Academic literature on the topic 'Methodological skepticism'
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Journal articles on the topic "Methodological skepticism"
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Rusin, Jill. "Characterizing Skepticism’s Import." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2, no. 2 (2012): 99–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x627249.
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This paper discusses a common contemporary characterization of skepticism and skeptical arguments—that their real importance is instrumental, that they “drive progress in philosophy.” I explore two possible contrasts to the idea that skepticism’s significance is thus wholly methodological. First, I recall for the reader a range of views that can be understood as ‘truth in skepticism’ views. These concessive views are those most clearly at odds with the idea that skepticism is false, but instrumentally valuable. Considering the contributions of such ‘truth in skepticism’ theorists, I argue, shows that the good of furthering philosophical progress is partly achieved by the work of those who would reject the ‘merely methodological’ view of skepticism’s import. While this shows such a view of skepticism’s import to be partially self-effacing, it is not therefore incoherent. Rather, the characterization is revealed to be wedded to particular diagnoses of skepticism, and not independently innocuous or neutral. Second, I discuss the idea that the ‘merely methodological’ characterization of skepticism’s import draws a contrast with philosophical positions or theses that are supposed to have practical teeth. Here, I think the danger of acquiescing too readily to this view is that the normative import of skeptical arguments is obscured. At a time when discussions of the value of knowledge are in ascendency, this in particular seems a loss—a route from consideration of skeptical arguments to broader normative questions worth keeping open is rather more obscured than opened up. Any radically revisionary outcome of an encounter with skepticism is less likely, led by such an understanding, just when there is opportunity instead to connect up with broad questions of epistemic value. For these reasons I argue the characterization is not one to too readily, unthinkingly, endorse.
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Lee, Richard. "Being Skeptical about Skepticism: Methodological Themes concerning Ockham's Alleged Skepticism." Vivarium 39, no. 1 (2001): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685340152882516.
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Alcock, James E. "On the importance of methodological skepticism." New Ideas in Psychology 9, no. 2 (January 1991): 151–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0732-118x(91)90018-h.
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Misyurov, Nikolay Nikolayevich. "“POSITIVE SKEPTICISM” AS THE METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE OF FR. SCHLEGEL’S “HIGHER” PHILOSOPHY." Herald of Omsk University 25, no. 1 (May 22, 2020): 36–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.24147/1812-3996.2020.25(1).36-42.
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Discusses the concept in romanticism the problem of the volatility and uncertainty of sen-sual impressions; this leads to subjectivity and deceptiveness of the conclusions. F. Schle-gel separates the “perfect” philosophy of idealism. A critical attitude to contemporary phi-losophy is based on the romantic thesis of “eternal” variability of the human spirit and the philosophy of I. Kant as critics in accordance with the essence of skepticism. “Positive” skepticism is seen as a methodological principle of constructing a “predictive” philosophi-cal system, which will be filmed dialectical contradiction between “experience” and “na-ture”. The skepticism in relation to other philosophical systems, previous and current, un-derstood as romantic model controversy. It concludes that criticism of philosophy meant to actually search for “really a philosophical” system.
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Hall, Edward. "SKEPTICISM ABOUT UNCONSTRAINED UTOPIANISM." Social Philosophy and Policy 33, no. 1-2 (2016): 76–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052516000364.
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Abstract:In this essay, I critically engage with a methodological approach in contemporary political theory — unconstrained utopianism — which holds that we can only determine how we should live by first giving an account of the principles that would govern society if people were perfectly morally motivated. I provide reasons for being skeptical of this claim. To begin with I query the robustness of the principles unconstrained utopianism purportedly delivers. While the method can be understood as offering existence proofs, because we can devise other situations in which morally flawless decision making would unearth alternative sets of principles, I argue that such proofs tell us surprisingly little about how we should live in general. Drawing on this point, I contend that normative models that wish away certain phenomena that are uncontroversially central to any account of politics cannot plausibly claim to tell us how we should live in political society. I conclude by offering a more positive sketch of why avoiding this brand of utopianism might not represent a problematic capitulation to the morally nonideal and suggest that theorizing in light of certain constraints may be a precondition of good normative theorizing itself.
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HOLOVACH, Volodymyr, and Tetiana HOLOVACH. "The concept of the auditor's professional skepticism and its genesis." Economics. Finances. Law 2, no. - (March 3, 2022): 5–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.37634/efp.2022.2.1.
