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Jeong, Jinyong. "Essays in Matching Theory." Thesis, Boston College, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:107959.
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Thesis advisor: Utku UnverMy doctoral research focuses on the matching theory and its market design application. Specifically, I work on matching with property rights, where property rights not only mean the ownership, but also refer to the ability to determine how the good is used. In the matching with property rights model, an agent who owns a resource can claim how her resource is offered, depending on what she gets from the system. For example, in a housing exchange for vacation, an agent who gets a house with a car will offer her house also with a car. However, if she is assigned only a house without a car, she might refuse to offer a car. This restriction can be thought as a matching with externality, as someone's consuming my resource in certain way affects my utility. With property rights present, it is not clear how we can achieve a desirable outcome while satisfying the rights. I am currently pursuing two main lines of research in this topic that constitute the two chapters dissertation. In Matching with Property Rights: an Application to a Parking Space Assignment Problem, I introduce parking in urban areas as a matching problem. First, I model the street-parking market as a strategic game and show that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the set of stable allocations. However, it is not reasonable to expect drivers to reach a Nash equilibrium in the decentralized system due to lack of information and coordination failure. Therefore, I suggest a centralized mechanism that would enable a parking authority to assign available spaces to drivers in a stable way. The model incorporates resident parking spaces, such that visitors could access vacant resident spaces. To use the resident parking spaces, the system needs to protect exclusive property rights over their parking spaces. I show that, however, there is no mechanism that is stable and protects residents' rights. To resolve this issue, I introduce a new concept, a claim contract, and suggest a mechanism that protects property rights, is strategy proof for the drivers, and approximates a stable matching. Besides its market-design focus, this paper handles both priority-based and property right-based assignment, which considered separately in the matching theory literature. In Housing Market with Contracts, I study matching with property rights problem in the housing market framework. To introduce property rights in housing market, I assume the house can be offered in two contractual terms. Property rights requires that when an agent gets a house in a certain term, her house should also be offered as the same term. Moreover, when every agent owns a house, property rights reduces to an equal-term matching. After defining efficiency and core in equal-term domain, I show that, in a housing market with contracts problem, core may be empty. However, there always exists an efficient, individually rational, and equal-term matching in every housing market with contracts problem. Then I present a mechanism that always produces an efficient, individually rational, and equal-term matching. This is the first attempt to model a matching with contract in a exchange economy
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
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Corrêa, Márcio. "Essays on job-matching theory." Doctoral thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/8763.
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Doutoramento em EconomiaO objectivo principal da Job Matching Theiry é o de explicar os efeitos dos custos de mobilidade sobre o equilíbrio no mercado de trabalho. A ideia por trás deste tipo de modelo é a de que antes do início da actividade produtiva, tanto as firmas como os trabalhadores têm que despender tempo e recursos de forma a encontrar seu parceiro de produção.Nesta dissertação, nosso objectivo é o desenvolver t`rês artigos, todos desenvolvidos no mesmo ambiente, com o intuito de responder três questões distintas. No primeiro capítulo - Job Matching, Technological Progress. and Worker-Provided on-the job Training - nosso objectivo é o de estudar os efeitos do investimento em treinamento pagos pelo trabalhador empregado sobre o mercado de trabalho caracterizado por dois tipos distintos de progresso tecnólógico: destruição criativa e renovação. No segundo capítulo - Technological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality - nosso objectivo é o de estudar, também em um cenário caracterizado por search frictions, os efeitos da taxa de progresso tecnológico: destruição criativa e renovação. No segundo capítulo - Tecnhonological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality - nooso objectivo é o de estudar, tanbém em um cenário caracterizado por search frictions, os efeitos da taxa de progresso tecnológico sobre a qualidade média das parcerias proodutivas. No terceiro e último capítulo - Job Matching, Unexpected Obligations and Retirement Decisions - nosso objectivo é o de investigar os efeitos de variações não antecipadas no nível das obrigações dos trabalhadores sobre a sua regra óptima de entrada na reforma.
The main objective of the Job Matching Theory is to explain the effects of mobility costs over the labor market equilibrium. The basic idea behind these models is that before the production begins, firms and workers have to spend resources in order to find their production partner. In this dissertation, our main objective is to develop three essays, all carried out in the same environment - that of Job Matching Theory - with the aim of answering three distinct questions. In the first chapter - Job Matching Technological Progress, and Worker-Provided On-the-job Training - the objective is to study the effects of the worker-provided on-the-job training investments on a labor market characterized by technological progress of the creative destruction type and the renovative type. In the second chapter of the dissertation - Technological Progress and Average Job Matching Quality - our objective is to study, also a labor market characterized by search frictions, the effects of technological progress on the average quality of the job matches. In the third and final chapter of the thesis - Job Matching, Unexpected Obligations and Retirement Decisions - our objective is to investigate the effects of unexpected changes in the worker's obligations on the decision to retire.
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Sandi, Giulia <1982>. "Matching hypergraphs with game theory." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/13344.
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The problem of finding isomorphisms, or matching partitions, in hypergraphs has gained increasing interest from the scientific community in the last years, particularly in the Computer Vision field. This is due to the advantages that arises from overcoming the limitations provided by pairwise relationship, thus encoding a bigger pool of information. Association graph techniques represent a classical approach to tackle the graph matching problem and recently the idea has been generalized to the case of uniform hypergraphs. In this thesis, the potential of this approach, employed together with elements from the Evolutionary Game Theory, is explored. Indeed, the proposed framework uses a class of dynamical systems derived from the Baum-Eagon inequality in order to find the maximum (maximal) clique in the association hypergraph, that corresponds to the maximum (maximal) isomorphism between the hypergraphs to be matched. The proposed approach has extensively been tested with experiments on a large synthetic dataset. In particular both the pure isomorphism and the subgraph isomorphism problems have been analysed. The obtained results reflect the different complexity classes these problems belong to, thus showing that despite its simplicity the Baum-Eagon dynamics does an excellent job at finding globally optimal solutions in the pure isomorphism case, while in the subgraph case the use of more complex dynamics might be more suitable.
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Alva, Samson. "Essays on Matching Theory and Networks." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104379.
