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Journal articles on the topic 'Market power'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Weiss, Jürgen. "Market Power and Power Markets." Interfaces 32, no. 5 (2002): 37–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.32.5.37.74.

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2

Morris, John R. "Finding Market Power in Electric Power Markets." International Journal of the Economics of Business 7, no. 2 (2000): 167–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13571510050084514.

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3

Raj, Aniket, Utkarsh Gupta, Prabhakar Tiwari, and Asheesh K. Singh. "Market power analysis of the Indian power market." International Journal of Engineering, Science and Technology 13, no. 1 (2021): 39–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ijest.v13i1.6s.

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Emerging electricity reforms in the power market aims at removing the monopolistic oligopoly power market and promoting competition in the market by providing opportunities to more producers. This paper seeks to investigate various existing structures of the Power Market. Indian Energy Exchange (IEX) and Power Exchange India Limited (PXIL) facilitates transparent trading of electricity, a larger market spectrum and allows the participation of other players in the market. Market power is an indicator of an non-competitive market, that is increase in the market power will result in the degradati

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4

Lines, Thomas. "Markets, prices and market power." International Journal of Green Economics 2, no. 3 (2008): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijge.2008.021424.

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5

Ansink, Erik, and Harold Houba. "Market power in water markets." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, no. 2 (2012): 237–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.10.002.

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6

Twomey, Paul, and Karsten Neuhoff. "Wind power and market power in competitive markets." Energy Policy 38, no. 7 (2010): 3198–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.031.

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7

Cope III, Robert F., David E. Dismukes, and Rachelle F. Cope. "Modeling regional electric power markets and market power." Managerial and Decision Economics 22, no. 8 (2001): 411–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1031.

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8

Brennan, Donna, and Jane Melanie. "Market power in the Australian power market." Energy Economics 20, no. 2 (1998): 121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-9883(97)00010-8.

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9

Ito, Koichiro, and Mar Reguant. "Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage." American Economic Review 106, no. 7 (2016): 1921–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141529.

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We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer

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10

Borenstein, Severin, James Bushnell, Edward Kahn, and Steven Stoft. "Market power in California electricity markets." Utilities Policy 5, no. 3-4 (1995): 219–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0957-1787(96)00005-7.

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11

Kaplow, Louis. "Market definition, market power." International Journal of Industrial Organization 43 (November 2015): 148–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.05.001.

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12

Bask, Mikael, Jens Lundgren, and Niklas Rudholm. "Market power in the expanding Nordic power market." Applied Economics 43, no. 9 (2009): 1035–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840802600269.

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13

Green, Richard. "Market power mitigation in the UK power market." Utilities Policy 14, no. 2 (2006): 76–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2005.09.001.

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14

Ahn, Nam-sung, and Victor Niemeyer. "Modeling market power in Korea's emerging power market." Energy Policy 35, no. 2 (2007): 899–906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2005.12.027.

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15

Aviram, Amitai. "Cyclical Market Power." Israel Law Review 36, no. 1 (2002): 103–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700017908.

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Market power is not ubiquitous; it is limited to certain products, in certain areas, and to certain times. Understanding the limits of the market power possessed by a firm in a given case is essential to the correct assessment of the firm's behavior and its antitrust implications.The most common method used to identify the scope as well as the strength of a firm's market power is through the definition of relevant markets, calculation of market share and identification of relevant market conditions (e.g., barriers to entry). Correct assessment of suspected market power should relate to all the

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16

T’Syen, Koen. "Market Power in Bidding Markets: An Economic Overview." World Competition 31, Issue 1 (2008): 37–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2008004.

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Undertakings often claim to operate on a bidding market, where it is impossible to have market power (“bidding market defence”). This defence is only valid under four conditions: winner-takes-all, lumpy demand, absence of lock-in effects and easy entry. If fulfilled, one speaks of an ideal bidding market. Non-compliance with at least one condition invalidates the defence, and “ordinary” antitrust problems resurge: firms may exercise market power. The feasibility thereof depends, firstly, on whether the bidding process is better qualified as an ascending or a sealed-bid auction and, secondly, o

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17

Sirjani, Bahareh, and Morteza Rahimiyan. "Wind power and market power in short-term electricity markets." International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems 28, no. 8 (2018): e2571. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/etep.2571.

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18

Staten, Michael, John Umbeck, and William Dunkelberg. "Market share/market power revisited." Journal of Health Economics 7, no. 1 (1988): 73–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(88)90006-9.

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19

Pauly, Mark V. "Market power, monopsony, and health insurance markets." Journal of Health Economics 7, no. 2 (1988): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(88)90011-2.

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20

Atkins, Karla, Jiangzhuo Chen, V. S. Anil Kumar, Matthew Macauley, and Achla Marathe. "Locational market power in network constrained markets." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70, no. 1-2 (2009): 416–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001.

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21

Sexton, Richard J. "Market Power, Misconceptions, and Modern Agricultural Markets." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 95, no. 2 (2012): 209–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aas102.

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22

Hyytinen, Ari, and Otto Toivanen. "Monitoring and market power in credit markets." International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, no. 2 (2004): 269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.06.001.

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23

Wang, P., Y. Xiao, and Y. Ding. "Nodal Market Power Assessment in Electricity Markets." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 19, no. 3 (2004): 1373–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2004.831695.

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24

Raper, Kellie Curry, and H. Alan Love. "Market power in tobacco: Measuring multiple markets." Agribusiness 23, no. 1 (2007): 35–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/agr.20112.

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25

Ramamohan Rao, T. V. S. "Strategic market power of firms in imperfect markets." Information Fusion Research 2, no. 1 (2024): 6298. http://dx.doi.org/10.59429/ifr.v2i1.6298.

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Studies dealing with the market power of a firm depend on the elasticity of demand even when market imperfection is acknowledged. This study suggests that a firm derives its market power due to its interface with consumers on the market as well as its interaction with rival firms on the market. As a result, its market share and market power over a unit of sales in the industry require attention in the context of imperfect markets. Similarly, non-price strategies of firms offer some market power that should be incorporated in the definition. Thus the modified market power indices are a signific

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26

Prey, Robert. "Locating Power in Platformization: Music Streaming Playlists and Curatorial Power." Social Media + Society 6, no. 2 (2020): 205630512093329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2056305120933291.

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Where does the “power” of platformization reside? As is widely recognized, platforms are matchmakers which interface between different markets or “sides.” This article analyzes platform power dynamics through three of the most important markets that Spotify—the leading audio streaming platform—is embedded within: the music market; the advertising market; and the finance market. It does so through the lens of the playlist. Playlists can be seen as a central example of how platforms like Spotify employ curation or “curatorial power” to mediate markets in the attempt to advance their own interest

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27

Berger, David, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey. "Labor Market Power." American Economic Review 112, no. 4 (2022): 1147–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191521.

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We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20

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28

Hu, Desheng, Jeffrey Gleason, Muhammad Abu Bakar Aziz, et al. "Market or Markets? Investigating Google Search’s Market Shares under Vertical Segmentation." Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media 18 (May 28, 2024): 637–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v18i1.31340.

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Is Google Search a monopoly with gatekeeping power? Regulators from the US, UK, and Europe have argued that it is based on the assumption that Google Search dominates the market for horizontal (a.k.a. “general”) web search. Google disputes this, claiming that competition extends to all vertical (a.k.a. “specialized”) search engines, and that under this market definition it does not have monopoly power. In this study we present the first analysis of Google Search’s market share under vertical segmentation of online search. We leverage observational trace data collected from a panel of US reside

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29

Kaszyński, Przemysław, Aleksandra Komorowska, and Jacek Kamiński. "Revisiting Market Power in the Polish Power System." Energies 16, no. 13 (2023): 4856. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en16134856.

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The consequences of the liberalisation of electricity markets have been widely discussed in the literature emphasising the successes or failures of privatisation and deregulation. While most developed power systems have undergone a form of economic transformation, they still require to be monitored and analysed to assess market power. The Polish power system is an example wherein the potential of market power examined fifteen years ago was summarised as significant. Since then, the transformation process and changes in the ownership structure have taken place. This study focuses on the assessm

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30

Lo, K. L., and Y. A. Alturki. "Towards reactive power markets. Part 2: Differentiated market reactive power requirements." IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution 2, no. 4 (2008): 516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd:20070370.

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31

Wilson, James F. "Scarcity, Market Power, and Price Caps in Wholesale Electric Power Markets." Electricity Journal 13, no. 9 (2000): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1040-6190(00)00153-6.

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32

HELMAN, U. "Market power monitoring and mitigation in the US wholesale power markets." Energy 31, no. 6-7 (2006): 877–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2005.05.011.

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33

Asgari, Mohammad Hossein, Hassan Monsef, and Majid Oloomi Buygi. "A novel approach for evaluating market power in reactive power markets." European Transactions on Electrical Power 21, no. 5 (2010): 1731–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/etep.521.

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34

Bühler, Benno. "Market Power: Introduction." Competition Law & Policy Debate 5, no. 2 (2019): 16–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/clpd.2019.02.03.

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35

Bühler, Benno, and Lars Wiethaus. "Market Power: Introduction." Competition Law & Policy Debate 5, no. 2 (2019): 16–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/cpld.2019.02.03.

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36

Galtung, Andreas. "Significant Market Power." European Business Law Review 12, Issue 7/8 (2001): 160–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/396526.

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37

Gabszewicz, Jean J., and Lisa Grazzini. "Taxing Market Power." Journal of Public Economic Theory 1, no. 4 (1999): 475–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00022.

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38

Damro, Chad. "Market power Europe." Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 5 (2012): 682–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.646779.

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39

Minkel, J. R. "Artificial Market Power." Scientific American 296, no. 4 (2007): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0407-28b.

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40

Weretka, Marek. "Endogenous market power." Journal of Economic Theory 146, no. 6 (2011): 2281–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.002.

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41

Guthmann, Rafael R. "Vanishing Market Power." Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo) 54, no. 1 (2024): 135–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1980-53575415rrg.

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Abstract Perfect competition can be approximated in an environment with differentiated goods, heterogeneous firms, and frictions of trading. This paper considers an environment where sellers sell differentiated goods to buyers, and frictions of trading are represented by the buyers having incomplete consideration sets of the sellers in the market. Besides selling differentiated products, some sellers are more “prominent” and so are present in a larger number of buyers’ consideration sets. However, despite these imperfections, as the average number of sellers in the buyers’ consideration sets e

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42

Montgomery, Cynthia A. "Product-Market Diversification and Market Power." Academy of Management Journal 28, no. 4 (1985): 789–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/256237.

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43

Boulding, William, and Richard Staelin. "Environment, Market Share, and Market Power." Management Science 36, no. 10 (1990): 1160–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.10.1160.

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44

Eeckhout, Jan. "Market power and labour market inequality." Oxford Open Economics 3, Supplement_1 (2024): i1006—i1011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ooec/odad066.

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Abstract I discuss how firms contribute to inequality in the UK as laid out in the article in this collection by De Loecker, Obermeier and Van Reenen. As in other economies around the world, the UK has seen a rise in market power since 1980 leading to an increase in inequality of firm sizes. While firm inequality per se is not harmful, when it is driven by market power, it does have major implications for the labour market. This commentary examines the effect of the firm size distribution and market power on the labour share, declining labour dynamism and wage inequality. I also outline policy

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45

Montgomery, C. A. "PRODUCT-MARKET DIVERSIFICATION AND MARKET POWER." Academy of Management Journal 28, no. 4 (1985): 789–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256237.

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46

Fiuza de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo, and Toby Daglish. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?" Energy Economics 58 (August 2016): 11–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.010.

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47

Gounari, Panayota. "Neoliberalizing Higher Education in Greece: New Laws, Old Free-Market Tricks." Power and Education 4, no. 3 (2012): 277–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/power.2012.4.3.277.

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48

Franck, Jens-Uwe, and Martin Peitz. "Market power of digital platforms." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 39, no. 1 (2023): 34–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac045.

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Abstract Digital platforms have reshaped many product markets and play an increasingly important role in economies around the globe. Some of these platforms have become powerful players and may possess a lot of market power. Economists use a number of indicators to assess market power. In this article we discuss to which extent these indicators are helpful in the context of digital platforms. In particular, we focus on assessing entrenched market power and the role of potential competition to constrain this power. Finally, we discuss some cross-border issues of platform market power.

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49

Fayyaz, Um-E.-Roman, Raja Nabeel-Ud-Din Jalal, Gianluca Antonucci, and Michelina Venditti. "Does CEO power influence corporate risk and performance? Evidence from Greece and Hungary." Corporate Ownership and Control 18, no. 4 (2021): 77–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv18i4art6.

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We intend to investigate the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) powers on corporate decisions made by firms in the context of board oversight (BO) and market competition (MC). From 2007 to 2017, we applied a quantitative approach to a sample of two stressed European markets (i.e., Hungary and Greece). We found that CEO power has a negative impact on corporate risk and firm performance. Furthermore, results also reveal no sign of moderation effect for MC with corporate decisions, whereas BO moderated the CEO power and corporate decisions in the Hungarian market. However, the results of m

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50

Mozdawar, Seyed Alireza, Asghar Akbari Foroud, and Meysam Amirahmadi. "Interdependent electricity markets design: Market power and gaming." International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems 136 (March 2022): 107641. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107641.

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