. Therefore, it is important to be able to rank various families of rules. In this paper we consider three classes of decision rules: (i) balanced expert rules, (ii) the so-called single expert rules, and (iii) restricted majority rules. For the first two classes, we show that, as we deviate from the best rule in the family, the effectiveness of the decision rule decreases. For the last class, we obtain a very different phenomenon: any inner ranking is possible.
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Cotton, James A., and Mark Wilkinson. "Majority-Rule Supertrees." Systematic Biology 56, no. 3 (June 1, 2007): 445–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10635150701416682.
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Mueller, Dennis C. "Probabilistic Majority Rule." Kyklos 42, no. 2 (August 1989): 151–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1989.tb00185.x.
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Martin, Mark O. "Microbiology: Majority rule." Nature 507, no. 7493 (March 2014): 428–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/507428a.
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Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 4 (November 1, 2015): 339–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140038.
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We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is costly and values, costs, and electorate sizes are all random. Unlike previous work, where the electorate size was either fixed or Poisson distributed, and exhibited no limiting dispersion, we allow for general distributions that permit substantial dispersion. We identify conditions on these distributions guaranteeing that a large election under majority rule produces the utilitarian choice with probability one. Absent these conditions, nonutilitarian outcomes are possible, as we demonstrate. We also show that majority rule is the only voting rule with the utilitarian property—strict supermajority rules are not utilitarian. (JEL D71, D72)
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Sharkey, Michael J., and Jason W. Leathers. "Majority Does Not Rule: The Trouble with Majority-Rule Consensus Trees." Cladistics 17, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 282–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1096-0031.2001.tb00124.x.
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Sharkey, M. "Majority Does Not Rule: The Trouble with Majority-Rule Consensus Trees." Cladistics 17, no. 3 (September 2001): 282–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/clad.2001.0174.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Majority Rule"
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Lewis, Daniel C. "Majority rule direct democracy and minority rights /." Diss., Connect to online resource - MSU authorized users, 2008.
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Raddatz, Adrian. "The double majority rule : estimating the impact of a supermajoritarian rule in pre-Confederation Canada." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/63262.
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This thesis uses a counterfactual simulation to estimate the impact that applying the double majority rule would have had on legislative productivity in the Province of Canada, 1840-1867. The double majority rule was supermajoritarian in nature, and if applied would have required two sectional majorities from the administrative regions within the province to pass legislation. The thesis compares a constructed dataset where votes could only pass with a double majority to the observed data, arguing that applying the double majority rule would have reduced legislative productivity. There is weak statistical evidence found supporting gridlock interval size as the causal explanation for the decreased productivity, but this is argued to be due to abnormal status quo points and the potential for voting patterns to collapse from two ideological dimensions to one. Finally, the introduction of responsible government is found to not influence whether votes were passed with a double majority. This is explained through the partisan capacity hypothesis, which argues that supermajoritarian rules are ignored when they would prevent a government from implementing its legislative agenda. These conclusions argue that the historical literature was correct that applying the double majority rule would have reduced productivity, but wrong about the impact of responsible government on passing votes with double majorities.Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
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Berndt, Rasmussen Katharina. "Democracy and the Common Good : A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-92851.
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In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.
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Oja, E. (Erik). "The United States foreign political interests regarding majority rule in Rhodesia in 1976." Bachelor's thesis, University of Oulu, 2016. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201605241875.
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Rahmani, Ataollah. "Majority rule and minority shareholder protection in joint stock companies in England and Iran." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2007. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1848/.
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Principally, joint stock companies are governed by the principle of majority rule, which means that while they are formed and continue to work through participation of every shareholder, only those who hold a majority of voting shares can make decisions in companies. The principle relies on contract and is often supported by company law. In the main, it is advantageous to companies, the Judiciary and the economy. It facilitates collective action, allows management to focus on the daily running of the company business and encourages corporate financing, which is decisively important for corporations. It also saves, by curbing minority actions, the courts’ time and the public budget. In one sense, however, it can also be dangerous to the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Using the majority rule, majority shareholders may fix for themselves private benefits or adopt policies which are poor and consequently harmful to companies. Such danger could discourage likely investors from investing their capital in companies and might undermine one of the main purposes of the corporation as an institution introduced by law and business practice to solve problems encountered in raising substantial amounts of capital. This research seeks to study in the light of English and Iranian company laws difficulties deriving from application of the majority rule for minority shareholders and possible ways and mechanisms which can be used to sensibly curb the occurrence of such difficulties. To this objective, it identifies four factors which can explain how and why the rule is liable to abuse by majority shareholders and examines the mechanisms provided by company laws of England and Iran which attempt to strike a balance between the rule of majority and interests of minority shareholders.
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Erasmus, Annalise. "Striking a balance between majority rule and minority protection - a constitutional analysis of the South African democracy." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/46120.
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Dasan, Sathish Kumar. "From Soweto to freedom : an analysis of the capacity of South Africa to accept majority rule post-apartheid /." Title page, contents and introduction only, 1991. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09ard229.pdf.
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Kim, Semin. "Essays on Mechanism Design and Positive Political Theory: Voting Rules and Behavior." The Ohio State University, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1395839366.