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Thesis advisor: Utku UnverThis dissertation is composed of three essays in microeconomic theory. The first and second essays are in the theory of matching, with hierarchical organizations and complementarities being their respective topic. The third essay is in on electoral competition and political polarization as a result of manipulation of public opinion through social influence networks. Hierarchies are a common organizational structure in institutions. In the first essay, I offer an explanation of this fact from a matching-theoretic perspective, which emphasizes the importance of stable outcomes for the persistence of organizational structures. I study the matching of individuals (talents) via contracts with institutions, which are aggregate market actors, each composed of decision makers (divisions) enjoined by an institutional governance structure. Conflicts over contracts between divisions of an institution are resolved by the institutional governance structure, whereas conflicts between divisions across institutions are resolved by talents' preferences. Stable market outcomes exist whenever institutional governance is hierarchical and divisions consider contracts to be bilaterally substitutable. In contrast, when governance in institutions is non-hierarchical, stable outcomes may not exist. Since market stability does not provide an impetus for reorganization, the persistence of markets with hierarchical institutions can thus be rationalized. Hierarchies in institutions also have the attractive incentive property that in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with talents making offers to institutions, the choice problem for divisions is straightforward and realized market outcomes are pairwise stable, and stable when divisions have substitutable preferences. Complementarity has proved to be a challenge for matching theory, because the core and group stable matchings may fail to exist. Less well understood is the more basic notion of pairwise stability. In a second essay, I define a class of complementarity, asymmetric complements, and show that pairwise stable matchings are guaranteed to exist in matching markets where no firm considers workers to be asymmetric complements. The lattice structure of the pairwise stable matchings, familiar from the matching theory with substitutes, does not survive in this more general domain. The simultaneous-offer and sequential-offer versions of the worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm can produce different matchings when workers are not necessarily substitutable. If no firm considers workers to be imperfect complements, then the simultaneous-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, but this is not necessarily true otherwise. If no firm considers workers to be asymmetric complements, a weaker restriction than no imperfect complements, then the sequential-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, though the matching produced is order-dependent. In a third essay, I examine electoral competition in which two candidates compete through policy and persuasion, and using a tractable two-dimensional framework with social learning provide an explanation for increasing political polarization. Voters and candidates have policy preferences that depend upon the state of the world, which is known to candidates but not known to voters, and are connected through a social influence network that determines through a learning process the final opinion of voters, where the voters' initial opinions and the persuasion efforts of the candidates affect final opinions, and so voting behavior. Equilibrium level of polarization in policy and opinion (of both party and population) increases when persuasion costs decrease. An increase in homophily increases the equilibrium level of policy polarization and population opinion polarization. These comparative static results help explain the increased polarization in both the policy and opinion dimensions in the United States
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
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Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao. "Models of Matching Markets." Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493461.
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The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through three essays. The first essay highlights the role of constraints at the interviewing stage of matching markets where participants have to make choices even before they discover their own preferences entirely. Two results stand out from this setting. When preferences are ex-ante aligned, relaxing the interviewing constraints for one side of the market improves the welfare for everyone on the other side. Moreover, such interventions can lead to a decrease in the number of matched agents. The second essay elucidates the importance of rematching opportunities when relationships last over multiple periods. It identifies sufficient conditions for existence of a stable matching which accommodates the form of preferences we expect to see in multi-period environments. Preferences with inter-temporal complementarities, desire for variety and a status-quo bias are included in this setting. The third essay furthers our understanding while connecting two of the sufficient conditions in a specialized matching with contracts setting. It provides a novel linkage by providing a constructive way of arriving at a preference condition starting from another and thus proving that the later implies the former.Economics
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Shorrer, Ran I. "Essays on Indices and Matching." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467351.
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In many decision problems, agents base their actions on a simple objective index, a single number that summarizes the available information about objects of choice independently of their particular preferences. The first chapter proposes an axiomatic approach for deriving an index which is objective and, nevertheless, can serve as a guide for decision making for decision makers with different preferences. Unique indices are derived for five decision making settings: the Aumann and Serrano (2008) index of riskiness (additive gambles), a novel generalized Sharpe ratio (for a standard portfolio allocation problem), Schreiber’s (2013) index of relative riskiness (multiplicative gambles), a novel index of delay embedded in investment cashflows (for a standard capital budgeting problem), and the index of appeal of information transactions (Cabrales et al., 2014). All indices share several attractive properties in addition to satisfying the axioms. The approach may be applicable in other settings in which indices are needed.
The second chapter uses conditions from previous literature on complete orders to generate partial orders in two settings: information acquisition and
segregation. In the setting of information acquisition, I show that the partialorder prior independent investment dominance (Cabrales et al., 2013) refines Blackwell’s partial order in the strict sense. In the segregation setting, I show that without the requirement of completeness, all of the axioms suggested in Frankel and Volij (2011) are satisfied simultaneously by a partial order which refines the standard partial order (Lasso de la Vega and Volij, 2014).
In the third and fourth chapters, I turn to examine matching markets. Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011). The third chapter demonstrates that in large, balanced, uniform markets using the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, each woman’s best response to truthful behavior by all other agents is to truncate her list substantially. In fact, the optimal degree of truncation for such a woman goes to 100% of her list as the market size grows large. Comparative statics for optimal truncation strategies in general one-to-one markets are also provide: reduction in risk aversion and reduced correlation across preferences each lead agents to truncate more. So while several recent papers focused on the limits of strategic manipulation, the results serve as a reminder that without preconditions ensuring truthful reporting, there exists a potential for significant manipulation even in settings where agents have little information. Recent findings of Ashlagi et al. (2013) demonstrate that in unbalanced random markets, the change in expected payoffs is small when one reverses which side of the market “proposes,” suggesting there is little potential gain from manipulation. Inspired by these findings, the fourth chapter studies the implications of imbalance on strategic behavior in the incomplete information setting. I show that the “long” side has significantly reduced incentives for manipulation in this setting, but that the same doesn’t always apply to the “short” side. I also show that risk aversion and correlation in preferences affect the extent of optimal manipulation as in the balanced case.Business Economics
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Bó, Inácio G. L. "Essays in Matching Theory and Mechanism Design." Thesis, Boston College, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104172.
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Thesis advisor: Utku ÜnverThis dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter consists of a survey of the literature on affirmative action and diversity objective in school choice mechanisms. It presents and analyzes some of the main papers on the subject, showing the evolution of our understanding of the effects that different affirmative action policies have on the welfare and fairness of student assignments, the satisfaction of the diversity objectives as well as the domain of policies that allows for stable outcomes. The second chapter analyzes the problem of school choice mechanisms when policy-makers have objectives over the distribution of students by type across the schools. I show that mechanisms currently available in the literature may fail to a great extent in satisfying those objectives, and introduce a new one, which satisfies two properties. First, it produces assignments that satisfy a fairness criterion which incorporates the diversity objectives as an element of fairness. Second, it approximates optimally the diversity objectives while still satisfying the fairness criterion. We do so by embedding "preference" for those objectives into the schools' choice functions in a way that satisfies the substitutability condition and then using the school-proposing deferred acceptance procedure. This leads to the equivalence of stability with the desired definition of fairness and the maximization of those diversity objectives among the set of fair assignments. A comparative analysis also shows analytically that the mechanism that we provide has a general ability to satisfy those objectives, while in many familiar classes of scenarios the alternative ones yield segregated assignments. Finally, we analyze the incentives induced by the proposed mechanism in different market sizes and informational structures. The third chapter (co-authored with Orhan Aygün) presents an analysis of the Brazilian affirmative action initiative for access to public federal universities. In August 2012 the Brazilian federal government enacted a law mandating the prioritization of students who claim belonging to the groups of those coming from public high schools, low income families and being racial minorities to defined proportions of the seats available in federal public universities. In this problem, individuals may be part of one or more of those groups, and it is possible for students not to claim some of the privileges associated with them. This turns out to be a problem not previously studied in the literature. We show that under the choice function induced by the current guidelines, students may be better off by not claiming privileges that they are eligible to. Moreover, the resulting assignments may not be fair or satisfy the affirmative action objectives, even when there are enough students claiming low--income and minority privileges. Also, any stable mechanism that uses the current choice functions is neither incentive compatible nor fair. We propose a new choice function to be used by the universities that guarantees that a student will not be worse off by claiming an additional privilege, is fair and satisfies the affirmative action objectives whenever it is possible and there are enough applications claiming low--income and minority privileges. Next, we suggest a stable, incentive compatible and fair mechanism to create assignments for the entire system
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
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Ulus, Dogan. "Pattern Matching with Time : Theory and Applications." Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018GREAM003/document.