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The paper considers such a fundamental principle of audit as the auditor's professional skepticism. Guided by an integrated approach, the conceptual foundations of professional skepticism, patterns of its origin, its formation and development are determined depending on the understanding of the public function of audit and the auditor's duty to detect the fraud at the appropriate historical stage. It is noted that the concept of skepticism has a deep history and is considered in philosophy, psychology, law and other sciences. It is concluded that in the aspect of audit the methodological skepticism deserves attention, which is not limited to doubt, but is aimed at making sound hypotheses. Their construction and verification are subject to the general laws of gnoseology, which directly apply to the auditor's cognitive activity. Based on this approach, it is proposed to consider a hypothetical judgment in audit activity to identify and assess the risks of fraud from the standpoint of professional skepticism as making and verifying assumptions in the form of a version. Thus, the professional judgment of the auditor, which takes the form of professional skepticism, is necessarily based on the conclusions of the opposite or contradictory judgment. The paper also presents a critical assessment of the Law of Ukraine "On Auditing Financial Statements and Auditing" to determine the content of professional skepticism. The ways to improve national legislation and its conformation with the requirements of International Standards on Audit are proposed.
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Parascandola, Mark. "Skepticism, Statistical Methods, and the Cigarette: A Historical Analysis of a Methodological Debate." Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 47, no. 2 (2004): 244–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2004.0032.
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Coliva, Annalisa. "What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8, no. 3 (September 21, 2018): 198–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20181341.
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The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.
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Elkins, Zachary, and Tom Ginsburg. "On disruption and leximetrics: A reply to Niels Petersen and Konstantin Chatziathanasiou." International Journal of Constitutional Law 19, no. 5 (December 1, 2021): 1835–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab121.
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Abstract We explore the apparent disruption of legal scholarship wrought by leximetrics—variable-oriented, predictive methods. We view the skepticism surrounding leximetrics as healthy, in that it focuses attention on some central inferential challenges relevant to most empirical methods. Scholarly anxiety may be a natural by-product of this disruption, as scholars navigate the rise and fall in popularity of various ideas and approaches. Some of this anxiety is related to a perceived hierarchy of methodological approaches in social science. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that broadminded, ecumenical tastes will prevail. One likely future for legal scholars is similar to that of political science, whose practitioners have largely embraced methodological pluralism, and maintained the value of case-oriented research.
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DeRose, Keith. "Précis of The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 2." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 1 (March 3, 2020): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191398.
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The Appearance of Ignorance develops and champions contextualist solutions to the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery. Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Methodological skepticism"
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Kollert, Lukáš. "Sebevědomí a sebepoznání. Studie k roli subjektu a vědomí myšlení v Descartově filosofii." Master's thesis, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-340018.
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The thesis aims at examining Descartes's so called cogito from a wider perspective, especially as regards to the role in the development of Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) and in the context of other relevant texts. Being an attempt to give a broad account of Descartes's "first cognition" the study deals not only with the cogito itself, e.g. with its logical structure, but also with other key Cartesian doctrines, so that we can understand the cogito as an integral part of Descartes's philosophy. The thesis inquires for this reason into the question of meditator's identity, the methodological skepticism, the question whether logical principles are called into question in the First meditation, the problem of the Cartesian circle, the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas and finally, the question how to explain, according to Descartes, the awareness of our thoughts. Sometimes the considerations become rather systematic and go beyond a mere exegesis of Descartes's philosophy, especially when they concern the problem with the presence of ego in cogito and the explanation of our self-consciousness. There are three competing approaches to the second issue mentioned that are introduced and assessed in the last chapter. I have chosen this way of...
Books on the topic "Methodological skepticism"
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Strohminger, Margot, and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri. Moderate Modal Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0016.
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This chapter examines moderate modal skepticism, a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagen’s argument for moderate modal skepticism assumes Yablo’s (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. This chapter raises two problems for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen’s argument. It then considers how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which does not face these problems: Williamson’s (2007) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, the chapter also finds a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw.
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Kaplan, Mark. Austin's Way with Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198824855.001.0001.
