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Journal articles on the topic 'Management. Contracts. Economics'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 February 2022

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1

LEE, JUNG HOON, CHARLES TRZCINKA, and SHYAM VENKATESAN. "Do Portfolio Manager Contracts Contract Portfolio Management?" Journal of Finance 74, no. 5 (July 9, 2019): 2543–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12823.

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Carmichael, David G., and John P. Karantonis. "Construction contracts with conversion capability: a way forward." Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 20, no. 2 (August 3, 2015): 132–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfmpc-10-2014-0022.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the role and viability of changing contract terms as a project progresses and to offer an original analysis in this respect. Commonly, projects start out with broadly defined information, and this gets refined as the project progresses. This suggests that a prudent approach would be to tailor the contract between the project owner and the project contractor to the project stage, with conversions along the way. Information asymmetry between owner and contractor also suggests the need to tailor a contract to a project ' s situation. Design/methodology/approach – An original method of analysis of the conversion of contract terms within projects is given, along with discussion on the risk transfer between owner and contractor, the common law issues associated with implementing such conversions, any compensation that the owner might need to pay, the timing of the conversion and associated practical implementation issues. The paper, for definiteness, concentrates on construction contracts with conversion between payment types, but the paper’s approach applies to all contracts and all terms within contracts. Findings – The paper provides a readily usable method for analysing the value of having a convertible contract, couched within acceptable common law practice. Practical implications – The paper offers a novel method and framework usable by practitioners for establishing the value of convertibility within a contract. Having convertibility within a contract can be shown to offer benefits to both contracting parties. Originality/value – The idea of having flexible contracts is not new, but, hitherto, a rational method of analysing their value has been missing. This paper gives an original analysis of contracts with conversion capabilities. Current literature does not deal directly with the matter addressed in the paper.

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Di Tella, Sebastian, and Yuliy Sannikov. "Optimal Asset Management Contracts With Hidden Savings." Econometrica 89, no. 3 (2021): 1099–139. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta14929.

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We characterize optimal asset management contracts in a classic portfolio‐investment setting. When the agent has access to hidden savings, his incentives to misbehave depend on his precautionary saving motive. The contract dynamically distorts the agent's access to capital to manipulate his precautionary saving motive and reduce incentives for misbehavior. We provide a sufficient condition for the validity of the first‐order approach, which holds in the optimal contract: global incentive compatibility is ensured if the agent's precautionary saving motive weakens after bad outcomes. We extend our results to incorporate market risk, hidden investment, and renegotiation.

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GUINVARC'H, MARTIAL V., JACQUES JANSSEN, and JEAN E. CORDIER. "AGRICULTURAL FINANCE REVENUE FUTURES CONTRACT." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 07, no. 02 (March 2004): 85–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219024904002372.

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To respond to financial compound risk of farmers, two multiplicative derivative contracts, called respectively revenue futures contract and revenue put option, are proposed. The paper presents the theoretical management strategy of such a contract under the constraint that price and crop yield futures contracts are quoted. A financial intermediary can thus develop a risk-free management strategy to build a revenue futures contract. This paper opens perspectives on risk management for farmers, on completeness of markets and on new financial intermediation.

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Shymanska, Oksana. "Theoretical framework of optimal contracts (Nobel Prize in Economics 2016 awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström)." Herald of Ternopil National Economic University, no. 3(89) (October 10, 2018): 126–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2018.03.126.

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The article considers Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström’s contributions to the development of contract theory. The contributions are represented by studies on the nature of optimal contract in view of motivation of contract agents and factors that affect their motivation. A particular attention is placed on the practical utility of the research done by Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences 2016 that have fostered further studies on the theory of the firm, corporate finance, management, labour economics and the public sector, political science and law. The new theoretical tools created by O. Hart and B. Holmström serve for analysis of financial terms of contracts and for the distribution of supervisiory rights, property rights and decision-making rights. It is emphasized that O. Hart and B. Holmström’s contributions to the field of contract theory present formal treatment of motivation issues, moral hazard and incomplete contracts. The role of contracts in managing future interactions and ensuring conditions for establishing high-quality institutions is recognized. It is pointed out that the contract theory reveals working mechanisms of institutions, and presents potential hazard that may arise when new contracts are being drafted. Particular attention is paid to positioning of the contract theory within the theory of economic organization and the economic theory of information that is aimed at developing models with asymmetric information and taking into account non-observable actions. Real situations, game models and contract structure with the distinction between complete and incomplete contracts are examined (based on the informativeness principle). The performance of multi-task model and career-growth model in the contract theory is outlined. The paper analyzes the impact of the contract theory on changes in approaches to analyzing corporate relationships, which were previously based on the trade-off theory that includes balancing between the reduction of tax payments and corporate debt servicing.

