Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Memory, Husserl, and Phenomenology'

La présente recherche vise à analyser l’essence de la fantaisie considérée comme un vécu intentionnel à partir de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En quel sens pouvons-nous affirmer que la fantaisie, généralement associée à la liberté et à la création, est en effet productrice ? Il nous faut remarquer que la question de la fantaisie s’inscrit parmi les problématiques qui ont contribué à la consolidation du répertoire thématique de la phénoménologie naissante. Cependant, la définition de la fantaisie à laquelle Husserl aboutit à partir de 1904/1905 ne tient pas compte de son aspect libre et productif, mais la considère comme fantaisie re-productrice. Pour arriver à une définition plus large et précise de l’essence morphologique de la fantaisie, sans abandonner la phénoménologie de Husserl, cette recherche propose les objectifs suivants. En premier lieu, montrer les explications que Husserl met à l'épreuve et pourquoi il les rejette. Parmi celles-ci, en plus des explications propres, il faut souligner celles de Brentano et de Twardowski. Deuxièmement, expliciter comment les analyses de la conscience interne du temps et du souvenir ont conduit à la définition canonique de la fantaisie en tant que modification de neutralité appliquée au souvenir. Ensuite, une critique de cette définition est effectuée. Enfin, il est proposé de surmonter les difficultés soulignées à partir d’éléments de la phénoménologie de Husserl, tels que les fonctions que la fantaisie remplit, entre autres dans l’intuition des essences, l’expérience d’autrui et l’expérience esthétique, où la fantaisie opère par la production d’analogues qui ont un effet « harmonisant » sur l’expérience
The present research is framed in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and aims to analyse the essence of phantasy considered as an intentional experience. In what sense can it be sustained that phantasy, generally associated with freedom and creation, is indeed productive? It should be noted that the question of phantasy appears among the issues that contributed to the consolidation of the thematic agenda of nascent phenomenology. However, Husserl’s definition of phantasy, which is attained in1904/05, does not take into account its free and productive aspect, but rather regards it in a re-productive way. To arrive at a broader, yet precise, definition of the morphological essence of phantasy, without leaving Husserl’s phenomenology, the following objectives are pursued. Firs, I present the possible explanations of phantasy that Husserl puts to the test (among which those of Brentano and Twardowski must be highlighted) as well as the reasons why he rejects them. Second, I explain how the analyses of the internal time consciousness and memory led to the canonical definition of phantasy as a neutrality modification applied to memory. A critique of this definition is subsequently established. Finally, I propose that those difficulties may be overcome by considering other elements of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the functions that phantasy fulfills, for instance in the intuition of essences, in the experience of others and in the aesthetic experience i.a., where phantasy operates by the producing of analogues which have a “harmonizing” effect on experience

This thesis is a study of the two major texts of Derrida on Husserl's phenomenology. Engaging in a close reading of Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (1962) and Speech and Phenomena (1967), this thesis tries to bring together, and reconstruct, under the title of speech and writing, those Husserlian questions which never stop occuping, motivating and intriguing Derrida's thought, from his student studies and the Introduction to Rogues (2003) These were the questions or themes of origin and of historicity, of scientific objectivity and truth, of reason and responsibility, as well as of the living present, of living speech, of egological subjectivity and the alter ego. The question that this thesis raises is the following: why are these Husserlian themes of historicity, of the idea of the infinite task, of the living speech, etc., not simply the first objects or targets, subsequently to be abandoned, of Derridean deconstruction? Why is deconstruction, the event, the advent or invention of deconstruction, irreducible to some methodical or theoretical procedure, or to an operation of problematization or delegitimation of transcendental questioning? As we show in the first part of the thesis, these questions were investigated and developed by Husserl as a "responsible" response to the Crisis of the European sciences and humanity. Our investigation into Husserl's teleological discourse of history and responsibility shows that this crisis, which is anything but an empirical accident, threatens the very thing that Husserl wants to keep safe and sound (or to immunize, as Derrida writes in Rogues): the transcendental freedom of an egological subjectivity. For Husserl the possibility of crisis (of the subject) remains linked with the moment of truth, i.e., with the production and tradition of scientific objectitivities, and in fact has an essential link to writing. Husserl's teleological determination of writing as phonetic writing is an attempt to limit, tame and economize the essential ambiguity of writing: it threatens with passivity, forgetfulness and irresponsibility the very thing that makes possible, i.e., the transcendental and ideal community of a we-human-subjects- investigators-responsible-for-the-history-of-truth/reason. In the second part of the thesis, following Derrida's reading of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena, in Form and Meaning, Signature Event Context, and Eating Well, we show that Husserl's phenomenology of language and of phone is also a great philosophy of the transcendental subject. The essential and phenomenological distinctions between nonlinguistic and linguistic signs, sense and meaning, expression and indication, which are at the centre of Husserl's doctrine of signification, have also a teleological character: they are destined to define the limit, the arche and telos of language, as human language or human (i.e., phonetic) writing. In our reading we give great emphasis to Derrida's phenomenological analysis and deconstruction of this unique experience of auto-affection, the experience of hearing oneself speak. This is the experience of the human subject, the experience of a free, voluntary, auto-affecting egological subjectivity conscious of its voice, its speech and its humanity. Denying the possibility of phonic auto-affection of the human subject, in favour of the hetero-affection of writing was never the point of Derridean deconstruction. Deconstruction, the concept of writing or arche-writing, the graphics of differance, of iterability, are not imposed from the outside on Husserl's discourse on the human subject, the zoon logon echon. Rather, phenomenology itself interrupts or deconstructs itself, according to Derrida, as soon as it addresses the question of time and of the other, of the alter ego. Deconstruction was never only a thcoretico-philosophical, or academic affair. In our conclusion, we argue for the right of deconstruction, i.e., the right or demand to deconstruction. This right or demand to deconstruction, to ask questions about truth, consciousness, language, responsibility and so forth - so many powers, capacities or possibilities of which the animal is said to be deprived and poor - and the right or demand to do so performatively, by writing, by transforming and producing new analyses, new events and texts, new events of thought in the history of the concepts of man, of truth, of the subject and of human rights, is according to Derrida, an ethical and political demand.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney
The argument of this dissertation is that futurity is a central theme of phenomenology, because it is central to a proper understanding of two pillars of the phenomenological method, namely, constituting consciousness and intentionality. The centrality of futurity to phenomenology first manifests itself in all three levels of Husserl's constituting consciousness via the three-fold distinction within futurity between protention, expectation, and anticipation. This analysis of futurity within constituting consciousness reveals that the object of futurity must bear a necessary relation to our horizons of constitution, but an analysis of anticipation itself suggests that futurity cannot be solely contained within those horizons. In turning to that which opens the subject to what is beyond its own horizons of constitution, we see that futurity enables Levinas to insert a level of passive-ication into intentionality, and thereby into ethics and constituting consciousness as well. The consequences of this for phenomenology manifest themselves most clearly in Derrida's parallel analyses of futurity (via the notions of differance and the messianic) and the promise. Through this latter we see the fundamental necessity of both constituting consciousness and intentionality for the phenomenological subject. The dissertation concludes with a brief examination of how these conclusions might apply to the philosophy of religion via an analysis of the question of the possibility or impossibility of the divine
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

This Ph.D. thesis is, in large part, a deepening of my M. A. dissertation, entitled: "Différance Beyond Phenomenological Reduction (Epoché)?" - an edited version of which was published in The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1989. The M. A. dissertation explores the development of the various phases of the movement of epoché in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and its relevance for Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. The analyses not only attend to the need for an effective propaedeutic to an understanding of phenomenology as method, they also serve to demystify the logics of Derridean non-teleological strategy by explaining the sense of such a manoeuvre - as a kind of maieutic response to the Husserlian project - which operates within the horizon of a radical epoché. According to this orientation, Derrida's deconstruction of phenomenology is permitted to open itself up to a phenomenology of deconstruction. This doctoral thesis develops these analyses and utilizes a form of critique that points the way to the possibility of a phenomenological-deconstruction of the limits of Derrida's project of deconstruction through the themes of epoché, play, dialogue, spacing, and temporalization. In order to trace the resources from which he draws throughout the early development of deconstruction, this study confines itself to a discussion on the texts published between 1962 and 1968. This subjection of deconstruction to a historical de-sedimentation of its motivational, methodological, theoretical, and strategic moments, involves a certain kind of transformational return to the spacing between phenomenology and deconstruction that urgently puts into question the alleged supercession of phenomenology by deconstruction. The expression of such a 'beyond' is already deeply sedimented in contemporary deconstructive writing to the point at which it is now rarely even noticed, let alone thematized and brought into question. This conviction (regarding the transgression of phenomenology by deconstruction) traces itself out in the form of an attitude to reading which is, in fact and in principle, counter to D6rrida's own call for care. The meaning and limits of the very terms, transgression, beyond, supercession, etc., must be continually subjected to deconstruction. The notions of play, dissemination and supplementarity - with the concomitant sense of transformational repetition that defines them - do not function as a mere excuse for lack of scholarly rigour. Deconstruction is a movement of critical return, which must insert itself (with a sense of irony) within the margins and intersections of that which gives itself up to this practice of textual unbuilding. The strategy of play encourages the structural matrix of that with which it is engaged to turn in upon itself, exposing its limits and fissures in a kind of textual analogue to a psychoanalysis. To be sure, this does involve a certain kind of violence -a violation of the ( system's' own sense of propriety (what is proper [propre] and closest to itself) -but in no sense is this an anarchical celebration of pure destruction. We speak rather of irony, parody, satire, metaphor, double-reading and other tactical devices, which permit a reorganization of the deconstructed's (textual analysand's) self-relation and the possibility of playful speculation. Such play demands care and vigilance in regard to the appropriation of the logics of the system with which it is in a relation of negotiation. In order to play well, one must learn the game-rules.

In a famous passage in Ideas I, Husserl claims that the pure consciousness is to be understood as independent of anything apart from itself in order to constitute itself, and that it therefore is able exist without a world at all. This notion seems to be contradicted in many of Husserl’s other works as well as stand in conflict with the core of phenomenology itself as a descriptive science of intentional consciousness. Three years before the publication of Ideas I, Husserl held a series of lectures that were later published with the title The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Here, in stark contrast to Ideas I, the inquiry culminates in stepping beyond the subject as self-given and immanent by instead focusing on intersbjectivity and phenomenological time-consciousness. This essay sets out to examine the relation between the transcendental subject in these two works. It is argued that, while the phenomenological epoché indeed establishes a subject that is prior to the world in the sense that it does not need to suppose the world to guarantee its own existence, Husserl’s philosophical project in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology shows the importance of going beyond such an immanent subject to uncover the full phenomenological field.