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J. L. Austin is famous for the extent to which he wrote as if it is a condition, on the adequacy of what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. Most would use the term “infamous”. Not long after Austin’s death, there formed a durable consensus: Austin’s commitment to pursuing an epistemology that is faithful to “ordinary language” was fundamentally misguided—born of a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. This book argues, however, that the consensus is mistaken—that both the condition of adequacy to which Austin was committed, and his reason for being committed to it, have been misunderstood by his critics. By looking carefully at the things Austin said about knowledge in “Other Minds,” examining the response to skeptical argument that these things provide, and taking seriously the methodological remarks Austin scattered in his corpus, the book shows that Austin’s way of pursuing epistemology was not born of a misunderstanding of the project of epistemology. It was born, rather, of a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived. But, as the book also shows, Austin was not against epistemological theorizing itself. On the contrary, Austin understood himself to be offering—and was, in fact, defending a way of doing epistemology that is fully capable of offering—substantive answers to important epistemological questions.
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Shoemaker, David. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0001.
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This introduction to the fourth volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility briefly discusses each of the new essays being published. The essays cover a wide range of topics relevant to agency and responsibility: free will, strength of will, the nature of intentions, practical necessity, shared agency, partial responsibility, criminal attempts, the forward-looking role of blame, responsibility for implicit bias, epistemic skepticism, forgiveness, regret, and protest. Approximately half the essays are on agency, and the other half are on responsibility, with different methodological approaches and emphases in the various essays. They represent some of the best cutting-edge work being done in the field.
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DeRose, Keith. The Appearance of Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199564477.001.0001.
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This volume presents, develops, and champions contextualist solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: The puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we’ve lost the lottery (unless one is in fact the winner of the lottery, in which case one does not know that one has lost, but is reasonable in thinking that one knows it). Accounting for how it is that we know that skeptical hypotheses are false and why it seems that we don’t know that they’re false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work. Along the way, the following are all carefully explained and defended: Moorean methodological approaches to skepticism, on which one seeks to defeat, rather than refute, the skeptic; contextualist responses to skepticism; contextualist substantive Mooreanism; the basic safety approach to knowledge and the double-safety picture of what knowledge is; insensitivity accounts of various appearances of ignorance; the closure principle for knowledge; and the claim that our knowledge that we are not brains in vats is a priori, despite its being knowledge of a deeply contingent fact.
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Garrett, Don. Truth, Method, and Correspondence in Spinoza and Leibniz. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195307771.003.0010.
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This chapter discusses Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s specific criticisms of Descartes’s use of his so-called “truth rule”—that is, the principle that whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly is true—and explores the relation of these criticisms to the two philosophers’ own conceptions of truth as requiring both the internal adequacy of ideas and the external correspondence of those ideas to their objects. One conclusion is that, for both Spinoza and Leibniz, the conception of truth as requiring internal adequacy of ideas explains their rejection of Descartes’s methodological skepticism. A second conclusion is that, for both philosophers, the problem of establishing that all ideas with internal adequacy must correspond with their objects can only be satisfactorily solved by embracing logical necessitarianism.
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Pincock, Christopher. Logical Empiricism. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.19.
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At different times logical empiricists engaged one another in debates about the proper problems and methods for philosophy or its successor discipline. The most pressing problem focused on how to coordinate the abstract statements of the sciences with what can be experienced and tested. While the new logic was the main tool for coordination for Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, and Rudolf Carnap, there was no agreement on the nature of logic or its role in coordination. Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank countered with a sophisticated alternative that emphasized the social and political context within which science is done. All told, one finds in logical empiricism a high level of methodological awareness as well as a healthy skepticism about the appropriate aims and methods of philosophy.
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Preyer, Gerhard, ed. Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791492.001.0001.
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The study of meaning in language embraces a diverse range of problems and methods. Philosophers think through the relationship between language and he world; linguists document speakers’ knowledge of meaning; psychologists investigate the mechanisms of understanding and production. Up through the early 2000s, these investigations were generally compartmentalized: indeed, researchers often regarded both the subject-matter and the methods of other disciplines with skepticism. Since then, however, there has been a sea change in the field, enabling researchers increasingly to synthesize the perspectives of philosophy, linguistics and psychology and to energize all the fields with rich new intellectual perspectives that facilitate meaningful interchange. The time is right for a broader exploration and reflection on the status and problems of semantics as an interdisciplinary enterprise, in light of a decade of challenging and successful research in this area. Taking as its starting-point Lepore and Stone’s 2014 book Imagination and Convention, this volume aims to reconcile different methodological perspectives while refocusing semanticists on new problems where integrative work will find the broadest and most receptive audience.
