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1

Cramm, Wolf-Jurgen. "John McDowell, Mind and World." ProtoSociology 8 (1996): 338–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/protosociology19968/921.

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2

Wunsch, Matthias. "Das Verhältnis zwischen erster und zweiter Natur bei John McDowell und Nicolai Hartmann." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68, no. 2 (May 5, 2020): 247–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0015.

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AbstractWhen discussing the philosophical question of the relation between mind and nature, dualistic approaches are often contrasted with scientistic approaches. However, mind can be situated in nature in a non-scientistic manner and outside of nature in a non-dualistic manner. John McDowell represents the first approach, as he connects mind to our second nature. In his attempt to specify the categorial relation between first and second nature, McDowell finds himself in a dilemma which cannot be solved within his framework. The second approach is represented by Nicolai Hartmann, for whom mind does not belong to nature, but to the real world. Hartmann’s ontology of layers is able to avoid McDowell’s dilemma and the unity of the real world is made intelligible.
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3

Tomaszewska, Anna. "McDowell and Perceptual Reasons." Forum Philosophicum 17, no. 1 (June 4, 2012): 73–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2012.1701.04.

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John McDowell claims that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs. Perceptual reasons, according to the author of Mind and World, can be identified with passively “taken in” facts. Concepts figure in the acts of acquiring perceptual reasons, even though the acts themselves do not consist in judgments. Thus, on my reading, McDowell’s account of reasons-acquisition can be likened to Descartes’ account of the acquisition of ideas, rather than to Kant’s theory of judgment as an act by means of which one’s cognition comes to be endowed with objective validity. However, unlike Descartes, McDowell does not acknowledge the skeptical challenge which his conception of reasons-acquisition might face. He contends that perception is factive without arguing for the background assumption (about a “perfect match” between mind and world) on which it rests. Hence, as I suggest in my article, the McDowellian claim that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs is not sufficiently warranted.
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4

Fleming, Michael. "Misrepresentation and Non-conceptual Content." Dialogue 39, no. 3 (2000): 557–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007551.

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RésuméUne thèse sous-jacente au présent article est que la reconnaissance de notre capacité à mal représenter le monde devrait jouer un rôle significatif dans les explications de la genèse de la connaissance empirique. Je recours à cette contrainte explicative pour évaluer le tableau proposé par John McDowell dans Mind and World et, en particulier, ses arguments contre l'idée que le contenu de l'expérience est non conceptuel. McDowell considère Gareth Evans comme un représentant de cette conception et soutient que le contenu de toute expérience est conceptuel. Je soutiens, pour ma part, que l'approche de McDowell est inadéquate parce qu'elle ne permet pas de rendre compte de notre capacité à mal représenter le monde.
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5

Pietroski, Paul M. "John McDowell, Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press1994. Pp. x + 191." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (December 1996): 613–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717470.

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6

Weinberg, Jonathan M. "John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996), xxiv + 191 pp." Nous 32, no. 2 (June 1998): 247–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00099.

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7

Ordóñez Pinilla, Camilo Andrés. "MCDOWELL: PASIVIDAD, CONTENIDO Y PERCEPCIÓN." Praxis Filosófica, no. 44 (April 6, 2017): 13–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i44.4345.

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En su libro Mind and World, John McDowell propone una caracterización de la percepción como un proceso cognitivo pasivo. En el presente texto quisiera mostrar que tal caracterización tiene un problema fundamental: implicaría que la percepción no tiene contenido, atendiendo al modelo mcdowelliano de la intencionalidad. Dado que tal consecuencia es indeseable en el proyecto filosófico de McDowell, esto mostraría que existe una tensión lógica y conceptual entre la concepción de McDowell de la experiencia como un proceso pasivo y su concepción de las condiciones para el contenido. Para cumplir este objetivo, primero explicaré qué significa sostener que la percepción es pasiva, en el sentido en el que lo afirma McDowell. Segundo, propondré que si uno asume el modelo mcdowelliano de la intencionalidad, el contenido y la pasividad, no parecer ser posible que la percepción sea al mismo tiempo tanto pasiva como un estado con contenido (i.e. un estado intencional).
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8

Byrne, Alex. "Spin Control Comment on John McDowell's "Mind and World"." Philosophical Issues 7 (1996): 261. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522911.

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9

Rouse, Joseph. "Beyond Realism and Antirealism ---At Last?" Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9, no. 1 (February 15, 2018): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26979.

