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1

Leal, David L. "American Public Opinion toward the Military." Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 1 (October 2005): 123–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x05278168.

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2

Hartley, Thomas, and Bruce Russett. "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?" American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (December 1992): 905–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1964343.

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We measure the extent to which military spending policy reflects public opinion, while controlling for other reasonable influences on policy. We use survey data as an indicator of aggregate public opinion on military spending and find evidence that changes in public opinion consistently exert an effect on changes in military spending. The influence of public opinion is less important than either Soviet military spending or the gap between U.S. and Soviet military spending and more important than the deficit and the balance of Soviet conflict/cooperation with the United States. We also examine the hypothesis that public opinion does not influence the government but that the government systematically manipulates public opinion. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis.
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3

Haesebrouck, Tim. "Who follows whom? A coincidence analysis of military action, public opinion and threats." Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 6 (August 20, 2019): 753–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343319854787.

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Does public opinion act as a constraint on military action, are ordinary citizens the easily manipulated targets of the public relations efforts of their governments, or does the general public react as assertively to threats as decisionmakers? This article examines the causal connection between military action, public opinion and threats. Empirically, it focuses on the pattern of EU member state participation in two recent military operations: the 2011 intervention in Libya and the operation against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Three competing causal models on the relationship between threats, public opinion and military action were derived from the scholarly literature and tested with coincidence analysis. The results of the analysis show that public opinion acted as a constraint on executives during the Libya operation. However, there was no direct causal link between public opinion and military participation in the operation against IS, in which both military action and public support were an effect of threat. More generally, the results suggest that the context of the intervention is decisive for the relation between threat, military action and public support. More specifically, whether public opinion constitutes a constraint on military action or is an effect of threats to national interests depends on whether these threats are clear and tangible.
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4

TOMZ, MICHAEL, and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (April 14, 2020): 856–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000064.

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Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.
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5

Golby, James, Peter Feaver, and Kyle Dropp. "Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion About the Use of Military Force." Armed Forces & Society 44, no. 1 (February 6, 2017): 44–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x16687067.

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Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views? We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly 12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorsements of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.
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Gul, Saima, Shamaila Farooq, and Shahid Ahmed Afridi Afridi. "A Media Framing Analysis of Political-Military Narrative on Pakistan's Military Operation Zarb-E-Azb." Global Mass Communication Review V, no. I (March 30, 2020): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gmcr.2020(v-i).05.

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The language, structure and undertone using which the media frame an issue influence, formulate public opinion. A manifestation of this is the largest - in scale, intensity and impactmilitary operation conducted by the Pakistan army since the country’s explicit involvement in the global war on terror. “Zarb-e-Azb (ZeB)”, Pakistan Military’s flagship operation against militant outfits operating predominantly from erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas, (FATA) was launched in June, 2014. The initial successes of the operation could be attributed to the whole-of-the-nation approach deployed by the Pakistan army reflecting a national consensus to extricate terrorism. Media is a strong driver of public opinion and ZeB could prove to be ineffective without public consensus and support. Therefore, any understanding of the causal effects of ZeB’s outcomes must begin from an analysis of the media frames, developed through opinion making in print journalism, that have done to form, or in certain cases unformed, a certain public opinion.
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7

Solon, Paul. "Tax Commissions and Public Opinion: Languedoc 1438-1561." Renaissance Quarterly 43, no. 3 (1990): 479–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2862556.

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In Summer 1550 King Henry II of France commissioned the renewal of a special military tax, the taillon. In his commission, chancery draftsmen asserted that this recently-introduced tax and associated military reforms had been so successful "que de tous costes s'en levent et rendent graces à Dieu." They added that provinces previously complaining of garrisons now clamored for them "pour en avoir le prouffit." Such assertions were patently ridiculous in an era when soldiers were about as welcome as a horde of locusts, yet the royal government did not scruple to offer them.
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8

Tomz, Michael, Jessica L. P. Weeks, and Keren Yarhi-Milo. "Public Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies." International Organization 74, no. 1 (December 6, 2019): 119–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818319000341.