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Edwards, Martin S., and Jonathan M. DiCicco. International Organizations and Preventing War. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.407.
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International organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations play an important role in war prevention. In theory, IOs reduce the risk of war between belligerents by improving communication, facilitating cooperation, and building confidence and trust. In practice, however, IOs’ war-preventing capacities have sparked skepticism and criticism. Recent advances in the scholarly study of the causes of war have given rise to new and promising directions in research on IOs and war prevention. These studies highlight the problems of interstate and intrastate wars, global and regional organizations, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, and the relationship between IOs and domestic institutions. They also offer novel insights that both complement and challenge studies of traditional concepts such as collective security. An interesting work is that of J. D. Fearon, who frames war as a bargaining process between rational states. Fearon articulates a central puzzle of international relations: since war is costly, the question that arises is why rational leaders of competing states choose to fight instead of pursuing less costly, nonviolent dispute settlements. Three general mechanisms account for rational, unitary states’ inability to identify an alternative outcome that both would prefer to war: bluffing about private information, commitment problems, and indivisibility of stakes. Despite the obvious progress in research on IOs and war prevention, there remain methodological and theoretical issues that deserve consideration for further investigation, two of which are: the interaction of domestic and international organizations, and the implications of variations in IO design.
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Thompson, Kevin. Systematicity and Normative Justification. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198778165.003.0003.
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This chapter examines systematicity as a form of normative justification. Thompson’s contention is that the Hegelian commitment to fundamental presuppositionlessness and hence to methodological immanence, from which his distinctive conception of systematicity flows, is at the core of the unique form of normative justification that he employs in his political philosophy and that this is the only form of such justification that can successfully meet the skeptic’s challenge. Central to Thompson’s account is the distinction between systematicity and representation and the way in which this frames Hegel’s relationship to the traditional forms of justification and the creation of his own distinctive kind of normative argumentation.
Book chapters on the topic "Methodological skepticism"
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Stamm, Marcelo. "Skepticism and Methodological Monism: Aenesidemus-Schulze Versus Arcesilaus-Erhard." In The Skeptical Tradition Around 1800, 143–58. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3465-3_12.
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Lagerlund, Henrik. "Descartes’ Methodological Skepticism, Bayle’s Super-Skepticism, and Berkeley’s Anti-Skepticism." In Skepticism in Philosophy, 119–43. Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315149622-7.
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Gillett, Carl. "The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism." In Physicalism and its Discontents, 225–50. Cambridge University Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511570797.012.
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Doris, John M. "The Future of Character." In Character Trouble, 189–258. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0011.
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This chapter advances and refines the author’s character skepticism in light of the extensive commentary in philosophy, and significant developments in psychology, that have emerged since his original contributions to the debate (e.g., Doris, 1998, 2002). Among the topics discussed are methodological issues in philosophy and psychology; controversy concerning classic studies; the interpretation of effect sizes; theory choice and revision; a pluralistic conception of ethical thought.
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Colander, David, and Craig Freedman. "The Art and Craft of Economics." In Where Economics Went Wrong, 139–62. Princeton University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691179209.003.0009.
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This concluding chapter argues that Classical Liberal methodology is defined more by an attitude than it is by a particular methodological approach. That attitude blends a deep-seated skepticism of mainstream theory—often manifested by heterodox economists—with an appreciation of the gains that have been made by mainstream theory, an appreciation generally lacking among heterodox critics. A Classical Liberal attitude would also display a mutual respect for the methods that have evolved in mainstream and non-mainstream traditions to handle theoretical problems. The chapter then presents six economists who displayed a Classical Liberal attitude to methodology in important aspects of their work: Edward Leamer, Ariel Rubinstein, Alvin Roth, Paul Romer, Amartya Sen, and Dani Rodrik.
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Gilbert, Nigel. "Modeling Sociality: The View from Europe." In Dynamics in Human and Primate Societies. Oxford University Press, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195131673.003.0018.
