Relevant bibliographies by topics / Majority Rule / Journal articles
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Majority Rule.

Journal articles on the topic 'Majority Rule'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 25 May 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Majority Rule.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Novak, Stéphanie. "Majority Rule." Philosophy Compass 9, no. 10 (October 2014): 681–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12164.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Balinski, Michel, and Rida Laraki. "Majority judgment vs. majority rule." Social Choice and Welfare 54, no. 2-3 (July 2, 2019): 429–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Berend, Daniel, Yuri Chernyavsky, and Luba Sapir. "Ranking of Weighted Majority Rules." Journal of Applied Probability 45, no. 4 (December 2008): 994–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1239/jap/1231340229.

Full text
Abstract:
A decision-making body may utilize a wide variety of different strategies when required to make a collective decision. In principle, we would like to use the most effective decision rule, that is, the rule yielding the highest probability of making the correct decision. However, in reality we often have to choose a decision rule out of some restricted family of rules. Therefore, it is important to be able to rank various families of rules. In this paper we consider three classes of decision rules: (i) balanced expert rules, (ii) the so-called single expert rules, and (iii) restricted majority rules. For the first two classes, we show that, as we deviate from the best rule in the family, the effectiveness of the decision rule decreases. For the last class, we obtain a very different phenomenon: any inner ranking is possible.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Berend, Daniel, Yuri Chernyavsky, and Luba Sapir. "Ranking of Weighted Majority Rules." Journal of Applied Probability 45, no. 04 (December 2008): 994–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021900200004939.

Full text
Abstract:
A decision-making body may utilize a wide variety of different strategies when required to make a collective decision. In principle, we would like to use the most effective decision rule, that is, the rule yielding the highest probability of making the correct decision. However, in reality we often have to choose a decision rule out of some restricted family of rules. Therefore, it is important to be able to rank various families of rules. In this paper we consider three classes of decision rules: (i) balanced expert rules, (ii) the so-called single expert rules, and (iii) restricted majority rules. For the first two classes, we show that, as we deviate from the best rule in the family, the effectiveness of the decision rule decreases. For the last class, we obtain a very different phenomenon: any inner ranking is possible.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Cotton, James A., and Mark Wilkinson. "Majority-Rule Supertrees." Systematic Biology 56, no. 3 (June 1, 2007): 445–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10635150701416682.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Mueller, Dennis C. "Probabilistic Majority Rule." Kyklos 42, no. 2 (August 1989): 151–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1989.tb00185.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Martin, Mark O. "Microbiology: Majority rule." Nature 507, no. 7493 (March 2014): 428–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/507428a.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 4 (November 1, 2015): 339–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140038.

Full text
Abstract:
We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is costly and values, costs, and electorate sizes are all random. Unlike previous work, where the electorate size was either fixed or Poisson distributed, and exhibited no limiting dispersion, we allow for general distributions that permit substantial dispersion. We identify conditions on these distributions guaranteeing that a large election under majority rule produces the utilitarian choice with probability one. Absent these conditions, nonutilitarian outcomes are possible, as we demonstrate. We also show that majority rule is the only voting rule with the utilitarian property—strict supermajority rules are not utilitarian. (JEL D71, D72)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Sharkey, Michael J., and Jason W. Leathers. "Majority Does Not Rule: The Trouble with Majority-Rule Consensus Trees." Cladistics 17, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 282–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1096-0031.2001.tb00124.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Sharkey, M. "Majority Does Not Rule: The Trouble with Majority-Rule Consensus Trees." Cladistics 17, no. 3 (September 2001): 282–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/clad.2001.0174.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
11

Berend, Daniel, and Luba Sapir. "Between the expert and majority rules." Advances in Applied Probability 35, no. 4 (December 2003): 941–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1239/aap/1067436329.

