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1
Cameron, Robyn-Ann. "Were Abnormal Items Used to Manage Earnings to Earnings Benchmarks?" Thesis, Griffith University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10072/366349.
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Accounting standards permit management to use its discretion in determining how certain components of earnings are classified, or where they are reported in the financial statements. Prior to 2001, Australian accounting standards required companies to separately classify and report any unusually large items of income and expense as “abnormal items” to distinguish such items from “normal” earnings. In the U.S. such items are referred to as “special items” or “unusual items”. The term “abnormal items” was subsequently removed from the accounting standards, a move in part driven by the perception of regulators and shareholder interest groups that companies were opportunistically classifying items as abnormal to enhance the reported earnings before abnormal items in order to meet earnings benchmarks. However, there is little empirical evidence on whether earnings were classified as abnormal to manage earnings.
The U.S. evidence on special items suggests managers opportunistically classify such items to enhance reported “normal” earnings and that special items are associated with classification shifting for the purpose of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. McVay (2006) found that U.S. firms opportunistically shift expenses from “core” expenses by reporting them as special items. Some limited evidence of Australian companies engaging in earnings management by opportunistically classifying normal earnings items as abnormal was provided by Cameron (1998) and Cameron and Gallery (2001). This thesis extends prior research to examine whether Australian companies used abnormal items to manage earnings to meet earnings benchmarks.
The predictions in this thesis are based on U.S. research findings that special items are asymmetric with a bias to negative special items and that special items are used to: manage the change in earnings from the prior year, reduce the current year’s earnings levels, minimise earnings or “take a bath”, and avoid reporting losses and earnings forecast errors. A sample of Australian top-500 firms for the seven-year period from 1994 to 2000 is used to test the following predictions.
(1) The frequency of companies reporting abnormal items increased over the study period.
(2) There is asymmetry in reporting frequency and magnitude of negative and positive abnormal items, with a bias to negative abnormal items.
(3) The incidence and magnitude of reported abnormal items are associated with three earnings benchmarks, which are: level of current period earnings, annual change in earnings, and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The assumption that firms align earnings before abnormal items to analysts’ earnings forecasts is also empirically tested.
Although the prediction of an increase in the frequency of reporting abnormal items over the study period is not supported, the magnitude of abnormal items increased significantly. The findings support the prediction of asymmetry in both the incidence and magnitude of abnormal items, showing that the frequency of reporting negative abnormal items and their magnitude is consistently greater than positive abnormal items over the study period. Logistic regression results indicate that firms with higher levels of earnings and changes in earnings were more likely to report abnormal items. The results of multiple regression analysis reveal that although there is no association between the amount of abnormal items and earnings levels, the significant negative relationship between earnings changes and abnormal items and the fact that abnormal items are, on average, negative, suggests that for firms that have a decline in earnings over the previous year, the lower the level of earnings before abnormal items, the greater the magnitude of negative abnormal items. This infers “bath-taking” behaviour.
Partitioning the sample according to the sign of the earnings level, the sign of the earnings change and the sign of abnormal items yields significant results, suggesting firms have differing incentives to manage earnings depending on whether the firm reports a profit or a loss, or an increase (decrease) in the change in earnings. Findings infer that profit firms that raised positive abnormal items did so to maximise current period profits, whereas loss firms reporting positive abnormal items did so to minimise or smooth reported losses, or to shift from reporting a loss before abnormal items to reporting a profit after abnormal items.
The significant positive relationship for the positive earnings change sub-sample reporting positive abnormal items suggests positive abnormal items were used to maximise the earnings change, which has the effect of maximising net earnings. On the other hand, the significant negative relationship for the negative earnings changes subsample that raised positive abnormal items did so to dampen the bottom line negative change in earnings and thereby smooth net earnings. The significant positive association for the negative earnings change sub-sample raising negative abnormal items infers negative abnormal items were used to maximise the negative earnings change which could also reflect “big bath” behaviour. The significant negative relationship for the positive earnings change sub-sample raising negative abnormal items indicates negative abnormal items were used to dampen the earnings change and smooth net earnings.
Finally, the results show that firms which met or beat analysts’ forecasts were more likely to report abnormal items than firms which missed the forecast. Moreover, the finding of associations between analysts’ forecast errors and abnormal items, for the full sample and sub-samples, indicates that reporting negative abnormal items had the effect of shifting losses from earnings before abnormal items. Thus, earnings before abnormal items are more closely aligned with analysts’ earnings forecasts.
The results from this thesis represent a comprehensive analysis of abnormal items in the context of earnings management, providing fresh insights into the earnings management phenomenon. This study also extends U.S. literature by including income-increasing abnormal items in the analysis. Collectively, the results suggest that firms used the classification of earnings as abnormal items for earnings management purposes. The findings suggest that the standard setters may have been justified in removing the “abnormal” classification from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed that all firms acted opportunistically in the classification of items as abnormal. They may have done so to signal the transitory nature of the item. Removal of discretion to use such a signalling device may limit the scope for firms to effectively communicate information about the nature of items presented in financial reports.<br>Thesis (PhD Doctorate)<br>Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)<br>Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics<br>Griffith Business School<br>Full Text
2
Kala, Tejshree. "Does the manager matter to users of management earnings forecasts?" Phd thesis, Canberra, ACT : The Australian National University, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/148174.
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Prior research provides evidence on how manager
attributes affect characteristics of management earnings
forecasts and how firm characteristics affect market
participants’ perception of the credibility of management
earnings forecasts. Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset,
this thesis examines whether the perceived credibility of
management earnings forecasts, as measured by investors’ and
analysts’ responses to management earnings forecasts news, are
influenced by: (1) the forecasting track records of individual
managers, and (2) manager attributes. The results indicate that,
overall, investors’ responses to management earnings forecasts
vary with the firms’ forecasting track records but not with the
forecasting track records of individual managers or with manager
attributes. The results indicate that analysts’ responses to
management earnings forecasts are positively associated with
managers’ individual forecasting track records. Results also
indicate that analysts react less strongly to management earnings
forecasts issued by CEOs with CFO experience, and react more
strongly to management earnings forecasts issued by managers who
are also the chairperson. Overall, the results suggest that
analysts, being more sophisticated users, consider both manager-
and firm-specific characteristics in their assessments of
management earnings forecasts. This thesis contributes to the
literature by providing a more comprehensive understanding of
whether manager-specific forecasting track records and manager
attributes matter to investors and analysts. The findings
reported in this thesis may help to inform the communicators
(firms and managers) of management earnings forecasts about what
matters to users, which may help them vary their forecasting
behaviours. Results may also help inform boards of directors
about what matters to users of management earnings forecasts and
help the board better monitor managers in this regard, and,
inform observers such as regulators and commentators in providing
signals about what matters to users in terms managers’
forecasting behaviours and attributes.
