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Journal articles on the topic 'Metaphysics'
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1
Meixner, Uwe. "Playing God." Religions 10, no. 3 (March 19, 2019): 209. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10030209.
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Metaphysical modelling is a method in (epistemologically enlightened) metaphysics. It uses models for the philosophical analysis of metaphysico-epistemological situations. In this paper, the method is applied to a set of metaphysical questions that concern the relationship between God and the world, and the relationship between human beings and the world. The questions revolve around a center: What is it that ultimately determines reality? This complex metaphysical subject is treated in a simplified and downsized manner: on the scale of board games. As will be seen, the unusual perspective provided by the model leads to new insights and has a salutary corrective effect in the metaphysico-epistemological respect. The paper also provides an analysis and defense of analogical thinking in metaphysics (of which way of thinking metaphysical modelling is a special form).
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Vanheeswijck, Guido. "The Multilayered Context of Leszek Kołakowski's Hermeneutical Metaphysics." Review of Metaphysics 78, no. 1 (September 2024): 87–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a936572.
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Abstract: In 1988, the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski published his essay Metaphysical Horror , conceived as a philosophical and historical interpretation of the vicissitudes of metaphysics in Western philosophy. At the same time, Kołakowski's attempt to map out the history of that metaphysical horror was a way to escape from it. Put differently, he traced the evolution of metaphysical horror—from metaphysics to antimetaphysics—in Western philosophy while simultaneously pleading for the preservation of metaphysics, be it in a very specific shape. To clarify Kołakowski's idiosyncratic position regarding the status of metaphysics, the author's exposition falls into two parts, each in three steps. In the first part, mainly drawing upon a textual analysis of Metaphysical Horror, Kołakowski's portrayal of the evolution of Western metaphysics toward its marginalization in contemporary philosophy is summarized. Subsequently, his own concept of hermeneutical metaphysics in relation to the everlasting importance of man's metaphysical need for the Absolute is presented. In the second part, set up as an exercise in intellectual history, Kołakowski's concept of hermeneutical metaphysics is situated against the double background of his Oxford environment and of that of an Eastern-European ally regarding the vicissitudes of the metaphysical tradition. The conclusion is double. First, this twofold background makes it clear why his hermeneutical metaphysics is at the same time a historical metaphysics and a moral ontology, dependent on man's everlasting metaphysical need for the Absolute. Second, it clarifies why his hermeneutical metaphysics takes a unique position in contemporary philosophy, different from the current concept of analytic metaphysics, on the one hand, and from the present-day concept of post-metaphysics in Continental philosophy, on the other.
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Kim, Kwangsu. "Philosophy and science in Adam Smith’s ‘History of Astronomy’." History of the Human Sciences 30, no. 3 (July 2017): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952695117700055.
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This article casts light on the intimate relationship between metaphysics and science in Adam Smith’s thought. Understanding this relationship can help in resolving an enduring dispute or misreading concerning the status and role of natural theology and the ‘invisible hand’ doctrine. In Smith’s scientific realism, ontological issues are necessary prerequisites for scientific inquiry, and metaphysical ideas thus play an organizing and regulatory role. Smith also recognized the importance of scientifically informed metaphysics in science’s historical development. In this sense, for Smith, the metaphysico-scientific link (i.e. metaphysically coherent conjecture), was a basic criterion of scientific validation by Inference to the Best Explanation. Furthermore, Smith’s comments implicitly suggest that in scientific progress there is a dialectic between metaphysics and science. These themes are illustrated primarily through his writings on the history of astronomy.
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Borda, Michał, and Rafał Tetela. "Kilka uwag o aktualności filozofii metafizycznej." Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne, no. 31 (September 14, 2018): 179–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pst.2017.31.08.
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The article discusses the characteristics of a philosophical and cultural dispute with metaphysics and about metaphysics itself. The criticism of metaphysics and its revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is discussed here. In the first part, the most important philosophical directions dealing with issues of metaphysics are presented: metaphysical idealism, anti-metaphysical positivism and neo-positivism, analytic philosophy versus metaphysics on the example of L. Wittgenstein, the revision of the metaphysical tradition and new investigations in metaphysics. The second part of the article concerns the picture of natural metaphysics including the mathematical-empirical method of researching the world. In the conclusion of the article, a thesis is put forward on searching for new metaphysics which will include a wider sphere of rationality and existential and spiritual experience.
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Yo'ldoshev, Azizbek, Jonibek Norboy oʻgʻli Hasanov, and Sanjar Zafarjon oghly Jurakulov. "ON THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO PHYSICS." GOLDEN BRAIN 2, no. 1 (January 6, 2024): 501–16. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10465616.
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<em>Ignoring a crucial nuance in using the concept of metaphysics is "Does physics come first or metaphysics?" It makes it difficult to answer the question. The nuance under consideration is related to the "two-sided" structure of metaphysics. Metaphysics as a science refers to two types of phenomena with the existence of metaphysical principles - things that cannot be entered into concepts, closed to interpretation, and things that are realized through experience. From this point of view, it can be said that every society, regardless of the level of civilization, has some metaphysical principles. However, it is also observed that societies with metaphysical principles fail to develop metaphysics as a science. To develop metaphysics as a science, it is necessary to engage in natural sciences and use the results of natural sciences. In our research, we will try to show the connection between the areas that feed metaphysical teachings and these areas and metaphysical teachings with examples from the history of philosophy.</em>
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Yo'ldoshev, Azizbek, Jonibek Norboy oʻgʻli Hasanov, and Sanjar Zafarjon oʻgʻli Jurakulov. "ON THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO PHYSICS." GOLDEN BRAIN 2, no. 1 (January 7, 2024): 472–86. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10466581.