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This paper recapitulates my four primary lines of argument that what is wrong with scientific realism is not realist answers to questions to which various anti-realists give different answers, but instead assumptions shared by realists and anti-realists in framing the question. Each strategy incorporates its predecessors as a consequence. A first, minimalist challenge, taken over from Arthur Fine and Michael Williams, rejects the assumption that the sciences have a general aim or goal. A second consideration is that realists and antirealists undertake a mistaken, substantive commitment to a separation between mind and world, which allows them to frame the issue in terms of how epistemic “access” to the world is mediated. A third strategy for dissolving the realism question challenges its underlying commitment to the independence of meaning and truth, a strategy pursued in different ways by Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, John Haugeland, and myself. The fourth and most encompassing strategy shows that realists and antirealists are thereby committed to an objectionably antinaturalist conception of scientific understanding, in conflict with what the sciences themselves have to say about our own conceptual capacities.
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10

Friedman, Michael. "Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition: Comments on John McDowell's Mind and World." Philosophical Review 105, no. 4 (October 1996): 427. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998421.

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11

Bounds, Graham. "Heidegger, the Given, and the Second Nature of Entities." Open Philosophy 1, no. 1 (October 1, 2018): 256–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0019.

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Abstract In this paper I draw from Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of the 1920s to outline some basic features of his theory of intentionality that I believe have not been fully appreciated or utilized, and that allow for both novel and fruitful interventions in questions about meaning, the relationship between mind and the world, and epistemic justification, principally as they appear in John McDowell’s synoptic project in Mind and World. I argue that while elements of McDowell’s picture are ultimately unsatisfying and problematic, much of his conceptual framework can and should be put into dialogue with Heidegger’s, and that in so doing we make available powerful resources for amending the McDowellian account. Moreover, these emendations have attractive implications for his distinctive desiderata. In particular, they provide original conceptions of normativity’s place in nature, of the boundaries of the space of reasons, and of the relationship between the answerability of thought both to the world and to human beings as a rational community.
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12

Ahmed, Arif. "Review: John McDowell." Mind 115, no. 458 (April 1, 2006): 403–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl403.

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13

Bird, Graham. "McDowell's Kant: Mind and World." Hegel Bulletin 17, no. 01 (1996): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200003128.

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McDowell's Mind and World is a commentary on a traditional, dualist, epistemology which puzzles over, and offers accounts of, a fundamental division between mental, subjective items, and non-mental, objective items in experience. The principal responses to that tradition which McDowell considers are those of Davidson's coherentism, Evans's form of realism, and Kant; but it is Kant's famous B75 text which occupies centre stage: Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer; Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind. (Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind). I shall unfortunately say nothing of the philosophical import of McDowell's reflections on these positions, for my aim here is to focus on his account of Kant. My view is that his account is fundamentally mistaken, and I can indicate the points of disagreement in two related ways. First, as McDowell stresses, his Kant is Strawson's Kant. But, as I have argued elsewhere Strawson's Kant is not Kant, and so McDowell's Kant is not Kant either. Second, more specifically, Strawson's Kant has notoriously two sides, light and dark, insightful and monstrous, in which the dark side, the so-called ‘Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism”, cannot be eliminated, and McDowell follows Strawson in this. Indeed in Strawson's The Bounds of Sense that dark side has equal status with the more promising insights, although more recently he has modified that strong view. My claim is that this bizarre dualism, and especially the dark side which McDowell unwisely calls the “transcendental story” (MW p 41), are not present in Kant in anything like the way that Strawson and McDowell suppose.
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14

Gunnarsson, L. "Reading McDowell: On Mind and World." Philosophical Review 114, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 540–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-4-540.

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15

Morrison, Brian. "Mind, World and Language: McDowell and Kovesi." Ratio 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 293–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00192.

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16

PEACOCKE, CHRISTOPHER. "Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell." Mind C, no. 397 (1991): 123–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/c.397.123.

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17

Bird, Graham. "McDowell's Kant: Mind and World." Philosophy 71, no. 276 (April 1996): 219–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100041450.

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McDowell's Mind and World is a commentary on a traditional, dualist, epistemology which puzzles over, and offers accounts of, a fundamental division between mental, subjective items, and nonmental, objective items in experience. The principal responses to that tradition which McDowell considers are those of Davidson's coherentism, Evans's form of realism, and Kant; but it is Kant's famous B75 text which occupies centre stage:‘Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer; Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind’. (Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind).
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18

Kortum, Richard D. "Review of Mind, Value, and Reality, by John McDowell." Essays in Philosophy 5, no. 2 (2004): 521–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20045229.