3
Tran, Nam D. "Why Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Before Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions?" Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11537.
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xi, 68 p. : ill. (some col.)<br>In this dissertation, I examine whether high disclosure costs explain why acquirers manage earnings before stock-for-stock acquisitions. Because stock-for-stock acquirers use their own shares to pay for targets' shares, stock-for-stock acquirers have incentives to manage earnings in order to boost their stock prices. I show that high disclosure costs lead to an equilibrium in which acquirers engage in earnings management in a manner consistent with target firms' expectations. As a result, I hypothesize that stock-for-stock acquirers with high disclosure costs are more likely to manage earnings before the acquisition than stock-for-stock acquirers with low disclosure costs. Using a sample of stock-for-stock acquisitions in the United States during the period from 1988 to 2009, I find a positive association between acquirers' proprietary disclosure costs and pre-acquisition abnormal accruals. In addition, I find a negative association between pre-acquisition abnormal accruals and abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement for acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs but not for acquirers with low proprietary disclosure costs. Assuming that the market is efficient with respect to publicly available information, this evidence is also consistent with acquirers with high proprietary disclosure costs using abnormal accruals to manage earnings. Finally, I do not find a statistically significant association between the extent of acquirers' earnings management and the acquisition premium received by target shareholders. This is consistent with acquirers' earnings management not serving to extract wealth from target shareholders. Overall, the evidence in this dissertation suggests that earnings management by stock-for-stock acquirers is a rational response to targets' expectations when high disclosure costs prevent the acquirers from credibly signaling the absence of earnings management.<br>Committee in charge: Steven Matsunaga, Chairperson;
Angela Davis, Member;
David Guenther, Member;
Van Kolpin, Outside Member
4
Teixeira, Alan. "Disclosure Rules, Manager Discretion and the Relative Informativeness of Earnings Components." Thesis, University of Auckland, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/2292/2401.
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This is a study of earnings quality, examining whether components of earnings based on New Zealand (N.Z.) accounting classification systems have different information parameters. The N.Z. environment provides a unique opportunity to examine a period with no legislative backing of accounting standards and a flexible accounting standard. Combined, this gave mangers the ability to clearly identify earnings components they considered to be differentially informative. Informativeness is assessed by the ability of current period earnings to predict next period earnings and the contemporaneous relation between returns and earnings. The results indicate that disaggregated reported earnings are more informative than aggregated earnings in a non-trivial way. In one of the sample periods disaggregated earnings explained 29% of the variance in returns, more than twice the explanatory power of aggregated earnings. N.Z. accounting standard setters replaced SSAP7 with FRS7 in 1994 contending that the discretion available to mangers reduced the informativeness of earnings. Not only do the results not support that contention but earnings informativeness has fallen since FRS7 came into effect, suggesting that standard setters should revisit that decision. The results also have implications for the content and form of the N.Z. Stock Exchange (NZSE) preliminary announcement. "Unusual earnings" reported to the NZSE by companies are shown to be differentially informative to investors yet the NZSE does not always identify these components when the preliminary announcement is summarised and disseminated to market participants. To summarise, the effective codification of earnings brought about by FRS7 has reduced the informativeness of earnings – locking differences between components into total earnings. The N.Z. results beg the question as to whether similar economic events are locked into the COMPUSTAT summary earnings variables for U.S. data.
5
Pettersson, Johan, and Edmund Wu. "Do tax evaders manage earnings more? : A quantitative study on the relationship between tax evasion and earnings management." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-255889.
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The relationship between earnings management and tax manipulation has been discussed in academia recently. We contribute to this discussion by using a list of tax evader companies, to test the relationship. The list was supplied by the Swedish Tax Agency and consists of public companies from the Swedish stock exchanges. Our findings show that tax evader companies are more prone to manage their earnings and that they do it by reporting small earnings. The effect of labelling the companies as tax manipulators does also not change the extent that they manipulate their earnings in the future. There is therefore no disciplinary effect from the tax evader fine on a manipulating company to behave more credible in the future. Out of our results the most unexpected was however that when we compare the NASDAQ companies with the ones listed on less liquid stock exchanges the NASDAQ ones were more pervasive in managing their earnings. This goes against our own hypothesis as well as previous literature and shows that investors have to be careful also when investing in premium markets.
6
Luippold, Benjamin Labrie. "Managing audits to manage earnings the impact of baiting tactics on an auditor's ability to uncover earnings management errors /." Amherst, Mass. : University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2009. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/106/.
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Harrison, Sydelle Rose, and Sydelle Rose Harrison. "Do CEOs Manage Earnings Before Turnover and do Auditors Recognize the Risk?" Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625004.
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CEOs have a large amount of control within an organization and discretion when it comes to accounting within a firm. A firm's earnings also have large implications both internally and externally. Internally the earnings of a firm affect executives and lower level employee’s compensation, when a portion is based on earnings. Externally, investors and the market take into account the earnings of a firm and the smoothness of the earnings when considering whether or not to invest and the future of the company. The CEO in charge of large firms are not solely responsible for the financial statements, but in many cases they have the final say in discretionary expenses such are research and development and advertising, which can be income increasing accruals that increase earnings.
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Li, Zhaochu. "How does the stock market respond to R&D cuts used to manage earnings?" Thesis, University of Oregon, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/20438.
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Prior research shows returns are positive when firms meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts but negative when firms miss. Past studies also show managers frequently cut R&D expenses in order to meet the consensus forecast. Despite these findings, there is limited evidence about how the market responds when firms beat the forecast by cutting R&D. This study shows the stock market penalizes firms that use R&D cuts to manage earnings and exacts a discount to the market reward if beating the forecast requires cutting R&D. The discount is only partial and firms are still better off doing so in the short run. Furthermore, this study shows the R&D cuts used to manage earnings are concentrated in specific industries and are likely temporary, as firms tend to increase R&D spending in the subsequent period. Investors appear to recognize these short-term cuts and treat them similar to accruals.<br>10000-01-01
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Call, Andrew Crafton. "The implications of cash flow forecasts for investors' pricing and managers' reporting of earnings /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8764.
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Tama-Sweet, Isho. "Do managers alter the tone of their earnings announcements around stock option grants and exercises? /." Connect to title online (Scholars' Bank) Connect to title online (ProQuest), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10242.
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Tama-Sweet, Isho 1973. "Do managers alter the tone of their earnings announcements around stock option grants and exercises?" Thesis, University of Oregon, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10242.
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ix, 69 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.<br>In this dissertation I investigate whether managers alter the linguistic tone of their earnings announcements to increase the value of their stock options. Empirical research finds evidence that managers use optimistic tone to signal future firm performance. However, prior literature also finds a positive relation between optimistic tone in earnings announcements and short-window abnormal returns. The market reaction to optimistic tone suggests that managers can profit from using pessimistic tone to lower the firm's stock price prior to option grants and optimistic tone to increase the stock price prior to option exercises.