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Les systèmes dynamiques présentent des comportements temporels qui peuvent être exprimés sous diverses formes séquentielles telles que des signaux, des ondes, des séries chronologiques et des suites d'événements. Détecter des motifs sur de tels comportements temporels est une tâche fondamentale pour comprendre et évaluer ces systèmes. Étant donné que de nombreux comportements du système impliquent certaines caractéristiques temporelles, le besoin de spécifier et de détecter des motifs de comportements qui implique des exigences de synchronisation, appelées motifs temporisés, est évidente.Cependant, il s'agit d'une tâche non triviale due à un certain nombre de raisons, notamment la concomitance des sous-systèmes et la densité de temps.La contribution principale de cette thèse est l'introduction et le développement du filtrage par motif temporisé, c'est-à-dire l'identification des segments d'un comportement donné qui satisfont un motif temporisé. Nous proposons des expressions rationnelles temporisées (TRE) et la logique de la boussole métrique (MCL) comme langages de spécification pour motifs temporisés. Nous développons d'abord un nouveau cadre qui abstraite le calcul des aspects liés au temps appelé l'algèbre des relations temporisées. Ensuite, nous fournissons des algorithmes du filtrage hors ligne pour TRE et MCL sur des comportements à temps dense à valeurs discrètes en utilisant ce cadre et étudions quelques extensions pratiques.Il est nécessaire pour certains domaines d'application tels que le contrôle réactif que le filtrage par motif doit être effectué pendant l'exécution réelle du système. Pour cela, nous fournissons un algorithme du filtrage en ligne pour TREs basé sur la technique classique des dérivées d'expressions rationnelles. Nous croyons que la technique sous-jacente qui combine les dérivées et les relations temporisées constitue une autre contribution conceptuelle majeure pour la recherche sur les systèmes temporisés.Nous présentons un logiciel libre Montre qui implémente nos idées et algorithmes. Nous explorons diverses applications du filtrage par motif temporisé par l'intermédiaire de plusieurs études de cas. Enfin, nous discutons des orientations futures et plusieurs questions ouvertes qui ont émergé à la suite de cette thèseDynamical systems exhibit temporal behaviors that can be expressed in various sequential forms such as signals, waveforms, time series, and event sequences. Detecting patterns over such temporal behaviors is a fundamental task for understanding and assessing these systems. Since many system behaviors involve certain timing characteristics, the need to specify and detect patterns of behaviors that involves timing requirements, called timed patterns, is evident. However, this is a non-trivial task due to a number of reasons including the concurrency of subsystems and density of time.The key contribution of this thesis is in introducing and developing emph{timed pattern matching}, that is, the act of identifying segments of a given behavior that satisfy a timed pattern. We propose timed regular expressions (TREs) and metric compass logic (MCL) as timed pattern specification languages. We first develop a novel framework that abstracts the computation of time-related aspects called the algebra of timed relations. Then we provide offline matching algorithms for TRE and MCL over discrete-valued dense-time behaviors using this framework and study some practical extensions.It is necessary for some application areas such as reactive control that pattern matching needs to be performed during the actual execution of the system. For that, we provide an online matching algorithm for TREs based on the classical technique of derivatives of regular expressions. We believe the underlying technique that combines derivatives and timed relations constitutes another major conceptual contribution for timed systems research.Furthermore, we present an open-source tool Montre that implements our ideas and algorithms. We explore diverse applications of timed pattern matching over several case studies using Montre. Finally we discuss future directions and several open questions emerged as a result of this thesis
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Evci, Bora <1982>. "Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6569/1/Evci_Bora_Tesi.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization.
In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms.
In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile.
In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm.
In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework.
We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.
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Evci, Bora <1982>. "Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6569/.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization.
In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms.
In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile.
In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm.
In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework.
We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.
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Norine, Serguei. "Matching structure and Pfaffian orientations of graphs." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/7232.
Full textAbstract:
The first result of this thesis is a generation theorem for
bricks. A brick is a 3-connected graph such that the graph
obtained from it by deleting any two distinct vertices has a
perfect matching. The importance of bricks stems from the fact
that they are building blocks of a decomposition procedure of
Kotzig, and Lovasz and Plummer. We prove that every brick except
for the Petersen graph can be generated from K_4 or the prism by
repeatedly applying certain operations in such a way that all the
intermediate graphs are bricks. We use this theorem to prove an
exact upper bound on the number of edges in a minimal brick with
given number of vertices and to prove that every minimal brick has
at least three vertices of degree three.
The second half of the thesis is devoted to an investigation of
graphs that admit Pfaffian orientations. We prove that a graph
admits a Pfaffian orientation if and only if it can be drawn in
the plane in such a way that every perfect matching crosses
itself even number of times. Using similar techniques, we give a
new proof of a theorem of Kleitman on the parity of crossings and
develop a new approach to Turan's problem of estimating crossing
number of complete bipartite graphs.
We further extend our methods to study k-Pfaffian graphs and
generalize a theorem by Gallucio, Loebl and Tessler. Finally, we
relate Pfaffian orientations and signs of edge-colorings and prove
a conjecture of Goddyn that every k-edge-colorable k-regular
Pfaffian graph is k-list-edge-colorable. This generalizes a
theorem of Ellingham and Goddyn for planar graphs.
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Delgado, Lisa A. "Matching Market for Skills." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2009. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/41030.
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EconomicsPh.D.
This dissertation builds a model of information exchange, where the information is skills. A two-sided matching market for skills is employed that includes two distinct sides, skilled and unskilled agents, and the matches that connect these agents. The unskilled agents wish to purchase skills from the skilled agents, who each possess one valuable and unique skill. Skilled agents may match with many unskilled agents, while each unskilled agent may match with only one skilled agent. Direct interaction is necessary between the agents to teach and learn the skill. Thus, there must be mutual consent for a match to occur and the skill to be exchanged. In this market for skills, a discrete, simultaneous move game is employed where all agents announce their strategies at once, every skilled agent announcing a price and every unskilled agent announcing the skill she wishes to purchase. First, both Nash equilibria and a correlated equilibrium are determined for an example of this skills market game. Next, comparative statics are employed on this discrete, simultaneous move game through computer simulations. Finally, a continuous, simultaneous move game is studied where all agents announce their strategies at once, every skilled agent announcing a price and every unskilled agent announcing a skill and price pair. For this game, an algorithm is developed that if used by all agents to determine their strategies leads to a strong Nash equilibrium for the game.
Temple University--Theses
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Ortega, Sandoval Josue Alberto. "Matching with real-life constraints." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2017. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/8492/.
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This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter explains the relevance of the research that has been undertaken and it contains an overview of this research for a general audience. The second chapter studies a multi-unit assignment with endogenous quotas in a dichotomous preference domain. The main conclusion I obtain is that pseudo-market mechanisms perform poorly in this type of environment. The third and fourth chapters use matching theory to understand segregation in matching environments ranging from integrating kidney exchanges platforms to the increase in interracial marriages after the popularization of online dating platforms. In both Chapters, using different formulations, I show under which conditions social integration can be obtained.