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<em>Ignoring a crucial nuance in using the concept of metaphysics is "Does physics come first or metaphysics?" It makes it difficult to answer the question. The nuance under consideration is related to the "two-sided" structure of metaphysics. Metaphysics as a science refers to two types of phenomena with the existence of metaphysical principles - things that cannot be entered into concepts, closed to interpretation, and things that are realized through experience. From this point of view, it can be said that every society, regardless of the level of civilization, has some metaphysical principles. However, it is also observed that societies with metaphysical principles fail to develop metaphysics as a science. To develop metaphysics as a science, it is necessary to engage in natural sciences and use the results of natural sciences. In our research, we will try to show the connection between the areas that feed metaphysical teachings and these areas and metaphysical teachings with examples from the history of philosophy.</em>
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MARINCHUK, Yuriy. "MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S METAPHYSICAL QUESTION OF 1929-1930: GENESIS AND CONSEQUENCES." Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences 7, no. 1 (July 26, 2024): 31–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/342413.
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The article examines the foundations that constitute the formulation of the metaphysical question in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. The article focuses in detail on the period of 1929-1930, which includes the report “Was ist Metaphysik?” and the lecture course “Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit”. The introduction to the article and the main problem are three prejudices from Being and Time that make it impossible to ask a clear question about being. The main material is presented on the basis of primary sources: “Being and Time”, “Basic Concepts of Metaphysics”. The peculiarity of Heidegger’s work of the 1929s and 1930s is the approximation of the research methodology in the 1927 treatise to the present. Phenomenological hermeneutics and fundamental ontology were used in relation to the ancient Greeks to develop a metaphysics of ciphers or special words in which Heidegger concentrated the Greek experience of being. During the 1930s, Heidegger would make an effort to realize this experience by looking for points of intersection between Greeks and Germans in German idealism and poetry. Since the Greeks are ruled by aeon (temporal time) and agon (the spirit of competition), modern metaphysics needs to develop a special concept of being that would distinguish who Germans are, where they came from, and where they are going. The article proposes a distinction between higher being - divine, human life-world – social, human essence – cultural, working, shepherd. Being, being and man are subject to metaphysical questioning as the most general concepts. That is, those that immediately or a priori express a certain clarity. Nihilism, as the spirit of the time, demands that metanarratives be questioned and self-evidence be reassessed. An outstanding achievement of Heidegger’s metaphysical question is the distinction being as Seyn. The nationalist or folk Old German definition of being both frees it from academic requirements and accurately captures the open horizon in which the existence of the first half of the 20th century was frozen. Since this essence of man is presented after the linguistic turn, it lacks the main feature of the turn-a specific linguistic ability or words that clarify being. The article aims to study Martin Heidegger’s metaphysical teaching in the 1929-1930s. The article concludes that the metaphysics of the above-mentioned years of Heidegger’s philosophy reveals itself in parallel with the spirit of the time of the then German conservative revolution. As we know, Martin Heidegger did not remove the question of being and selected names for it, because he was looking for an appropriated lawn and a boundary, beyond which the exit to the lawn opens. This article offers a look at this problematic in the contextual name of metaphysic – Seyn.
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Allen, Sophie R. "What Matters in (Naturalized) Metaphysics?" Essays in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2012): 212–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213113.
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Can metaphysics ever really be compatible with science? In this paper, I investigate the implications of the methodological approach to metaphysical theorizing known as naturalized metaphysics. In the past, metaphysics has been rejected entirely by empirically-minded philosophers as being too open to speculation and for relying on methods which are not conducive to truth. But naturalized metaphysics aims to be a less radical solution to these difficulties, treating metaphysical theorizing as being continuous with science and restricting metaphysical methods to empirically respectable ones. I investigate a significant difficulty for naturalized metaphysics: that it lacks the methodological resources to comparatively evaluate competing ontological theories, or even to distinguish adequately between them. This objection is more acute when applied to robust realist versions of naturalized metaphysics, since the realist should be able to say which theory is true of the objective world. If this objection holds, then it seems that the commitment to naturalized metaphysics, or to robust realism about the categories and processes in metaphysics, will have to be relaxed.
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Terekhovich, Vladislav. "Challenges in Constructing Scientific Metaphysics: A Case Study of the Everettian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 5 (July 2024): 134–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2024-5-134-139.
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The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental concepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by examples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scientific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of mainstream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the ontologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.
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Wang, Hongjian. "Nihilismus zwischen traditioneller Metaphysik und Post‑Metaphysik. Kritische Untersuchung von Heideggers Nietzsche‑Interpretation." Studia Phaenomenologica 22 (2022): 237–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20222212.
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In his interpretation of Nietzsche, Heidegger on the one hand acknowledges the anti‑metaphysical orientation of Nietzsche’s nihilism, but on the other hand considers Nietzsche to be the ultimate metaphysician. This location is based firstly on Heidegger’s reflections on the relationship between metaphysics and nihilism. By revealing the origin and end of metaphysics, it is to be shown that nihilism and metaphysics are two aspects of the same thing. Moreover, Heidegger expands the meaning of metaphysics by ascribing to it the distinction between the sensuous and supersensuous worlds, between beings and beingness. Based on the critique of Nietzsche, he is able to develop a post‑metaphysical philosophical conception. Nietzsche himself, however, is not addicted to metaphysics, and in his overcoming of metaphysics and his vision of post‑metaphysical thinking he is rather a precursor of Heidegger.
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Hofweber, Thomas. "Fundamental Ontology and Esoteric Metaphysics: How to settle the Question." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (December 9, 2024): 753–82. https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_4_0753.