I hypothesize that managers adjust the tone of their earnings announcements to increase the value of their stock options. In addition, I hypothesize that managers will alter the tone to increase option payouts when the costs of doing so (proxied by litigation risk) are low and when the financial reporting incentives to do so (proxied by earnings management) are high. I test these predictions using 17,211 firm-quarter observations from 1998-2006. In my tests I regress the tone of the earnings announcement on its known determinants and indicators for a stock option grant or exercise shortly following the announcement.
I do not find evidence that managers, on average, alter the tone of earnings announcements prior to option grants or exercises. However, I find that managers decrease optimistic tone prior to option grants when they also record low discretionary accruals, which suggests that altering tone and managing earnings are complementary strategies to move stock price. I also find that managers increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises when litigation risk is low, but decrease optimistic tone prior to option exercises when litigation risk is high. Further analysis indicates the litigation risk results hold only after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Overall, my evidence suggests that managers increase optimistic tone prior to option exercises except when a high threat of litigation constrains such opportunism. When managers do alter tone, the average financial gain is small relative to their total compensation.<br>Committee in charge: Steven Matsunaga, Chairperson, Accounting;
Angela Davis, Member, Accounting;
David Guenther, Member, Accounting;
Jeremy Piger, Outside Member, Economics
12
Kokkonen, Fanny, and Annie Larsson. "Den kostsamma manipulationen : handlingarna och konsekvenserna av earnings management." Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Akademin för textil, teknik och ekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-14374.
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Redovisningen används som ett verktyg för beslutsfattande i olika situationer och därför är det viktigt att redovisningen sker på ett korrekt sätt. Dock har det visat sig att verktyget inte alltid fungerar i praktiken eftersom att företag kan använda sig av earnings management för att vilseleda användarna. Studien har gjorts som en komparativ fallstudie med hjälp av tio olika case som byggts upp genom skandaler där earnings management uppdagats i svenska företag. En jämförelse har sedan gjorts av de olika casen i syfte att upptäcka likheter och skillnader för att på så sätt få en ökad förståelse av fenomenet. Studien undersöker vad som gör att en företagsledare använder sig av earnings management samt vilka konsekvenser det får för företaget och dess olika intressenter. Det empiriska materialet har analyserats med hjälp organisations- och redovisningsteorier tillsammans med etik och moral för att kunna identifiera olika vinklar av problematiken. Studien konstaterar att det sällan finns en enda bakomliggande faktor som bidrar till att earnings management används. De olika bakomliggande faktorerna som har identifierats handlar om att ge en förskönad bild över antingen företaget eller företagsledaren själv. Det framgår även att earnings management medför negativa konsekvenser för såväl företaget som dess intressenter. Slutligen kan studien konstatera att earnings management inte medför något positivt och således inte har någon vinnare.<br>Financial statement is used as an instrument for decision making in several situations, thus it is of high importance that it is performed accurately. However, it has appeared to not always operate correctly since companies have the possibility to use earnings management to misguide the users. This study has been accomplished as a comparative case study with ten various cases, generated from scandals where earnings management has been exposed in Swedish companies. We have compared the cases in order to gain an increased comprehension of the phenomenon and its effects. The study examines the underlying reasons for a business manager to apply earnings management and which consequences it brings to the enterprise and its stakeholders. The empirical material has been analyzed with organizational and accounting theories along with ethical and moral beliefs in order to identify different perspectives of the stated problem. The conclusion is that it is often more than one underlying factor that contributes to the use of earnings management. The identified underlying factors are about giving a better picture of either the business manager or the company. It also emphasizes that earnings management causes adverse consequences for the firm as well as its stakeholders. Finally, this study states that earnings management does not lead anything positive, thus it does not result in anyone winner.
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Xing, Lu. "Corporate governance in Chinese listed companies : how managerial characteristics matter." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/33095.
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This thesis consists of three studies on corporate governance issues of Chinese listed companies. In the first study, I investigate the role of board secretaries in management earnings forecasts. Individuals in this senior executive position are responsible for coordinating information disclosure. I find that their legal and accounting expertise and foreign experience help improve management earnings forecast quality. The quality of forecasts, as indicated by forecast occurrence, frequency, precision and accuracy, is positively associated with board secretaries' duality role and equity holdings, whereas it is negatively associated with their political connections. The quality of forecasts is found to increase the compensation of board secretaries. Finally, I show that the equity holdings of board secretaries reduce litigation risks and increase corporate philanthropic giving. Based on the notion that women cooperate more with women than with men, my second study examines the gender interaction effect between female top managers and female board directors in Chinese firms. I show that this gender interaction is positively associated with the firm's accounting return but negatively associated with its stock price return. Earnings management, which can lead to overstated accounting numbers but unfavourable stock market reactions, partly explains the opposite results. Furthermore, I find that only the newly appointed female top managers engage in this earnings management. Overall, the findings suggest that the pressure on women to perform leads to 'women helping women', which is detrimental to shareholders' value. Women are underrepresented on corporate boards. By employing the large variation in socioeconomic development across provinces of China, the third study shows that the barriers to board gender diversity are deeply rooted in societal gender role attitudes. I find that corporate boards tend to be more gender diverse in a province where there is a smaller gender difference in educational achievement in STEM disciplines, where there is a stronger belief that women and men possess equal intrinsic abilities, or where female political leaders are present in the provincial government or communist party. However, I find little evidence that female labour force participation or childcare provision would affect board gender diversity. Collectively, the findings suggest that it is the gender equality attitudes rather than the supply of average female labour that contribute to gender-diverse corporate boards.
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Santos, Adriana Maria dos. "A influência do gerente de conta no uso do internet banking pelo cliente alta renda no Brasil: um estudo de caso." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/5544.