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Social science research based on computer simulation, much of it using multiagent, multilevel models, has grown dramatically in Europe since the early 1990s. This growth has been inspired by the recent upsurge of work within computer science on distributed artificial intelthe metaphor between agents and people/social actors. This chapter reviews some recent and influential European examples of the multiagent simulation of social phenomena. One common thread running through what is otherwise a very heterogeneous collection of studies is the description and exploration of a small number of generalized "logics" or "abstract social processes." It has been possible to investigate these through the construction of "artificial societies," and it is this methodological discovery that partly accounts for the current energy and excitement in the field of computational social simulation. However, the assumption of a simple correspondence between agents and social actors needs to be applied with some care if it is to be useful in understanding human societies. The same epistemological puzzles and problems that sociologists have struggled over during the last hundred years can recur in trying to understand soci eties through computer simulations. Some of these problems will be described, again with reference to current European studies. While the use of simulation as a methodological tool is a commonplace in the natural sciences and engineering (e.g., Shannon 1975; Zeigler 1976), it still strikes many people as remarkable that one could use simulation in the social sciences. The very idea of modeling the obvious complexity, unpredictability, and autonomy of humans and their societies using computer simulation is considered by some social scientists as absurd. They suggest that if simulation of social phenomena could ever be possible, it would have to involve such simplification that nothing of value could be learned. Clearly, the whole enterprise is just an excuse for playing around with computers. While I do not agree with this view, there is a real question at the heart of many social scientists' skepticism.
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Herz, Norman, and Ervan G. Garrison. "Archaeogeophysical Exploration." In Geological Methods for Archaeology. Oxford University Press, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195090246.003.0013.
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Geophysical techniques are a commonplace tool in today's archaeology as a result of an extensive collaboration between scientists and archaeologists on both sides of the Atlantic. This "cross-fertilization" has produced growing subdisciplines, of which archaeological geophysics is one example. As may be recalled from our introductory chapter, K. Butzer defined geoarchaeology as archaeology done using a geological methodology. G. Rapp and J. A. Gifford describe archaeological geology as the use of geological techniques to solve archaeological problems. Fagan has called geoarchaeology a "far wider enterprise than geology," involving (1) geochemical and geophysical techniques to locate sites and features; (2) studies of site formation and spatial context; (3) geomorphology, palynology, paleobotany; (4) absolute and relative dating procedures; and (5) taphonomic studies. Archaeological geophysics is a major aspect of archaeological geology. The application of geophysical exploration techniques in archaeology is also known as archaeogeophysics. Geophysical methods of potential usefulness to archaeological geology fall within the following classes: 1. seismic: reflection/refraction 2. electrical & electromagnetic: resistivity and conductivity 3. magnetic 4. radar 5. microgravity 6. thermography All have been used on a variety of archaeological problems. The application of geophysical techniques has grown as (1) the access to the instruments and (2) the methodological understanding of the users have increased. Access to geophysical instrumentation has been made easier by the steady development in solid-state design and computerization, which has reduced size and costs as it has in almost every technical field. The beneficiaries are the geologists and archaeologists. The first to recognize the applicability of geophysical methods to archaeology were the geologists—more specifically, the geophysicists. Working in association with their archaeological colleagues, the earth scientists translated the objectives of the archaeologists into practice. Such cooperation was very productive but suffered from the same kinds of problems that dogged the early usage and acceptance of radiocarbon dating. The archaeologists' untutored enthusiasm, coupled with their lack of a true understanding of the physics and atmospheric chemistry inherent in that technique, led to a backlash of skepticism when dates reported by the first radiocarbon researchers were found to be in error.
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Doris, John M. "Heated Agreement." In Character Trouble, 105–14. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198719601.003.0006.
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This chapter was originally a contribution to a book symposium on Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue (2006), which develops an extended response to the arguments for character skepticism put forth in Doris’ Lack of Character (2002). It is argued that despite the differences between them, the works are actually in considerable agreement, both methodologically and substantively, when it comes to the fundamentals of moral psychology. Both sides agree that philosophical moral psychology ought to be empirically informed, and both sides agree that traditional conceptions of character traits require revision in light of empirical information.
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Valente, Marco. "Agent-Based Simulation Modeling." In Relational Methodologies and Epistemology in Economics and Management Sciences, 128–39. IGI Global, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-9770-6.ch004.
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Computer simulations are a powerful tool for scientific research, but lack an accepted methodology for their use, and consequently their results are generally received with skepticisms. This chapter proposes a methodological approach allowing to formally unify the treatment of “traditional” quantitative phenomena with that of phenomena from economics or biology that prevent a universal adoption of data-centered methods. We propose to adopt the explanation as the basic unit of knowledge, which is able to cover all possible cases. From this assumption, we can derive the conclusion that simulation models fail to deliver their full potential as scientific investigative tool because their implementations lack crucial details on the intermediate steps producing simulation results.