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Carrasco, Bruno. "Essays in appied theory of search and matching." Thesis, University of Essex, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.242234.
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Pan, Siqi. "Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1491839757068552.
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Hurder, Stephanie Ruth. "Essays on Matching in Labor Economics." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11056.
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In this dissertation, I present three essays on matching and assignment in labor economics. The first chapter presents an integrated model of occupation choice, spouse choice, family labor supply, and fertility. Two key features of the model are that occupations differ both in wages and in an amenity termed flexibility, and that children require a nontrivial amount of parental time that has no market substitute. I show that occupations with more costly flexibility, modeled as a nonlinearity in wages, have a lower fraction of women, less positive assortative mating on earnings, and lower fertility among dual-career couples. Costly flexibility may induce high-earning couples to share home production, which rewards husbands who are simultaneously high-earning and productive in child care. Empirical evidence broadly supports the main theoretical predictions with respect to the tradeoffs between marriage market and career outcomes. In the second chapter, I use the University of Michigan Law School Alumni Survey to investigate the interaction between assortative mating and the career and family outcomes of high-ability women. Women with higher earnings potential at the time of law school graduation have higher-earning spouses and more children 15 years after graduation. As the earnings penalty from reduced labor supply decreased over the sample, women with higher-earning spouses and more children reported shorter work weeks and were less likely to be in the labor force. Decreasing the career cost of non-work may have the unintended result of reducing the labor supply of the highest-ability women, as their high-earning spouses give them the option to temporarily exit the labor force. The third chapter addresses specification choice in empirical peer effects models. Predicting the impact of altering composition on student outcomes has proven an unexpected challenge in the experimental literature. I use the experimental data of Duflo et al. (2011) to evaluate the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of popular reduced form peer effects specifications. I find that predictions of the impact of ability tracking on outcomes are highly sensitive to the choice of peer group summary statistics and functional form assumptions. Standard model selection criteria provide some guidance in selecting among peer effect specifications.
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Zhou, Bo. "Matchings with a size constraint." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/29413.
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We study the matching problem and some variants such as b-matching and (g, f)-factors. This thesis aims at polynomial algorithms which in addition have other properties. In particular, we develop a polynomial algorithm which can find optimal solutions of each possible size for weighted matching problem, and a strongly polynomial algorithm which can find a (g, f)-factor of fixed size.Science, Faculty of
Mathematics, Department of
Graduate
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Moore, Emilia Hoffman Dean. "On the existence of even and k-divisible-matchings." Auburn, Ala, 2008. http://repo.lib.auburn.edu/EtdRoot/2008/SPRING/Mathematics_and_Statistics/Dissertation/Moore_Emilia_43.pdf.
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Cymer, Radosław [Verfasser]. "Applications of matching theory in constraint programming / Radosław Cymer." Hannover : Technische Informationsbibliothek und Universitätsbibliothek Hannover (TIB), 2014. http://d-nb.info/1050990498/34.
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Zhao, Jingjing. "Resource allocation for D2D communications based on matching theory." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2017. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/25990.
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Device-to-device (D2D) communications underlaying a cellular infrastructure takes advantage of the physical proximity of communicating devices and increasing resource utilisation. However, adopting D2D communications in complex scenarios poses substantial challenges for the resource allocation design. Meanwhile, matching theory has emerged as a promising framework for wireless resource allocation which can overcome some limitations of game theory and optimisation. This thesis focuses on the resource allocation optimisation for D2D communications based on matching theory. First, resource allocation policy is designed for D2D communications underlaying cellular networks. A novel spectrum allocation algorithm based on many-to-many matching is proposed to improve system sum rate. Additionally, considering the quality-of-service (QoS) requirements and priorities of di erent applications, a context-aware resource allocation algorithm based on many-to-one matching is proposed, which is capable of providing remarkable performance enhancement in terms of improved data rate, decreased packet error rate (PER) and reduced delay. Second, to improve resource utilisation, joint subchannel and power allocation problem for D2D communications with non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is studied. For the subchannel allocation, a novel algorithm based on the many-to-one matching is proposed for obtaining a suboptimal solution. Since the power allocation problem is non-convex, sequential convex programming is adopted to transform the original power allocation problem to a convex one. The proposed algorithm is shown to enhance the network sum rate and number of accessed users. Third, driven by the trend of heterogeneity of cells, the resource allocation problem for NOMA-enhanced D2D communications in heterogeneous networks (HetNets) is investigated. In such a scenario, the proposed resource allocation algorithm is able to closely approach the optimal solution within a limited number of iterations and achieves higher sum rate compared to traditional HetNets schemes. Thorough theoretical analysis is conducted in the development of all proposed algorithms, and performance of proposed algorithm is evaluated via comprehensive simulations. This thesis concludes that matching theory based resource allocation for D2D communications achieves near-optimal performance with acceptable complexity. In addition, the application of D2D communications in NOMA and HetNets can improve system performance in terms of sum rate and users connectivity.
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Lin, Jing Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Minimum-correction second-moment matching : theory, algorithms and applications." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128088.
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Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, 2020Cataloged from PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-81).
We address the problem of finding the closest matrix Ũ a given U under the constraint that a prescribed second-moment matrix P̃ must be matched, i.e.Ũ[T superscript]Ũ . We obtain a closed-form formula for the unique global optimizer Ũ for the full-rank case, which is related to U by an SPD (symmetric positive definite) linear transform. This result is generalized to rank-deficient cases as well as to infinite dimensions. We highlight the geometric intuition behind the theory and study the problem's rich connections to minimum congruence transform, generalized polar decomposition, optimal transport, and rank-deficient data assimilation. In the special case of P̃ = I, minimum-correction second-moment matching reduces to the well-studied optimal orthonormalization problem. We investigate the general strategies for numerically computing the optimizer, analyze existing polar decomposition and matrix square root algorithms. More importantly, we modify and stabilize two Newton iterations previously deemed unstable for computing the matrix square root, which can now be used to efficiently compute both the orthogonal polar factor and the SPD square root. We then verify the higher performance of the various new algorithms using benchmark cases with randomly generated matrices. Lastly, we complete two applications for the stochastic Lorenz-96 dynamical system in a chaotic regime. In reduced subspace tracking using dynamically orthogonal equations, we maintain the numerical orthonormality and continuity of time-varying base vectors. In ensemble square root filtering for data assimilation, the prior samples are transformed into posterior ones by matching the covariance given by the Kalman update while also minimizing the corrections to the prior samples.
by Jing Lin.
S.M.
S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering
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Merrill, Lauren. "Essays in Microeconomic Theory." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10291.
