Academic literature on the topic 'Matching theory'
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Journal articles on the topic "Matching theory"
Rota, Gian-Carlo. "Matching theory." Advances in Mathematics 80, no. 1 (March 1990): 134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0001-8708(90)90019-j.
Full textEchenique, Federico, SangMok Lee, Matthew Shum, and M. Bumin Yenmez. "Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings." Games 12, no. 2 (April 9, 2021): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12020033.
Full textAharoni, Ron. "Infinite matching theory." Discrete Mathematics 95, no. 1-3 (December 1991): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0012-365x(91)90327-x.
Full textLuong, Kyle. "Matching theory: kidney allocation." University of Western Ontario Medical Journal 82, no. 1 (October 1, 2013): 14–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/uwomj.v82i1.4632.
Full textWakeford, Colin. "Advanced colour matching theory." Pigment & Resin Technology 27, no. 1 (February 1998): 6–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03699429810194320.
Full textAliprantis, C. D., G. Camera, and D. Puzzello. "A random matching theory." Games and Economic Behavior 59, no. 1 (April 2007): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.001.
Full textMahavir Varma, Sushil. "Stochastic Matching Networks: Theory and Applications to Matching Platforms." ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 52, no. 3 (January 9, 2025): 3–6. https://doi.org/10.1145/3712170.3712173.
Full textKarlsson, Andreas. "Statistical Matching: Theory and Practice." Technometrics 49, no. 3 (August 2007): 361–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1198/tech.2007.s507.
Full textScheuren, Fritz. "Statistical Matching: Theory and Practice." Journal of the American Statistical Association 102, no. 479 (September 2007): 1076–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1198/jasa.2007.s204.
Full textTewari, Surya P., H. Huang, and R. W. Boyd. "Theory of self-phase-matching." Physical Review A 51, no. 4 (April 1, 1995): R2707—R2710. http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/physreva.51.r2707.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Matching theory"
Jeong, Jinyong. "Essays in Matching Theory." Thesis, Boston College, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107959.
Full textMy doctoral research focuses on the matching theory and its market design application. Specifically, I work on matching with property rights, where property rights not only mean the ownership, but also refer to the ability to determine how the good is used. In the matching with property rights model, an agent who owns a resource can claim how her resource is offered, depending on what she gets from the system. For example, in a housing exchange for vacation, an agent who gets a house with a car will offer her house also with a car. However, if she is assigned only a house without a car, she might refuse to offer a car. This restriction can be thought as a matching with externality, as someone's consuming my resource in certain way affects my utility. With property rights present, it is not clear how we can achieve a desirable outcome while satisfying the rights. I am currently pursuing two main lines of research in this topic that constitute the two chapters dissertation. In Matching with Property Rights: an Application to a Parking Space Assignment Problem, I introduce parking in urban areas as a matching problem. First, I model the street-parking market as a strategic game and show that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the set of stable allocations. However, it is not reasonable to expect drivers to reach a Nash equilibrium in the decentralized system due to lack of information and coordination failure. Therefore, I suggest a centralized mechanism that would enable a parking authority to assign available spaces to drivers in a stable way. The model incorporates resident parking spaces, such that visitors could access vacant resident spaces. To use the resident parking spaces, the system needs to protect exclusive property rights over their parking spaces. I show that, however, there is no mechanism that is stable and protects residents' rights. To resolve this issue, I introduce a new concept, a claim contract, and suggest a mechanism that protects property rights, is strategy proof for the drivers, and approximates a stable matching. Besides its market-design focus, this paper handles both priority-based and property right-based assignment, which considered separately in the matching theory literature. In Housing Market with Contracts, I study matching with property rights problem in the housing market framework. To introduce property rights in housing market, I assume the house can be offered in two contractual terms. Property rights requires that when an agent gets a house in a certain term, her house should also be offered as the same term. Moreover, when every agent owns a house, property rights reduces to an equal-term matching. After defining efficiency and core in equal-term domain, I show that, in a housing market with contracts problem, core may be empty. However, there always exists an efficient, individually rational, and equal-term matching in every housing market with contracts problem. Then I present a mechanism that always produces an efficient, individually rational, and equal-term matching. This is the first attempt to model a matching with contract in a exchange economy
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Corrêa, Márcio. "Essays on job-matching theory." Doctoral thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/8763.