A pesquisa pretende investigar o significado e a origem da influência de Carl Stumpf na terceira investigação lógica intitulada Sobre a teoria dos todos e das partes(Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen), publicada em 1901, buscando relacioná-la ao desenvolvimento anterior do pensamento de Husserl. Serão abordados o surgimento dos conceitos de auto-suficiência (Selbständigkeit) e não auto-suficiência (Unselbständigkeit) no contexto do problema da origem da representação de espaço e da obra de Stumpf referida ao tema; a interpretação de Husserl destes conceitos; e seu papel sistemático do ponto de vista da evolução da filosofia husserliana em seu período inicial
This research intends to investigate the meaning and origin of the influence of Carl Stumpf on the third logical investigation, entitled On the theory of Wholes and Parts(Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen), published in 1901, trying to relate it do the former development of Husserls thought. It will be taken into account the birth of the concepts of independence (Selbständigkeit) and dependence (Unselbständigkeit) in the context of the problem of the origin of the representation of space and Stumpfs work related to this theme; the interpretation Husserl gives to these concepts; and their systematic role from the point of view of the evolution of the husserlian philosophy on its initial period

Le présent travail propose de caractériser le projet philosophique de Husserl et de Heidegger comme une phénoménologie de la possibilité. Il s’agit, ce faisant, de démontrer qu’il existe un concept phénoménologique de possibilité, qui ne se confond ni avec le concept métaphysique ni avec le concept modal, et de reconstruire ce concept à l’aide de Husserl et de Heidegger. Il apparaît ainsi que la phénoménologie, non seulement renverse le primat traditionnel de l’effectif sur le possible, mais accomplit le dépassement de leur opposition statique pour mettre au jour leur co-appartenance dynamique. Si donc, pour la phénoménologie, « plus haut que l’effectivité se tient la possibilité », c’est pour autant qu’elle découvre l’entrelacement de l’effectif et du possible dans le réel
While describing Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophical project as a phenomenology of possibility, we intend to prove the existence of a phenomenological concept of possibility that cannot be reduced to a metaphysical or a mere modal concept. For phenomenology not only inverts the traditional primacy of effectivity on possibility, but also, and most importantly, overcomes the static opposition of the two by bringing to light the fact that they dynamically belong together. Therefore, phenomenology has the right to assert that « higher than effectivity stands possibility » insofar it discovers their constant and irreducible intertwining within reality

Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens
In this dissertation, I develop an engaged understanding of objectivity, or good knowledge practices. I argue that for knowledge practices to be good, they must both be truth-conducive and engaged, that is, explicitly implicated in the critical appraisal of background values and assumptions. I pursue this argument in six stages. First, I consider work in epistemology that countenances a place for values in objectivity. I conclude from this that truth-conduciveness is not sufficient for objectivity, and that a social approach to knowledge is called for. Second, I consider standpoint theory, a prominent feminist approach to objectivity. This allows me to show the possible insights available to marginalized perspectives, while indicating that this will be a component of rather than itself offering an account of objectivity. Third, I consider a more comprehensive approach in Helen Longino's critical contextual empiricism, which locates objectivity in the social features of inquiry. Her approach is promising, but requires the insights of early phenomenology in order to develop that potential. I develop the phenomenological framework in Chapter 4, where I consider Husserlian phenomenology. Fifth, I bring the insights of phenomenology to the challenges presented by critical contextual empiricism, and develop my positive view, critical phenomenological objectivity. On this view, inquiry is objective when individuals and communities foster critical perspectives, seek transformative epistemic experiences, build coalitions, foster diversity, and pursue empirical adequacy. In the final chapter, I consider a case study that enables me to defend the merit and warrant of these features of objectivity
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

\"As Investigações lógicas\", de Edmund Husserl, têm sua origem na busca por uma nova fundamentação para a lógica. Tal objetivo resulta, em grande parte, de insatisfações em relação à compreensão da lógica como ramificação da psicologia, que, para Husserl, culminaria em contradição. Em oposição a essa teoria, o autor argumenta em prol de uma lógica verdadeira em si, possível apenas a partir de uma compreensão da verdade como ideia, independente de toda facticidade empírica. Husserl recusa-se, contudo, a subscrever à noção de uma idealidade hipostatizada, parte de uma realidade própria, separada do mundo sensível. Como é possível, então, sustentar simultaneamente essas duas posições? Para responder a essa questão e clarificar a relação entre as esferas do real e do ideal na obra, examinarei o texto das Investigações dando especial atenção ao lugar ocupado pela idealidade. Mostrarei, assim, que a compreensão husserliana de conceitos como expressão, ato mental e intencionalidade permite ao autor atribuir uma posição peculiar aos objetos ideais, que existem como objetos legítimos, sem situá-los num domínio totalmente separado daquele dos objetos da sensibilidade.
Edmund Husserl\'s \"Logical Investigations\" have their starting point in the search for a new foundation for Logic. This goal springs to a great extent from dissatisfactions regarding the prevailing theory of Logic as a branch of Psychology, which results, to the author, in blatant contradiction. Opposing this theory, Husserl argues for a logical science that is true in itself, possible only when truth is taken as an idea, free from all empirical facticity. At the same time, the author refuses to subscribe to the idea of a hypostatized ideality, pertaining to its own realm, separate from the world of sensibility. How is it possible, then, to concurrently support these two positions? To answer this question and clarify the relationship between the spheres of real and ideal, we will delve into the Logical Investigations with an eye to the role fulfilled by ideality in their pages. In doing this, I will show that Husserl\'s understanding of concepts such as expression, act and intentionality allow him to assign a special role to ideal objects, which exist as legitimate objects, without consigning them to a realm completely foreign to that of the objects of sensory perception.

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This research aims to present a reading of the notion of intersubjectivity based on the Cartesian Meditations work of Edmund Husserl. For this, will be demonstrated, how, from of solipsism to the formation of a Intermonadologic universal community, Husserl offers a proposal for theoretical reasoning about knowledge of the alter ego, based on the status of phenomenology as transcendental idealism. At first moment, will be done an approach of the major concepts of phenomenology contained in the work, and that arise in the first meditations until the theoretical core of the question: the Fifth Meditation. In the intermediate section will be prioritized the description of the donation modes of the alter ego to ego through the constitutive dynamic. Finally, will be explained the formation of communities of higher grade as a result of the unity of monadic egos and response at the problem of intersubjectivity.
A presente pesquisa visa apresentar uma leitura da noção de intersubjetividade com base na obra Meditações Cartesianas, de Edmund Husserl. Para tanto, será demonstrado como, a partir do solipsismo à formação de uma comunidade universal Intermonadológica, Husserl oferece uma proposta de fundamentação teórica acerca do conhecimento do alter ego, com base no estatuto da fenomenologia enquanto idealismo transcendental. Num primeiro momento, será feita uma abordagem dos principais conceitos da fenomenologia contidos na obra, e que surgem no itinerário correspondente às quatro primeiras meditações, até o cerne teórico acerca do tema: a Quinta Meditação. No capítulo intermediário será priorizada a descrição acerca dos modos de doação do alter ego para o ego em meio à dinâmica constitutiva. Por fim, explicitar-se-á a formação das comunidades de grau superior como resultado da unidade dos egos monádicos e resposta ao problema da intersubjetividade.

Parmi les nombreuses questions que soulève la phénoménologie husserlienne une concerne en particulier la relation complexe avec la psychologie. À cet égard, la notion de réduction psychologique peut offrir une clé de lecture féconde pour rendre compte de cette complexité en clarifiant la connexion entre les différents niveaux dans lesquels se déroule l'analyse phénoménologique. Dans cette perspective, il faut retracer le parcours du projet philosophique husserlienne depuis le début jusqu'à la fin : le premier chapitre porte donc sur le rapport de Husserl à Brentano et Stumpf, ses maîtres, ainsi que sur sa confrontation avec Lipps, Dilthey et Natorp, ses interlocuteurs privilégiés dans le cadre de la psychologie au début du XXème siècle. Ensuite, il faut montrer que Husserl élabore sa propre phénoménologie comme réalisation véritable de la philosophie et, corrélativement, comme science du fondement de toutes les sciences, y compris de la psychologie : c'est dans cette optique que s'inscrit le projet husserlien d'une psychologie “phénoménologique”, auquel est consacré le deuxième chapitre. Cette psychologie pure intentionnelle a la double fonction de réformer la psychologie traditionnelle et de jouer le rôle d'intermédiaire et de facilitateur pour assurer le bon déroulement de la phénoménologie transcendantale. Il s'agit d'une question de méthode que le troisième chapitre vise à résoudre en prenant comme fil conducteur la réduction psychologique : revenir sur les étapes de l'élaboration de la réduction (phénoménologique-)psychologique permet d'interpréter correctement l'évolution du rapport entre phénoménologie et psychologie tout en préservant l'unité et la cohérence intime de la pensée de Husserl. Le quatrième chapitre procède enfin à enrayer les nombreux malentendus qui sont à l'origine des paradoxes relatifs aux opérations méthodiques d'épochè et de réduction qui caractérisent la phénoménologie husserlienne. Cette clarification ouvre des perspectives de recherche bien fondées au niveau philosophique comme au niveau psychologique
Among the many questions raised by Husserl's phenomenology, one concerns in particular the complex relationship with psychology. In this regard, the concept of psychological reduction can offer a key to successful understanding of this complexity by clarifying the connection between the different levels phenomenological analysis consists of. It is in this perspective that we need to look at Husserl's philosophical project as a whole in order to retrace his steps from beginning to end : the first chapter is therefore focused on Husserl's connection with Brentano and Stumpf, his masters, as well as with his confrontation with Lipps, Dilthey and Natorp, his privileged dialogue partners in the framework of early twentieth-century psychology. Then, it must be shown that Husserl develops his own phenomenology as genuine fulfillment of the idea of philosophy and, correlatively, as truly foundational science compared to all the other sciences, including psychology. Husserl's project of a “phenomenological” psychology, to which the second chapter is devoted, arises exactly in this context. Phenomenological psychology as pure intentional psychology has the twofold task of reforming traditional psychology and playing the role both of mediator and facilitator for ensuring a phenomenological inquiry properly performed in transcendental terms. This is a matter of method that the third chapter intends to resolve by focusing on psychological reduction : presenting all the different making levels of (phenomenological)- psychological reduction to allow a proper interpretation of the development of the relation between phenomenology and psychology in Husserl, without affecting the coherence and unity of his philosophical purpose, this is the main aim of the current study. The fourth chapter deals, finally, with the eradication of the misunderstandings which cause paradoxes concerning Husserl's phenomenological method of epoché and reduction, even at the level of psychological phenomenology. This clarification opens up new research prospects both in philosophy and in psychology

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl
In my dissertation I aim to reconstruct the basic principles of Heidegger’s fledgling attempt at a phenomenology of religion in his 1920 and 1921 courses on St. Paul and St. Augustine. In order to understand the parameters and the stakes of that project I consider it light of Husserlian phenomenology as well as broader German trends in “scientific” [Wissenschaftliche] philosophy, theology, and history of religions. The measure of Heidegger’s success is his account of “formal indication,” which endeavors to provide a reflective (i.e. philosophical) articulation of life without privileging a particular theoretical standpoint. This attempt leads him to reconceive phenomenology as a hermeneutics of factical life and to shift his emphasis from a phenomenology of religious consciousness to a phenomenology of religious life. What distinguishes this account is its focus on the “motivated” or “enacted” nature of meaning from out of life. After reconstructing and elaborating Heidegger’s account I note a problematic tendency toward over-formalization that focuses exclusively on the enactment sense (Vollzugsinn) at the expense of the content sense (Gehaltsinn). I enlist the aid of Kierkegaard, whom Heidegger is reading carefully at this point in time, to show why a focus on the appropriative nature of meaning does not require one to ignore its content. I conclude by suggesting some ways that a modified version of Heidegger’s formally indicative philosophy of religion still may prove useful to us today
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms.