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AbstractMany theories of international relations assume that public opinion exerts a powerful effect on foreign policy in democracies. Previous research, based on observational data, has reached conflicting conclusions about this foundational assumption. We use experiments to examine two mechanisms—responsiveness and selection—through which opinion could shape decisions about the use of military force. We tested responsiveness by asking members of the Israeli parliament to consider a crisis in which we randomized information about public opinion. Parliamentarians were more willing to use military force when the public was in favor and believed that contravening public opinion would entail heavy political costs. We tested selection by asking citizens in Israel and the US to evaluate parties/candidates, which varied randomly on many dimensions. In both countries, security policy proved as electorally significant as economic and religious policy, and far more consequential than nonpolicy considerations such as gender, race, and experience. Overall, our experiments in two important democracies imply that citizens can affect policy by incentivizing incumbents and shaping who gets elected.
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9

Clements, Ben. "Public Opinion and Military Intervention: Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya." Political Quarterly 84, no. 1 (January 2013): 119–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.2013.02427.x.

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10

Lian, Bradley, and John R. Oneal. "Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion." Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 277–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002793037002003.

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11

Nagel, Joane. "Climate Change, Public Opinion, and the Military Security Complex." Sociological Quarterly 52, no. 2 (May 2011): 203–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01200.x.

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12

Madison, Cory. "Tracking public support for Japan’s remilitarization policies: An examination of elitist and pluralist governance." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4, no. 2 (April 15, 2018): 123–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891118764354.

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Has Japan’s post-Second World War transformation into one of the most militarily capable nations been the result of 60 years of truly representative government? This research compares government-collected opinion polls to policy trends and actions, to determine whether the case of Japan’s remilitarization argues for or against the country’s democratic quality. For the purpose of this research, the size of Japan’s military and its legislative freedom to act as a more conventional military were considered the most pertinent militarization policies. Results indicated that those policies were consistently unjustified by measured opinion, suggesting elitist policy formation. However, other policy areas, such as Japan’s military budget, participation in UN peacekeeping, and national defense capability, have indicated a more pluralist model of policy formation. Therefore, results suggest that the country’s remilitarization has been the product of both elitist and pluralist governance.
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13

Simon, Christopher A., Nicholas P. Lovrich, Baodong Liu, and Yehua Dennis Wei. "Citizen Support for Military Expenditure Post–9/11." Armed Forces & Society 44, no. 4 (December 4, 2017): 688–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x17741462.

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Citizens adjust their perceptions of military expenditure based largely on their worldview, as defined by their race, ethnicity, ideology, gender, socioeconomic status (SES), and education. Worldview might also reasonably be impacted by nativity. We explore the relationship between nativity and public opinion about military expenditure. Native-born survey respondents are less likely to believe that military expenditures are excessive than those born abroad. Race, ethnicity, ideology, nativity, and confidence in the military are the most significant variables used in explaining attitudes about military expenditure. Interaction analysis carried out for this article and reported here demonstrates that Hispanic and Asian ethnicity impacts on public perception of military expenditure are significantly greater when factoring in the nativity of survey respondents. With a growing portion of non-native-born citizens joining the electorate, public opinion analyses regarding military expenditure should take into account nativity as well as SES, gender, race, ideology, education, and ethnicity when seeking to explain public opinion dynamics.
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14

Tomz, Michael, and Jessica L. P. Weeks. "Military Alliances and Public Support for War." International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 3 (February 25, 2021): 811–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab015.

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Abstract How do military alliances affect public support for war to defend victims of aggression? We offer the first experimental evidence on this fundamental question. Our experiments revealed that alliance commitments greatly increased the American public's willingness to intervene abroad. Alliances shaped public opinion by increasing public fears about the reputational costs of nonintervention and by heightening the perceived moral obligation to intervene out of concerns for fairness and loyalty. Finally, although alliances swayed public opinion across a wide range of circumstances, they made the biggest difference when the costs of intervention were high, the stakes of intervention were low, and the country needing aid was not a democracy. Thus, alliances can create pressure for war even when honoring the commitment would be extremely inconvenient, which could help explain why democratic allies tend to be so reliable. These findings shed new light on the consequences of alliances and other international legal commitments, the role of morality in foreign policy, and ongoing debates about domestic audience costs.
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15

ALLEN, MICHAEL A., MICHAEL E. FLYNN, CARLA MARTINEZ MACHAIN, and ANDREW STRAVERS. "Outside the Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Public Opinion in Host States." American Political Science Review 114, no. 2 (February 3, 2020): 326–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000868.

