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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy'
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Oberst, Achim. "The bounds of being : existence - death - language : the existential-ontological connection of language and death in Heidegger's being and time : an exegetical approach to Heidegger's linguistic ontology." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36783.
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The thesis of this dissertation can be summed up in a nutshell: Death forces language into being. When faced with the possibility of non-existence, humans are confronted with the reality of nothingness and respond (with speech) by filling the fathomless emptiness of the abyss with permanent meaning.Chapter I outlines this thesis in detail as grounded in Heidegger's existential analytic and provides examples of some of its manifold applications in both everyday life and literary experience.
The thesis is supported in three main steps. In Part A I explore the problem of human subjectivity in terms of Heidegger's existential ontology in particular with respect to the question of language and death. I show that the process of language evolution can be understood as an ongoing conflict resolution between the two fundamental modes of human selfhood. The gap between authenticity and inauthenticity is resolved in the dialogue of language. Death, which is nothing other than the nothingness of this yawning gap where one can easily lose oneself, thus appears to be a main factor of language origination, and, paradoxically, at the same time it finds its supersession in language.
In Part B I demonstrate that Heidegger has an answer to the question of language origins, and what his answer is. Both the "That" and the "What" lead to the further question of why language "exists" at all. The answer is simple. If Heidegger's phenomenological ontology can be understood as a linguistic ontology, as argued in Chapter I, the relationship between death and language follows. Death motivates the emergence of language, because it is the "existence" of language that can counteract the facticity of death.
In Part C I derive support for such a position from Hegel and Benjamin in order to demonstrate that the position is tenable also for other thinkers. In the concluding chapter on Parmenides I show that, with Heidegger, it is possible to see in Parmenides the originator of the thought that the "divine" ontological status of language constitutes, in its persistent thinking of being, a continued existence that defies the facticity of death.
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Ripamonti, Lidia. "Edith Stein's critique of Martin Heidegger : background, reasons and scope." Thesis, Anglia Ruskin University, 2013. http://arro.anglia.ac.uk/581543/.
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This thesis is a critical assessment of Edith Stein’s critique of Martin Heidegger, which is focused on the definition of the human being. I explore Stein’s ontology of the person from the point of view of her examination of Heidegger’s existential ‘Dasein’ and the way she reaches a very different answer to the same question that Heidegger posed, the question of the meaning of being. To this end I examine key passages of Stein’s most important ontological work Finite and Eternal Being - An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being along with its appendix Martin Heidegger’s Philosophy of Existence, in which she directly discussed Heidegger’s philosophy, focusing on his work Being and Time. In the first part of this research I draw a historico-philosophical overview of the academic and political background of the period between World War I and World War II in Germany in order to position both authors in context and investigate their philosophical influences as well as their ambiguous relationship with the phenomenological school. The central part is dedicated to Stein’s analysis of Heidegger’s Dasein: I compare and explain both authors’ approaches to the philosophical understanding of human being, person, life, soul and death. This investigation was carried out with both a hermeneutical and terminological analysis. I draw upon the results to demonstrate how Stein’s phenomenology of life experiences enlarges the borders of human finitude to embrace the possibility of its ontological horizon while Heidegger restricts and concentrates the entire ontological question on the Dasein, its existence and ultimately its finitude. My findings provide an assessment of the limits as well as the strengths of Stein’s critique. I demonstrate that Stein attempted to build a bridge between classical ontology and phenomenology, while Heidegger’s distance from the philosophical tradition was rooted in his methodological refusal. I also show how their opposite methods and findings present unexpected similarities and how Stein’s philosophical significance should be reconsidered in the light of her work. This research leads to various implications for today’s philosophical debate and makes it possible to view Stein’s theory of being in a wider ethical context, as presented in the final part of this work. I argue that Heidegger depersonalises and violates traditional ontology to explain the human being only in terms of pure existence, while Stein’s portrait of the ‘fullness’ and the meaning of life contributes to the discussion between philosophy and religion. In the final section of this work I show how some of the elements emerging from Stein’s critique of Heidegger can cast a light on the current ethical discussion about how death is understood and experienced socially, and how best to care for the dying.