Le projet de cette thèse est d’examiner ce que nous avons appelé le problème du monde, en entendant par là le problème du mode d’apparition d’une totalité intotalisable qui ne se réduit pas à la somme de ce qui apparaît, et le problème du mode d’être de celui qui appartient au monde et qui est également celui pour lequel le monde comme totalité apparaît. Le problème a été examiné dans le cadre de deux philosophies privilégiées : la philosophie kantienne et la phénoménologie husserlienne. La thématique de l’homme comme habitant du monde apparaît au croisement de trois grandes entreprises kantiennes : l’élaboration d’une épistémologie de la géographie physique en tant qu’elle comporte nécessairement un examen des modalités de l’existence de l’homme sur Terre ; le projet d’une réfutation de l’idéalisme, qui conduit à définir l’homme par son appartenance au monde ; la constitution d’une anthropologie pragmatique qui, tout en unifiant les thématiques précédentes les élargit en les intégrant dans la perspective de la destination pratique de l’homme auquel incombe la tâche de réaliser les conditions de son existence mondaine d’agent moral. Chez Husserl, le mode d’apparition du monde comme totalité est expressément élucidé dans le cadre de la phénoménologie de la perception au moyen de la doctrine de l’intentionnalité horizontale, au terme d’un assez long parcours que nous nous efforçons de reconstituer. En revanche, le mode d’être de celui pour lequel le monde apparaît en tant que tel ne fait l’objet de sa part que d’analyses programmatiques, auxquelles nous proposons de donner un prolongement dans la perspective d’une philosophie de l’environnement
The objective of this study is to inquire into what has been called the problem of the world, i.e. the problem of the mode of apparition of an intotalisable totality which cannot be reduced to the addition of what appears, and the problem of the mode of being of the subject who belongs to the world and to whom the world as totality appears. This problem has been examined with reference to two privileged philosophies : Kant’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. The theme of the inhabitant of the world appears at the meeting-point of three major Kantian undertakings, which are (1) the elaboration of an epistemology of geographical physics that necessarily contains an examination of the modalities of existence of man on Earth ; (2) the project of refuting idealism, which leads to defining man in his belonging to the world ; (3) the constitution of a pragmatic anthropology which, while unifying the foregoing topics, broadens them by integrating them into the perspective of the practical destination of man, upon whom falls the task of realising the conditions of his worldly existence as moral agent. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the concept of horizontal intentionality, developed in the phenomenology of perception, helps to explain the mode of apparition of the world as totality, at the end of a long run of thought which we try to reconstitute from the beginning. By contrast, the mode of being of the subject to whom the world as such appears is only programmatically examined in Husserl’s phenomenology. Our study seeks to give a prolongation to Husserl’s insights on this topic, in the direction of an environmental philosophy

This project involves a sustained investigation into the sense of the enemy. Chapter one begins by focusing on a common understanding of the enemy found within our homeworld: the political enemy. As will become clear, this mode of encountering the enemy has become the dominant framework for understanding the enemy in our liberal-democratic home. Our task at this point is to identify the political elements from which our mode of understanding the enemy emerges. Once this dominant understanding has been developed, I will treat it as a clue for a fuller investigation into the sense of the enemy. In chapter two, we see that even positions critical of liberal-democratic thought tend to occupy a similar political understanding of the enemy. Working with the writings of Carl Schmitt, we observe how even his critical posture towards the liberal-democratic understanding of the enemy is itself operating within a similar articulation of the enemy. I argue that Schmitt's articulation is similar to the liberal-democratic articulation in that they are both modern in nature. The task of the third chapter is to understand the problematic aspects of the modern understanding of our world so as to clear the way for a fuller understanding of the enemy. This is followed by the fourth chapter that is devoted to finding a way to think outside of the modern liberal-democratic model of politics that regulates our homeworld understanding of the enemy. In so doing, chapters three and four help us find an opening into a more essential structure organizing the sense of the enemy. Once this goal is accomplished, the final chapter investigates the way we encounter the enemy within generative and intersubjective lived experience.

David Lewin, in his 1986 article “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” offers a promising methodological approach for the analysis of tonal music from a phenomenological perspective. Lewin’s phenomenological method has a propensity to render seemingly contradictory readings in such a way that their respective validities can be preserved by articulating them within differentiated contexts. Expanding upon Lewin’s phenomenological work with analyzing tonal music, I propose that a phenomenological investigation of an atonal song, Webern op. 3, no. 1, from within a variety of differentiated contexts can shed light upon what it means to perceive a piece of music as being “not in a key.” This thesis will open with an introduction to Lewin’s phenomenological work and the writings of Edmund Husserl and Izchak Miller that Lewin used as a point of departure. The analysis of Webern op. 3, no. 1, that follows will regard the voice and piano parts as differentiated musical contexts in order to investigate the interaction between these contexts as they generally undermine the perception of tonality in the song. Finally, the notion of a “musical context” as an organizing factor of musical perception will be expanded to include the different analytical approaches of Olli Väisälä and Elmar Budde as they interact to reveal contrasting aspects of the song’s multivalent structure.

El tema del pluralismo”, frecuentemente abordado desde la sola perspectiva de los retos éticos, políticos y culturales que la era de la globalización plantea a las comunidades humanas en todo el orbe, nos enfrenta a profundos dilemas racionales sobre los que ha reflexionado la humanidad desde la aurora de la filosofía griega. El texto se refiere a dos de ellos: a la relación, por un lado, entre unidad y multiplicidad; y, por el otro, entre semejanza” y otredad”, a saber, entre identidad” y diferencia”. Sin su reconocimiento, colapsaría la posibilidad misma del pensamiento teórico, de las reglas prácticas y de la valoración ética y estética. El texto reconsidera esta antigua tensión a un nivel menos abstracto, proponiendo plantear algunos problemas en torno a la diferencia” y la otredad” desde la perspectiva de la teoría husserliana de la intersubjetividad cultural y social, a saber, de los problemas superiores de la comunidad intermonádica.---Difference and Otherness from Husserl’s Phenomenology”. The issue of pluralism”, often approached exclusively from the perspective of ethical, political, and cultural challenges that the era of globalization lays at the door of human communities all over the world, faces us in fact with deep rational dilemmas upon which humanity has reflected since the dawn of Greek philosophy. The A. refers to two of them: the relationship, on the one side, between unity and multiplicity; and, on the other, between sameness” and otherness”, namely, between identity” and difference”. Without their recognition, the possibility itself of theoretical thought, practical rules, and ethical or esthetical valuation would collapse. This paper reconsiders this ancient tension on a less abstract level, proposing to lay down some problems on difference” and otherness” from the perspective of Husserl’s theory of cultural and social intersubjectivity, namely, of the higher problems of intermonadic community.

La philosophie de Husserl est guidée par la volonté d'atteindre une connaissance objective du monde. La description de l'expérience de la conscience qu'elle propose porte en effet d'abord sur l'expérience des vécus par lesquels nous prenons connaissance du monde et sur les différences qu'il existe entre une connaissance authentique et une simple présomption, une croyance ou une illusion. Mais cette priorité de la connaissance objective dans l'ordre de la méthode ne doit pas occulter l'antériorité, dans l'ordre réel, de l'expérience non-conceptuelle et inobjective des biens. En effet, le monde se donne à nous d'abord comme un monde de biens et comme la manifestation sensible de certaines valeurs. Nous voyons de beaux objets, nous trouvons l'espace utile ou pratique, nous sommes attirés par un bruit, gênés par une lumière, etc. Comment concilier ces deux exigences, celle de la méthode et celle de l'expérience ? Cette question porte sur les conditions de possibilité de la phénoménologie elle-même, puisque cette méthode, pour intégrer le nouveau genre de problèmes que posent les valeurs, dans l'ordre esthétique ou éthique, doit s'amender en permanence. Les valeurs touchent en effet aux limites de la description des actes objectivants, car elles relèvent d'une dimension qui n'est pas assimilable à celle de la nature objective des choses. Les valeurs éthiques, plus précisément, touchent aux limites de l'exigence phénoménologique de l'unité de la raison et du strict parallélisme entre les différents types d'actes correspondant aux divers registres de l'expérience (théorique, axiologique et pratique). Ainsi, l'injustice ou la vertu ne se donnent pas à la manière dont se donnent les choses dans la perception sensible et ne sauraient faire l'objet d'une « constitution intentionnelle » depuis les prestations subjectives. Le sens d'une valeur ne dépasse-t-il pas toujours et par principe les possibilités constitutives du sujet ? En d'autres termes, peut-on penser les valeurs éthiques comme des « analoga » des propriétés empiriques des objets, dont il faudrait rendre compte et qu'il faudrait parvenir à connaître de manière objective, ou bien n'y a-t-il pas là un ordre qui échappe à la description, voire au rêve husserlien d'une science de tous les phénomènes et d'une description pure de tous les types d'expérience ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous procédons en deux temps. Le premier s'interroge sur les conditions de possibilité d'une théorie des valeurs élaborée au fil de la méthode phénoménologique, c'est-à-dire au moyen d'un double réquisit – analogique et transcendantal. Le second montre comment la compréhension du sens des valeurs éthiques implique des glissements et des réélaborations de cette méthode qui ont pour fonction de révéler, à la racine des actes d'évaluation et de volition qui se rapportent aux valeurs, la vie et l'œuvre du sujet éthique
Husserl's philosophy is an attempt to obtain objective knowledge on the world, which offers a description of the cognitive consciousness, in order to distinguish a presumptive or an illusory belief and an authentic knowledge. However, such a methodological precedence of the objective knowledge should not hide the actual priority of a non-objective and pre-predicative experience of the world. Indeed, the world first appears to us as a practical and valuable world. We can see beautiful objects, useful tools, pleasant landscapes. One is drawn by a sound or disturbed by a light. How are these two points of view to be reconciled? May we conciliate the methodological priority of theoretical consciousness and the empirical precedence of values and goods? This question deals with the possibility of phenomenology itself, because this philosophical method has to transform itself in order to take into account the idiosyncratic kinds of problems that raise the experience of values. Values reach the limits of the “objectifying consciousness's” possibilities. Because they do not belong to the realm of nature, values are not one of the empirical properties of things. More precisely, ethical values query the need of unity in Reason and the need of a strict parallelism between different intentional acts. May injustice or virtue appear as do so colours or shapes in the sensible world? Can these values be intentionally constituted? Does the meaning of values ever exceed the constitutive capabilities in the subject? In order to answer these questions, two fields shall be developed. The first one questions the possibility of a value theory, which is brought by the phenomenological method, that is to say, through a demand of analogy and a demand of transcendental constitution. The second one indicates how the understanding of ethical values implies some shifting and new elaborations in the methodology itself, in order to show, behind the rationality of emotional and volitional acts, the life and work of the ethical subject