Full text
Abstract:
Sapir (1998) calculated the probabilities of the expert rule and of the simple majority rule being optimal under the assumption of exponentially distributed logarithmic expertise levels. Here we find the analogous probabilities for the family of restricted majority rules, including the above two extreme rules as special cases, and the family of balanced expert rules. We compare the two families, the rules within each family, and all rules of the two families with the extreme rules.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
12

Berend, Daniel, and Luba Sapir. "Between the expert and majority rules." Advances in Applied Probability 35, no. 04 (December 2003): 941–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0001867800012684.

Full text
Abstract:
Sapir (1998) calculated the probabilities of the expert rule and of the simple majority rule being optimal under the assumption of exponentially distributed logarithmic expertise levels. Here we find the analogous probabilities for the family of restricted majority rules, including the above two extreme rules as special cases, and the family of balanced expert rules. We compare the two families, the rules within each family, and all rules of the two families with the extreme rules.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
13

Caplin, Andrew, and Barry Nalebuff. "On 64%-Majority Rule." Econometrica 56, no. 4 (July 1988): 787. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1912699.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
14

Risse, Mathias. "Arguing for Majority Rule*." Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 1 (March 2004): 41–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00190.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
15

Yumlu, Ogan. "Dimensions of majority rule." Philosophy & Social Criticism 45, no. 4 (January 13, 2019): 527–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453718823032.

Full text
Abstract:
The principle of majority rule is a concept that is often employed both in normative democratic theory and in practical politics. But not only that there are relatively few academic studies focusing exclusively on this concept, it is also possible to claim that the existing discussions usually overlook different dimensions of majority rule. This article aims to outline some suggestions for what these dimensions might be, such as: the nature of the participants, the subject matter of the decision and the context in which the decision is made. One underlying assumption in this study is that the normative prospects of the majority rule principle depend on the evaluation of these different dimensions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
16

Dong, Jianrong, David Fernández-Baca, F. R. McMorris, and Robert C. Powers. "Majority-rule (+) consensus trees." Mathematical Biosciences 228, no. 1 (November 2010): 10–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2010.08.002.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
17

Nehring, Klaus, and Marcus Pivato. "Majority rule in the absence of a majority." Journal of Economic Theory 183 (September 2019): 213–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.006.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
18

Baharad, Eyal, and Shmuel Nitzan. "Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity." American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (December 2002): 745–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402000424.

Full text
Abstract:
In pairwise voting, when a simple majority rule produces a winner, that winner is robust to the minority's preferences. The typical means of protecting the minority from the decisiveness of the majority is by increasing the required majority or by augmenting the simple majority rule with constitutional constraints. In the former case the required majority q becomes larger than one-half, and this implies that the q-majority rule becomes biased in favor of one of the alternatives, usually the status quo. In the latter case the augmented rule becomes biased in favor of the minority. The main issue examined in this paper is whether the amelioration of majority decisiveness can be attained by unbiased voting rules that allow some restricted expression of preference intensities. Our results clarify that the use of scoring rules provides a positive answer to the above question when voters resort to variable degrees of coordinated strategic voting. The results are illustrated in the special cases of the plurality and the Borda rules.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
19

Taylor, Elizabeth, Kelsey Hewitt, Robert A. Reeves Dr, Stephen H. Hobbs Dr, and W. F. Lawless. "Group Decision-making: Consensus Rule Versus Majority Rule." Procedia Technology 9 (2013): 498–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.protcy.2013.12.055.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
20

Berend, Daniel, and J�rgen E. Harmse. "Expert rule versus majority rule under partial information." Theory and Decision 35, no. 2 (September 1993): 179–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01074958.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
21

Humes, Brian D. "Majority rule outcomes and the choice of germaneness rules." Public Choice 75, no. 4 (April 1993): 301–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01053441.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
22

Cheng, Qingqing, and Ming Li. "Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda." Games 10, no. 2 (June 3, 2019): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10020025.