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How can we settle whether key metaphysical questions should properly be stated by relying on a substantial notion of metaphysical priority, like grounding or being metaphysically more fundamental than? Relatedly, how can we settle whether ontology should properly be seen as the disciple that studies either what there is or else only what there is fundamentally? Which way of thinking about ontology brings out its proper metaphysical significance? One challenge to giving notions like grounding or fundamentality key roles in metaphysics is that these notions are insufficiently clear, and that metaphysics tied to them turns into esoteric metaphysics. To make progress on these issues I propose a particular challenge—the cognitive function challenge—that needs to be met for metaphysics based on a substantial notion of priority not to turn into objectionable esoteric metaphysics. I also outline some reasons why other approaches that aim to establish such notions as legitimate for metaphysics fall short and how the cognitive function challenge might be met.
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Kosykhin, Vitaly G., and Svetlana M. Malkina. "Metaphysics and Realism." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 2 (2021): 216–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158237.
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The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
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Pinzani, Alessandro. "Do We Need a Metaphysics of Morals?" Dialogue and Universalism 31, no. 3 (2021): 249–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202131355.
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This paper argues that Kant’s project of a metaphysics of morals represents a normative ideal grounded on the core ideas of Enlightenment. In the first section, it analyzes Kant’s concept of metaphysical principles of morals by establishing a connection between a metaphysics of morals and Kant’s concept of metaphysics in general and of metaphysics of nature in particular. It then discusses what is metaphysical in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In its last section, it tackles the question of whether a non-metaphysical reading of Kant’s doctrines of right and of virtue is desirable if we want to remain faithful to Kant’s Enlightenment project.
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Batista, Ricardo Barroso, and Bruno Nobre. "Explorations in Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics: Mind, Identity, and Society." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 3 (October 31, 2024): 733–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_3_0733.
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Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology.
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Alfonso Leon Guillen Gomez. "Gravity, Metaphysics or Physics?" International Journal of Fundamental Physical Sciences 3, no. 4 (December 31, 2013): 68–74. https://doi.org/10.14331/ijfps.2013.330058.
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Gravity is the foundation of the current physical paradigm. Due to that gravity is strongly linked to the curvature of space-time, we research that it lacks of a valid physical concept of space-time, nevertheless that from the science philosophy, via substantivalism, it has tried respond. We found that is due to that the gnoseological process applied from the general relativity, necessarily us leads to metaphysic because ontologically space-time is a metaphysical entity. Thus, we arrive to the super substantivalism that from metaphysics gives an answer on space-time rigorously exact with the vision of Einstein on physics. The result is that matter is nothing since all is space-time, i.e. geometry, therefore is a imperative of the physical science break the current paradigm.
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Rivera, Joseph. "God and Metaphysics in Contemporary Theology: Reframing the Debate." Theological Studies 77, no. 4 (November 17, 2016): 823–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040563916666821.
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Recent post-metaphysical trends in contemporary theology seek to overcome “metaphysics,” in order to free God-language from the trappings of onto-theology. This means that theology prioritizes the conventional discourse of the church over the universal ambitions of metaphysical language. This article offers a corrective to the “post-metaphysical” corrective by proposing a broader definition of metaphysics, one rooted in concrete experience. In this regard I constructively consider Jean-Yves Lacoste’s “conceptual rescue operation” metaphysics in his wide-ranging Être en danger (2011)
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Xia, Yu. "What Is Metaphysics? Heidegger’s Evolving Account of Metaphysics." Symposion 10, no. 2 (2023): 275–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion202310216.
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In this paper, I deal with Heidegger’s evolving account of metaphysics, since Heidegger’s persistent concern, the question of being, is a basic metaphysical question. To date, most Heidegger scholars have focused only on a particular stage of Heidegger’s philosophy: either his early attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, or his efforts to overcome metaphysics in the 1930s, or his late embrace of ‘releasement’ from metaphysics. However, these limited approaches fail to address Heidegger’s different understandings of metaphysics, which lie at the root of his changing approaches to the question of being. They also fail to explain whether there is any inner connection between the various approaches. Further, given Heidegger’s unremittingly negative attitude towards metaphysics, some scholars have even maintained that Heidegger thought it both possible and desirable to leave metaphysics behind altogether. I address these issues first by arguing that metaphysics for Heidegger has three interconnected meanings: initially it is the representation of the totality of things that are present-at-hand, a view subsequently developed into subjective representational thinking, and finally radicalized into an expression of the will to power. At each stage, Heidegger critiques the metaphysical tradition but never claims that it can be fully eliminated, since it is a mode of Dasein’s being and ultimately possiblized by being itself. For this reason, Heidegger’s own philosophy of being remains inseparable from metaphysics.
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Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. "Religion, Philosophy, Scholarship and the Muddles Thereof." Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 28, no. 1 (December 2, 2016): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341355.
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For many centuries, the relations between philosophy and religion were very close—at times indistinguishable. That is not so in the modern secular academy, which houses philosophy along with the study of religion but without noticeable mutual relations between the two. Kevin Schilbrack has ably dealt with that situation in his latest publication ‘Philosophy and the Study of Religion’. Schilbrack’s diagnoses are acute and most scholars in the study of religion will consider them worth heeding—except, most likely, his calls for more metaphysical concerns based on ideas of ‘unmediated experience’. His arguments proceed from current philosophical positions and theories of situated cognition and his appeals are quite convincing. However, they do have one remarkable drawback as this critic sees it: That metaphysics move from the ontological realm to the epistemic (!). That is no mean feat, because as no one really seems to know what metaphysics are in this ‘post-metaphysic age’, Schilbrack’s proposal seems to indicate that metaphysics now become humanly approachable and intellectually tractable. As such, they could justifiably become an integral part of the study of religion—as could philosophy.
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Thomasson, Amie L. "Changing Metaphysics: What Difference does it Make?" Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (July 2018): 139–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000188.