Full textO objectivo principal da Job Matching Theiry é o de explicar os efeitos dos custos de mobilidade sobre o equilíbrio no mercado de trabalho. A ideia por trás deste tipo de modelo é a de que antes do início da actividade produtiva, tanto as firmas como os trabalhadores têm que despender tempo e recursos de forma a encontrar seu parceiro de produção.Nesta dissertação, nosso objectivo é o desenvolver t`rês artigos, todos desenvolvidos no mesmo ambiente, com o intuito de responder três questões distintas. No primeiro capítulo - Job Matching, Technological Progress. and Worker-Provided on-the job Training - nosso objectivo é o de estudar os efeitos do investimento em treinamento pagos pelo trabalhador empregado sobre o mercado de trabalho caracterizado por dois tipos distintos de progresso tecnólógico: destruição criativa e renovação. No segundo capítulo - Technological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality - nosso objectivo é o de estudar, também em um cenário caracterizado por search frictions, os efeitos da taxa de progresso tecnológico: destruição criativa e renovação. No segundo capítulo - Tecnhonological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality - nooso objectivo é o de estudar, tanbém em um cenário caracterizado por search frictions, os efeitos da taxa de progresso tecnológico sobre a qualidade média das parcerias proodutivas. No terceiro e último capítulo - Job Matching, Unexpected Obligations and Retirement Decisions - nosso objectivo é o de investigar os efeitos de variações não antecipadas no nível das obrigações dos trabalhadores sobre a sua regra óptima de entrada na reforma.
The main objective of the Job Matching Theory is to explain the effects of mobility costs over the labor market equilibrium. The basic idea behind these models is that before the production begins, firms and workers have to spend resources in order to find their production partner. In this dissertation, our main objective is to develop three essays, all carried out in the same environment - that of Job Matching Theory - with the aim of answering three distinct questions. In the first chapter - Job Matching Technological Progress, and Worker-Provided On-the-job Training - the objective is to study the effects of the worker-provided on-the-job training investments on a labor market characterized by technological progress of the creative destruction type and the renovative type. In the second chapter of the dissertation - Technological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality - our objective is to study, also a labor market characterized by search frictions, the effects of technological progress on the average quality of the job matches. In the third and final chapter of the thesis - Job Matching, Unexpected Obligations and Retirement Decisions - our objective is to investigate the effects of unexpected changes in the worker's obligations on the decision to retire.
Sandi, Giulia <1982>. "Matching hypergraphs with game theory." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/13344.
Full textAlva, Samson. "Essays on Matching Theory and Networks." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104379.
Full textThis dissertation is composed of three essays in microeconomic theory. The first and second essays are in the theory of matching, with hierarchical organizations and complementarities being their respective topic. The third essay is in on electoral competition and political polarization as a result of manipulation of public opinion through social influence networks. Hierarchies are a common organizational structure in institutions. In the first essay, I offer an explanation of this fact from a matching-theoretic perspective, which emphasizes the importance of stable outcomes for the persistence of organizational structures. I study the matching of individuals (talents) via contracts with institutions, which are aggregate market actors, each composed of decision makers (divisions) enjoined by an institutional governance structure. Conflicts over contracts between divisions of an institution are resolved by the institutional governance structure, whereas conflicts between divisions across institutions are resolved by talents' preferences. Stable market outcomes exist whenever institutional governance is hierarchical and divisions consider contracts to be bilaterally substitutable. In contrast, when governance in institutions is non-hierarchical, stable outcomes may not exist. Since market stability does not provide an impetus for reorganization, the persistence of markets with hierarchical institutions can thus be rationalized. Hierarchies in institutions also have the attractive incentive property that in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with talents making offers to institutions, the choice problem for divisions is straightforward and realized market outcomes are pairwise stable, and stable when divisions have substitutable preferences. Complementarity has proved to be a challenge for matching theory, because the core and group stable matchings may fail to exist. Less well understood is the more basic notion of pairwise stability. In a second essay, I define a class of complementarity, asymmetric complements, and show that pairwise stable matchings are guaranteed to exist in matching markets where no firm considers workers to be asymmetric complements. The lattice structure of the pairwise stable matchings, familiar from the matching theory with substitutes, does not survive in this more general domain. The simultaneous-offer and sequential-offer versions of the worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm can produce different matchings when workers are not necessarily substitutable. If no firm considers workers to be imperfect complements, then the simultaneous-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, but this is not necessarily true otherwise. If no firm considers workers to be asymmetric complements, a weaker restriction than no imperfect complements, then the sequential-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, though the matching produced is order-dependent. In a third essay, I examine electoral competition in which two candidates compete through policy and persuasion, and using a tractable two-dimensional framework with social learning provide an explanation for increasing political polarization. Voters and candidates have policy preferences that depend upon the state of the world, which is known to candidates but not known to voters, and are connected through a social influence network that determines through a learning process the final opinion of voters, where the voters' initial opinions and the persuasion efforts of the candidates affect final opinions, and so voting behavior. Equilibrium level of polarization in policy and opinion (of both party and population) increases when persuasion costs decrease. An increase in homophily increases the equilibrium level of policy polarization and population opinion polarization. These comparative static results help explain the increased polarization in both the policy and opinion dimensions in the United States
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao. "Models of Matching Markets." Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493461.