Full text
Abstract:
Adopting the group turnout model of Herrera and Mattozzi, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2010, 8, 838–871, we investigate direct democracy with supermajority rule and different preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: Reform versus status quo. Two parties spend money and effort to mobilize their voters. We characterize the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. We investigate the optimal majority rule that maximizes voters’ welfare. Using an example, we show that the relationship between the optimal majority rule and the preference intensity is not monotonic—the optimal majority rule is initially decreasing and then increasing in the preference intensity of the status quo side. We also show that when the preference intensity of the status quo side is higher, the easiness to mobilize voters on the status quo side is lower, or the payoff that the reform party receives is higher, the optimal majority rule is more likely to be supermajority.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
23

Carrera, C., and J. Richmond. "Investment Decisions under Majority Rule." Economica 55, no. 219 (August 1988): 365. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2554014.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
24

Hyland, Eddie. "Minority Government and Majority Rule." Philosophical Studies 33 (1991): 284–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philstudies1991/19923328.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
25

Weirich, Paul. "Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47, no. 1 (September 1986): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107727.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
26

Miller, Nicholas R., Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld. "The Geometry of Majority Rule." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 4 (October 1989): 379–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692889001004001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
27

van Erp, Herman. "Democratic pluralism and majority rule." South African Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 4 (November 1999): 347–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.1999.10878193.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
28

Morone, James, James MacGregor Burns, and L. Marvin Overby. "Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Power." Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 1 (1992): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2152138.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
29

Coughlin, Peter J. "MAJORITY RULE AND ELECTION MODELS." Journal of Economic Surveys 4, no. 2 (June 1990): 157–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1990.tb00084.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
30

Lambiotte, R. "Majority rule on heterogeneous networks." Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 41, no. 22 (May 21, 2008): 224021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1751-8113/41/22/224021.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
31

Dong, Jianrong, and David Fernández-Baca. "Properties of Majority-Rule Supertrees." Systematic Biology 58, no. 3 (June 2009): 360–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sysbio/syp032.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
32

DeLue, Steven M. "Minority government and majority rule." History of European Ideas 13, no. 6 (January 1991): 863–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(91)90164-t.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
33

Quesada, Antonio. "The Majority Rule with Arbitrators." Group Decision and Negotiation 22, no. 2 (September 11, 2011): 321–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-011-9264-4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
34

GÖTZ, IVAN, ISAAK RUBINSTEIN, EUGENE TZVETKOV, and BORIS ZALTZMAN. "COMPLEXITY AND HIERARCHICAL MAJORITY RULE." International Journal of Modern Physics C 15, no. 03 (March 2004): 427–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183104005838.

Full text
Abstract:
Hierarchical structure is an essential part of complexity, an important notion relevant for a wide range of applications ranging from biological population dynamics through robotics to social sciences. In this paper we propose a simple cellular-automata tool for study of hierarchical population dynamics.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
35

Kim, Won Kyu, and Kyoung Hee Lee. "On a continuous majority rule." International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences 2005, no. 16 (2005): 2555–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/ijmms.2005.2555.

Full text
Abstract:
A seminal paper by May characterizes the majority rule in terms of anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness. Since then, there have been many characterizations of the majority rule using different axioms by several authors. In this paper, we will introduce the concept of a continuous majority rule which generalizes the previous social welfare functions beyond the discrete values, and using new axioms, we will give a characterization of the continuous majority rule.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
36

Wreen, Michael. "Moral Relativism and Majority Rule." Metaphilosophy 50, no. 3 (April 2019): 361–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meta.12363.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
37

Galam, S., and S. Wonczak. "Dictatorship from majority rule voting." European Physical Journal B 18, no. 1 (November 2000): 183–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100510070090.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
38

Jordan, James S. "Majority rule with dollar voting." Review of Economic Design 6, no. 3-4 (December 1, 2001): 343–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580100056.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
39

Fang, Shao C., and Santosh S. Venkatesh. "The capacity of majority rule." Random Structures and Algorithms 12, no. 1 (January 1998): 83–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1098-2418(199801)12:1<83::aid-rsa5>3.0.co;2-p.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
40