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Grelz, Astrid. "A Phenomenology of Transcendence : Edith Stein and the Lack of Authentic Otherness in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Filosofi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32350.
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This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.
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Tennant, Matthew Aaron. "The existential dimension of the liberation theology of Juan Luis Segundo." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6bcc14cd-db9a-4109-9ae9-a7e5ac5ec3f3.
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Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) was a Uruguayan Jesuit priest who, I argue, based his liberation theology on his understanding of existentialism. The major contribution of this thesis is the exploration of unknown and unexplored sources in Segundo's work. These sources support my thesis of his basis in existentialism and are corroborated by his mature theology. This thesis is significant because the connection between existentialism and liberation theology has been widely overlooked. My starting point is Segundo's 1948 book, in which he combines existentialism with personalism and develops a transcendental method grounded in love and inter-subjectivity. The following three chapters develop my argument through his engagement with four existentialist thinkers: Berdyaev, Sartre and Camus, and Heidegger. Chapter 3 demonstrates how Segundo follows Berdyaev's primacy of freedom, which allows for human creativity, but Segundo takes it as a "quality of the will" and relates freedom to love. Berdyaev influences Segundo's preference for a methodology yielding consistent growth rather than a systematic approach to theology. Chapter 4 shows how Sartre's and Camus' understanding of freedom and limits influenced Segundo's sense that a person's lived reality must be the starting point for theological reflection (e.g. the hermeneutic circle). In chapter 5, I use an unpublished manuscript to show how Segundo uses the place of tradition in the Christian church and the role of tradition in Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein in order to build his theology of "liberative human seeking and divine revelation". In the final two chapters, I draw the new sources together with two of Segundo's widely read books: Faith and Ideologies (1982) in chapter 6 and The Liberation of Theology (1975) in chapter 7. In chapter 6, the transcendental method he first wrote about in 1948 returns and he addresses materialism and personalism. Chapter 7 serves as my conclusion and uses Segundo's hermeneutic circle as the fullest manifestation of my argument.
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Fagniez, Guillaume. "L'histoire au coeur de la subjectivité: la confrontation de Heidegger avec Dilthey." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209323.
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La thèse interroge le sens et la portée de l’historicité de l’existence à partir de l’œuvre de Dilthey et de sa lecture par Heidegger :qu’est-ce qu’être historique et quelles sont les conséquences d’une telle historicité pour la pensée philosophique ?L’approche diltheyenne d’une telle question repose sur une « psychologie concrète » qui en tentant de saisir la vie dans sa Faktizität s’engage sur la voie d’une anthropologie historique. L’interrogation psychologique et historique de Dilthey est radicalisée par Heidegger, qui reprend la question de l’historicité à partir de son enracinement dans l’« être » de l’existence, c’est-à-dire également à l’horizon d’une pensée renouvelée de la temporalité. Cette dernière conduit au seuil d’une conception de l’« événementialité » de la vie qui, tout en rompant avec Dilthey, permet de réviser les grands thèmes de ce dernier. Le travail de recherche se penche notamment sur le passage d’une herméneutique philosophique à une philosophie herméneutique intégrant l’historicité de l’existence jusque dans la dimension première du sens. Est également examiné le réinvestissement, par cette herméneutique repensée à l’aune d’un concept radicalisé d’historicité, de certains thèmes et concepts de l’herméneutique diltheyenne. La question de savoir comment la philosophie doit assumer sa propre historicité peut dès lors être reprise. Tandis que Dilthey répond à la mise en cause de la possibilité de la métaphysique par l’histoire à travers l’élaboration d’une doctrine de la vision du monde, Heidegger procède à une radicalisation transcendantale du concept d’histoire – cette dernière étant toutefois appelée à être renversée au bénéfice de l’événement.The Dissertation investigates the historicity of existence, its meaning and impact, from Wilhelm Dilthey’s Works and Heidegger’s reading of it: What does being historical mean, and what are the consequences of this historicity on philosophical thought? Dilthey’s approach to this problem is based on a “concrete psychology” which, by developing the implications of the facticity of life, leads to an historical anthropology. Heidegger radicalizes this psychological and historical Diltheyan questioning by reconsidering the problem of historicity from the point of view of the “being” of existence, which also involves a renewed conception of temporality. The latter leads to the threshold of a conception of life as “eventiality” which means both a break with Dilthey and the possibility of taking over an improved version of Dilthey’s major issues. The research examines in particular the transition from a philosophical hermeneutics to a hermeneutic philosophy based on the acknowledgment of the radical historicity of life. Heidegger’s appropriation of Diltheyan themes and concepts in the context of this transition is analyzed in a detailed manner. Finally, the question is raised how philosophy has to deal with its historicity. Dilthey’s response to the historical undermining of the very possibility of metaphysics consists in the development of a doctrine of worldviews. Heidegger carries out a transcendental radicalization of the concept of history – the latter however being soon anew reversed for the benefit of the “event”.
Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Robinson, Charles. "Martin Heidegger's Critique of Freedom." Thesis, Boston College, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/655.
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Thesis advisor: Susan M. ShellTitle: Martin Heidegger's Critique of Freedom Author: Charles Robinson Advisor: Professor Susan Shell Boston College Political Science Department This is a study of thought and politics of Martin Heidegger. It presents an examination of his understanding of freedom, principally as he expressed it in Being and Time, but also considers some of his subsequent essays and lectures, as well as his Rectorate Address. Ever since Heidegger's public embrace of National Socialism, his defenders and critics have argued about the possible relation between his thinking and his infamous political commitments. While many of his critics have linked his commitments to an alleged lack of understanding of freedom, some of his scholarly defenders have sought to present interpretations of his concept of freedom at odds with his infamous politics, in order to separate his thought from any association with Nazism. The conclusions of these critics and defenders of Heidegger are both mistaken: in Being and Time Heidegger sought the meaning of being in the authentic experience of human self-determination revealed by the conscience, which he worked out as "forward running resolve." It was this militant concept of freedom that grounded his project for a destined community of battle to be championed by a free corps of freedom fighters, and led him to embrace, in the very name of freedom, the tyranny of Hitler's new Reich. The study of Heidegger's concept of authentic freedom reveals that, far from lacking any understanding of freedom, it was rather a central theme and concern of his philosophical efforts, and that his infamous political commitments were indeed its necessary and coherent practical consequence. Heidegger's thought thus poses a more trenchant and pressing challenge to liberal (and leftist) politics than many of his critics and defenders appreciate. There have been comparatively few sustained thematic treatments of Heidegger's understanding of freedom in English. This study accordingly hopes to contribute to an understanding of this central theme of Heidegger's philosophical efforts, which not only reveals their necessary connection to his politics, but also promises to improve our access to the coherent intelligibility of his thought as a whole
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Political Science
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Byle, Nicholas. "Divine Temporality: Bonhoeffer's Theological Appropriation of Heidegger's Existential Analytic of Dasein." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6196.
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This dissertation’s guiding question is: What was the impact of Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology? I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his technical term for human existence, provides Bonhoeffer with important conceptual tools for developing his Christology, from which the rest of his theology follows.
Part of recognizing Heidegger’s importance to Bonhoeffer involves understanding the latter’s critiques of previous notable philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. As Bonhoeffer evaluates these philosophers, they lead to theologically unacceptable positions. Heidegger, in contrast, has come to a theologically profitable understanding of human existence and epistemology. Though there are theologically useful elements in Heidegger’s philosophy, there are elements that require significant alteration, and even rejection. Heidegger recognizes that epistemology must be based on actual human existence, and he can account for the historical continuity of human existence; however, because of Heidegger’s anthropocentric philosophy, he cannot account for God’s transcendence necessary for proper theology. Bonhoeffer then applies the conceptual tools he has appropriated from Heidegger to revelation, Christology, and the church. This eliminates the anthropocentrism that made transcendence impossible, while maintaining the benefits of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to account for Christian existence.
