Relevant bibliographies by topics / Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy

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  2. Dissertations / Theses
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Academic literature on the topic 'Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy'

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Published: 4 June 2021
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Journal articles on the topic "Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy"

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Tomyuk, Ol'ga Nikolaevna. "Creativity in Martin Heidegger's existentialism." Культура и искусство, no. 5 (May 2020): 18–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0625.2020.5.32811.

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In the conditions of globalization with characteristic for this era sociocultural transformations, the anthropological problematic, which emphasizes the role of interrelation between creativity and personal being, comes to the forefront. The object of this study is creativity in the philosophical-cultural concept of M. Heidegger. The subject is the phenomenon of creation in M. Heidegger's existentialism. Reference to the concept of M. Heidegger is not accidental, since the problem of human and creativity is focal in his philosophical writings. In his work “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger sets an ontological vector of studying creativity in art, assigning to being as such the core position.  The article explores M. Heidegger's understanding of creation, which he describes using the terms of "being", "time", "space", "unconcealment", "truth", "thingness", "beautiful", and "beauty".The theoretical and methodological basis of the study was the cultural and historical method. The appeal to the existential-phenomenological methodology allows identifying the peculiarities of comprehension of creativity in the concept of M. Heidegger. The systemic approach serves as the foundation for examining the phenomenon of creativity as a system. It is determines that Heidegger explains creativity as the artist’s way to personal fulfillment. The conclusion is made that according to the philosopher not every work can be attributed to creation, but only those that reflect the system of views of the artist and specificity of time. For Heidegger, art is the space of existence and creation; the essence of art consists in the truth being created in creation.
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Bolea, Ștefan. "The Courage To Be Anxious. Paul Tillich’s Existential Interpretation of Anxiety." Journal of Education Culture and Society 6, no. 1 (January 3, 2020): 20–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.15503/jecs20151.20.25.

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The similitude between anxiety and death is the starting point of Paul Tillich's analysis from The Courage To Be, his famous theological and philosophical reply to Martin Heidegger's Being And Time. Not only Tillich and Heidegger are concerned with the connection between anxiety and death but also other proponents of both existentialism and nihilism like Friedrich Nietzsche, Emil Cioran and Lev Shestov. Tillich observes that "anxiety puts frightening masks" over things and perhaps this definition is its finest contribution to the spectacular phenomenology of anxiety. Moreover, Tillich has some illuminating insights about the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, which are important for the history of the existential philosophy. It is interesting how the protestant theologian tries to answer to Heidegger: while the German philosopher asserted that we must avoid fear and we have to embrace anxiety as a route to personal authenticity, Tillich notes that we should transform anxiety into fear, because courage is more likely to "abolish" fear.
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Pramono, Adi Tri. "Religious Conflict in Terms of Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of Existentialism." International Journal of Religious and Cultural Studies 2, no. 2 (October 26, 2020): 81–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.34199/ijracs.2020.10.05.

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This paper aims to provide an overview of the process and construction of religious conflict, including genealogy, forms, and analysis of religious conflict causes. Further, this research also provides an in-depth analysis of religious conflicts from Martin Heidegger's existentialist philosophy. The methodology employed in this paper is hermeneutics. The research result indicates that the root of religious conflict is fear in facing increasingly modern life. The existence of this fear reduces the presence of the possibility. In the context of Martin Heidegger's existentialist philosophy, the experience is a process of being as Dasein to exist. Therefore religious conflict tends to be taken as a priority decision due to the lack of awareness of existential possibilities. The paper contributes to society in the sense that education must be accessible without any obstacles because, through knowledge, a broader perspective can be obtained since the right to education must be placed prior the right to exist.
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Kaulius, Tomas. "Edith Stein’s approach to Martin Heidegger’s existential philosophy." SOTER: Journal of Religious Science 59 (2016): 9–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.7220/2335-8785.59(87).1.

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Lipps, Hans, and Jason Hills. "Pragmatism and Existential Philosophy." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 18, no. 1 (January 26, 2010): 106–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2010.174.

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Hans Lipps compares pragmatism (William James and John Dewey) existentialism (Friedrich Nietzsche, Soren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger) in this 1936 article translated from French. He claims that they aim at the same goals, e.g., a return to lived experience and a rejection of the Cartesian legacy in philosophy. While summarizing the commonalities of each, he engages in a polemic against philosophy then that remains relevant now into the next century.
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Stein, Edith, and Mette Lebech. "Martin Heidegger’s Existential Philosophy Translation by Mette Lebech." Maynooth Philosophical Papers 4 (2007): 55–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/mpp200747.

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Siplivii, Gregory N. "The Phenomenology of “Nothingness” by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 6 (2021): 120–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2021-6-120-130.

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This article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenology “Nothingness” by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Through research of existential phe­nomenology, the article also touches on the topic of “mood” as philosophical in­tentionality. Various kinds of “moods”, such as faintness (Verstimmung), ennui (Langeweile), burden (Geworden), inquisitiveness (Neugier), care (Sorge) and conscience (Gewissen), by Martin Heidegger’s and nausea (la nausée), anxiety (l’anxiété), dizziness (le vertige) by Jean-Paul Sartre, is considered in the context of what they may matter in an ontological sense. The phenomenologically under­stood “mood” as a general intentionality towards something is connected with the way in which the existing is able to ask about its own self. In addition, the ar­ticle forms the concept of the original ontological and phenomenological “in­completeness” of any existential experience. It is this incompleteness, this “al­ways-still-not” that provides an existential opportunity to realize oneself not only thrown into the world, but also different from the general flow of being. This “elusive emptiness” is interpreted in the article in accordance with the psychoan­alytic category of “real” (Jacques Lacan).
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Ortega, Mariana. "“New Mestizas,” “World'Travelers,” and “Dasein”: Phenomenology and the Multi-Voiced, Multi-Cultural Self." Hypatia 16, no. 3 (2001): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.tb00922.x.

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The aim of this essay is to carry out an analysis of the multi-voiced, multi-cultural self discussed by Latina feminists in light of a Heideggerian phenomenological account of persons or “Existential Analytic.” In so doing, it (a) points out similarities as well as differences between the Heideggerian description of the self and Latina feminists' phenomenological accounts of self, and (b) critically assesses María Lugones's important notion of “world-traveling.” In the end, the essay defends the view of a “multiplicitous” self which takes insights from Lugones's view of the self that “travels ‘worlds’” and from other Latina feminists' accounts of self as well as from Martin Heidegger's account of Dasein.
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Todres, Leslie A. "The Experience of Human Finitude: A Phenomenological Investigation." South African Journal of Psychology 16, no. 4 (December 1986): 122–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/008124638601600404.

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This article attempts to explore some relationships between awareness of finitude and our every-day lives. To this end, both existential philosophy and phenomenological-psychological research are employed. Existential philosophy, especially as in the writings of Martin Heidegger, is used to delineate this field of interest as a vital context for self-understanding. A phenomenological-psychological research methodology is employed to describe the experience of focusing on personal finitude by a group of young people by means of experiential procedures and reflections.
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Mitlyanskaya, Maria B. "Key notions and ideas of Martin Heidegger’s «history of being» concept." Вестник Пермского университета. Философия. Психология. Социология, no. 3 (2020): 384–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2020-3-384-394.

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The paper explores Martin Heidegger’s concept of the «history of being». This concept was created in the philosopher’s late period. Critically analyzing the own paths of existential philosophy revealed in Being and Time, Heidegger gradually forms a spectrum of being-historical notions that will occupy a central position in contemplation after «the turn». The methods of analyzing the presence used before «the turn» create the appearance of an anthropological approach to the question of being, which becomes the main subject of the philosopher’s self-criticism. This, in particular, served as an originative impulse for the formation of the «history of being» concept. This article presents the key intentions of this concept. The author reveals these intentions in their natural interconnection, tracing the development trends from Black Notebooks to full-fledged volumes devoted to history of being. The questions asked in the renowned Heidegger’s opus magnum are revealed in a completely different plane, where the human presence (Dasein) is transformed into the foundation of the people’s essence, provided they are open to the call of being (Geschick). The author of the article does not share the opinion of researchers claiming that there are sufficient grounds to draw a hard line between Heidegger-1 and Heidegger-2, interpreting «the turn» as a sharp rejection by the philosopher of the results of his work before the 1930s. However, the being-historical layer requires new historical and philosophical interpretations: the professor’s forced release from the academic framework opened a new depth of his language and thought. Therefore, the key notions of the being-historical concept, necessary for acquaintance with it, have become the topic of this study. The hermeneutic and historical-genetic methods are the main ones applied in the study. The former, perfected by Martin Heidegger himself, is necessary in the interpretation of his texts, saturated with specific turns, original use of previously known terms, poetic allegories.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy"

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Oberst, Achim. "The bounds of being : existence - death - language : the existential-ontological connection of language and death in Heidegger's being and time : an exegetical approach to Heidegger's linguistic ontology." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36783.

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The thesis of this dissertation can be summed up in a nutshell: Death forces language into being. When faced with the possibility of non-existence, humans are confronted with the reality of nothingness and respond (with speech) by filling the fathomless emptiness of the abyss with permanent meaning.
Chapter I outlines this thesis in detail as grounded in Heidegger's existential analytic and provides examples of some of its manifold applications in both everyday life and literary experience.
The thesis is supported in three main steps. In Part A I explore the problem of human subjectivity in terms of Heidegger's existential ontology in particular with respect to the question of language and death. I show that the process of language evolution can be understood as an ongoing conflict resolution between the two fundamental modes of human selfhood. The gap between authenticity and inauthenticity is resolved in the dialogue of language. Death, which is nothing other than the nothingness of this yawning gap where one can easily lose oneself, thus appears to be a main factor of language origination, and, paradoxically, at the same time it finds its supersession in language.
In Part B I demonstrate that Heidegger has an answer to the question of language origins, and what his answer is. Both the "That" and the "What" lead to the further question of why language "exists" at all. The answer is simple. If Heidegger's phenomenological ontology can be understood as a linguistic ontology, as argued in Chapter I, the relationship between death and language follows. Death motivates the emergence of language, because it is the "existence" of language that can counteract the facticity of death.
In Part C I derive support for such a position from Hegel and Benjamin in order to demonstrate that the position is tenable also for other thinkers. In the concluding chapter on Parmenides I show that, with Heidegger, it is possible to see in Parmenides the originator of the thought that the "divine" ontological status of language constitutes, in its persistent thinking of being, a continued existence that defies the facticity of death.
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Ripamonti, Lidia. "Edith Stein's critique of Martin Heidegger : background, reasons and scope." Thesis, Anglia Ruskin University, 2013. http://arro.anglia.ac.uk/581543/.

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This thesis is a critical assessment of Edith Stein’s critique of Martin Heidegger, which is focused on the definition of the human being. I explore Stein’s ontology of the person from the point of view of her examination of Heidegger’s existential ‘Dasein’ and the way she reaches a very different answer to the same question that Heidegger posed, the question of the meaning of being. To this end I examine key passages of Stein’s most important ontological work Finite and Eternal Being - An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being along with its appendix Martin Heidegger’s Philosophy of Existence, in which she directly discussed Heidegger’s philosophy, focusing on his work Being and Time. In the first part of this research I draw a historico-philosophical overview of the academic and political background of the period between World War I and World War II in Germany in order to position both authors in context and investigate their philosophical influences as well as their ambiguous relationship with the phenomenological school. The central part is dedicated to Stein’s analysis of Heidegger’s Dasein: I compare and explain both authors’ approaches to the philosophical understanding of human being, person, life, soul and death. This investigation was carried out with both a hermeneutical and terminological analysis. I draw upon the results to demonstrate how Stein’s phenomenology of life experiences enlarges the borders of human finitude to embrace the possibility of its ontological horizon while Heidegger restricts and concentrates the entire ontological question on the Dasein, its existence and ultimately its finitude. My findings provide an assessment of the limits as well as the strengths of Stein’s critique. I demonstrate that Stein attempted to build a bridge between classical ontology and phenomenology, while Heidegger’s distance from the philosophical tradition was rooted in his methodological refusal. I also show how their opposite methods and findings present unexpected similarities and how Stein’s philosophical significance should be reconsidered in the light of her work. This research leads to various implications for today’s philosophical debate and makes it possible to view Stein’s theory of being in a wider ethical context, as presented in the final part of this work. I argue that Heidegger depersonalises and violates traditional ontology to explain the human being only in terms of pure existence, while Stein’s portrait of the ‘fullness’ and the meaning of life contributes to the discussion between philosophy and religion. In the final section of this work I show how some of the elements emerging from Stein’s critique of Heidegger can cast a light on the current ethical discussion about how death is understood and experienced socially, and how best to care for the dying.
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Grelz, Astrid. "A Phenomenology of Transcendence : Edith Stein and the Lack of Authentic Otherness in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Filosofi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32350.

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This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.
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Tennant, Matthew Aaron. "The existential dimension of the liberation theology of Juan Luis Segundo." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6bcc14cd-db9a-4109-9ae9-a7e5ac5ec3f3.

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Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) was a Uruguayan Jesuit priest who, I argue, based his liberation theology on his understanding of existentialism. The major contribution of this thesis is the exploration of unknown and unexplored sources in Segundo's work. These sources support my thesis of his basis in existentialism and are corroborated by his mature theology. This thesis is significant because the connection between existentialism and liberation theology has been widely overlooked. My starting point is Segundo's 1948 book, in which he combines existentialism with personalism and develops a transcendental method grounded in love and inter-subjectivity. The following three chapters develop my argument through his engagement with four existentialist thinkers: Berdyaev, Sartre and Camus, and Heidegger. Chapter 3 demonstrates how Segundo follows Berdyaev's primacy of freedom, which allows for human creativity, but Segundo takes it as a "quality of the will" and relates freedom to love. Berdyaev influences Segundo's preference for a methodology yielding consistent growth rather than a systematic approach to theology. Chapter 4 shows how Sartre's and Camus' understanding of freedom and limits influenced Segundo's sense that a person's lived reality must be the starting point for theological reflection (e.g. the hermeneutic circle). In chapter 5, I use an unpublished manuscript to show how Segundo uses the place of tradition in the Christian church and the role of tradition in Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein in order to build his theology of "liberative human seeking and divine revelation". In the final two chapters, I draw the new sources together with two of Segundo's widely read books: Faith and Ideologies (1982) in chapter 6 and The Liberation of Theology (1975) in chapter 7. In chapter 6, the transcendental method he first wrote about in 1948 returns and he addresses materialism and personalism. Chapter 7 serves as my conclusion and uses Segundo's hermeneutic circle as the fullest manifestation of my argument.
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Fagniez, Guillaume. "L'histoire au coeur de la subjectivité: la confrontation de Heidegger avec Dilthey." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209323.

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La thèse interroge le sens et la portée de l’historicité de l’existence à partir de l’œuvre de Dilthey et de sa lecture par Heidegger :qu’est-ce qu’être historique et quelles sont les conséquences d’une telle historicité pour la pensée philosophique ?L’approche diltheyenne d’une telle question repose sur une « psychologie concrète » qui en tentant de saisir la vie dans sa Faktizität s’engage sur la voie d’une anthropologie historique. L’interrogation psychologique et historique de Dilthey est radicalisée par Heidegger, qui reprend la question de l’historicité à partir de son enracinement dans l’« être » de l’existence, c’est-à-dire également à l’horizon d’une pensée renouvelée de la temporalité. Cette dernière conduit au seuil d’une conception de l’« événementialité » de la vie qui, tout en rompant avec Dilthey, permet de réviser les grands thèmes de ce dernier. Le travail de recherche se penche notamment sur le passage d’une herméneutique philosophique à une philosophie herméneutique intégrant l’historicité de l’existence jusque dans la dimension première du sens. Est également examiné le réinvestissement, par cette herméneutique repensée à l’aune d’un concept radicalisé d’historicité, de certains thèmes et concepts de l’herméneutique diltheyenne. La question de savoir comment la philosophie doit assumer sa propre historicité peut dès lors être reprise. Tandis que Dilthey répond à la mise en cause de la possibilité de la métaphysique par l’histoire à travers l’élaboration d’une doctrine de la vision du monde, Heidegger procède à une radicalisation transcendantale du concept d’histoire – cette dernière étant toutefois appelée à être renversée au bénéfice de l’événement.

The Dissertation investigates the historicity of existence, its meaning and impact, from Wilhelm Dilthey’s Works and Heidegger’s reading of it: What does being historical mean, and what are the consequences of this historicity on philosophical thought? Dilthey’s approach to this problem is based on a “concrete psychology” which, by developing the implications of the facticity of life, leads to an historical anthropology. Heidegger radicalizes this psychological and historical Diltheyan questioning by reconsidering the problem of historicity from the point of view of the “being” of existence, which also involves a renewed conception of temporality. The latter leads to the threshold of a conception of life as “eventiality” which means both a break with Dilthey and the possibility of taking over an improved version of Dilthey’s major issues. The research examines in particular the transition from a philosophical hermeneutics to a hermeneutic philosophy based on the acknowledgment of the radical historicity of life. Heidegger’s appropriation of Diltheyan themes and concepts in the context of this transition is analyzed in a detailed manner. Finally, the question is raised how philosophy has to deal with its historicity. Dilthey’s response to the historical undermining of the very possibility of metaphysics consists in the development of a doctrine of worldviews. Heidegger carries out a transcendental radicalization of the concept of history – the latter however being soon anew reversed for the benefit of the “event”.


Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Robinson, Charles. "Martin Heidegger's Critique of Freedom." Thesis, Boston College, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/655.

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Thesis advisor: Susan M. Shell
Title: Martin Heidegger's Critique of Freedom Author: Charles Robinson Advisor: Professor Susan Shell Boston College Political Science Department This is a study of thought and politics of Martin Heidegger. It presents an examination of his understanding of freedom, principally as he expressed it in Being and Time, but also considers some of his subsequent essays and lectures, as well as his Rectorate Address. Ever since Heidegger's public embrace of National Socialism, his defenders and critics have argued about the possible relation between his thinking and his infamous political commitments. While many of his critics have linked his commitments to an alleged lack of understanding of freedom, some of his scholarly defenders have sought to present interpretations of his concept of freedom at odds with his infamous politics, in order to separate his thought from any association with Nazism. The conclusions of these critics and defenders of Heidegger are both mistaken: in Being and Time Heidegger sought the meaning of being in the authentic experience of human self-determination revealed by the conscience, which he worked out as "forward running resolve." It was this militant concept of freedom that grounded his project for a destined community of battle to be championed by a free corps of freedom fighters, and led him to embrace, in the very name of freedom, the tyranny of Hitler's new Reich. The study of Heidegger's concept of authentic freedom reveals that, far from lacking any understanding of freedom, it was rather a central theme and concern of his philosophical efforts, and that his infamous political commitments were indeed its necessary and coherent practical consequence. Heidegger's thought thus poses a more trenchant and pressing challenge to liberal (and leftist) politics than many of his critics and defenders appreciate. There have been comparatively few sustained thematic treatments of Heidegger's understanding of freedom in English. This study accordingly hopes to contribute to an understanding of this central theme of Heidegger's philosophical efforts, which not only reveals their necessary connection to his politics, but also promises to improve our access to the coherent intelligibility of his thought as a whole
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science
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Byle, Nicholas. "Divine Temporality: Bonhoeffer's Theological Appropriation of Heidegger's Existential Analytic of Dasein." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6196.