A preliminary overview of Husserl reading Kant shows that both thinkers represent two essentially different types of philosophies in their methods and reach. The judgement made by Husserl about Kant allows to state that we are facing two different privileged intuitions. Nevertheless, it also allows to state a family resemblance”–if not in their styles and methodology– in certain ground convictions regarding philosophy and reason’s finite nature. This paper approaches, from a Husserlian perspective, the relationship between experience and judgment” –proper to a Transcendental Theory of Elements”– and in that between science and philosophy” –corresponding to a Transcendental Theory of Method”. Furthermore, it will approach the distinction between natural and transcendental-phenomenological attitudes that allow Husserl to introduce two levels of philosophical interrogation and two types of philosophical anthropologies, corresponding to the splitting of the ego – a pure constitutive ego and a constituted one. This last will lead to the genetic problem of the ego’s self-constitution from the deepest strata of passive instinctive life (unconscious and irrational) towards rational life in a teleological ascending movement that enacts the Kantian problem of reason’s finitude. Despite of the incorporation that Husserl makes of a teleology of Leibnizian type that resolves the Kantian hiatus between sensible and intelligible world, the Kant connoisseurs will recognize his tracks in the configuration of the Husserlian trascendental phenomenology.
Una revisión preliminar de la lectura que hace Husserl de Kant muestra que ambos pensadores representan dos tipos de filosofía esencialmente distintas en sus métodos y alcances. El juicio que hace Husserl sobre Kant permite constatar que estamos ante distintas intuiciones privilegiadas. Empero, también permite constatar un aire de familia” –si no en los estilos y la metodología– en ciertas convicciones de fondo respecto de la filosofía y la naturaleza finita de la razón. En este trabajo se aborda, desde la perspectiva husserliana, la relación entre experiencia y juicio” –propia de una teoría trascendental de los elementos” –y entre ciencia y filosofía” –correspondiente a una teoría trascendental del método.”Asimismo, se hará ver la distinción entre las actitudes natural y fenomenológica-trascendental que permite a Husserl introducir dos niveles de interrogaciónfilosófica, y dos tipos de antropologías filosóficas, correspondientes al desdoblamientodel yo– un yo puro constituyente y otro constituido. Esto último conducirá al problema genético de la auto-constitución del yo desde lo más profundo dela vida instintiva pasiva (inconsciente e irracional) hasta la vida racional en un movimiento de ascenso teleológico, que da lugar al replanteamiento del problema kantiano de la finitud de la razón. A pesar de que Husserl incorpora una teleología de tipo leibniziano que resuelve el hiato kantiano entre mundo sensible e inteligible, los conocedores de Kant podrán reconocer sus huellas en la configuración de la fenomenología trascendental husserliana.

Cette thèse a pour point de départ l’évolution de la conception husserlienne de l’imagination, ouvrant la voie à une phénoménologie du monde de la fiction théâtrale. En 1918, Husserl décrit l’expérience du spectateur au théâtre comme quasi expérience : regardant le jeu des acteurs, le spectateur fait l’expérience de quelque chose sans être dans l’attitude d’expérience, dans une « imagination perceptive ». Sur scène, l’acteur ne représente pas à la manière d’un portrait: sujet agissant et masque, il est une présence vivante, impossible à distinguer du personnage qu’il incarne. L’expérience du spectateur et celle de l’acteur sont interdépendantes. Cette dualité de points de vue m’a conduit à mener une double enquête : j’ai tâché d’éclairer l’une par l’autre la théorie husserlienne de l’imagination et l’expérience théâtrale dont témoignent les formateurs d’acteurs et les professionnels de la scène. La première partie de la thèse reconstitue la généalogie de la quasi expérience de phantasia chez Husserl, en fusionnant deux thématiques disjointes au départ: 1) l’imagination comme phantasia et conscience d’image et 2) l’expérience perceptive comme synthèse continue d’actes. Prenant appui sur l’acquis de ces analyses, la seconde partie apporte des compléments psychologiques et historiques concernant l’évolution de la formation de l’acteur, du Paradoxe du comédien du XVIIIe siècle jusqu’à nos jours. « Ouvriers de l’imagination » selon l’expression de Sartre, les acteurs agissent en leur nom propre et en même temps pour leurs personnages. Le jeu dramatique fait exister la fiction théâtrale pour le spectateur, impliquant chez l’acteur une double conscience et une continuité spécifique d’attention. J’ai proposé un traitement phénoménologique de l’intrication entre les deux plans, imaginaire et réel, fictif et effectif. L’enquête menée dans la thèse a ainsi abouti à une caractérisation phénoménologique de la représentation théâtrale : résultat de la mise en cohérence des événements vraisemblables, le monde représenté sur scène est pourvu d’une existence propre. Le jeu théâtral a la force d’ouvrir aux acteurs et aux spectateurs les possibilités imaginaires d’autres mondes, dont ils déploient les possibilités de sens
Pas de résumé anglais

Doctor of Philosophy(PhD)
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is most well known as a matematician, or a logician, and then famed a the initiator of a phenomenological movement. He has been accused of promoting transcendental indealism to the point of solipsism. His focus on pure consciousness has been received as a method which operates above its historical context and straight to the 'seeing essences.' This is partly because of his problematic wording in his earlier writings. However, his last published (yet unfinished) work, The Crisis of European Sciences (Belgrade, 1936), is certainly a very different introduction to his phenomenology. In this publication he struggles with the issue of Life-world, the world we live in, before it gets to be described abstractly, in a scientific way. One aspect of our experience in this Life-world is our consciousness of internal time (not the clock-time, not even a simple measuring of duration). This investigation into the consciousness of internal time, impinges his definition of pure consciousness. Consciousness is embedded in internal-time-consciousness. Consciousness cannot operate "outside" time. In this line of thinking Husserl almost "by accident" came to formulate his philosophy of history, for which is so far much less known. Husserl's 'Philosophy of History' is his last contribution as a philosopher who had failed to systematize his teaching, as in his Erste Philosophie mss. of 1923-'24., and again in Cartesianische Meditationen, mss. 1929. which he has kept revising and ultimately dropping. Just as well in the latter case, since tempora mutantur and nos mutamus in illis, and so, as I will contend, his new conderns with history emerged. This is my thesis presented here, and it is my own original research, that Hussel's philsosphy of history is not only worthy of reconstruction but a very significant aspect of his mature phenomenology.

Cette thèse vise à reconstituer la théorie de l'espace développée par Husserl dans les manuscrits des premières années quatre-vingt-dix qui composent le Livre de l'espace. On en exposera les thématiques principales et identifiera les influences exercées sur la pensée de Husserl durant sa formation philosophique, avec une attention particulière en ce qui concerne les aspects mathématiques et scientifiques du problème de l'espace
My thesis aims to reconstruct the first husserlian space theory, as developed in several unpublished manuscripts from the early 1890s, which were meant to compose the so-called "Book of Space".The author will present the Book of space in its several aspeccts, by offering a general averview of its topics and identifying those theoretical influences that somehow shaped Husserl's philosophical formation. Moreover, part of this thesis is dedicated to discuss the background of mathematical and scientifc ideas animating the debate about the problem of space, between nineteenth and twentieth century

Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Waterloo, 1995.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 216-223). Issued also in PDF format and available via the World Wide Web. Requires Internet connectivity, World Wide Web browser, and Adobe Acrobat Reader. Also available in microfiche format.