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Shorrer, Ran I. "Essays on Indices and Matching." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467351.
Full textBusiness Economics
Bó, Inácio G. L. "Essays in Matching Theory and Mechanism Design." Thesis, Boston College, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104172.
Full textThis dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter consists of a survey of the literature on affirmative action and diversity objective in school choice mechanisms. It presents and analyzes some of the main papers on the subject, showing the evolution of our understanding of the effects that different affirmative action policies have on the welfare and fairness of student assignments, the satisfaction of the diversity objectives as well as the domain of policies that allows for stable outcomes. The second chapter analyzes the problem of school choice mechanisms when policy-makers have objectives over the distribution of students by type across the schools. I show that mechanisms currently available in the literature may fail to a great extent in satisfying those objectives, and introduce a new one, which satisfies two properties. First, it produces assignments that satisfy a fairness criterion which incorporates the diversity objectives as an element of fairness. Second, it approximates optimally the diversity objectives while still satisfying the fairness criterion. We do so by embedding "preference" for those objectives into the schools' choice functions in a way that satisfies the substitutability condition and then using the school-proposing deferred acceptance procedure. This leads to the equivalence of stability with the desired definition of fairness and the maximization of those diversity objectives among the set of fair assignments. A comparative analysis also shows analytically that the mechanism that we provide has a general ability to satisfy those objectives, while in many familiar classes of scenarios the alternative ones yield segregated assignments. Finally, we analyze the incentives induced by the proposed mechanism in different market sizes and informational structures. The third chapter (co-authored with Orhan Aygün) presents an analysis of the Brazilian affirmative action initiative for access to public federal universities. In August 2012 the Brazilian federal government enacted a law mandating the prioritization of students who claim belonging to the groups of those coming from public high schools, low income families and being racial minorities to defined proportions of the seats available in federal public universities. In this problem, individuals may be part of one or more of those groups, and it is possible for students not to claim some of the privileges associated with them. This turns out to be a problem not previously studied in the literature. We show that under the choice function induced by the current guidelines, students may be better off by not claiming privileges that they are eligible to. Moreover, the resulting assignments may not be fair or satisfy the affirmative action objectives, even when there are enough students claiming low--income and minority privileges. Also, any stable mechanism that uses the current choice functions is neither incentive compatible nor fair. We propose a new choice function to be used by the universities that guarantees that a student will not be worse off by claiming an additional privilege, is fair and satisfies the affirmative action objectives whenever it is possible and there are enough applications claiming low--income and minority privileges. Next, we suggest a stable, incentive compatible and fair mechanism to create assignments for the entire system
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Ulus, Dogan. "Pattern Matching with Time : Theory and Applications." Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018GREAM003/document.
Full textDynamical systems exhibit temporal behaviors that can be expressed in various sequential forms such as signals, waveforms, time series, and event sequences. Detecting patterns over such temporal behaviors is a fundamental task for understanding and assessing these systems. Since many system behaviors involve certain timing characteristics, the need to specify and detect patterns of behaviors that involves timing requirements, called timed patterns, is evident. However, this is a non-trivial task due to a number of reasons including the concurrency of subsystems and density of time.The key contribution of this thesis is in introducing and developing emph{timed pattern matching}, that is, the act of identifying segments of a given behavior that satisfy a timed pattern. We propose timed regular expressions (TREs) and metric compass logic (MCL) as timed pattern specification languages. We first develop a novel framework that abstracts the computation of time-related aspects called the algebra of timed relations. Then we provide offline matching algorithms for TRE and MCL over discrete-valued dense-time behaviors using this framework and study some practical extensions.It is necessary for some application areas such as reactive control that pattern matching needs to be performed during the actual execution of the system. For that, we provide an online matching algorithm for TREs based on the classical technique of derivatives of regular expressions. We believe the underlying technique that combines derivatives and timed relations constitutes another major conceptual contribution for timed systems research.Furthermore, we present an open-source tool Montre that implements our ideas and algorithms. We explore diverse applications of timed pattern matching over several case studies using Montre. Finally we discuss future directions and several open questions emerged as a result of this thesis
Evci, Bora <1982>. "Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6569/1/Evci_Bora_Tesi.pdf.
Full textEvci, Bora <1982>. "Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6569/.
Full textBooks on the topic "Matching theory"
Ladvánszky, János. Theory of Power Matching. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16631-1.
Full textHan, Zhu, Yunan Gu, and Walid Saad. Matching Theory for Wireless Networks. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56252-0.
Full textMoghaddam, Mohsen, and Shimon Y. Nof. Best Matching Theory & Applications. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46070-3.