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Sheth, Alpen, and Hemang Subramanian. "Blockchain and contract theory: modeling smart contracts using insurance markets." Managerial Finance 46, no. 6 (May 29, 2019): 803–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-10-2018-0510.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to model blockchain-based smart contracts specifically for the insurance industry. The authors introduce the concept of smart contracts and further discuss the implementation of a decentralized insurance marketplace, namely Etherisc, using smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain platform. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ three methods in this paper. The first one is a design illustration of a live application, namely, Etherisc. The second one is an economic model using demand–supply and equilibrium economics. The third one is an illustration using principal–agent modeling using constrained optimization. Findings The findings illustrate the following: in the design discussion, the authors demonstrate the architecture of a live Ethereum-based smart contract system. In the economic model, the authors illustrate how decentralized smart contract systems can increase social welfare by shifting demand and supply by reducing transactional costs. In the principal–agent model, the authors show how both the principal and agent are positively benefited by various mechanisms. Originality/value The paper is an original contribution and can be used as a reference model to study insurance or other similar marketplaces and the underlying economic transformations happening therein.

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Petersen, Bent, and Kim Østergaard. "Reconciling contracts and relational governance through strategic contracting." Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 33, no. 3 (April 3, 2018): 265–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jbim-09-2016-0223.

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Purpose In an industrial marketing context of manufacturer–distributor collaboration, this law and economics paper aims to contrast two approaches to contracting: conventional and strategic. Design/methodology/approach Based on relational rent theory, this paper provides an analytical framework for juxtaposing conventional and strategic contracting. A contingency approach is applied to formulate propositions as to when conventional versus strategic contracting is preferable. Findings The distinction between conventional and strategic contracting has implications as to whether relational governance substitutes or complements formal contracts (the substitution versus complements perspectives). Strategic contracting results in complementarity (rather than substitutability) between formal contracts and relational governance. Research limitations/implications This paper argues that a more nuanced view on contract types, such as strategic versus conventional, may reconcile the enduring research controversy between the substitution and complements perspectives. Practical implications Today, formal contracts with foreign distributors tend to resemble “prenuptial agreements”. The opportunity for relational rent (e.g. manifested in higher export revenues) grows if conventional contracts are superseded by contracts following strategic contracting principles. Originality/value This study is interdisciplinary, not only by its combination of marketing, management and contractual economics but also through its law and economics amalgamation.

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Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Prat. "The Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review 105, no. 5 (May 1, 2015): 452–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151002.

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Does the “soft side” of management matter? Many managers assert that “firm culture” is strongly correlated with productivity, but there are few robust tests of this assertion. In a set of field experiments, we study driver productivity within a large US logistics company that is arguably transitioning from one relational contract to another, while leaving formal practices and incentives unchanged. We find that sites under the new contract are associated with 1/8 percent higher productivity. Our findings suggest that relational contracts have a first-order effect on productivity and that they can be altered over time.

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Lehominova, Svitlana, and Alona Goloborodko. "TECHNOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTELLECTUAL SYSTEMS IN DIGITAL ECONOMICS." Economic discourse, no. 1 (March 2020): 16–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.36742/2410-0919-2020-1-2.

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Introduction. The paradigm of the modern development of economic intelligent systems is associated with the introduction of information technology, technology platforms, protocols, and IoT. Understanding the essence of technological breakthroughs and finding ways to implement technological innovations to digitize economic processes should help solve a number of problematic areas of doing business that focus on improving competitiveness. Methods. The methodological basis of the article was the current principles of the theory of innovation, methods of cognition, which are formed in the main works on the theoretical direction of the theory of organization, theory of organizational behaviour, theory of competition and theory of system analysis. Results. The essence is examined and the feasibility of using blockchain technology to increase the competitiveness of the business and reduce the risks of its business is proved. An idea of the functioning of the blockchain technology has been formed and the advantages based on the principles of invariability and accessibility of the tool have been highlighted, therefore they should work on the safety and efficiency of doing business. The experience of introducing blockchain technology by foreign countries is analyzed, possible applications are identified. The modern vitality of economic intellectual systems requires specialized technical knowledge and skills, understanding of the essence of technological processes and access to databases that allow to combine economic and technological pools of knowledge to achieve business goals. Discussion. Prospects for further research will be concentrated in the field of potential applications of blockchain technology on the Ethereum platform through smart contracts with promising use of artificial intelligence. Keywords: economic intelligent systems, digitalization, blockchain technology, Ethereum platform, smart contract, competitiveness.

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Mahdi Hosseinian, S., and David G. Carmichael. "Optimal sharing arrangement for multiple project outcomes." Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 19, no. 3 (October 28, 2014): 264–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfmpc-09-2013-0038.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to address a shortfall in the literature dealing with optimal sharing arrangements. In construction projects, where the owner is concerned about multiple project outcomes (cost, time, quality, […]), there exist no guidelines in the literature on what a sharing arrangement should be between the owner and the contractor. This paper gives that arrangement, under defined risk assumptions on the contractor (risk averse ranging to risk neutral) and the owner (risk neutral). The sharing aligns the contractor's interests with those of the owner. Design/methodology/approach – The results are based on solving a constrained maximisation problem involving the expected utilities of both the owner and contractor. Construction practitioners were interviewed in a designed experiment to validate the results. Findings – It is demonstrated that, at the optimum, the proportions of outcomes sharing to the contractor should be higher for outcomes with lower effort cost and a lower level of uncertainty, and by increasing the correlation between outcomes, the fixed component of the contractor’s fee should increase and the proportions to the contractor should decrease. Research limitations/implications – The theoretical results assume that the contractor is risk-averse ranging to risk-neutral, and that the owner is risk-neutral. The theory is supported through conducting an empirical study based on interviewing a sample of practitioners working for medium-sized contractors, and hence the support is limited to similar situations, until further data are assembled. Practical implications – By providing a broader understanding of sharing arrangements within contracts, a contribution is made to the current practice of contracts management. The results may be used in the design of contracts, or as benchmarks, by which contracts designed differently, may be compared. Originality/value – The results address a shortfall in the literature and are an original solution to establishing an optimal multiple-outcome sharing arrangement.

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Wertheimer, Alan. "Unconscionability and Contracts." Business Ethics Quarterly 2, no. 4 (October 1992): 479–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857584.

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This article considers the principles that underlie the claim that some contracts are unconscionable and that such contracts should not be enforceable. It argues that it is much more difficult to explain unconscionability than is often supposed, particularly in cases where the contract is mutually advantageous or Pareto superior. Among other things, the article considers whether unconscionability is a defect in process or result, whether the gains in an unconscionable contract are disproportionate, whether there is a strong link between the use of standard forms and unconscionability, and whether the principle of inequality of bargaining power can account for unconscionability. After rejecting several standard explanations of unconscionability, I consider several alternative ways in which it might be explained.

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Li, C. Wei, and Ashish Tiwari. "Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management." Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 11 (March 25, 2009): 4681–714. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp013.

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Berrios, Ruben. "Government Contracts and Contractor Behavior." Journal of Business Ethics 63, no. 2 (January 2006): 119–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-005-3969-8.

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14

Ge, Ling, Xiaoyan Wang, and Zhilin Yang. "The strategic choice of contract types in business process outsourcing." Business Process Management Journal 27, no. 5 (May 24, 2021): 1569–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bpmj-11-2020-0493.

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PurposeHow to determine the appropriate contractual structure for an outsourcing relationship has been a major theme in the business process outsourcing (BPO) literature. Drawing on transaction cost economics, this study aims to examine how anticipated coordination and adaptation costs in a BPO relationship affect the choice of contract types. Specifically, this research categorizes contracts types (fixed-price, time and materials and hybrid contracts) based on levels of contract design comprehensiveness and flexibility to change.Design/methodology/approachThe research setting is the BPO for a focal firm, involving a contractor. Data from 153 US companies are collected using a structured questionnaire on senior executives of functional areas of marketing, IT and finance. Hypotheses were tested using ordered probit model.FindingsThe results show that maturity is negatively associated with anticipated adaptation costs, while modularity and IT detachability are negatively related to anticipated coordination costs. Furthermore, adaptation costs have a direct impact on the choice, whereas the anticipated coordination costs do not have a significant direct impact on contract choice. The strength of adaptation costs' impact, however, is significantly reduced when coordination costs are high.Originality/valueThis study explicitly examines the role of anticipated coordination and adaptation costs in shaping the strategic choice of contract types in the BPO market. By differentiating the two types of anticipated transaction costs, this research enables a better understanding of the dynamics between transaction characteristics, anticipated transaction costs and contract types in complicated relationships such as BPO relationships.

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Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija, and Oliver Hart. "Continuing Contracts." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 36, no. 2 (January 29, 2020): 284–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz022.

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Abstract Parties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example. Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point. A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or long-term contract. However, fair bargaining makes adjusting to outside options difficult and may cause inefficient outcomes. An implicit promise of a long-term relationship, as in employment, can improve matters. (JEL D23, D86, K12).

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Schieg, Martin. "STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT." Journal of Business Economics and Management 9, no. 1 (March 31, 2008): 47–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1611-1699.2008.9.47-51.

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A construction project is characterized by a high number of project participants and a multitude of contract relations. The Principal Agent Theory deals with the design of contracts, especially with respect to asymmetric information. Asymmetric distribution of information in co‐operations can have effects before as well as after closing a contract. In construction project management therefore attention has to be paid to where information imbalances occur. Several methods are known with which one can cope with the resulting problems but which in turn cause costs.

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Arantes, Amílcar, and Luís Miguel D. F. Ferreira. "Underlying causes and mitigation measures of delays in construction projects." Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 25, no. 2 (February 26, 2020): 165–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfmpc-03-2019-0029.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to contribute to the theory and practice of project management in the construction industry by identifying the primary causes and extracting the underlying causes of construction delays and providing recommendations on delay mitigation measures. Design/methodology/approach AA survey was used to identify the importance of 47 causes of delays. The relative importance index was used to rank them, factor analysis was applied to extract the underlying causes and focus group interviews were used for discussion and development of mitigation measures. Findings Six of the ten most important causes are in the top ten universal delays in construction projects. Factor analysis revealed six underlying causes: improper planning, poor consultant performance, inefficient site management, owner influence, bureaucracy and sub-standard contracts. Practical implications The owner/sponsor/client must have adequate engineering and project management skills to be able to evaluate proposals and contractors more accurately, economically and technically. The bidding and contract award process should focus on the most economically advantageous proposal and contracts should provide for mechanisms for managing risks while executing projects. Contractors should select reliable, high-quality subcontractors and suppliers and should have competent site managers. Originality/value This work expands and improves the understanding of the causes of delays in construction projects by providing an empirical study of the causes of delays and respective mitigation measures in Portugal.

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Zervos, Vasilis. "Integrated Approaches in Economics of Contracting and Knowledge Management." Journal of Economics and Public Finance 5, no. 4 (November 25, 2019): p448. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jepf.v5n4p448.

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Knowledge management (KM) in the space sector is a particularly interesting study owing to the specific characteristics of lack of patenting and recording of information associated with security considerations, as well as the sectoral age pyramid and the obsolescence of equipment that results in significant KM transaction costs and loss of information. Coupled with the custom-made nature that is typical of space projects, the analysis in this paper focuses on contractual mechanisms that incorporate transfer of KM within and beyond a project’s life-cycle and the implications for specific types of contracts that are typically used -mostly in procurement. This leads to incentives for contractors to enhance also inter-firm transfer of knowledge and develop the management tools that will sustain virtual skills of past project teams. The paper shows that this approach can result in significant benefits for all stakeholders, despite challenges associated with potential transaction costs in contracting and lack of standards and relevant experience in usage of such mechanisms. Finally, a critique of the industry tradition of cost and performance assessments prior to end of lifetime is emerging.

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Gillen, David, and William G. Morrison. "The economics of franchise contracts and airport policy." Journal of Air Transport Management 11, no. 1 (January 2005): 43–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2004.11.003.

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Rosenberg, Sidney B., and John B. Corgel. "Agency Costs in Apartment Property Management Contracts." Real Estate Economics 18, no. 2 (June 1990): 184–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00516.

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Cole, Shawn, Xavier Giné, Jeremy Tobacman, Petia Topalova, Robert Townsend, and James Vickery. "Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 104–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.1.104.

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Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of nonsystematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and nonprice factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to US insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints, and limited salience are significant nonprice frictions that constrain demand. We suggest possible contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions. (JEL D14, D81, O12, O13, O16, O18, Q12)

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ELFakir, Adil, and Mohamed Tkiouat. "A multiagent game theoretical approach to adverse selection in corporate financing." Investment Management and Financial Innovations 13, no. 2 (July 14, 2016): 292–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.13(2-2).2016.04.

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In this research the authors tried to solve the adverse selection problem in the Mudaraba contracts with respect to the projects privately known prospects. The authors introduced a model of two contracts characterized by an adverse selection index for each contract. They have managed to find that a case of market breakdown can occur because the efficient agent might mimic the inefficient agent. The authors, then, managed to develop a ‘Mimicking Likelihood Index’ whereby one can infer whether a type of an agent has a tendency to mimic the other type. In the same context, the authors developed a “Relative Adverse Selection” index to measure which type of agents has more tendencies to select a specific type of contracts. These findings should help Islamic financial institutions in their agent selection process and hedge its risky Mudaraba contracts

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Dunfee, Thomas W. "Business Ethics and Extant Social Contracts." Business Ethics Quarterly 1, no. 1 (January 1991): 23–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857591.

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Extant social contracts, deriving from communities of individuals, constitute a significant source of ethical norms in business. When found consistent with general ethical theories through the application of a filtering test, these real social contracts generate prima facie duties of compliance on the part of those who expressly or impliedly consent to the terms of the social contract, and also on the part of those who take advantage of the instrumental value of the social contracts. Businesspeople typically participate in multiple communities and, as a consequence, encounter conflicting ethical norms. Priority rules can be devised to resolve such conflicts. The framework of extant social contracts merges normative and theoretical research in business ethics and specifies a domain for empirical studies.

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Cimino, Chapin F. "The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract." Texas A&M Law Review 3, no. 1 (September 2015): 91–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v3.i1.4.

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Modern contract law scholarship embraces a particularly strange contradiction. On one hand, most legal scholars accept the core insight of what is called relational contract theory: most commercial contracts involve repeat players who seek to maximize wealth while still maintaining cooperative relationships. On the other hand, many of these same contract scholars believe that there is nothing contract law could or should do about it. They contend that contract law and legal theory are better off ignoring this insight, rather than trying to respond to it. This Article brings these disparate lines of contract scholarship together by introducing new information that could dramatically change how legal scholars make sense of relational contract theory. It turns out that while legal scholars have largely discounted the importance of relational contract theory, another community of scholars—working in organizational theory, marketing, and strategic management—have studied, tested, and developed its insights. As a result, they have not only empirically confirmed the presence of relational behaviors in modern contracting, but they have begun to discover the sort of data that might make it possible to better account for the economic effects of relational contracting behavior in both legal theory and contract law doctrine. This literature demonstrates that it is possible to operationalize the insights of relational contract theory in an interdisciplinary way that respects both the need for a methodologically rigorous framework and the complex nature of economic behavior. In this Article, I argue that contract law scholars should set out on that same course.

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Wang, Fuxi, Bernard Gan, Yanyuan Cheng, Lin Peng, Jiaojiao Feng, Liquian Yang, and Yiheng Xi. "China’s Employment Contract Law: Does it deliver employment security?" Economic and Labour Relations Review 30, no. 1 (February 7, 2019): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1035304619827758.

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During its transition to a market economy, structural inequalities became increasingly apparent across China’s workforce, threatening social harmony. China’s 2008 Employment Contract Law, legislated amid policy debate, was intended to remedy these phenomena. We examine a crucial element of its remit: has its promotion of continuing contracts as against fixed-term employment contracts been effective? This is crucial for improving workers’ rights through secure employment. How have employers responded to this challenge to their prerogatives in terms of hiring and firing? We analysed data from 2007 and 2012 drawn from All-China Federation of Trade Unions surveys, which cover approximately 80,000 individuals. Using institutional theory, we discuss a variety of employer responses. We find that the Employment Contract Law has increased the likelihood of signing continuing contracts among migrant workers, employees in privately owned enterprises, and those with lower professional titles and who are short-term employees – all disadvantaged labour market categories previously. It has also significantly narrowed gaps regarding access to continuing contracts between these categories and matched advantaged ones. There is also evidence that some employers seek to avoid or sidestep compliance through cost-minimising worker engagement strategies. JEL Codes: J41, J53, K31

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Tehranian, Hassan, Nickolaos G. Travlos, and James F. Waegelein. "Management Compensation Contracts and Merger-Induced Abnormal Returns." Journal of Accounting Research 25 (1987): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2491079.

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LIANG, PIERRE JINGHONG. "Equilibrium Earnings Management, Incentive Contracts, and Accounting Standards*." Contemporary Accounting Research 21, no. 3 (September 2004): 685–718. http://dx.doi.org/10.1506/586l-8dkt-3uyl-l9q4.

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Filson, Darren, David Switzer, and Portia Besocke. "AT THE MOVIES: THE ECONOMICS OF EXHIBITION CONTRACTS." Economic Inquiry 43, no. 2 (April 2005): 354–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi024.

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Makovii, Viktor, Svitlana Voloshyna, Yaroslav Kushnir, Iryna Mykhailova, and Serhii Tsarenko. "Contract for the Provision of Services and Labor Contract: A Comparative Analysis of Consequences for Parties Under Ukrainian Legislation." European Journal of Sustainable Development 10, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 466. http://dx.doi.org/10.14207/ejsd.2021.v10n1p466.

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The article analyzes the legal consequences of concluding a labor contract and a contract for the provision of services. The need for such an analysis is due to the fact that employers often prefer to conclude civil law contracts with employees instead of labor contracts, since the latter are less beneficial for them. At the same time, for an employee, the conclusion of a contract for the provision of services instead of an employment contract entails the deprivation of all guarantees provided for by labor legislation. The historical prerequisites for the existence of similarities between labor and civil contracts are examined in the article. In order to distinguish between these types of contracts, a comparative analysis of the legal nature and consequences of the conclusion of an employment contract and a contract for the provision of services is carried out. The article analyzes the guarantees that are provided for by labor legislation and are aimed at ensuring the human right to work. It is concluded that when concluding civil contracts, these guarantees are lost, which significantly worsens the position of the employee. In this regard, the article analyzes the recommendations of the International Labor Organization aimed at distinguishing between civil and labor legal relations. The conclusion is made that it is necessary to consider these recommendations in the national legislation of all Member States.

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Wang, Xingchun. "Valuation of new-designed contracts for catastrophe risk management." North American Journal of Economics and Finance 50 (November 2019): 101041. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2019.101041.

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Koontz, Stephen R., Michael A. Hudson, and Matthew W. Hughes. "Livestock Futures Markets And Rational Price Formation: Evidence For live Cattle And Live Hogs." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 24, no. 1 (July 1992): 233–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0081305200026157.

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AbstractThe efficiency of livestock futures markets continues to receive attention, particularly with regard to their forward pricing or forecasting ability. The purpose of this paper is to present a more general theory that encompasses the forward pricing concept. It is argued that futures contract prices for competitively produced nonstorable commodities, such as live cattle and live hogs, follow a rational formation process. Futures contract prices reflect expected market conditions when contracts are sufficiently close to the delivery month that the supply of the underlying commodity cannot be changed. However, prior to the period when future supplies are relatively fixed, futures contract prices should adjust to reflect the competitive equilibrium, where output price equals average costs of production. Presented evidence suggests that live cattle and live hog futures markets support the rational price formation hypothesis: prices for distant contracts reflect average costs of feeding. Implications for risk management strategies are considered.

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Boon, Ling-Ni, Marie Brière, and Bas J. M. Werker. "Systematic longevity risk: to bear or to insure?" Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 19, no. 3 (November 25, 2019): 409–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474747219000192.

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AbstractWe compare two contracts for managing systematic longevity risk in retirement: a collective arrangement that distributes the risk among participants, and a market-provided annuity contract. We evaluate the contracts’ appeal with respect to the retiree's welfare, and the viability of the market solution through the financial reward to the annuity provider's equityholders. We find that individuals prefer to bear the risk under a collective arrangement than to insure it with a life insurers' annuity contract subject to insolvency risk (albeit small). Under realistic capital provision hypotheses, the annuity provider is incapable of adequately compensating its equityholders for bearing systematic longevity risk.

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Hillier, David, Beatriz Martínez, Pankaj C. Patel, Julio Pindado, and Ignacio Requejo. "Pound of Flesh? Debt Contract Strictness and Family Firms." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 42, no. 2 (December 26, 2017): 259–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1042258717748933.

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While past work finds support for both higher and lower cost of debt among family firms, whether lower shareholder–creditor agency conflicts in family firms translate into greater ex-ante contracting efficiency (i.e., lower debt contract strictness) remains unexplored. Drawing on a shareholder–creditor agency framework and costly contracting theory, creditors, expecting firm value maximization rather than shareholder value maximization from family firms, may offer less strict debt contracts to increase contracting efficiency. We find in a sample of 716 publicly traded U.S. firms (2001–2010) that family firms have less strict debt contracts, which are even less strict when family firms have higher asset tangibility. Although increases in R&D investments could lead to more pronounced shareholder–creditor agency conflicts, given family firms' preferences for lower risk and growth, debt contract strictness among family firms is not positively associated with higher R&D intensity.

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Lee, Jooho. "Contracts and Hierarchies: A Moral Examination of Economic Theories of the Firm." Business Ethics Quarterly 28, no. 2 (February 12, 2018): 153–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2017.54.

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ABSTRACT:An influential set of economic theories argue that the firm is a nexus of contracts that institute a hierarchy to overcome the problems of incomplete contracting in the market. However, the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy violates the moral requirement to respect the autonomy of those who contract into the firm. The internal logic of the theory depends on a morally unacceptable abdication of a part of the employee’s capacity to set her own ends in the future. So a different theory is needed to understand the nature and purpose of the firm. The development of such a theory can benefit from business ethicists engaging with existing economic theories of the firm to explore concepts like contracts, agency, and property.