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Previous issue date: 2007-12-03T00:00:00Z<br>The present study was held in a segment of individual clients with high earnings of a big retail bank in Brazil and was focused on the municipality of São Paulo. The investigation aimed to verify whether there has been any relation between the account manager profile, as to his or her technology and internet knowledge and ability, and the level of adoption of the Internet Banking by clients under his or her orientation. For this investigation it was adopted a qualitative approach which consisted of internal data analysis, interviews, and questionnaire sent to a group of account managers. The results (1) suggest that even in the high earnings segment there have been other variables as age and the credit of salary in current account that affect the level of use of Internet Banking by clients; and that the manager profiles differ in terms of level of involvement with new technologies, which includes the internet; and (2) signalize that account managers whose profile is more technologically advanced make use of the internet more naturally and present stronger power of convincement over clients under his or her orientation as to Internet Banking adoption.<br>O presente estudo foi realizado no segmento de pessoas físicas de alta renda de um grande banco de varejo do Brasil, com foco no Município de São Paulo. A investigação teve como objetivo verificar se há alguma relação entre o perfil do gerente de conta, no que se refere a sua desenvoltura tecnológica e com a Internet, e o nível de uso do Internet Banking pelos clientes sob sua gestão. Para esta investigação foi utilizada uma abordagem qualitativa composta pela análise de dados internos do segmento, entrevistas em profundidade e envio de questionário a um grupo de gerentes. Os resultados (1) sugerem que mesmo no segmento alta renda existem outras variáveis como a idade e o recebimento do crédito salário na conta que afetam o nível de utilização do Internet Banking pelos clientes; e que o perfil dos gerentes divergem em termos de envolvimento com as novas tecnologias, o que inclui o uso da Internet; e (2) indicam que o gerente com maior domínio das tecnologias e da Internet possui maior poder de convencimento junto aos seus clientes no que se refere ao uso do Internet Banking.
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Lin, Po-Ting, and 林柏廷. "How do Managers Manipulate Earnings? The Perspective of Earnings Thresholds." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/bs2e6z.
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碩士<br>中國文化大學<br>會計學系<br>103<br>This study aims to investigate the impact of earnings thresholds on managers’ earnings manipulation behavior. Based on a design developed by Goh et al. (2013), this research examines earnings management behavior under the scenarios just made, clearly beat, and clearly missed. We find evidence that companies experience more upward earnings adjustments in cases where their earnings clearly exceed the analyst forecasts and where they have small positive reported earnings. Such results indicate that management attempts to clearly beat analysts’ expectations and avoid reporting negative earnings. Nevertheless, managers may downward adjust their earnings, i.e., big-bath behavior, in cases where their companies suffer huge losses. Moreover, this study provides show evidence showing that, in cases either earnings slightly or largely exceed earnings thresholds, the more earnings thresholds companies meet, the more tendency they may have to upward adjust earnings.
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Tai, Jung-Che, and 戴榮哲. "Earnings Management behavior of division Managers." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97291997612768985757.
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碩士<br>國立雲林科技大學<br>財務金融系碩士班<br>92<br>This article investigates Fdenberg and Tirole (1995) by using a three-period model. We assume there is information decay factor which indicates current report is always more informative than previous report to future incomes. The object of earnings management for a division manager is to keep the tenure but not for the firm’s profit. This study draws three main conclusions: (1) under one-time decision and income following a first-order Markov process, a division manager will adopts a fixed first-period report in which it shows a pooling equilibrium and no information is revealed; (2) under income following a high-order process, when greater than an full information cutoff level, there is an optimal contract which induces a division manager telling the truth and (3) under the ongoing decision making, the first-period report can be informative, but that there is an upper bound on the amount of information it reveals.
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Chen, Han-Yun, and 陳翰昀. "Why do firms manage earnings before seasoned equity offerings?" Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12649846216879543093.
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碩士<br>國立東華大學<br>財務金融學系<br>101<br>The main purpose of this paper is why firms do manage earnings before seasoned equity offerings. Most of the literatures that studied earnings management during seasoned equity offerings focus on misleading the investors, but the results of our study show that enterprise used discretionary accruals to increase earnings, primarily to release of the enterprise's prospect message; while the enterprise used real earnings management methods to increase earnings, mainly in order to mislead the investors. On the other hand, if the enterprise used earnings management to reduce earnings during seasoned equity offerings, we think this enterprise manager maybe want to make future returns and earnings more smoothing.
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Cheng, Wan-Ying, and 鄭琬穎. "Do Firms Manage Earnings to Cater Investor Demand for Dividend?" Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/t3fyv2.
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碩士<br>國立東華大學<br>財務金融學系<br>100<br>This paper examines whether managers manage earnings to cater investors’demand for dividends. Daniel et al. (2008) report empirical evidence that firms manage earnings pwards to meet dividend thresholds. Li and Lie (2006) find that managers consider investor demand for dividend when they make dividend policy. As a result, managers cater to investor demand for dividends by paying dividends when
investors place a premium on dividend-paying stocks, and vice versa. This paper discuss if firms cater investor demand for dividend by managing earnings upward to meet the threshold and examine the market response to dividend policy.
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Ko, Chao-Chin, and 柯朝欽. "Earnings to Manage? -The Forth Quarter Analysis for TaiwanBanking Industry." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73177628815697005131.
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碩士<br>國立高雄第一科技大學<br>風險管理與保險所<br>98<br>Based on the assets and liabilities of banks, the "indirect testing method" approach is used to study the earnings management of Taiwan banks. We also divide the sample to two subsamples, the expansion stage and contraction stage, by the CEPD business cycle dates. Our data are collected from the Economic Journal database, ranging from year 88 to 97 years with publicly traded bank and joined the Bank of Taiwan unlisted.
Empirical results indicate that the bank project managers manipulate earnings in a different way during an economic expansion. Contrarily, they have a higher degree of earnings management in the fourth quarter in the economic contraction stage. Therefore, a different stage of economy influences the management of bank earnings for bank managers in the forth quarter.
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Hsu, Wan-Lin, and 許婉琳. "Why Managers do Earnings Management before Stock Splits Announcements？." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10159090446473729202.
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碩士<br>國立東華大學<br>會計與財務金融碩士學位學程<br>98<br>This paper examines the relationship between the pre–split abnormal accrual and post–split abnormal returns with data from CRSP, proposing two hypotheses: reinforcing signals hypothesis and opportunism hypothesis. We find the moderate upward earnings can reinforce the split signal which lends credibility to the accrual signal. The excessive upward earnings maybe let investors think that if there are other possible of speculation. Whereas decreasing the earnings prior to stock split announcements, the moderate earnings decreasing can let market responded that is much smaller after the stock split announcements. But drop earnings dramatically, post–stock split abnormal returns are driven pre–stock split downward earnings management. Thus, the moderate earnings management is better than the excessive earnings management. Investors hold a skeptical attitude in the excessive earnings management.
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Ferreira, Joana Catarina Soares. "Do managers mislead investors through earnings manipulation before SEOs?" Master's thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1822/42281.
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Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças<br>In this study, I assess the discretion in financial reported earnings before seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs). Using a sample of 344 European SEOs between 2000 and 2010, together with a
propensity score matched control sample, I find evidence of statistically significant and
economically relevant real earnings manipulation before these corporate events; in contrast, there
is no evidence of accruals manipulation. The results also suggest that prior to the equity issue the
amount of earnings management is higher in countries where the quality of the information
environment is poor. Additionally, I do not find significant differences in post-issue long-term stock
performance between issuers and comparable non-issuers. However, consistent with the literature,
I find that post-issue market-adjusted performance is significantly lower for issuers. To some extent,
the results suggest a negative relation between pre-issue earnings management and post-issue
stock performance.<br>Neste estudo, avalio se os gestores das empresas usam a sua discricionariedade para reportar
resultados mais favoráveis antes da emissão de novo capital. Utilizando uma amostra de 344
emissões Europeias de novo capital decorridas entre 2000 e 2010, juntamente com uma amostra
de controlo encontrada através do propensity score matching (PSM), os resultados revelam
evidência estatisticamente significativa de manipulação através de atividades reais antes destes
eventos. Por outro lado, não existe evidência de manipulação em termos de accruals.