Full textNakajima, Ryō. Matchingu gēmu no jisshō bunseki. Tōkyō-to Bunkyō-ku: Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo, 2015.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Matching theory"
Cioabă, Sebastian M., and M. Ram Murty. "Matching Theory." In A First Course in Graph Theory and Combinatorics, 86–99. Gurgaon: Hindustan Book Agency, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-93-86279-39-2_8.
Full textCioabă, Sebastian M., and M. Ram Murty. "Matching Theory." In Texts and Readings in Mathematics, 111–26. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-0957-3_8.
Full textOsborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. "Matching." In Models in Microeconomic Theory, 305–16. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/obp.0362.18.
Full textOsborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. "Matching." In Models in Microeconomic Theory, 305–16. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/obp.0361.18.
Full textRässler, Susanne. "Frequentist Theory of Statistical Matching." In Statistical Matching, 15–43. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-0053-3_2.
Full textSaoub, Karin R. "Matching and Factors." In Graph Theory, 213–73. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2021. | Series: Textbooks in mathematics: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781138361416-5.
Full textCsikvári, Péter. "Statistical Matching Theory." In Bolyai Society Mathematical Studies, 195–221. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59204-5_5.
Full textRahman, Md Saidur. "Matching and Covering." In Basic Graph Theory, 63–75. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49475-3_5.
Full textYadav, Santosh Kumar. "Matching & Covering." In Advanced Graph Theory, 141–70. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22562-8_5.
Full textDiestel, Reinhard. "Matching Covering and Packing." In Graph Theory, 35–58. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53622-3_2.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Matching theory"
Pan, Wen-Xin, Isabel Haasler, and Pascal Frossard. "Subgraph Matching via Partial Optimal Transport." In 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 3456–61. IEEE, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit57864.2024.10619388.
Full textZhou, Lin, Qianyun Wang, Jingjing Wang, Lin Bai, and Alfred Hero. "Large Deviations for Statistical Sequence Matching." In 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 1275–80. IEEE, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit57864.2024.10619312.
Full textCrafts, Evan Scope, Xianyang Zhang, and Bo Zhao. "Score Matching with Deep Neural Networks: A Non-Asymptotic Analysis." In 2024 IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), 319–23. IEEE, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1109/itw61385.2024.10807035.
Full textFarag, Michael, and Bobak Nazer. "Matching alignment." In 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isit.2015.7282973.
Full textFox, Jeremy T. "Identification in matching games." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807503.
Full textBaker, Brenda S. "A theory of parameterized pattern matching." In the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/167088.167115.
Full textVuillod, Benini, and De Micheli. "Generalized matching from theory to application." In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computer Aided Design (ICCAD). IEEE, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccad.1997.643255.
Full textTan, Xing, Jingwei Huang, and Yilan Gu. "SMAT: String Matching in Action Theory." In 2022 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wi-iat55865.2022.00014.
Full textChen, Yu-lei, and You-gen Li. "Matching relationship among corporate lifecycles theory, stakeholder theory and CSR." In 2012 First National Conference for Engineering Sciences (FNCES). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/nces.2012.6543468.
Full textSchniter, Philip, Lee C. Potter, and Justin Ziniel. "Fast bayesian matching pursuit." In 2008 Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ita.2008.4601068.
Full textReports on the topic "Matching theory"
Yan, Jin, Kenneth D. Forbus, and Dedre Gentner. A Theory of Rerepresentation in Analogical Matching. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada466013.
Full textChiappori, Pierre-André, Monica Costa Dias, and Costas Meghir. Changes in Assortative Matching: Theory and Evidence for the US. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26932.
Full textMeghir, Costas, Monica Costa Dias, and Pierre-André Chiappori. Changes in assortative matching: theory and evidence for the US. The IFS, April 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2020.1020.
Full textGanimian, Alejandro, and Emiliana Vegas. Theory and Evidence on Teacher Policies in Developed and Developing Countries. Inter-American Development Bank, August 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0012277.
Full textBaader, Franz, and Ralf Küsters. Unification in a Description Logic with Transitive Closure of Roles. Aachen University of Technology, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.25368/2022.115.
Full textPlummer, Michael D. Matching and Vertex Packing: How Hard Are They? Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada245928.
Full textGathergood, John, Neale Mahoney, Neil Stewart, and Joerg Weber. How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt? The Balance-Matching Heuristic. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24161.
Full textGathergood, John, Neale Mahoney, Neil Stewart, and Jörg Weber. How Do Americans Repay Their Debt? The Balance-Matching Heuristic. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25557.
Full textEdwards, Wesley, Cornelius Anderson, Alexis Miller, and Kafarra Burden. Teacher-Principal Ethnoracial Matching Keeps New Teachers in their Classrooms. University of North Texas, September 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.12794/untsw.2178704.
Full textSianesi, Barbara. An introduction to matching methods for causal inference and their implementation in Stata. The IFS, June 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/ps.ifs.2024.0876.
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