Thesis advisor: Arthur Madigan
Since at least Galileo, not only the technological abilities of natural science but the meaning of science's claims have been shaken to their very foundations, according to Edmund Husserl. We know what scientists say, but we do not know what they mean. Nor, Husserl claims, do they know what they mean. They do what works. They measure, they tabulate, they calculate. But they do not thereby really know the world. And since they are the standing authorities of knowledge in our culture, we do not have a reliable referent to which we can turn for an appropriate standard of meaning. At some level we realize that this piece of paper in my hand is not precisely a geometrical rectangle, in which all four angles are exactly ninety degrees and both sets of sides are exactly parallel to each other, but for the most part we simply identify it as a rectangle and move on. In our everyday experience, Husserl would say, we tend to conflate geometrical space and experiential space. We do not, however, have any real idea why we can do so effectively, even if we are engineers or physicists. Geometrical shapes are categorically different from the shapes we daily experience in our interactions with the world. No matter how carefully I draw lines or cut edges, I can never make a piece of paper (or, for that matter, a cow) that exactly meets the requirements of a geometrical rectangle. Even the fact that geometrical rectangles are, by definition, plane figures, which means they only have two dimensions, rather than the (at least) three that structure any perceptible thing, prevents perceptible things from ever meeting the strict requirements of geometrical figures. Given this basic disparity, what is it that justifies our using these geometrical figures to describe the perceptible world in which we live? If we want to know the world, Husserl tells us, we need to know what our scientific claims mean. This, he claims, is the only way we can meaningfully ground our increasingly science-governed lives. Plan of the Dissertation In this dissertation, then, I undertake the project of identifying more precisely what this problem is and offering some solution to it. My argument will have three steps. I shall argue first that to solve the problem Husserl so helpfully lays out, we need to go back to Aristotle's Metaphysics; second, that although Aristotle proposes a solution for the metaphysical problems implied by using mathematics to know perceptible things, this solution fails to answer the questions as he presents them, even if it is broadly interpreted; and, finally, that there are within Aristotle's metaphysical thought implicit resources for constructing this missing metaphysical justification, and that these can be found explicitly in his way of thinking about the distinction between actuality and potency, in his discussion of the metaphysical implications of knowing, and in his discussion of material causality. The basic problem is that mathematical objects and perceptible things are different kinds of things. We would not say that `Joe's idea is hungry' in anything other than a very metaphorical way, because we recognize that ideas are not the kinds of things that get hungry. Hunger is the province of animals. Ideas are not animals. Ideas, then, cannot be hungry. Mathematical objects and perceptible things, though, while also different kinds of things, are regularly combined. We do say, `This piece of paper is rectangular', although it would seem that pieces of paper (or cows) are not the kinds of things that could be rectangles. In this dissertation, I begin in chapter one with a careful recapitulation of Husserl's articulation of this problem of thoughtlessly conflating mathematical and experiential things. Husserl takes this to be the root of the crisis, not only of the meaning of the sciences, but also of all human meaning. I use Husserl's articulation, rather than simply explaining the problem as I understand it and moving directly to Aristotle's Metaphysics, where I see the roots of its solution, in part because Husserl's work was so influential in shaping my own understanding of the problem. More importantly, though not unrelatedly, Husserl helpfully contextualizes the problem both culturally and historically. He tells us why this matters, and he tells us how it seems to have happened. Both of these seem to me to be crucial to any ultimately successful resolution to the problem. In Husserl's articulation of the problem, he identifies Galileo as responsible for taking it as `obvious' that the `universally valid' shapes of geometry constituted the objectively real component of all things. He argues that Galileo inherits a tradition in which our approximations to `limit shapes' and the increased precision in replicating these made possible by technological advances gradually meld together, such that we learn to take the world to be fundamentally a mathematical manifold. In taking over this tradition, Galileo simply presumes that the world is fundamentally mathematizable and sets about developing methods by which even the concrete sensory plena through which any experienced shape is necessarily presented can be mathematized. Since we take as `given' these assumptions, whose origin Husserl attributes to Galileo, and which remain unjustified metaphysically, Husserl's tracing of the development of these assumptions can help us notice and evaluate them. This will be helpful in recovering the meaning of our mathematical scientific claims, and, ultimately, in recovering the meaning of our non-scientific claims. While Husserl helpfully identifies the problem and begins the historical tracing he proposes with his analysis of Galileo's assumptions, he does not complete the latter project, in part because he died so soon after beginning it. His project in the Crisis, as with many of the projects he undertook as a scholar, gets developed in many different directions, without any of these being completed. He proposes a philosophical-historical retracing of the assumptions of geometry, from its earliest inception through the present. He proposes a simultaneous careful consideration of the metaphysical assumptions at work in mathematical science and the justification necessary for it. He proposes transcendental phenomenology as the way to correctly understand the correlation between mathematical claims and the perceptible world they describe. While the development of transcendental phenomenology and the ways that it can help us come to understand more correctly our interaction with the world are fascinating, in this dissertation I want to focus on Husserl's other proposals toward a solution, namely the philosophical-historical retracing of assumptions and the metaphysical analysis. Specifically, I want to focus on the metaphysical analysis that Aristotle performs on the problems generated by presuming that one can use mathematical objects to know perceptible things. In chapter two, then, I explain more thoroughly the first two proposals toward a solution that Husserl proposes, and defend my claim that this metaphysical analysis in Aristotle is an appropriate continuation of Husserl's project. For completeness, Husserl's project needs, in addition to his tracing of the historical sources of lazy assumptions, an Aristotelian metaphysical analysis of what material and mathematical things are, to clarify whether and how mathematics could be appropriately (or inappropriately) applied to material things. In chapter three, I turn to Aristotle's Metaphysics and cull from its pages, primarily from Books III and XIII, the basic metaphysical questions and problems that arise in Aristotle's discussion of the use of mathematical objects to know perceptible things. I organize these into six central questions: 1) What exactly are the mathematical objects Aristotle discusses? 2) Are these mathematical objects substances? 3) Are these mathematical objects separable from perceptible things? 4) Are these mathematical objects constituents of perceptible things? 5) Are these mathematical objects principles or causes of perceptible things? 6) Is knowledge of these mathematical objects somehow knowledge of perceptible things? From these six questions, the basic problem that emerges is that knowledge of mathematical objects requires these objects to be exact, unchangeable, and indivisible, whereas the perceptible things of which they are supposed to provide knowledge are less determinate, changeable, and divisible. It seems like the mathematical objects would have to be separate from these perceptible things to be objects of mathematical knowledge, but if they were so, it is unclear how knowledge of them could be taken to also be knowledge of the perceptible things. These mathematical objects would have to somehow be part of the causal structure of these perceptible things for knowledge of them to be knowledge of these perceptible things. In chapter four, I take up the solution that Aristotle proposes for these difficulties, the `insofar as'/ `qua' (hêi) structure of knowing. Various attributes belong to a given perceptible thing in virtue of various ways of its being. Being green belongs to a plant, for example, insofar as it is a surface. The method of abstraction (aphairesis) allows us to separate out in thought the relevant way of being of the thing, so as to make the appropriate attribution to it. We can know a thing as something, even if that `something' is not itself actually separable. This proposal of Aristotle's begins to resolve some of the metaphysical problems that chapter three articulated. It is not itself, however, metaphysically justified. While it seems that we do regularly make these kinds of claims about perceptible things, it is not clear what justifies us in separating in thought what is not separate in fact, nor just how these various ways of being belong to the unified perceptible thing such that knowledge of them provides knowledge of the thing. This difficulty in giving a metaphysically coherent account of Aristotle's model of abstraction pervades the scholarly literature. Aristotle, it seems, does not have a satisfactory solution to the troubling metaphysical problems he raises about using mathematical objects to know perceptible things. In my fifth, and final, chapter, I undertake to construct from other texts in Aristotle's corpus a metaphysical justification for his model of abstraction that can, in fact, resolve the metaphysical problems that he and Husserl have raised. I find this metaphysical justification in an implicit claim of Aristotle's, to be found in the same section where he proposes his model of abstraction as a solution (Met XIII.3): the claim that mathematical objects are potential substances. I examine what these potential substances are, how they are related to their own actualizations and how they are related to the perceptible things of which they are supposed to provide knowledge, relying primarily on Metaphysics VIII and IX. I consider how knowledge of these could be possible, using texts from De Anima III, and then explore a connection between these potencies and the material cause of perceptible things in Physics II.9. I conclude at last that we are, in fact, justified in using mathematical objects to describe perceptible things. These objects, however, are mathematically describable only insofar as they are material, by which Aristotle means, insofar as they are potential, rather than actual
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy

In this dissertation I examine our relationship with the Earth and our natural environment by clarifying what it means to be human. I do this by looking at the interpenetration of spheres of being or philosophical anthropology to articulate how the human being is the dynamic meeting point of life and spirit. In this interpenetration of life and spirit, the task of the human being as loving flashes forth. On the basis of this task, it is possible to realize a loving relationship with the Earth and our natural environment that is not based on domination or use. To understand further how we are situated in relation to the earth and our natural environment, I discuss shortcomings of both the conservation and deep ecology movements. I also discuss problems with traditional philosophical anthropologies to highlight how some of these presuppositions have been incorporated into our relationship with the earth and our natural environment. To illuminate how life and spirit are enmeshed in one another, I describe Nicolai Hartmann's new ontology and Edmund Husserl's regional ontology as well as Scheler's philosophical anthropology since all of these philosophers ground their reflections in experience. However, since Scheler grounds being human in loving, his approach is unique and not only resolves the supposed dualism between life and spirit but gives us a fresh outlook on the responsibility inherent to being human. This opens the possibility for living a loving relationship with the earth and our natural environment.

In this dissertation, I investigate how questioning appears within Edmund Husserl’s work. I do so through five chapters. In the first, I introduce questioning as a moment of a reason’s striving for truth, as it appears both in the individual and through history. In the second, I clarify how he finds the structure of questioning as an intention that appears to fulfill a questionable experience. In the third, I explicate his analysis of its temporal genesis and fulfillment in the individual. In the fourth, I turn to how he treats the development of questioning across generations, especially as it first emerges from the child’s curiosity. Finally, in the fifth, I give an overview of the transformation of questioning through three stages of history, expressed in myth, science, and phenomenology. Through these chapters, I claim Husserl finds a development of ways of questioning through history but also that questioning itself is an essential moment of this historical development.

This dissertation is addressing the criticism of Sartre the notion of transcendental Ego in the phenomenology of Husserl. Within the framework of developing the work of Husserl, the Transcendental Ego can be flagged as a result of the introduction of the concept of epoché, or phenomenological reduction, the "transcendental turn" of phenomenology. The transcendental Ego is both the result of this operation and the principle of formation of any sense of the world. The transcendental phenomenology of Husserl is then Transcendental Idealism. Against this conception, in The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre presents the argument that I not the content of transcendental consciousness, necessary to ensure its unity and individuality, but a transcendent object. The unity and individuality, for the conscience is guaranteed by intentionality, interpreted as the fundamental character of all consciousness. Through it all conscience is "positional consciousness" (tetic) of its object and "non-positional consciousness" (non-tetic) of itself, so this is the first consciousness non-reflected already consciousness of itself and should be considered independently, since no need to be reflected. However, this way the thesis of Sartre threat inherent tendency to obscure all that it takes conscious reflection, ie it introduces a split between non-reflected and reflection that makes the reflection a fortuitous event. Try during this study provide an answer to this objection to using theoretical tools provided by Sartre in his Phenomenological Ontology. The intentionality serve as a leitmotif of these tests, and that is through their radicalization that Sartre puts in question the very being of consciousness separate from their knowledge. Finally the criticism of Sartre to the transcendental Ego would be an onto-phenomenological approach onto the consciousness.
A presente dissertação tem como tema a crítica de Sartre a noção de Ego transcendental na fenomenologia de Husserl. Dentro do quadro de evolução da obra de Husserl, o Ego transcendental pode ser assinalado como resultado da introdução da noção de epoché, ou redução fenomenológica, na chamada virada transcendental da fenomenologia. O Ego transcendental é simultaneamente o resultado desta operação e o princípio de constituição de todo sentido do mundo. A fenomenologia transcendental de Husserl é então Idealismo Transcendental. Contra esta concepção, em A Transcendência do Ego, Sartre apresenta a tese segundo a qual o Eu não é um conteúdo da consciência transcendental, necessário para garantir a sua unidade e individualidade, mas um objeto transcendente. A unidade e individualidade, necessárias à consciência, é garantida pela intencionalidade, interpretada como o caráter fundamental de toda consciência. Através dela toda consciência é consciência posicional (tética) do seu objeto e consciência não-posicional (não-tética) de si, portanto esta primeira consciência irrefletida é já consciência de si e deve ser considerada autônoma, pois não tem necessidade de ser refletida. No entanto, desta maneira a tese de Sartre ameaça tornar incompreensível à tendência inerente que leva toda consciência a reflexão, ou seja, introduz-se uma cisão entre irrefletido e reflexão que torna a reflexão um acontecimento fortuito. Tentaremos ao longo deste estudo oferecer uma resposta a esta objeção recorrendo ao instrumental teórico fornecido por Sartre na sua Ontologia Fenomenológica. A intencionalidade servirá como fio condutor destas análises, entendendo que é através da sua radicalização que Sartre põe em questão o próprio ser da consciência distinto do seu conhecimento. Finalmente a crítica de Sartre ao Ego transcendental teria como pressuposto uma abordagem onto-fenomenológica da consciência.