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Helper, Susan, and Rebecca Henderson. "Management Practices, Relational Contracts, and the Decline of General Motors." Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 49–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.28.1.49.

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General Motors was once regarded as the best-managed and most successful firm in the world. However, between 1980 and 2009, GM's US market share fell from 46 to 20 percent, and in 2009 the firm went bankrupt. We argue that the conventional explanation for this decline—namely high legacy labor and healthcare costs—is seriously incomplete, and that GM's share collapsed for many of the same reasons that many highly successful American firms of the 1960s were forced from the market, including a failure to understand the nature of the competition they faced and an inability to respond effectively once they did. We focus particularly on the problems GM encountered in developing the relational contracts essential to modern design and manufacturing, and we discuss a number of possible causes for these difficulties. We suggest that GM's experience may have important implications for our understanding of the role of management in the modern, knowledge-based firm and for the potential revival of manufacturing in the United States.

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Nachman, David C., and Thomas H. Noe. "Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management." Economic Theory 5, no. 2 (June 1995): 315–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01215206.

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Gibbons, Robert, and Robert S. Kaplan. "Formal Measures in Informal Management: Can a Balanced Scorecard Change a Culture?" American Economic Review 105, no. 5 (May 1, 2015): 447–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151073.

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We extend traditional agency theory by exploring the roles for formal measures when managerial behavior is not governed by rules, formulas, or contracts. Part I describes relational incentive contracts with informal weights on formal performance measures. More importantly, it also explores how formal measures could be used in models of informal management, such as adaptation and coordination, politics and influence, leadership, and informal authority. Part II considers the benefits from allowing key stakeholders to develop their own, potentially inferior, performance measures. The collaboration to create a “balanced scorecard” of performance measures can help change an organization's culture.

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Hong and Lee. "Supply Chain Contracts under New Product Development Uncertainty." Sustainability 11, no. 23 (December 2, 2019): 6858. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11236858.

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New product development has been serving as a growth engine for companies; given this background, the innovation of suppliers that possess new technologies for new products has been a significant subject for manufacturers, particularly in high-tech industries. However, the technology uncertainty associated with the supplier’s development capability may become a considerable obstacle to new product development projects. In this paper, we further develop an analytical model that has been widely applied in the economics literature and examine two representative supply chain contracts, a revenue-sharing contract and a cost-sharing contract, for new product development through upstream innovation under technology uncertainty. We confirm that the supplier’s development capability has a significant impact on contract feasibility. The revenue-sharing contract helps to attain a higher new product quality level and profit for the supply chain. Furthermore, we explore the relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier concerning the performance of the new product development project. Adopting a Nash bargaining model, we analyze the two supply chain contracts under a cooperative relationship in which the manufacturer and supplier cooperatively determine the sharing portion of the revenue or cost. For both contracts, compared with the unilateral relationship, the cooperative relationship leads to a lower manufacturer profit, but a higher new product quality and a higher supply chain profit.

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Chong Ju Choi. "Contract Enforcement Across Cultures." Organization Studies 15, no. 5 (September 1994): 673–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/017084069401500502.

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The importance of contract enforcement and formal and informal agreements has recently become an increasingly researched area in management. A major part of this research is the difference between the sociological and management approach and that of the recent developments in organization economics. Recent works in this area include Barney (1990), Eisenhardt (1989) and Noord erhaven (1992). The main purpose of this paper is to try and develop the ideas in these works further with respect to agreements and non-legal forms of contracts. We do this by comparing systems of cooperation and agreements in Eastern Europe, East Asia and Southeast Asia.

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Zou, Wenting, Saara A. Brax, Mervi Vuori, and Risto Rajala. "The influences of contract structure, contracting process, and service complexity on supplier performance." International Journal of Operations & Production Management 39, no. 4 (May 14, 2019): 525–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijopm-12-2016-0756.