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19

BOYLE, BRENDAN. "The Bildungsroman after McDowell: Mind, World, and Moral Education." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69, no. 2 (May 2011): 173–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6245.2011.01459.x.

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20

Aportone, Anselmo. ""Taking in the world". L'ereditŕ kantiana in John McDowell." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2012): 141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2012-001008.

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McDowell carries on the dialogue with Kant opened by Sellars and Strawson. He is particularly interested in Kant's idea of intuition as an impression that is already an actualization of the conceptual capacities exercised by the knowing subject in judging. It enables him to release the contemporary discussion on intentionality from the stalemate between bald naturalism and coherentism. Because of the issues raised by both philosophers and some features of their arguments, it is undoubted that Mc- Dowell belongs to the Kantian heritage and exploits some of its elements. The final part of the essay aims at showing that these have in their original context a stronger und more definite meaning than in McDowell's proposal, and that it could be what we are in need of to make the latter more accurate.
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21

Rouse, Joseph. "Mind, Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language." Inquiry 48, no. 1 (February 2005): 38–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201740510015329.

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22

Ivanov, Dmitry V. "The relation between mind and reality in the analytic philosophy of John McDowell." Philosophy Journal 11, no. 3 (2018): 20–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2018-11-3-20-32.

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23

Strong, Tom. "Review of Mind, reason, and being-in-the-world: The McDowell-Dreyfus debate." Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35, no. 2 (2015): 140–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000013.

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24

Dennis, P. "Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, edited by Joseph Schear." Mind 124, no. 494 (April 1, 2015): 683–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv018.

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25

Heras Escribano, Manuel. "Razón y experiencia." Análisis Filosófico 34, no. 2 (November 1, 2014): 203–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2014.55.

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En el siguiente artículo se expone un análisis crítico de la obra Mind, Reason and Beingin-the-world: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, editada por Josep K. Schear (2013). Primero se ofrecerá una sucinta introducción a las propuestas filosóficas de ambos autores para dar cuenta de la percepción y su relación con la racionalidad. Tras esto se evaluarán los dos argumentos de Dreyfus (la apelación al experto y el argumento de la unión) contra la tesis principal de McDowell según la cual no hay solución de continuidad entre la experiencia y la razón, con especial atención a las nociones de contenido perceptivo y acceso epistémico de la experiencia que ambos autores manejan.
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26

Urban, Charles Macmillan. "Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, edited by Joseph K. Schear." Mind 125, no. 500 (August 19, 2016): 1222–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw002.

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27

Mohr, Eric J. "Joseph Schear (ed): Mind, reason, and being-in-the-world: The McDowell–Dreyfus debate." Continental Philosophy Review 47, no. 2 (April 30, 2014): 239–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9296-y.

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28

Thomas, Alan. "McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and “Error Theory”." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4, no. 2 (May 28, 2014): 109–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-03031108.

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John McDowell has recently changed his line of response to philosophical scepticism about the external world. He now claims to be in a position to use the strategy of transcendental argumentation in order to show the falsity of the sceptic’s misrepresentation of our ordinary epistemic standpoint. Since this transcendental argument begins from a weak and widely shared assumption shared with the sceptic herself the falsity of external world scepticism is now demonstrable even to her. Building on the account of perceptual intentionality defended in the Woodbridge lectures, McDowell argues that the idea of narrow perceptual content is unavailable to anyone, including the sceptic. This argument is assessed by drawing out an analogy with parallel responses to error theories in ethics.
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29

Quante, Michael. "Reconciling Mind and World: Some Initial Considerations for Opening a Dialogue between Hegel and McDowell." Southern Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 1 (March 2002): 75–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2002.tb01890.x.

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30

Buskell, Andrew. "Joseph K. Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate." Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 2 (April 18, 2014): 423–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9364-0.

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31

Miller, Alexander. "Rule-Following, Meaning, and Primitive Normativity." Mind 128, no. 511 (December 12, 2017): 735–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx033.