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How do citizens within countries hosting U.S. military personnel view that presence? Using new cross-national survey data from 14 countries, we examine how different forms of exposure to a U.S. military presence in a country affect attitudes toward the U.S. military, government, and people. We find that contact with U.S. military personnel or the receipt of economic benefits from the U.S. presence correlates with stronger support for the U.S. presence, people, and government. This study has profound implications for the role that U.S. installations play in affecting the social fabric of host nations and policy implications for the conduct of U.S. military activities outside the United States.
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16

Bell, Mark S., and Kai Quek. "Authoritarian Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." International Organization 72, no. 1 (October 26, 2017): 227–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002081831700042x.

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AbstractThe “democratic peace”—the regularity that democracies rarely (if ever) fight with other democracies but do fight with nondemocracies—is one of the most famous findings in international relations scholarship. There is little agreement, however, about the mechanism that underpins the democratic peace. Recently, scholars have shown that mass publics in liberal democracies are less supportive of using military force against other democracies. This finding has been taken to support the idea that the content of public opinion may provide one mechanism that underpins the democratic peace. Using a large-scale survey experiment, we show that mass publics in an authoritarian regime—China—show the same reluctance to use force against democracies as is found in western democracies. Our findings expand the empirical scope of the claim that mass publics are reluctant to use force against democracies, but force us to rethink how public opinion operates as a causal mechanism underpinning the democratic peace.
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17

TOMZ, MICHAEL R., and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055413000488.

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One of the most striking findings in political science is the democratic peace: the absence of war between democracies. Some authors attempt to explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of public opinion. They observe that democratic leaders are beholden to voters and argue that voters oppose war because of its human and financial costs. This logic predicts that democracies should behave peacefully in general, but history shows that democracies avoid war primarily in their relations with other democracies. In this article we investigate not whether democratic publics are averse to war in general, but whether they are especially reluctant to fight other democracies. We embedded experiments in public opinion polls in the United States and the United Kingdom and found that individuals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. Moreover, our experiments suggest that shared democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure. These findings shed light on a debate of enduring importance to scholars and policy makers.
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18

Setzekorn, Eric. "China’s Pundits in Uniform: Military Officers and Guiding Public Opinion." Journal of Political & Military Sociology 46, no. 2 (February 12, 2020): 343–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5744/jpms.1012.

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19

Setzekorn, Eric. "China’s Pundits in Uniform: Military Officers and Guiding Public Opinion." Journal of Political & Military Sociology 46, no. 2 (February 12, 2020): 343–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5744/jpms.2019.1012.

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20

Oyuntuya, Ganbat. "PUBLIC OPINION ON THE PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITY OF MONGOLIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL." Discourse 5, no. 3 (2015): 60–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2019-5-3-60-65.

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21

Barzilai, Gad, and Efraim Inbar. "The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options." Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 1 (October 1996): 49–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x9602300103.

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22

Schutte, Chart, and Bill Sass. "PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING PART-TIME MILITARY SERVICE AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS." African Security Review 4, no. 6 (January 1995): 39–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.1995.9627655.

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23

Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad." World Politics 47, no. 4 (July 1995): 534–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100015203.

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This article argues that the problems identified in the literature on public choice should critically affect our research on public opinion and our understanding of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. While a robust literature has emerged around social choice issues in political science, there has been remarkably little appreciation for these problems in the literature on public opinion in general and on public opinion and foreign policy in particular. The potential importance of social choice problems for understanding the nature and role of public opinion in foreign policy making is demonstrated through an examination of American public attitudes about military intervention abroad. In particular, drawing on several common descriptions of the underlying dimensionality of public attitudes on major foreign policy issues, it is shown that there may be important intransitivities in the ordering of public preferences at the aggregate level on policy choices such as those considered by American decision makers in the period leading up to the Gulf War. Without new approaches to public-opinion polling that take these problems into consideration, it will be difficult to make credible claims about the role of public opinion in theforeignpolicy process.
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24

Flynn, Michael E., Carla Martinez Machain, and Alissandra T. Stoyan. "Building Trust: The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Public Opinion in Peru." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 3 (June 13, 2019): 742–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz028.

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AbstractSince the 1950s, US military personnel have taken on an increasingly diverse set of responsibilities, including less traditional roles delivering disaster aid and engaging in public diplomacy. Focusing on a particular subset of deployments, humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments to Latin America, we examine the effect that a US military presence can have on public opinion in the host country. We focus on the microfoundations of popular support and use survey data and newly collected subnational data on deployments to examine the effect of these deployments on mass attitudes toward the US military and government in Peru. We find that these deployments do improve perceptions of the US military and government, and correlate with assessments of US influence that are more positive. Our findings bolster the conclusions of previous research that shows how aid can both improve public attitudes toward the donor country and address the foreign aid attribution problem.
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25

Eichenberg, Richard C. "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005." International Security 30, no. 1 (July 2005): 140–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894616.

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Although previous studies have examined U.S. public support for the use of military force in particular historical cases, and have even made limited comparisons among cases, a full comparison of a large number of historical episodes in which the United States contemplated, threatened, or actually used military force has been missing. An analysis of U.S. public support for the use of military force in twenty-two historical episodes from the early 1980s through the Iraq war and occupation (2003-05) underscores the continuing relevance of Bruce Jentleson's principal policy objectives framework: the objective for which military force is used is an important determinant of the base level of public support. The U.S. public supports restraining aggressive adversaries, but it is leery of involvement in civil-war situations. Although the objective of the mission strongly conditions this base level of support, the public is also sensitive to the relative risk of different military actions; to the prospect of civilian or military casualties; to multilateral participation in the mission; and to the likelihood of success or failure of the mission. These results suggest that support for U.S. military involvement in Iraq is unlikely to increase; indeed, given the ongoing civil strife in Iraq, continuing casualties, and substantial disagreement about the prospects for success, the public's support is likely to remain low or even decline.
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26

LIU, Xiao-liang. "BBS topic tracking method for military public opinion based on Wikipedia." Journal of Computer Applications 32, no. 11 (May 27, 2013): 3026–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1087.2012.03026.

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27

Guardino, Matt, and Danny Hayes. "Foreign Voices, Party Cues, and U.S. Public Opinion about Military Action." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 30, no. 3 (May 4, 2017): 504–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edx009.

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28

Kim, Claudia J., and Taylor C. Boas. "Activist Disconnect: Social Movements, Public Opinion, and U.S. Military Bases in East Asia." Armed Forces & Society 46, no. 4 (July 28, 2019): 696–715. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x19864127.

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Do activists seeking to challenge the U.S. military presence overseas succeed in persuading the local population? While the comparative literature on base contestation often makes implicit causal claims about public opinion and behavior, these claims have never been tested empirically using individual-level data. Based on an online survey, experiment with residents of communities hosting U.S. military bases in Korea and Japan, we demonstrate a disconnect between anti-base movements and local residents. Local public opinion is most responsive to pragmatic framing of opposition by social movements and tangible information about the consequences of base expansion. Other common activist tactics have little effect and may even backfire. Our findings fill an important gap in the growing literature on the politics of U.S. military bases abroad.
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Libor, Frank. "Security, Defence and Armed Forces - Public View." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 23, no. 1 (June 20, 2017): 184–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2017-0029.