Adicionalmente, os resultados sugerem que antes da emissão de novo capital o montante de
manipulação é mais acentuado em países onde a qualidade de informação é classificada como
fraca. Relativamente à performance de longo prazo após a emissão de novo capital, quando
avaliada em relação às empresas de controlo, não existe qualquer evidência de que esta seja
negativamente afetada. No entanto, quando o desempenho das empresas que emitem novo capital
é medido em relação ao índice de mercado, os resultados revelam que as empresas que
apresentam elevados níveis de manipulação no período imediatamente anterior à emissão de novo
capital apresentam uma performance pior.
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"Do Financial Analysts Respond Efficiently To Managers' Earnings Guidance?" Doctoral diss., 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.14741.
Full textAbstract:
abstract: When managers provide earnings guidance, analysts normally respond within a short time frame with their own earnings forecasts. Within this setting, I investigate whether financial analysts use publicly available information to adjust for predictable error in management guidance and, if so, the explanation for such inefficiency. I provide evidence that analysts do not fully adjust for predictable guidance error when revising forecasts. The analyst inefficiency is attributed to analysts' attempts to advance relationship with the managers, analysts' compensation not tie to forecast accuracy, and their forecasting ability. Finally, the stock market acts as if it does not fully realize that analysts respond inefficiently to the guidance, introducing mispricing. This mispricing is not fully corrected upon earnings announcement.<br>Dissertation/Thesis<br>Ph.D. Accountancy 2012
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Hsiao, Fu-Jen. "Is SFAS 142 a good opportunity for firms to manage earnings?" 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10106/2071.
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Luippold, Benjamin Labrie. "Managing Audits to Manage Earnings: The Impact of Baiting Tactics on an Auditor’s Ability to Uncover Earnings Management Errors." 2009. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/106.
Full textAbstract:
This study examines an aspect of earnings management that I refer to as audit management. I define audit management as a client's strategic use of techniques (e.g., baiting tactics) to prevent auditors from discovering earnings management during the audit. Specifically, I examine whether two baiting tactics, diversionary statements and distracting errors, affect an auditor's ability to uncover an accounting error used to manage earnings. Auditors performed analytical review on financial statements that contained an earnings management error (i.e., an intentional error that results in the client meeting an earnings target). I manipulated whether management provided a diversionary statement that explicitly identified risk in other areas of the audit, and whether management seeded easier, distracting errors into those other areas, both of which were designed to lure the auditor away from the earnings management error. I found that when auditors were intentionally directed to error free accounts they were unlikely to uncover an earnings management error elsewhere in the financial statements. On the other hand, auditors were most accurate in identifying earnings management when they were directed to audit areas that contained distracting errors. These results suggest that managers can use certain baiting tactics to strategically manage the outcome of the audit, but that, in some circumstances, baiting tactics may actually make auditors more likely to uncover managed earnings.
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Chen, Wen-Yi, and 陳文怡. "The Relationship Between Accounting Line Manager Turnover and Earning Management." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/80806564551536345047.
Full textAbstract:
碩士<br>東吳大學<br>會計學系<br>94<br>After a lot of financial scandals reveal in succession, government begin amending relative law to avoid similar case occur in the future. Management was charged with the duty of preparing financial reporting to enhance the veridicality of financial report ,to reduce the stakeholder mislead by window dressing report.
Previous research regarding earning management usually confer the relationship between its motivation, it method, and executive turnover or director turnover. But, accounting line manager is conductor of preparing financial report. It’s a strong relationship between accounting line manager and earning management. This study is from accounting line manager angle to confer whether his behavior is affected by relative law. Accounting line manager turnover is the object of study for understanding the change of earning management. Furthermore, separate the effect of ownership turnover from accounting line manager turnover with dummy variable.Tisted companies in Taiwan from 2003 to 2004 were used as samples to test our hypotheses by multiple regression analysis.The empirical results are summarized as follow :
1. Before amending law, the degree of earning management of company with accounting line manager turnover is greater than that of company without accounting line manager turnover.
2. After amending law, the degree of earning management of company with accounting line manager turnover is smaller than that of company without accounting line manager turnover
3. Based on the above results, it’s different between the degree he degree of earning management of company with accounting line manager turnover before amending law and that after mending law.
4. The degree he degree of earning management of company with accounting line manager turnover which is not affected by owner’s turnover is same with above empirical results.
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Chen, Zhenhua. "Internal and External Attributions by Managers in Earnings Conference Calls." Diss., 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/6166.
Full textAbstract:
<p>In this study, I examine whether managers make self-serving attributions by internally (externally) attributing favorable (unfavorable) performance or demonstrate leadership by accepting blame and deflecting praise when communicating with analysts and investors. After validating the attribution measure I use in this paper, I find that managers tend to attribute favorable performance to internal factors and unfavorable performance to external factors, consistent with self-serving attribution being the dominant force. I also find that investors react negatively to mangers' internal attributions. Further analysis reveals that more internal attributions are associated with lower earnings persistence.</p><br>Dissertation
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Riley, Tracey Jean. "An investigation into managers' language use in earnings press releases." 2011. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3445180.
Full textAbstract:
For years, researchers have examined financial data in corporate earnings announcements and their influence on market participants. More recently, a body of research has been developing recognizing the impact of narrative disclosures and managers’ deliberate language choices. However, no prior studies have investigated those language choices of managers which are likely unintentional in composing such narratives; language choices which—as previous research has revealed—escape conscious access. Using an empirically-grounded model which systematically classifies different predicates, I examined whether managers use systematic patterns of language when construing the earnings press release in a likely unintentional effort to channel or direct readers’ attention. I found that managers write positive information using a more concrete construal than negative information. Additionally, I used experimental data to examine whether these systematic differences lead to different perceptions of the company and its value as an investment alternative. Nonprofessional investors performed an analysis of an earnings press release where I manipulated the valence of the narrative as positive or negative and the construal of the narrative as abstract or concrete. I found that these manipulations had an interactive influence on investment decisions. Specifically, investors were least likely to invest when a negatively valenced narrative was written concretely. I also found that the influence of the narrative on the investment decision was direct and not the result of the narrative influencing the investors’ focus of attention on the accompanying financial statements. Additionally, I tested whether the investor judgments were due to intentional cognitive effects and found that the influence of the narrative on the investment decision was not conscious on the part of the investor. Lastly, I conducted an analysis of archival data to examine the relationship between managers’ language use in forward-looking statements of the earnings press release and future firm performance and the extent to which the market responds to these linguistic clues. Results from the analysis suggest that construal is predictive of future firm performance and the market is incorporating this into pricing for firms that meet or beat earnings expectations.