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AbstractThis paper explores the prospects for using the notion of a primitive normative attitude in responding to the sceptical argument about meaning developed in chapter 2 of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It takes as its stalking-horse the response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein developed in a recent series of important works by Hannah Ginsborg. The paper concludes that Ginsborg’s attempted solution fails for a number of reasons: it depends on an inadequate response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ‘finitude’ objection to reductive dispositionalism; it erroneously rejects the idea that a speaker’s understanding of an expression guides her use; it threatens to collapse into either full-blown non-reductionism or reductive dispositionalism; and there is no motive for accepting it over forms of non-reductionism such as those developed by Barry Stroud and John McDowell.
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KIRYUSHCHENKO, VITALY. "Reasons, Language, and Tradition: The Idea of Conceptual Content in McDowell’sMind and World." Dialogue 58, no. 3 (August 13, 2018): 491–511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221731800046x.

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InMind and World,John McDowell claims that we need to steer our way between bald naturalism and rampant platonism as two ways to explain our capacity to use concepts. Performing this task requires an explanation of how concepts can be both socially charged and, at the same time, genuinely involving the world as it really is. I suggest that McDowell’s explanation is insufficient and that Wilfrid Sellars’s idea of sense impressions might be used to clarify the relationship between social practices and conceptual knowledge without incurring too much damage to the overall architectonics of McDowell’s theory.
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33

Coll Mármol, Jesús Antonio. "McDowell’s Dogmatic Empiricism." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 39, no. 116 (December 7, 2007): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2007.530.

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McDowell’s Mind and World offers an epistemological proposal that can be considered as minimally empiricist. His proposal is a notion of experience —appearings—that has a conceptualized character and can serve as a justification for our beliefs. I will argue that even though McDowell’s appearings partially solve some of the problems raised against the myth of the Given, they cannot offer a justification for our beliefs. This is so because although appearings do not fall into the dualism of scheme and content, they are the product of another dogmatic distinction that McDowell maintains: the distinction between active and passive kinds of thought.
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34

Sagoff, M. "Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World, by John Broome." Mind 123, no. 489 (January 1, 2014): 194–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu028.

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35

Howlett, Patricia, and Charles F. Howlett. "A Silent Witness for Peace: The Case of Schoolteacher Mary Stone McDowell and America at War." History of Education Quarterly 48, no. 3 (August 2008): 371–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5959.2008.00156.x.

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A 1964 television series, “Profiles in Courage,” based on the late President John F. Kennedy's Pulitzer prize-winning book, featured the life of Mary Stone McDowell, a quiet, yet strong, teacher. Within peace circles, McDowell was a well-known figure. It was not unusual to see her marching in peace demonstrations or handing out antiwar literature at street meetings in the rain, snow, sleet and hot days in the summer. It was not out of the ordinary to read her editorials urging war tax resistance and certainly not surprising to those who knew her to draw strength from her courage and convictions. Yet what captured the interest of the show's producers was the stand she took during World War I. This quiet, unassuming Phi Beta Kappa graduate from Swarthmore College, and Quaker public school teacher in New York City, became the first educator in American history to test the constitutionality of the newly enacted loyalty oaths on religious, rather than political, grounds.
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36

Thornton, Tim. "An Aesthetic Grounding for the Role of Concepts in Experience in Kant, Wittgenstein and Mcdowell." Forum Philosophicum 12, no. 2 (November 1, 2007): 227–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2007.1202.18.

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The paper begins by asking, in the context of McDowell's Mind and World, what guides empirical judgement. It then critically examines David Bell's account of the role of aesthetic judgement, or experience, in Kant and Wittgenstein, in shedding light on empirical judgement. Bell's suggestion that a Wittgensteinian account of aesthetic experience can guide the application of empirical concepts is criticised: neither the discussion of aesthetic judgement nor aesthetic experience helps underpin empirical judgement. But attention to the parallel between Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding rules and the question of how empirical concepts can be applied to particulars suggests how to dissolve the felt need for an answer. This in turn helps shed light on McDowell's conceptualist account of experience.
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Cogliandro, Giovanni. "Concepts, Images, Determination. Some remarks on the understanding of Transcendental Philosophy by McDowell and Fichte." Fichte-Studien 48 (2020): 109–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/fichte2020489.

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McDowell in Mind and World developed a post-transcendental understanding of some core philosophical puzzles of subjectivity, like consciousness, conceptual capacity and perception. One of the main assumptions in the background of his philosophical proposal is that all our possible experience has to be determined and therefore has to be acknowledged as conceptual, therefore this very experience has to be both relational and representational.After this statement of conceptual experience in the early 2000’s a debate started which still involves philosophers like Brandom, Gaskin, Wright, Heck, Stalnaker, Peacocke, Dreyfus.The discussion in the beginning was focused on the definition of the Space of Reasons, what is most lively today is the epistemological uncertainty of the possibility of perceiving imagines in a reductive view as perceptual (non-conceptual) experience. The proposal of McDowell is a quasi-Hegelian understanding of concepts. I think that is possible an alternative path, moving from a new understanding of conceptual spontaneity and of the determination in general, rooted in J. G. Fichte Sittenlehre (1812) and in the general framework of the Wissenschaftslehre (mostly the WL Nova methodo and some later expositions) in a broader and more nuanced understanding of the postkantian transcendental philosophy.
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Langsam, H. "A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism, by John Foster." Mind 121, no. 483 (July 1, 2012): 812–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs087.

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39

Rodríguez Tirado, Álvaro. "Seguir una regla: tres interpretaciones." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 18, no. 53 (December 8, 1986): 3–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1986.605.

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It is my contention that the profundity of Wittgenstein’s discussion of the problem of following a rule has not yet been fully appreciated in our philosophical environment. This is, to say the least, rather surprising, given its multitudinous connections with many other philosophical problems of the first order, especially, in the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. Saul Kripke’s latest contribution to philosophy has been a book whose title, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, deals precisely with these issues. Kripke’s discussion, brilliant and lucid as it was to be expected from the author of Naming and Necessity, has exerted an amazing influence on analytical philosophers dealing with problems as diverse as realism in semantics, the notion of ‘proof’ in mathematics, the possibility of a private language, the theory of meaning for a natural language, behaviourism in the philosophy of mind, the notion of objectivity, and many others. Notwithstanding the immense amount of resources which Kripke brought to hear in his discussion, I believe that if we follow him all the way, we end up with a feeling that the point we have reached is very different from the one Wittgenstein wanted and, indeed, argued for. If, then, my reading of Wittgenstein’s texts is on anything like the right lines, one should be a bit skeptical about Kripke’s exegesis. Two years after the publication of Kripke’s book, John McDowell wrote a splendid essay entitled ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’ in which he challenges Kripke’s interpretation and, to my mind, some of McDowell’s arguments prove to be devastating of the position endorsed by Kripke. But McDowell considers it to be absolutely essential, for his own arguments to go through, to assume what I call ‘the community view’ on the practice of following a rule and this, I think, is a mistake. In a recent book, Colin McGinn has endorsed this conclusion, and I’ve tried to make it more appealing by exploring the possibility of bringing into play a causal theory of understanding.
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Bakhurst, David. "Training, Transformation and Education." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 (May 2015): 301–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824611500003x.

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AbstractInMind and World, John McDowell concludes that human beings ‘are born mere animals’ and ‘are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents’, principally by their initiation into language. Such ‘transformational views’ of human development typically represent first-language learning as a movement from a non-rationally secured conformity with correct practice, through increasing understanding, to a state of rational mastery of correct practice. Accordingly, they tend to invoke something like Wittgenstein's concept of training to explain the first stage of this process. This essay considers the cogency of this view of learning and development. I agree with Sebastian Rödl that the idea of training (as developed, say, by Meredith Williams) is inadequate to the nature of infancy and child-parent interaction, and I draw on the work of Lev Vygotsky and Michael Tomasello to offer McDowell a richer picture, which acknowledges the child's active role in fostering the second-personal relations that underlie the possibility of language learning. Such considerations force us to revise the transformational view, but do not refute it outright as Rödl believes. I conclude by considering the relevance of McDowell's view of second nature to two striking ideas: Ian Hacking's suggestion that the development of autistic children is ‘non-Vygotskian’ and Derek Parfit's claim that persons are not human beings.
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41

Felicity Durey, Jill. "John Galsworthy's Conscience and First World War Disablement." Victoriographies 8, no. 2 (July 2018): 151–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/vic.2018.0303.