Understanding Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Heidegger is additionally important for understanding Heidegger’s potential relation to theology. This dissertation concludes by placing Bonhoeffer in the context of other theological appropriations of Heidegger. In light of this context and Heidegger’s own understanding of philosophy’s relation to theology, I argue that Bonhoeffer represents one, viable theological use of Heidegger.
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Lauer, Dean W. "The place of ethical possibility: Language and the constitution of the world in Heidegger's existential analytic." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29026.
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This thesis attempts to show a relevant correlation between Heidegger's conception of language, as rooted in the logos, and the possibility for ethical action. That language is the primary mode of disclosure for Dasein suggests that the character of language will inflect the disclosure, and so the constitution of the world, according to the shape and way we use language. In short, the character of the world disclosed will be coloured by the language of disclosure. Thus, possibilities for ethical acting, insofar as we live in a world primordially constituted by language, arise in language and remain there with its users.
As is well known, Heidegger does not address the issue of ethical possibilities directly. Therefore, this is an interpretive, though as I contend an entirely plausible, reading of Heidegger's works mainly before and around Sein und Zeit. The interpretation suggests that there are language-based ethical possibilities implicit in his philosophy.
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Lepadatu, Gilbert Vasile. "EARLY HEIDEGGER'S TRANSITION FROM LIFE TO BEING." UKnowledge, 2009. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/725.
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Heidegger was not always preoccupied, as he himself would later come to believe, with the question regarding the sense of being. Eight years before he published his magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, in 1927 he was totally devoted to finding a systematic way to bringing “life” as the ultimate source of meaning to explicate itself. In the years between 1919-1923, “life”, and not “being”, is the matter of philosophy par excellence, only to be disregarded, even refuted as a “proper” matter of philosophy in the subsequent years. In this paper I examine the philosophical motives that led Heidegger from life to being. The purpose of this project isto trace the emergence of the “thinking of being” in “life philosophy.” I will show that the transition from “life” to “being” is not at all as radical as Heidegger wants it to be whenever he voices his concerns about the metaphysical grounds of life philosophy. When “life” is understood in the exact terms in which Heidegger himself understands it in the years between 1919-1923 then, I argue, the transition to being is more a radicalization, and by no means an abandonment, of life philosophy. In the process of elaborating an understanding of life so fundamentally sympathetic to life that it can claim itself to be life’s own self-understanding, Heidegger comes gradually to realize the importance of life’s own way of living understandingly, the performative sense in which it [life] itself understands itself to be, for the very effort to understand life. Life is now interpreted as a way of being for which this very being, its way of being, is an issue for itself.
In the first chapter I go back to the original motives that led Heidegger to choose life, lived experience, as the proper topic of philosophy. It is here that Heidegger discovers that philosophy is ultimately about an entity that is somehow concerned with itself already in being-engaged to “something” other than itself. Intentionality is interpreted as the manner in which an entity is playing itself out, as it were, in engaging a world. In the second chapter, I follow his elaborations of this newly discovered topic, the “personal” character of experience, with a focus on the unique way in which he develops it by both rejecting the Neokantian approach to life and by critically appropriating Dilthey’s conception of lived experience. The third chapter presents Heidegger’s “insights” into life – which will remain unchanged, only put to different uses when the topic changes from life to being. The fourth chapter takes up the issue of how life is (and is itself)in being referred to its own past. Here I show how life is found to be “in need” to appropriate what it has been as the way in which it can be itself. Chapters five and six delve into the proper relation between living and philosophizing by focusing on how life is living-in-understanding. It is shown here how Heidegger elaborates, unfortunately insufficiently, his method of “formal indicators” which will enable him to interpret life as a “way of being.” Such interpretation leaves open the possibility, however, of either interpreting life as the manner in which being itself can be experienced or, as Heidegger does in the first early years, or interpreting being as the manner in which life can come to itself. Early Heidegger can only justify the former interpretation: in developing for itself a sense of being which can only be performed as a way in which life lives, life develops a genuine self-understanding.
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McNicolls, Christopher Ferdinand. "Self-understanding and the care for being : Heidegger's ethical thought /." *McMaster only, 1998.
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Taljaard, Frederik. "Imaginative unconcealment Heidegger's philosophy of aletheia and the truth of literary fiction /." Pretoria : [s.n.], 2005. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-03062006-200330.