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Nosso objetivo é analisar a teoria da intencionalidade de Edmund Husserl, tal como se encontra em seu texto de 1913, Ideias para uma fenomenologia pura e para uma filosofia fenomenológica, e, paralelamente, a teoria da intencionalidade de Aron Gurwitsch, formulada em sua tese de doutoramento, de 1929, intitulada Fenomenologia da temática e do eu puro. Destacamos, por um lado, o método utilizado pelos dois autores para estabelecerem as suas teorias e, por outro lado, os conteúdos específicos de cada uma delas. A pesquisa busca contribuir para a elucidação do papel de Husserl e de Gurwitsch na história da psicologia e da filosofia, para a clarificação das relações possíveis entre fenomenologia transcendental e psicologia empírica e para uma compreensão mais adequada da psicologia fenomenológica que pode ser desenvolvida a partir da teoria da intencionalidade e da fenomenologia constitutiva. O trabalho tem início com uma contextualização histórica e lógica da problemática relacionada aos conceitos de intencionalidade e de descrição psicológica, tendo como ponto de partida a obra de Franz Brentano. Na sequência, o primeiro capítulo apresenta a teoria da redução fenomenológica de Husserl e a sua motivação cartesiana. O segundo capítulo consiste em uma série de análises e descrições sobre a consciência pura e transcendental. O terceiro capítulo consiste em uma apresentação da hipótese de constância, de sua derrogação pela Psicologia da Gestalt e da analogia, feita por Gurwitsch, entre esta e a redução fenomenológica. O quarto capítulo consiste em uma apresentação dos aspectos estruturais da teoria da intencionalidade de Gurwitsch. O quinto capítulo lida com a teoria de Gurwitsch sobre a atenção. O sexto capítulo, por fim, apresenta os principais problemas que Gurwitsch enxerga na concepção egológica da consciência e as principais...
Our goal is to analyze Edmund Husserl's theory of intentionality, as found in his 1913 text, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, and, in parallel, Aron Gurwitsch's theory of intentionality, as formulated in his doctoral thesis, from 1929, entitled Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego. We emphasize, on the one hand, the method used by the authors in order to establish their theories, and, on the other hand, the specific contents of each theory. The research aims to contribute to the elucidation of the role of Husserl and Gurwitsch in the history of psychology and philosophy, to the clarification of the possible relations between transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology, and to provide a better understanding of phenomenological psychology, which can be developed from the theory of intentionality and from constitutive phenomenology. The dissertation begins with providing a historical and logical background for the problems related to the concepts of intentionality and psychological description, taking as depart the work of Franz Brentano. The first chapter introduces Husserl's theory of phenomenological reduction and his Cartesian motivation. The second chapter consists of a series of analyzes and descriptions of pure and transcendental consciousness. The third chapter consists of a presentation of the constancy hypothesis, of its rejection by Gestalt psychology and, then, of the analogy made by Gurwitsch between this rejection and phenomenological reduction. The fourth chapter consists of a presentation of the structural aspects of Gurwitsch's theory of intentionality. The fifth chapter deals with Gurwitsch's theory of attention. Finally, the sixth chapter presents the main problems which Gurwitsch sees in the egological conception of consciousness and the main contributions of his...

Orientador: Danilo Saretta Verissimo
Banca: Elizabeth Piemonte Constantino
Banca: Sávio Passafaro Peres
Resumo: Nosso objetivo é analisar a teoria da intencionalidade de Edmund Husserl, tal como se encontra em seu texto de 1913, "Ideias para uma fenomenologia pura e para uma filosofia fenomenológica", e, paralelamente, a teoria da intencionalidade de Aron Gurwitsch, formulada em sua tese de doutoramento, de 1929, intitulada "Fenomenologia da temática e do eu puro". Destacamos, por um lado, o método utilizado pelos dois autores para estabelecerem as suas teorias e, por outro lado, os conteúdos específicos de cada uma delas. A pesquisa busca contribuir para a elucidação do papel de Husserl e de Gurwitsch na história da psicologia e da filosofia, para a clarificação das relações possíveis entre fenomenologia transcendental e psicologia empírica e para uma compreensão mais adequada da psicologia fenomenológica que pode ser desenvolvida a partir da teoria da intencionalidade e da fenomenologia constitutiva. O trabalho tem início com uma contextualização histórica e lógica da problemática relacionada aos conceitos de intencionalidade e de descrição psicológica, tendo como ponto de partida a obra de Franz Brentano. Na sequência, o primeiro capítulo apresenta a teoria da redução fenomenológica de Husserl e a sua motivação cartesiana. O segundo capítulo consiste em uma série de análises e descrições sobre a consciência pura e transcendental. O terceiro capítulo consiste em uma apresentação da hipótese de constância, de sua derrogação pela Psicologia da Gestalt e da analogia, feita por Gurwitsch, entre esta e a redução fenomenológica. O quarto capítulo consiste em uma apresentação dos aspectos estruturais da teoria da intencionalidade de Gurwitsch. O quinto capítulo lida com a teoria de Gurwitsch sobre a atenção. O sexto capítulo, por fim, apresenta os principais problemas que Gurwitsch enxerga na "concepção egológica da consciência" e as principais...
Abstract: Our goal is to analyze Edmund Husserl's theory of intentionality, as found in his 1913 text, "Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy", and, in parallel, Aron Gurwitsch's theory of intentionality, as formulated in his doctoral thesis, from 1929, entitled "Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego". We emphasize, on the one hand, the method used by the authors in order to establish their theories, and, on the other hand, the specific contents of each theory. The research aims to contribute to the elucidation of the role of Husserl and Gurwitsch in the history of psychology and philosophy, to the clarification of the possible relations between transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology, and to provide a better understanding of phenomenological psychology, which can be developed from the theory of intentionality and from constitutive phenomenology. The dissertation begins with providing a historical and logical background for the problems related to the concepts of intentionality and psychological description, taking as depart the work of Franz Brentano. The first chapter introduces Husserl's theory of phenomenological reduction and his Cartesian motivation. The second chapter consists of a series of analyzes and descriptions of pure and transcendental consciousness. The third chapter consists of a presentation of the constancy hypothesis, of its rejection by Gestalt psychology and, then, of the analogy made by Gurwitsch between this rejection and phenomenological reduction. The fourth chapter consists of a presentation of the structural aspects of Gurwitsch's theory of intentionality. The fifth chapter deals with Gurwitsch's theory of attention. Finally, the sixth chapter presents the main problems which Gurwitsch sees in the "egological conception of consciousness" and the main contributions of his...
Mestre

Un anciano Zubiri concluye su búsqueda en la definición de la filosofía como: "La filosofía no es fenomenología ni ontología sino que es filosofía de lo real en cuanto real, es metafísica". Mi investigación ha pretendido reconstruir el proceso de pensamiento que lleva a esta conclusión. Esta definición implica enmendar el giro copernicano de Kant: el entendimiento debe emerger de lo real mismo individual. El proceso de constitución del saber filosófico consistirá en un proceso de maduración de una idea, fuerza primitiva, que actuaría como un principio formal metódico que determina la marcha del pensar. En este proceso se da una tensión entre un método lógico y un método realista. Frente a la primacía de la idea universal de Husserl, Zubiri propone a la primacía de la substancia individual. En definitiva, una versión radical de la filosofía física de Aristóles.
An aged Zubiri conludes his search of Philosophy definition like knowledge: "The philosophy isn't phenomenology neither ontology, but philosophy of the real about the real, is metaphysic". My research has tried to rebuilt the thinking process that leads us to this conclusion. This definition involves to enmend the Kant turn: The intellect must emerge from the individual real concept. The constitution process of the philosophical wisdom will consist of a formal methodic rudiment that determines the way of thinking. In this process appears a tension between a logical method and a realist method. In opposite to the primacy of the Husserl universal idea, Zubiri proposes the primacy of the individual substance. Definetly, a radical version of the Aristoteles Philosophy of Phisics

This thesis presents a discursive and historical investigation of the origins and causes of the design review in architectural education. The design review, jury or ”crit” i s an integral and central part of the contemporary paradigm for architectural education – the design studio. The thesis discusses previous research on the design review, which paints a gloomy picture of the learning possibilities of the review. The historical roots of the review are studied with the Swedish context as a focus, showing that the review in its contemporary form was adopted concurrently with the design studio paradigm during the 1990’s. Furthermore, interviews were carried out with instructors at the School of Architecture at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. Results from the interviews point to several contradictions and issues in the discourse about the review. Seeing the concept and faculty of judgment as central to understand the implicit definition of the architect, as manifested in the review and in the canon of the discipline, these findings are the discussed and contextualised.
I detta examensarbete görs en diskursiv och historisk undersökning av kritikgenomgången i arkitektutbildningen. Kritikgenomgången utgör en central komponent i det samtida paradigmet för arkitektutbildning – studion. Examensarbetet går igenom och diskuterar aktuell forskning om kritikgenomgången, vilket ger en nedslående bild av kritikgenomgångens pedagogiska potential. Vidare undersöks kritikgenomgångens historiska rötter med fokus på den svenska kontexten, vilket ger vid handen att kritikgenomgången i sin nuvarande form fick sin roll i svensk arkitektutbildning under 1990-talet, alltså samtidigt med studioparadigmets genomslag. Dessutom redovisas resultaten av en intervjustudie med lärare vid KTH Arkitekturskolan, vilka visar att diskursen om kritikgenomgången innehåller flera motsägelser och problem. Resultaten av undersökningarna diskuteras sedan utifrån en förståelse av omdömet som centralt begrepp och förmåga för att förstå den implicita definition av arkitekten som manifesteras i kritikgenomgången och i disciplinens kanon.

Husserlian phenomenology of time, as it is developed on theLectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness, shows some  difficulties  to  explain  certain  temporal  experiences.  This  is  the  case  of the incompatibility between the rigidity of the retentional modification and the effective approach that a subject may have with his memories. On the one hand, according to the Lectures’ explanation, the darkening of the past occurs in an homogeneous way: The more distant an experience is, the lower the clarity of the associated retention. However, our relation with the past is not so direct. Complementing the studies of the Lectureswith those of the Analysis concerning passive synthesiscould allow to explain this kind of temporal phenomena.
La fenomenología del tiempo husserliana, tal como es desarrollada en las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempo, presenta dificultades a la hora de explicar ciertas experiencias relativas a la temporalidad. Es el caso de la incompatibilidad entre la rigidez de la modificación retencional y la aproximación efectiva que tiene un sujeto con sus recuerdos. Por una parte, según  la  explicación  de  las Lecciones, el oscurecimiento del pasado opera de manera homogénea: cuanto más lejana es una experiencia, menor claridad se atribuye a la retención asociada. Por otra parte, en los hechos, la relación con el pasado no es tan directa. Complementar los estudios de las Leccionescon los de los Análisis sobre las síntesis pasivas permitiría dar cuenta de este tipo de fenómenos temporales.