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The article traces, from a literary perspective, John Galsworthy's (1867–1933) conscience in his fictional depictions and non-fictional discussions of those damaged and disabled by World War One. It notes that, for the duration of the War, Galsworthy was tireless in his writing crusade on topics relating to the hostilities, but fell silent on these matters after the War, when he returned to his much broader range of topics. Through its references to both narratives and essays, the article demonstrates Galsworthy's strong advocacy for restoring disabled men to dignified work and self-respect, whereby they can continue to fulfil their vital masculine role in society, including their romantic life. As is shown in the article, Galsworthy believed that this restorative period could involve re-training for more challenging work than men had undertaken before the War. The article stresses Galsworthy's holistic approach to men's restoration in his constant reminder to the nation that, for this to take place, both the mind and the body need equally to be healed. While adequate resources were needed for rehabilitation requiring training establishments and technology for prosthetic limbs, often the most effective psychological restoration entailed no funds at all, especially when it encompassed therapy through women's beauty and through the human-animal bond. The article includes Galsworthy's wider focus, too, on civilian adults and children who were wounded and disabled by the War. It also compares Galsworthy's views on rehabilitation and healing with those of modern commentators, and illustrates how, for his time, some of his ideas were particularly advanced.
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42

Bowis, John. "Who's mind is it anyway?" Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale 14, no. 1 (March 2005): 39–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1121189x00001913.

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SummaryAs UK Health Minister John Bowis knew the challenges, the progress and the disasters of mental health provision and policy. He learned from service users, carers and practitioners that reality was usually different from theory. He came to believe a new structure was necessary to give patients a one-stop shop of care and treatment, that patients should be more involved in decisions that affect them and that stigma must be tackled by education and by wider understanding of services and crisis management. He now campaigns in the European Parliament and in many parts of the world for mental health to be higher on national agendas and to be based on effective and humane policies that ensure the appropriate treatment is provided and provided with dignity”Declaration of Interest: none
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43

Bhattacharjee, Jolly. "Truth is Beauty, Beauty is Truth the Philosophy of John Keats Selected Odes." SMART MOVES JOURNAL IJELLH 9, no. 4 (April 28, 2021): 160–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.24113/ijellh.v9i4.10995.

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Life can never be completely free of problems and pain. This is perhaps because no two people think alike, work alike or have similar taste. Problems and pain will be there when two persons live. So there are bounds to be differences and judgements born there of and create disharmony and conflicts. The natural inclination of human mind to get rid of pain and problems of life wanders for a different world. The romantic poet John Keats philosophically searched for such a place and wanted to escape. And escaping into the world of imagination helped him to get rid of pain and problems of life and discovers anything true is beautiful as beauty dwells in truth. Manifestation of god in all the objects of nature magnetically attracts Keats’s mind as it serves as a therapy to contemplate in the serene and isolated space he sought for. Human being and Nature are interrelated, meaning the harmonious unity of Man and Nature are interrelated as both assume qualities of the other as they born and die, ashes go into the lap of Mother Nature as the very essence of human being, the structure is made up of the elements of Nature. The serene, calm and quiet Nature provides a kind of nourishment to Keats’ mind to discover the beauty, provides him joy and it is a truth. Longing of every soul is to be away from the problems of life.
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44

Leezenberg, Michiel. "The Contract of Language: John Searle's Philosophy of Society." International Review of Pragmatics 3, no. 1 (2011): 98–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187731011x563746.

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AbstractIn Making the Social World, John Searle develops what he calls a "philosophy of society", which explores the ontological status and logical structure of institutional facts like universities and baseball games. This philosophy of society crucially depends on Searle's earlier work in the philosophy of language and mind. In this review, I discuss some aspects of Searle's theory of institutional facts as structured in terms of declaratives that are most relevant to working linguists, like the relation of language to other social institutions, the emergence of normativity in language, the articulation of (legitimate and illegitimate) power in language usage, and the question of whether there should be any restrictions on the allegedly universal human right to free speech.
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45

Hyman, John. "Is Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder?" Think 1, no. 1 (2002): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175600000130.

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In this article, John Hyman argues that beauty does not consist in mathematical perfection; that Hume was mistaken in claiming that beauty exists only in the mind; that we can discover what is really beautiful by learning to give reasons for our preferences; and that some things in the world are beautiful—probably many more than we imagine.
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46

Christou, Theodore Michael. "Raising an Athlete for Christ: Saint John Chrysostom and Education in Byzantium." Akropolis: Journal of Hellenic Studies 2 (December 31, 2018): 105–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.35296/jhs.v2i0.12.