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If the number of individuals is odd, Campbell and Kelly (2003) show that majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of linear orders that admit a Condorcet winner, an alternative that is preferred to every other by a majority of individuals in pairwise majority voting. This paper shows that the claim is false when the number of individuals is even, and provides a characterization of non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rules on this domain. Two examples illustrate the primary reason that the result does not translate to the even case: when the number of individuals is even, no single individual can change her reported preference ordering in a manner that changes the Condorcet winner while remaining within the preference domain. Introducing two new definitions to account for this partitioning of the preference domain, the chapter concludes with a counterpart to the characterization of Campbell and Kelly (2003) for the even case. Adapting the models of Laibson (1994) and O’Donogue and Rabin (2001), a learning–naıve agent is presented who is endowed with beliefs about the value of the quasi–hyperbolic discount factor that enters into the utility calculations of her future–selves. Facing an infinite–horizon decision problem in which the payoff to a particular action varies stochastically, the agent updates her beliefs over time. Conditions are given under which the behavior of a learning–na¨ıve agent is eventually indistinguishable from that of a sophisticated agent, contributing to the efforts of Ali (2011) to justify the use of sophistication as a modeling assumption. Building upon the literature on one–to–one matching pioneered by Gale and Shapley (1962), this paper introduces a social network to the standard marriage model, embodying informational limitations of the agents. Motivated by the restrictive nature of stability in large markets, two new network–stability concepts are introduced that reflect informational limitations; in particular, two agents cannot form a blocking pair if they are not acquainted. Following Roth and Sotomayor (1990), key properties of the sets of network–stable matchings are derived, and concludes by introducing a network–formation game whose set of complete–information Nash equilibria correspond to the set of stable matchingsEconomics
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Sng, Colin. "Efficient algorithms for bipartite matching problems with preferences." Connect to e-thesis, 2008. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/301/.
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Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Glasgow, 2008.Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Department of Computing Science, Faculty of Information and Mathematical Sciences, University of Glasgow, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.
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Eeckhout, Jan. "Perfect matching and search in economic models." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2861/.
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This thesis uses general matching techniques - both perfect matching and search - to study some problems in economies that are characterised by heterogeneity of their agents. Here, matching in its broadest sense is interpreted as a form of trade that is strictly limited between two partners: transactions are one-to-one, between one buyer and one seller exactly. The first part proposes a framework that integrates two well documented strands of the existing economic literature. It is a search model that generalises the frictionless perfect matching model to a context where trade does not occur instantaneously. A general methodology with proof is given which allows us to derive the unique equilibrium allocation of agents. Though the limit case without friction reproduces the perfect matching result, with friction results deviate substantially from conclusions in both the perfect matching literature and the search literature. The second part of the thesis concentrates entirely on frictionless matching models. First, a general class of preferences is identified that yields a unique allocation. Second, the matching model is studied when endogenous choice of characteristics is allowed and has an intuitive application to the labour market. It is shown that in the presence of job heterogeneity, too many resources are spent in order to achieve a higher ranked job. The results, including issues of turnover and distribution, are verified with some stylised facts in the empirical literature. Finally, a model that mimics a matching equilibrium and that allows for endogenous choice of characteristics is applied to the context of education in the labour market. It is shown that multiple equilibria can exist in the presence of spillovers in production.
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Zschache, Johannes. "The matching law and melioration learning." Doctoral thesis, Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2017. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-216771.
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Das Thema dieser Dissertation ist die Anwendung des „Matching Law” als Verhaltensannahme bei der Erklärung sozialer Phänomene. Das „Matching Law” ist ein Modell der behavioristischen Lerntheorie und sagt aus, dass die relative Häufigkeit der Wahl einer Handlung mit der relativen Häufigkeit der Belohnung dieser Handlung übereinstimmt.
In der Dissertation werden verschiedene Probleme in Bezug auf die soziologische Anwendung des „Matching Law” erörtert. Aufbauend auf diesen Erkenntnissen wird das Entsprechungsgesetz in die ökonomische Entscheidungstheorie integriert und mit bestehenden Verhaltensprognosen theoretisch verglichen.
Anschließend wird das Entsprechungsgesetz auf mehrere soziale Situationen angewandt. Dabei kommt ein Lernmodell zum Einsatz, welches als „Melioration Learning” bezeichnet wird und unter bestimmten Bedingungen zum Entsprechungsgesetz führt. Mit Hilfe dieses Lernmodells und agentenbasierter Simulationen werden Hypothesen zu sozialem Verhalten hergeleitet.
Zunächst werden einfache Situationen mit nur zwei interagierenden Akteuren betrachtet. Dabei lassen sich durch das Entsprechungsgesetz einige Lösungskonzepte der Spieltheorie replizieren, obwohl weniger Annahmen bezüglich der kognitiven Fähigkeiten der Akteure und der verfügbaren Informationen gesetzt werden.
Außerdem werden Interaktionen zwischen beliebig vielen Akteuren untersucht. Erstens lässt sich die Entstehung sozialer Konventionen über das Entsprechungsgesetz erklären. Zweitens wird dargestellt, dass die Akteure lernen, in einem Freiwilligendilemma oder einem Mehrpersonen-Gefangenendilemma zu kooperieren.
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Infeld, Ewa Joanna. "Uniform avoidance coupling, design of anonymity systems and matching theory." Thesis, Dartmouth College, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10145489.
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We start by introducing avoidance coupling of Markov chains, with an overview of existing results. We then introduce and motivate a new notion, uniform coupling. We show that the only Markovian avoidance coupling on a cycle is of this type, and that uniform avoidance coupling of simple random walks is impossible on trees, and prove that it is possible on several classes of graphs. We also derive a condition on the vertex neighborhoods in a graph equivalent to that graph admitting a uniform avoidance coupling of simple random walks, and an algorithm that tests this with run time polynomial in the number of vertices. We then discuss a conjecture that no Markovian avoidance coupling can be possible on a tree and propose how a proof might proceed.
In the second half of this work, we talk about the design of online communication systems that aim to guarantee anonymity for their users. A popular paradigm is k-anonymity. We notice that the scarcity of a typical social relation makes k-anonymity vulnerable to traffic analysis, and propose a way to use this scarcity to reduce the efficiency cost to exactly the amount of cover traffic we might need. Then we use Bregman's theorem to show that for a given infrastructure cost, modelled by the number of edges in a bipartite graph, k-anonymity offers the highest number of possible perfect matchings between users and observed behaviors.
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Raykov, Radoslav S. "Essays in Applied Microeconomic Theory." Thesis, Boston College, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104087.