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AbstractI have argued elsewhere for a deflationary conception of metaphysics, which takes well-formed metaphysical questions to be answerable using nothing more mysterious than empirical information and descriptive and normative conceptual work. Here I examine the ways in which our practices of metaphysics should change, if we adopt the deflationary reconception of metaphysics. Adopting this approach does not mean abandoning metaphysics, but it does lead to important differences regarding which debates and positions are worth taking seriously. It also requires us to reevaluate which criteria for choosing metaphysical views are appropriate – particularly where debates about existence are concerned.
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Ross, Don. "A Flexible, Sloppy Blob?" American Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.1.02.
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Abstract Ladyman and Ross argue that analytic metaphysics is a misguided enterprise that should give way to a naturalized metaphysics that aims to reconcile everyday and special-scientific ontologies with fundamental physics as the authoritative source of knowledge on the general structure of the universe. Le Bihan and Barton (argue, as against this, that analytic metaphysics remains useful as a basis for the body of work in AI known as “applied ontology.” They stop short of claiming, however, that analytic metaphysics is useful as metaphysics. I consider a basis for making the stronger claim: Smith's project for building what he claims to be metaphysical foundations for applied ontology (and for AI generally). Ultimately, the stronger claim is rejected; but in the course of this dialectic new aspects of the naturalistic metaphysical project come to light, including relationships between it and the traditional metaphysical project of providing foundations for philosophical semantics of truth and reference.
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Samraj, Tennyson. "Metaphysics: Intelligible Questions and the Explicable World of Intentionality." Athens Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 4 (November 30, 2022): 221–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajphil.1-4-3.
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Metaphysics deals with the intelligible world of questions and the explicable world of intentionality. Metaphysics is explicable, and its explicability is connected to questions related to what there is to know about the nature of reality. While physics deals with what is and what else there is, metaphysics deals with the nature of reality and what else there is to know about the nature of reality. If the content of metaphysics is considered as "answers" to questions related to cosmology and consciousness, then metaphysical claims must be understood in the context of the questions that necessitate such claims. For without understanding the relevance of the questions, we cannot establish the 'truth' or 'falsity' of metaphysical claims. The relevance of the questions is the basis for establishing the veracity of the metaphysical distinctions. Hence, all metaphysical distinctions are a non-reductive explanation of what is considered as being reductive. The content of consciousness or intentionality deals with the following metaphysical distinctions, namely, the matter/mind, the essence/ existence, the space/time, the concrete/abstract, the particular/universal, and the contingent/necessary distinctions. These distinctions are made possible because of the questions raised by the intelligent mind. Two questions that connect physics and metaphysics are-- what is there and the nature of what is there. Two further questions that promote our interest in physics and metaphysics are: what else is there to know, and what else is there to know about the nature of reality. Reality and the nature of reality are the same. However, because the mind makes this distinction, we can state that what is physical is an empirical given, and what is metaphysical is a phenomenological or an existential given. Keywords: metaphysics, intentionality, subjectivity, creativity, freedom and time
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Tounsi, Mohammad. "metaphysics of physics: When the boundaries of science and metaphysics intertwine." International journal of health sciences 8, S1 (April 4, 2024): 515–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.53730/ijhs.v8ns1.14846.
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The evolution of contemporary physics proved that science cannot abandon metaphysics, there is evidence that there are theories that engage in metaphysical topics or offer metaphysical solutions to scientific problems, there were many concepts and theories that were not based on experience because of the difficulty of testing them. This is the result of the great theoretical progress achieved in physical research, The evolution of contemporary physics has shown that the Positivism call for excluding metaphysics from science cannot be achieved, Metaphysics is found in the principles of science as we rely on postulates that cannot be demonstrated, such as the stability of the laws of nature, The necessity of metaphysics arises from the fact that the development of physics has proven the limitations of scientific experience, The theoretical aspect must advance because cognitive curiosity will not stop the human from asking questions, Metaphysical ideas can play a guiding role in theoretical research in physics,
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Ahmed Fakhre Alam, Shaikh Zeeshan Ahmed Fakhre Alam, and Dr Narayan Shankar Gadade. "Epistemology of Advaita Vedanta." June-July 2023, no. 34 (June 1, 2023): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.55529/jpps.34.1.5.
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This present research work is about Epistemology of Vedanta particularly about Advait Vedanta and how epistemology and metaphysics are interconnected. Epistemology is one of the branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, structure, types, sources, method and validity of knowledge. Every system of Indian philosophy has its own epistemology. Epistemology and metaphysics are inter-related. Metaphysics is one of the main branch of philosophy. Every Indian school has its own metaphysics. Metaphysics deals with questions regarding reality like what is reality? whether it is material or spiritual? what exists? is the world real or not? out of what substance this world is made? whether reality is one, two or many? Etc. What then is the epistemology of Vedanta? Epistemology of any school of Indian philosophy is based upon its metaphysical views regarding reality. Therefore it is important that first of all we must know the metaphysics of Vedanta specially Advait Vedanta of Sri Shankaracharya. Metaphysics tells us what exist and epistemology tells us how we can know that. In this way epistemology serves the role of instrument for knowing metaphysical realities. Metaphysics comes first then comes epistemology.
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Arenhart, Jonas R. Becker, and Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo. "The spectrum of metametaphysics." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 66, no. 1 (December 27, 2021): e41217. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41217.
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Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant.
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Covoni, Niccolò, Alberto Corti, and Vincenzo Fano. "A Model-based Form of Naturalised Metaphysics." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (December 9, 2024): 783–818. https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_4_0783.