Binder, Sarah. "Marching (Senate Style) Towards Majority Rule." Forum 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2021): 663–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2022-2039.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract The United States Senate is marching, Senate style, toward majority rule. Chamber rules have long required super, rather than simple, majorities to end debate on major and minor matters alike. But occasionally over its history – and several times over the past decade – the Senate has pared back procedural protections afforded to senators, making it easier for cohesive majorities to secure their policy goals. Both parties have pursued such changes – sometimes imposed by simple majority, other times by a bipartisan coalition. Why has the pace of change accelerated, and with what consequences for the Senate? In this article, I connect rising partisanship and electoral competition to the weakening of partisan commitments to Senate supermajority rule. No one can predict with any certainty whether the Senate will yet abolish the so-called “legislative filibuster.” But pressures continue to mount towards that end.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
41

Berend, Daniel, and Luba Sapir. "Expert rule versus majority rule under partial information, II." Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences 6, no. 2 (January 1, 2002): 79–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/s1173912602000068.

Full text
Abstract:
The main purpose of this paper is clarifying the connection between some characteristics of a deciding body and the probability of its making correct decisions. In our model a group of decision makers is required to select one of two alternatives. We assume the probabilities of the decision makers being correct are independent random variables distributed according to the same given distribution rule. This distribution belongs to a general family, containing the uniform distribution as a particular case. We investigate the behavior of the probability of the expert rule being optimal, as well as that of the majority rule, both as functions of the distribution parameter and the group size. The main result is that for any value of the distribution parameter the expert rule is far more likely to be optimal than the majority rule, especially as the deciding body becomes larger.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
42

SPICER, MICHAEL W. "ON FRIEDRICH HAYEK AND TAXATION: RATIONALITY, RULES, AND MAJORITY RULE." National Tax Journal 48, no. 1 (March 1, 1995): 103–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ntj41789127.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
43

Mukhopadhyay, Arpan, Ravi R. Mazumdar, and Rahul Roy. "Voter and Majority Dynamics with Biased and Stubborn Agents." Journal of Statistical Physics 181, no. 4 (August 20, 2020): 1239–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10955-020-02625-w.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract We study binary opinion dynamics in a fully connected network of interacting agents. The agents are assumed to interact according to one of the following rules: (1) Voter rule: An updating agent simply copies the opinion of another randomly sampled agent; (2) Majority rule: An updating agent samples multiple agents and adopts the majority opinion in the selected group. We focus on the scenario where the agents are biased towards one of the opinions called the preferred opinion. Using suitably constructed branching processes, we show that under both rules the mean time to reach consensus is $$\varTheta (\log N)$$ Θ ( log N ) , where N is the number of agents in the network. Furthermore, under the majority rule model, we show that consensus can be achieved on the preferred opinion with high probability even if it is initially the opinion of the minority. We also study the majority rule model when stubborn agents with fixed opinions are present. We find that the stationary distribution of opinions in the network in the large system limit using mean field techniques.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
44

Tushnet, Mark. "Justice Brennan, Equality, and Majority Rule." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139, no. 5 (May 1991): 1357. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3312369.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
45

Busetto, Francesca, Giulio Codognato, and Simone Tonin. "Simple majority rule and integer programming." Mathematical Social Sciences 113 (September 2021): 160–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
46

Silbey, Joel H., James MacGregor Burns, and L. Marvin Overby. "Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power." Journal of American History 78, no. 3 (December 1991): 1036. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2078810.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
47

Cremer, Helmuth, Philippe De Donder, and Firouz Gahvari. "Taxes, Budgetary Rule and Majority Voting." Public Choice 119, no. 3/4 (June 2004): 335–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:puch.0000033324.71658.f3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
48

Dasgupta, Partha, and Eric Maskin. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule." Journal of the European Economic Association 6, no. 5 (September 2008): 949–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.949.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
49

White, John Kenneth. "Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power." History: Reviews of New Books 20, no. 3 (April 1992): 104–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1992.9949642.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
50

SADURSKI, WOJCIECH. "Legitimacy, Political Equality, and Majority Rule." Ratio Juris 21, no. 1 (March 2008): 39–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00379.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the bibliographies on the topic 'Majority Rule' for other source types:
Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography