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Journal articles on the topic 'Military Assistance Command Vietnam'
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1
Ivanov, V. V. "MILITARY INTERVENTION OF THE USA AND SOUTH VIETNAM IN LAOS IN JANUARY-APRIL 1971 ACCORDING TO THE MEMOIRS OF THE VIETNAM AND AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS OF THE WAR." History: facts and symbols, no. 3 (September 14, 2021): 130–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.24888/2410-4205-2021-28-3-130-140.
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The article is devoted to the history of the planning and making of intervention of USA and South Vietnam into Laos in February-April 1971. The operation was named «Lam Son 719». The invasion group was to destroy the infrastructure of material support of People‟s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) – «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The work is built with the assistance of a memoir – translations memories combatants in Laos, soldiers and commanders of Army of United States America, South Vietnam and Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The materials housed in the monographs of American and Vietnam researchers of the Indochina conflict, 1960–1970-s.In 1971 amid the withdrawal of US troops from Indochina, American administration made a decision to invade Laos. The main target of the intervention was destroying the objects of «Ho Chi Minh Trail» in the southeastern regions of the kingdom. With a success of ARVN in Laos, the PAVNs combat effectiveness is seriously reduced. This operation was critical test of Vietnamization. «Lam Son 719» had to demonstrate high combat capability of ARVN. The victory was supposed to strengthen international credibility of USA. In 8 February 1971, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) invaded into kingdom. The command of PAVN, having guessed the enemy's plan, pulled together large forces in Lower Laos. Supported by U.S. artillery, helicopters, fightersbombers and B-52s, South Vietnamese troops advanced fought heavy battles with the enemy. The author paid attention to some military and political aspects of intervention into Laos. The article deals with the problems of South Vietnamese troops. Special attention is paid by the author to the analysis of the morale and combat effectiveness units of ARVN during invasion into Laos. The author concluded, that the intervention of ARVN and U.S. Army ended in complete failure. The main objectives of the invasion were not achieved.
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Yin, Chengzhi. "“China’s Military Assistance to North Vietnam Revisited”." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 26, no. 3 (August 27, 2019): 226–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02603002.
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North Vietnam announced its intention to unify its country with armed struggle in 1959. Thereafter, Hanoi consistently requested military assistance from the People’s Republic of China (prc). However, Beijing did not grant Hanoi’s request until 1962. Why did the prc agree to provide military assistance to North Vietnam? This article argues that China did so because the United States greatly increased its military presence in South Vietnam in late 1961 and 1962. Therefore, Beijing provided military assistance to Hanoi to secure China’s southern border. Employing primary sources, this study traces changes in Beijing’s attitude toward its Vietnam policy from 1958 to 1962. It shows that when U.S. military presence was limited, Beijing paid more attention to the avoidance of war with the United States and maintaining a hospitable environment in neighboring Indochina. However, when the prc perceived the U.S. presence as a threat to its security, the objective of seeking security overwhelmed other objectives.
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Lin, Mao. "Building Ho’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam." Chinese Historical Review 27, no. 2 (July 2, 2020): 185–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1547402x.2020.1789282.
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Gao, Jie. "Xiaobing Li, Building Ho’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam." Canadian Journal of History 55, no. 1-2 (August 2020): 160–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cjh-55-1-2-br15.
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Bakich, Spencer D. "Institutionalizing supreme command: explaining political–military integration in the Vietnam War, 1964–1968." Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 688–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.599172.
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Storkmann, Klaus. "East German Military Aid to the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua, 1979–1990." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 2 (April 2014): 56–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00451.
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The East German regime provided extensive military assistance to developing countries and armed guerrilla movements in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In the 1980s, the pro-Soviet Marxist government in Nicaragua was one of the major recipients of East German military assistance. This article focuses on contacts at the level of the ministries of defense, on Nicaraguan requests to the East German military command, and on political and military decision-making processes in East Germany. The article examines the provision of weaponry and training as well as other forms of cooperation and support. Research for the article was conducted in the formerly closed archives of the East German Ministry for National Defense regarding military supplies to the Third World as well as the voluminous declassified files of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (the ruling Communist party).
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Kuok, Hung Nguyen. "COOPERATION OF RUSSIA WITH VIETNAM." SCIENTIFIC REVIEW. SERIES 1. ECONOMICS AND LAW, no. 1-2 (2020): 108–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.26653/2076-4650-2020-1-2-09.
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Russia is developing cooperation with Vietnam in the format of a comprehensive strategic partnership and in conditions of mutual understanding and trust of the heads of state. Military and economic cooperation began in 1946 during the first Indochina war, strengthened and expanded in 1966-1973. during the Second Indochina war. Vietnam received tremendous help in rebuilding the national economy and industrialization from the USSR until its collapse in 1991. Restructuring in post-Soviet Russia affected the sharp reduction in military assistance and economic relations with Vietnam. In the XXI century, the rapid development of Russian-Vietnamese cooperation began as part of the RF’s strategy for the “return to Asia” brand. Tasks. Explore the current trends in relations between Russia and Vietnam in the face of global instability, new threats and challenges of the XXI century. Methodology. The use of scientific methods of cognition and study of factors affecting interstate relations. Results. The results of military-technical cooperation and trade are analyzed. Personal participation of the President of the Russian Federation in the restoration of a comprehensive strategic partnership. Conclusions. Vietnam, relying on Russia, successfully solves economic problems and has a reliable military shield to repel any aggression in the turbulent and explosive atmosphere of confrontation with China due to the military conflict in the South China Sea.
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Jang Kwangyeol. "The Comparative Study on Military Alliance and Combined Military Command System of U.S. with South Korea and South Vietnam." Journal of Military History Studies ll, no. 137 (June 2014): 149–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.17934/jmhs..137.201406.149.
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Robertson, A. G., and T. S. Weeramanthri. "(A40) Military and Civilians in Australian Disaster Medical Assistance Teams." Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 26, S1 (May 2011): s12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x11000525.
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The Australian Government first started to deploy civilian medical teams internationally in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami to Banda Aceh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Historically, Australia had relied upon the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to provide overseas medical assistance, but, in this instance, the volunteers deployed were civilian staff, predominantly from tertiary hospital environments. Civilian Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMATs), particularly in Banda Aceh, interacted closely with the ADF after the tsunami and have had a close liaison with the ADF in subsequent disasters, particularly where ADF assistance was required for aeromedical evacuation of patients. This has included assistance after the 2005 Bali bombing, the 2009 Ashmore Reef explosion, the 2009 Samoa tsunami, and the 2010 Pakistan floods. In the latter, Australia deployed a joint military-civilian medical taskforce to provide care to the affected people in Kot Addu in central Pakistan. Having had extensive experience in both military and civilian disaster responses, the authors in this presentation will look at the lessons that can be shared between civilian and military teams in the Australian context. The military brings particular proficiency in command and control, information gathering, security, communications, general logistics, aeromedical evacuation and living in the field. The civilian AUSMATs bring specialized medical expertise, experience in operating in small teams in a range of disaster conditions, health logistics, surveillance, and public health measures in a disaster setting. Learning how to blend these skill sets will be critical in ensuring effective and collaborative international deployments in the future.
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Yushkevych, Volodymyr. "Assistance of the USA to refugees during the Korean War (1950 – 1953)." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 6 (2018): 82–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2018.06.82-90.
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The article reveals a set of measures taken by the United States of America to assist “the refugees of war” in the context of local conflict in the Korean Peninsula. It is underlined that securing assistance to hundreds of thousands of Korean refugees has become a unique experience for the United States and the international community in providing financial support, assistance programs, combat operations, and organized troop deployment. Particular attention was paid to the decisions and actions of the US Armed Forces Command aimed at avoiding panic among refugees from the North, evacuating civilians, setting up and operating Refugee Camps. The unprecedented scale of the Hungnam rescue operation carried out during the offensive of the Chinese and North Korean troops in December 1950 is examined. The first exampled experience was the work of the United Nations Civil Aid Command in Korea, whose field teams distributed clothing, supplies, consumer goods and large-scale vaccinations against smallpox and typhoid during the second half of 1950. In addition, it reviewed the work of UNCURK, which was to help rebuild the country. As part of the program, Korean refugees received rice, used clothing and shoes, and medical equipment. At the same time, the establishment and activities of the UNKRA, to whom the United States has been the major donor, have played a leading role in assisting the forced migrants. The relief programs subsequently became a significant factor in the Westernization and economic revival of the Republic of Korea. It has been shown that in the context of the military conflict in Korea, US assistance to refugees was provided not only through a profile UN agency but also through the active involvement of US military structures and non-governmental organizations. The role of volunteer organizations and private initiatives of the American public in support of the Korean Refugee was noted.
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Edwards, Paul N. "Cyberpunks in Cyberspace: The Politics of Subjectivity in the Computer Age." Sociological Review 42, no. 1_suppl (May 1994): 69–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.1994.tb03410.x.
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In the Cold War, Americans constructed the political world as a closed system of ideological conflict. Computers were developed to support a closed-world discourse with centralized, computerized military command and control, embodied in Vietnam-era systems and Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Simultaneously, at the level of individual minds, a cyborg discourse about intelligent machines linked the microworlds constituted by computer programs to human thought processes. Popular science fiction of the 1980s, such as the Star Wars film trilogy, Neuromancer, and The Terminator merged closed-world political themes, such as military computing and global conflict, with cyborg discourse about machine subjectivity and virtual space. This political history provides a critical counterpoint to cyberpunks' overenthusiastic embrace of cyberspace.
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Sanderson, John M. "The Need for Military Intervention in Humanitarian Emergencies." International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (March 2001): 117–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2001.tb00006.x.
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I have been a keen student of international intervention since long before my command of the United Nations forces in Cambodia. My military career has spanned much of the Cold War years and has taken me to places like Malaysia during the period of confrontation over its formation, Vietnam, Europe at the height of the strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction, and most of Southeast Asia. I was an instructor at the British Army Staff College at the time of the establishment of UNIFIL – the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon – a serious aberration in the determinedly passive international peacekeeping approach to that time. The earlier intervention in the Congo in the 1960s seemed to have warned the UN off anything forceful in disrupted states, leaving it to former colonial powers to extract themselves from their former areas of engagement with as much saving grace as they could muster. Many of them did not do this very well.
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Mandeles, Mark D., Edward J. Marolda, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. "The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat 1959-1965." Military Affairs 52, no. 3 (July 1988): 160. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1988253.
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Nash, William L. "The Laws of War: A Military View." Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 1 (March 2002): 14–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00370.x.
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I served as a lieutenant in Vietnam. In June 1969, after being in the country for about ten days, I saw my first combat action and it was typically confusing. My platoon was on a reconnaissance mission as part of a larger force when some members of the unit saw a few Vietcong soldiers and began to pursue them through the jungle and marshland countryside. The enemy soldiers were quickly cornered, one was captured, and at least two more cowered in a streambed about 100 yards away. In circumstances I do not fully understand to this day, there was gunfire, many vehicles raced back and forth, and the two radios I was required to monitor broadcast a confusion of chatter. Suddenly, on the higher command radio, I heard the voice of our colonel: “Stop shooting; that's murder,” he ordered. The soldiers did stop shooting, the prisoners were secured, and we continued our mission. But that single, short order had great impact on me. It taught me more than any schoolhouse instruction ever could have about the laws of war and how professional soldiers behave in combat.
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Path, Kosal. "China's Economic Sanctions against Vietnam, 1975–1978." China Quarterly 212 (December 2012): 1040–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741012001245.
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AbstractThis article carries a two-fold argument. First, Beijing's economic sanctions against Vietnam during the period 1975–1978 were mainly motivated by its desire to punish Vietnam for an anti-China policy that smacked of ingratitude for the latter's past assistance, fuelled further by Hanoi's closer relations with Moscow. They were also designed to extract Hanoi's accommodation of China's demand for territorial boundary concessions and to halt the persecution of ethnic Chinese residents in Vietnam. Second, the resultant meltdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations, as well as the making of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance between 1975 and 1978, was gradual and contentious rather than swift and decisive as most existing studies contend. Hanoi's reluctance to forge a formal military alliance with the faraway Soviet Union against China was largely driven by the importance of China's remaining aid and economic potential to Vietnam's post-war economic reconstruction and the uncertainty of the Soviet commitment to aid Vietnam.
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Ghimire, Pragya. "Nepal’s military diplomacy: Retrospect and prospect." Unity Journal 1 (February 1, 2020): 120–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/unityj.v1i0.35702.
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Military diplomacy has been an important security and foreign policy tool for many centuries. However, in the age of globalization, its importance has grown more rapidly than ever because of the recognition that country’s survival and development also depend on a peaceful and stable national and regional environment. Some of the significant practices in the past reflect that various tools of military diplomacy could be implemented to strengthen country’s overall diplomacy, including bilateral and multi-lateral contacts of military and civilian defence officials of foreign countries; preparing bilateral/multilateral security and defence agreements; exchanging experience with foreign military and civilian defence officials; providing military assistance and support to other countries, such as aid, materials and equipment when there is need and request during the disaster or humanitarian crises. However, these tools of strengthening military diplomacy will not be as effective as expected if there is no effective civil-military relations and synergies between a country’s national security and foreign policy. Moreover, it will require strong expertise and good command of civilian diplomats on security issues and military diplomats on foreign policy issues. To strengthen its military diplomacy to contribute to Nepal’s overall diplomacy and foreign policy, it will require more military attaché in Nepal foreign diplomatic missions of vital security and development interest. Moreover, Nepal should continue building synergies between its national security, foreign and development policies as well as strengthening military diplomacy both at bilateral and regional levels.
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Pelz, Stephen, Edward J. Marolda, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. "The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict. Volume 2, From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965." American Historical Review 93, no. 2 (April 1988): 527. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1860111.
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Reynolds, Clark G., Edward J. Marolda, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. "The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict. Vol. II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965." Journal of American History 74, no. 4 (March 1988): 1392. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1894507.
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Won, Tae Joon. "Britain's Retreat East of Suez and the Conundrum of Korea 1968–1974." Britain and the World 9, no. 1 (March 2016): 76–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/brw.2016.0215.
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This article examines the discussions and decisions which occurred within the British government concerning Britain's military involvement in the Korean peninsula at a time when Britain was pulling out of its military obligations in Asia – colloquially known as the ‘retreat East of Suez’ – in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. After the end of the Korean War, Britain created the Commonwealth Liaison Mission in Seoul and provided a frigate for use in Korean waters by the American-led United Nations Command and British soldiers for the United Nations Honour Guard. When relations between North and South Korea reached crisis point at the end of the 1960s, London was concerned that Britain could be entangled in an unaffordable military conflict in the Korean peninsula. The Ministry of Defence therefore argued for the abolition of the commitment of the British frigate, but the Foreign Office opposed this initiative so as to mitigate the blow to Anglo-American relations caused by Britain's refusal to commit troops to Vietnam. When Edward Heath's government negotiated a Five Power Defence Agreement with Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand in April 1971, the Ministry of Defence was, despite the objections of the Foreign Office, finally successful in repealing the frigate commitment for reasons of overstretching military resources. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence then called for the abolition of the Commonwealth Liaison Mission altogether when it was then discovered that the British contingent of the United Nations Honour Guard would have to fight under the command of the United Nations Commander in case of a military conflict in the Korean peninsula. But this proposal too was rebuffed by the Foreign Office, concerned that such a move would greatly damage Anglo-Korean relations at a time when Britain was considering establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea.
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Hirst, Monica. "Latin American armed humanitarianism in Haiti and beyond." Relaciones Internacionales 27, no. 55 (December 18, 2018): 213–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.24215/23142766e048.
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MINUSTAH represents a benchmark in the link between global securitization and humanitarian practices in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional military responsibilities in Haiti turned useful to improve and expand capabilities employed in international humanitarian crisis. Engagement in natural disaster has been the dominating terrain in which military humanitarian action takes place in Latin America and the Caribbean. Military presence in Haiti has also contributed for experimentation in the fight against organized crime and gangs, a growing concern on the radar of international humanitarian organizations and actors. Armed humanitarianism in the region has benefitted from ties with the US, particularly the South Command, and with the UN System, particularly the DPKO. Domestic and international involvement in humanitarian assistance has become major topic in regional intra-military initiatives, stimulated by exchange of new expertise and the expansion of teamwork programs. Simultaneously, armed humanitarianism has amplified the spectrum of civil-military relations by broadening interaction with local population and organizations in different parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet, armed humanitarian is controversial in the region in face of its implication for human rights protection and the strength of democratic institutions. This text intends to trace a middle ground around military and humanitarian studies conceptualization by interlacing the concepts of postmodern military and armed humanitarianism. It parts from the assumption that both concepts, while focusing on different objects, may knit well to explain post-MINUSTAH Latin American military developments.
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Heurlin, Christopher. "Authoritarian Aid and Regime Durability: Soviet Aid to the Developing World and Donor–Recipient Institutional Complementarity and Capacity." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (September 1, 2020): 968–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa064.
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Abstract How does authoritarian aid influence the durability of dictatorships? Western aid is thought to facilitate authoritarian durability because it can provide patronage. Authoritarian aid, by contrast, has received far less attention. This article examines both Soviet economic and military assistance, developing a theory of donor–recipient institutional complementarity to explain the impact of Soviet aid during the Cold War. The argument is developed through case studies of Vietnam and Ghana and a cross-national statistical analysis of Soviet economic aid and military assistance to developing countries from 1955 to 1991. Soviet economic aid was tied to the purchase of Soviet industrial equipment. When recipient states shared the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy, economic aid strengthened state infrastructural power by (1) enhancing fiscal capacity and (2) cultivating the dependency of the population on the state. Aid flows helped consolidate and maintain authoritarian institutions, promoting authoritarian durability. By contrast, while Soviet economic aid to noncommunist regimes provided some opportunities for patronage through employment in SOEs, the lack of institutional complementarity in planning institutions and overall lack of capacity of these institutions caused Soviet aid to contribute to inflation and fiscal crises. Economic problems, in turn, increased the vulnerability of noncommunist regimes to military coups, particularly when ideological splits emerged between pro-Soviet rulers and pro-Western militaries that undermined elite cohesion. The institutional subordination of the military to communist parties insulated communist regimes from the risk of coups.
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Sribniak, Іhor, and Anna Khlebina. "Everydays Life of the Interned Ukrainian Soldiers in the Libereс Camp (Czechoslovakia): Endeavour of Visualization (by Materials of the Central State Archives of Supreme Authorities and Government of Ukraine and Slavonic Library in Prague)." European Historical Studies, no. 13 (2019): 203–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2019.13.203-232.
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The creation of the Libereс camp of interned soldiers-Ukrainians was caused by emergence on the territory of Czechoslovakia of certain groups of Ukrainian soldiers, who tried to get back to their motherland. Their placement in the camp has begun at September 1920, and the life of the camp was built on a military basis. With a view to establish of Liberec camp`s cultural and educational life, there were created the «Cultural and Educational Club» of four (theatrical, musical, historical and photographic) sections. Its primary task was to set up courses for illiterates, as well as providing regular statements for other categories of interned soldiers, organization of sports clubs and archiving. Realization of cultural and educational work at the Liberec camp was largely depended on financial assistance, received from officers of the Ukrainian Galician Army interned at Německé Jablonné camp. It was especially needed in the winter of 1920-1921, when camp inhabitants has suffered of cold in wooden barracks and of deficient food rations. However, this situation did not prevent the organization of activities a number of artistic and educational centers (theater, choirs, courses, schools) in the Camp, intensive national patriotic and educational work as well. There was a library with a fund of about 1000 books and also a shop. The camp command had sought therefore to socialize of interned soldiers, caring for their general and special education for civil professions. Most of the camp inhabitants went gradually out of Camp as part of the workers’ teams to various parts of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the military discipline was supported in the Camp; military exercises were required, every time when new soldiers came to the Camp, the military organization, specific for the parts of the UHA, was restored. Even workers’ teams formed in the Camp, have a military basis and were subordinated to the UHA Army’s Initial command. These measures were aimed to preparing Ukrainian soldiers for the continuation of the armed fighting for Ukraine’s independence.
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Vasiliev, A. M. "War and negotiations. How Vietnam defeated the American Colossus." MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, no. 3 (July 8, 2020): 41–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-3-72-41-67.
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Over the course of the prolonged US war in Vietnam, the bloodiest one after World War II, it became obvious that there was no alternative to a negotiation process. Important reasons were the impossibility for Washington to win the battlefield and the rise of anti-war sentiment in the United States. The author tried to show how certain psychological characteristics of US leaders led to the war and then eventually to negotiations. When started negotiations were accompanied by military action. The course of the war and negotiations was influenced by Soviet military assistance to the DRV, as well as by relations in the triangle of the USSR - USA - China. The time of detente between the USSR and the USA coincided with war in Vietnam, which influenced the behavior of the Soviet leaders, as evidenced by the recollections of the USSR ambassador to the United States A. Dobrynin.The Politburo of the Central Committee had disagreements regarding Vietnam and detente with the United States. But the war weakened US international stance and contributed to the achievement of strategic agreements with the USSR.The main objectives of the DRV in the negotiations were to stop US bombings and then withdrawal of US troops. The United States sought to maintain the Saigon puppet regime for some time after the withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam. Washington’s main goal was to “save its face”, declaring defeat a “victory”. To achieve this goal the war and negotiations dragged on for years, and on the eve of the signing of the agreements, the most fierce bombing of the DRV was carried out.Thanks to the powerful air defense created with the help of the USSR, the DRV won the “air Dien Bien Fu”.The United States was forced to sign a peace agreement, which provided for the complete cessation of all US military operations in Vietnam, the withdrawal of all American troops, but left the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam together with the armed forces of the National Liberation Front along with the decaying and doomed to death Saigon regime. In 1975 its army was defeated the regime capitulated, which ensured the subsequent reunification of South and North Vietnam.The Vietnamese people defeated the American colossus, having suffered terrible sacrifices themselves, but achieved the national goal - the withdrawal of the Americans and the unification of the country. The full support of Vietnam can be seen as a successes story of Soviet foreign policy.
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Volovik, V. O. "Improvement of administrative and legal support of preparation of citizens for military service." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law, no. 64 (August 14, 2021): 205–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2021.64.37.
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The purpose of the article is to determine the directions for improving the administrative and legal support for the preparation of citizens for military service.The article substantiates that the preparation of citizens for military service is a special type of activity of the de-fense forces and other subjects, aimed at developing a complex of motivational, emotional-volitional and cognitive qualities, knowledge, skills and abilities necessary for successful military service in a civilian. It has been deter-mined that the subject of preparing citizens for military service is. Such a subject is not a serviceman, but a person who, with a certain degree of probability, can enter military service. This makes the procedure for organizing this training fundamentally different from the traditional hierarchical system of subordination with the observance of the principle of one-man command. Considering that the subjects of training are the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, other central executive bodies, local state administrations, local self-government bodies, bodies of the Society for the Assistance to the Defense of Ukraine, as well as other associations of citizens are involved with their consent in accordance with their charters, a set of rights and obligations of subjects training is determined by legal acts regu-lating their legal status.Based on the analysis of legal acts, the author concluded that the competence of these subjects is not specific: many of them are indicated that they “contribute to the preparation of young people for military service,” and what is such assistance, goals, objectives, principles of such training, how are those responsible for her face remains uncertain. This contributes to the formalization of the activities of some entities for which the activity to ensure the state’s defense is not the main one. This necessitates the delimitation of the competence of the subjects of prepara-tion for military service, assigning specific areas of work to each of them, increasing the transparency of these types of activities, if this is not related to the observance of state secrets, creating objective criteria for assessing such activities and fixing the relevant provisions in acts of administrative legislation.
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Petrov, Vladislav. "Psychology of financial literacy of military personnel." Applied psychology and pedagogy 4, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/2500-0543-2019-1-9.
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The article is devoted to the problem of psychology of financially competent behavior of servicemen. The psychological etiology of financial literacy / illiteracy of the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is shown. The study was conducted using: 1) content analysis of information (publications, materials of official inspections, etc.) about the attitude of the personnel of law enforcement agencies to money and financial behavior; 2) expert survey; 3) psychodiagnostic examination (method "California psychological questionnaire". Experts and subjects were 67 soldiers.
The study found that financially literate / illiterate behavior is determined by a pattern of both General and specific qualities. The basis of the pattern of General qualities of a soldier with a financially competent command were such characteristics as responsibility, self-control and developed intellectual and prognostic abilities. Persons with financially illiterate behavior were distinguished by: inability to competently plan a personal budget; propensity to risky financial transactions; promiscuity and inattention to spending money; frivolous attitude to debts and loans; focus on spending money, not saving it. Thus, the more socially responsible is the behavior of the soldier, the more they demonstrate financially competent behavior.
The material of the article allows to justify the involvement of military psychologists to solve the problem of improving the financial literacy of personnel. First of all, it concerns preventive psychodiagnostics of propensity of the military personnel to financially illiterate behavior. This should be followed by the provision of psychological assistance to persons in need of it, as well as the formation of the personnel of financial responsibility and predictability, the ability to plan and control personal spending. Ultimately, the work to improve the financial literacy of military personnel will have a positive impact on overcoming the problem of deviant behavior of personnel, as a consequence, to maintain a high level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces.
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Kraisoraphong, Keokam, and Brendan Howe. "Thailand’s Participation in un Peacekeeping Missions." Journal of International Peacekeeping 18, no. 3-4 (November 26, 2014): 236–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18754112-1804007.
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This paper traces experiences of the Royal Thai Armed Forces in un peacekeeping missions. A relatively small troop contributor at first, Thailand later took a high-profile role in the un operations in East Timor during 1999–2005, and has continued since then to support several un peacekeeping forces. The paper first discusses the rationales, development, and current status of Thailand’s contributions. It then goes on to explore how, and to what extent, tasks and duties assigned under the un peacekeeping framework to the dispatched forces, as well as experiences and lessons the Thai armed forces gained from their participation in missions, contribute to the diffusion of norms and the development of functional competencies relating to peacekeeping and human security protection within the Thai military. The paper finds that while the dispatched forces received invaluable benefits in terms of prestige, economic rewards and learning experiences from the peacekeeping operations under the un command, including approaches to humanitarian assistance during the time of acute conflict and monitoring human rights violations, the human security norm underlying these functional competencies has yet to be fully internalized by the military as an institution. Yet, there are some areas, especially in civil-military affairs where competencies developed from the internal security operations and international peacekeeping operations can be mutually reinforcing.
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Anh Tuan, Nguyen. "Vietnam and Ukraine: Briliant Relations in New Period." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XIX (2018): 273–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2018-16.
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The article describes the development and strengthening of communication between Ukraine and Vietnam thanks to tireless work of many generations. Ukraine provided tremendous efficient moral and material assistance to Vietnam while it conducted struggle for peace and national independence as well as in the period of post-war national reconstruction. In the course of this war, thousands of Ukrainian advisors and military experts marched long distances throughout Vietnam to make their contribution to assisting the Vietnamese nation. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese, namely high-ranking officials in various fields, have been trained in Ukraine and obtained the necessary knowledge and skills. Ukrainians have made a significant contribution to the development of Vietnam. Over the last 26 years, traditional friendship and all-round cooperation between the two states have transformed into a comprehensive partnership. That upshot is the establishment of a new development basis of Vietnamese-Ukrainian relations that were rapidly developing in all domains, including economy, politics, defense, trade, science, education, and humanitarian cooperation. Ukraine is highly interested in developing cooperation with Vietnam, especially on those matters related to giving permission to Ukraine for vegetable exports to Vietnamese market. Ukraine also purports to deepen cooperation in the realm of machinery production, energy, in particular in projects of modernization, improvement or construction of new power plants in Vietnam. Besides, Vietnam is the only foreign state where Ukraine has its own port. Vietnamese and Ukrainian enterprises in the realm of agriculture, mining, IT, vessel construction, and footwear industry have concluded a range of agreements. Keywords: Vietnam, cooperation, Ukraine, Vietnamese nation, comprehensive partnership, Vietnamese-Ukrainian agreements.
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Nguyen, Quoc Hunga, and T. V. Lezhenina. "Economic Models of Mongolia and Vietnam: Common and Distinctive Features." Economics and Management 26, no. 1 (February 28, 2020): 16–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.35854/1998-1627-2020-1-16-22.
Full textAbstract:
New economic models began to develop in Mongolia and Vietnam after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), when former Soviet republics formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Further development after the USSR’s dissolution was especially difficult for Mongolia, which almost entirely relied on the economic aid from the USSR. The US and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) immediately took advantage of the crisis in Mongolia. They offered tranches to Mongolia under the condition of complete democratization of political power and establishment of market-based development institutions within the framework of a standby arrangement. Vietnam embarked on a course of destroying the socialist model in 1986, i.e. before the USSR’s collapse, and its transition to a market economy was peculiar, yet significantly different from Mongolia’s.Aim. The presented study aims to examine the benefits and drawbacks of the economic models of Vietnam and Mongolia as well as their common and distinctive features.Methods. The study uses general methods of analyzing the international experience of transforming economic models.Results. The authors prove the efficiency of the current Mongolian and Vietnamese models in the context of global instability and crises. Emergence of new, highly efficient technological paradigms and absence of internal political protests in Mongolia and Vietnam ensure economic sustainability and high growth rate. Russia’s military aid to these countries also plays an important role.Conclusions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia received substantial assistance from the United States and was able to maintain state independence and develop its economy under the market conditions of economic activity. Relying on cooperation with Russia and China, in the 21st century Mongolia engaged in the processes of integration in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). The Vietnamese model was forming during the country’s participation in the ASEAN free trade zone and cooperation with the developed economies of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. Unlike Mongolia, Vietnam retained full political leadership of the Communist party, the unity of its people, and support for the development of market economy. In confronting difficult challenges, Vietnam receives assistance from the Donor Club.
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Lyozin, Alexander I. "The asymmetry of Laos conflict in the views of the RAND Corporation experts (1960–1973)." Samara Journal of Science 9, no. 2 (May 29, 2020): 213–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/snv202213.
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The paper deals with analytical reports prepared by the experts of the RAND Corporation on the Secret War in Laos (19601973) between the Royal Laotian Army, tacit living in the United States, and the communist movement Patet Lao, which received assistance from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Initially, it was Laos, not Vietnam that was the strategic and important region of Southeast Asia in the concept of domino theory of the US policy. A vivid example is the study of Laos in the RAND Corporation, which began earlier than the study of Vietnam. Analyst reports were created on the basis of geography, demography, geology, economics, etc. The paper addresses reports on the development of the military-political situation in Laos by the experts of the corporation such as Joel Martin Halpern, Paul Langer and Joseph Zastoff. It is shown that a part of the research was carried out with the aim of developing the theory of counterinsurgency at the request of the Agency for Perspective Research under the Ministry of Defense of the USA for the development of a foreign policy strategy in the countries of the Third world. Special attention is paid to the connection of research on the situation in Laos with the analysis of the prospects of the American policy in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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Jespersen, T. Christopher. "Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam." Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 3 (August 1, 2002): 439–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/phr.2002.71.3.439.
Full textAbstract:
Although not elected to the office, Gerald Ford nonetheless had the opportunity to change the nation's course in Vietnam when he assumed the presidency in August 1974. He did not do so, leaving the burden of ending the war there to the U.S. Congress. Contrary to what some policymakers and historians have subsequently argued, Congress did not sell out a healthy, viable South Vietnamese government to the communists in 1974––1975. Instead, the senators and representatives who voted to reduce, not cut off, military and economic assistance to the government of Nguyen Van Thieu made the correct and proper decision in the face of that regime's obviously untenable nature and the overwhelming desire of the American people to curtail support for it. Rather than working out a plan to end the war and remove those South Vietnamese who had worked with the Americans over the years, the Ford administration, led by the President himself, his Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, and Graham Martin, the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, chose to pursue a deliberate policy of denial, one designed to place the blame for the loss of South Vietnam on the shoulders of Congress. The resulting tragedy left thousands of Vietnamese to face life as the clear losers in a civil war.
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Yi, Kil J. "In Search of a Panacea: Japan-Korea Rapprochement and America's "Far Eastern Problems"." Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 4 (November 1, 2002): 633–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/phr.2002.71.4.633.
Full textAbstract:
The United States had three challenges in Asia in the mid-1960s: a hostile China, an assertive Japan, and a faltering South Vietnam. The Johnson administration's solution to these problems was to promote the normalizing of relations between its two vital Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. The two countries had refused to recognize each other diplomatically since the end of Japan's colonial rule over Korea after World War II. The acrimonious relations between Seoul and Tokyo weakened the containment wall in Northeast Asia while depriving Korea of Japanese investments, loans, and markets. These problems forced the United States to commit extensive military and economic assistance to Korea. As expected, a Tokyo-Seoul rapprochment buttressed the West's bulwark against communist powers in the region and hindered a potential Beijing-Tokyo reconciliation. It opened the road for Japan's economic penetration into Korea and enabled Seoul to receive Tokyo's help in economic development. Reassured by the friendship between Korea and Japan, Washington forged an alliance with Seoul in the Vietnam War. Between 1965 and 1973 Korea dispatched 300,000 soldiers in Vietnam, making it the second largest foreign power in support of Saigon. The Korea-Japan rapprochment proved to be a powerful remedy for America's problems in Asia.
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Batyuk, Vladimir. "US INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY AND EURASIA." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 1 (2021): 135–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2021.01.06.
Full textAbstract:
Despite the critical attitude of the current American President towards his predecessor, the Trump administration actually continued the course of the Obama administration to turn the Asia-Pacific region into the most important priority of American foreign policy. Moreover, the US Asia-Pacific strategy was transformed under Trump into the Indo-Pacific strategy, when the Indian Ocean was added to the Asia-Pacific region in the US strategic thinking. The US Pacific command was renamed the Indo-Pacific command (May 2018), and the US Department of defense developed the Indo-Pacific strategy (published in June 2019). The Indo-Pacific strategy is an integral part of Trump’s national security strategy, according to which China, along with Russia, was declared US adversary. The American side complained about both the economic and military-political aspects of the Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, official Washington is no longer confident that it can cope with those adversaries, China and Russia, alone. Trying to implement the main provisions of the Indo-Pacific strategy, official Washington has staked not only on building up its military power in the Indo-Pacific, but also on trying to build an anti-Chinese system of alliances in this huge region. Along with such traditional American allies in the region as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, the American side in the recent years has made active attempts to attract India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to this system of alliances as well. These American attempts, however, can only cause serious concerns not only in Beijing, but also in Moscow, thereby contributing to the mutual rapprochement of the Russian Federation and China. Meanwhile, the Russian-Chinese tandem is able to devalue American efforts to strategically encircle China, creating a strong Eurasian rear for the Middle Kingdom.
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Terent’ev, Vyacheslav O. "The Interaction Between the Soviet and the British Troops in Austria in the Spring of 1945." Vestnik of Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series Humanitarian and Social Sciences, no. 5 (October 10, 2020): 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.37482/2227-6564-v048.
Full textAbstract:
This article is part of the series of the author’s works covering the interaction between the Soviet and the British troops in the spring of 1945. For the first time in historiography, a comprehensive reconstruction of the meeting of these troops in Austria on 9–13 May 1945 is undertaken on the basis of original documents from Russian and British archives, quite a few of which have never been analysed or even mentioned before. The final stage of the liberation of Austria has been rather misrepresented in Soviet historiography. In particular, the Soviet troops were thought to have met the American troops on the Linz–Gaflenz–Klagenfurt line in late April – early May. However, the archival documents indicate that it was the British troops the Red Army met in Austria, and that as late as May 9–13. What is more, Klagenfurt was never reached by the Soviet units, as the British division headquarters were dislocated there. In Austria, the interaction lines had not been clearly determined due to Churchill’s efforts; at the same time, a crisis was brewing there between the British contingent and the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin pushed the meeting line planned by the British prime minister far west. The actions of Tolbukhin’s units and their assistance to the Bulgarian and the Yugoslavian troops substantially weakened the British positions in the future political dialogue and practically wrecked Churchill’s plans for strengthening the British influence on the Balkans. Further, this paper depicts and analyses the activities of the Soviet headquarters and military units aimed to make their way forward into the area of the “opposing ally” – Great Britain. In addition, the role of the Soviet command in settling the British-Bulgarian military confrontation is noted.
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Leslie, Stuart W. "Cold War Suburbs." Southern California Quarterly 102, no. 1 (2020): 24–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/scq.2020.102.1.24.
Full textAbstract:
At the height of the Cold War, in both the US and the Soviet Union, top technical talent was ensconced in state-of-the-art laboratories set among new suburbs with cultural amenities. In Orange County, California, defense research labs were enticed by capitalist strategies; in the USSR, by government command. In both, the new white-collar suburbs made moves to the new centers attractive. The architecture of the housing as well as of the research labs reveals the faith in technology, shifting to a bunker mentality in the Vietnam era. In the USSR, research institutes were set far from city centers. Their architecture and artworks were boldly modern, their engineers and scientists housed in modern apartments among parklands. Reflecting declining military contracts by the 1990s, Orange County’s “think factories” were demolished or repurposed; upscale master-planned communities drew affluent commuters. Former Soviet research institutes morphed into universities and computer and electronics centers, surrounded by exclusive residential communities. There are striking parallels.
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Ramsey, Michael D. "Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency." American Journal of International Law 110, no. 4 (October 2016): 701–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000763184.
Full textAbstract:
In 2007, presidential candidate Barack Obama argued that the U.S. president did not have independent constitutional authority to use military force except in response to an actual or imminent attack on the United States. Since 2008, President Obama has directed the use of U.S. military force in at least seven countries (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia). Critics find inconsistency in these positions, contending that the Obama presidency will be remembered for expansion of the presidency's war powers. But when the administration's record is closely examined, these claims seem overstated. At least with regard to war initiation, the Obama presidency need not be regarded as materially enhancing the president's constitutional powers.This assessment begins by establishing two baselines. First, most war powers scholars agree that under the Constitution's original meaning, Congress’ power to “declare War” required the president to seek congressional approval prior to initiating war. This constitutional command had substantial grey areas, including responses to threats and attacks, relations with non-state actors, and low-level hostilities. Nonetheless, the basic proposition stated by candidate Obama appears well founded both in the Constitution's text itself and in early postratification practice. Second, in the modern (post-Vietnam War) era, most scholars agree that the practice has changed somewhat, with presidents asserting an expanded independent authority over uses of military force. This essay agrees with that description, although it contends that the change in actual practice is less dramatic than commentary sometimes claims.
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Hernandez, Stephen. "A Case Report of Air Force Reserve Nurses Deployed to New York City for COVID-19 Support." Military Medicine 186, Supplement_2 (September 1, 2021): 56–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usab090.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACT Initial DoD support of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operations for New York City (NYC) coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) relief included the deployment of military medics to the Javits New York Medical Station and USNS Comfort. When Air Force (AF) Reservists arrived in NYC, 64th Air Expeditionary Group leaders worked with FEMA, Task Force New York/New Jersey, and NYC chains of command to send Airmen to NYC hospitals, including Lincoln Medical Center (LMC). Within 72 hours of arrival, 60 AF Reservists, including 30 registered nurses and 3 medical technicians, integrated into LMC to provide support during April and May 2020. This assistance began during the peak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections. Air Force nurses provided over 6,000 hours of care to over 800 patients in the emergency department and ad hoc intensive care and medical-surgical units. As infections declined, AF nurses shifted to providing care in established units. In these units, AF nurses provided patient care and worked directly with LMC nurses to provide directed teaching experiences to improve their comfort and competency with caring for acutely ill COVID-19 patients. The deployment of AF Reservists into civilian facilities was a success and bolstered the capability of three facilities struggling to care for SARS-CoV-2 patients. This effort was recognized by military and civilian healthcare leaders and resulted in over 600 military medical personnel being sent to support 11 NYC public hospitals.
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Tropp, Jacob. "“Intertribal” Development Strategies in the Global Cold War: Native American Models and Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia." Comparative Studies in Society and History 62, no. 2 (March 30, 2020): 421–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417520000109.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis article bridges the traditionally segregated fields of Native American history and the history of American foreign relations by investigating a series of activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s that interconnected Native American development and American counterinsurgency agendas in the unstable political landscapes of Southeast Asia. A small coterie of American bureaucrats, with careers spanning foreign assistance and Native American development work, saw great potential in selectively showcasing Indian economic “success stories” to serve “hilltribe” development and counterinsurgency programs in Laos and Thailand sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency. One result was a series of “intertribal” development tours arranged for Laotian and Thai representatives in multiple Native American communities in Arizona and New Mexico. Moreover, sharing a sense that Native Americans could offer unique advantages as direct development agents among other “tribes” overseas, the tours’ organizers garnered support from a diverse range of actors—CIA and USAID officials, Laotian and Thai military officers, and Indian political and business leaders—for launching a “tribe-to-tribe” foreign assistance program. Viewed together, these transnational schemes and discussions reveal how the flexible and multivalent meanings of key development concepts at the time—such as Indian achievement, tribal initiative, and “intertribal” understanding—both facilitated and constrained official designs to employ Native American models to support political and military agendas in the “shadow” theaters of the escalating Vietnam conflict.
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Chang, Kuo-Liang, Shang-Chia Chiou, and Jih-Lian Ha. "Effects of American cultural identity on purchase intention of American commodity — an example of American military housing after the war." Acta Oeconomica 64, Supplement-2 (November 1, 2014): 303–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/aoecon.64.2014.suppl.21.
Full textAbstract:
With the changing world situation, the end of World War II, the withdrawal of Japanese people from Taiwan, the eruption of Korean War, the assistance of Military Assistance Advisory Group in Taiwan, and the participation of American military in Vietnam War, a lot of US people came to Taiwan and brought a distinct lifestyle and culture, which have exerted their influence up to now. Apparently, the introduction of American culture greatly influenced the society at the time; people pursuing fashion gradually accepted western way of leisure and changed the existing traditional model. It also revealed the expansion of exotic cultural identity locally.By distributing and collecting questionnaires on-site, teachers and students of Chinese Culture University and the neighboring citizens in Yangmingshan are sampled for this study. A total of 500 copies of questionnaires were distributed, and 316 valid copies were retrieved, with the retrieval rate of 73%. Each retrieved copy stands for a valid sample. The research results are concluded as follows. 1. Cultural Identity presents significantly positive effects on Possible to purchase in Purchase Intention of American Commodity. 2. Cultural Identity reveals remarkably positive effects on Intend to Purchase in Purchase Intention of American Commodity. 3. Cultural Identity shows notably positive effects on Consider to Purchase in Purchase Intention of American Commodity. 4. The correlation between Cultural Identity and Purchase Intention of American Commodity shows partially significant differences on demographic variables.
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Vepreva, Irina Trofimovna, and Minh Tuan Uong. "Strategy of positive mediatization of war in Vietnam (based on newspapers "Pravda" and "Komsomol’skaya pravda", 1965)." Communication Studies 7, no. 2 (June 30, 2020): 351–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24147/2413-6182.2020.7(2).351-364.
Full textAbstract:
The article is devoted to the analysis of the strategy of positive mediatization
of the Vietnamese War in the Soviet media. The theoretical basis of the work is
the concept of mediatization of politics developed as a term in the era of global
informatization when the perception of social conflicts and their evaluation are
actively formed by the mass-media. The projection of this concept to the events of
1965-1973 allows identifying the features of coverage of the military conflict in
the Soviet media which are the mouthpiece of the official authorities. The material
for the research is the newspaper resources in "Pravda" and "Komsomol'skaya
pravda" for 1965 which is the starting point of the beginning of the USSR’s military assistance to fighting Vietnam. Two polar substrategies of mediatization of
the image of Vietnam are found and characterized, based on opposition of ours
and theirs: the substrategy of the heroization of the Vietnamese people and the
substrategy of the accusation and condemnation of the external aggressor – the
United States. The opposition of ours and theirs is value oriented. The representation of ours and theirs dichotomy by means of a totalitarian language has identified hypertrophied and simplified evaluation in the designation of ours and
theirs. The first group is characterized by an absolutely positive evaluation, the second is absolutely negative. Among the linguistic means of implementing the
substrategy of accusation and condemnation of the external aggressor, evaluative
epithets, metaphorical nominations, political labels with negative evaluative
connotation, and slogan headings of the accusatory and condemning type are
found. The substrategy of the heroization of the Vietnamese people has formed a
general idea of the national character of the Vietnamese. The positive mediatization of the Vietnam War has resulted in the enrichment of the meaning of the
concept of Vietnam. In the Russian linguistic consciousness, there formed positively estimated views about the Vietnamese as a friendly, hardworking, heroic
nation, capable of defending their independence.
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Lee, Kan. "The “China Lobby” in Tokyo: The Struggle of China’s Mission in Japan for General Douglas MacArthur’s Military Assistance in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949." Journal of Chinese Military History 8, no. 1 (May 17, 2019): 29–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22127453-12341338.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The Chinese Mission in Japan, which existed from 1946 until Japan regained its sovereignty as a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, represented the Republic of China in working with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in reconstructing postwar Japan. The original objective of the Chinese Mission was to serve as the government’s agency to carry out the repatriation of Japanese troops and civilians from China in coordination with the Allies, secure war reparations from Japan, and try war criminals. However, as President Harry S. Truman terminated US aid to China in 1947 and Guomindang (GMD) military fortunes in the Chinese Civil War declined under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Mission was given an additional assignment: to lobby General Douglas MacArthur to secure military assistance from SCAP. This essay discusses the interaction between the Chinese Mission and General MacArthur during the Chinese Civil War from 1946 to 1949 and examines the way in which the Chinese Mission persuaded him to play a role in the Civil War. This study argues that although it was in opposition to Washington, MacArthur’s determination to assist Chiang Kai-shek was in great part due to the strenuous lobbying of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo. Although MacArthur’s intervention could not reverse the final outcome of the Chinese Civil War, his anti-Communist outlook was formed and played a significant role during the Korean War a year later.
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Young, Dave. "Computing War Narratives." A Peer-Reviewed Journal About 6, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 50–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/aprja.v6i1.116011.
Full textAbstract:
In this text, I will unpack the workings of a particular technological apparatus applied in South Vietnam during the war, contextualising it in the culture of systems-analysis which became prevalent in US defence strategy following the Second World War. This apparatus – called the Hamlet Evaluation System – was in formal operation from 1967 until 1973, and aimed to provide US Forces with a vital narrative of progress in their “pacification programmes” in Vietnam. With its disruptive use of computers, the immense scale and scope of its task, and its affordance of a managerial approach to warfare, this system raises a number of issues around the role of the computer as bureaucratic mediator – in this case, tasked with converting complex insurgencies into legible, systematic narratives. What kind of insights did it provide into the operations of the Vietcong insurgency? How does it fit into the wider ecologies of command and control in the US Military during the first few decades of the Cold War? As the Hamlet Evaluation System, almost fifty years after its inception, is still considered the “gold standard of [counterinsurgency]” (Connable 113), it remains an important case study for those trying to understand how computers structure the institutional bureaucracy of war, and how they are imagined as epistemological tools that can somehow reveal objective truths about the complex, dynamic reality of war.
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Schmitt, Michael N. "TARGETING NARCOINSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN: THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW." Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 12 (December 2009): 301–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1389135909000117.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn October 2008, upon the request of the Afghan government, NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Budapest agreed that ‘ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, in the context of counternarcotics, subject to the authorization of respective nations’. In explaining the scope of the contemplated actions, NATO officials noted that drug producers and traffickers who aided the ongoing insurgency could now be attacked. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US General Bantz Craddock, justified the policy on the ground that the Taliban reaped over $100 million annually from the drug trade. US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates likewise defended the decision as sound strategy.It soon became clear that other key figures were less enamoured with the new approach, or the subsequent guidance issued to effectuate it. On 5 January 2009, Craddock instructed General Egon Ramms, the German Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, which overseas NATO operations in Afghanistan, ‘to attack directly drug producers and facilities throughout Afghanistan’. The threshold for engagement seemed to require little connection to the insurgency. According to SACEUR's guidance, it was ‘no longer necessary to produce intelligence or other evidence that each particular drug trafficker or narcotics facility in Afghanistan meets the criteria of being a military objective’ because the alliance ‘has decided that (drug traffickers and narcotics facilities) are inextricably linked to the Opposing Military Forces, and thus may be attacked’.
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Ross, Robert S. "Building Hồ’s Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam, by Xiaobing Li. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019. viii+283 pp. US$50.00 (cloth)." China Journal 84 (July 1, 2020): 163–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/709000.
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van der Kraan, Alfons. "On Company Business The Rijckloff van Goens Mission to Siam, 1650." Itinerario 22, no. 2 (July 1998): 42–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165115300011943.
Full textAbstract:
On 13 April 1650 the young Chief (Opperhoofd) of the Siam factory of Dutch East India Company (VOC), the Merchant (Koopman) Jan van Muijden, arrived at Batavia aboard the flute de Gecroonde Liefde (Crowned Love), with a cargo unusual even by the standards of this thriving stapling port. Aboard were a total of twelve elephants, a gift from the King of Siam and his Mandarins, Oya Sabartiban (Okya Sabartiban) and Oya Berckelang (Okya Phrakhlang), to Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn and the four Councillors of the Indies present in Batavia at the time, one of whom was the Director-General and second-in-command François Caron. When Van Muijden stepped ashore, he presented Van der Lijn and the Councillors with a letter from Prasat-Thong, the King of Siam, in which the King requested several precious diamond rings for himself and for his Mandarin, Oya Sabartiban, ‘various curiosities from the Netherlands and elsewhere’, military assistance against his rebellious subjects in Cambodia and on the Malay peninsula, and an end to the all-too-frequent molesting by Company ships of Chinese and Portuguese vessels en route to Siam.
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Roy, Franççois Le. "Mirages over the Andes: Peru, France, the United States, and Military Jet Procurement in the 1960s." Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 2 (May 1, 2002): 269–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/phr.2002.71.2.269.
Full textAbstract:
On May 5, 1967, U.S. National Security Adviser Walter W. Rostow briefed President Lyndon B. Johnson that Peru had contracted to buy twelve Mirage 5 supersonic fighter jets from France, "despite our repeated warnings of the consequences." The first planes were delivered a year later, prompting the United States to withhold development loans from Peru as directed by the Conte-Long Amendment to the 1968 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill. Peru was the first Latin American country (with the exception of Cuba) to equip its air force with supersonic combat aircraft, and its decision spurred a dramatic qualitative and financial escalation in regional arms procurement, thereby defeating Washington's effort to control the latter. The CIA qualified the "Mirage affair" as the "most serious issue" in U.S.-Peruvian relations at the time. The event demonstrated the growing desire of Peru and other Latin American countries to loosen the ties that bound them to Washington and exemplified France's drive to depolarize world politics during the Cold War. Demanded by the Peruvian military establishment, the Mirage deal also announced the golpe of October 1968 that ended the presidency of Fernando Belaúúnde Terry and ushered in the reformist military dictatorship of Juan Velasco Alvarado. In addition, it complicated relations between the White House, Congress, and the press in the antagonistic context of the Vietnam War. Finally, it further illustrated the diplomatic and economic stakes of military aircraft sales, as well as the appeal of the airplane as a symbol of national sovereignty and modernity.
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Lakishyk, Dmytro. "Features of US Geostrategy in the Third World (50’s – First Half of the 60’s of the XX Сentury)." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 9 (2020): 9–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2020.09.1.
Full textAbstract:
The main tendency of the postwar world order was the absence of direct military conflicts between major powers and the division of the world into two military-political blocs.These entities brought together countries that differed in ideology and socio-economic structure. In the context of this conflicting confrontation, third world countries have become the arena of mediated rivalry. The confrontation took place in order to increase the area of influence in developing countries by engaging them in some form of socio-economic and political system. The most striking similarity can be seen in the development of the divided nations of Korea, China, Vietnam, in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. In the event of such contradictions, it is possible not to claim the conflict between superpowers and third world countries, but about the involvement or intervention of major powers in internal or interstate conflicts. During the second half of the 1940s – early 1960s, the main task of US administrations was to create a «power ring» around the Soviet control area, to maintain its functioning and further strengthening it. Initially, its line ran in Europe, then in East Asia, and later expanded to the Middle East, with adequate security in the form of US military bases and military-political blocs. By pursuing a policy of containment and extending its line throughout the periphery of Eurasia, the United States was increasingly confronted with the effects of the collapse of the colonial empires and forced, in one form or another, to fill the vacuum of emerging power. At the same time, geopolitical considerations played a major role in this process. The first attempt at an integrated response to the needs of underdeveloped countries was President G. Truman’s Point Four programm, which provided them with technical assistance. In the 1950s, US geostrategic priorities changed: Europe retained its importance, but more attention was paid to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. During this period, the strengthening of US positions in the Gulf region – the most important strategic point in terms of both oil resources and geographical location – began.
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Van Der Kroef, Justus M. "Clients, mandataires et partenaires silencieux : Configurations du conflit américano-soviétique en Asie du Sud-Est." Études internationales 13, no. 1 (April 12, 2005): 109–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/701316ar.
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In the Southeast Asian area modalities of political dependence have developed which involve the distinctive typology of clients, silent partners, and proxies. These modalities govern the relationship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. They also are operative in the international interaction between the members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (Asean) and the Western major powers. A set of strategic cooperative arrangements, as well as direct military assistance between Asean, the Commonwealth and the U.S., has its counterpart in similar relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Hanoi dominated lndo-China alliance. As a result, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Southeast Asia is expressed politically and strategically primarily through the proxy relationships with the lndo-China states and key Asean members respectively. In turn, there are strong undercurrents in Asean seeking an accommodation with Hanoi, in order to minimize the conflict potential in the region generated by opposing U.S. and Soviet strategic interests. Particularly the relatively warming relationship between the U.S. and People's China has strengthened the Asean fears of China s long-term intentions in the region. An independent Vietnam, free from its proxy-client status toward the Soviet Union, could act as a buffer between China and the Southeast Asian region. Since Hanoi, if only for long-standing nationalistic reasons, wishes to be free from its currently necessary dependence on Moscow, Asean's accommodationist interests may well meet with appreciation in Hanoi in the future. This would tend to lessen the effect of the American-Soviet confrontation in the area.
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Reaves, Erik J., Michael Termini, and Frederick M. Burkle. "Reshaping US Navy Pacific Response in Mitigating Disaster Risk in South Pacific Island Nations: Adopting Community-Based Disaster Cycle Management." Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 29, no. 1 (December 23, 2013): 60–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x13009138.
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AbstractThe US Department of Defense continues to deploy military assets for disaster relief and humanitarian actions around the world. These missions, carried out through geographically located Combatant Commands, represent an evolving role the US military is taking in health diplomacy, designed to enhance disaster preparedness and response capability. Oceania is a unique case, with most island nations experiencing “acute-on-chronic” environmental stresses defined by acute disaster events on top of the consequences of climate change. In all Pacific Island nation-states and territories, the symptoms of this process are seen in both short- and long-term health concerns and a deteriorating public health infrastructure. These factors tend to build on each other. To date, the US military's response to Oceania primarily has been to provide short-term humanitarian projects as part of Pacific Command humanitarian civic assistance missions, such as the annual Pacific Partnership, without necessarily improving local capacity or leaving behind relevant risk-reduction strategies. This report describes the assessment and implications on public health of large-scale humanitarian missions conducted by the US Navy in Oceania. Future opportunities will require the Department of Defense and its Combatant Commands to show meaningful strategies to implement ongoing, long-term, humanitarian activities that will build sustainable, host nation health system capacity and partnerships. This report recommends a community-centric approach that would better assist island nations in reducing disaster risk throughout the traditional disaster management cycle and defines a potential and crucial role of Department of Defense's assets and resources to be a more meaningful partner in disaster risk reduction and community capacity building.ReavesEJ,TerminiM,BurkleFMJr.Reshaping US Navy Pacific response in mitigating disaster risk in South Pacific Island nations: adopting community-based disaster cycle management.Prehosp Disaster Med.2014;29(1):1-9.
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Dal Ponte, Silvana T., Carlos F. D. Dornelles, Bonnie Arquilla, Christina Bloem, and Patricia Roblin. "Mass-casualty Response to the Kiss Nightclub in Santa Maria, Brazil." Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 30, no. 1 (December 29, 2014): 93–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x14001368.
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AbstractOn January 27, 2013, a fire at the Kiss Nightclub in Santa Maria, Brazil led to a mass-casualty incident affecting hundreds of college students. A total of 234 people died on scene, 145 were hospitalized, and another 623 people received treatment throughout the first week following the incident.1 Eight of the hospitalized people later died.1 The Military Police were the first on scene, followed by the state fire department, and then the municipal Mobile Prehospital Assistance (SAMU) ambulances. The number of victims was not communicated clearly to the various units arriving on scene, leading to insufficient rescue personnel and equipment. Incident command was established on scene, but the rescuers and police were still unable to control the chaos of multiple bystanders attempting to assist in the rescue efforts. The Municipal Sports Center (CDM) was designated as the location for dead bodies, where victim identification and communication with families occurred, as well as forensic evaluation, which determined the primary cause of death to be asphyxia. A command center was established at the Hospital de Caridade Astrogildo de Azevedo (HCAA) in Santa Maria to direct where patients should be admitted, recruit staff, and procure additional supplies, as needed. The victims suffered primarily from smoke inhalation and many required endotracheal intubation and mechanical ventilation. There was a shortage of ventilators; therefore, some had to be borrowed from local hospitals, neighboring cities, and distant areas in the state. A total of 54 patients1 were transferred to hospitals in the capital city of Porto Alegre (Brazil). The main issues with the response to the fire were scene control and communication. Areas for improvement were identified, namely the establishment of a disaster-response plan, as well as regularly scheduled training in disaster preparedness/response. These activities are the first steps to improving mass-casualty responses.Dal PonteST, DornellesCFD, ArquillaB, BloemC, RoblinP. Mass-casualty response to the Kiss Nightclub in Santa Maria, Brazil. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2015;30(1):1-4.
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Garver, John W. "Building Ho's Army: Chinese Military Assistance to North Vietnam Xiaobing Li Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2019 xiii + 283 pp. $50.00 ISBN 978-0-813-17794-6." China Quarterly 242 (June 2020): 600–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741020000375.
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