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Journal articles on the topic 'Matrimonial consent'
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Wąsik, Wojciech Stanisław. "The Concept of Matrimonial Consent in Can. 1057 CIC 1983." Verbum Vitae 39, no. 4 (December 17, 2021): 1217–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/vv.12633.
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The article is devoted to matrimonial consent as described in Can. 1057 CIC/83, which has replaced the former Can. 1081 CIC/17. The regulation found in this canon emphasizes the importance of matrimonial consent and constitutes the basis for all reasons for the nullification of marriage. The analyzed norm, describing matrimonial consent in the positive aspect, was formulated in the personalistic spirit and adapted to Vatican II's teachings. Can. 1057 CIC/83 was placed among the norms introducing the De matrimonio of CIC/83 part, which resulted in ordering the vision of marriage in CIC/83. The studies on the normative content of Can. 1057 §1, CIC/83, focus on matrimonial consent, which establishes the matrimonial bond and is the only efficient cause of marriage, being a bilateral consensual contract and a sacrament for those baptized. The article discusses legal requirements assuring that consent will result in contracting a valid marriage. The article explains in detail the norm, according to which a defective matrimonial consent cannot be supplemented or replaced by another legal act. The article analyses the object of matrimonial consent in Can. 1057 §2, CIC/83, which was harmonized with the definition of marriage in Can. 1055 CIC/83. Ius in corpus is no longer such an object (as it narrows marriage to a communion finding fulfillment in the sexual and procreative sphere) but rather the parties to the contract, who give themselves to one another in an analogous sense (material object) and the communion for their entire life, in all its dimensions (formal object).
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Rivadeneira Martínez, Carlos. "El amor en el matrimonio: De la canonística al derecho chileno." Derecho y Justicia, no. 4 (November 17, 2015): 101–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.29344/07196377.4.915.
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Resumen No obstante tener el amor una significativa gravitación en el desarrollo del consorcio marital, si hablamos de la incidencia jurídica del amor conyugal en el matrimonio, necesariamente hay que referirla al consentimiento matrimonial, en tanto éste es la causa eficiente del matrimonio, y por lo tanto en el momento de su manifestación se determina la existencia o inexistencia, la validez o nulidad del matrimonio, tanto canónico como civil, según la suficiencia jurídica del consentimiento. En este trabajo se afirma que el amor conyugal es condición sine qua non para la existencia del consentimiento matrimonial, de la voluntad de contraer matrimonio, y también del objeto del contrato de matrimonio, de lo que se sigue que el desamor conyugal hace imposible el consentimiento hacia el matrimonio, y el objeto del mismo, y constituye una causal de inexistencia jurídica matrimonial, canónica y civil. Palabras clave: Amor conyugal; matrimonio; consentimiento; validez jurídica; derecho canónico. LOVE IN MARRIAGE: FROM CANON TO CHILEAN LAW Abstract While love has a significant relevance in the development of marital consortium, if we talk about the legal incidence of conjugal love in marriage, we necessarily have to refer it to marital consent, as this is the efficient cause of marriage, and therefore at the time of its manifestation it determines the existence or nonexistence, the validity or nullity of marriage, both canonical and civil, according to the legal sufficiency of consent. This paper argues that conjugal love is a condition sine qua non for the existence of consent, the will to get married and also the object of the marriage contract and that the conjugal unlove makes the consent to marriage, as well as its object, impossible, and constitutes a cause of marital nonexistence, canonical and civil. Key words: Conjugal love; marriage; consent; legal validity; canon law.
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Bar OFMConv, Wiesław. "Prawo naturalne a wady zgody małżeńskiej." Annales Canonici 7 (December 31, 2011): 19–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/ac.0702.
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The article consists of three parts in which the following topics are presented: 1) natural law, 2) invalidity of matrimonial consent, and 3) „and”.In the first part the author focuses on the state of the present study on natural law in the Church and in the Catholic academic centers. The impulse for the research came from John Paul II’s speech, from 6th Feb. 2004, to participants of the session of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.Next part includes the classification of the causes of invalidity of matrimonial consent. The special attention was paid to the discussion about the origin of canons: 1098 and 1103 CIC 1983.At the end of the article, the author analyzes the relation, contained in the title of the article that obtains between natural law and invalidity of matrimonial consent. The deliberation took into consideration some circumstances in which matrimonial consent is expressed such as: respect for nature law, ethical order, and legal protection of act of will.
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Marumoagae, Motseotsile Clement. "Deprivation of Retirement Benefits on Divorce through Living Annuities in South Africa." Journal of African Law 66, no. 1 (November 2, 2021): 151–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855321000413.
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AbstractThis article discusses the law regulating living annuities when spouses in South Africa are divorcing. It demonstrates that South African courts have interpreted the law to prejudice non-member spouses financially. It argues that courts have failed to consider matrimonial principles when determining whether living annuities are susceptible to being shared on divorce. It argues further that adequate consideration of matrimonial principles will render it impossible for retirement fund members to prejudice their spouses financially by purchasing living annuities without the consent of such spouses, particularly when married in community of property. Disregarding matrimonial law principles may lead to deprivation of property.
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Leszczyński, Grzegorz. "Brak wiary a wykluczenie godności sakramentalnej małżeństwa." Ius Matrimoniale 30, no. 4 (October 15, 2019): 17–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.2019.30.4.02.
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The Code of Canon Law of 1983 classifies the reasons for marriage invalidity in three different categories: diriment impediments, defects in matrimonial consent and lack or defect of canon form. Among different defects in matrimonial consent, in 1101 § 2, Code of Canon Law enumerates simulations. Simulation signifies that a person contracting marriage expresses marital agreement merely on the surface, excluding in reality through a positive act of the will the marriage itself, some essential elements or an essential property of marriage. The present article is an attempt of looking at the relation existing between the validity of marriage and the exclusion of the sacramental dignity, with the special consideration of the faith of the person.
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Marumoagae, Motseotsile Clement. "Notes: Do retirement funds have a right to transfer accrued retirement benefits without non-member spouses’ consent? An analysis of the Collatz matter." South African Law Journal 140, no. 1 (2023): 17–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.47348/salj/v140/i1a2.
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Neither the legislature nor the courts have adequately determined how to regulate benefits that retirement fund members married in community of property derive a right to claim before their death. It illustrates the failure of the courts to assess the intersection between matrimonial principles and pension rules when faced with nonmember spouses who argue that their deceased member spouses’ retirement benefits accrued to their joint estates. The courts need to consider seriously the applicability of matrimonial principles before retirement benefits can be treated as death benefits. Further, the note demonstrates that the courts over-emphasise the role of pension rules and totally disregard matrimonial principles, thereby depriving surviving non-member spouses of their share of the accrued retirement benefits. This note further argues that the legislature should urgently intervene.
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Gałkowski, Tomasz. "Zgoda małżonków w procesie skróconym przed biskupem." Ius Matrimoniale 30, no. 2 (April 15, 2019): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.2019.30.2.03.
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The study analyzes the answer of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts regarding the need to obtain the explicit consent of the other party as a sine qua non condition for the commencement of the Briefer Matrimonial Process before the Bishop. The author analyzes the rations for formulating the content of the answer, but also points to situations that impede obtaining such a consent. He points out that the actual grounds for the annulment of a marriage should prevail over the formal reason.
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Felea, Alina. "From the history of the institution of marriage in Moldova in the 17th - beginning of the 19th centuries: conditions for concluding the marriage and the investigation procedure." Revista de istorie a Moldovei, no. 1-2(129-130) (November 2022): 66–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.58187/rim.129-130.02.
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This article examines the research procedure that was mandatory for the conclusion of a matrimonial alliance in Moldova in the XVIIth - the beginning of the XIXth century and which was based on the ascertance of the presence of the necessary conditions for marriage (voluntary agreement of the young people, consent of the parents / relatives of the young people, age allowed for marriage), lack of any kind of impediments and the presence of the wedding authorization act. The country of Moldova, being an Orthodox country, in matters of matrimonial law was guided by Orthodox canon law, according to which in order to conclude a legitimate marriage certain conditions had to be observed. The execution of the investigation procedure was entrusted to the priest.
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Kosowicz, Stanisław. "Zaburzenia psychiczne ograniczające wykonanie zobowiązań powziętych w akcie zgody małżeńskiej." Prawo Kanoniczne 29, no. 1-2 (June 5, 1986): 217–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/10.21697/10.21697/pk.1986.29.1-2.06.
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In this article a problem of the psychical perturbations is done, which constrains executions of the obligations being included in the act of the matrimonial consent. The ability to live in community, a question of the bringing forth and education of the children, finally mutual perfecting themselves in the maried couple, there are esemtial elements of the sacramental mariage. If anyone of thees elements by the one of the parties contracting mariage is not realised, of the cause psychical disease, then it is possible to adjudicate the nullity of mariage. A difficulty to decide in these matters is, because it is not always easy to ascertain with full certitude, if the psichical disease effects a stagger of the spiritual counterpoise in such high degree that the person is not able to fulfill the obligations included in the act of the matrimonial consent The problem in this article brought up is now new one, but in this matter will be in time to come more and more decisions of Rota, which will be guide lines to adjudicate the causes for the lower instances in the analogical causes.
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Bazić, Jovan. "Religious marriage between consent and coercion - Čović Ana: Family And Legal Aspects Of Religious Marriages, Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade, 2020." Socioloski pregled 55, no. 2 (2021): 593–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/socpreg55-31820.
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The review of this monograph is observed through the analytical-descriptive approach, which considers the social context of religious marriage arrangement. Moreover, special attention is paid to the results of the analysis of the church matrimonial law rules and their effect in Serbia's legal system, as well in some European societies. The review also speaks about the arrangement of LGBT partnerships as a challenge to the traditional marriage concept.
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Briulotta, Tiziana. "Instabilitŕ coniugale e separazioni giudiziali. Modelli di conflitto prevalenti in un area della Sicilia." SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO, no. 1 (July 2009): 125–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sd2009-001005.
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- Matrimonial instability brings meanings assimilated in the course of time and originally generated by changes taking place not only in the individual, but also in society as a whole, in the way that marriage is understood and in relations between the genders. Reacting to the trend that has the wife taking the initiative in the majority of divorce proceedings, several scholars have focused special attention on women's changing role in society, on their more widespread presence in the labour market, on the satisfaction perceived inside the couple's relationship and on new models of interaction in the family. Nevertheless, the analysis of matrimonial instability in Italy cannot avoid drawing a distinction between separations by mutual consent and judicial separations: while in the former more than half the women involved are employed and the spouses in question are more often than not in the medium to high income brackets, in the latter the proportion of employed women is significantly smaller and they tend to live in families in the lower income brackets. Although southern Italy still registers lower levels of matrimonial instability than the rest of the country, at the same time it has a higher proportion of spouses who choose the judicial path to separation. This idiosyncrasy of the South prompted further investigation of the phenomenon by analysing the texts of a sample of cases of judicial separation heard before the court of Catania, which revealed not only socio-economic variables among the spouses, but also in how they go about describing their conflicts, starting from a gender perspective.
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Boccafola, Kenneth E. "Lack of Faith and Its Effect on the Validity of the Matrimonial Consent of the Baptized." Jurist: Studies in Church Law and Ministry 74, no. 1 (2014): 59–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jur.2014.0017.
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Welch, Lawrence J., and Perry Cahall. "An Examination of the Role of Faith in Matrimonial Consent and the Consequences for the Sacrament of Marriage." Nova et vetera 16, no. 1 (2018): 311–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nov.2018.0012.
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Góralski, Wojciech. "Problematyka niezdolności konsensualnej do zawarcia małżeństwa w pracach Papieskiej Komisji do Rewizji KPK w fazie wypracowywania nowych kanonów (1966-1973)." Roczniki Nauk Prawnych 32, no. 1 (2022): 95–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rnp22321.6.
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Commenced after the end of the Second Vatican Council, the reform of canon law included, inter alia, matrimonial law. A particularly important area of codification in this respect was the marriage consent, which is the cause of marriage. The lack of regulations on consensual capacity in the 1917 KPK and the development of psychological and psychiatric sciences prompted the doctrine and jurisprudence to fill this gap. No wonder that in the process of reforming and codifying canon law, the Pontifical Commission for the Revision of the CIC, supported by the consultors, attempted to define more precisely the consensual incapacity. The intensive work of the consultants of the De matrimonio team of the Pontifical Commission in this regard (in the first phase of codification: 1966-1973) resulted in the preparation of a draft of new canons, which became the basis for further work. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal of the Roman Rota played a significant role in the process of revision and codification. The subject of this study is the process of shaping the future can. 1095, ff. 1-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the first of the above-mentioned phases (1966-1973) of the complex process of the post-conciliar revision and codification of canon law. In the first part, the author discusses the works carried out in the years 1966-1970, and in the second part, the works lasting in the years 1970-1973.
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León Vegas, Milagros. ""Dejándome en toda libertad, sin vejarme ni molestarme": mujer y disenso matrimonial, una aproximación a través de la documentación del Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Granada (siglo XVIII)." Vínculos de Historia Revista del Departamento de Historia de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, no. 11 (June 22, 2022): 430–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.18239/vdh_2022.11.20.
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La Real Pragmática de matrimonios de 1776 fue una iniciativa de la Monarquía Hispánica para restablecer e imponer el veto o consentimiento paterno en los matrimonios de los hijos. Más allá de la reafirmación de una sociedad patriarcal, esta legislación supuso una pugna del poder temporal con la Iglesia para controlar los matrimonios, pilar de la familia y de las sociedades de siglos pasados. En medio de ese conflicto, este tipo de reglamentación multiplicó el recurso de las partes ante los tribunales civiles e incluso, en algunos casos, los novios ganaron el pleito frente a la oposición de los intereses familiares. La documentación rastreada en el Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Granada sobre disensos (1777-1816) nos servirá para aproximarnos a esta realidad, deteniéndonos en describir, a través de un estudio de caso, algunos rasgos contestatarios de la voluntad femenina en el ámbito conyugal como muestra del incipiente despunte del individualismo afectivo en época ilustrada. Palabras clave: Matrimonio, mujer, disenso, individualismoTopónimos: España, AndalucíaPeriodo: Siglo XVIII ABSTRACTThe Real Pragmática de Matrimonios of 1776 was an initiative on the part of the Spanish Monarchy to restore and impose parental veto or consent on their children’s marriage. Beyond the reaffirmation of a patriarchal society, this legislation was a manifestation of the struggle between temporal power and the Church to control marriages, for centuries a cornerstone of family and society. In the midst of this conflict, this type of regulation multiplied the number of appeals lodged before civil courts, with the bride and groom, in some cases, even winning lawsuits in opposition to family interests. The documentation on dissent (1776-1816) tracked down in the Archive of the Royal Chancery of Granada helps us to approach this reality, and describe, by means of a case study, certain rebellious traits of the female will as an example of the incipient rise of affective individualism during the Enlightenment. Key words: Marriage, woman, dissent, individualismToponyms: Spain, AndalusiaPeriod: 18th century REFERENCIASBaldellou Monclús, D., “El honor de los padres y la libertad de los hijos: la aplicación del veto paterno a los matrimonios transgresores en la España preliberal”, en Familias rotas. Conflictos familiares en la España del Antiguo Régimen, Zaragoza, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2014, pp. 47-99.Bel Bravo, M. A., “Familia y género en la Edad Moderna: pautas para su estudio”, Memoria y Civilización, 9, (2006), pp. 13-49.Bernhard, J. Lefebvre, Ch. y Rapp, F., L´epoque de la réforme et du Concile de Trente, Paris, Éditions Cujas, 1990.Blanco Carrasco, P., “Disensos. 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Tradición y conflicto”, Studia Historica. Historia Moderna, 38-2, (2016), pp. 55-105.Sánchez-Montes, F., “La familia en el Reino de Granada en la Edad Moderna”, Chronica Nova, 45, (2019), pp. 19-37.Simó Rodríguez, M. I., “Fondos judiciales en los archivos históricos provinciales”, Boletín de la ANABAD, XXXIII-1 y 2, (1982), pp. 27-41.Torremocha Hernández, M., “El matrimonio y las relaciones de los cónyuges en la Castilla postridentrina (en la literatura de la época)”, en Familia, valores y representaciones, Murcia, Universidad de Murcia, 2010, pp. 155-178.— “La fragilidad femenina y el arbitrio judicial (s. XVIII). Entre la caridad y la equidad en los tribunales”, Tiempos Modernos, 9-36, (2018), pp. 430-453. Torremocha Hernández M. y Corada Alonso, A. (coords.), La mujer en la balanza de la Justicia (Castilla y Portugal, siglos XVII y XVIII), Valladolid, Castilla Ediciones, 2017.Van Dülmen, R., El descubrimiento del individuo,1500-1800, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2016.
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Gildenhuys, Anel. "'n Leë dop is soms beter as 'n halwe eier / An empty shell is sometimes better than half an egg – Gounden v Master of the High Court [2015] JOL 32896 (KZD) and Govender v Gounden 2019 2 SA 262 (KZN)." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 23 (April 23, 2020): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2020/v23i0a7449.
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The KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban, recently had the opportunity to interpret section 15(3)(b)(iii) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 within the context of the South African law of succession. This section states that: "A spouse shall not without the consent of the other spouse … receive any money due or accruing to that other spouse or the joint estate by way of … inheritance, legacy, donation, bursary or prize left, bequeathed, made or awarded to the other spouse." The question before the court was whether a person who is married in community of property requires the consent of his or her spouse in order to repudiate an intestate inheritance. The following aspects were considered by both the court a quo (Gounden v Master of the High Court [2015] JOL 32896 (KZD)) as well as the full bench on appeal (Govender v Gounden 2019 2 SA 262 (KZN)): the distinction between dies cedit and dies venit; the importance of this distinction in electing to either adiate or to repudiate an inheritance; and the implications for the joint estate of spouses married in community of property. The purpose of this contribution is to analyse and critically discuss the reasoning in the judgments in relation to these three aspects.
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Tajul Urus, Nur Sarah, and Alias Azhar. "IMPLICATIONS OF MATRIMONIAL OFFENCES TOWARDS THE FAMILY INSTITUTION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION." International Journal of Law, Government and Communication 5, no. 20 (September 15, 2020): 57–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.35631/ijlgc.520003.
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This paper debates the implications of matrimonial offenses on the family institution. The offence of pronouncing talaq (divorce utterance) outside the court is chosen instead of the other two matrimonial offences, which are underage marriage and polygamy without consent. The choice is due to the practice of pronouncing talaq outside the court being an infringement of the existing legal procedure. This issue is raised when the divorce application procedure, which requires talaq to be pronounced in court, continues to be questioned by religious groups and society who are skeptical of the Islamic family law currently in force in the country. The objectives of this article are first, to identify the legal provisions related to divorce application procedure according to its application in Malaysia as well as the role of the Advisory Unit under the Administration of Family Law Division, Kelantan Islamic Affairs Department at Lundang, Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Second, this paper aims to analyse the implications that can be expected if talaq is not pronounced in court and the catalyst for the occurrence of this phenomenon. Third, the paper suggests that religious groups and society be more open in the era of globalisation by considering the maslahah and public interest in general. This study used qualitative data that were gathered through document analysis and interviews. Data analysis was performed by adopting a descriptive approach using content analysis. The finding of the study showed the existence of global impacts on the family institution arising from the offence of pronouncing talaq outside the court. Thus, it is hoped that religious groups and legal experts can work together to create elements of innovation and reduce misunderstandings between the shariah law and legislation that is in force. Awareness and empowerment of law compliance should be implemented collectively so that compliance of the existing law is achieved with deep understanding and awareness. Furthermore, messages conveyed by the religious groups should be consistent and not in conflict with the law that is currently in force.
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Ćavar, Klara, and Lucija Šikić. "Bitna svojstva ženidbe - jednost i nerazrješivost." Magistra Iadertina 12, no. 1 (March 16, 2018): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.15291/magistra.1458.
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This article deals with the issues related to the essential properties of marriage, unity and indissolubility. Church has always seen marriage as a natural covenantal partnership between the baptized, and as a sacrament, which means that the natural reality of matrimonial covenant has been elevated to the supernatural order as an effective sign of grace. The essential properties, the unity and the indissolubility which are proper to natural marriage obtain a special firmnessin Christian marriage. These properties are also important for Christian and non-Christian marriages because they arise from the very nature and essential purpose of marriage. The Christian tradition and the doctrine of St. Paul teach that these two properties reflect the unique and indissoluble bond of Christ and the Church. The article deals with the exclusion of essential properties from the marriage consent or proof of nullity of marriage because of the exclusion of unity and indissolubility by a positive act of will.
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Pielichowski, Jerzy. "KORELACJA WAD OŚWIADCZENIA WOLI PRZY ZAWARCIU MAŁŻEŃSTWA NA GRUNCIE PRAWA KANONICZNEGO I POLSKIEGO." Zeszyty Prawnicze 12, no. 3 (December 16, 2016): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/zp.2012.12.3.03.
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CORRELATION OF DEFECTS OF DECLARATION OF INTENT WHEN ENTERING INTO MATRIMONY UNDER CANON LAW CODE AND FAMILY AND GUARDIANSHIP CODE Summary The analysis concerns the intertwining of the areas of secular and canon law with regard to defects of a declaration of will at the time of contracting a marriage. The author proceeds from an analysis of the historic background to denominational marriages starting with the 1557 Synod of Piotrków, until the 1917 enactment of the Canon Law Code (Kodeks Prawa Kanonicznego, „KPK”), when a uniform approach to marriage was adopted in the whole Universal Church. He goes on to look into the question of the forms of contracting a marriage, both the ordinary and the extraordinary form, based on the provisions of the Canon Law Code from 1983. A further part of the analysis looks back at the historical evolution of the regulations relating to the defects of the declaration of will in Polish matrimonial legislation, with emphasis on the periods when Poland was partitioned by the neighboring powers and on post-WWII Polish and international legislation relating to family matters. The article ends with an analysis of the defects of declarations of intent made in connection with entering into matrimony under the KPK and under the Family and Guardianship Code („KRO”). Under the former, these include: the lack of sufficient use of reason, significant absence of the person’s awareness of material marital rights and duties, mental inability to accept significant marital duties, error, trickery, simulation of marital consent, conditional consent, coercion or fear, while under KRO these would include: lack of awareness of a declaration of will, mistake concerning a person and threat.
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Bridge, Stuart. "Judicial paternalism and private ordering on divorce." Cambridge Law Journal 58, no. 3 (November 1999): 461–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197399343014.
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II is axiomatic that divorcing spouses cannot by agreement oust the jurisdiction of the court to award ancillary relief: Hyman v. Hyman [1929] A.C. 601. Finality can only be achieved by obtaining the sanction of the court in the form of a consent order, invoking a procedure which requires full disclosure of all material factors so that the court can exercise its own discretion on the basis of the information put before it: Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.33A; Livesey v. Jenkins [1985] A.C. 424. But out-of-court agreements made by the parties are not without significance. Far from it, they will be treated as a very important consideration should the court subsequently be asked by one of the parties to make an award of ancillary relief, and will not usually be departed from unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that injustice will be done by holding the parties to their terms: Edgar v. Edgar [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1410. Presumptive enforceability has been criticised as “the worst of both worlds”, as the parties must go to court to determine whether the agreement they have reached is legally binding: Pounds v. Pounds [1994] 1 F.L.R. 775, 791, per Hoffmann L.J. Either the agreement should bind, or it should be wholly disregarded.
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De La Hera, Alberto. "WILLIAM M. VAN OMMEREM, Mental Illnes Affecting Matrimonial Consent, 1 vol. de XI + 241 págs., The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1961." Ius Canonicum 4, no. 8 (April 16, 2018): 602–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.4.23338.
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Lebon, Caroline. "Vorlagebeschluss of June 29, 1999 — The Protection of "Vulnerable Sureties" as to German, French, Belgian, Dutch, English and Scottish Law." European Review of Private Law 9, Issue 2/3 (June 1, 2001): 417–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/359027.
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The standard terms of the bank, where a man got a loan for the restoration of the matrimonial home (where he also had his architect's firm) he was the sole proprietor of, obliged the spouse to grant security for the loan. The architect's wife made no objections. At the time of the conclusion of the whole transaction, she was 32, mother of a young child, owed two already several times charged pieces of land and got only a low income as employee in the bureau of her husband. After several delays in payments on the loan, the bank terminated the loan and called upon the wife as guarantee as the man was not able to repay. The editors of this journal made an interesting choice by taking the Vorlagebeschluss from the 29th June 1999 as case to be annotated. This not only because of the - at least - strange end of the affair, but mostly because of the style and form of the decision itself. The decision provides, like a real textbook, a complete overview of the different opinions concerning the Sittenwidrigkeit of contracts of suretyship of the IXth and the XIth Civil Chambers of the Bundesgerichtshof. After discussing the German Law, it will be investigated how (vulnerable) sureties can try to avoid liability under French, Belgian, Dutch, English and Scottish Law. The present standpoint in France upon this matter stems from the so-called Macron-case of the Court de Cassation of the 17th June 1997, which introduced the delictual libaility of banks that demanded "manifest disproportionate" sureties. Since then, French sureties are better protected than at the time when it was only possible to obtain annulment of the contract of suretyship for a defect of consent. In Belgium sureties still have to take the hard way and proof a defect of consent in order to get relief of a null contract. It will be considered therefore if sureties cannot profit from the latest case law-evolution on the contractors' duties in the precontractual stage.
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Bagan-Kurluta, Katarzyna. "Dobro dziecka w sprawach o uprowadzenie dziecka za granicę. Zmiany w prawie i ich spodziewane skutki." Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego 25 (December 31, 2019): 5–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/pppm.2019.25.01.
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The international child abduction is regulated in the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in the Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (Brussels II bis), and in the domestic law — in the Code of Civil Procedure. In the recent years the Regulation Brussels II bis was subject to review. As a result drawbacks were indicated and amendments have been proposed, in particular with a view of simplifying the procedures. The changes were triggered by the increasing number of cases in which one of the parents removes the child without a consent from the other. The Ministry of Justice does not provide any data on the amount of cases taking place in Poland. It is nevertheless certain that this amount has increased in comparison to previous years. Moreover, it is acknowledged that contrary to the Hague Convention and the EU Regulation, many children abducted by their parents are retained in Poland. The amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure seem to address this situation and streamline the process of the return of the children. The question remains: do the proposed amendments to the EU Regulation and those already enacted in the Code of Civil Procedure warrant to a sufficient degree that the welfare of a child — being one of the determinants of these regulations — is safeguarded?
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Maseda Rodríguez, Javier. "Crisis matrimoniales y la reforma de las reglas domésticas españolas de competencia judicial internacional: paso adelante o paso atrás." Revista Jurídica Digital UANDES 2, no. 2 (December 7, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.24822/rjduandes.0202.1.
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Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la reciente reforma de las normas domésticas españolas de competencia judicial internacional en materia de crisis matrimoniales. Estas reglas son aplicables en ciertos casos aun cuando la vinculación de los operadores jurídicos españoles (y de los Estados miembros de la UE) por el Reglamento (CE) núm. 2201/2003, del Consejo, de 27 de noviembre de 2003, relativo a la competencia, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones judiciales en materia matrimonial y de responsabilidad parental. Se examina la nueva normativa doméstica en su comparación con la derogada, con la intención de determinar si mejora el sistema o, por contrario, no había razón para modificar el régimen anterior.
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Bzdyrak, Grzegorz. "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE IN POLISH LAW AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IN CANON LAW – A COMPARATIVE STUDY." Review of European and Comparative Law 2627, no. 34 (December 31, 2016): 65–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/recl.4979.
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Annulment and nullity of marriage are two institutions that function in two separate and independent legal systems. Despite some similarities, they cannot be used interchangeably. The differences between the annulment and declaring nullityof marriage follow mainly from the fact that the canonical marriage between baptized persons is a sacrament, a lifelong and indissoluble bond. For this reason, once validly contracted, it cannot be annulled or dissolved by divorce, but only bythe death of a spouse or a dispensation from an unconsummated marriage and the privilege of faith. In the case when marriage is contracted, despite the existence of impediments to marriage, the ecclesiastical tribunal, after completing the relevant proceedings, declares its nullity whereby this judgment is of a declarative nature. In the case of annulment of marriage, the legislator provided for some restriction as to the persons authorized to file a claim, and it also listed the situations in which, even though marriage was contracted in breach of law, its annulment is not possible. Therefore, convalidation by force of law is permissible. Such validation and such restrictions have not been provided by the ecclesiastical legislator, although the convalidation of marriage is possible as long as the matrimonial consent continues and some additional conditions have been satisfied. The judgment regarding the annulment of marriage is constitutive, although the effects of annulment have retroactive effects, whereby the legislator stated that for certain relationships, the rules of divorce shall be applicable.
Both in the state and canonical orders, there are three groups of reasons that are the basis for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage. These are impediments to marriage, defects to the declarations of intention of the spousesand defects to the mandate to contract marriage. The individual reasons have been briefly discussed to present the differences in their understanding under canon law and state law.
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Ansari, Abdul Haseeb, and Kyaw Hla Win Md. Hassan Ahmed. "Legal and Social Viability of Polygamy: An Analysis." Journal of Islam in Asia (E-ISSN: 2289-8077) 8 (February 2, 2012): 397–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/jia.v8i0.273.
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In Islam, a Muslim male is allowed to have up to four wives provided all wives are treaty equally and do not suffer from any kind of discrimination. The divine injunction of equal treatment is actually for protecting rights of the wives. It is for this reason that many Muslim countries have enacted laws for providing protection to wives. One of the notable legal principles is that a man, who has a wife, cannot marry with another female without permission of the first wife, and so on; or he can do so if allowed by the court of competent jurisdiction. Some other countries, like Tunisia, have banned polygamy. This, in effect, is denial to the right guaranteed in the Sharʑah to both Muslim males and females, as in certain circumstances polygamy brings happiness to the family. For example, if wife is suffering from some kind of contagious disease and the husband is deprived of fulfilling his sexual desire, in view of the ban, he will have to divorce his first wife in order to marry with some other female. In India, in such a situation, there are reports that the firs wife, who is already in agony of a disease, is either burned or divorced on the basis of mutual consent, which is generally based on duress or payment of inappropriate amount of money. This is violation of matrimonial rights guaranteed by the Sharʑah and constitutions of modern states. The paper discusses the human right aspect of polygamy referring to various religious positions and law in some Muslim countries. The paper concludes that polygamy should be allowed but law should be designed in such a way that the divine injunction of equal treatment of all wives is ensured.
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Schöch, Nikolaus. "Fede e consenso matrimoniale." ARCHIV FÜR KATHOLISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 183, no. 1 (November 25, 2014): 295–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589045x-183-01-90000032.
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Burton, Frances. "Owens v Owens: A Most Curious Case." Denning Law Journal 32, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 5–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5750/dlj.v32i1.1916.
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The combination of the long Brexit delays, largely unwelcome General Election, a change of leadership and Cabinet composition in the Conservative government and finally the coronavirus has between them resulted in a long pause in expected reforming legislation which is much needed in Family Law, including the initial loss of the Divorce Dissolution and Separation Bill 2019, generated in 2019 by the failure of Mrs Owens’ ’ Supreme Court appeal in the now notorious case of Owens v Owens. While this was immediately hailed by the media as justification for urgent reform of the Law of Divorce in England and Wales – on the grounds that English law was almost alone in modern liberal jurisdictions in lacking a No Fault Divorce regime – clearly this has now been overtaken by subsequent events.
While it may be factually accurate that England and Wales does not have such a regime for dissolution of marriage without fault and by consent (at least without satisfying the inconvenient condition of waiting for the two-year delay necessary for a decree on the basis of two years of separation and consent), and perhaps should have one for the reason stated, the failed Owens appeal has absolutely no jurisprudential connection with any urgency for reform of the law in order to secure such a decree at all. This is because the legal profession has been effectively obtaining divorces under the present law for over 40 years, and, notwithstanding Owens, has been continuing to do so since 2018, albeit with the caveat that drafting must be undertaken with extreme care to be sure to avoid a repeated debacle. Nevertheless, on account of the age of the present statute, legal, political and social theorists of course have strong arguments for a No Fault addition to the existing Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or even for replacing the existing provisions of that statute altogether.
However this is because the present statute is itself a re-enactment and consolidation of the original Divorce Reform Act 1969 which led the post-WWII reforms creating our current Law of Divorce, so is well past its ‘sell-by date’, but not because it does not work in modern times. If anything, and especially with the assistance of s76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, s 1(2)(b) of the 1973 Act works entirely consistently with present philosophy, that is, as marriage is a partnership of equals there is no place for any form of domestic abuse within it.
In fact Mrs Owens thus could (and arguably should) have obtained her divorce on the existing basis, pursuant to s 1(2)(b) of the 1973 Act, namely on that of her husband’s ‘behaviour’. Thus, as indeed hinted by Lady Hale in her paragraph 50 of the Supreme Court judgment, which she added to the agreed text set by Lord Wilson, there was clear evidence of the alleged ‘authoritarian, demeaning and humiliating conduct over a period of time’, which in law was capable of founding a decree, and there was existing case law supporting this in the case of Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard.
Consequently in her paragraph 53 she identified what in her view was thus ‘the correct disposal … to allow the appeal and send the case back to be tried again’ – which, however, could not be adopted in the particular circumstances, owing to the fact that no one, including the Appellant, Mrs Owens, wanted to go through such a trial again, not least as even her counsel, Philip Marshall QC, ‘viewed such a prospect with dread’. Thus, in her paragraph 54, Lady Hale concluded that she was ‘reluctantly persuaded that this appeal should be dismissed’ – a conclusion, however, not stopping her from including some forthright comments on the conduct of the case below, with which any analysis can only agree.
So, whatever happened in Owens v Owens? In the Central London Family Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court?
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Robitaille, Lynda. "Pornografia e consenso matrimoniale. La fruizione di pornografia oggi e il suo influsso sul consenso matrimoniale canonico by Emanuele Albanese. Tesi Gregoriana." Jurist: Studies in Church Law and Ministry 75, no. 2 (2015): 677–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jur.2015.0025.
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Tejero, Eloy. "La discreción de juicio para consentir el matrimonio." Ius Canonicum 22, no. 44 (March 14, 2018): 403–534. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.22.19202.
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Pree, Helmuth. "Le presunzioni legali del consenso matrimoniale canonico in un occidente scristianizzato." Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht 181, no. 2 (November 24, 2012): 637–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589045x-181-02-90000024.
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Burke, Raymond L. "Grave difetto de discrezione di giudizio: fonte di nullità del consenso matrimoniale." Ius Canonicum 31, no. 61 (February 7, 2018): 139–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.31.17318.
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Sonnekus, JC. "Regspraak: Regsontdaning kragtens ’n akte van dading, soos ’n huweliksvoorwaardekontrak, beliggaam ’n ooreenkoms gebaseer op wilsooreenstemming en dít word beheers deur die beginsel pacta sunt servanda – mits die afstanddoener dan handelingsbevoeg is." Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2022, no. 4 (2022): 809–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2022/i4a11.