Ce travail thématique et historique a pour objectif de mettre en lumière les difficultés que l'on peut rencontrer lorsque nous tentons de saisir ce que signifie la vie de l'ego d'un point de vue phénoménologique et scientifique. Les questions qui nous animent sont les suivantes et rythment le travail présent : que signifie précisément dire « Je » ? ; Quelle est la caractérisation de l'ego dans la phénoménologie husserlienne ? Dans quelle mesure la vie de l'ego peut-elle être naturalisée ?Notre cheminement suit les traces du corpus husserlien, en ce que nous considérons qu'il est tout d'abord nécessaire d'éclaircir le sens du terme ego dans l'optique d'une « phénoménologie analytique ». Cela nous a permis de comprendre que l'indexical « Je » peut être la marque d'une « ingénuité descriptive » qui consiste en une incapacité à décrire pleinement une situation ou la subjectivité exprimant un indexical. Seule une entente phénoménologique du « Je » peut modifier cette conception en ce qu'elle induit la présence d'une subjectivité en chair et en os, un Nullpunkt irréductible à quelque réification que ce soit. Le langage phénoménologique, en plus de valoriser la part subjective du vécu (Ichrede), permet en outre de modifier notre conception ontique du sens des termes usités afin de décrire un état de chose d'un point de vue eidétique – la chose comme corrélat.En reprenant cette idée cardinale, nous avons par la suite tenté de résoudre l'énigme du Je d'un point de historique à partir d'une étude comparée entre la phénoménologie husserlienne et celle de ses disciples (Reinach, Ingarden, Sartre). À partir de là, nous étions en mesure d'appréhender le bienfondé des critiques apportées à l'égard du tournant transcendantal de la phénoménologie. Pourtant, ces critiques ne sauraient dépasser ni compromettre la pensée de Husserl en ce qu'elle déborde selon nous le cadre formel et stérile d'une binarité idéalisme-réalisme. Nous avons ainsi voulu mettre en exergue le renouvellement, dès le tournant génétique, de la phénoménologie à partir de ce que nous nommons le « naturalisme phénoménologique » de Husserl, en particulier en ce qui concerne le traitement qu'il a accordé aux sujets comme la naissance, la mort, l'anomalité et l'animalité. Ce faisant, nous avions tous les éléments pour démontrer que Husserl n'était idéaliste qu'en apparence et que son œuvre contenait les germes de l'entreprise naturaliste en développement depuis quelques dizaines d'années.Il fallut dès lors montrer les corrélations entre la phénoménologie « classique » et la naturalisation de la phénoménologie à travers une étude des textes contemporains présentés par des auteurs comme F.Varela, N.Depraz ou J-L Petit. Il nous apparut ainsi que la naturalisation en restait à l'état embryonnaire, mais qu'elle pouvait dans un avenir proche, grâce à des recherches sur l'agentivité, la dépression, ou sur la phénophysique, éclairer les sciences cognitives dans l'optique d'une étude cogénérative et fertile en ce qu'elle joint les perspectives à la première et la troisième personne. Or, il nous semble malgré tout que la naturalisation de la phénoménologie demeure davantage asubjective, au sens que donne Patocka, que pleinement phénoménologique. Nous concluons de la sorte en affirmant qu'il faut distinguer deux types de phénoménologie de même que deux types de naturalisation, tout en avançant qu'il serait judicieux de prendre également en considération le rôle du système nerveux entérique, en plus du cerveau, dans la caractérisation de la vie subjective
This thematic and historical work aims to highlight the difficulties that can be encountered when we try to grasp what the egological life means from a phenomenological and scientific point of view. The questions that animate us are the following and rhythm the present work: what exactly does it mean to say "I"? ; What is the characterization of the egological life in Husserlian phenomenology? To what extent can the egological life be naturalized?Our path follows the Husserlian corpus for we consider that it is first necessary to clarify the meaning of the term “ego” in the perspective of an “analytic phenomenology”. This allowed us to understand that the indexical “I” can be the mark of a “descriptive ingenuity” which consists in an inability to fully describe a situation or a subjectivity expressing itself. Only a phenomenological understanding of the “I” may modify this conception by inducing that the presence of a subjectivity made of flesh and bones is an irreducible Nullpunkt. The phenomenological language, in addition to valuing the subjective part of live experience (Ichrede), also allows to modify our ontic conception of the meaning of termes used in order to describe a state of things from an eidetic point of view – a thing as correlate.By taking up this cardinal idea, we have subsequently attempted to solve the enigma around the I from a historical point of view on the basis a comparative study between Husserlian phenomenology and what critics made by Husserls disciples such as Reinach, Ingarden and Sartre. From then on, we were able to grasp the depth and validity of some critics made against the transcendental turn of phenomenology. Yet, these critics cannot go beyond or compromise Husserl'sthinking for this latter one overflows in our view the formal and sterile framework of an idealistic-realistic binarity. In this way, we wanted to highlight the renewal of phenomenology from the genetic point of view, starting with what we call the “phenomenological naturalism”, especially in regard to the treatment Husserl accorded to subjects such as birth, death, a(b)no(r)mality and animality. In doing so, we had the evidence to show that Husserl was only apparently an idealist and that his work contains the seeds of the naturalistic enterprise under developent for some decades.It was therefore necessary to show the correlations between the “classical” phenomenology and the naturalization of phenomenology through a study of contempory texts presented by authors such as F. Varela, N. Depraz or J-L Petit. It appeared to us that naturalization was still embryonic, but that it may in the near future, through researches on agentivity, depression or phenophysics, illuminate cognitive sciences from the perspective of a cogenerative and fertile study for it joins the first and third person perspectives. However, it seems to us that the naturalization of phenomenology remains more asubjective, in the sense given by Patocka, than fully phenomenological. In conclusion, we affirm that two types of phenomenology must be distinguished, as well as two types of naturalization, while arguing that it would be also wise to take into consideration the role of the enteric nervous system, in addition to the brain, in the characterization of subjective life

Positive memories play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Additionally, there are potential clinical benefits of recalling positive memories on affect, cognitions, and behaviors. However, most research/clinical work has focused on the role of traumatic memories in PTSD's symptomatology and treatment. The current study examined positive memory recall difficulties and positive memory phenomenology among 185 trauma-exposed individuals with varying PTSD severity. Participants completed the Life Events Checklist for DSM-5, PTSD Checklist for DSM-5, Autobiographical Memory Test, Memory Experiences Questionnaire – Short Form, Ruminative Thought Style Questionnaire, Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale – Brief 16-Item Version, Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale – Positive Emotions, the Positive Affect subscale of the Affective Control Scale, and two items from the Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index. Results showed that (1) greater PTSD severity was a marginally significant predictor of fewer recalled positive memories; (2) greater positive emotional dysregulation predicted fewer recalled positive memories controlling for PTSD severity; and (3) increasing PTSD severity predicted more negative valence, less vividness, less coherence, less accessibility, less clear time perspective, fewer sensory details, and greater distancing ratings of the recalled positive memory, controlling for sleep quantity/quality. Such findings add to the PTSD-positive memory literature by informing PTSD theoretical perspectives; enhancing an understanding of if/how positive memories may be incorporated into PTSD treatments; and highlighting potential clinical targets, such as positive emotional regulation skills, when integrating a focus on positive memories into PTSD intervention.

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This paper aims to describe from a steiniana perspective on the theme of empathy, as constitutor element of uniqueness of the human person, in the relationships we have subjectively and intersubjectively with each other. He background thread is to present, as Edith Stein philosophically position yourself in search of the essence of the theme of empathy, and what are the prospects opening up from its investigation. In this sense, questions and notes are highlighted on the subject of empathy of her teacher Edmund Husserl and confrontations with other similar experiences, raised by other philosophers, such as; Theodor Lipps and Max Scheler. Edith Stein puts in theoretical confrontation with the phenomenological tradition, seeking to describe the essence of the acts of empathy, and affirms the importance of this experience, as constitutor element of uniqueness of the human person. We develop our research, substantiated by the phenomenological method and literature, of which, there is the work of Edith Stein, "About the problem of empathy" (Zum problem der Einfühlung) and Ideas II of Edmund Husserl. The structure of the dissertation was divided into three parts inextricably linked, from which we highlight: At first we describe on the subject of empathy Edmund Husserl, where we present his phenomenological position on the issue, and some developments that allowed her reflection. Our main goal at the moment is to present basic research, in which Stein followed. The second time, presents the theme of empathy in essence according to Stein. In this sense we list the main concepts and philosophical clashes that Stein sets out to do, showing genuine character as a result of empathy and their execution conditions. The third time, we discussed the act of empathizing. Our intention is to introduce empathy, as constitution experience the uniqueness of the human person and the affirmation of personal and other people's values in their relations. However, we affirm that in our relations, there is the possibility of a reciprocal exchange of knowledge and personal values, or formed by our community, safeguarding the dignity of our own existence. This reciprocity is qualified by experience of empathy that enables us to put up from 'other' point of view (the one originating in 'other') and discover hitherto unknown values.
O presente trabalho tem por objetivo descrever, desde uma perspectiva steiniana, sobre o tema da empatia, como elemento constituidor da singularidade da pessoa humana nas relações que estabelecemos subjetiva e intersubjetivamente com o outro. A discussão de fundo consiste em apresentar como Edith Stein posiciona-se filosoficamente na busca da essência do tema da empatia e quais são as perspectivas que se abrem desde sua investigação. Nesse sentido, ressaltam-se os questionamentos e os apontamentos sobre o tema da empatia de seu mestre, Edmund Husserl, bem como as confrontações com as outras vivências similares levantadas por outros filósofos, como por exemplo: Theodor Lipps e Max Scheler. Edith Stein coloca-se em confronto teórico com a tradição fenomenológica, na busca de descrever a essência dos atos de empatia e afirma a importância desta vivência, como elemento constituidor da singularidade da pessoa humana. Desenvolvemos nossa pesquisa, fundamentada pelo método fenomenológico e por pesquisa bibliográfica, da qual, destaca-se a obra de Edith Stein, Sobre o problema da empatia (Zum problem der Einfühlung) e Ideias II , de Edmund Husserl. A estruturação da dissertação foi dividida em três partes intrinsecamente interligadas, das quais destacamos: No primeiro momento, descrevemos sobre o tema da empatia de Edmund Husserl, onde apresentamos o seu posicionamento fenomenológico sobre o tema e alguns desdobramentos que a sua reflexão permitiu. Nosso objetivo principal nesse momento, é apresentar a base de investigação, pela qual Stein seguiu. O segundo momento apresenta o tema da empatia em sua essência, segundo Stein. Neste sentido, elencamos os principais conceitos e embates filosóficos que Stein se propõe a fazer, mostrando como resultado o caráter genuíno da empatia e suas condições de efetivação. Já no terceiro momento, discutimos sobre o ato de empatizar. Nossa intenção tem como finalidade apresentar a empatia como vivência constituidora da singularidade da pessoa humana e da afirmação dos valores pessoais e alheios em suas relações. Contudo, afirmamos que, em nossas relações existe a possibilidade de uma troca recíproca de conhecimento e dos valores pessoais ou constituídos pela nossa comunidade, que garantem a dignidade da nossa própria existência. Essa reciprocidade é qualificada pela vivência da empatia que nos possibilita colocar-se deste outro‟ ponto de vista (aquele originário do outro‟) e descobrir valores até então desconhecidos.