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Thesis advisor: Utku UnverThis dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomic theory: two focusing on insurance theory and one on matching theory. The first chapter is concerned with catastrophe insurance. Motivated by the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, it studies a strategic model of catastrophe insurance in which consumers know that they may not get reimbursed if too many other people file claims at the same time. The model predicts that the demand for catastrophe insurance can ``bend backwards'' to zero, resulting in multiple equilibria and especially in market failure, which is always an equilibrium. This shows that a catastrophe market can fail entirely due to demand-driven reasons, a result new to the literature. The model suggests that pricing is key for the credibility of catastrophe insurers: instead of increasing demand, price cuts may backfire and instead cause a ``race to the bottom.'' However, small amounts of extra liquidity can restore the system to stable equilibrium, highlighting the importance of a functioning reinsurance market for large risks. These results remain robust both for expected utility consumer preferences and for expected utility's most popular alternative, rank-dependent expected utility. The second chapter develops a model of quality differentiation in insurance markets, focusing on two of their specific features: the fact that costs are uncertain, and the fact that firms are averse to risk. Cornerstone models of price competition predict that firms specialize in products of different quality (differentiate their products) as a way of softening price competition. However, real-world insurance markets feature very little differentiation. This chapter offers an explanation to this phenomenon by showing that cost uncertainty fundamentally alters the nature of price competition among risk-averse firms by creating a drive against differentiation. This force becomes particularly pronounced when consumers are picky about quality, and is capable of reversing standard results, leading to minimum differentiation instead. The chapter concludes with a study of how the costs of quality affect differentiation by considering two benchmark cases: when quality is costless and when quality costs are convex (quadratic). The third chapter focuses on the theory of two-sided matching. Its main topic are inefficiencies that arise when agent preferences permit indifferences. It is well-known that two-sided matching under weak preferences can result in matchings that are stable, but not Pareto efficient, which creates bad incentives for inefficiently matched agents to stay together. In this chapter I show that in one-to-one matching with weak preferences, the fraction of inefficiently matched agents decreases with market size if agents are sufficiently diverse; in particular, the proportion of agents who can Pareto improve in a randomly chosen stable matching approaches zero when the number of agents goes to infinity. This result shows that the relative degree of the inefficiency vanishes in sufficiently large markets, but this does not provide a "cure-all'' solution in absolute terms, because inefficient individuals remain even when their fraction is vanishing. Agent diversity is represented by the diversity of each person's preferences, which are assumed randomly drawn, i.i.d. from the set of all possible weak preferences. To demonstrate its main result, the chapter relies on the combinatorial properties of random weak preferences
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
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Chang, Jung-Fu. "A simulation matching approach of mate selection : an integration study." Thesis, University of Reading, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.362226.
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Essaid, Amira. "Decision making for ontology matching under the theory of belief functions." Thesis, Rennes 1, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015REN1S100/document.
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L'appariement des ontologies est une tâche primordiale pour palier au problème d'hétérogénéité sémantique et ainsi assurer une interopérabilité entre les applications utilisant différentes ontologies. Il consiste en la mise en correspondance de chaque entité d'une ontologie source à une entité d'une ontologie cible et ceci par application des techniques d'alignement fondées sur des mesures de similarité. Individuellement, aucune mesure de similarité ne permet d'obtenir un alignement parfait. C'est pour cette raison qu'il est intéressant de tenir compte de la complémentarité des mesures afin d'obtenir un meilleur alignement. Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes intéressés à proposer un processus de décision crédibiliste pour l'appariement des ontologies. Étant données deux ontologies, on procède à leur appariement et ceci par application de trois techniques. Les alignements obtenus seront modélisés dans le cadre de la théorie des fonctions de croyance. Des règles de combinaison seront utilisées pour combiner les résultats d'alignement. Une étape de prise de décision s'avère utile, pour cette raison nous proposons une règle de décision fondée sur une distance et capable de décider sur une union d'hypothèses. Cette règle sera utilisée dans notre processus afin d'identifier pour chaque entité source le ou les entités ciblesOntology matching is a solution to mitigate the effect of semantic heterogeneity. Matching techniques, based on similarity measures, are used to find correspondences between ontologies. Using a unique similarity measure does not guarantee a perfect alignment. For that reason, it is necessary to use more than a similarity measure to take advantage of features of each one and then to combine the different outcomes. In this thesis, we propose a credibilistic decision process by using the theory of belief functions. First, we model the alignments, obtained after a matching process, under the theory of belief functions. Then, we combine the different outcomes through using adequate combination rules. Due to our awareness that making decision is a crucial step in any process and that most of the decision rules of the belief function theory are able to give results on a unique element, we propose a decision rule based on a distance measure able to make decision on union of elements (i.e. to identify for each source entity its corresponding target entities)
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Guneydas, Ismail. "ACTOR POSITIONING IN WIRELESS SENSOR AND ACTOR NETWORKS USING MATCHING THEORY." Available to subscribers only, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1674095431&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Thesis (M.S.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2008."Department of Computer Science." Keywords: Gale-Shapley, Wireless sensor networks. Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-45). Also available online.
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Cardoze, David Enrique Fabrega. "Efficient algorithms for geometric pattern matching." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/8162.
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Imamura, Kenzo. "Essays in Market Design:." Thesis, Boston College, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:109090.
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Thesis advisor: M. Utku ÜnverThesis advisor: M. Bumin Yenmez
This dissertation consists of two essays in market design. In the first chapter, we study affirmative action policies in college admissions and hiring. A college or firm makes admissions or hiring decisions in which each candidate is characterized by priority ranking and type, which may depend on race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The admissions or hiring committee faces a trade-off between meritocracy and diversity: while a merit-first choice rule may admit candidates of the same type, a diversity-first choice rule may be unfair due to priority violations. To formalize this trade-off, we introduce a measure of meritocracy and a measure of diversity for choice rules. Then, we investigate how to resolve the tension between them. A choice rule that uses both reserves and quotas can be viewed as a compromise and is a generalization of the two extreme rules. The first result is comparative statics for this class of choice rules: we show that as parameters change and the choice rule becomes more meritorious, it also becomes less diverse. The second result is a characterization of the choice rule, which may help admissions or hiring committees to decide their policies. In the second chapter, we introduce a method to measure manipulability of a matching mechanism and use theory and simulation to study constrained mechanisms in school choice. First, we show that the implications from existing measures are strongly dependent on the full preference domain assumption. Our measure is more robust. The implications from existing measures can be carried over as well: while the recent school admissions reforms did not fully eliminate incentives to manipulate, they discouraged manipulation. Second, we use simulations for quantitative analysis. Our results support the recent school admissions reforms quantitatively, as well as qualitatively: they largely eliminated the incentives to manipulate. In addition, while the qualitative implications from theory are parallel to existing measures, the quantitative implications from simulations confirm a significant difference
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
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Weng, Weiwei, and 翁韡韡. "Two essays on matching and centralized admissions." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2011. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46419974.
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Cao, Dasong. "Topics in node packing and coloring." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/25513.
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Ranjan, Pawas. "Discrete Laplace Operator: Theory and Applications." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343832381.
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Gola, Paweł. "Essays on two-sector matching, status rewards and liability." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d2476ffb-3853-4e5b-bdc2-4105db6036c3.
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This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. Chapter 1 develops a two-sector, bivariate matching model, in which each sector uses a different dimension of skill in the production process. I show there exists a unique assignment of agents to sectors and derive comparative statics. The main result is that if jobs are scarce, both an increase in sector one skills' spread and a technological improvement increase the supply of talent in sector one, but decrease it in sector two. In sector two, this raises wages and wage inequality. In sector one, the effects are ambiguous in general, but wages increase for the most and decrease for the least talented agents. Chapter 2 studies the impact of social status on occupational sorting in a two-sector matching framework. Talent is two-dimensional and thus status is not a zero-sum game; it depends both on occupational prestige and within-sector rank (local status). I show that the weights with which these two components enter - the structure of status - crucially influence the way in which agents self-select into sectors and argue that it is likely that these weights differ across occupations. The more important are the individual components of status in a sector, or the less important the collective component, the better the agents who join that industry, which has important implications for total payoffs, wage levels and inequality, and profits. I also show that the stable assignment is typically inefficient, which is driven by the distortion of relative status rewards, not status concerns per se. Chapter 3 investigates whether directors of companies should have limited liability. I develop a three-player model in which: (a) debtholders and equityholders are defined by their control rights and (b) the project is run by the directors. The main result is that increased liability for directors forces them to internalise more of the downside risk of the project and hence reduces their risk-taking. This is optimal if over-investment was a problem initially. I show that the extent to which over-investment is a problem depends on how well debtholders are protected compared to equityholders. If debtholders are strong, increased liability can cause under-investment.