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The paper addresses the main meta-metaphysical question, i.e., whether it is possible to do metaphysics and, in the case of an affirmative answer, how should we do it? With such an aim in mind, we sketch the broad context in which these meta-metaphysical questions arose in the philosophical literature (§ 1); then, we present what we take to be the three most widespread conceptions of metaphysics that are available in the analytic tradition: the neo-Quinean (§ 2), metaphysics as the science of possibilities (§ 3) and metaphysics as the study of the fundamental structures of reality (§ 4). We criticise these positions throughout these paragraphs before cashing out our proposal (§ 5). Our interpretation aligns with the recently proposed approach known as ‘naturalised metaphysics’ but with crucial differences. In our view, metaphysics is not only constrained by physics; rather, it grows out from all empirical sciences. More precisely, it can be achieved using formal language and the analysis of the results of scientific theories.
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Faritov, Vyacheslav T. "Post-metaphysical metaphysics L.P. Karsavina." Vestnik of Samara State Technical University. Series Philosophy 4, no. 1 (May 11, 2022): 11–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.17673/vsgtu-phil.2022.1.2.
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The article is devoted to comprehending the path of Russian religious philosophy in the perspective of the crisis of European metaphysics. Based on the analysis of the concepts of L.P. Karsavin and F. Nietzsche, the article substantiates the thesis that Karsavins philosophy is characterized by a post-metaphysical orientation. A comparative analysis of the teachings of L. Karsavin and F. Nietzsche is carried out.
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Rubsky, V. M. "POST-METAPHYSICAL CHANGING IN METAPHYSICS." Innovative Solution in Modern Science 7, no. 26 (December 2, 2018): 88. http://dx.doi.org/10.26886/2414-634x.7(26)2018.6.
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Schaffer, Jonathan. "Laws for Metaphysical Explanation." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (July 2018): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000164.
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AbstractI argue that, just like causal explanation requires laws of nature, so metaphysical explanation requires laws of metaphysics. I offer a minimal rendition of the argument for laws of metaphysics, assuming nothing about grounding or essences, and little about explanation. And I offer a positive and minimal functional conception of the laws of metaphysics, coupled with an argument that some laws of metaphysics are fundamental.
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Strollo, Andrea. "The Logical Rise of Analytic Metaphysics." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (December 9, 2024): 819–40. https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_4_0819.
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Analytic metaphysics is usually considered a contemporary form of traditional, pre-Cartesian metaphysics. This paper examines the epistemic legitimacy of analytic metaphysics in the face of scientific dominance. While naturalized metaphysics has found its place within science, analytic metaphysics remains challenged. To meet the challenge, I propose interpreting analytic metaphysics as a form of logical inquiry, positioning logic as its foundation, similarly to how science grounds naturalized metaphysics. The argument is developed through three key points: (1) tracing the historical connection between science and naturalized metaphysics on the one hand, and analytic metaphysics and philosophical logic on the other hand, (2) highlighting similarities between logic and metaphysics, and (3) demonstrating that contemporary analytic metaphysics often operates as a logical inquiry. I show that this strategy preserves classical options at the meta-metaphysical level, arguing that a view of logic as grounded in language is in a better position to safeguard the autonomy from science and the collapse into naturalized metaphysics.
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Switzer, Adrian. "The Traditional Form of a Complete Science." Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 44 (2014): 149–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2014224422.
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The article treats as significant the formal coincidence between Kant’s presentation of the science of metaphysics in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” chapter of the first Critique and Alexander Baumgarten’s presentation of the same in the Metaphysica. From his comments on Baumgarten in the metaphysics lectures, the article shows that for Kant metaphysics in its traditional form lacked completeness and systematic order. Kant fits completeness into his architectonic plan of a scientific metaphysics by Converting Baumgartian ontology into an “analytic of the understanding”; Kant achieves the systematicity by modeling a rational “idea of the form of the whole” after Baumgarten’s tree-like ordering of the special sciences of metaphysics. Thus, Kant realizes the completeness and systematicity in a theoretical presentation of the science of metaphysics that he finds lacking in Baumgarten precisely by borrowing from the latter his scheme for metaphysics.
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Blas, González Pedro. "Ortega y Gasset on Metaphysics [Ortega y Gasset sobre la metafísica]." Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 6, no. 7 (December 22, 2017): 199–209. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1490487.
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<em>Some Lessons in Metaphysics</em> is José Ortega y Gasset’s testament to metaphysics in relation to existential longing. While Ortega writes about metaphysics in other of his works, it is in <em>Some Lessons in Metaphysics</em> that he defines metaphysics as springing from man’s immediate (existential) necessity to find coherence in individual human existence, which man experiences as a «shipwrecked» being in the cosmos. Metaphysical reflection aims to establish coherence and meaning in human life. As a result of existential inquietude, Ortega argues that metaphysics is the cornerstone of thoughtful philosophical reflection for people who «need it».
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Iakovlev, V. A. "GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF METAPHYSICAL PROGRAMS." Metaphysics, no. 1 (April 4, 2022): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2022-1-19-28.
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The paper analyzes the meaning and content of the concept of metaphysics in history. There are seven metaphysical programs of Antiquity, which largely determined the development of science. It is proved that metaphysics acts as the fundamental foundation of science and philosophy as a whole, their essential structure. Metaphysical principles are informational elements of the universe. The modern religious direction of metaphysical research is considered in detail.
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Iakovlev, V. A. "GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF METAPHYSICAL PROGRAMS." Metaphysics, no. 1 (April 4, 2022): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2022-1-19-28.
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The paper analyzes the meaning and content of the concept of metaphysics in history. There are seven metaphysical programs of Antiquity, which largely determined the development of science. It is proved that metaphysics acts as the fundamental foundation of science and philosophy as a whole, their essential structure. Metaphysical principles are informational elements of the universe. The modern religious direction of metaphysical research is considered in detail.