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Oja, E. (Erik). "Realpolitik and human rights:the United States’ foreign political interest and diplomacy regarding Rhodesia’s transition to majority rule 1969–1979." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2017. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201706012325.
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The United States began pursuing a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia in 1976 by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger had noted the situation in Rhodesia already in 1969 but chose to pursue majority rule in order to de-escalate the armed conflict in Rhodesia and to avoid a Cold War confrontation in the region similar to the Angolan civil war. Kissinger closely cooperated with the British and started a diplomatic process which aimed to bring majority rule to the country. Kissinger’s biggest accomplishment regarding the Rhodesian quest for majority rule came in September 1979 when Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith publicly embraced majority rule for the first time. A conference in Geneva was set up that fall led by the British but it was unsuccesful and did not lead to a transition. Jimmy Carter won the United States Presidential elections of 1976 and was inaugurated in 1977 marking an end to Kissinger’s role in US foreign policy. The Carter administration continued to pursue majority rule in Rhodesia and continued where Kissinger had left off. However the Carter administration had an emphasis on human rights which lead to the new administration working more closely with the Zimbabwean nationalists and neighboring Presidents compared to Kissinger who had closely cooperated with South Africa. The Carter administration also continued to closely work together with the British and tried to keep the momentum alive achieved by Kissinger in 1976. The Carter administration met with several setbacks and did not reach major breakthroughs regarding Rhodesia. The Smith regime of Rhodesia agreed to an internal settlement with some of the Zimbabwean nationalists which lead to the forming of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian state in 1979. Although the new administration was not internationally recognized, it was a majority ruled country chosen by a general election that did not meet international criteria. At this point several domestic factors in the US combined with the newly appointed British Government led to the US pulling back from actively taking part to finding a solution to the conflict. Finally in 1980 after months of negotiating between the British, the Smith regime and the African nationalists of Rhodesia a general election was held and the new majority ruled state of Zimbabwe was foundedYhdysvallat pyrki edesauttamaan Rhodesian siirtymistä enemmistövaltaan ensimmäistä kertaa vuonna 1976 silloisen ulkoministeri Henry Kissingerin toimesta. Yhdysvaltojen johtohahmot olivat huomioineet enemmistövaltaan siirtymisen vaikutukset Rhodesiassa jo vuonna 1969 mutta eivät nähneet syytä toimia asian suhteen. Seitsemän vuotta myöhemmin pääasiassa geopoliittiset syyt ja kylmänsodan eskaloitumisen pelko ajoivat Kissingerin aktiivisesti kampanjoimaan enemmistövaltaan siirtymisen puolesta etsien diplomaattista ratkaisua aseelliseen konfliktiin. Kissinger toimi vahvasti yhteistyössä Iso-Britannian kanssa kaikissa Rhodesiaan liittyvissä toimissa, sillä virallisesti alue oli yhä Iso-Britannian siirtomaa. Vuoden 1976 diplomatia johti rhodesian pääministeri Ian Smithin puheeseen syyskuussa, jossa Smith ensimmäistä kertaa julkisesti tunnusti enemmistövaltaan siirtymisen välttämättömäksi. Neuvottelut johtivat Iso-Britannian isännöimään konferenssiin, johon osallistuivat kaikki Rhodesian konfliktin osapuolet. Konferenssi ei onnistunut löytämään ratkaisuja keskeisiin kysymyksiin ja päättyi tuloksettomana vuoden lopussa. Kissinger väistyi ulkopolitiikasta presidentti Carterin voitettua Fordin syksyn 1976 vaaleissa ja astuessa virkaan 1970 helmikuussa. Carterin hallinto jatkoi pitkältä edeltäjiensä viitoittamalla tiellä pyrkiessään saavuttamaan enemmistövallan Rhodesiaan. Vaikka Carterin hallinto piti kylmänsodan eskaloitumista yhä vaarana, se samaan aikaan painotti ihmisoikeuksia joka näkyi erilaisena lähestimystapana Rhodesiaan liittyvässä diplomatiassa verrattuna Kissingeriin. Siinä missä Kissinger oli pääasiassa koordinoinut Etelä-Afrikan ja Rhodesian naapurivaltojen kanssa, Carterin hallinto oli laajemmin suoraan yhteydessä zimbabwelaisiin nationalisteihin. Carterin hallinto oli Etelä-Afrikan apartheidin vastustaja joka osaltaan heikensi maiden välejä myös Rhodesiaan liittyvissä kysymyksissä. Carterin hallinto koordinoi erittäin tiiviisti Iso-Britannian kanssa yrittäessään saavuttaa enemmistövaltaan siirtyminen Rhodesiassa niin pian kuin mahdollista. Kovasta yrityksestä huolimatta anglo-amerikkalainen yhteistyö kohtasi useita vastoinkäymisiä niin sisäpoliittisesti, kuin ulkopoliittisesti. Vuosien 1977 ja 1978 aikana järjestettiin useita pienempiä neuvotteluita Rhodesian tilanteeseen liittyen mutta suurempi kaikkien osapuolien välinen siirtymään pohjaava konferenssi jäi toteutumatta. Samanaikaisesti Rhodesian pääministeri Ian Smith pyrki saavuttamaan niin kutsutun sisäisen ratkaisun maltillisten nationalistien kesken, jossa siirtymävaihe ja sen hallinto sovittaisiin ilman ulkovaltoja tai aseelliseen konfliktiin osallistuvia nationalisteja. Vuonna 1979 sisäisen ratkaisun pohjalta Rhodesia muutti nimensä Zimbabwe-Rhodesiaksi ja järjesti vaalit, joissa maalle valittiin enemmistövaltainen hallitus. Kansainvälinen yhteisö ei kuitenkaan tunnustanut tätä valtiota ja maata vastaan asetetut taloudelliset pakotteet pysyivät voimassa. Yhdysvaltojen aktiivinen osallistuminen Rhodesiaan liittyen päättyi vuoteen 1979 ja Iso-Britannian uusi hallitus jatkoi neuvotteluja Yhdysvaltojen tuella mutta ilman sen aktiivista osallistumista prosessiin. Lopulta neuvottelut johtivat avoimiin äänestyksiin ja vuonna 1980 kansainvälisesti tunnustettu ja enemmistövaltainen Zimbabwen valtio perustettiin
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Karkotis, Alexis. "'Now we live together' : village formation amongst the Ngöbe and how "Majority rule is still an alien concept to most Guaymi"." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.573435.
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My thesis is an exploration into the social dynamics of village formation amongst the Ngobe, a process which begun in the 1970's. This represents a dramatic change from their 400 year old settlement pattern, whereby kin groups as the ultimate locus of power within the society, lived in autonomous hamlets dispersed across , The rugged tropical terrain. Focusing on one particular community called Bisira I show how its locals, as residents in a concentrated community, while retaining their kin group membership, establish relationships of friendship amongst themselves based on trust, generosity, fecundity and respect and transgress kinship boundaries. I argue that the Ngobe have been forming communities whose internal 'configuration' reflects and replicates their stateless society, without thus becoming loci where power has the potential to accumulate in the hands of a few. The ethnography presented in this thesis explores a number of interrelated issues that can help us understand social change in Ngobe society. In the thesis I investigate (a) how the Ngobe in recent years have successfully organized to fend off the state in its attempts to develop open-pit mining and hydro-electric damming in their land. I address how the Ngobe leaders negotiate amongst themselves and between the state arguing that the fabric of their stateless society, while under severe threat by the state, still remains acephalous, multi-centered and non-hierarchical; (b) A successful Malaria Project which was implemented by PAHO in 2006 as prime example of the 'generative culture' of the Ngobe on the community level since through collective and voluntary work Bisira went from having one of the highest cases of Malaria in the country to none within two years after its implementation; (c) How informal ritualistic boxing Jamete solidifies relationships and forms brothers out of others. I also address (d) the importance of working at the plantations (as an experience of discrimination) had in enhancing solidarity, and the influence that the Mama Chi millenarian, reformist, nativistic movement -which appeared in the 1960's-had in bringing the women (within one generation) to have the same public rights as the men, while concurrently establishing the idea of a Pan-Nqobe-sister-brotherhood: and (e) the effects of schooling, party politics, and Christianity on the local culture and how aspects of modernity are consumed, rejected, desired or ignored by the locals. Several narratives are presented whereby the Ngobe voice, formally or informally, their views from family affairs to community formation. These narratives are in turn complemented by an anthropological analysis of the context at hand, and interpretations of particular events which make that context meaningful. Concurrently the thesis highlights the 'mundane' and subtle aspects of daily living: body postures, gestures, breathing, reflecting, tone of voice, the tone of silence, the unwritten laws about laws, the insignificant, or as Malinowski puts it, 'the manner of taking food and preparing it: the tone of conversational and social life around the village fires."
Books on the topic "Majority Rule"
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Minority government and majority rule. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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Carrera, C. Investment decisions under majority rule. [Colchester]: University of Essex, Dept.of Economics, 1985.
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Emerson, Peter. From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4.
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Burns, James MacGregor. Cobblestone leadership: Majority rule, minority power. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990.
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John, Craven. Extended majority rule and acyclic social preferences. Canterbury: University of Kent atCanterbury, 1988.
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Herbert, Döring, ed. Parliaments and majority rule in western Europe. Frankfurt: Campus, 1995.
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Akaniro, Ebere Gregory. Majority rule and minority protection in company law. Ikeja, Nigeria: Elcoon Press, 1997.
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Epple, Dennis N. The Tiebout hypothesis and majority rule: An empirical analysis. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
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Thoughts on democracy: Enquiry concerning majority rule versus individual freedom. Kolkata: Firma KLM, 2010.
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Minority rights, majority rule: Partisanship and the development of Congress. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Majority Rule"
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Malyshev, Vitaly. "Optimal Majority Rule Versus Simple Majority Rule." In Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies, 382–95. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66412-1_24.
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de Almeida, Adiel Teixeira, Danielle Costa Morais, and Hannu Nurmi. "The Majority Rule." In Systems, Procedures and Voting Rules in Context, 13–20. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30955-8_3.
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Jain, Satish Kumar. "The Strict Majority Rule." In Domain Conditions and Social Rationality, 53–67. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_4.
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Dong, Jianrong, David Fernández-Baca, and F. R. McMorris. "Constructing Majority-Rule Supertrees." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 73–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04241-6_7.
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Nurmi, Hannu. "Majority Rule and Stability." In Handbook of Global Political Policy, 13–27. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429272004-2.
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Mustafa, Nabil H., and Aleksandar Pekeč. "Majority Consensus and the Local Majority Rule." In Automata, Languages and Programming, 530–42. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48224-5_44.
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Bronselaer, Antoon, Guy De Tré, and Daan Van Britsom. "Multiset Merging: The Majority Rule." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 279–92. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24001-0_26.
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Jordan, James S. "Majority rule with dollar voting." In Markets, Games, and Organizations, 211–20. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_13.
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Emerson, Peter. "Majority Rule in the West." In From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics, 31–46. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4_3.
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Emerson, Peter. "The Myths of Majority Rule." In Defining Democracy, 3–24. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20904-8_1.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Majority Rule"
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Benouaret, Karim, and Kian-Lee Tan. "Probabilistic Majority Rule-Based Group Recommendation." In 2023 IEEE 39th International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE). IEEE, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icde55515.2023.00118.
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Corrales, Sancho, Edwin Armas, Martin King, Joshua Moorehead, Omar Mourad, and Salem Othman. "MMR: Multiple Majority Rule Model with Bias." In 11th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010475802070214.
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Corrales, Sancho, Edwin Armas, Martin King, Joshua Moorehead, Omar Mourad, and Salem Othman. "MMR: Multiple Majority Rule Model with Bias." In 11th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010475800002995.
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Xu, Lei, Lin Chen, Martin Flores, Hansheng Lei, Liyu Zhang, Mahmoud K. Quweider, Fitratullah Khan, and Weidong Shi. "The Majority Rule: A General Protection on Recommender System." In ASIA CCS '20: The 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3385003.3410923.
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Mukhopadhyay, Arpan, Ravi R. Mazumdar, and Rahul Roy. "Majority Rule Based Opinion Dynamics with Biased and Stubborn Agents." In SIGMETRICS '16: SIGMETRICS/PERFORMANCE Joint International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2896377.2901488.
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Srisomboon, Kanabadee, Yutthna Sroulsrun, and Wilaiporn Lee. "Adaptive Majority Rule in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing for Ad hoc Network." In 2020 8th International Electrical Engineering Congress (iEECON). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ieecon48109.2020.229583.
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Haret, Adrian, Hossein Khani, Stefano Moretti, and Meltem Öztürk. "Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/42.
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We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.
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Ohashi, Nozomu, Yuki Funabora, Shinji Doki, and kae Doki. "Majority Rule Sensor Fusion System with Particle Filter for Robust Robot Localization." In 2018 IEEE/ASME International Conference on Advanced Intelligent Mechatronics (AIM). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/aim.2018.8452415.
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Fernandes, Rigel, José Antonio Apolinário Jr., António Ramos, and José de Seixas. "Applying the majority voting rule in acoustic detection and classification of drones." In XXXIX Simpósio Brasileiro de Telecomunicações e Processamento de Sinais. Sociedade Brasileira de Telecomunicações, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14209/sbrt.2021.1570726624.
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Fernandes, Rigel, José Antonio Apolinário Jr., António Ramos, and José de Seixas. "Applying the majority voting rule in acoustic detection and classification of drones." In XXXIX Simpósio Brasileiro de Telecomunicações e Processamento de Sinais. Sociedade Brasileira de Telecomunicações, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.14209/sbrt.2021.1570726624.
Full textReports on the topic "Majority Rule"
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Epple, Dennis, Thomas Romer, and Holger Sieg. The Tiebout Hypothesis and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6977.
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Bouton, Laurent, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, and Frédéric Malherbe. Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20417.
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Michel, Bob, and Tatiana Falcão. Taxing Profits from International Maritime Shipping in Africa: Past, Present and Future of UN Model Article 8 (Alternative B). Institute of Development Studies (IDS), November 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2021.023.
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International maritime shipping is an essential part of global business. Since the establishment of the current international tax regime in the 1920s, there has been a consensus that profits generated by this business are taxable only in the residence state –the state where the shipowners are located. Source states – the port states where business physically takes place – are generally expected to exempt income from international shipping. This standard is currently reflected in Article 8 of the OECD Model and Article 8 (Alternative A) of the UN Model, and is incorporated in the vast majority of bilateral tax treaties currently in force. Exclusive residence state taxation of shipping profits is problematic when the size of mercantile fleets and shipping flows between two states are of unequal size. This is often the case in relations between a developed and developing country. The latter often lack a substantial domestic mercantile fleet, but serve as an important revenue-generating port state for the fleet of the developed country. To come to a more balanced allocation of taxing rights in such a case, a source taxation alternative has been inserted in UN Model Article 8 (Alternative B). From its inception, Article 8B has been labelled impractical due to the lack of guidance on core issues, like sourcing rules and profit allocation. This gap is said to explain the low adoption rate of Article 8B in global tax treaty practice. In reality, tax treaty practice regarding Article 8B is heavily concentrated and flourishing in a handful of countries in South/South-East Asia – Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. All these countries subject non-resident shipping income to tax in their domestic income tax laws. Except for India, all countries are able to exercise these domestic tax law rules in relation to shipping enterprises located in the biggest shipowner states, either because they have a treaty in place that provides for source taxation or because there is no treaty at all and thus no restriction of domestic law. None of the relevant tax treaties contain a provision that incorporates the exact wording of Article 8B of the UN Model. If other countries, like coastal countries in sub-Saharan Africa, are looking to implement source taxation of maritime shipping income in the future, they are advised to draw on the South/South-East Asian experience. Best practice can be distilled regarding sourcing rule, source tax limitation, profit attribution and method of taxation (on gross or net basis). In addition to technical guidance on tax, the South/South-East Asian experience also provides important general policy considerations countries should take into account when determining whether source taxation of maritime shipping profits is an appropriate target for their future tax treaty negotiations.
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Ruiz, Pablo, Craig Perry, Alejando Garcia, Magali Guichardot, Michael Foguer, Joseph Ingram, Michelle Prats, Carlos Pulido, Robert Shamblin, and Kevin Whelan. The Everglades National Park and Big Cypress National Preserve vegetation mapping project: Interim report—Northwest Coastal Everglades (Region 4), Everglades National Park (revised with costs). National Park Service, November 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.36967/nrr-2279586.
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The Everglades National Park and Big Cypress National Preserve vegetation mapping project is part of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP). It is a cooperative effort between the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the National Park Service’s (NPS) Vegetation Mapping Inventory Program (VMI). The goal of this project is to produce a spatially and thematically accurate vegetation map of Everglades National Park and Big Cypress National Preserve prior to the completion of restoration efforts associated with CERP. This spatial product will serve as a record of baseline vegetation conditions for the purpose of: (1) documenting changes to the spatial extent, pattern, and proportion of plant communities within these two federally-managed units as they respond to hydrologic modifications resulting from the implementation of the CERP; and (2) providing vegetation and land-cover information to NPS park managers and scientists for use in park management, resource management, research, and monitoring. This mapping project covers an area of approximately 7,400 square kilometers (1.84 million acres [ac]) and consists of seven mapping regions: four regions in Everglades National Park, Regions 1–4, and three in Big Cypress National Preserve, Regions 5–7. The report focuses on the mapping effort associated with the Northwest Coastal Everglades (NWCE), Region 4 , in Everglades National Park. The NWCE encompasses a total area of 1,278 square kilometers (493.7 square miles [sq mi], or 315,955 ac) and is geographically located to the south of Big Cypress National Preserve, west of Shark River Slough (Region 1), and north of the Southwest Coastal Everglades (Region 3). Photo-interpretation was performed by superimposing a 50 × 50-meter (164 × 164-feet [ft] or 0.25 hectare [0.61 ac]) grid cell vector matrix over stereoscopic, 30 centimeters (11.8 inches) spatial resolution, color-infrared aerial imagery on a digital photogrammetric workstation. Photo-interpreters identified the dominant community in each cell by applying majority-rule algorithms, recognizing community-specific spectral signatures, and referencing an extensive ground-truth database. The dominant vegetation community within each grid cell was classified using a hierarchical classification system developed specifically for this project. Additionally, photo-interpreters categorized the absolute cover of cattail (Typha sp.) and any invasive species detected as either: Sparse (10–49%), Dominant (50–89%), or Monotypic (90–100%). A total of 178 thematic classes were used to map the NWCE. The most common vegetation classes are Mixed Mangrove Forest-Mixed and Transitional Bayhead Shrubland. These two communities accounted for about 10%, each, of the mapping area. Other notable classes include Short Sawgrass Marsh-Dense (8.1% of the map area), Mixed Graminoid Freshwater Marsh (4.7% of the map area), and Black Mangrove Forest (4.5% of the map area). The NWCE vegetation map has a thematic class accuracy of 88.4% with a lower 90th Percentile Confidence Interval of 84.5%.
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Tokoro, Yasuhiro, and Virginia Leticia Valdivia Caballero. Working Paper PUEAA No. 9. The trade policy of the United States, and the current situation and a perspective of the CPTPP (TPP-11). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Programa Universitario de Estudios sobre Asia y África, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/pueaa.007r.2022.
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The CPTPP allows economies and countries in other regions to formally incorporate trade flows with the Asia-Pacific and Pacific Rim, as well as boost trade with countries in these regions. The TPP was signed by 12 countries in February 2016 and on December 9 of the same year the Japanese government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved the TPP by a majority in the House of Representatives. However, in January 2017, Trump, as the new President of the United States, officially declared the withdrawal of the United States from the TPP to fulfill one of his election promises. In the end, Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the TPP has done nothing but exclude the United States from strengthening its trade ties with the Pacific Rim, while establishing the new 21st century rules for multilateral trade. In this context, this paper focuses on the study of two axes: the process and strategy of U.S. trade policy, and the current situation and a perspective of the TPP 11.