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Hough, Wesley K. "On Independence, Matching, and Homomorphism Complexes." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/math_etds/42.
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First introduced by Forman in 1998, discrete Morse theory has become a standard tool in topological combinatorics. The main idea of discrete Morse theory is to pair cells in a cellular complex in a manner that permits cancellation via elementary collapses, reducing the complex under consideration to a homotopy equivalent complex with fewer cells. In chapter 1, we introduce the relevant background for discrete Morse theory.
In chapter 2, we define a discrete Morse matching for a family of independence complexes that generalize the matching complexes of suitable "small" grid graphs. Using this matching, we determine the dimensions of the chain spaces for the resulting Morse complexes and derive bounds on the location of non-trivial homology groups. Furthermore, we determine the Euler characteristic for these complexes and prove that several of their homology groups are non-zero.
In chapter 3, we introduce the notion of a homomorphism complex for partially ordered sets, placing particular emphasis on maps between chain posets and the Boolean algebras. We extend the notion of folding from general graph homomorphism complexes to the poset case, and we define an iterative discrete Morse matching for these Boolean complexes. We provide formulas for enumerating the number of critical cells arising from this matching as well as for the Euler characteristic. We end with a conjecture on the optimality of our matching derived from connections to 3-equal manifolds
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Zhou, Wei. "Scene illuminant estimation with binocular stereo matching." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file 2.74Mb, 160 p, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3181859.
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Albarelli, Andrea <1975>. "A game-theoretic approach to matching and robust inlier selection." Doctoral thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/919.
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In questa tesi la nostra attenzione è rivolta alla classe di problemi di matching dove qualche funzione di compatibilità e definibile su un insieme di due o più coppie corrispondenti. Nello specifico proponiamo un approccio flessibile che sfrutta la teoria dei giochi per permettere l'evoluzione di un'iniziale popolazione di ipotesi verso uno stato evolutivamente stabile dove un ristretto insieme di corrispondenze altamente compatibili è riuscito a sopravvivere. La motivazione che spinge ad adottare tale approccio è duplice. Infatti da un punto di vista teorico è possibile dimostrare che in molte formulazioni di problemi gli stati evolutivamente stabili o gli equilibri di Nash corrispondono a configurazioni desiderabili della soluzione, quali ad esempio isomorfismi massimali o allineamenti ottimali di superfici. Inoltre sono disponibili in letteratura molti algoritmi efficienti per guidare il processo evolutivo e, come mostreremo con un'estensiva copertura sperimentale, persino le dinamiche più semplici permettono di condurre la popolazione iniziale verso un match ottimale. Applicando il nostro framework a diverse tipologie di scenario mostreremo la sua efficacia sia in contesti di matching pairwise, sia coinvolgendo compatibilità di ordine superiore.
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Degani, Asaf. "Modeling human-machine systems : on modes, error, and patterns of interaction." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/25983.
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Dragone, David. "APPLYING MATCHING EQUATION TO PITCH SELECTION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL." Master's thesis, Temple University Libraries, 2018. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/524832.
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Applied Behavioral AnalysisM.S.Ed.
This study applied the generalized matching equation (GME) to pitch selection in MLB during the 2016 regular season. The GME was used to evaluate the pitch selection of 21 groups of pitchers as well as 144 individual pitchers. The GME described pitch selection well for four of the 21 pitching groups and 32 of the 144 individual pitchers. Of the remaining groups and individual pitchers, behavior may be explained by rule following behavior or be impacted by distant reinforcers such as salary. All 21 groups demonstrated a bias for fastballs as well as 119 of the 144 individual pitchers. The results extend the use of the GME to natural contexts and suggest an alternative view to evaluating pitchers.
Temple University--Theses
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Beyer, Steven Phillip. "Examining the Impact of Race Matching and Cultural Worldview Matching On Treatment Outcomes for Patients with Schizophrenia." University of Akron / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=akron1513168908905989.
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Marutani, Kyohei. "Essays on the Theory of Indivisible Good Markets." Kyoto University, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/253062.
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Stanton, Kevin Blythe. "Matching Points to Lines: Sonar-based Localization for the PSUBOT." PDXScholar, 1993. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4630.
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The PSUBOT (pronounced pea-es-you-bought) is an autonomous wheelchair robot for persons with certain disabilities. Its use of voice recognition and autonomous navigation enable it to carry out high level commands with little or no user assistance. We first describe the goals, constraints, and capabilities of the overall system including path planning and obstacle avoidance. We then focus on localization-the ability of the robot to locate itself in space. Odometry, a compass, and an algorithm which matches points to lines are each employed to accomplish this task. The matching algorithm (which matches "points" to "lines") is the main contribution to this work. The .. points" are acquired from a rotating sonar device, and the "lines" are extracted from a user-entered line-segment model of the building. The algorithm assumes that only small corrections are necessary to correct for odometry errors which inherently accumulate, and makes a correction by shifting and rotating the sonar image so that the data points are as close as possible to the lines. A modification of the basic algorithm to accommodate parallel lines was developed as well as an improvement to the basic noise removal algorithm. We found that the matching algorithm was able to determine the location of the robot to within one foot even when required to correct for as many as five feet of simulated odometry error. Finally, the algorithm's complexity was found to be well within the processing power of currently available hardware.
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Bhattacharjee, Sangita, and University of Lethbridge Faculty of Arts and Science. "A primal-dual algorithm for the maximum charge problem with capacity constraints." Thesis, Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, 2010, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10133/2557.
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In this thesis, we study a variant of the maximum cardinality matching problem known as
the maximum charge problem. Given a graph with arbitrary positive integer capacities assigned
on every vertex and every edge, the goal is to maximize the assignment of positive
feasible charges on the edges obeying the capacity constraints, so as to maximize the total
sum of the charges. We use the primal-dual approach. We propose a combinatorial algorithm
for solving the dual of the restricted primal and show that the primal-dual algorithm
runs in a polynomial time.ix, 96 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm
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Rodriguez, Emily M. "Angel Financing: Matching Start-Up Firms with Angel Investors." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/136.
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The hardest time to receive financing for a venture is at its earliest stage. These ventures are among the riskiest investments for an investor, which creates a gap in financing that is often bridged through a source of funding called Angel Financing. Angel investors are one of the best providers of early stage funding. This thesis will explain what angel investing is, how they work, and what angels look for. This information will help entrepreneurs be better equipped to find an angel investor for their venture.
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Petrongolo, Barbara. "Job matching and unemployment : applications to the UK labour market and international comparisons." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1501/.
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This thesis studies different aspects of job matching, mismatch, and their relationship with aggregate unemployment. The first part addresses the question of the structural rise in the unemployment rate in OECD countries by looking at the link between sectoral shocks and aggregate performance in an economy with heterogeneous labour. The type of sectoral shock considered in chapter 2 is the introduction of skill-biased technologies, that increase the relative demand for skilled labour at the expenses of the less-skilled. Unless the supply of skills adjusts accordingly to the increased demand, and/or relative wages are perfectly flexible, this shock has permanent effects on the aggregate unemployment rate, as shown in a non-competitive labour market model with skilled and unskilled workers. The calibration of this model predicts that a relevant proportion of the recent rise in British unemployment can be attributed to an unbalanced evolution in the demand and the supply of skills, while in continental Europe skill imbalances do not seem responsible for serious labour market problems. Finally, the impact of skill mismatch on US unemployment was limited in magnitude and almost completely offset by counteracting forces. The second part of the work uses a job-search approach to investigate the technical characteristics of the matching process between vacancies and unemployed job-seekers. Chapter 3 reviews the empirical search literature that has estimated hiring functions, concluding that recent work has successfully established the existence of a labour market matching function, in which both vacancies and unemployed workers contribute significantly to job formation. Chapter 4 considers a plausible alternative to a random meeting technology between employers and job-seekers, based on the existence of cheap information channels that save all traders the effort of locating matching partners. When combined with a proper handling of timing in the matching technology, this set-up provides novel results on the recent performance of the British labour market. In particular, it seems that the claimed deterioration of the search effectiveness of the unemployed cannot be explained by a lack of search effort per se, but by stronger competition that the registered unemployed face by other labour market segments. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the matching process at the micro level, using individual duration data obtained from a British sample of unemployment entrants. The determinants of re-employment probabilities are here related to a search model in which transitions into employment depend on the probability of receiving a job offer and that of accepting a job offer. The analysis shows that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the matching technology, embodied in most bilateral search models, is not rejected by the data. Individual re-employment probabilities respond in fact to local labour market tightness, and are unaffected by its size.
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Ellerby, Zack W. "A combined behavioural and electrophysiological examination of the faulty foraging theory of probability matching." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50085/.
Full textAbstract:
Given a repeated choice between two or more options with fixed, independent and identically distributed reward probabilities, overall pay-offs can be maximized by the exclusive selection of the option with the greatest likelihood of reward. The tendency to match response proportions to reward contingencies is suboptimal. Nevertheless, this behaviour is well documented. This thesis had two core objectives. First, it was aimed to ascertain the relative contributions of several existing accounts of probability matching in determining choice behaviour, particularly regarding the maximization versus diversification of choices. These accounts include failed pattern matching, driven by apophenia, and a heuristic-driven response that can be overruled with sufficient deliberation. Second, to then further address potential mechanisms underlying whichever factor was found to make the most substantive contribution to choice behaviour, through the combined application of behavioural and electrophysiological methods. Over a series of behavioural studies, the use of strategy over intuition proved to be the most consistent and substantial predictor of maximizing choices, in robust support of the heuristic account. Given this finding, the question emerges of why probability matching is the dominant intuitive response. One possibility is that matching represents the overextension of an evolutionarily stable foraging strategy, an account termed the ‘Faulty Foraging Theory’. A simple simulated foraging task was designed to assess choice behaviour when reward schedules incorporate the factor of natural resource accumulation and depletion. The contrast in choice behaviour on this task with the standard probability matching preparation was consistent with the Faulty Foraging model. A series of electrophysiological studies were then conducted, in an attempt to uncover the putative illusory internal representation of reward accumulation on the standard task, which could drive suboptimal diversification of choices. This was ultimately unsuccessful. However, further corroborating electrophysiological evidence was obtained for the heuristic account, in the form of characteristic patterns of prefrontal activity relating to maximizing vs. diversification of choices.
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Nanton, Ashley. "Empirical topics in search and matching models of the labour market." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2014. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/59780/.
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Search and matching models such as those of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) have come under criticism in recent years. Analysis of the model by Shimer (2005) and others has focussed in particular on the models’ inability to generate sufficient volatility in variables such as the unemployment and vacancies rates, and the vacancyunemployment ratio. Newer models have sought to ameliorate these empirical issues by changing the model – for example by adding wage rigidity or by amending the specification of the costs of search. In Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, we re-address some of these issues using the method of indirect inference. The method allows us to formally test the hypothesis that data was generated by a particular model under a given set of parameter values. It therefore offers a statistically founded replacement for the somewhat arbitrary moment-by-moment comparisons found in much of the existing literature. We apply the method to Shimer’s analysis of the Mortensen Pissarides model, and concur with his analysis that, under his chosen parameters, the model fails to fit the data. We also apply the method to the model used in Yashiv’s (2006) paper, which argues using moment comparisons that the standard model can be improved by adding convex search costs. In contrast, we find that the augmented model is rejected under formal indirect-inference tests. The aggregate search and matching literature has also generated an empirical debate about the relative importance of labour market flows, expressed in terms of the hazard rates of labour market transition faced by workers. Many studies decompose changes in steady-state unemployment in terms of the contributions of various hazard rates. This thesis also extends this literature so as to model the contributions of hazards for two distinct and contiguous geographical areas – those of Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom, using Labour-Force-Survey panel data. We find some evidence that in this regard, the UK hazards are weighted towards the hazards “out of” unemployment, whereas for Wales the hazards “into” and “out of” unemployment are of approximately equal importance. We also find however that the results are sensitive to whether or not the data are smoothed, and whether a steady-state is imposed.
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Gelder, Alan Bruce. "Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments." Diss., University of Iowa, 2014. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1323.
Full textAbstract:
In a multi-stage contest known as a two-player race, players display two fundamental behaviors: (1) The laggard will make a last stand in order to avoid the cost of losing; and (2) the player who is ahead will defend his lead if it is threatened. Last stand behavior, in particular, contrasts with previous research where the underdog simply gives up. The distinctive results are achieved by introducing losing penalties and discounting into the racing environment. This framework permits the momentum effect, typically ascribed to the winner of early stages, to be more thoroughly examined. I study the likelihood that the underdog will catch up. I find that neck-and-neck races are common when the losing penalty is large relative to the winning prize, while landslide victories occur when the prize is relatively large. Closed-form solutions are given for the case where players have a common winning prize and losing penalty.
Chapter 2 then experimentally examines the prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregated data, but more conclusive evidence when scrutinizing individual player behavior. Players tend to adopt one of several strategies. We develop a taxonomy to classify player types and study how the different strategies interact. The last stand and surrendering behaviors have implications for winning margins and the likelihood of an upset, which we investigate. Behaviorally, players are typically more aggressive when they reach a state in the contest by winning rather than by losing.
The third and final chapter is a distinct departure from the study of multi-battle contests. Using comprehensive census data for Cornwall County, England, I create a panel dataset that spans six censuses (1841--1891)—possibly the largest panel dataset for Victorian England at present. I present the methodology for linking individuals and families across these censuses. This methodology incorporates recent advances in census linking (including the use of machine learning) and introduces new methods for tracking migration and changes in household composition. I achieve a forward matching rate of 43%. The additional inclusion of marriage and death records could allow for well over 60% of the population to be accounted for from one census to the next. Using this new panel, I investigate the frequency with which sons pursue the same occupations that they observed their fathers doing while growing up. For sons that did not follow in their father's footsteps, I identify some correlates that may have contributed to the change.