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This dissertation’s guiding question is: What was the impact of Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology? I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his technical term for human existence, provides Bonhoeffer with important conceptual tools for developing his Christology, from which the rest of his theology follows. Part of recognizing Heidegger’s importance to Bonhoeffer involves understanding the latter’s critiques of previous notable philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. As Bonhoeffer evaluates these philosophers, they lead to theologically unacceptable positions. Heidegger, in contrast, has come to a theologically profitable understanding of human existence and epistemology. Though there are theologically useful elements in Heidegger’s philosophy, there are elements that require significant alteration, and even rejection. Heidegger recognizes that epistemology must be based on actual human existence, and he can account for the historical continuity of human existence; however, because of Heidegger’s anthropocentric philosophy, he cannot account for God’s transcendence necessary for proper theology. Bonhoeffer then applies the conceptual tools he has appropriated from Heidegger to revelation, Christology, and the church. This eliminates the anthropocentrism that made transcendence impossible, while maintaining the benefits of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to account for Christian existence. Understanding Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Heidegger is additionally important for understanding Heidegger’s potential relation to theology. This dissertation concludes by placing Bonhoeffer in the context of other theological appropriations of Heidegger. In light of this context and Heidegger’s own understanding of philosophy’s relation to theology, I argue that Bonhoeffer represents one, viable theological use of Heidegger.
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Lauer, Dean W. "The place of ethical possibility: Language and the constitution of the world in Heidegger's existential analytic." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29026.

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This thesis attempts to show a relevant correlation between Heidegger's conception of language, as rooted in the logos, and the possibility for ethical action. That language is the primary mode of disclosure for Dasein suggests that the character of language will inflect the disclosure, and so the constitution of the world, according to the shape and way we use language. In short, the character of the world disclosed will be coloured by the language of disclosure. Thus, possibilities for ethical acting, insofar as we live in a world primordially constituted by language, arise in language and remain there with its users. As is well known, Heidegger does not address the issue of ethical possibilities directly. Therefore, this is an interpretive, though as I contend an entirely plausible, reading of Heidegger's works mainly before and around Sein und Zeit. The interpretation suggests that there are language-based ethical possibilities implicit in his philosophy.
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Lepadatu, Gilbert Vasile. "EARLY HEIDEGGER'S TRANSITION FROM LIFE TO BEING." UKnowledge, 2009. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/725.

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Heidegger was not always preoccupied, as he himself would later come to believe, with the question regarding the sense of being. Eight years before he published his magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, in 1927 he was totally devoted to finding a systematic way to bringing “life” as the ultimate source of meaning to explicate itself. In the years between 1919-1923, “life”, and not “being”, is the matter of philosophy par excellence, only to be disregarded, even refuted as a “proper” matter of philosophy in the subsequent years. In this paper I examine the philosophical motives that led Heidegger from life to being. The purpose of this project isto trace the emergence of the “thinking of being” in “life philosophy.” I will show that the transition from “life” to “being” is not at all as radical as Heidegger wants it to be whenever he voices his concerns about the metaphysical grounds of life philosophy. When “life” is understood in the exact terms in which Heidegger himself understands it in the years between 1919-1923 then, I argue, the transition to being is more a radicalization, and by no means an abandonment, of life philosophy. In the process of elaborating an understanding of life so fundamentally sympathetic to life that it can claim itself to be life’s own self-understanding, Heidegger comes gradually to realize the importance of life’s own way of living understandingly, the performative sense in which it [life] itself understands itself to be, for the very effort to understand life. Life is now interpreted as a way of being for which this very being, its way of being, is an issue for itself. In the first chapter I go back to the original motives that led Heidegger to choose life, lived experience, as the proper topic of philosophy. It is here that Heidegger discovers that philosophy is ultimately about an entity that is somehow concerned with itself already in being-engaged to “something” other than itself. Intentionality is interpreted as the manner in which an entity is playing itself out, as it were, in engaging a world. In the second chapter, I follow his elaborations of this newly discovered topic, the “personal” character of experience, with a focus on the unique way in which he develops it by both rejecting the Neokantian approach to life and by critically appropriating Dilthey’s conception of lived experience. The third chapter presents Heidegger’s “insights” into life – which will remain unchanged, only put to different uses when the topic changes from life to being. The fourth chapter takes up the issue of how life is (and is itself)in being referred to its own past. Here I show how life is found to be “in need” to appropriate what it has been as the way in which it can be itself. Chapters five and six delve into the proper relation between living and philosophizing by focusing on how life is living-in-understanding. It is shown here how Heidegger elaborates, unfortunately insufficiently, his method of “formal indicators” which will enable him to interpret life as a “way of being.” Such interpretation leaves open the possibility, however, of either interpreting life as the manner in which being itself can be experienced or, as Heidegger does in the first early years, or interpreting being as the manner in which life can come to itself. Early Heidegger can only justify the former interpretation: in developing for itself a sense of being which can only be performed as a way in which life lives, life develops a genuine self-understanding.
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McNicolls, Christopher Ferdinand. "Self-understanding and the care for being : Heidegger's ethical thought /." *McMaster only, 1998.

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Books on the topic "Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy"

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Generation existential: Heidegger's philosophy in France, 1927-1961. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

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Young, Julian. Heidegger's later philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

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Heidegger's later philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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4

Kleinberg, Ethan. Generation existential: Heidegger's philosophy in France, 1927-1961. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

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Heidegger's philosophy of art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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Young, Julian. Heidegger's philosophy of art. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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Heidegger's philosophy of science. New York: Fordham University Press, 2000.

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Heidegger's philosophic pedagogy. London: Continuum, 2010.

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Rockmore, Tom. On Heidegger's Nazism and philosophy. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

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1960-, Denker Alfred, and Denker Alfred 1960-, eds. Historical dictionary of Heidegger's philosophy. 2nd ed. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2010.

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Book chapters on the topic "Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy"

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Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Heidegger's Later Philosophy (1960)." In Martin Heidegger, 335–50. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315249636-12.

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"3. Martin Buber." In The Existential Philosophy of Etty Hillesum, 125–88. BRILL, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004266100_005.

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Dombrowski, Daniel A. "Heidegger, Political Philosophy and Disequilibrium." In Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism, 108–34. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474453400.003.0005.

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Chapter Abstract: In this chapter Martin Heidegger's right wing, indeed fascist, political philosophy is examined. His view deviates significantly from reflective equilibrium. Thankfully, process thinkers have not been persuaded by Heidegger's version of anti-democracy, although recent alt-right thinkers have indeed found (Nietzsche's and) Heidegger's views attractive.
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Immanen, Mikko. "The Frankfurt Discussion." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 115–42. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0005.

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This chapter recalls Theodor W. Adorno and Martin Heidegger's reputation as archenemies because of their political antagonism and Adorno's unanswered polemics against Heidegger after World War II. It examines Adorno and Heidegger's emphasis on the philosophical significance of art and their concern over the allegedly diminished capacity of moderns to experience the world beyond the technical domination of nature. It also investigates the role played by Heidegger in the emergence of Adorno's critical theory between the publication of Being and Time in 1927 and Heidegger's Nazi turn in 1933. The chapter reconstructs the Frankfurt discussion between Adorno and his Heideggerian opponents in the University of Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933. It elaborates that Frankfurt discussion was a debate over the significance of Heidegger's revolutionary philosophy and its implicit diagnosis of the crisis of modernity.
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Immanen, Mikko. "Stakes of the Hegel Debate." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 81–112. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0004.

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This chapter weighs the stakes of the Hegel debate by questioning why Martin Heidegger ended up rejecting Herbert Marcuse's study. It contends the impossibility to separate the philosophical debate over Hegel given Heidegger's turn to radical conservatism in the late 1920s and the recent appearance of the Black Notebooks. It also relates the Davos debate in Peter E. Gordon's reading to Heidegger's changing political sensibilities. The chapter looks at Theodor W. Adorno's lifelong and ambivalent struggle with Heidegger as he judged Being and Time as fascist right down to its innermost components. It analyses Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (The Jargon of Authenticity) from 1964, which stated that Heidegger's book acquired its aura by describing the directions of the dark drives of the intelligentsia before 1933.
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Immanen, Mikko. "Demythologizing Heidegger’s Thrownness." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 172–202. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0007.

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This chapter reviews Theodor W. Adorno's criticism that revolves around Martin Heidegger's notion of historicity, at the core of which lay an understanding of the human being after the temporal scheme of thrownness and projection. It mentions Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West and Ludwig Klages's TheSpirit as Adversary of the Soul as the popular doomsday prophecies of the Weimar era. It also analyses Heidegger's insight about moments, history and nature that were essential in understanding human life. The chapter explores the central elements of Adorno's lecture and illuminates its status as immanent critique. It connects Adorno's lecture to a doctoral thesis on Heidegger by Dolf Sternberger, who was after an immanent critique of Being and Time.
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Immanen, Mikko. "Critical Theory as a Reply to Heidegger, Scheler, and the Frankfurt Heideggerians." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 238–70. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0009.

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This chapter examines Martin Heidegger's role in Max Horkheimer's programmatic formulations of critical theory in the early 1930s as the director of the Institute for Social Research. It highlights Horkheimer's sublation of philosophy into multidisciplinary social criticism that opened a third post-metaphysical path along Heidegger's philosophical hermeneutics and analytical philosophy. It also refers to Jürgen Habermas, who judges Horkheimer's early critical theory as an original, anti-Heideggerian response to the end of metaphysics. The chapter investigates Horkheimer's critical theory as an alternative to the hegemonic teachings of Heidegger and Max Scheler as well as to the neo-metaphysical doctrines of the Frankfurt Heideggerians. It reviews Horkheimer's debates in the Frankfurt discussion with Kurt Riezler and Paul Tillich.
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Immanen, Mikko. "Being and Time." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 205–37. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0008.

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This chapter focuses on Max Horkheimer's years as a student and private lecturer in the 1920s and argues that he was indeed impressed by Martin Heidegger's radical teachings. It recounts Horkheimer's experience of Germany's failed socialist revolution in 1919 and his disillusionment with Max Weber's famous statements against socialism and emancipatory social theory. It also looks at Heidegger's radicalism that appeared as a genuine promise to bring philosophy back in touch with life. The chapter details how Horkheimer had grown highly critical of Heidegger as he saw Being and Time as a major competitor to his critical theory. It describes the distinguishing aspect of Horkheimer's case as he saw Max Scheler as an equally great challenge for critical theory.
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Immanen, Mikko. "Introduction." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 1–18. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0001.

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This chapter begins with the publication of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) in 1927, which made the philosopher Martin Heidegger become one of the most discussed figures in German intellectual life. It explains that Being and Time thoroughly questions the scientifically minded philosophical and cultural self-understanding of modern Europe. It also suggests that Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse saw in Heidegger the most provocative challenge and competitor to their own analyses of the discontents of European modernity. The chapter focuses on the years between the publication of Being and Time and Heidegger's notorious embrace of National Socialism in 1933. It examines what Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer saw as the merits and the blind spots of Heidegger's philosophy before its contamination by Nazism.
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Immanen, Mikko. "The Un-Heideggerian Core of Marcuse’s Most Heideggerian Text." In Toward a Concrete Philosophy, 21–55. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501752377.003.0002.

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This chapter argues that Herbert Marcuse's Freiburg writings formed a continuous effort to redirect Martin Heidegger's philosophical revolution from solipsistic existentialism toward a critical theory of capitalism or concrete philosophy. It discusses how Marcuse did not see himself simply as criticizing Heidegger but rather persuading him to recognize the social-critical, Hegelian-Marxist elements of Being and Time. It also sheds new light on Lucien Goldmann's famous claim about Heidegger's debt to Georg Lukács by showing that Marcuse had suspected such debt in the 1920s. The chapter looks at Marcuse's experience as part of the failed socialist revolution in Germany after World War I that is crucial in understanding why he could become enthusiastic about Heidegger. It mentions Marcuse's goal to reconstruct the philosophical premises of Marxism.
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