Phenomenological evidence has been characterized as fulfillment of a meaning intention, comprehension that tends to assimilate evidence to fulfilled consciousness, without making justice to the essential and mutual implication of emptiness and fullness that constitutes it out of its horizontic-intentional kind. The horizon, typically configured, offers the field of possible fulfillment; that is why it can be said that evidence takes place in a consciousness of possibility, namely, a modal one, though in an originary material and not doxic or positional sense,because it is the first one that is incumbent upon relationships of fulfillment. Modality that essentially characterizes evidence does not reveal itself then in the possible modalization as positional modification of a unitary content, but in its outlined” material configuration of fullness and emptiness that gives somethingas something referring to other possibilities as moments of its own validity.
La evidencia fenomenológica ha sido caracterizada como cumplimiento de una intención mentante, comprensión que tiende a asimilar la evidencia con la conciencia plena, sin hacer justicia a la esencial implicancia mutua de vacío y plenitud que la constituye por su carácter horizóntico-intencional. El horizonte, configurado típicamente, ofrece el campo de cumplimiento posible, por lo que puede sostenerse que la evidencia tiene lugar en una conciencia de posibilidad, es decir, modal, aunque en sentido originariamente material y no dóxico o posicional, pues es el primero el que compete a las relaciones de cumplimiento. La modalidad que caracteriza esencialmente a la evidencia no se revela entonces en la modalización posible en cuanto modificación posicional de un contenido unitario, sino en su configuración material perfilada” de plenitud y vacío que da algo como algo remitiendo a otras posibilidades como momentos de su propia validez.

Lack of understanding of the Husserlian phenomenological issues peculiarity in relation to science fact and in particular the psychology (either a lack of understanding come from philosophers or psychologists outside or not the phenomenological movement) constitutes the rationale for developing this work. If even some of his disciples did not comprehend it, It would not be enough to assume that today (i.e. the distance of a century) these problems remain misunderstood. Thus, our specific goal is to understand the scope and limits of the phenomenological reduction, the method that give us free access to the terrain phenomenological. So we can effectively overcome the obstacles that keep the spiritual thought locked in his own horizon. Our investigations are focused on the first two parts of Ideas I, the first work that came public with the specific goal to be a systematic introduction to phenomenology. In the first chapter of this work, we keep proper within the formal logic, we will investigate the differences of principle between essences and facts, as well as between science and science of essences of facts in order to understand how philosophy should it be a science of essences, peculiar and autonomous. In the second and third chapter, however, we will move it in phenomenological terrain. While the second will investigate the designation and the effective of restriction on the natural positing to finally understand how such a reduction takes place; In the third, the goal is to establish a definite distinction between "abstraction" in the phenomenological positing of mere abstractions of the natural sciences. From the primary exclusion (a term that allude to manifestation of the reduction) it will be develop other attempts of exclusion, thus extending the phenomenological reduction to other transcendent spheres of being. With these weights we expect to have finally got rid of that constant temptation to establish a erroneous metabasis own thought that closes a natural theoretical positing.
A não compreensão da peculiaridade da problemática fenomenológica husserliana em relação às ciências de fato e em especial à psicologia (já seja uma não compreensão oriunda de filósofos ou psicólogos alheios ou não ao movimento fenomenológico) constituí a justificativa para desenvolvimento do presente trabalho. Se mesmo alguns de seus discípulos não a compreenderam, não seria demais supor que atualmente (isto é, com o distanciamento de um século) tal problemática continuaria incompreendida. Com isso, nosso objetivo específico é compreender o alcance e os limites da redução fenomenológica, o método que nos franqueia o acesso livre ao território fenomenológico. Assim poderemos superar efetivamente os obstáculos que mantém o pensamento espiritual fechado em seu próprio horizonte. Nossas investigações estão centradas nas duas primeiras partes das Idéias I, a primeira obra que veio publicamente com a meta específica de ser uma introdução sistemática a fenomenologia. No primeiro capítulo deste trabalho, nos manteremos propriamente no território da lógica formal, investigaremos as diferenças de principio entre essências e fatos, bem como entre ciências de essências e ciências de fatos para poder compreender como a filosofia deve se constituir como ciência de essências peculiar e autônoma. No segundo e no terceiro capítulo, não obstante, nos moveremos, pois, em território fenomenológico. Enquanto no segundo investigaremos a designação e a efetivação da restrição na atitude natural para enfim entendermos como tal redução se efetua; no terceiro, a meta é estabelecer uma distinção definitiva entre a abstração em atitude fenomenológica das meras abstrações das ciências naturais. A partir tirar-de-circuito primordial (termo este que alude a manifestação da redução) desenvolver-se-á outros ensaios de tirar-de-circuito, ampliando assim a redução fenomenológica a outras esferas transcendentes do ser. Com essas ponderações esperamos ter nos livrado finalmente daquela constante tentação de estabelecer uma metabasis errônea própria do pensamento que se fecha numa atitude teórica natural.

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Fundação Araucária
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the statute of the notion of world in Husserl‟s phenomenology. It starts of an analysis of the elements involved in the characterization of this as universal objective correlate of the transcendental life. To do so, it was necessary to examine the notions of conscience and epoché, insofar as the understanding of its unique and original sense is determinative to a full apprehension of the proposed question. The notion of conscience is elaborated by Husserlian phenomenology in a radically opposing meaning to the modern conceptions of it, in which it was conceived, in general, as psychic interiority that articulates ideas or psychological data from incoming from stimulations received from the outside. According to Husserl, the true subjectivity should be described as ideal- transcendental field that encloses the constitution of both the poles involved in any experience. Its basic characteristic will be drawn by intentionality operative that ensure the direct correlation between possible subjects and possible objects. The method that allows to have access such field, becoming possible the pure description of the reference apriórica of the noetic acts its respective noematic correlates, is the method of epoché. The validation of this as appropriate procedure and demanded by the character of the inquiry is indispensable within the Husserlian thought. The process of eidetic variation and the role of the fantasy are also highlighted in function of its importance in the whole operation. The conception of the world drew from the use of this methodology that invalidates the natural attitude of consideration, while an naive and insufficient procedure to establish the knowledge, is extracted, first, in a movement of refutation to the concept modern of world. The conception of world as a horizon of meaning for each and every experience is based only through the overcoming of the traditional figures of conscience and idealism. The new meaning, established by phenomenology, brings as specificity determinative the essential character of the analysis, resource that allows it to raise it to the transcendental attitude of inquiry abandoning, concomitantly, the facticity imposed by natural consideration. The meticulous examination of the essential structure present in any one experience allows the verification of the horizons involved in each individual lived. The interconnection of these in an indefinite system of new experiences eidetically predetermined from the internal and external horizons of each objectivity individually taked, leads to the total horizon of the world. The world then will be characterized as the horizon of horizons or, still, as correlative infinite idea to infinities of possible experiences in the unity of one same life. It is, at last, to understand the world as sense Omni-encompassing that involves each individual experience in order to determine the indefinite possibility experiences possible according to the telos of agreement and sedimentation.
O objetivo da dissertação é investigar o estatuto da noção de mundo na fenomenologia de Husserl. Parte-se de uma análise dos elementos implicados na caracterização deste como correlato objetivo universal da vida transcendental. Para tanto, fez-se necessário examinar as noções de consciência e epoché, na medida em que a compreensão de seu sentido inédito e original é determinante para uma plena apreensão da questão proposta. A noção de consciência é elaborada pela fenomenologia husserliana numa significação radicalmente oposta às concepções modernas da mesma, nas quais era concebida, em geral, como interioridade psíquica que articula idéias ou dados psicológicos provenientes de estímulos recebidos do exterior. De acordo com Husserl, a verdadeira subjetividade deverá ser descrita como âmbito ideal-transcendental que abrange a constituição de ambos os pólos implicados numa experiência qualquer. Sua característica fundamental será traçada pela intencionalidade operante que garante a correlação direta entre sujeitos possíveis e objetos possíveis. O método que permite acessar tal âmbito, tornando possível a descrição pura da apriórica referência dos atos noéticos aos seus respectivos correlatos noemáticos, é o método da epoché. A validação deste como procedimento cabível e exigido pelo caráter da investigação se mostra indispensável no interior do pensamento husserliano. O processo de variação eidética e o papel da fantasia também são destacados em função de sua importância no todo da operação. A concepção de mundo haurida a partir do emprego desta metodologia que invalida a atitude natural de consideração, enquanto um procedimento ingênuo e insuficiente para fundar o conhecimento, é extraída, primeiramente, num movimento de refutação ao conceito moderno de mundo. A concepção de mundo como horizonte de sentido para toda e qualquer experiência somente encontra fundamento através da superação das tradicionais figuras de consciência e de idealismo. A nova acepção, instaurada pela fenomenologia, traz como especificidade determinante o caráter essencial da análise, recurso que lhe permite alçar-se à atitude transcendental de investigação abandonando, concomitantemente, a faticidade imposta pela consideração natural. O exame meticuloso da estrutura essencial presente em uma experiência qualquer permite a constatação dos horizontes implicados em cada vivido singular. A interconexão destes num sistema indefinido de novas experiências, eideticamente pré-determinadas a partir dos horizontes interno e externo de cada objetividade tomada individualmente, leva ao horizonte total do mundo. O mundo será então caracterizado como horizonte dos horizontes ou, ainda, como idéia infinita correlativa às infinidades de experiências possíveis na unidade de uma mesma vida. Trata-se, enfim, de compreender o mundo como sentido omni-englobante que envolve cada experiência individual de modo a determinar a possibilidade indefinida de experiências possíveis segundo o telos de concordância e sedimentação.