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“At the dissolution of a marriage subject to the accrual system, … the spouse whose estate shows no accrual or a smaller accrual than the estate of the other spouse, … acquires a claim against the other spouse or his estate for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the respective estates of the spouses” (s 3(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 – emphasis added). This indicates that, but for explicit exceptions, before the dissolution of the marriage no patrimonial right regarding accrual sharing vests. The vesting of the patrimonial right follows by operation of law and does not depend on the subjective animus accipiendi of the benefitting spouse. For that reason the act provides that the same applies even where the benefitting spouse’s demise caused the dissolution of the marriage – dead people cannot form an intention to accept to which a court should adhere. In the JAN matter the wife in 2019 desperately wanted a speedy divorce and on numerous occasions explicitly declared that she wanted nothing out of the marriage and accordingly stated in the deed of settlement, after consultation with the applicable divorce attorney who explained that her marriage was governed by accrual sharing, that she would waive her claim to accrual sharing. The matrimonial property regime in the marriage that had broken down irretrievably was governed by a valid ante-nuptial contract that provided for accrual sharing to which the parties agreed after consultation with the notary before their marriage 23 years earlier. Three years after the divorce she approached the court in the current matter for the rescission of the divorce order in so far as it incorporated the deed of settlement in the court order. The court correctly held that no justification existed for such a rescission. Pacta sunt servanda governs not only the ante-nuptial contract but also the deed of settlement, especially since both documents resulted from consensus reached between the spouses after receiving guidance and advice from independent attorneys and notaries. The deed of settlement is also the subject of the order of the high court – leaving little room to claim that the alleged agreement was only the result of an unintended misrepresentation. In a society governed by the rule of law, all legal subjects should adhere to the binding principle that an agreement reached may not lightly be negated just because one of the parties in hindsight is no longer satisfied with the outcome of the agreement he/she misrepresented to the other party to agree to. These agreements cannot be interpreted similar to a tombola ticket at a church fete or some insurance cover where every participant always gets something out. The court correctly held that the “inherent jurisdiction of the High Court does not include the right to tamper with the principle of finality of judgments” (par 22). “There are two basic requirements to be met when a court considers a request to grant a judgment in accordance with the terms of a settlement agreement. The first, relevant for present purposes, is that the court must be satisfied that the parties to the agreement have freely and voluntarily concluded the agreement and that they are ad idem as to its terms. Once a court has made a consent judgment, it is functus officio and the matter becomes res judicata” (par 23). The same requirements apply to the ante-nuptial agreement. It is submitted that the addition by the applicant of her signature to the deed of settlement to which she agreed three months before the divorce order in the presence of the attorney, could not have had the legal effect of an immediate waiver of the patrimonial right because at that stage no patrimonial right to accrual sharing had yet vested in her estate. It would only vest if applicable, that is, if at the dissolution of the marriage her estate shows the smaller accrual. Had her estate become insolvent after signing the deed of settlement but before the granting of the divorce order, the right to share in the accrual would be an asset in her estate after vesting at the dissolution of the marriage and it would be to the benefit of her creditors notwithstanding the previously signed deed of settlement. It is only during the subsistence of the marriage that the potential right/spes to accrual sharing is not transferable or liable to attachment, and it does not form part of the insolvent estate of a spouse (s 3(2) of Act 88 of 1984). The deed of settlement at most indicated her intention, unless retracted before the court order, to then waive her claim and the intention of her erstwhile husband to accept the benefit that her act of waiver offers him. As such it was conditional that at dissolution of the marriage the entitled party still has the power and intention to legally waive the acquired right. In this case nothing hampered with the condition and the court order finalised the matter. It may be that the resulting benefit for the husband carry some tax consequences since as erstwhile debtor he is acquitted of his debt and released of accrual sharing. This aspect was not considered.
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Wojciechowska, Beata. "RAPTUS PUELLAE JAKO PRZESZKODA MAŁŻEŃSKA W DEKRECIE GRACJANA." Saeculum Christianum 23 (September 22, 2017): 48–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/sc.2016.23.05.
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Marriage has always been a concern of the Church. Christian doctrine gave matrimonium sacred meaning and at the same time fully endorsed the concept of mutual consent which originated from Roman law. The act of abduction with its legal and ethical consequences was described in detail in the Decretum Gratiani. The punishment for the abductor was public penance and prohibition of marriage. If the fiancé was unwilling to take back the abducted bride he was allowed to marry another woman. However, if the fiancé and the bride wanted to get married afresh, they were to be both excommunicated until they had made their reparation. The Decretum Gratiani clearly indicated that the raptus puellae was an obstacle which prevented marriage. The reason was the duress of abduction, which was contrasted with free will, voluntarily consent and the approval of father, parents or guardians.
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Barcons Campmajó, Maria. "Los matrimonios forzados como violencia de género: aspectos controvertidos desde los feminismos | The forced marriages as a gender based violence: controversial aspects from feminisms." Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho, no. 41 (December 27, 2019): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/cefd.41.14866.
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Resumen: Los matrimonios forzados son una forma de violencia de género y una vulneración de derechos humanos. Al analizar esta problemática tan compleja, desde los feminismos, pueden surgir algunos aspectos controvertidos a la vez que necesarios como son el concepto de autonomía, consentimiento, multiculturalidad e interseccionalidad.
Abstract: Forced marriages are a form of gender violence and a violation of human rights. When analyzing this complex problem, from the feminisms, some controversial aspects can arise at the same time as necessary, such as the concept of autonomy, consent, multiculturality and intersectionality.
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Morán, Gloria M. "Angela Patrizia TAVANI, Fede e consenso matrimoniale, G. Giappichelli, Torino 2013, 244 pp." Ius Canonicum 54, no. 108 (December 1, 2014): 875–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.54.703.
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Campuzano Díaz, Beatriz. "El Artículo 15 del Reglamento 2201/2003 y la remisión a un órgano jurisdiccional mejor situado para conocer del asunto. Nota a la Sentencia del TJUE de 4 de octubre de 2018, IQ y JO, AS. 478/17 = Article 15 of Regulation 2201/2003 and the transfer to a court better placed to hear the case. Comment to the ECJ Judgment 4 October 2018, IQ v JO, C-478/17." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 2 (October 1, 2019): 452. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4971.
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Resumen: Esta Sentencia tiene por objeto la interpretación del artículo 15 del Reglamento (CE) N.o 2201/2003 del Consejo, de 27 de noviembre de 2003, relativo a la competencia, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones judiciales en materia matrimonial y de responsabilidad parental, por el que se deroga el Reglamento (CE) n.o 1347/2000. La cuestión que se planteó era cómo había que proceder en una situación caracterizada por el hecho de que los tribunales de los dos Estados miembros afectados tenían competencia judicial internacional conforme a las disposiciones de este Reglamento para conocer del fondo del asunto.Palabras clave: remisión a un órgano jurisdiccional mejor situado, tribunal competente para conocer del fondo del asunto.Abstract: This judgment refers to the interpretation of Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) Nº 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000. The question was how to proceed in a situation characterised by the fact that the courts of both Member States concerned, had jurisdiction under this Regulation.Keywords: transfer to a court better placed to hear the case, court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case.
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Patrizia Tavani, Angela. "L'amentia habitualis nel cic. Rilevanza giuridica quanto al consenso matrimoniale ed alla imputabilità penale." Revista Española de Derecho Canónico 56, no. 146 (January 1, 1999): 237–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.36576/summa.6009.
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Góralski, Wojciech. "La simulazione del consenso matrimoniale. Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Citta del Vaticano 1990 ss. XI + 236." Ius Matrimoniale 4 (January 15, 1993): 132–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.1993.1.1.17.
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Bañares, Juan Ignacio. "Cormac Burke, L'oggetto del consenso matrimoniale. Un'analisi personalistica, Ed. G. Giappichelli, Torino 1997, 111 pp." Ius Canonicum 38, no. 75 (February 5, 2018): 345–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.38.15902.
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Beal, John P. "Le Presunzioni Legali Del Consenso Matrimoniale Canonico in Un Occidente Scristianizzato by Piero Antonio Bonnet." Jurist: Studies in Church Law and Ministry 70, no. 1 (2010): 264–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jur.2010.0018.