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Abstract The paper deals with the interpretation of public opinion polls in the Czech Republic related to security, defence and armed forces. In recent years, we can observe concern about the security situation development in the relatively close vicinity of the Czech Republic. In particular, information regarding the activities of the so-called Islamic State, the conflict in Ukraine and media presentation of recent terrorist attacks, as well as the dominant securitization of migration, have a major impact on the public opinion and the level of support for specific steps of the government in the field of security and defence policy. In the surveys, we can trace not only the growing public concern, but also the increasing support for higher defence spending and possible reintroduction of some form of compulsory military service. Special attention is paid to the public perception of the armed forces and the interpretation of the latest public opinion polls at the turn of 2016/2017. The growing support for the military and the increasing willingness of the public to engage in the Active Reserve System are positive factors that can be used to meet the recruiting goals of the Czech Armed Forces.
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PIDSHYBIAKIN, Serhii. "THE ILOVAISK TRAGEDY OF 2014 IN THE DISCOURSE OF UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION." Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Identity, Statehood 33 (2020): 243–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.33402/ukr.2020-33-243-259.

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The perception of the Ilovaisk tragedy of 2014 in the discourse of Ukrainian public opinion is analyzed. The tragedy («Ilovaisk cattle») was in surrounding a group of Ukrainian troops about 1,200 soldiers by the regular units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) and Russian terrorist groups near Ilovaisk, Donetsk region. While leaving the «cattle» through the humanitarian corridor, the Ukrainian soldiers came under shelling by the Russian side. Pro-government circles saw among the causes of such a tragic situation the treachery of the Russian leadership. Previously having agreed with Kyiv that it would release Ukrainian fighters from the encirclement, it eventually committed the shootings. Another reason was the betrayal of some Ukrainian soldiers who deserted from defensive positions, creating for the enemy favorable conditions to encircle. The participants of the events, experts, media partly accused the Ukrainian state and military leadership of inertia, passivity, and ignoring reports about the need for reinforcements. However, some military analysts acknowledged that the Ukrainian military command had done everything possible in the circumstances. Along with Russian intervention as the main part in the Ilovaisk tragedy, some experts saw a benefit for some Ukrainian politicians, as the constant threat factor could be used in the run-up canvassing to the October 2014 snap parliamentary elections. Finally, the criminal case concerning the Ilovaisk tragedy, which continues up today, has already been assessed by the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine (GPU). According to assessment, the deaths of Ukrainian soldiers and the loss of weapons and military equipment near Ilovaisk were directly connected with the actions of the RF Armed Forces, which on August 23-24, 2014, treacherously invaded the Donetsk region and murdered Ukrainian soldiers. It was concluded that the Ilovaisk tragedy had not only hard military but also political consequences for the country, in particular, due to the adoption of the Minsk agreements under the pressure of the tragedy, which showed itself in an imperfect «truce», which, was repeatedly violated by the enemy. Keywords: Ilovaisk tragedy, Ukrainian public opinion, politicum, mass media, expert circles, Ukraine, Russia.
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DIXON, PAUL. "Britain's ‘Vietnam syndrome’? Public opinion and British military intervention from Palestine to Yugoslavia." Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 99–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500000991.

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There have been calls for policymakers to draw ‘lessons’ from Britain's experience of Empire and Northern Ireland to inform a new generation of post-Cold War interventions by the international community. This article emphasises the role that domestic public opinion, galvanized by the impact of casualties and the plight of military relatives, has played in shaping Britain's experience of ‘military intervention’ in the ‘civil wars’ of Palestine, Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. Three principal arguments are put forward.
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32

Rahkonen, Juho. "Public Opinion, Journalism and the Question of Finland’s Membership of NATO." Nordicom Review 28, no. 2 (November 1, 2007): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nor-2017-0211.

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Abstract The big question behind the research on media and democracy is: do media influence public opinion and the actual policy? The discussion about Finland’s NATO membership is a case in point. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there has been a continuous public debate about whether Finland should join NATO. In the last 16 years, however, public opinion on NATO membership has not changed much. Despite the changes in world politics, such as NATO enlargement and new weapons technology, Finns still rely on military non-alliance and want to keep their own army strong. During the last ten years, there seems to be no correlation between media coverage and public opinion: pro-NATO media content has not been able to make Finns’ attitudes towards NATO more positive. The information provided by most of the Finnish newspapers is different from the way ordinary people see NATO. In the papers’ view, joining the alliance would be a natural step in Finland’s integration into Western democratic organizations. Ordinary people on the contrary consider NATO more as a (U.S. led) military alliance which is not something Finland should be a part of. Historical experiences also discourage military alignment. In the light of data drawn from newspaper articles and opinion polls, the article suggests that journalism has had only a slight effect on public opinion about Finland’s NATO membership. The NATO issue does not count for much in any measurements that have been made regarding the preferences of Finnish voters. As the NATO issue is not considered to be important, most people do not have enough motivation to learn about NATO. Thus, the journalistic interpretation of NATO has not reached the general public, leaving the impact of the media limited.
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Rich, Timothy S. "Casualties and Public Support for Military Conflict with North Korea." PS: Political Science & Politics 52, no. 1 (December 18, 2018): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096518000999.

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ABSTRACTWhat explains the American public’s support for military conflict with North Korea? Despite increased rhetoric, few analyses address American public opinion or whether priming the public to consider casualties influences their perceptions. The results of an experimental survey design suggest that mentioning the human cost—even without explicit references to American casualties—reduces support for American military action against North Korea but not broader perceptions of North Korea.
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TURES, JOHN. "The Democracy-Promotion Gap in American Public Opinion." Journal of American Studies 41, no. 3 (October 24, 2007): 557–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875807003994.

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United States foreign-policymakers have enthusiastically backed policies of promoting democracy abroad. But do the American people support these plans? Evidence from polls reveals that while people generally like the idea of exporting freedom, they do not view it as a top priority. Other concepts such as political and economic security are valued more by the American public. Backing for democracy promotion also seems to be waning in recent years. I examine these issues and offer possible reasons for this “gap” in response to democracy promotion among American people. I also explain the implications of these findings for America's foreign policy, including the types of government the US appears to support in the wake of military operations. I conclude with an examination of why the policy of democracy promotion has not been more popular with the American people, evaluating competing arguments that the policy is flawed, as opposed to simply a case of poor public relations.
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35

Pérez, Orlando J. "Public Opinion and the Future of U.S.-Panama Relations." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 3 (1999): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166157.

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Using survey data and interviews, this study examines Panamanian attitudes toward the United States and toward the central issues in US.- Panama relations. It also compares Panamanian attitudes with opinions toward the United States in the rest of Central America. The study finds that nationalism, system support, anticommunism, and, for the mass public, ideology are the most important variables in determining support for the United States. Elites are more nationalistic and less accommodationist toward the United States than the mass public. Concern about the politicization and misuse of the Panama Canal and adjacent lands has led many in the general public to support a continued US. military presence on the Isthmus of Panama.
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36

Furst, Zev. "The Second Lebanon War: Military Strategy and the Battle for Public Opinion." Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (January 2007): 11–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2007.11446252.

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37

Sarigil, Zeki. "Public Opinion and Attitude toward the Military and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey." Armed Forces & Society 41, no. 2 (November 5, 2013): 282–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x13504573.

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38

Leep, Matthew, and Jeremy Pressman. "Foreign cues and public views on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no. 1 (November 21, 2018): 169–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148118809807.

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As foreign sources in the news might help the public assess their home country’s foreign policies, scholars have recently turned attention to the effects of foreign source cues on domestic public opinion. Using original survey experiments, we explore the effects of domestic (United States) and foreign (Israeli, British, and Palestinian) criticism of Israel’s military actions and settlements on US attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We find that foreign cues by government officials and non-governmental organisations have modest effects, and are generally not more influential than domestic cues. We also show that individuals might discount foreign criticism of Israel in the context of US bipartisan support for Israel. While our experiments reveal some heterogeneous effects related to partisanship, we are sceptical of significant movement in opinion in response to foreign cues. These findings provide insights into foreign source cue effects beyond the context of the use of military force.
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39

Guichaoua, Yvan. "The bitter harvest of French interventionism in the Sahel." International Affairs 96, no. 4 (July 1, 2020): 895–911. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa094.

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Abstract This article studies the bitter diplomatic sequence arising in the fall of 2019 between France and the Sahelian countries where France has been conducting military operations since 2013. Far from being just one more hiccup in the troubled relations between France and its former colonies, the article interprets this sequence as a constitutive effect of French protracted military presence in the Sahel. Specifically, it argues that although France has a rather clear security-driven agenda, its operational moves produced by bureaucratic thinking are questioned by influential sections of Sahelian public opinions who frame the French military presence as a deeply political issue over their country's sovereignty. In addition, being the de facto military guarantor of the security of Sahelian regimes, France constrains the domestic political conversation through the ‘red lines’ it imposes on actors. This externally-induced distortion of the domestic political landscape eventually places Sahelian authorities in front of a dilemma. Pleasing their foreign patrons might cost them the support of the section of public opinion most attached to national sovereignty, and expose them to nationalist entrepreneurs.
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Chow, Wilfred M., Enze Han, and Xiaojun Li. "Brexit identities and British public opinion on China." International Affairs 95, no. 6 (November 1, 2019): 1369–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz191.

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Abstract Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity—that is, believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants—are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive outlook overall on China's place within the global community.
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41

Shin, Doh Chull. "Democratic Consolidation in Korea: A Trend Analysis of Public Opinion Surveys, 1997–2001." Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (November 2001): 177–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109901000226.

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The Republic of Korea (Korea hereinafter) has been widely regarded as one of the most vigorous and analytically interesting third-wave democracies (Diamond and Shin, 2000: 1). During the first decade of democratic rule, Korea has successfully carried out a large number of electoral and other reforms to transform the institutions and procedures of military-authoritarian rule into those of a representative democracy. Unlike many of its counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, Korea has fully restored civilian rule by extricating the military from power. As is the case in established democracies of North America and Western Europe, free and competitive elections have been regularly held at all the different levels of the government. In the most recent presidential election, held in December 1997, Korea also established itself as a mature electoral democracy by elevating an opposition party to political power. In Korea today, there is general agreement that electoral politics has become the only possible political game in town.
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42

Scarr, Deryck. "Evidence, ideology and miscalculation : public opinion and the 1987 military coups in Fiji." Journal de la Société des océanistes 92, no. 1 (1991): 69–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/jso.1991.2898.

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43

Clements, Ben. "Public Opinion in Britain towards Military Action in Libya: A Micro-Level Analysis." Politics 32, no. 2 (May 4, 2012): 109–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01433.x.

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44

Bates, Benjamin R. "Circulation of the World War II / Holocaust analogy in the 1999 Kosovo intervention." Journal of Language and Politics 8, no. 1 (April 1, 2009): 28–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.8.1.03bat.

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This essay offers an analysis of the circulation of World War II and Holocaust analogies in discourses about American military involvement in Kosovo. The essay argues that the World War II/Holocaust analogy provided the public with a new vocabulary for understanding the situation in Kosovo. The essay uses Bill Clinton’s speeches about Kosovo during the first week of American intervention as a representative anecdote for discussing the analogy and its rhetorical force. The essay then probes the circulation of the analogy in other governmental, media, and public opinion outlets. By comparing Kosovo 1999 to Europe 1945, the analogy offers descriptive and prescriptive reasons for American involvement that encourage public approval of military intervention. The essay offers conclusions and implications of this analysis for the understanding of the relationships among rhetoric, public opinion, and international conflict.
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45

McLeod, Douglas M., William P. Eveland, and Nancy Signorielli. "Conflict and Public Opinion: Rallying Effects of the Persian Gulf War." Journalism Quarterly 71, no. 1 (March 1994): 20–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769909407100103.

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This study examines the dissipation of “rally effects” in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War using data from a panel of 167 New Castle County (Delaware) respondents interviewed during the war and one year later. Public support for the war and confidence in the president, Congress, and the military declined significantly. Hostility toward antiwar protesters also diminished. The study combines the “rally around the flag” literature from political science and functional conflict theory from sociology to explain the impact of this major external conflict on support for government institutions and intolerance for elements perceived as a potential threat.
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46

Vezhlivtseva, N. Yu. "Public Opinion as an Instrument of Socio-Cultural Influence in the Debate on the «NATO Option» in Finland." Concept: philosophy, religion, culture, no. 1 (July 7, 2020): 164–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2020-1-13-164-171.