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De, Sousa Rui. "Martin Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek aletheia and the philological response to it." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36760.
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This thesis tries to provide a critical review of Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth in the different stages of his career and it also examines the philological response that his work on this question elicited. The publication of Sein und Zeit made Heidegger's views on a ,l h&d12;q3ia available to a wide public and thereby launched a heated debate on the meaning of this word. The introduction tries to give an account of the general intellectual background to Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth. It also looks at the kind of interpretative approach favored by the philologists responding to Heidegger's views on a ,l h&d12;q3ia . The thesis first examines his arguments on ancient Greek truth and language in Sein und Zeit from the point of view of the larger philosophical project of Heidegger's seminal work. It then looks at some initial philological responses to Heidegger along with Heidegger's views on a ,l h&d12;q3ia in a few works following the publication of Sein und Zeit . As a next step, the bulk of the philological work responding to Heidegger is carefully examined with a special focus on the interpretative approaches of the various authors. Heidegger's attempt to respond to some of these philologists is also reviewed. Finally, Heidegger's retraction of his earlier views on a ,l h&d12;q3ia is examined in light of a growing critical consensus among philologists. The very latest philological responses to Heidegger are also considered. The conclusion looks at the contributions made by Heidegger and his philological respondents to our knowledge of ancient Greek truth. Some suggestions are also made for future research on this topic.
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Hanasyk, Matthew. "Uniqueness and the event : rethinking the horizonal in Martin Heidegger's Contributions to philosophy (of the event)." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/61284.
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This thesis explores the idea of uniqueness in Martin Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event). Written between 1936 and 1938, Contributions is an in-depth account of what Heidegger calls the event of appropriation [Ereignis]. It is written as a critique of the history of philosophy and a call to think this history from out of another beginning, which it attempts to sketch out in terms of what Heidegger calls beyng-historical thinking. This thesis focuses on the uniqueness of the event by focusing on what it means for the unique to emerge historically. This thesis challenges other scholarly research on the text by placing the idea of uniqueness within the context of its own horizon. Previously, the horizonal, as a concept, was inextricably bound to the concept of transcendence that Heidegger abandons as beholden to the metaphysical way of thinking in which he distances himself. This thesis attempts to show that the horizonal is in fact rethought in Contributions in terms of the unique. As a result, this thesis challenges the idea that only transcendence can be thought horizonally. This thesis focuses primarily on the chapter in Contributions titled, The Grounding. This thesis is itself divided into three chapters: Da-sein, Selfhood, Imagination; The Essence of Truth and the Simplicity of the Unique; Time-space and the Persistence of Fathoming. Each of these chapters focuses primarily on one or more of the subsections within the chapter of Contributions mentioned above. I argue that the uniqueness of the event can be thought of in terms of the separation between the horizon of uniqueness and the uniqueness of the horizon that opens up within uniqueness itself with respect to the grounding of Da-sein, or “there-being,” in its self-assignment to the event. It is the persistence of fathoming the simplicity of this uniqueness in the appropriation of the truth of beyng that opens up the time-space of the event for the coming to presence of the historical moment. Furthermore, I explore the possibility that uniqueness holds for giving a positive account of nothingness, which is an imperative expressed by Heidegger himself within the text.Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
Graduate
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Persson, Anders. "Lärartillvaro och historieundervisning : innebörder av ett nytt uppdrag i de mätbara resultatens tid." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-135323.
