Journal articles on the topic 'Military law Constitutional law Germany (West)'

This article examines the complex interplay between the American military governor and German political leaders through an analysis of two crises that occurred over the making of the Basic Law. Why did a trial of strength between General Lucius Clay and the Social Democratic Party leadership in March and April 1949 come about? Understanding Clay's intervention in the politics of constitution-making in occupied Germany requires a more probing investigation than references to the temperament of a “proconsul” or a bias against a left-wing party. The analysis of Clay's intervention in this account shows how the Social Democrats evaded and challenged directives from the occupation authorities, and illuminates the limits of his influence over German framers of the Basic Law.

AbstractToday, the 1989 Revolution in East Germany is recognized and celebrated as the event that abolished the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and brought about German unification. What is mostly overlooked, however, is that these are not the Revolution's only and, from the perspective of constitutional law, not even its most important achievements. More important with respect to understanding constitutional lawmaking in Germany is that the 1989 Revolution did not lead to an unconditional adoption of West German constitutional law in the new East German states. Instead, the Revolution had its own constitutional agenda, which went beyond the West German Basic Law and was transferred to unified Germany where it then needed to be integrated into the existing West German constitutional order. The Article reinterprets the 1989 Revolution and shows how a revolutionary popular movement in the GDR developed its own constitutional agenda, which first found legal manifestation in GDR legislation, and then was transferred to unified Germany through the Unification Treaty and the new state constitutions.

Germany v. N. Decision No. 2 WD 12.04. At <http://www.bverwg.de>.Bundesverwaltungsgericht (German Federal Administrative Court), June 21, 2005.On June 21, 2005, in Germany v. N, the Federal Administrative Court of Germany (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) acquitted a soldier charged with disobeying an order in violation of his military duty of obedience and loyal service. The soldier, a major in the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), had refused to participate in a military software project that he feared could support Operation Iraqi Freedom. The major based his refusal on his belief that the Iraqi war was illegal and that, as a result, he was permitted to refuse the order under his constitutional right of freedom of conscience.2 The court held that in view of the serious reservations that exist about the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom and also about Germany's position in that conflict, the soldier's right to freedom of conscience required that he be offered alternative tasks unrelated to a war that he reasonably believed to be illegal.

Representatives of German state (constitutional) law define political extremism as "a set of political beliefs and aspirations... which are aimed at denying the democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values". Based on the definition, the criterion for recognising any "political belief or aspiration" as extremist is the notion of a democratic constitutional state. In line with this, the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has given an expansive interpretation of a "free democratic state" that "constitutes a legal state order whose basis is the self-determination of the people according to the will of the majority, freedom and equality. It excludes all forms of despotism or arbitrariness. Among the basic principles of this order are at least: the protection of human rights as laid down in the Basic Law of Germany, the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, the responsibility of the government, the legitimacy of government, the independence of the judiciary and the principle of multi-partyism. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), political parties that "endeavour to harm or destroy the foundation of the free demo-cratic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany" are declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The possibility to ban political parties as provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees the development of a democratic political system of the state. It is worth emphasising that the stability and democratism of the German political system and the stability of the constitutional order in the state depend not only on the prohibition provision in the Basic Law of the FRG, but above all on the ability of political parties to reach agreement on the basic principles of a "free democratic state system" and to implement these principles in the minds of the people. To realise these goals, Germany has the Federal Office for the Protection of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, a public authority whose task is to control and supervise the legality of the activities of political parties. The forms of extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany are "left-wing extremism" and "right-wing extremism". In right-wing extremism, the older generation is gradually being freed from the aggressive youth, in an increased willingness to use force. Left-wing extremism has become less focused on global global themes - it has become more local and regional, more relatable and at the same time integrated. Because of the new nature of the development of extremism in a united Germany a left-right antagonism has emerged. At the same time, different tendencies of West and East Germany can be observed: in West Germany the struggle "left vs. right" prevails, in East Germany the struggle "right vs. left" prevails.

When Belgium was overrun by Germany in 1914 neither the Belgian constitutional legislator, nor the Belgian legislator had determined how the police powers of the civil authorities could be transferred to the military authorities in the case of a war. Article 130 of the Constitution determined that the Constitution and the constitutional rights and freedoms it provided could never be suspended wholly or in part. This created a problem. There were several statutes which provided merely a limited answer for some situations. When Belgian military authorities instead of civil authorities took measures which invaded upon constitutional rights, disputes arose. In order to avoid these, the Belgian King enacted the decree-law concerning the state of war and the state of siege on 11 October 1916. Many provisions of this decree-law had been taken from the French war laws of 9 August 1849 and 4 April 1878, but – contrary to these French laws – the Belgian decree-law was not based on a formal constitutional stipulation. This decree-law, which contravened the Belgian Constitution of 7 February 1831 and the fundamental rights and freedoms which were safeguarded by this Constitution in several respects, made it possible to take a number of measures during the state of war and the state of siege. As soon as these different provisions were applied, several citizens protested against them. Their protest was mainly aimed at the force of ‘law’ of the decree-law of 11 October 1916 and all of the other decree-laws. The rest of this contribution will detail when and why this protest took place, as well as how the Belgian administration of justice dealt with this protest.

“Aerial Security Law.” Case No. 1 BvR 357/05. 115 BVerfGE 118. Available at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de>.Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), February 15, 2006.On February 15,2006, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held the Aerial Security Act to be unconstitutional. This act authorized the use of military force against any aircraft intended to be used for the killing of human beings, if the use of such force was the only means to avert an immediate danger. The Court based its ruling on two grounds: first, that the federal level of government had no legislative power to enact such a law, and second, that the act's authorization of military force infringed upon the guarantee of human dignity as embodied in Article 1(1) of the German Constitution, or Basic Law (Grundgesetz).On January 5, 2003, a small airplane circled over the Frankfurt banking district. For a few moments people saw themselves confronted with a terror attack, recalling 9/11 and the pictures of the burning World Trade Center. The police evacuated several buildings and two Air Force fighter jets arrived before it was established that the pilot was not a terrorist but merely a mentally confused person. A year later, in January 2004, the federal government proposed a draft federal Aerial Security Act. The government argued that the attacks of 9/11, along with the Frankfurt incident, made clear that in order to protect against such attacks, it was necessary to clarify the roles of the federal and state (Länder) governments. “This draft is meant to achieve that aim … and to establish quick and efficient mechanisms for information gathering and decision.”

The article examines the experience of military courts functioning in guaranteeing the right to judicial protection to military personnel in foreign countries of the world. The countries in which the military courts operate are highlighted and the activities of these courts are analyzed in countries such as: United States of America, United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany. It has been found out that the presence of military courts in foreign countries is conditioned by the fact that military personnel as persons with special legal status are subject to military law in addition to general law. It has been established that the protection of the rights and freedoms of servicemen in the leading countries of the world through judicial protection is becoming more and more universal, which is explained by the high degree of democratic trial and based on the principles of court independence, transparency and openness. The analysis of the national legislation, first of all, of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine «On Judiciary and Status of Judges» of June 2, 2016 № 1402-VIII and considered the feasibility of functioning during a special period under the conditions of the operation of the United Forces in the system of judicial system of Ukraine military courts whose competence will be to hear cases in criminal proceedings concerning war crimes committed by military personnel, which will facilitate the practical implementation of the guarantees of the rights and freedoms of military personnel and maintaining law and order in the troops. It is established that for the effective implementation of the constitutional right of military personnel to judicial protection, especially during the special period and increasing the number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations, the positive experience of the leading countries in which the judicial authorities act as a real guarantor of the protection of rights and freedoms is essential military personnel whose experience can be applied in Ukraine. On the basis of the conducted research the author emphasizes that military courts are a real guarantee of protection of the rights and freedoms of persons who pass military service and the possibility of applying foreign experience in Ukraine.

In contrast to the United States, where there is little or no public financing of parties and candidates below the presidential level, the German “party state” grants generous subsidies in a variety of forms to the political parties, though not to individual candidates. The German Basic Law (constitution), various laws passed by the national and Land (state) parliaments, and the Federal Constitutional Court have been important factors in the development of a complex and costly system of public financing for election campaigns, parliamentary parties and party foundations and for free television and radio time and billboard advertising space. In addition, the federal government incurs large tax expenditures through the encouragement of tax deductible contributions to political parties. In spite of the crucial role which public financing has assumed, recent scandals have occurred involving illegal contributions from business interests. A revised party law of 1984 and a Federal Constitutional Court decision in July 1986 have brought about significant changes, but controversy in Germany over public financing and the impact of recent reforms continues.

Abstract Fritz Bauer was one of the main figures of post-war West Germany who fought to bring Nazi perpetrators to trial before German courts at a time when the prevailing general climate and mentality was one of impunity and a need to make a ‘clean break’. This article investigates whether Bauer’s ideas can be set in relation to today’s notions of international criminal justice. Looking for this connection seems an obvious and necessary endeavour, since Bauer’s work focused on prosecuting Nazi crimes, which were dealt with initially by the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, the first international criminal tribunal in history. However, this connection has rarely been studied. By taking the example of Bauer’s views on criminal responsibility of the staff at Auschwitz, expressed in relation to the first Frankfurt Auschwitz trial (1963-1965), this article demonstrates that his ideas stood out from common legal opinions in West Germany at the time. It also shows elements in his thinking corresponding to the concept of joint criminal enterprise in today’s international criminal law. The article will also argue that although Bauer’s far-reaching understanding of criminal liability made its way into legal practice only to a limited extent, this must be seen within the historical context of West German jurisprudence concerning Nazi crimes in the 1960s, the period in which Bauer worked.

Summary Apart from the survival of serfdom in western Germany, the perpetuation of unfreedom elsewhere in western Europe has frequently been overlooked. Recent research on France, especially its eastern districts, has shown how specific forms of feudal dues, such as the heriot, evolved into a general status of subjection akin to citizenship, just as occurred in the west German lands. In Scandinavia, harsh forms of personal and tenurial unfreedom yielded over time to the state's need for a free peasantry bound only by its duty of military service. In the Mediterranean lands the spread of sharecropping could subject the peasantry to quasiservile dependence.

AbstractThe politics of succession in post-independence West Africa has left much to be desired and, by extension, has affected the quality of democracy and human security in the sub-region. This article briefly assesses succession politics in Togo, a small West African nation of approximately 5 million people, following the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, one of Africa's longest serving dictators. The author describes the military takeover and subsequent election that legitimized the illegal take over of power by Eyadema's son despite sustained domestic opposition from politicians and civil society, as well as sub-regional, regional and international condemnation of a Constitutional "coup d'etat" in Togo. The article concludes that the succession crisis in Togo is far from over, given the continuing manipulation of what the author calls the geo-ethnic divide in that country.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided, in the case Tanja Kreil v. Germany, that Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 (equal treatment directive) precludes the application of national provisions, such as those of German law, which impose a general exclusion of women from military posts involving the use of arms. The ECJ found that such policies violated the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. Since this ruling both the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) and the ECJ have had to confront the question whether the German system of compulsory military service for men is compatible with Article 3.2 and 3.3 of the Grundgesetz (GG – German Basic Law) and the equal treatment directive.

AbstractThe article explores the key components of the political project of West Germany and the role of the Rechtsstaat within it. It shows how the German Federal Republic developed a specific reading of the rule of law as an order founded on basic rights as supra-legal values and judicial authority, which had to be defended even against democratic government. This did not signify a departure from the constitutional theory of the Weimar period, as constitutional lawyers such as Gustav Radbruch and Carlo Schmid claimed at the time. Instead, the decisive innovations in constitutional thought stemmed from the Weimar era. Judicial review and basic rights had been instruments in a political and legal struggle over the social question and the boundaries of democratic decision-making in the 1920s. They had been invoked by conservative lawyers such as Carl Schmitt and been the subject of a substantial critique mounted by social democrat interpreters of the Weimar Constitution such as Hermann Heller and Franz Neumann. As such the Rechtsstaat, which is so strongly associated with the renewal of German democracy, carries with it a tradition of legal thought which systematically and successfully expanded judicial power to the detriment of the legislature and democratic action.

Perception and Impact of the American Constitution on German Constitutional Debates, 1789–1949 This article considers the impact of the American federal constitution of 1787 on German constitutional debates. Its prime chronological focus is on the nineteenth century, as this time period has so far received relatively little systematic scholarly attention. The article examines both the political rhetoric that emphasised – and often exaggerated – American influences and the practical impact these debates had on constitutions in German-speaking countries. The article highlights the extreme complexity of such developments, with very widely different perceptions of what ‹America› stood for, being used as a reference point in constitutional debates. The direct impact of American constitutional thinking on the structure and design of constitutions in German countries remained, however, very limited. It was only after the unconditional surrender of National Socialist Germany that a constitutional order emerged in the Federal Republic in 1949 that embodied significant elements of American (or more generally ‹Western›) constitutional thought, most importantly in the provisions for ‹basic rights› and a Federal Constitutional Court in the West German Basic Law.

This article is dedicated to the problem of enforcement of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the Federal Republic of Germany. The author explores the experience of West Germany in settling the conflict between the national law and international treaty &ndash; the European Convention on Human Rights. Special attention is given to the analysis of positions of the Federal Republic of Germany related to the decisions of ECHR made in regard to other countries and constituting precedents in German courts, as well as mandatory for considering in the work of government bodies. The scientific novelty is defined by focusing on the previously uncovered by the Russian legal experts combination of relevant aspects of the enforcement of decisions by ECHR in Western Germany through the prism of the realities of Russian law. Being fluent in German language, the author used the original laws and regulations of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as scientific literature in German language. The conclusion is made that by imparting the status of general law upon the European Convention on Human Rights, Germany still relies on priority of the norms of international law over the national legislation and compliance with the decisions of ECHR. The author recommends to incorporate the German practice, according to which for preventing the instances of violating Convention in the future, the government bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany must consider the directive of ECHR not only with regards to Germany, but also foreign countries, as the practice of the European Court of Human Rights accordant to the position of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany constituents has precedential value.

When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.

Many of the new states that emerged or reconstituted themselves after the First World War used declarations of independence or preliminary constitutions, or both, as organic law until the adoption of a permanent constitution. The majority of those documents did not address the civil and political rights of citizens (e.g. Germany, Ireland) or did so very briefly (e.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Georgia, Latvia). Estonia stood out by having a whole chapter dedicated to civil rights in its preliminary constitution. The Preliminary Constitution of Estonia (valitsemise ajutine kord) was adopted by the Constituent Assembly (Asutav Kogu) on 4 June 1919, only six weeks after the Assembly first convened on 23 April 1919. The Constituent Assembly was elected and worked on the Preliminary Constitution at the time of the War of Independence between Estonia and Soviet Russia. Strong left-wing sentiment in the country’s society was reflected in the composition of the Assembly: social democrats held 41 seats, the Labour Party (tööerakond) held 30 seats, and Socialist-Revolutionaries (esseerid) held seven seats, together accounting for 65 per cent of the total 120 seats. The centrist People’s Party (rahvaerakond) led by the journalist and renowned politician Jaan Tõnisson had 25 seats, the centre-right Rural League (maaliit) led by another prominent politician and lawyer Konstantin Päts had only seven seats, the Christian People’s Party had five seats, three seats belonged to representatives of the German minority, and one seat went to the Russian minority. Similar proportions were reflected in the 15-member Constitution Committee that was elected on 24 April 1919. The first draft of the Preliminary Constitution, and of the Civil Rights Chapter as part of it, was allegedly prepared by a young legal scholar named Jüri Uluots. Uluots was a member of the Special Committee that was already convened by the Provisional Government in March of 1919 before the election of the Constituent Assembly. The Special Committee was composed of eight lawyers, each of whom was appointed by one of the major political parties. It was assigned the task to provide first drafts of the provisional and permanent constitutions. The Committee fulfilled only the first task. Due to disagreements in the Special Committee, the draft Preliminary Constitution was submitted to the Assembly without the Civil Rights Chapter. The Constituent Assembly processed the Preliminary Constitution Bill very quickly. The Assembly and its committees worked six days a week. It took about three weeks for the Constitution Committee to modify the Bill and submit it to the plenary session of the Assembly on 18 May 1919. The plenary session read the Bill three times and adopted it on 4 June 1919. The Preliminary Constitution entered into force on 9 July 1919 and was in force until 21 December 1920, when Estonia’s first Constitution entered into full force. The Committee spent considerable time on discussing the Civil Rights Chapter. Although concerns were expressed that the Committee was losing time with such discussions and suggestions were made to develop the chapter later as part of the permanent Constitution, the majority of the Committee deemed it important to also address civil rights in the Bill. Uluots, who had been elected to the Assembly as a candidate of the Rural League and was also a member of the Committee, submitted his draft Civil Rights Chapter to the Committee. Four out of eight sections in the Uluots draft found their way into the Chapter. These included equality before the law, civil and political rights and freedoms, and extraordinary restrictions. Sections regarding the right to participate in politics and the duty to obey the law (including military duty and the duty to pay taxes) were rejected at the plenary session, and the section regarding the right to private property was already omitted by the Committee. Also, the Committee preferred the social security provision proposed by the leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the schoolmaster Hans Kruus, to the one included in the Uluots draft. The Committee added a new provision concerning education and rejected the right to choose occupations and engage in business proposed by a People’s Party member, the military officer Karl Einbund, and a provision entitling citizens to bring criminal charges against corrupt officials proposed by the social democrat, lawyer and journalist Johan Jans. The first section of the Uluots draft declared all citizens equal before the law. Disputes arouse over the second sentence of the provision. Uluots had proposed that all property and other rights relating to social ranks (the privileges of the nobility) should be abolished. The social democrats (Jans, the writer Karl Ast and others) demanded that privileges and titles should be abolished immediately. Their more moderate opponents (Uluots, Tõnisson, Westholm and others) feared that this would create a legal vacuum in property, inheritance and matrimonial rights. The majority of the Assembly supported the more radical approach and declared that there are no privileges and titles relating to ranks in Estonia. The law implementing the abolition was adopted a year later, in June of 1920. The school headmaster Jakob Westholm, a member of the People’s Party, and Villem Ernits, a social democrat, proposed that the Committee should include a provision concerning education. Their original proposal was scaled back by omitting the duration of mandatory elementary education and by deleting the right to free secondary and university education for talented students. The Preliminary Constitution eventually stipulated (§ 5) that education is compulsory for school age children and is free in elementary schools, and that every citizen is entitled to education in his/her mother tongue. The Committee combined civil and political rights, which were originally in two separate provisions in the Uluots draft, into one section (§ 6) stipulating that the inviolability of the person and home, secrecy of correspondence, freedom of conscience, religion, expression, language, press, assembly, association, and movement can only be restricted in accordance with the law. There were no disputes over the provision in the Committee or at the plenary session. The Committee preferred the proposal made by Kruus as the basis for further discussions on social security: “Every citizen will be guaranteed a decent standard of living according to which every citizen will have the right to receive the goods and support necessary for the satisfaction of his/her basic needs before less urgent needs of other citizens are satisfied. For that purpose, citizens must be guaranteed the obtaining of employment, the protection of motherhood and work safety, and necessary state support in the case of youth, old age, work disability and accidents.” While the last part of Kruus’ proposal was similar to Uluots’ draft and the term “decent standard of living” resembled the German menschenwürdiges Dasein (later adopted in Article 151 of the Weimar Constitution), the origin of the middle part of the provision remains unclear. The social security provision was by far the most extensively debated provision of the Chapter. The main issue was the state’s ability to fulfil its promises and whether social security should take the form of direct allowances or mandatory insurance.Views diverged even within the same parliamentary groups. The Committee replaced “will be guaranteed” with the less imperative “must be guaranteed in accordance with the law”. As a compromise, it deleted the middle part guaranteeing satisfaction of basic needs since it was deemed ‘too communist’ for many members. The plenary session supported adding the right to acquire land for cultivation and dwelling in the second sentence of the provision (§ 7) just before the adoption of the Bill. The last section in the Chapter (§ 8) provided that extraordinary restrictions of the rights and freedoms of citizens and the imposition of burdens come into force in the event of the proclamation of a state of emergency on the basis and within the limits of the corresponding laws. In the course of the discussions led by the lawyer and member of the Labour Party, Lui Olesk, the Committee turned the original general limitations clause into an emergency powers clause resembling similar provisions in the Russian Constitution of 1906 (Article 83) and the Austrian Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals of 1867 (Article 20). Uluots urged the Committee to include protection of private property in the Bill as a safeguard against tyranny. The provision caused long and heated debates on the limits to nationalisation of private property, especially the principle of fair compensation. The provision was rejected by the majority of both the Committee and the plenary session. In anticipation of land reform, the deputies did not want to narrow down legal options for the expropriation of large estates owned mostly by the German nobility. After their defeat on the protection of private property, the right-wing members wished to protect freedom to choose an occupation and engage in business, trade, industry and agriculture. The majority refused again, arguing that during the war, there had been too much profiteering, and speculators do not deserve protection, and also that the government should have free hands to regulate industry. Without any long deliberations, the Committee also rejected the proposal to allow citizens to sue civil servants in criminal courts. Jans defended his proposal by pointing out the high level of corruption among officials and the need to provide the people with a means for self-defence. His opponents argued that Estonia had already set up administrative courts in February of 1919, providing citizens with an avenue for challenging the corrupt practices of officials. Committee and Assembly members also discussed the legal nature of the fundamental rights and freedoms included in the Bill. Some social democrats deemed it important to craft the provisions as guarantees that citizens can enforce against the state (Jans), but the majority deemed the provisions as political guidance for the legislator. Supporters of the latter view were afraid that direct enforceability of the Civil Rights Chapter would saddle the government with an unsurmountable economic burden. The state’s only directly binding obligation was probably the right to free elementary education.

Learning from the Weimar experience, the founding fathers of theFederal Republic eliminated the chance of a renewed institutionalizedconflict between the head of state and the federal governmentthrough the creation of the Basic Law [Grundgesetz ]. They primarilystrengthened the power of the chancellor and his cabinet by introducingthe “constructive” vote of no confidence and abolishing theprinciple of individual ministerial responsibility, while also reducingthe position of the federal president to a mere representative head ofstate. With these clear-cut constitutional arrangements it is not surprisingthat Germany has not been among the number of west Europeandemocracies (such as Italy or Austria) for which issuesregarding the power of heads of state have occupied a rather prominentposition on the political agenda of the 1990s.

The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of the Convention in its judgement in the complaints of the former East German political and military leaders Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz. All three were convicted and sentenced to terms in prison by German courts in relation to the deaths of East Germans who were killed in attempts at fleeing across the fortified border between East and West Germany. Nonetheless, the Court's decision constitutes a clear rejection of the Radbruch Formula, which served as a central line of reasoning in the decisions of the German courts in the cases. The author addresses the Court's rejection of the Radbruch Formula, focusing especially on the distinct historical and political circumstances that existed after World War II and in 1989.

Post–World War II developments concerning citizenship and access as one of the dimensions of citizenship are examined through the prism of noncitizenship and rights, using the drafting of the asylum paragraph of the 1949 Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic of Germany as a specific case study. The aim of this article is to look into the creation of the right to asylum in West Germany, to examine its political history by exploring its development and by searching for its conceptual, political, and rhetorical origins. The article investigates the birth of the unique conceptualization of asylum in the debates of the Parliamentary Council, the constitutional and quasi-parliamentary assembly responsible for the writing of the postwar Basic Law, and examines the political choices, motivations, and compromises behind its creation. To connect the matter of asylum to a wider problematic related to noncitizens and rights, the article benefits from the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, with reference to her writings on human rights and refugees in the immediate post–World War II period.

Nowadays, widespread consensus exists that the dramatic events of September 11, 2001 changed not only the country that suffered these attacks but also the way many in the West view the world outside this exclusive circle. For quite a number, it confirmed Huntington's thesis of a clash of civilizations – a vision of a future of ‘us’ versus ‘them'. But as the attackers were being identified, it became clear that in a sense they came from among us; although technically foreign nationals all, they lived and studied inconspicuously in western, multicultural societies. How are we then to deal with this enemy within? How is democracy to fight this so-called War on Terror and survive? Such questions are obviously not new. Bearing De Tocqueville's assertion in mind that a long war is not needed in order to put freedom at risk in a democratic society, this article, using the technique of a thought experiment, seeks to examine the increased prerogatives that governments – fearing the enemy within – have granted themselves in the realm of criminal law to deal with the perceived threat. This experiment will bring the reader, in a non-specialist way, from the criminal justice system of Germany to the possible role of an operational International Criminal Court, and from the criminal justice system of the United States to military tribunals as a means of dealing with what those in power claim is an extraordinary threat.

The revolutionary transition of power to democratic forces after the "dignity revolution" in 2014 in Ukraine did not indicate the absence of contradictions within the new ruling class, because patriotic and devotion to democratic transformation are not the only condition for the consolidation of the ruling class. The democratic theory of the elite, which corresponds to the essence of the designated form of government, recognizes the existence of a select minority (elite) in each of the social spheres, which owns intellectual and voluntary law, not leadership. The relations between the elites are not stable, but on the contrary may become exacerbated in the fractured periods of history In the countries of "young democracy", the relationship between the political and military elite is controversial lace of relations, because the military elite represents a closed "group of interests" in politics, so it can move from supporting the ruling class to a strong opponent of relations. Even the neutral position of the military elite includes a variant of interference in political processes of power scale. Revolutionary changes on Ukraine's path to European integration may have been deeply embedded in the formation of a new military elite that has tempered itself in the armed struggle with the Russian-separatist forces, was engaged in joint exercises, and most importantly, in business cooperation with representatives of the military elites of the West, which have a long tradition Serious interaction with the ruling class. Taking into account that social and political processes in Ukraine can be compared with developing countries, the whole set of contradictory relations between the political and military elite in our country should be directed to the general line of constitutional-legal civil-military relations.

Is military intervention effective in spreading democracy? Existing studies disagree. Optimists point to successful cases, such as the transformation of West Germany and Japan into consolidated democracies after World War II. Pessimists view these successes as outliers from a broader pattern of failure typified by cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Those in between agree that, in general, democratic military intervention has little liberalizing effect in target states, but contend that democracies can induce democratization when they explicitly pursue this objective and invest substantial effort and resources. Existing studies, however, often employ overly broad definitions of intervention, fail to grapple with possible selection effects in countries where democracies choose to intervene, and stress interveners' actions while neglecting conditions in targets. Astatistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.

I am deeply conscious of the fact, as I consider the subject of torture, that I have led a very sheltered life. I have never been tortured. I have never seen anybody being tortured. Nor have I ever met anyone who has undergone this dreadful practice. But I cannot say that I have never met anyone who has had anything to do with it. The Cyprus emergency was at its height during my period of national service. My attempt to persuade the military authorities that my knowledge of classical Greek was a suitable qualification for me to be sent to the island to act as an interpreter was unsuccessful. I was sent instead to serve with an infantry battalion in the British Army of the Rhine in West Germany. I did not think so at the time as we endured one of the coldest winters in living memory in Nordrhein-Westphalia, but I was to discover later that this may well have been the better option. When I went up to university I met someone who had indeed been sent to Cyprus. He had acted as an interpreter when Greek Cypriot members of the Eoka organization were being interrogated. Conscious of the constraints of the Official Secrets Act, he never revealed to me the details of what was done to them during this process. But I had the distinct impression, as we talked, that he had been revolted by it and that things were done which were and would always remain a scar on his memory.

Austria emerged in 1955 from a ten-year occupation administered by the four major powers of the successful anti-Third Reich coalition of World War II—France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as a united, independent state. The 15 May 1955 State Treaty signed by these countries and Austria spared Austria the fate of Cold War division suffered by Austria's neighbor to the north (in the ultimate East-West breakdown of Germany's parallel postwar quadripartite occupation). Paving the way for Austria's good fortune was a political quid pro quo agreed between Austrian leaders and their Soviet counterparts in Moscow the previous April. In the 15 April 1955 Moscow Memorandum, Austria consented to becoming a permanently neutral state modeled on Switzerland. This neutrality precluded a possible Austrian membership in NATO in exchange for a long-delayed Soviet assent to an end of Austria's occupation regime with a concomitant abandonment of the Soviet occupation zone and the withdrawal of all occupation troops. After the completion of this withdrawal, a fully sovereign Austria made good on its pledge with the passage on 26 October 1955 of a constitutional law declaring Austria to be “permanently neutral” and foreswearing all military alliances.

This edition of PER consists of eight articles, four notes and two book reviews covering a range of topics. The first article is by Oliver Fuo, a postgraduate student of the North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus). His contribution deals with the status of executive policies and the basis for their judicial enforcement in a constitutional and socio-economic context. He demonstrates that "executive" policies may be perceived to have the force of law, especially where their enforcement may be imperative for the realisation of socio-economic rights. Secondly, Ig Rautenbach of the University of Johannesburg considers empirical data on the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court during the period 1995 to 2012. He focuses on the following three questions: "How did the cases reach the court", "why did the court refuse to consider some of them", and "how often did the court invalidate laws and actions". In the third article, Magda Slabbert and Hendrik Pienaar, follows a multi-disciplinary approach to discuss the legal position of the locum tenens that is often used by medical practitioners in private practice. They recommend that a locum tenens be appointed as an independent contractor rather than an employee, and argues that the onus to ensure that he or she is registered and fit to practice rests on the principal. The fourth article by Carika Keuler deals with the "pay now, argue later" rule in terms of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. She is of the opinion that the Act fails to address the imbalance between the duties of the South African Revenue Services and the right of the taxpayer to access the courts. JC Knobel, the author of the fifth article, gives an overview of the conservation status of eagles in South Africa. He discusses the existing legal framework and makes a number of recommendations to improve their legal status. Two authors, Laurence Juma and James Tsabora, both from Rhodes University, discuss the possibility of South Africa enacting a new law regulating private military and/or security companies, which they refer to as PMSC's. The seventh article by Johan Kruger and Clarence Tshoose gives a South African perspective on the impact of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 on minority trade unions. In the eight place, Dave Holness offers an analysis of compulsory "live client" clinical legal education as part of the LLB course as a means of improving access to justice for the indigent.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), also known as Napoleon I, was a French military leader and emperor who conquered much of Europe in the early 19th century. Born on the island of Corsica, Napoleon rapidly rose through the ranks of the military during the French Revolution (1789-1799). After seizing political power in France in a 1799 coup d’état, he crowned himself emperor in 1804. Shrewd, ambitious and a skilled military strategist, Napoleon successfully waged war against various coalitions of European nations and expanded his empire. However, after a disastrous French invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon abdicated the throne two years later and was exiled to the island of Elba. In 1815, he briefly returned to power in his Hundred Days campaign. After a crushing defeat at the Battle of Waterloo, he abdicated once again and was exiled to the remote island of Saint Helena, where he died at 51.Napoleon was responsible for spreading the values of the French Revolution to other countries, especially in legal reform and the abolition of serfdom. After the fall of Napoleon, not only was the Napoleonic Code retained by conquered countries including the Netherlands, Belgium, parts of Italy and Germany, but has been used as the basis of certain parts of law outside Europe including the Dominican Republic, the US state of Louisiana and the Canadian province of Quebec. The memory of Napoleon in Poland is favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies. The social structure of France changed little under the First Empire. It remained roughly what the Revolution had made it: a great mass of peasants comprising three-fourths of the population—about half of them works owners of their farms or sharecroppers and the other half with too little land for their own subsistence and hiring themselves out as laborers. Industry, stimulated by the war and the blockade of English goods, made remarkable progress in northern and eastern France, whence exports could be sent to central Europe; but it declined in the south and west because of the closing of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The great migrations from rural areas toward industry in the towns began only after 1815. The nobility would probably have declined more swiftly if Napoleon had not restored it, but it could never recover its former privileges. Finally we can say that many of the territories occupied by Napoleon during his Empire began to feel a new sense of nationalism.

Terrorism that involves the deliberate release or distribution of biological agents is called bioterrorism. These pathogens are bacteria, viruses, fungi, other microorganisms and their related toxins, insects, and they can be natural or human-modified forms, which are roughly the same way as in biological warfare that can sicken or kill people, livestock, or crops. These high-priority means include organisms or toxins that pose the greatest risk to the public and national security: Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) Plague (Yersinia pestis). They have the ability to have harmful effects on human health in many ways, from relatively mild allergic reactions to serious medical conditions and even death. Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that produces anthrax, and is one of the pathogens most likely to be used for biological attacks.Bioterrorism cancausemass deaths, epidemics, medical staff illness, environmental pollution, legal issues, and cause anxiety in the medical community and the wider community (1). Unfortunately, bioterrorism agents are difficult to control and affect military personnel and civilian men, women and children. In the past 100 years, the United States and the international community have experienced various acts of bioterrorism against civilians. The model shows that the economic impact of bioterrorism attacks ranges from an estimated US$477.7 million per 100,000 people exposed (brucellosis scenario) to US$26.2 billion per 100,000 people exposed (anthrax scenario). The possibility of bioterrorism is particularly worrying because it causes disease, death and panic, disproportionate to the resources consumed (2). The purpose of bioterrorism is usually to create fear and / or threaten the government or society in order to obtain political, religious or ideological objectives. Compared to weapons like explosives, it can have a unique impact on society. Depending on the situation, wear a mask to reduce inhalation or spread of bacteria. If you have been in contact with biological agents, remove and store your clothing and personal things. Follow official instructions for disposing of contaminated items. Wash with soap and water and put on clean clothes. Bioterrorism agents can be spread through the air or into food or water, and are extremely difficult to detect. The outbreak of biological weapons’ diseases may lead to the extinction of endangered wild animal species, the erosion of genetic diversity of domesticated animals and plants, and the destruction of traditional human livelihoods (3). Symptoms of exposure to biological agents may include sore throat, fever, blurred vision or diplopia, rash or blistering, exhaustion, slurred speech, confusion, muscle weakness, nausea, abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhoea, and cough. The occurrence of a weapon attack may be impossible, but planning and preparation can greatly reduce the death and suffering caused by it. Only 16 countries plus Taiwan possess or presumably possess biological weapons programs: Canada, China, Cuba, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, Syria, and the United States. Britain and the United States. The way to deal with such threats is through international law and carefully negotiated treaties and verification mechanisms. An important protection measure against biological weapons is currently being negotiated in Geneva. Available protective equipment includes respiratory protection devices, full-face protective masks and surgical masks for respiratory protection, combat suits, protective gloves, and skin-protecting boots. Full protection is required when the agent is not recognized. The inherent characteristics of biological agents that affect their potential for use as weapons include: virulence; toxicity; pathogenicity; incubation period; transmissibility; lethality and stability. Now regarding the COVID19 pandemic, there is a game of blame between the two superpowers, the United States and China. It is not clear whether the spread of COVID19 is intentional or unintentional, whether it is a natural virus threatening the world or an artificial virus. Two conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID19 are widely circulated in China and the West, one accusing the United States and the other accusing the higher-level biological containment laboratory in Wuhan, the epicentre of the pandemic (4). However, this has caused pain, death, mental distress, depression, and billions of dollars in treatment and vaccine costs all over the world. This whole process reminds us of Frankenstein's sci-fi monster. The moral lesson learned from this is that people need to blend in and feel connected to others in order to survive. In addition, humans must carefully consider the cost of scientific progress.

The post-World War II occupation of western Germany remains salient to developing theories of post-war crime, insurgency, and policing during post-conflict reconstruction. Yet there are no quantitative assessments of civilian crime for its first year (1945–6). Different from the Soviet-controlled East, where there is a relatively robust consensus that social and governmental disorder led to prolonged violent criminality, the picture for the western US and British zones is less clear and the literature is disjointed. We address this gap and in so doing help resolve the account of post-war criminality in the west with new data derived from the records of the US and British military government courts. Comparative analyses of crimes against the person, against property, and against civil restrictions were conducted. We employed a historical criminological approach to interpreting these data and to extrapolating their findings to current theories of counterinsurgency, post-conflict policing, and reconstruction. They indicate high rates of petty property crimes, minor civil violations, and limited violent disorder, commensurate with earlier studies of 1947 onwards. We could also better assess contested accounts of social conditions, revealing a more nuanced picture than prior historical analyses. Drawing on criminological, psychological, and counterinsurgency theories, we suggest that economic and social strain forced extensive minor law-breaking that, when combined with intense anxieties, manifested as fear of violent crime. But, importantly, Germans remained confident in the US and British military governments’ ability to ensure security, aiding the west’s recovery.

This article is devoted to the problem of confrontation between researchers about the dress of Ukrainian prosecutors and whether prosecutors should have class ranks (special ranks, equated to military ranks and providing bonuses to salaries). This confrontation has lasted for more than 10 years. Ukrainian MPs have proposed legislative amendments to solve this problem, but the approaches of the proposals are in opposition to each other. According to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ of 19 September 2019, the Ukrainian Parliament, at the ninth convocation, completely abolished the class ranks and military-like dress of prosecutors. At the same time, a Draft Law on their restoration is being considered by the current session of the same parliament, and the initiators call their abolishment a ‘premature mistake’. Regardless of the consequences of the consideration of this Draft Law, this issue may not be resolved in the near future in Ukraine, as it is an integral part of the worldview and culture of the pro-Western or Eurasian vector of the prosecutor’s office. The aim of the present piece of legal scholarship is to provide a report that is as informative as possible on the consistency between class ranks, prosecutor’s dress, and the principles of justice, the functions of the prosecutor, and his/her role in the justice system in comparison with the approaches of other states. Moreover, it is important to advise the legislative initiatives, and the voice of parliamentarians since this issue has gained traction in the professional environment and in society. The author analysed the issue of prosecutor’s dress and class ranks in relation to various aspects – constitutional functions and roles of prosecutors, procedural law, comparative law, international law, incentive, as well as psychological, value-philosophical, cultural, and deontological aspects, etc. The prosecutor’s dress code of the Council of Europe’s 47 member states has been clarified; it was found that only prosecutors from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have the military dress; in other countries, prosecutors wore a robe or business suit. Periods of transformation of the prosecutor’s office had taken place in all the post-Soviet republics as a part of their European integration processes – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as Georgia and Moldova, abandoned the military dress of prosecutors as associate members of the EU. The remuneration system of prosecutors in Poland and Germany is analysed in detail, where seniority, experience, qualifications, and position are taken into account in the ‘rates’ (Poland) or ‘R levels’ (Germany) of the basic salary of prosecutors. ‘Rates’ and ‘R levels’ are important only for calculating wages and are not analogous to class ranks.

The parliamentary control of executive power in foreign affairs in Germany suffered two severe blows last November; one may wonder whether it will ever recover. First, on 16 November 2001, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder transformed one of the most important foreign policy debates in the Bundestag (Parliament) into a more general policy debate by combining the decision regarding the provision of German troops to the American-led, so-called “War on Terrorism” in Afghanistan with a vote of confidence with respect to his government, pursuant to Article 68 of the Grundgesetz (GG – Basic Law). With the fate of the Red/Green coalition government hinging on the vote, and the very existence of the Green Party at stake, it was not surprising that Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens), in his speech on the issue, took a tone more suited for a party convention than for a foreign and security policy debate. And although deploring that posture, most of the opposition speakers followed suit. It was a sad day for German parliamentary democracy. The failure of the Bundestag to live up to its responsibilities is even more apparent in the declarations that accompanied the vote, which show that a considerable number of members of the Bundestag voted for the government in spite of their continuing opposition to the provision of Bundeswehr (German Army) forces, the very conjunction rendered impossible by the use of Article 68. The use of this Article both quashed the existing strong parliamentary backing for the provision of German troops to the anti-terrorism effort in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and denied the Bundestag, and the German public, a serious debate about the first German military operation outside Europe since World War II, excepting the humanitarian contributions to UN missions in Cambodia, East Timor and Somalia.

It has been two years since the European migrant crisis. In autumn 2015, Europe was flooded by a refugee wave that people neither expected nor imagined. It was a surprise in every way. Modern technology, reputable institutions, and leading global experts from different fields did not anticipate what happened. The European legal order, human rights, the Schengen regime, and the ideas of the West dissolved quickly and left people faced with a naked reality. Where are the refugees now, how many are there, and how do they feel? How did the refugee crisis affect the national security system and the common European defence and security policy? The media rarely reports on this now, two years later. Instead, there is much talk of terrorist attacks in European cities, the UK’s exit from the European Union, the US President, Donald Trump, and the Korean rockets that ruffle the Japanese sea. Years ago, Samuel P. Huntington wrote a book The Clash of Civilizations. It was published in Slovenia in 2005. His assumption was that the main reason for the clash of nations in the future would be their cultural and religious identity. He predicted that the greatest threat would be extreme terrorism. Different ideologies would be replaced by self-oriented individuals, who would no longer be concerned about the common good, but focused on themselves and their benefits. The absence of ideologies would be replaced by a return to ancient traditions. Responses to Huntington's work were very different; some were enthusiastic, others sceptical. We can, however, conclude that his theory, first presented in 1992, was confirmed in the case of the war in the Western Balkans. When the ideology of former Yugoslavia died, the nations and nationalities returned to their roots, which resulted in a war that claimed the lives of many people. Robert D. Kaplan also wrote about the fact that the Western Balkans is a crossroads of different cultures. The most famous of his works is Balkan Ghosts, in which Kaplan examines in detail the historical and cultural turbulence in the immediate neighbourhood of the cradle of Western civilization, which has been the driving force behind the development of the West for the past two thousand years. This issue of Contemporary Military Challenges is therefore interested in what is new on the Old Continent, emphasizing security, defence and the military. In his article Geostrategic Shifts in Contemporary Europe, Uroš Tovornik examines the geostrategic significance of the relationships between France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the countries that shaped the fate of Europe in the past. With the UK's decision to leave the European Union, the former classic geostrategic triangle can now turn into other decisive geostrategic links which could greatly change the Old Continent. József Kis Benedek writes about the consequences of events in North Africa and the Middle East. In the recent past, some authors have wondered whether the Arab Spring would be followed by Arab Winter; however, what followed was the European migrant crisis and the escalation of terrorist attacks in Europe. In his article Challenges Posed to the European Union by the Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan Crises, the author focuses on the participation of foreign fighters in crisis areas, coming from Europe to aid. Economic Intelligence: an Inevitable Choice is the title of an article written by Laris Gaiser. It stresses the urgent need for Slovenia to devote greater attention to this area in order to ensure greater benefits for its citizens. Slovenia has come a long way since 1991, but modern security guidelines stipulate that, besides classic tasks in the intelligence and security field, economic intelligence is also important. What is the situation in Slovenia and what else should we do? For several years, the Slovenian Armed Forces have been involved in the international operation and mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slovenia is accompanied by many other European Union member states, ensuring peace and order in the country. How long will this go on, and how successful are the international security forces in the area? It is this and some other questions that the authors Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Johanna Suhonen and Kari Sainio try to answer in the article Assessing the Planning and Implementation of the EU Missions and Operations: Case Study of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cybernetics, cyberspace and cyber attacks are commonly known terms of which much has been heard and read about recently. How well do we really know these terms? Is there a legal basis at the national level and how is this field regulated in the international environment? This is a challenge requiring strategic and concrete answers. One of the possible answers can be found in the article Legality of Low-Intensity Cyber Operations under International Law by Pika Šarf. Military aviation is an integral part of the modern armed forces. Slovenian military aviation is relatively young and has, in its short history, experienced several development phases, both in the field of aeronautics and in the organizational military sense. The quality of cooperation of Slovenian military pilots in international operations, missions, and international military exercises testifies that we are on the right track. But how to proceed? In his article, Characteristics of the Slovenian Armed Forces Air Force: Now and 20 Years in the future, the author Mitja Lipovšek refers to the idea that history is a debate of the past with the present for the future. We wish you an interesting read, and invite you to also participate as authors of articles.

IntroductionNordic mythology, also known as Norse mythology, is a term used to describe Medieval creation myths and tales of Gods and otherworldly realms, told and retold by Northern Germanic and Scandinavian tribes of the ninth century AD (see for example Gaiman).I discuss a new type of Nordic mythology that is being created through popular culture, social media, books, and television shows. I am interested in how contemporary portrayals of the Nordic countries has created a kind of mythological place called Scandinavia, where things, people, and ideas are better than in other places.Whereas the old myths portray a fierce warrior race, the new myths create a utopian Scandinavia as a place that is inherently good; a place that is progressive and harmonious. In the creation of these new myths the underbelly of the North is often neglected, producing a homogenised representation of a group of countries that are in actuality diverse and inevitably imperfect.ScandimaniaGenerally the term Scandinavia always refers to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. When including Finland and Iceland, it is more accurate to refer to the five as the Nordic countries. I was born and grew up in Denmark. My observations are skewed towards a focus on Denmark, rather than Scandinavia as a whole. Though I will use the term Nordic and Scandinavia throughout the article, it is worth noting that these definitions describe a group of countries that despite some commonalities are also quite different in geography, and culture.Whether we are speaking strictly of Scandinavia or of the Nordic countries as a whole, one thing is certain: in recent years there has been a surge of popularity in all things Nordic. Scandinavian design has been popular since the 1950s, known for its functionality and simplistic beauty, and globalised through the Swedish furniture chain IKEA. Consequently, Nordic interior design has become a style widely praised and emulated, as has Nordic fashion, architecture, and innovation.The fact that Scandinavian people are often represented as being intelligent and beautiful adds to the notion of stylish and aesthetically pleasing ideals. This is partly why sperm from Danish sperm donors is the most sought after and widely distributed in the world: perhaps prospective parents find the idea of having a baby of Viking stock appealing (Kale). Nordic countries are also known for their egalitarian societies, which are described as “the holy grail of a healthy economy and society” (Cleary). These are countries where the collective good is cherished. Tax rates are high (in Denmark between 55 per cent and 60 per cent of income), which leads to excellent welfare systems.In recent years other terms have entered the collective Western vocabulary. New Nordic Cuisine describes a trend that has taken the culinary world by storm. This term refers to food that is created with seasonal, local, and foraged ingredients. The emphasis being a renewed connection to nature and old ways. In 2016 the Danish word hygge was shortlisted by the Oxford Dictionary as word of the year. A word, which has no direct English translation, it means “a quality of cosiness and comfortable conviviality that engenders a feeling of contentment or well-being (regarded as a defining characteristic of Danish culture)”. Countless books were published in the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, explaining the art of hygge. Other Scandinavian words are now becoming popular, such as the Swedish lagom, meaning “just enough”.In the past two years, the United Nations’ World Happiness Report listed Denmark and Norway as the happiest places on earth. Other surveys similarly put the Nordic countries on top as the most prosperous places on earth (Anderson).Mythologies and Discursive FormationsThe standard definition of myth is a “traditional story, especially one concerning the early history of a people or explaining a natural or social phenomenon, and typically involving supernatural beings or events.” Or “A widely held but false belief or idea” (Oxford Dictionaries, Myth).During what became known as the “discursive turn”, both Barthes and Foucault expanded the conception of myth by placing it within a wider socio-political and historical contexts of power and truth. “Discursive formations” became a commonly accepted way of describing a cluster of ideas, images, and practices that define particular “truths” within a given cultural context (Hall 6). In other words, myths serve specific purposes within given socio-cultural constructions.I argue that the current idolisation of Scandinavia is creating a common global narrative of a superior society. A mythical place that has “figured it out”, and found the key to happiness. The mythologised North is based on an array of media stories, statistics, reports, articles, advertising, political rhetoric, books, films, TV series, exhibitions, and social media activity. These perpetuate a “truth” of the Nordic countries as being especially benign, cultured, and distinguished. The Smiling PolicemanIn his well-known essay Myth Today, Barthes analyses an image of a North African boy in uniform saluting the French flag on the front cover of a magazine. Barthes argues that by analysing the semiotic meaning of the image in two stages, one can identify the “myth”.The first level is the signifiers (what we see), a dark skinned boy, a uniform, a raised arm, a flag. The signified is our recognition of these as a North African boy raising his arm to the French flag. The second level of interpretation is the wider context in which we understand what we see: the greatness of France is signified in the depiction of one of her colonial subjects submitting to and glorifying the flag. That is to say, the myth generated by the image is the story of France as a great colonial and military nation.Now take a look at this image, which was distributed the world over in newspapers, online media, and in turn social media (Warren; Kolff). This image is interesting because it epitomises much of what is believed about Scandinavia (the new myths). If we approach the image through the semiotic lens of Barthes, we firstly describe what is seen in the picture (signifiers): a blonde policeman, a girl of dark complexion, a road in the countryside, a van in the distance, and some other people with backpacks on the side of the road. When we put these elements together in context, we understand that the image to be depicting a Danish policeman, blonde, smiling and handsome, playing with a Syrian refugee girl on an empty Danish highway, with her fellow refugees behind her.The second level of interpretation (the myth) is created by combining the elements into a story: A friendly police officer is playing with a refugee girl, which is unusual because policemen are commonly seen as authoritarian and unfriendly to illegal immigrants. This policeman is smiling. He is happy in his job. He is healthy, good-looking, and compassionate.This fits the image of Scandinavian men as good fathers (they have paternity leave, and often help equally with child rearing). The image confirms that the happiest people on earth would of course also have happy, friendly policemen. The belief that the Scandinavian social model is one to admire would appear to be endorsed.The fact that this is in a rural setting with green landscapes adds further to the notion of Nordic freshness, naturalness, environmentalism, and food that comes from the wild. The fact that the policeman is well-groomed, stylish, well-built, and handsome reinforces the notion that Scandinavia is a place of style and taste, where the good Viking gene pool produces fit and beautiful people.It makes sense that in a place with a focus on togetherness and the common good, refugees are also treated well. Just as the French image of a dark-skinned boy saluting the French flag sent out messages of French superiority, this image sends out messages of inherent Nordic goodness in a time where positive images of the European refugee crisis are few and far between.In a discursive discussion, one asks not only what meanings does this image convey, but why is this image chosen, distributed, shared, tweeted, and promoted over other images? What purpose does its proliferation serve? What is the historical context in which it is popularised? What is the cultural imagination/narrative that is served? In the current often depressing socio-political situation in Europe, people like to know that there is a place where compassion and play exists.Among other news stories of death, despair, and border protection, depictions of an idealised North can help calm anxieties by implying the existence of a place that is free of conflict. Jakob Stougaard-Nielsen writes:The flood of journalistic and popular ethnographic explorations of the Nordic region in the UK is an expression, perhaps, of a search for a lost sense of identity, a nostalgic longing for an imagined past