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Purpose To build a more comprehensive understanding of factors affecting the success of service contracting, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the influences of service complexity, contract structure and contracting process on the buyer-perceived supplier performance in business-to-business (B2B) services. Design/methodology/approach A research model is developed based on transaction cost economics and the research on service contracting. The model is tested by the survey data collected. Professional focus groups on LinkedIn are used to generate the list of potential respondents. The sample consists of 177 purchasing professionals from 25 countries. Findings The results indicate that three major contract dimensions and follow-up management practices positively influence buyer-perceived supplier performance. Furthermore, service complexity amplifies the effects of incentives designed in the contract and the buyer’s follow-up contract management on perceived supplier performance. Research limitations/implications The sample consists of respondents from 25 countries and provides good geographic coverage. However, the results should be generalized with caution because not all countries were represented equally. Practical implications The study suggests a framework and guidelines for purchasing managers to improve the design and management of service contracts to secure good performance from their supplier. Originality/value This paper contributes to understanding the performance-enhancing aspects of designing and monitoring service contracts in B2B contexts. It also adds to the knowledge of the role of service complexity in successful B2B service purchasing.

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Wirl, Franz. "Inter-Divisional Contracts." International Journal of the Economics of Business 11, no. 2 (July 2004): 197–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1357151042000222828.

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Riis, Christian. "Strategic wage contracts." Journal of Economics 50, no. 2 (June 1989): 129–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01239122.

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Beuve, Jean, Marian W. Moszoro, and Stéphane Saussier. "Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 28, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 316–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12268.

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Bental, Benjamin, Bruno Deffains, and Dominique Demougin. "Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts." European Journal of Law and Economics 50, no. 2 (September 18, 2020): 241–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-020-09667-1.

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Martimort, David, and Wilfried Sand-Zantman. "Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities." RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 4 (December 2006): 763–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00056.x.

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Wacker, John G., Chenlung Yang, and Chwen Sheu. "A transaction cost economics model for estimating performance effectiveness of relational and contractual governance." International Journal of Operations & Production Management 36, no. 11 (November 7, 2016): 1551–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijopm-10-2013-0470.

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Purpose As outsourcing continues to grow, supplier management becomes critical to the success of manufacturing firms. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests that firms should choose supplier governance mechanisms to ensure fulfillment of contractual obligations and safeguard against opportunism for their outsourcing activities. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine how buying organizations govern supplier contracts to improve manufacturing competitiveness and financial performance. The relative effectiveness of two primary governance mechanisms, contractual governance (CG), and relational governance, are examined. Design/methodology/approach Expanding upon previous studies, this study delineates three relational governance mechanisms (negotiation efficiency (NE), problem solving relations, and information sharing (IS)) that are conceptually, statistically and pragmatically different. Based on the TCE literature, a conceptual model is developed to decipher the relationships between pre-contract conditions (supplier asset specificity and environmental uncertainty (EU)), governance mechanisms, performance ambiguity (PA), and performance. Using the data collected from 987 firms, the statistical results present several important findings that would advance current theory and practice in outsourcing. Findings The authors find empirical support for the effects of contractual and relational governance in improving manufacturing and financial performance. The governance of supplier contracts clearly facilitates manufacturers’ ability to leverage their resources to improve performance. The relative effectiveness of these two governance mechanisms is related to the levels of EU and supplier asset specificity. Relational governance displays greater influence on performance than CG does. However, CG appears to be complementary to relational governance. Research limitations/implications The interplays between supplier asset specificity and EU should be examined in the future. The relationships among NE, IS, and problem solving should also be examined to facilitate the development of relational governance. Practical implications Managers should be aware of the situational performance of governance mechanisms. Moreover, it is important to realize how differently each of the three relational governance mechanisms and CG contribute to performance. Originality/value This study extends the academic discussion of supplier governance by investigating the alignment of governance mechanisms (relational governance and CG) with pre-contract conditions to reduce PA and, thereby, enhance manufacturing performance. Under the theoretical framework of TCE, the direct and indirect effects of pre-contract conditions and governance variables are fully examined and discussed. Moreover, relational governance involves multiple mechanisms that are conceptually and pragmatically different, and future studies should not treat it as one single construct.

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Choi, Soon-Yong, Dale Stahl, and Andrew Whinston. "Intermediation, Contracts Contracts and Micropayments in Electronic Commerce." Electronic Markets 8, no. 1 (1998): 20–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10196789800000006.

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OSWALD, ANDREW J. "New Research on the Economics of Trade Unions and Labor Contracts." Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 26, no. 1 (January 1987): 30–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232x.1987.tb00692.x.

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Johnson, W. Bruce. "Discussion of Management Compensation Contracts and Merger-Induced Abnormal Returns." Journal of Accounting Research 25 (1987): 77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2491080.

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OBAIDULLAH, OHAMMED. "Financial Options in Islamic Contracts: Potential Tools for Risk Management." Journal of King Abdulaziz University-Islamic Economics 11, no. 1 (1999): 3–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4197/islec.11-1.1.

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