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Peng, Jyu-hu, and 彭鉅湖. "The Impact of Information Transparency on Managers’ and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/99642094465638355966.
Full textAbstract:
碩士<br>中國文化大學<br>會計研究所<br>96<br>Information Transparency has been a necessary device in the activities of cor-porate governance. Earnings forecasts have both immediate and future. When inves-tors make decisions, the earning forecast is an important information. However, managers and analysts offer main earnings forecasts. What is difference between managers’ and analysts’ earnings forecasts? The level of information transparency is high or low, whether affect the gap between managers’ and analysts’ earnings fore-casts or not?
The empirical results show the following facts. Firstly, managers’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic than analysts’ earnings forecasts. Secondly, when in-formation transparency is higher, managers’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic than analysts’ earnings forecasts. Information transparency has an impact on manag-ers’ and analysts’ earnings forecasts.
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Park, Jin Dong. "Managers' forecast guidance in earnings surprises around employee stock option reissues." 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10106/1728.
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Huie-Chien, Su, and 蘇惠卿. "A Empirical Study on Characteristics on Board of Directors 、Manager、Shareholder and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02589911817798670076.
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Shih, Yi-Ju, and 施羿如. "Factors associated with the voluntary disclosure of managers'' earning forecasts." Thesis, 1998. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16471750283679229530.
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"Anchoring and Motivated Reasoning in Managers' Review of Accounting Estimates." Doctoral diss., 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.38451.
Full textAbstract:
abstract: Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created by reporting incentives.<br>Dissertation/Thesis<br>Doctoral Dissertation Accountancy 2016
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Huang, Chao-Hsin, and 黃朝信. "The Disposal of Assets to Manage Earnings after the Prohibition of Asset Impairment Reversals in China." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/91750206466182264782.
Full textAbstract:
博士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>會計學研究所<br>101<br>Firms that experience asset impairment generate a reverse account to determine the extent of impairment. If the accounting standards permit the reversing of a previously recognized impairment loss, this reversal provides an opportunity for earnings management. In this case, the impairment losses serve as a “cookie jar.” However, if the accounting standards prohibit the reversing of an impairment loss, managers can still utilize this cookie jar reversal with the subsequent sale and disposal of the impaired assets.
The listed firms in China have abused the provision for the reversal of impairment losses to manage earnings. Thus, the Chinese government announced a new accounting standard—with effect from the reporting periods beginning on or after January 1, 2007—that prohibits the reversal of long-term asset impairments to limit the opportunistic reporting by managers following asset impairment recognition and reversal. This new standard gives an opportunity to examine whether managers would dispose of impaired assets to manipulate earnings based on overestimated asset impairments. Additionally, I also examine whether a corporate governance mechanism can mitigate this opportunistic behavior.
Data were selected from China’s listed A shares between 2003 and 2009. The income from sales of assets before and after the change of this accounting standard is analyzed using the regression method. The abnormal accumulated impairment, which excludes the normal write-downs under the economic factors, is calculated in order to differentiate between managers’ opportunistic behaviors. Since the stock exchanges in China label firms in financial trouble as special treatment firms if they have a negative net income for two consecutive years, managers have an incentive to report a profit when their firm has reported losses in the prior year.
The results show that firms that previously reported losses with higher abnormal accumulated impairments have a higher income from the sale of assets in the periods when accounting standards prohibit the reversal of impairments than in the periods when accounting standards permit the reversal. Specifically, firms that reversed impairment losses to manage earnings could still utilize the overestimated asset impairment by disposing of the impaired asset. The empirical findings also show that firms that previously reported losses with higher abnormal accumulated impairments and less corporate governance have a higher income from the sale of assets after the prohibition of the reversals. Further analysis finds that a mitigating effect comes from the shareholder structure. These findings could provide insights into policies for regulators and accounting standard setters.
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Liu, Lian-Hsu, and 劉聯旭. "The Impact of SEC Mandatory Financial Forecast Regulations on Managers’ Voluntary Earnings Forecast Behaviors." Thesis, 1999. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52443009021306079410.
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碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>會計學研究所<br>87<br>The primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether managers in Taiwan change their earnings forecast behaviors after June 1991 in response to new SEC statutes regulating mandatory management earnings disclosure. Prior literature focuses mainly on examining factors influencing managers'' willingness and timing of voluntary earnings forecasts. However, managers'' reactions to mandatory management earnings forecasts have not yet been fully explored.
Our sample includes 154 firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1986 to 1996(except 1991). Logistic and OLS regressions are applied to test the impact of the new SEC regulations on managers forecast behaviors for two subsamples based on the periods before and after 1991. This study also controls industry effects and other possible confounding factors.
The results indicate that the new SEC statutes inversely affect managers'' willingness to forecast earnings. Factors such as size, profitability(profit), type of firm category(cat), and management forecast history(mono) are highly related to managers'' earnings forecast behaviors.
As for how the new SEC statutes affect managers'' earnings forecast behaviors, we find that only the accuracy of management forecast(mfa) is consistent with our hypothesis. New SEC regulations in 1991 significantly affected managers'' earnings forecast behaviors. Regression results indicate that the magnitudes of coefficients of corporate characteristics such as size, profitability(profit) and management forecast history(mono) are changed after 1991.
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"Do managers manipulate earnings to beat their own benchmarks: A study of management forecast success." Tulane University, 2008.
Find full textAbstract:
archives@tulane.edu<br>This study investigates whether and how managers manipulate earnings to improve their annual earnings forecast success, measured by predictive success, forecast error, or forecast surprise. Based on a large sample of management annual earnings forecasts from 1998 to 2006, I find strong evidence that the level of abnormal cash flow from operations and the level of abnormal production costs are associated with positive forecast errors and positive forecast surprises at earnings announcement dates. However, accruals manipulation and abnormal discretionary expenses do not affect forecast success. These results are robust after controlling for the endogeneity of forecast range. In addition, managers who issue range forecasts appear to have incentives to beat the lower bound, the midpoint, as well as the upper bound of range forecasts. Finally. managers manipulate earnings not only to reduce negative forecast surprises but also to boost positive forecast surprises at earnings announcement dates although the degree of earnings management in the presence of negative forecast surprises is more intensive.<br>1<br>Admin
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Chang, Kuo-Hsien, and 張國賢. "The Effect of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance on Real Earnings Management Behavior of Managers." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76491714894358070849.