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Araujo, María Caridad, Andrés Mejía Acosta, and Vicente Albornoz. The political economy of the budget process: The case of Ecuador. Inter-American Development Bank, November 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0009198.
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This study describes the main actors (formal and informal) involved in the budget-making process in Ecuador, and presents evidence regarding the main political and economic determinants of fiscal performance. It also discusses whether different political and institutional arrangements governing the budget process affect incentives for the composition of the budget. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature by analyzing the formal rules, incentives, and coalition dynamics of the relevant budget players behind the process of design, approval, execution, and oversight of budgets. The current research agenda requires a systematic analysis of the different arenas and stages in which budgets are made. The variable of interest is the quality of budget outcomes, a composite notion that seeks to evaluate four dimensions of budget performance: whether budgets allocations are representative of the interests of the majority, are sustainable over time, are efficiently allocated, and can be adaptable to changing economic circumstances. The paper tests the validity of the proposed analysis of budget dynamics in Ecuador, a country where major political and economic transformations of recent years, including the adoption of considerable constitutional reforms in 1998 and the move to dollarization in 2000 should have altered the representative, efficiency, flexibility, and sustainability of budget outcomes.
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Yusrina, Asri, Ulfah Alifia, Shintia Revina, Rezanti Putri Pramana, and Luhur Bima. Is the Game Worth the Candle? Examining the Effectiveness of Initial Teacher Education in Indonesia. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-wp_2022/106.
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An impactful teacher education programme equips teachers with knowledge and skills to improve their effectiveness. Empirical findings on the effectiveness of teacher preparation programmes show that the accountability of institutions and teachers should not only be based on the knowledge or skills produced but also on student learning. Our study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of a pre-service teacher education programme in Indonesia, known as Pendidikan Profesi Guru Prajabatan or PPG. PPG is a one-year full-time programme in addition to four years of undergraduate teacher education (Bachelor of Education). PPG graduate teachers pass a selection process and receive a teaching certificate upon completion of the programme. We use mixed methods to understand the differences in the outcome of PPG graduates majoring in primary school teacher education to their counterparts who did not attend PPG. To estimate the impact of PPG, we exploit the combination of rules and events in the selection process which allows us to estimate the impact of PPG on teacher performance using fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). Once we attest to the validity of the fuzzy RDD, we find that PPG has no impact on a teacher’s professional knowledge and student outcomes in numeracy and literacy. We argue that this is due to the ineffective selection mechanism in distinguishing the PPG and the comparison group. We conclude that as an initial teacher training programme, PPG did not improve teacher effectiveness. Despite incorporating best practices from effective teacher training into the programme design, PPG does not appear capable of producing a higher-quality teacher.
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Lewis, Dustin. Three Pathways to Secure Greater Respect for International Law concerning War Algorithms. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.54813/wwxn5790.
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Existing and emerging applications of artificial intelligence in armed conflicts and other systems reliant upon war algorithms and data span diverse areas. Natural persons may increasingly depend upon these technologies in decisions and activities related to killing combatants, destroying enemy installations, detaining adversaries, protecting civilians, undertaking missions at sea, conferring legal advice, and configuring logistics. In intergovernmental debates on autonomous weapons, a normative impasse appears to have emerged. Some countries assert that existing law suffices, while several others call for new rules. Meanwhile, the vast majority of efforts by States to address relevant systems focus by and large on weapons, means, and methods of warfare. Partly as a result, the broad spectrum of other far-reaching applications is rarely brought into view. One normatively grounded way to help identify and address relevant issues is to elaborate pathways that States, international organizations, non-state parties to armed conflict, and others may pursue to help secure greater respect for international law. In this commentary, I elaborate on three such pathways: forming and publicly expressing positions on key legal issues, taking measures relative to their own conduct, and taking steps relative to the behavior of others. None of these pathways is sufficient in itself, and there are no doubt many others that ought to be pursued. But each of the identified tracks is arguably necessary to ensure that international law is — or becomes — fit for purpose. By forming and publicly expressing positions on relevant legal issues, international actors may help clarify existing legal parameters, pinpoint salient enduring and emerging issues, and detect areas of convergence and divergence. Elaborating legal views may also help foster greater trust among current and potential adversaries. To be sure, in recent years, States have already fashioned hundreds of statements on autonomous weapons. Yet positions on other application areas are much more difficult to find. Further, forming and publicly expressing views on legal issues that span thematic and functional areas arguably may help States and others overcome the current normative stalemate on autonomous weapons. Doing so may also help identify — and allocate due attention and resources to — additional salient thematic and functional areas. Therefore, I raise a handful of cross-domain issues for consideration. These issues touch on things like exercising human agency, reposing legally mandated evaluative decisions in natural persons, and committing to engage only in scrutable conduct. International actors may also take measures relative to their own conduct. To help illustrate this pathway, I outline several such existing measures. In doing so, I invite readers to inventory and peruse these types of steps in order to assess whether the nature or character of increasingly complex socio-technical systems reliant upon war algorithms and data may warrant revitalized commitments or adjustments to existing measures — or, perhaps, development of new ones. I outline things like enacting legislation necessary to prosecute alleged perpetrators of grave breaches, making legal advisers available to the armed forces, and taking steps to prevent abuses of the emblem. Finally, international actors may take measures relative to the conduct of others. To help illustrate this pathway, I outline some of the existing steps that other States, international organizations, and non-state parties may take to help secure respect for the law by those undertaking the conduct. These measures may include things like addressing matters of legal compliance by exerting diplomatic pressure, resorting to penal sanctions to repress violations, conditioning or refusing arms transfers, and monitoring the fate of transferred detainees. Concerning military partnerships in particular, I highlight steps such as conditioning joint operations on a partner’s compliance with the law, planning operations jointly in order to prevent violations, and opting out of specific operations if there is an expectation that the operations would violate applicable law. Some themes and commitments cut across these three pathways. Arguably, respect for the law turns in no small part on whether natural persons can and will foresee, understand, administer, and trace the components, behaviors, and effects of relevant systems. It may be advisable, moreover, to institute ongoing cross-disciplinary education and training as well as the provision of sufficient technical facilities for all relevant actors, from commanders to legal advisers to prosecutors to judges. Further, it may be prudent to establish ongoing monitoring of others’ technical capabilities. Finally, it may be warranted for relevant international actors to pledge to engage, and to call upon others to engage, only in armed-conflict-related conduct that is sufficiently attributable, discernable, and scrutable.
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African Open Science Platform Part 1: Landscape Study. Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf), 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/assaf.2019/0047.
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This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.
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Monetary Policy Report - January 2023. Banco de la República, June 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/inf-pol-mont-eng.tr1-2023.
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1. Macroeconomic Summary In December, headline inflation (13.1%) and the average of the core inflation measures (10.3%) continued to trend upward, posting higher rates than those estimated by the Central Bank's technical staff and surpassing the market average. Inflation expectations for all terms exceeded the 3.0% target. In that month, every major group in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) registered higher-than-estimated increases, and the diffusion indicators continued to show generalized price hikes. Accumulated exchange rate pressures on prices, indexation to high inflation rates, and several food supply shocks would explain, in part, the acceleration in inflation. All of this is in a context of significant surplus demand, a tight labor market, and inflation expectations at different terms that exceed the 3.0% target. Compared to the October edition of the Monetary Policy Report, the forecast path for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items: EFR) increased (Graphs 1.1 and 1.2), reflecting heightened accumulated exchange rate pressures, price indexation to a higher inflation rate (CPI and the producer price index: PPI), and the rise in labor costs attributed to a larger-than-estimated adjustment in the minimum wage. Nevertheless, headline inflation is expected to begin to ease by early 2023, although from a higher level than had been estimated in October. This would be supported initially by the slowdown forecast for the food CPI due to a high base of comparison, the end anticipated for the shocks that have affected the prices of these products, and the estimated improvement in external and domestic supply in this sector. In turn, the deterioration in real household income because of high inflation and the end of the effects of pent-up demand, plus tighter external and domestic financial conditions would contribute to diluting surplus demand in 2023 and reducing inflation. By the end of 2023, both headline and core (EFR) inflation would reach 8.7% and would be 3.5% and 3.8%, respectively, by December 2024. These forecasts are subject to a great deal of uncertainty, especially concerning the future behavior of international financial conditions, the evolution of the exchange rate, the pace of adjustment in domestic demand, the extent of indexation of nominal contracts, and the decisions taken regarding the domestic price of fuel and electricity. In the third quarter, economic activity surprised again on the upside and the growth projection for 2022 rose to 8.0% (previously 7.9%). However, it declined to 0.2% for 2023 (previously 0.5%). With this, surplus demand continues to be significant and is still expected to weaken during the current year. Annual economic growth in the third quarter (7.1 % SCA)1 was higher than estimated in October (6.4 % SCA), given stronger domestic demand specifically because of higher-than-expected investment. Private consumption fell from the high level witnessed a quarter earlier and net exports registered a more negative contribution than anticipated. For the fourth quarter, economic activity indicators suggest that gross domestic product (GDP) would have remained high and at a level similar to that observed in the third quarter, with an annual variation of 4.1%. Domestic demand would have slowed in annual terms, although at levels that would have remained above those for output, mainly because of considerable private consumption. Investment would have declined slightly to a value like the average observed in 2019. The real trade deficit would have decreased due to a drop in imports that was more pronounced than the estimated decline in exports. On the forecast horizon, consumption is expected to decline from current elevated levels, partly because of tighter domestic financial conditions and a deterioration in real income due to high inflation. Investment would also weaken and return to levels below those seen before the pandemic. In real terms, the trade deficit would narrow due to a lower momentum projection for domestic demand and higher cumulative real depreciation. In sum, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would stand at 8.0%, 0.2% and 1.0%, respectively (Graph 1.3). Surplus demand remains high (as measured by the output gap) and is expected to decline in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024 (Graph 1.4). Although the macroeconomic forecast includes a marked slowdown in the economy, an even greater adjustment in domestic absorption cannot be ruled out due to the cumulative effects of tighter external and domestic financial conditions, among other reasons. These estimates continue to be subject to a high degree of uncertainty, which is associated with factors such as global political tensions, changes in international interest rates and their effects on external demand, global risk aversion, the effects of the approved tax reform, the possible impact of reforms announced for this year (pension, health, and labor reforms, among others), and future measures regarding hydrocarbon production. In 2022, the current account deficit would have been high (6.3 % of GDP), but it would be corrected significantly in 2023 (to 3.9 % of GDP) given the expected slowdown in domestic demand. Despite favorable terms of trade, the high external imbalance that would occur during 2022 would be largely due to domestic demand growth, cost pressures associated with high freight rates, higher external debt service payments, and good performance in terms of the profits of foreign companies.2 By 2023, the adjustment in domestic demand would be reflected in a smaller current account deficit especially due to fewer imports, a global moderation in prices and cost pressures, and a reduction in profits remitted abroad by companies with foreign direct investment (FDI) focused on the local market. Despite this anticipated correction in the external imbalance, its level as a percentage of GDP would remain high in the context of tight financial conditions. In the world's main economies, inflation forecasts and expectations point to a reduction by 2023, but at levels that still exceed their central banks' targets. The path anticipated for the Federal Reserve (Fed) interest rate increased and the forecast for global growth continues to be moderate. In the fourth quarter of 2022, logistics costs and international prices for some foods, oil and energy declined from elevated levels, bringing downward pressure to bear on global inflation. Meanwhile, the higher cost of financing, the loss of real income due to high levels of global inflation, and the persistence of the war in Ukraine, among other factors, have contributed to the reduction in global economic growth forecasts. In the United States, inflation turned out to be lower than estimated and the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced the growth forecast for 2023. Nevertheless, the actual level of inflation in that country, its forecasts, and expectations exceed the target. Also, the labor market remains tight, and fiscal policy is still expansionary. In this environment, the Fed raised the expected path for policy interest rates and, with this, the market average estimates higher levels for 2023 than those forecast in October. In the region's emerging economies, country risk premia declined during the quarter and the currencies of those countries appreciated against the US dollar. Considering all the above, for the current year, the Central Bank's technical staff increased the path estimated for the Fed's interest rate, reduced the forecast for growth in the country's external demand, lowered the expected path of oil prices, and kept the country’s risk premium assumption high, but at somewhat lower levels than those anticipated in the previous Monetary Policy Report. Moreover, accumulated inflationary pressures originating from the behavior of the exchange rate would continue to be important. External financial conditions facing the economy have improved recently and could be associated with a more favorable international context for the Colombian economy. So far this year, there has been a reduction in long-term bond interest rates in the markets of developed countries and an increase in the prices of risky assets, such as stocks. This would be associated with a faster-than-expected reduction in inflation in the United States and Europe, which would allow for a less restrictive course for monetary policy in those regions. In this context, the risks of a global recession have been reduced and the global appetite for risk has increased. Consequently, the risk premium continues to decline, the Colombian peso has appreciated significantly, and TES interest rates have decreased. Should this trend consolidate, exchange rate inflationary pressures could be less than what was incorporated into the macroeconomic forecast. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their impact on the country remains high, given the unpredictable course of the war in Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, local uncertainty, and the extensive financing needs of the Colombian government and the economy. High inflation with forecasts and expectations above 3.0%, coupled with surplus demand and a tight labor market are compatible with a contractionary stance on monetary policy that is conducive to the macroeconomic adjustment needed to mitigate the risk of de-anchoring inflation expectations and to ensure that inflation converges to the target. Compared to the forecasts in the October edition of the Monetary Policy Report, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed level of output exceeding the productive capacity of the economy. In this context of surplus demand, headline and core inflation continued to trend upward and posted surprising increases. Observed and expected international interest rates increased, the country’s risk premia lessened (but remains at high levels), and accumulated exchange rate pressures are still significant. The technical staff's inflation forecast for 2023 increased and inflation expectations remain well above 3.0%. All in all, the risk of inflation expectations becoming unanchored persists, which would accentuate the generalized indexation process and push inflation even further away from the target. This macroeconomic context requires consolidating a contractionary monetary policy stance that aims to meet the inflation target within the forecast horizon and bring the economy's output to levels closer to its potential. 1.2 Monetary Policy Decision At its meetings in December 2022 and January 2023, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) agreed to continue the process of normalizing monetary policy. In December, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to increase the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps) and in its January meeting by 75 bps, bringing it to 12.75% (Graph 1.5). 1/ Seasonally and calendar adjusted. 2/ In the current account aggregate, the pressures for a higher external deficit come from those companies with FDI that are focused on the domestic market. In contrast, profits in the mining and energy sectors are more than offset by the external revenue they generate through exports. Box 1 - Electricity Rates: Recent Developments and Indexation. Author: Édgar Caicedo García, Pablo Montealegre Moreno and Álex Fernando Pérez Libreros Box 2 - Indicators of Household Indebtedness. Author: Camilo Gómez y Juan Sebastián Mariño