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The article analyzes how the attitude of the Finnish population to Finland’s policy of military non-alignment correlates with the official foreign strategy. The question of public opinion can act as a possible sociocultural tool for its change is examined. The author explains the main reasons for the formation of stable public opinion in favor of neutrality, based on national and cultural identity. The role of public opinion in the Finnish internal debate on the «NATO option» is shown. The thesis that public opinion plays only an auxiliary role in comparison with external circumstances affecting the foreign policy of Finland, which is widespread in research circles, is considered. The author argues that public opinion on Finland’s possible entry into NATO is crucial in two key ways. First, at present, it’s a factor supporting the stable foreign policy decision, which is carried out by the state government. Secondly, in the future, public opinion may become a factor capable, under certain conditions of having a significant impact on the change of the Finnish course in foreign and security policy. The second option assumes that public opinion can play its own role by changing the pre-planned foreign policy scenario.
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47

Robson, Alan. "The unrepresentative democracy." Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 4, no. 1 (November 1, 1997): 19–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v4i1.610.

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Favourable public opinion egged the Papua New Guinea military on and forced Sir Julius Chan's hand over the resignation demand. Military commander Jerry Singirok struck a popular chord when he accused the PNG government of corruption in spite of the fact that he himself had been a party to the Sandline mercenary agreement.
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48

Dawes, Roy A., and Hunter Bacot. "Understanding Support for the War in Iraq during the Bush Years: Differences in Civilian and Military Opinion." American Review of Politics 34 (September 8, 2016): 47–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2013.34.0.47-61.

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We examine relationships between military affiliation and support for the war in Iraq and support for President Bush in five southern states chosen because of their support of Republican presidents and concentration of military families. Using public opinion data, we disentangle the effects of race, military affiliation, age, and ideology on support for President Bush and his prosecution of the war. Of note are differences between civilians and military-affiliated respondents in support for the Iraq War. Incongruence is evident about the direction of the war effort between those who fought the war—members of the military—and those who managed most of the war—President Bush and his administration.
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49

Chapman, Terrence L. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." International Organization 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 733–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990154.

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AbstractRecent work suggests that multilateral security institutions, such as the UN Security Council, can influence foreign policy through public opinion. According to this view, authorization can increase public support for foreign policy, freeing domestic constraints. Governments that feel constrained by public opinion may thus alter their foreign policies to garner external authorization. These claims challenge traditional realist views about the role of international organizations in security affairs, which tend to focus on direct enforcement mechanisms and neglect indirect channels of influence. To examine these claims, this article investigates the first link in this causal chain—the effect of institutional statements on public opinion. Strategic information arguments, as opposed to arguments about the symbolic legitimacy of specific organizations or the procedural importance of consultation, posit that the effect of institutional statements on public opinion is conditional on public perceptions of member states' interests. This article tests this conditional relationship in the context of changes in presidential approval surrounding military disputes, using a measure of preference distance between the United States and veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. Findings indicate that short-term changes in presidential approval surrounding the onset of military disputes in the United States between 1946 and 2001 have been significantly larger when accompanied by a positive resolution for a Security Council that is more distant in terms of foreign policy preferences. The article also discusses polling data during the 1990s and 2000s that support the strategic information perspective.
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50

Lewis, Jeff. "Propagating Terror: 9/11 and the Mediation of War." Media International Australia 104, no. 1 (August 2002): 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0210400110.

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Academic and public analysis of the media's performance during the 9/11 and Afghanistan wars are critically influenced by the specific ideological perspective of the analyst. Those commentators who support the reprisal attacks against bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban tend to commend the media, identifying a substantial confluence between state interests, public opinion and media reporting. Alternatively, commentators such as Noam Chomsky who are highly critical of American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, see the media as representing a pernicious conduit which allows state and military hegemonies to oppress and manipulate public opinion. The role of the media in reporting war and terrorism needs to be considered in terms of processes of cultural construction and representation. As we approach the anniversary of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, we need to understand that government foreign policy, public opinion and military action are all shaped through specific kinds of mediated discourse. Our role as media analysts is to expose these discourses in terms of those complex historical and cultural conditions which have served to generate a violence of this proportion.
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