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This article examines the homily titled Address on Vainglory, and the Right Way for Parents to Bring up their Children, concentrating upon the educational vision it expresses. The text is attributed to John Chrysostom, Christian saint and fourth century Patriarch of Constantinople. Uncertainty regarding the manuscript’s authenticity led to the exclusion of “Address on Vainglory” from most collections of John Chrysostom’s writings, which had seminal influence in a context when the church was united, and the homily has consequently received very limited attention. Chrysostom earned the epithet "The Golden Mouthed” primarily by virtue of his training in rhetoric and his ability to translate the classical sources that he read into his own, Christian, context. He argues that education must not only cultivate all the faculties of the student’s mind, but also prepare the child to live and act ethically in the world. Chrysostom reconfigures this argument using the striking imagery of an Athlete for Christ, who cultivated not only the faculties of his mind, but also exercised those of the soul.
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47

Alarcón-Hermosilla, Salvador. "World-switch and mind style in The Barracks: a cognitive approach to ideology." Journal of Literary Semantics 50, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jls-2021-2029.

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Abstract The aim of this paper is to take a close look at John McGahern’s mind style through the language of the heroine Elizabeth Reegan and other characters, in his 1963 novel The Barracks. Specifically, attention will be drawn to how the linguistic choices shape the figurative language to cast the author’s controversial views on the religion-pervaded puritan Irish society that he knew so well. This will be done from two different perspectives. One perspective is through the breast cancer afflicted heroine, who asserts herself as a free thinker and a woman of science, in a society where priests have a strong influence at all social levels, and most women settle for housekeeping. The other is also through Elizabeth, together with other minor characters, who dare question some of the basic well-established ideological assumptions, in a series of examples where the author skilfully raises two parallel dichotomies, namely, FAITH versus REASON, and DARKNESS versus LIGHT. At a linguistic level, the present analysis relies on precepts from Frame Semantics, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Cognitive Grammar. These insights prove a most useful method of approach to a narrative text while unearthing the author’s ideological world view.
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48

Webster, Robert. "Seeing Salvation: The Place of Dreams and Visions in John Wesley’s Arminian Magazine." Studies in Church History 41 (2005): 376–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0424208400000322.

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On Whitsunday, I went to bed weak in body, but happy in mind. In my sleep, I dreamed that I heard a band of Angels singing around me in a most delightful manner. On this I awoke with my heart full of love, and quite transported. O if a blind world did but feel what I then did, how would They also love and adore the God of their salvation! How would they run in the way of Wisdom, and partake of the felicities of thy chosen!
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49

Christensen, Carleton B. "The Horizonal Structure of Perceptual Experience." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 16, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 109–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01601006.

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Edmund Husserl’s account of the horizonal character of simple, sensuous perception provides a sophisticated account of perceptual intentional content which enables plausible responses to key issues in the philosophy of perception and in Heidegger interpretation. Section 2 outlines Husserl’s account of intentionality in its application to such perceptual experience. Section 3 then elaborates the notion of perceptual horizon in order to draw out, in Section 4, its implications for four issues: firstly, the relation between the object perceived and perceptual appearance (qua item “in consciousness”); secondly, the relation between the subject perceiving and perceptual appearance; thirdly, what sense of the body is inherent to perceptual experience of the horizonal kind; and fourthly, what John McDowell is getting at when he claims that traditional conceptions fail to capture how perception puts us in cognitive contact with the world. The paper concludes by using the interpretation developed to show how Husserl’s account of perceptual experience as horizonal enables one to draw out the sense and worth of what Heidegger means by worldliness and the “Da” of Dasein.
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50

Darenskiy, Vitaliy Yu. "Philosophy and Historiosophy of the Holy Saint Father John of Kronstadt." Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 102 (March 1, 2020): 104–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2020-0-1-104-116.

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The article reconstructs the integral philosophical doctrine in the heritage of Saint John of Kronstadt, which includes the doctrine of being, knowledge, man, nature and history (i.e. ontology, epistemology, anthropology, natural philosophy and historiosophy). It is shown that this doctrine is based on the hermeneutics of biblical texts and patristic tradition, and the method of this philosophy is spiritual reflection based on the acquisition of the Holy spirit and the transformation of the mind. The ontology in this philosophy is revealed through the Revelation of the creation of the world, and anthropology- the creation of man, and therefore they have the character of sacred history. Philosophy of nature has the character of the Revelations about Tri-hypostatic God showing His properties in the creation. Tri-hypostasis of the Creator defines the ontology of the human being, carrying His Image. The revelation of the End of the world sets the semantic structure of the historical process and is the paradigm for understanding any specific events.
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