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Journal articles on the topic 'Mentalistic explanation'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 8 February 2022

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1

Buckareff, Andrei A., and Jing Zhu. "The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human Action." Disputatio 3, no. 26 (2009): 73–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2009-0001.

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Abstract The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent’s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney’s criticisms, arguing that Tanney fails to provide a philosophically satisfying or psychologically realistic account of reas
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2

Schimmel, Paul. "Mind Over Matter? II: Implications for Psychiatry." Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 35, no. 4 (2001): 488–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1440-1614.2001.00914.x.

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Objective: To explore concepts of causality within the mind and aetiology of psychiatric disorders in the light of the proposed formulation of the mind–brain problem. Method: Taking the two propositions of this formulation as ‘first principles’ a logical analysis is attempted. Results and conclusions: Neural activity cannot in principle be regarded as causing mental activity, or vice versa. Causal processes are most coherently conceptualised in terms of the ‘mind–brain’ system. Determination of causal and aetiological effects will always necessitate consideration of contextual evidence. Becaus
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3

Sumonja, Milos. "Semantic mentalism, intesubjecitivity and metaphysics of normativity." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 4 (2017): 195–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1704195.

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The subject of this paper is Kripkenstein's critique of mentalistic explanation of linguistic normativity, as well as his intersubjective conception of normativity. The author argues against dominant intepretation of Kripkenstein's view on meaning as social metaphysics of normativity, the theory which reduces language rules to community consensus. It is pointed out that Kripkenstein's rejection of mentalistic thesis that meaning is some kind of mental state in the head of a speaker results in anti-reductionistic character of intersubjective conception of normativity, which describes how we spe
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4

Gustafsson, Martin. "Quine on Explication and Elimination." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36, no. 1 (2006): 57–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2006.0001.

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In section 53 of Word and Object, Quine argues that the set-theoretical explications of the concept of the ordered pair of f ered by mathematicians such as Wiener and Kuratowski give us a model for the clarification of philosophically troublesome ideas. According to Quine, ordered pairs might seem indispensible in science. But at the same time they have appeared unclear to many philosophers, who have argued that an extensional treatment of the logic of relations can be satisfactory only to the extent that we can give a transparent and substantial explanation of what an ordered pair really is.
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5

Haslam, Nick. "Dimensions of Folk Psychiatry." Review of General Psychology 9, no. 1 (2005): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.9.1.35.

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This article presents a social-cognitive model of laypeople's thinking about mental disorder, dubbed “folk psychiatry.” The author proposes that there are 4 dimensions along which laypeople conceptualize mental disorders and that these dimensions have distinct cognitive underpinnings. Pathologizing represents the judgment that a form of behavior or experience is abnormal or deviant and reflects availability and simulation heuristics, internal attribution, and reification. Moralizing—the judgment that individuals are morally accountable for their abnormality—reflects a form of intentional expla
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6

Searle, John R. "Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13, no. 4 (1990): 585–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00080304.

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AbstractCognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the “Connection Principle.” The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that intrinsic intentional
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7

Nachson. "Mentalistic Explanations of Organismic Behavior: Fact or Fiction?" American Journal of Psychology 132, no. 3 (2019): 387. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/amerjpsyc.132.3.0387.

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8

Montgomery, Derek E. "Situational features influencing young children's mentalistic explanations of action." Cognitive Development 9, no. 4 (1994): 425–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0885-2014(94)90014-0.

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9

Csibra, Gergely, and Gyorgy Gergely. "The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis." Developmental Science 1, no. 2 (1998): 255–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00039.

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10

Thelen, Esther, Gregor Schöner, Christian Scheier, and Linda B. Smith. "So what's a modeler to do?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 1 (2001): 70–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01553911.

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We argue that mentalistic constructs like the “object concept” are not substitutes for process explanations of cognition, and that it is impossible to prove the existence of such constructs with behavioral tasks. We defend the field theory as an appropriate level for modeling embodiment. Finally, we discuss the model's biological plausibility and its extensions to other tasks and other species.
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11

Schadeberg, Thilo C. "Classificatie van Naamwoorden en Dingen in Het Bantoe (1)." Afrika Focus 1, no. 1-2 (1985): 67–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2031356x-0010102006.

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Classification of nouns and things in Bantu Is there a semantic foundation for the system of noun classes and genders found in Bantu (and in Niger-Congo-Kordofanian) ? This question has intensely occupied many bantuists for over a century. Fundamentalist, mentalistic, and ethnosemantic approaches were used to construct explanations. The present paper reviews several such approaches, giving particular emphasis to some old and recent Dutch contributions to this field.
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12

Itkonen, Esa. "An Assessment of (Mentalist) Cognitive Semantics." Public Journal of Semiotics 7, no. 1 (2016): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.37693/pjos.2016.7.15840.

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Common claims within cognitive semantics (e.g. Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987) are that “the most fundamental issue in linguistic theory is the nature of meaning” and “meaning is a matter of conceptualization”. But the latter claim creates a problem. On the one hand, for many cognitive semanticists conceptualization takes place under the level of consciousness. On the other hand, semantic analysis is carried out on the level of consciousness, namely by means of (conscious) intuition-cum-introspection. What is, then, meaning? As Wittgenstein argues, meaning is use, understood as a we
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13

Milne, Derek, Shona Dickson, Ivy M. Blackburn, and Ian James. "All in the Head? A Content Analysis of Cognitive Therapy by Trainees and Experts." Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 13, no. 3 (1999): 203–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-8391.13.3.203.

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Although cognitive therapy (CT) has gained considerable ground as a treatment of choice for a number of clinical conditions, it is not without its detractors. Criticisms include the predilection for ‘mentalistic’ explanations (e.g., schemata) over environmental ones. Following on from prior analyses that found some support for this criticism in relation to published research and the routine practice of cognitive behavioral psychotherapists, the present analysis offers a systematic content analysis of 10 video recordings of novice and expert cognitive therapists. As predicted, these novice ther
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14

Joravsky, David. "The Impossible project of Ivan Pavlov (and William James and sigmund Freud)." Science in Context 5, no. 2 (1992): 265–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269889700001186.

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The ArgumentIn different contexts, beginning with different concerns, Pavlov, James, and Freud tried to achieve a neurophysiological explanation of mind, and suffered defeat. James and Freud acknowledged the defeat and attempted, in radically different ways, to construct an interim psychology, hoping that neural explanation would be achieved in the future. Pavlov came to the effort in his fifties, after decades of research that took for granted a sharp separation between neurophysiology and psychology. He changed his mind as he noticed the descent of his discipline from study of whole-body and
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15

Dillenburger, Karola, Careen Lindsay, Katerina Dounavi, Angelika Anderson, and Dennis Moore. "There are limitations to traditional mentalistic concepts of, and opportunities for parsimonious functionally based explanations, in relation to deferred imitation, joint attention, and social communication in autism spectrum disorders." Evidence-Based Communication Assessment and Intervention 7, no. 2 (2013): 84–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17489539.2013.844444.

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16

Copple, Mary M. "Gesture and Speech." Gesture 3, no. 1 (2003): 47–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/gest.3.1.04cop.

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The role of gesture in Leroi-Gourhan’s theory of the origin of language is portrayed in its historical context and in view of recent research to allow a balanced appraisal of his contribution to the debate. Written in the mid-1960s, his Gesture and Speech offers a vivid contrast to Chomsky’s contemporary mentalist view of language that espoused Cartesian rationalism with its barriers between man and beast, and between body and mind. On the contrary, Leroi-Gourhan takes an integrated approach to human evolution: gesture (conceived of as ‘material action’) and speech are seen as twin products of
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17

Kline, Michelle Ann. "How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other animals." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 (May 23, 2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x14000090.

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AbstractThe human species is more reliant on cultural adaptation than any other species, but it is unclear how observational learning can give rise to the faithful transmission of cultural adaptations. One possibility is that teaching facilitates accurate social transmission by narrowing the range of inferences that learners make. However, there is wide disagreement about how to define teaching, and how to interpret the empirical evidence for teaching across cultures and species. In this article I argue that disputes about the nature and prevalence of teaching across human societies and nonhum
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18

Schadeberg, Thilo. "Classification of Nouns and Things in Bantu." Afrika Focus 1, no. 1-2 (1985). http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/af.v1i1-2.6625.

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Is there a semantic foundation for the system of noun classes and genders found in Bantu (and in Niger-Congo-Kordofanian) ? This question has intensely occupied many bantuists for over a century. Fundamentalist, mentalistic, and ethnosemantic approaches were used to construct explanations. The present paper reviews several such approaches, giving particular emphasis to some old and recent Dutch contributions to this field. KEYWORDS : nominal classification, Bantu, semantics
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19

Laanpere, Taavi. "Autonomy of Folk Psychology Reconsidered." Studia Philosophica Estonica, February 15, 2017, 55–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2016.9.1.03.

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It has been a recurring theme in the philosophy of mind that folk psychology is autonomous. This paper has three goals. First, it aims to clarify what the term 'folk psychology' could mean in different contexts. Four widespread senses of the term are distinguished and the one eligible for autonomy is picked out. Secondly, a classic argument for autonomy is introduced and motivated. This is the argument from the normativity of folk psychology, based on its constitutive rationality. According to this argument, mentalistic concepts are to be understood as components of prescriptions for a rationa
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