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De La Hera, Alberto. "Piero Antonio BONNET, Introduzione al consenso matrimonial canonico. Giuffrè. Milano 1985. 1 vol. de XII+207 págs." Ius Canonicum 29, no. 58 (February 7, 2018): 759–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.29.18654.
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Becerril Ruiz, Diego, and José Jiménez Cabello. "Reformas legales y su efecto sobre las rupturas matrimoniales." OBETS. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 14, no. 2 (December 22, 2019): 287. http://dx.doi.org/10.14198/obets2019.14.2.01.
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España ha registrado, durante las últimas décadas, las transformaciones más significativas relacionadas con las rupturas matrimoniales. Desde la reaparición de la posibilidad legal de ruptura, hasta sustanciales reformas en época más reciente, relacionadas con la Ley 15/2005. Este proceso ha sucedido sin un análisis de la incidencia de las reformas legales sobre la propia evolución de las rupturas, que es el objetivo principal de este trabajo. Utilizando los datos disponibles en el Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) y el Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) se analizan las tendencias de las rupturas. Se concluye que las variaciones en las rupturas se han producido, en gran medida, de forma ajena a la introducción de reformas legales, si bien es cierto que las reformas tienen una incidencia relevante, aunque temporal.
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Benincasa, Zuzanna. "‘DEDUCTIO IN DOMUM MARITI’ A ZAWARCIE ‘IUSTUM MATRIMONIUM’." Zeszyty Prawnicze 13, no. 2 (December 13, 2016): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/zp.2013.13.2.01.
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‘DEDUCTIO IN DOMUM MARITI’ AND THE CONCLUSION OF A ‘IUSTUM MATRIMONIUM’SummaryAccording to the communis opinio the classical Roman law did not have a formal procedure of concluding a marriage, since its conclusion required only the mutual consent of a man and a woman (affectio maritalis, consensus). Nonetheless, the Roman culture developed a number of ritual acts related to the conclusion of a marriage, most of them deeply rooted in the Roman tradition and history and of great symbolic significance. The central moment of a wedding ceremony appears to be the deductio in domum mariti i.e. the ritual bringing of the bride to her husband’s house. The significance of this ritual is reflected in language since the expression uxorem ducere (“to lead a wife”) is the most common Latin expression for “to marry,” also in the legal sense, since according to some jurists when deductio in domum mariti had been accomplished, the couple was considered duly and legally married. The main function of the deductio was thus to give a proof that the marriage had been concluded and to manifest mutual affectio maritalis. Deductio in domum mariti played a special role when a marriage was concluded inter absentes (it seems that only the groom person could be absent and not the bride). In this case the formal deductio ceremony seems to have been an indispensable act constituting the only way in which the mutual affectio maritalis could be expressed. Since the bride’s procession to her new husband’s house was considered the public declaration of the consensus necessary to conclude a legal marriage, if the groom was absent such a ceremony was necessary as a proof that mutual affectio maritalis had been expressed and thus the marriage had been concluded. Nonetheless the necessity of leading the bride to her husband’s home in the case of a matrimonium inter absentes should not be confused with the constitutive character of deductio in domum mariti. Consensus still remained the only constitutive element and deductio in domum mariti was only the formal way in which this consensus had to be expressed in the particular circumstances.
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Góralski, Wojciech. ""La giurisprudenza della Rota Romana sul consenso matrimoniale (1908-2008)", Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2009, ss 284." Ius Matrimoniale 21, no. 15 (October 15, 2010): 221–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.2010.15(21).14.
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Dzierżon, Ginter. ""Condizione esplicita e consenso implicitamente condizionato nel matrimonio canonico", Myriam Tinti, Roma 2000: [recenzja]." Ius Matrimoniale 12, no. 6 (October 15, 2001): 231–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.2001.6(12).16.
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Góralski, Wojciech. "Podstępne wprowadzenie w błąd (kan. 1098 KPK) w opublikowanych orzeczeniach Roty Rzymskiej z lat 2010-2012." Ius Matrimoniale 30, no. 2 (April 15, 2019): 95–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.2019.30.2.06.
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The subject of this study is the jurisprudence of the Roman Rota Court regarding deceptive misleading (canon 1098 CIC) from 2010-2012, contained in Decisione seu sententiae. During this period, the title of marriage annulment was included in twelve judgments; ten of them have been published.
The analysis of rotating sentences was presented in the following thematic areas: deceptive misleading as a factor protecting marriage consent; deceptive action; error as a result of deception; the attribute of a person as an object of deceptive action (in genere and in individual judgments); deceptio dolosa prove.
Undoubtedly, the jurisprudence of the Roman Rota also provides for the area of deceptive misleading, the appropriate point of reference in the resolution of nullitatis matrimonii cases by church tribunals of lower degrees of jurisdiction.
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Dzierżon, Ginter. ""L’esclusione della dignità sacramentale dal consenso matrimoniale nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza recenti", Massimo Mignardi, Roma 1998 : [recenzja]." Ius Matrimoniale 10, no. 4 (October 15, 1999): 311–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/im.1999.4(10).23.
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Gramunt, Ignatius. "AA. VV., La Simulazione nel consenso Matrimoniale Canonico, Studi Giuridici XXII, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Città del Vaticano 1990." Ius Canonicum 32, no. 64 (February 7, 2018): 787–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/016.32.18156.
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Manchado López, Marta M. ª. "Servir al rey sin desconsuelo. La cuestión del matrimonio de los miembros de la Audiencia de Manila en el siglo XVIII." Revista de Indias 78, no. 273 (August 8, 2018): 505. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/revindias.2018.015.
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Este trabajo está dedicado al estudio de la problemática del matrimonio de los miembros de la audiencia de Manila en el siglo XVIII, a partir del caso del oidor don José Gonzalo de Leaegui, abordándola desde una doble perspectiva: la de los funcionarios filipinos y la del rey y su Consejo de Indias (quienes no mantuvieron siempre una postura concordante). El conflicto entre planteamientos jurídicos diversos se resolverá con la adopción de una política pragmática y casuística, profundamente contradictoria. Esta investigación se ha realizado a partir del análisis de una gran cantidad de fuentes inéditas procedentes del Archivo General de Indias (Sevilla).