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Swedish compulsory school has recently been subjected to a number of political reforms. Between 2011 and 2014, for example, earlier grades, more national tests and a new curriculum plan (Lgr 11) were to be implemented. This thesis aims to examine those changes as they were experienced by teachers who teach history in Swedish upper primary schools. The theoretical framework is in-spired by existential philosophy, primarily as formulated in the works of Martin Heidegger and Hanna Arendt. In this way, the study highlights the teachers’ lived experience by making use of the concepts yearning, appearance, acting and mood. The study comprises of 36 interviews with 26 informants. The interviews were carried out and transcribed during 2014. The questions focus on both the existential being of the teachers’ lives as well as the ideological function of the history subject. This highly renders in the issue of how lived experiences of a specific school reform corresponded to the teachers’ own perception of a mean-ingful history education. Both the yearnings that were expressed by the participants and their de-scriptions of what they have experienced, have been related to the overall educational ideological functions stated by Gert Biesta (socialisation, subjectification and qualification) and Jonas Aspelin (existentialisation). Although the teachers’ narratives were greatly varied in some aspects, their interpretations of the new assignment seemed to be quite homogenous. Most of the teachers portrayed a situation characterised by performativity. Measurable knowledge and more frequent documentation seemed to be prioritised. Some of them stressed that they experienced less autonomy. In terms of history, the new curriculum was associated with more content knowledge, cognitive skills and procedural abilities. From the teachers’ perspective, pure qualification, rather than subjectification and social-isation, characterised the new curriculum. Still, the teachers’ feelings towards the curricular changes showed a great deal of divergence. Some of them embraced most of the new aspects. They claimed that clearly formulated require-ments in the history curricula provided them with security. They declared that their history teaching to some extent became more professional. In line with such beliefs, some teachers asserted that the strengthened focus on analytical skills improved their teaching. Particularly those who ex-pressed that they preferred such analytic procedural approaches described their experience in terms of confirmation and approval. Others appeared to struggle with the changes. While a few teachers even tried to resist the curricular changes, some found themselves forced to endure what appeared to be a totally new situation. They expressed disbelief, frustration and pain. Notably it was those most devoted to the existentialisational function of history teaching that usually seemed to express such alienation. As argued, they appeared to long for a lost possibility to engage their pupils, to bring history alive and to make meaning of the past.
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Stephenson, Erik H. "The ethics of authenticity : Heidegger's retrieval of the Kantian ethic in Being and time." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2005. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015480233&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Esengrini, Stefano. "Preparation to the question of the sense of being in Martin Heidegger's thought : an introduction to the existential analytic of Dasein : Sein und Zeit (1927), Was ist Metaphysik (1929), Rektoratsrede (1933) /." Nijmegen : S. Esengrini, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb399594950.
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Blouin, Philippe S. "La phénoménologie comme manière de vivre." Thesis, Normandie, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020NORMR009.
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Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystiqueAt the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness
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"The question "who is Dasein?" in being and time: the existential analysis of the "I am"." 1999. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896321.
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by Hung Suet Yee.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-129).
Abstract also in Chinese.
Abstract --- p.2
撮要 --- p.3
Table of Content --- p.4
Abbreviation --- p.6
Introduction --- p.7
Chapter A. --- The obvious answer to the who-question --- p.8
Chapter B. --- The structure of this Thesis --- p.13
Chapter Chapter I --- "The Question of ""Who"" and the Question of Being" --- p.19
Chapter A. --- Introduction --- p.19
Chapter B. --- The Question of Being and Dasein's Understanding of Being --- p.22
Chapter 1. --- The clarification of the structure of the Question --- p.22
Chapter 2. --- The circularity of the question --- p.27
Chapter C. --- Dasein's understanding of Being as its essential characteristic --- p.30
Chapter 1. --- The preliminary indication of the meaning of Dasein --- p.30
Chapter 2. --- The analytic of Dasein as distinguished from Anthropology --- p.36
Chapter D. --- The question of who of Dasein --- p.43