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Stein, Ross. "A Metaphysical Analysis of Chemical Change: Toward a Reconciliation of Whiteheadian Process Metaphysics and Aristotelian-Scholastic Substance Metaphysics." Process Studies 53, no. 2 (2024): 213–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21543682.53.2.04.
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Abstract Can a bridge be constructed between Whiteheadian process metaphysics and Aristotelian-Scholastic substance metaphysics? I ask this question in the context of physical change, using the chemical transformation of molecules as the quintessential exemplar. While both metaphysical systems describe nature as dynamical and relational, each sees change differently: for process metaphysics, change is constitutive of all actualities, while for substance metaphysics, change is secondary and something that happens to actualities. My analysis concludes that these two systems of thought have fundamental metaphysical differences that do not permit a reconciliation. Rather than reconciliation, what might be possible is the development of a new way to speak about the actualities of world, not as substances or processes but a way that subsumes both.
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Lawal, Ademola Lukman. "Interface Between Metaphysics and Science." Àgídìgbo: ABUAD Journal of the Humanities 12, no. 2 (December 31, 2024): 634–44. https://doi.org/10.53982/agidigbo.2024.1202.44-j.
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The interface between metaphysics and science refers to the close-knit relationship between Metaphysics as First Philosophy and science. The first conception of metaphysics by Aristotle makes its appearance after Physics. The issue at hand borders on the lacuna between metaphysics and science, on the first hand, and on the interconnectedness of the metaphysics, and by extension the whole of philosophy, and the sciences of Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Engineering. We must underscore the view that Metaphysics investigates into the ground and foundation of all regularities and irregularities in nature. It is the first philosophy and the first science. We shall, therefore, probe into the development of modern science from classical antiquity and state the mistake of rejecting metaphysics by the logical positivists as a fundamental injury to science. Our attempt to recover and rediscover the metaphysical foundations of science shall reestablish an enabling interface between metaphysics and science. Our discussion shall first be on metaphysics as the first philosophy and the first science. After examining how science has dovetailed from metaphysics, we would reestablish the interface between metaphysics and science.
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Cruickshank, Justin. "Solidarity, critique and techno-science: Evaluating Rorty’s pragmatism, Freire’s critical pedagogy and Vattimo’s philosophical hermeneutics." Human Affairs 30, no. 4 (October 27, 2020): 577–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0051.
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AbstractThe critique of metaphysics can often entail a critique of liberalism. Rorty sought a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophy and the broader humanities, by linking the rejection of metaphysics to a justification for liberal democracy and reformism. He believed that the recognition of socio-historical contingency concerning interpretations of fundamental values and of truth, combined with a humanities education, would create a sense of solidarity that would motivate reforms. Freire argues that a dialogic form of education is as important as the humanities’ content. For Freire, people liberated by a critical education based on dialogue rather than a passive reception of information, can develop a radical critique of capitalism. Vattimo argues that while Heidegger saw techno-science as being the final phase in metaphysical domination, the contemporary development of information and communications technology creates a ‘Babel-like’ pluralism that undermines the ‘violence’ of metaphysic’s totalising thought. This can allow for the development of a post-metaphysical ‘weak communism’ that improves social justice. Rorty and Freire help to show that it is education, rather than technological developments, that can motivate a post-metaphysical politics of solidarity, and Vattimo and Freire are correct to argue that replacing reformism with radical critique is needed for social justice, although Vattimo’s weak communism only provides limited social justice.
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Moreira, Felipe G. A. "Overcoming Metametaphysics: Nietzsche and Carnap." Nietzsche-Studien 47, no. 1 (November 1, 2018): 240–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2018-0010.
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Abstract This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics characterized by the conjunction of the following three claims: (O-i) an overcoming of metaphysics ought to be performed; (O-ii) this overcoming is to be performed by adopting a method of linguistic analysis that is suspicious of the metaphysical use of language and that interprets such use through a different use of language which aims to avoid metaphysics; and (O-iii) this overcoming contributes to the political task of resisting “diseased” metaphysical practices and promoting “healthy” non-metaphysical practices.
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Sharkey, Sarah Borden. "Is Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being a Kind of “Phenomenological Metaphysics”?" Symposium 25, no. 2 (2021): 48–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium202125215.
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One striking feature of Finite and Eternal Being is Edith Stein’s exceedingly rare use of the term “metaphysics.” She uses the term “formal ontology” numerous times, but the term “metaphysics” only appears a handful of times in the body of the text, and even those references are themselves a bit surprising. This could be explained in several ways, some of which may be quite innocent and have nothing to do with whether she understands her project as metaphysical. In the following, however, I would like to explore a differing explanation and argue that (at least, in part) her reason for avoiding describing her work as metaphysical is connected with the type of philosophical critique she wants to make of traditional metaphysics. I will not argue that Finite and Eternal Being should ultimately be read as a phenomenological analysis of being rather than any sort of metaphysical treatise, but I will argue that Stein has explicitly phenomenological reasons for being cautious about using the term “metaphysics.”
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Copleston, Frederick. "Ayer and World Views." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (September 1991): 63–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007682.
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As we all know, in Freddie Ayer's famous book Language, Truth and Logic metaphysics received short shrift. Metaphysical assertions were dismissed as being all nonsensical (LTL, 2nd edn, 41). In the work in question Ayer clearly tended to equate metaphysics with what Professor W. H. Walsh was to describe as ‘transcendent’ (as distinct from ‘immanent’) metaphysics (Walsh, 1963). This tendency is also discernible, I think, in the 1949 debate between Ayer and myself on logical positivism. After all, my defence of metaphysics was largely prompted and certainly strengthened by what I believed to be the religious relevance of metaphysical philosophy. A lot of what Aristotle would have described as ‘first philosophy’ and what some later philosophers would have classified as ‘ontology’ Ayer would have called ‘philosophical analysis’. What he was primarily concerned with undermining was any claim by metaphysicians to be able to extend our knowledge of what exists, of the Absolute or God for example, by metaphysical arguments.
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Aspray, Barnabas. "Paul Ricœur and Metaphysics." Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 15, no. 2 (December 20, 2024): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2024.680.
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In twentieth-century France, the word “metaphysics” had connotations of closed systems which claimed certainty for themselves. As a result, few dared to engage in metaphysical speculation. Ricœur, however, rejected this prevalent definition because he believed it came from Heidegger’s procrustean reading of the history of philosophy. While agreeing that certainty and closure were neither desirable nor possible, Ricœur did make metaphysical claims. Following Jaspers’s revival of pre-modern apophatic metaphysics for which transcendence cannot be comprehended, Ricœur, in his early work, argued for “critical realism” against neo-Kantian idealism, “original affirmation” against Sartrean negativity, and the “metaphysical choice” of human freedom’s consent to the unchosen features of reality.
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Nuzzo, Angelica. "The Idea of ‘Method’ in Hegel's Science of Logic — a Method for Finite Thinking and Absolute Reason." Hegel Bulletin 20, no. 1-2 (1999): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200001403.
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Hegel's Science of Logic achieves its conclusion with a chapter on the ‘absolute Idea’ that parallels the ending of other works such as the ‘absolute Knowing’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the ‘absolute Spirit’ chapter of the Encyclopedia. However, the ending of the Logic claims special systematic attention due to the fact that Hegel presents here the ‘discourse on method’ of his philosophy. The method of philosophy — of philosophical thinking and philosophical knowing — is the method of speculative logic. This logic “takes the place” of the old metaphysics — of the traditional metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis — going beyond Kant's own critique and proposing a new science that establishes itself as the “eigentliche Metaphysik”. The project of concluding this new speculative metaphysics with a theory of method is complicated by the double systematic placing that Hegel attributes to his logic which, at the same time, figures as the very first and very last science of the whole system of philosophy. In this perspective, the absolute Idea of the Logic gains its double relation to the phenomenological ‘absolute knowing’ and to the highest moment of ‘absolute spirit’.
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Rödl, Sebastian. "Das metaphysische Unternehmen." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67, no. 1 (March 5, 2019): 98–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0007.
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Abstract In Barry Stroud’s book Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction, the eponymous dissatisfaction is said to be due to our inability to obtain certainty about the correspondence between the world and our ways of thinking it. In Stroud’s terms, this dissatisfaction is caused by the failure of the metaphysical enterprise. Beginning with Aristotle’s metaphysics, this paper discusses Stroud’s misunderstanding which stems from his particular construal of the object of metaphysics: There is no metaphysical enterprise and thus, there can be no metaphysical dissatisfaction.
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Mills, Philip. "The Seduction of Metaphors." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 31, no. 1/2 (April 12, 2024): 148–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2023.1045.
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Nietzsche’s metaphor of seduction suggests that language catches philosophers in the trap of metaphysics. Nietzsche uses the poetic powers of language to fight against this metaphysical language. However, his use of the metaphor of truth as a woman seems to seduce him back in metaphysics. Metaphors become seductive because of their rhetorical and performative power. One must therefore be wary of the seduction of metaphors when attempting at revaluating the metaphysics of language. Hélène Cixous undertakes such a task, using a poetic language in order to escape the metaphysical dualisms embedded in language without falling back into its traps.
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Maciaszek, Janusz. "Metafizyka zdarzeń Donalda Davidsona." Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, no. 22 (January 1, 2009): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.22.08.
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Donald Davidson (1917–2002) is mainly known as a philosopher of language who based his theory of meaning on Tarski's definition of truth. His theory without meanings as entities is the core of a subtle and sophisticated philosophical system that resembles very complicated puzzles. If isolated every part of his system seems arbitrary and not justified. It concerns particularly his metaphysics of events which justification can be found in Davidson's views on language, cognition and psychology. Davidson himself usually applies the term "ontology" but in fact makes some metaphysical presuppositions. These presuppositions do not constitute metaphysical system but rather are used to explain the phenomenon of linguistic communication. The main categories of Davidsonian metaphysic: event, object and causal relation, are irreducible and can be described in various ways. In the paper I reconstruct Davidson's way from his philosophy of language to his metaphysic. I also indicate some consequences of his metaphysical views for his philosophy of science and psychology.
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Kawka, Sebastian. "Próba zastosowania "siatki metafizycznej" M.A. Krąpca do analizy tożsamościowego sposobu istnienia (bytów) na przykładzie hasła "Metafizyka" w "Encyclopaedia Britannica"." Rocznik Tomistyczny (2024) 13 (December 30, 2024): 229–47. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14544877.
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The article has been divided into two parts. The first introduces and presents M.A. Krąpiec’s "metaphysical net” as the proper and adequate toolkit to investigate philosophical (resp. metaphysical topics). The second part of the article deals with an attempt to investigate the crux topic for metaphysics what a substantial (i.e. identical) mode of being is. This is based on the article <em>Metaphysics</em> from <em>Encyclopaedia Britannica</em>”. Due to the plurality of Encyclopaedia’s editions, the paper has been limited merely to its first edition (1771). To conduct the investigation, the „metaphysical net” has been executed and incorporated into it. There is an inkling that an image of metaphysics can be elucidated and provide a fertile, solid philosophical soil freed from unphilosophical particles due to Krąpiec’s „metaphysical net”.
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Knyazev, V. N. "ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF METAPHYSICS IN THE HISTORY OF CULTURE." Metaphysics, no. 3 (December 15, 2021): 128–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2021-3-128-141.
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The article examines the evolution of the concept of “metaphysics” in the history of culture. Metaphysics as the “first philosophy” of Aristotle has gone through a historically variable path as a consequence of the pluralistic nature of the very nature of philosophical knowledge. Solidarizing in the main thing - metaphysics is an understanding of the fundamental, fundamental principles of being - each independently thinking philosopher takes as a basis as principles different understandings of substances and its attributes. Questions of the relationship between the concepts of “metaphysics” and “ontology” in various historical and philosophical discourses are discussed. Based on this, metaphysical concepts in specific philosophical teachings and doctrines are quite variable in the history of culture, up to the positivist desire to expel metaphysics from science. The modern understanding of metaphysics in collaboration with the philosophy of science makes it possible to reveal the dialectical connection between metaphysics and science and, in particular, metaphysics and fundamental physics.
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Stoliarova, Olga. "The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review." Digital Scholar Philosopher s Lab 4, no. 1 (2021): 126–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32326/2618-9267-2021-4-1-126-143.
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The article (the publication consists of two parts) presents an analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. This phenomenon is proposed to be analyzed from the viewpoint of historical ontology, which deals with the ontological presuppositions of knowledge and their historical dynamics. In the first part, the author highlights two directions of the historical development of metaphysical problems, one of which expresses the immediate metaphysical position, and the other represents the criticism of this position. The author associates criticism of metaphysics with the development of science and the philosophy of science. The author shows the difference between the “analytical” and “continental” approaches to metaphysical problems. The consideration of metaphysics as a historical phenomenon is associated with Hegel’s metaphilosophical historicism. The alternative, non-historical, consideration of metaphysics is placed in the context of empiricism and positivism. The concepts of scientific realism are defined as a kind of positivistically restricted analytical metaphysics. The author highlights three points of growth of post-positivist philosophy and pays special attention to the relationship between post-positivist philosophy of science, history of science, metaphilosophical history of ideas, and sociology of science. The author traces the gradual formation of theoretical conditions for the rehabilitation of metaphysics in these research fields. The author demonstrates that the historicization of Kant’s “transcendental subject” creates a specific epistemological perspective that joins historicism with contextualism. Within this perspective, the question of the ontological presuppositions of empirical (primarily scientific) knowledge, their development and change becomes of great importance.
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Marciniak, Dominik. "Dwie koncepcje badań metafizycznych rozwijane w XX wieku w filozofii polskiej." Człowiek i Społeczeństwo 53 (June 27, 2022): 223–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/cis.2022.53.13.
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The paper presents two different conceptions of metaphysics – scientistic and neoscholastic – developed in the 20th century by, among others, Polish philosophers: Stanisław Kamiński, Mieczysław Gogacz, Tadeusz Czeżowski and Zygmunt Zawirski. These authors refer to the problem of the possibility of conducting metaphysical research in contemporary philosophy. In this context, they examine issues such as the method, subject, and specificity of research carried out within metaphysics. In the summary, the discussed conceptions are compared with each other. The basic issues determining the similarities and differences between respective positions are the problem of the autonomy of metaphysics in relation to other sciences and the issue of the starting point (source of preliminary data) of metaphysical research. Findings regarding the latter issue turn out to be crucial for resolving the question of the appropriate model for research in metaphysics.
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Karľa, Michal. "On Peirce’s Earliest Conception of Metaphysics." American Journal of Semiotics 37, no. 3 (2021): 267–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ajs20223976.
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In this paper, I explore Peirce’s initial conception of metaphysics as developed in his “Treatise on Metaphysics” (1861–2: W 1.57–84). Peirce claimed therein that the idea of metaphysics was three-fold, with its three perspectives consisting of its definition, object, and method. Since Peirce defined metaphysics as the “philosophy of primal truths” (1861: W 1.59), I initially focus on elaborating upon what these “primal truths” are and illustrate that they are analytical propositions resulting from the logical analysis of the general constitution of a mental state (an image) to its elements. Next, I give account of how Peirce’s thoughts regarding the justification of metaphysical propositions resulted in his concluding that in metaphysical knowledge, like in any other, there is an element of faith. Finally, I conclude with remarks regarding Peirce’s notion of reflexivity as it is employed in his metametaphysics.
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Batista, Ricardo Barroso, and Bruno Nobre. "Explorations in Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics: Grounding, Modality, and the Nature of Reality." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80, no. 4 (December 9, 2024): 741–50. https://doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2024_80_4_0741.
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Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology. Analytic metaphysics, as a contemporary branch of philosophical research, originated from the analytic tradition. This movement emerged in the early 20th century, driven by a desire for greater clarity and rigor in philosophical inquiry. Philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein were pioneers of this movement, advocating a methodology based on precise linguistic argumentation and rigorous logical analysis. Despite the advancements promoted by analytic philosophy, this period was also marked by a profound crisis for metaphysics. Influenced by the rigidity and the spectrum of the new logical positivism, the philosophical community began to view metaphysics with increasing skepticism, often considering it speculative and devoid of any meaningful or empirical content. This view became dominant, dismissing traditional metaphysical questions as pseudo-questions, i.e., devoid of empirical content and therefore devoid of real meaning. However, this trend began to shift under the influence of figures such as W. Quine, who played a key role in revitalizing metaphysics within the analytic tradition, and is often considered the founder of the new “analytic metaphysics.” Notably, his challenge to the then analytic-synthetic distinction in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” had profound implications for logical positivism and the verification principle. Quine argued that there was no clear boundary between purely analytic propositions (known through understanding alone) and synthetic propositions (known through experience), thus breaking the dogmatic boundaries between conceptual analysis and empirical representation. This perspective opened the possibility of reappreciating ontological questions that had until then been marginalized.