Full textAbstract:
碩士<br>國立臺北大學<br>會計學系<br>103<br>Using publicly-available D&O insurance data for public companies in Taiwan from 2008 to 2013, this study examines the effects of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on real earnings management behavior of managers. The empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance have greater magnitude of earnings than those without D&O insurance. In addition we also find that firms with higher D&O insurance coverage have greater magnitude of earnings. Beside, further results show the firms which purchase D&O insurance less than firms’ needs have greater magnitude of earnings (no matter increase earnings or decrease earnings). However, if firms which purchase excess D&O insurance coverage more than firms’ needs. We don’t find evidence to support that will association with real earnings management behavior of managers.
Key word：Directors and Officers Liability Insurance、 Real Earnings Management,、D&O Insurance
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Hsu, Wei-chen, and 許維真. "The Influences of the Establishment and Quality of Compensation Committee on Managers'' Earnings Management." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/wh4m84.
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碩士<br>國立中山大學<br>財務管理學系研究所<br>106<br>This study mainly investigates whether the establishment and the quality of the compensation committee in our country influence the correlation between the total compensation of the executives and corporate performance (pay-performance sensitivities). After analyzing how the quality of the compensation committee affects the pay-performance sensitivities, this study further investigates the effect of the quality of the compensation committee on managerial earnings management. This study takes the listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2016 as the research subjects and finds that the establishment of the compensation committee can significantly enhance the positive relationship between the corporate performance and the total compensation of the executives. This study uses accounting performance (Return on Equity, Return on Assets) and the return on stock price as corporate performance index and finds that the establishment of the compensation committee has a significant impact on increasing the pay-performance sensitivities regardless the corporate performance is measured by accounting index or return on stock price. Further, this study uses listed companies from 2011 to 2016 that revealed the implementation of the compensation committees and the qualifications of the members to conduct the analysis and finds that the higher the quality of the remuneration committee, the higher the pay-performance sensitivities. This study finally analyzes the impact of the quality of the compensation committee on the level of managerial earnings management. The empirical results show that the higher the quality of the compensation committee, the greater the greater the level of earnings management.
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Wu, Po-han, and 吳柏翰. "A Study of Incentive Mechanisms and Various Earnings Manipulation： Considering the Role of Managers and Director Board." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06676344542361102797.
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碩士<br>逢甲大學<br>會計所<br>100<br>The outbreak of corporate frauds is continuous since the end of 2001, so all walks of life were very concerned about the enterprise board members and compensation policy. In the past, the study of executive compensation contracts indicated that the design of compensation structure might induce managers to manipulate earnings.Furthermore, using various measure of earnings manipulation model to be discussed, and considering the inhibitory effect of the incentive of the director board on earning management, ,therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the association between executive compensation incentives (PPS) and the director board incentives on both of the the traditional earnings management and the real earnings management. Empirical results supported that the company which have high PPS , its managers are more likely to engage in real earnings management, for example, discretionary accruals、abnormal cash flow、product cost and discretionary expenditure. Furthermore, the study found that director board incentives help to inhibit the earnings management behavior of discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flow, indicating that director board with the company''s earnings target is more consistent,the more the directors have an incentive to oversee the company, so the likelihood of earnings management will be lower.Finally this study also used Information Disclosure Ranking Results as a proxy for Information Transparency to discuss that whether the board of directors or managers for earnings management incentives increase or not in the condition of the high information transparent. The empirical results indicate that when information Transparency is rising, the managers will decrease earnings management behavior. The results of this study suggest that the regulatory agencies to strengthen the regulatory system implement the functions of the board of directors and reduce the degree of information asymmetry and thereby reduce the opportunities of earnings management.
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CHANG, YI-REN, and 張譯仁. "Do Managers Use Related Party Transactions for Earnings Management or Operating Efficiency?Evidence from Pre- and Post-IPOs." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/s75ygb.
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碩士<br>東海大學<br>會計學系<br>104<br>This paper investigates the relation of related party transactions (RPTs) with earnings management and operating efficiency between pre- and post-IPO. Most of research has found that RPTs having a significant correlation with earnings management. But some research indicates that RPTs improving firms’ operating performance. However, the research did not investigate both the relationship between earnings management and operating performance.
Our samples are chosen from the firms traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2014. To compare the differences between pre- and post-IPOs, research period is three years before and after the firms IPO.
Results find that pre- and post-IPOs have a different relation between earnings management and operating efficiency. Management to avoid effecting firm's the quality of financial reporting before the IPO, and RPTs by investor concern. Pre-IPOs RPTs, not for manipulating earnings upward. After the firm public offering, the earnings pressure makes management to earnings management through related party sales. Post-IPOs related party purchases improve operating efficiency than pre- IPOs, increasing firm’s value. Both pre- and post-IPOs related party sales positive operating efficiency.
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Chen, Chia-Hsin, and 陳佳信. "Directors or Financial Managers with Working Experience of CPA Firms, the Accuracy of Financial Forecast, and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57257484389802595653.
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碩士<br>國立臺灣大學<br>會計學研究所<br>95<br>This study examines the relation among directors or financial managers with
working experience of CPA firms, the accuracy of financial forecast, and earnings management. We focus on the following three issues:
1. The relation between directors or financial managers with working experience of
CPA firms and earnings management.
2. The relation between the accuracy of financial forecast and earnings management.
3. Whether the companies with directors or financial managers who had working experience of CPA firms used higher extent of earnings management to make the financial forecast.
In this study, we use the discretionary accruals (DA) to measure the extent of earnings management, and the forecast error ratio (FER) for measuring the accuracy of financial forecast. This study includes all firms which announced financial forecasts and listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over-the-Counter from 2003 to 2005 in the sample.
The substantial evidence finds after the analysis, when DA is larger than zero, the companies with directors or financial managers who had working experience of CPA firms had higher extent of earnings management upwards. When DA is less than zero, there is nothing significantly different between the companies with directors or financial managers who had working experience of CPA firms and other firms.
No matter the actual earnings is higher or lower than forecasted earnings, DA upward and downward has different impacts on FER. DA upward shows no significant influence on FER. However, DA less than zero makes the financial forecast less accurate.
Besides, the companies with directors or financial managers who had working experience of CPA firms does not significantly had lower FER than other firms. When the financial forecast is underestimated, the companies with directors or financial managers who had working experience of CPA firms has lower accuracy of financial forecast than other companies which use the same extent of DA. When the forecasted earnings is higher than the actual earnings, the companies with directors or financial managers who had working experience of CPA firms are not significantly different from other companies in FER, no matter DA is upward or downward.
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YU, TAI-KANG, and 余岱剛. "The Involvement of Board of Directors to the Managers and the Earnings Management – The Moderating Effect of the Employee Bonus." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42184332863515541562.
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碩士<br>東海大學<br>會計學系<br>97<br>The corporate governance emphasizes that the composition of board of directors can raise the quality of financial statement. Including the independent directors to the board of directors can enhance the composition of board of directors, quality of decision, operation efficiency and reliability of financial statement. However, the perspective on the composition of board of directors affects the quality of financial statement in the literature was diverse. In the past, empirical studies focused on independence of board of directors and CEO duality. This research studies further the relationship of the involvement of board of directors into various executive position with earnings management.
This research separates the involvement of board of directors to the managers into CEO duality and non-CEO executive directors and studies the characteristics of earnings management with the involvement in Taiwan’s listed companies between 2005 and 2007. Moreover, the moderating effect of employee bonus was included in this issue to investigate whether the employee bonus weakening the monitoring function of the board of directors and aggravating the behavior of earnings management of the executives. This research used discretionary accruals as indicator of earnings management and applied the panel data model with fixed effect for estimation.
Empirical results indicated that when CEO is the board chairman, earnings management is more motivated; when the ratio of non-CEO inside directors gets higher, the behavior of managing earnings of the executives is inhibited. When the employee bonus was included as a moderator, it was found whether the position is of the director in the managerial level, the employee bonus has incentive effects to the earnings management: the behavior of earnings management by CEO duality is enhanced. The function that non-CEO inside directors inhibit the earnings management of the executives does not obviously show positive relation with the employee bonus when it was included as a moderator. Also it was found by differentiating between family-controlled firm and non-family controlled firm that employee bonus had weaker incentive to the earnings management by family-controlled firm with CEO duality.
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HUANG, RUEN HUNG, and 黃潤弘. "An Empirical Research on Whether Earnings Forecast Revisions Disclosured by Managers Have Multi-Preiod Imformation Content in Public-Offering Companies in Taiwan." Thesis, 1995. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56401221666175648337.
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Ruan, Yu-Fang, and 阮郁方. "Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior, Ethical Orientation, Organizational Commitment to Explore the Intention of Managers in Earning Management." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qgweuu.
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碩士<br>國立彰化師範大學<br>會計學系<br>105<br>In recent decades, the accounting scandal has made the issue of earnings management
gradually important. In the past, the researchers often use discretionary accruals as earning management indicator, and rather than explore the psychological factors of earnings management intention. This study is based on the theory of planned behavior(TPB) proposed by Ajzen (1985), and combines the moral orientation and organizational commitment to explore the earnings management intention of managers.The sample is taken from the managers in Taiwan, and 108 valid questionnaires were collected. After recovering the questionnaire, The Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is utilized to analyze the hypotheses of this research. The results are as follows:
(1) The managers’ “the attitude toward the earnings management” has positive significant influence on the “intention of the earnings management”.
(2) The managers’ “subjective norm of earnings management” has no significant influence on the “intention of the earning management”.
(3) The managers’ “perceived behavior control of earnings management” has positive significant influence on the “intention of the earning management”.
(4) The managers’ “idealism orientation” has no significant effect on the intention of the earnings management”.
(5) The managers’ “relativism orientation” has positive significant influence on the “intention of the earnings management”.
(6) The managers’ “organization commitment” has no significant influence on the “intention of the earnings management”.
In conclusion, it indicates that managers have more positive attitude toward earning management or have more chance and resource to engage in earning management ,and more relativistic orientation, managers have the stronger intention to earning management. The dimension of attitude toward the earnings management is the main factor to affect earning management intention, followed by perceived behavioral control of earnings management and relativistic orientation.
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Suliman, Yasmeen. "The use of earnings per share disclosures in annual financial statements by managers of South African equity unit trust portfolios as a performance indicator." Thesis, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10413/3803.
Full textAbstract:
The earnings per share ratio is often quoted in financial publications as an indictor
of how well a company has performed financially. However, there is much
controversy over the usefulness of earnings per share information, especially in
respect of its potential for manipulation by the preparers of financial information.
Recent changes to South African accounting standards through the International
Harmonisation Project resulted in a revision of the Statement of Generally
Accepted Accounting Practice 104: Earnings per Share (AC104). Significant
changes to the method of calculation and disclosure of both basic and diluted
earnings per share were implemented.
Unit trusts have gained popularity in South Africa over the past decade. Members
of the public prefer to invest on the Johannesburg .Stock Exchange through
intermediaries such as unit trusts rather than undertake investment decisions
personally. Unit trust portfolio managers are in an important and a responsible
position: they wield significant power on the stock exchange with their daily
dealings in shares but they also carry the responsibility of making sound investment
decisions.
Research has tended to focus more on earnings than earnings per share. A review
of literature and prior research revealed several controversial issues: the usefulness
of earnings in making investment decisions, the susceptibility of both earnings and
earnings per share to manipulation, the predictive value of earnings, the use of
earnings in the valuation of securities and the use of earnings and earnings per
share in performance measurement.
The research problem was thus developed as follows: are the earnings per share
disclosures of South African listed companies sufficient to meet the needs of equity
unit trust portfolio managers in South Africa as a performance indicator, and if not,
what additional information do they require?
In addressing the research problem, the following four objectives were formulated:
(i) to determine what changes have been made to earnings per share calculation
and disclosure by the issue of the new ACI04,
(ii) to determine what characteristics South African equity unit trust portfolio
managers regard as indicative of a good financial performance indicator,
(iii) to determine what impact the changes made to the earnings per share
calculation and disclosure by the new AC104 has had on the use of earnings
per share information by South African unit trust portfolio managers as a
performance indicator, and
(iv) to determine the extent of use of other similar performance indicators, such as
headline earnings per share and cash flows per share, as compared to earnings
per share.
In order to meet these objectives, it was necessary to conduct a survey of South
African equity unit trust portfolio managers. The descriptive survey method was
identified as being appropriate and a mailed survey was undertaken.
The main conclusions to this research were that:
(i) the characteristics of a useful performance indicator are related to reliability,
consistency, comparability, adequate disclosure and ease of computation and
understanding,
(ii) equity unit trust portfolio managers regard the changes to the calculation and
disclosure of basic earnings per share to be improvements to the standard but
their use of basic earnings per share as a performance indicator has remained
unchanged,
(iii) equity unit trust portfolio managers regard the changes to the calculation and
disclosure of diluted earnings per share to be improvements to the standard
and their use of diluted earnings per share as a performance indicator has, as a
result, increased,
(iv) headline earnings per share and diluted earnings per share are considered to be
better performance indicators and are used more frequently as performance
indicators than basic earnings per share.
Thus the research project achieved its objectives. In addition, interesting findings in
respect of other issues were identified. Further areas for research were also
identified.<br>Thesis (M.Acc.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2000.