Chapter E. --- Conclusion --- p.49
Chapter Chapter II --- "Confronting Descartes´ةand Kant's ""I am´ح" --- p.52
Chapter A. --- Introduction --- p.52
Chapter B. --- The Criticism on the Cartesian Ego --- p.54
Chapter 1. --- Indeterminacy of the sum --- p.57
Chapter 2. --- Indeterminacy of substantiality --- p.60
Chapter C. --- The Criticism on the Kantian Cogito --- p.62
Chapter 1. --- The Paralogism of Pure Reason --- p.64
Chapter 2. --- The fall back to the indeterminacy of substance --- p.67
Chapter 3. --- Kant's return to the res cogitans --- p.70
Chapter D. --- Conclusion --- p.78
Chapter Chapter III --- "The everyday ""I""一so close yet far away" --- p.81
Chapter A. --- Introduction --- p.81
Chapter B. --- Dasein's everyday work-world --- p.83
Chapter 1. --- "The Heideggerian concept of the ""world""" --- p.85
Chapter 2. --- The ontico-existentiell explication of Dasein's work-world --- p.87
Chapter 3. --- The ontologico-existential explanation of worldhood --- p.89
Chapter 4. --- The work-world and the lack of privilege of Dasein's I-here --- p.93
Chapter C. --- Dasein's everyday with-world --- p.97
Chapter 1. --- The primacy of Dasein over the encountering of Other --- p.99
Chapter 2. --- Dasein's everyday Being-I and the Others --- p.102
Chapter D. --- Ponclusion --- p.107
Conclusion --- p.111
Bibliography --- p.124
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Little, Nolan. "Authenticity and inauthenticity in Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history." Thesis, 2017. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/20869.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation explores the philosophy of history that Heidegger presents in his early magnum opus, Being and Time. I argue that his philosophy of history differs importantly from several influential philosophical studies of history by his predecessors (particularly Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl), and that it makes a valuable contribution to subsequent philosophy of history. Heidegger’s existential analysis emphasizes the interpretive character of the individual’s relation to history and, as a consequence, the hermeneutical features of any philosophical approach to history. An essential part of his analysis is his insistence on the individual’s frequently shirked responsibility for her interpretations. I argue that this focus on personal responsibility for historical interpretation places a burden upon the individual but also opens a possibility for creative engagement with the world. The value of the future is opened through the individual’s responsible engagement with her history.
In the first the two chapters I introduce general sorts of problems that have beset the philosophy of history in the last two centuries, in particular, the problems presented by the prospect of an objective interpretation of history. Since the objectivity of an interpretation implies that the interpretation has some authority over those who understand it, I contend that the prospect of objective historical interpretation raises specific and daunting questions about one’s responsibility with regard to such interpretations.
I continue the theme of responsibility and authority in the latter two chapters. There, I am interested in dissuading the reader from the view that Heidegger adopts an irresponsible attitude toward historical interpretation in Being and Time. By way of presenting a defense of Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity and inauthenticity, I argue that his philosophy amounts to a robust defense of historical responsibility. Through his analysis of conscience, guilt and resoluteness, Heidegger demonstrates Dasein’s capacity to recognize itself as a kind of entity that can and, indeed, must take responsibility for its interpretations and thereby for its historicity.
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"The reformulation of philosophy in Heidegger's early thinking." 1999. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896329.
Full textAbstract:
Leung Ka-wing.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 198-211).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
INTRODUCTION --- p.3
Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE REFORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY: THE RELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY --- p.8
Chapter §1.1 --- Philosophy and Science in Ancient Greek --- p.9
Chapter §1.2 --- Christian Theology and the First Philosophy --- p.15
Chapter §1.3 --- Hegel's Formulation of Philosophy --- p.18
Chapter §1.4 --- The Estrangement of Philosophy and Science --- p.21
Chapter §1.5 --- Reformulation of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century --- p.24
Chapter 1.5.1 --- Positivism --- p.26
Chapter 1.5.2 --- Neo-Kantianism --- p.31
Chapter 1.5.3 --- Phenomenology --- p.35
Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- PHILOSOPHY AS PRIMAL SCIENCE --- p.43
Chapter §2.1 --- Remark on the Division of Heidegger's Periods of Thinking --- p.44
Chapter §2.2 --- The Background of the Kreigsnotsemester --- p.50
Chapter §2.3 --- Philosophy and Worldviews --- p.54
Chapter §2.4 --- Philosophy and Particular Sciences --- p.59
Chapter §2.5 --- "The “Knowledge of Objects"" as the Subject-matter of Philosophy" --- p.63
Chapter §2.6 --- The Problematic of Axioms --- p.65