society more in tune with pre-Thatcherite welfarist values, by way of consuming, appropriating and exoticising proximate cultural identities such as the now much hyped Danish or Nordic utopias. (Nordic Noir, 6)In The Almost Nearly Perfect People, British writer Michael Booth wonders: “one thing in particular about this new-found love of all things Scandinavian … which struck me as particularly odd: considering all this positive PR, and with awareness of the so-called Nordic miracle at an all-time high, why wasn’t everyone flocking to live here [in Denmark]?” (7).In actuality not many people in the West are interested in living in the Nordic countries. Rather, as Barbara Goodwin writes: “utopias hold up a mirror to the fears and aspirations of the time in which they were written” (2). In other words, in an age of anxiety, where traditional norms and stabilities are shifting, to believe that there is a place where contemporary societies have found a way of living in happiness and togetherness provides a sense of hope. People are not flocking to live in Scandinavia because it is not in their interests to have their utopian ideals shattered by the reality that, though the North has a lot to offer, it is inevitably not a utopia (Sougaard-Nielsen, The Truth Is).UnderbellyParadoxically, in recent years, Scandinavia has become well known for its “Nordic Noir” crime fiction and television. In the documentary TV series Scandimania, British TV personality Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall travels through Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, exploring the culture, scenery, and food. He finds it curious that Denmark has become so famous for its sombre crime series, such as The Killing and The Bridge, because it seems so far removed from the Denmark he experiences riding around the streets of Copenhagen on his bike.Fearnley-Whittingstall ponders that one has to look hard to find the dark side of Denmark, and that perhaps it does not actually exist at all. This observation points to something essential. Even though millions of viewers worldwide have seen shows such as The Killing, which are known for their dark story lines, bleak urban settings, complex but realistic characters, progressive gender equality, and social commentary, the positive mythologising of Scandinavia remains so strong that it engenders a belief that the underbelly shown in Nordic Noir is perhaps entirely fictional.Stougaard-Nielsen (see also Pitcher, Consuming Race) argues that perhaps the British obsession with Nordic Noir (and this could be applied to other western countries) can be attributed to “a more appropriate white cosmopolitan desire to imagine rooted identities in an age of globalisation steeped in complex identity politics” (Nordic Noir, 8). That is to say that, for a segment of society which feels overwhelmed by contemporary multiculturalism, there may be a pleasure in watching a show that is predominantly populated by white Nordic protagonists, where the homes and people are stylish, and where the Nordic model of welfare and progressive thinking provides a rich identity source for white people as a symbolic point of origin.The watching/reading of Nordic Noir, as well as other preoccupations with all things Nordic, help build upon a mythological sense of whiteness that sets itself apart from our usual notions of race politics, by being an accepted form of longing for the North of bygone ages: a place that is progressive, moral, stylish, and imbued with aspirational ways of living, thinking, and being (Pitcher, Racial Politics).The image of the Danish police officer and the refugee girl fits this ideal of a progressive society where race relations are uncomplicated. The policeman who epitomises the Nordic ideal is in a position of power, but this is an authority which is benevolent. The girl is non-threatening in her otherness, because she is a child and female, and therefore does not fit the culturally dreaded Muslim/terrorist stereotype. In this constellation the two can meet beautifully.The reality, of course, is that the race relations and issues surrounding immigration in Denmark, and in other Nordic countries, are as complicated and often messy and hateful as they are in other countries. In Sweden, as Fearnley-Whittingstall touches upon in Scandimania, there are escalating problems with integration of the many new Swedes and growing inequalities in wealth. In Norway, the underlying race tensions became acutely topical in the aftermath of the 2011 massacre, where right-wing extremist Anders Breivik killed 77 people. Denmark has one of the harshest anti-immigration laws in Europe, laws that are continuously being tightened (Boserup); and whenever visiting Denmark I have been surprised to see how much space and time discussions about immigration and integration take up in the news and current affairs.If we contrast the previous image with the image above, taken within a similar timeframe on the same Danish highway, we can see the reality of Danish immigration policies. Here we are exposed to a different story. The scene and the location is the same, but the power dynamics have shifted from benign, peaceful, and playful to aggressive, authoritarian, and conflict ridden. A desperate father carries his daughter, determined to march on towards their destination of Sweden. The policeman is pulling his arm, attempting to detain the refugees so that they cannot go further, the goal being to deport the Syrians back to their previous place of detention, just over the border in Germany (Harticollis). While the previous image reflects the humanity of the refugee crisis, this image reflects the politics, policies, and to a large extent public opinion in Denmark, which is not refugee-friendly. This image, however, was not widely distributed, partly because it feeds into the same depressing narrative of an unsolvable refugee crisis seen so often elsewhere, and partly because it does not fit into the narrative of the infallible North. It could not be tweeted with the hashtag #Humanity, nor shared on Facebook with a smiley face and liked with an emoji heart.Another image from Denmark, in the form of a politically funded billboard, shows that there are deep-seated tendencies within Danish society that want to promote and retain a Denmark which adheres to its traditional values and ethnic whiteness. The image was displayed all over the country, at train stations, bus stops, and other public spaces when I visited in 2016. It was issued by Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People’s Party); a party which is anti-immigration and which was until recently the country’s second largest party. The title says “Our Denmark”, while the byline cleverly plays with the double meaning of passe på: it can mean “there is so much we need to take care of”, but also “there is so much we need to beware of.” In other words, the white working-class family needs to take care of their Denmark, and beware of anyone who does not fit into this norm. Though hugely contested and criticised (Cremer; see a counter-reaction designed by opponents below), the fact that thinly veiled anti-immigration propaganda can be so readily distributed speaks of an underbelly in Danish society that is not made of the dark murder mysteries in The Killing, but rather of a quietly brewing distain for the foreigner that reigns within stylishly designed living rooms. ConclusionMyths are stories cultures tell and retell until they form a belief system that becomes a natural part of our collective narrative. For Barthes, these stories were intrinsically connected to our understanding of language and our ability to read images, films, artifacts, and popular culture more generally. To later cultural theorists, the notion of discursive formations expands this understanding, to see myth within a broader network of socio-political discourses placed within a certain place and time in history. When connected, small narratives (images, advertising, film, music, news stories, social media sharing, scientific evidence, etc.) come together to form a common narrative (the myth) about how things are and should be in relation to a particular topic. The culminating popularity of numerous Nordic themes (Nordic television/film, interior design, fashion, cuisine, architecture, lifestyle, sustainability, welfare system, school system, gender equality, etc.) has created a grand narrative of the Nordic countries as a type of utopia: one that shows the rest of the world that an egalitarian society of togetherness and progressive innovation is possible. This mythologisation serves to quell anxieties about the flux and uncertainty of contemporary times, and may also serve to legitimise a yearning for a simple, benign, and progressive whiteness, where we imagine Nordic families sitting peacefully at their beechwood dining tables, candles lit, playing board games. 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