Chapter §2.7 --- The Teleological´ؤcritical Method of the Southwest German School of the Neo-Kantianism --- p.68
Chapter §2.8 --- A New Approach to the Psychical --- p.71
Chapter §2.9 --- The Problematic of Lived´ؤexperience --- p.78
Chapter §2.10 --- The Method for the Science of Lived´ؤexperiencein general --- p.83
Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- FROM LIFE TO BEING: THE ELEVATION OF THE BEING´ؤQUESTION TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY --- p.92
Chapter §3.1 --- Heidegger's First Confrontation with the Being- question --- p.94
Chapter §3.2 --- Life and Philosophy --- p.98
Chapter §3.3 --- The Incompatibility of Life and Science --- p.103
Chapter §3.4 --- "The Venture of ""Destruction""" --- p.108
Chapter §3.5 --- "“The Being of the Factical Life"" as the Problematic of Philosophy" --- p.114
Chapter §3.6 --- The Problematic of Time --- p.126
Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- BEING´ؤUNDERSTANDING AND TEMPORALITY: THE FORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY IN SEIN UND ZEIT --- p.133
Chapter §4.1 --- Philosophy as Ontology --- p.133
Chapter §4.2 --- The Priority of Human Dasein in the Being- question --- p.139
Chapter §4.3 --- The Transformation of the Being´ؤquestion --- p.147
Chapter §4.4 --- The Being-constitution of Dasein --- p.155
Chapter §4. 5 --- The Problematic of Temporality --- p.165
Chapter §4.6 --- The Structure of Understanding and the Horizonal Schema of the Ecstase of Zeitlichkeit --- p.168
Chapter §4.7 --- The Failure of the Program of Sein und Zeit --- p.clxxxi
CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.185
Chapter I. --- On Existence --- p.cxci
Chapter II. --- on Understanding --- p.192
Chapter III. --- on Historicality --- p.195
BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.198
Chapter I. --- Works by Heidegger and corresponding English translations --- p.198
Chapter II. --- Other references: --- p.202
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Beattie, Darren Jeffrey. "Martin Heidegger's Mathematical Dialectic: Uncovering the Structure of Modernity." Diss., 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/12223.
Full textAbstract:
Martin Heidegger is generally regarded as one of the most significant—if also the most controversial—philosophers of the 20th century. Most scholarly engagement with Heidegger’s thought on Modernity approaches his work with a special focus on either his critique of technology, or on his more general critique of subjectivity. This dissertation project attempts to elucidate Martin Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity, and, by extension, his thought as a whole, from the neglected standpoint of his understanding of mathematics, which he explicitly identifies as the essence of modernity.
Accordingly, our project attempts to work through the development of Modernity, as Heidegger understands it, on the basis of what we call a “mathematical dialectic.“ The basis of our analysis is that Heidegger’s understanding of Modernity, both on its own terms and in the context of his theory of history [Seinsgeschichte], is best understood in terms of the interaction between two essential, “mathematical” characteristics, namely, self-grounding and homogeneity. This project first investigates the mathematical qualities of these components of Modernity individually, and then attempts to trace the historical and philosophical development of Modernity on the basis of the interaction between these two components—an interaction that is, we argue, itself regulated by the structure of the mathematical, according to Heidegger’s understanding of the term.
The project undertaken here intends not only to serve as an interpretive, scholarly function of elucidating Heidegger’s understanding of Modernity, but also to advance the larger aim of defending the prescience, structural coherence, and relevance of Heidegger’s diagnosis of Modernity as such.
Dissertation
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Bowler, Michael J. "The philosophical context of Heidegger's reappropriation of Aristotle." 2004. http://etd.nd.edu.lib-proxy.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-02152005-103513/.
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Hartford, Sean Daniel. "Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian problem of scepticism." Master's thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10048/1074.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (M. A.)--University of Alberta, 2010.Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on April 9, 2010). A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, [Department of] Philosophy, University of Alberta. Includes bibliographical references.
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Knudsen, Donald L. "A Crushing Truth for Art: Martin Heidegger's Meditation on Truth and the Work of Art in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes." Thesis, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10756/291042.
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Setlakwe, Blouin Philippe. "La phénoménologie comme manière de vivre." Thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/24643.
Full textAbstract:
Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique.At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness.