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Journal articles on the topic 'Mind-body dualism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Balogun, Babalola Joseph, and Richard Taye Oyelakin. "An African Perspective on the Nature of Mind: Reflections on Yoruba Contextual Dualism." Culture and Dialogue 10, no. 2 (2022): 102–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340116.

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Abstract The problem of the nature of mind has lingered for a long time. Generated by the question of whether the mind is an independently existing entity or merely an aspect of bodily events and processes, the problem of the nature of mind has divided Western philosophers into two opposing camps, namely dualism and physicalism. Contemporary discourse of the nature of minds, within the Western philosophical tradition, continues to privilege physicalism over dualism, because it avoids the theoretical impasse engendered by the dualist inability to account for how two radically different entities

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2

McGhee, C. M., Susan A. Gelman, and Abigail J. Stewart. "Mind-Body Dualism, Health, and Well-being in University Students." Journal of Cognition and Culture 24, no. 5 (2024): 436–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12340195.

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Abstract Mind-body dualism conceptualizes mind and body as distinct, but there are different ways that dualism may be instantiated. In this study, we examined how Hierarchical Dualism (the belief that mind and body are distinct, and the mind is superior) and Mutual-Influence Dualism (the belief that mind and body are separate but interrelate) related to health behaviors and mental health in three student samples: exclusively queer, exclusively straight, and a mixed university subject pool (N = 535). Participants in each sample endorsed Mutual-Influence Dualism at a higher rate than Hierarchica

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3

Berent, Iris, and Alexzander Sansiveri. "Davinci the Dualist: The Mind–Body Divide in Large Language Models and in Human Learners." Open Mind 8 (2024): 84–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/opmi_a_00120.

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Abstract A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists—they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Furthermore, Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). Human learners, however, are also endowed with innate systems of core knowledge, and recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022). The resulting question, then, is whether the acquisition of Dualism requires core knowledge, or whether Dualism is learnable from experience alone, via domain-general mechanism. Since human learners ar

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4

Yablo, Stephen. "The Real Distinction Between Mind and Body." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 16 (1990): 149–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1990.10717225.

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….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a difference between minds and bodies per se, it is not initially clear what he is maintaining. Maybe

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Martínková, Irena. "Body Ecology: Avoiding body–mind dualism." Loisir et Société / Society and Leisure 40, no. 1 (2017): 101–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07053436.2017.1281528.

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6

Burgmer, Pascal, and Matthias Forstmann. "Mind-Body Dualism and Health Revisited." Social Psychology 49, no. 4 (2018): 219–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000344.

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Abstract. Does a sound mind require a sound body? Whether or not lay people subscribe to this notion depends on their belief in mind-body dualism and critically shapes their health-related behaviors. Six studies (N = 1,710) revisit the relation between dualism and health. We replicate the negative correlation between belief in dualism and health behavior (Study 1) and extend it to behavior in the field (Study 2). Studies 3a and 3b investigate how belief in dualism shapes intuitions about the material origin of psychological well-being, while Studies 4a and 4b examine how these intuitions deter

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7

Deutscher, Max. "Simulacra, Enactment and Feeling." Philosophy 63, no. 246 (1988): 515–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043837.

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The general context of this writing is that of finding exits both from dualism and from reductive physicalism. Dualism—the attitude of seeing and taking things according to a fixed absolute distinction, with mind as invisible, conscious ‘containing’ the thought, feeling and sensation ‘hidden’ by body. Reductive physicalism—the attempt to grasp and be satisfied with body as left over by dualism's rape of its mentality, dualism's refusal to recognize the distinctiveness of point of view, as requiring a bodily mentality. Physicalism finally supplants an ‘inner life’ within the bodily vacancy afte

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Grankvist, Gunne, Petri Kajonius, and Bjorn Persson. "The Relationship between Mind-Body Dualism and Personal Values." International Journal of Psychological Studies 8, no. 2 (2016): 126. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijps.v8n2p126.

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<p>Dualists view the mind and the body as two fundamental different “things”, equally real and independent of each other. Cartesian thought, or substance dualism, maintains that the mind and body are two different substances, the non-physical and the physical, and a causal relationship is assumed to exist between them. Physicalism, on the other hand, is the idea that everything that exists is either physical or totally dependent of and determined by physical items. Hence, all mental states are fundamentally physical states. In the current study we investigated to what degree Swedish univ

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9

Badham, Paul. "A Case for Mind-Body Dualism." Modern Churchman 34, no. 3 (1993): 19–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/mc.34.3.19.

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10

Bardina, S. M. "Psychopharmacologyconstructing emotions: Prozacversus mind-body dualism." Sociology of Power 29, no. 3 (2017): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2074-0492-2017-3-41-58.

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11

Jenkins, Laura. "Corporeal Ontology: Beyond Mind-Body Dualism?" Politics 25, no. 1 (2005): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2005.00223.x.

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The definition and boundaries of the political have received considerable attention in recent times in political science, perhaps as a result of the wavering confidence in the scientific status of the knowledge that the discipline creates. However, a conspicuous absence continues to haunt mainstream political science, one that if rectified threatens, in some ways, to broaden both the nature of the political still further and to challenge the very division of knowledge into the social and natural sciences. This absence is the human body and this article seeks to ask after its exclusion and to s

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12

DIKA, TAREK R. "The Origins of Cartesian Dualism." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 3 (2020): 335–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.47.

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AbstractIn the recently discovered Cambridge manuscript, widely regarded as an early draft of Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes does not describe the mind as a ‘purely spiritual’ force ‘distinct from the whole body’. This has led some readers to speculate that Descartes did not embrace mind-body dualism in the Cambridge manuscript. In this article, I offer a detailed interpretation of Descartes's mind-body dualism in the established Charles Adam and Paul Tannery edition of Rules, and argue that, while differences between the Cambridge manuscript and the established version of Rule

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Hodge, K. Mitch. "Descartes' Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption that Humans are Intuitive Cartesian Substance Dualists." Journal of Cognition and Culture 8, no. 3-4 (2008): 387–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853708x358236.

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AbstractThis article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are different substances, that the mind and soul are intensionally identical, and that the mind is the sole source o

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McKay, Noah. "Problems with the “Problems” with Psychophysical Causation." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 12 (2019): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2019123.

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In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fai

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McKay, Noah. "Problems with the "Problems" with Psychophysical Causation." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 12, no. 1 (2019): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.12.1.32-43.

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In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fai

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Lin, Chien-Te. "Rethinking mind-body dualism: a Buddhist take on the mind-body problem." Contemporary Buddhism 14, no. 2 (2013): 239–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639947.2013.832081.

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17

Deviatko, Ivan V. "Mind-Body Dualism and Asymmetry of Standards of Evidence." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 62, no. 2 (2025): 125–43. https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202562226.

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This paper provides reflection how contemporary analytic philosophy of mind applies justification criteria differently to dualism and physicalism. It shows that arguments in favor of dualism often face increased demands for standards of evidence, while the physicalist position is often treated more leniently. Paper shows that such a gap in standards is not necessarily a mistake, but it does imply implicit metaphysical assumptions in favor of physicalism. The article emphasizes that dualism can be considered a serious rival theory in explaining the nature of consciousness, provided that the jus

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Richert, Rebekah, and Paul Harris. "Dualism Revisited: Body vs. Mind vs. Soul." Journal of Cognition and Culture 8, no. 1-2 (2008): 99–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156770908x289224.

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AbstractA large, diverse sample of adults was interviewed about their conception of the ontological and functional properties of the mind as compared to the soul. The existence of the mind was generally tied to the human lifecycle of conception, birth, growth and death, and was primarily associated with cognitive as opposed to spiritual functions. In contrast, the existence of the soul was less systematically tied to the lifecycle and frequently associated with spiritual as opposed to cognitive functions. Participants were also asked about three ethical issues: stem cell research, life support

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19

Maunu, Ari. "A Sound Cartesian Argument from Doubt for Dualism." Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 4 (2018): 461–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1210020.

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I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind-body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, “Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist”, which is false, whereas the respective “Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist” is true.

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20

Mohammed, Akomolafe Akinola. "A Critique of Descartes’ Mind-Body Dualism." Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 1 (2012): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.25138/6.1.a.7.

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21

Maxwell, Nicholas. "The Mind–Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism." Philosophy 75, no. 1 (2000): 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003181910000005x.

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An important part of the mind–brain problem arises because consciousness seems inherently resistant to scientific explanation. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation, the personalistic, different from, irreducible to, but as viable as, scientific explanation, in terms of which consciousness can be understood. The problem of explaining why experiential or mental aspects of brain processes or things should be correlated with certain physical

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22

Bardina, S.M. "Psychopharmacologyconstructing emotions: Prozac versus mind-body dualism." Sociology of Power, no. 3 (June 7, 2017): 41–58. https://doi.org/10.22394/2074-0492-2017-3-41-58.

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The paper deals with the problem which was first raised by theorists of the "new sociology of emotions" - namely, the use of different conceptions of body in the sociology of emotions. The study of emotions is divided into two main areas: positivism and constructionism. Positivist theories marginalize social aspects of emotions, whereas constructionist theories dismiss the fact that emotional experience is embodied. Therefore, proponents of the "new sociology of emotions" assert that the new study of emotions should be based on a non-positivist concept of body, so that we could examine emotion

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23

Andrea, Bucci. "Where and What: Two Experiments for Dualism." Journal of NeuroPhilosophy 1, no. 2 (2022): 125–32. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7253845.

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In 2007, two experiments that have now become very famous have appeared in the neuroscientific literature. With over of one thousand of citation, that moved neuroscientist to speculate about the self- representation and other conscious phenomena and to create new experiments, Henrik Ehrsson and Bigna Lengenhagger produce in two studies out of the body experiences in healthy subjects. The literature reports this kind of experience as consequence of neurological disease or drug use. In this article, I will prove that the where, and the what, of the out of the body experience and the normal exper

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Hyde, Jason. "Kim and the Pairing Problem for Dualism." Forum Philosophicum 28, no. 1 (2023): 127–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.07.

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The philosophical history of metaphysics of mind can be narrowed into two problems: Mind and body causation and issues of the self or persons. Due to the rise of the scientific revolution the nature of mental states and its possessors has been reduced to brain and cognitive functioning or eliminated instead of the ontological basic substance of a soul. The other criticism of soul identity or substance dualism is the problem of mental causation. In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (2018), Jaegwon Kim argues against the intelligibility of Cartesian dualism and further extends that ar

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WILLIAMS, CLIFFORD. "Topic neutrality and the mind–body problem." Religious Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): 203–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005199.

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In a previous paper I argued that there is conceptual parity between Christian materialism and Christian dualism because nonmatter is neutral with respect to thinking and feeling – it might do these but it also might not. This undermines the explanatory power of immaterial souls. J. P. Moreland responded by saying that dualists reject this neutral conception of souls: souls are not generic immaterial substances, but consist of a special kind of nonmatter, namely, nonmatter whose essence it is to think and feel. I reply that conceptual parity can still be maintained: Christian materialists can

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Ventriglio, A., and D. Bhugra. "Descartes' dogma and damage to Western psychiatry." Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 24, no. 5 (2015): 368–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045796015000608.

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René Descartes described the concept of mind–body dualism in the 16th century. This concept has been called his error but we prefer to call it his dogma because the error was recognised much later. We studied the original writings translated by various scholars. We believe that his dogma has caused tremendous amount of damage to Western psychiatry. This dualism has created boundaries between mind and body but as we know they are inextricably interlinked and influence each other. This has affected clinical practice and has increased the dichotomy between psychiatric services and the physical he

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Pech, Robin. "Mezi filosofií a medicínou. Ke Kantovu překonání karteziánského dualismu mysli a těla." Filosofický časopis 72, no. 4 (2024): 649–61. https://doi.org/10.46854/fc.2024.4r.649.

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The aim of the study is to show that one of the essential motifs of Kant’s critical philosophy is the issue of human health. Its starting point is therefore Kant’s reflections in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and the Conflict of the Faculties (1798), where Kant presented his concept of so-called “universal medicine,” which focuses on the problem of a healthy regimen. Since its basic assumption is that the body and mind of a person, however different they might be, are mutually connected so that the diseases of the body can be cured by way of the mind, it is the author’s interpretation that

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R, Mishra. "The Explorations of Descartes and Ryle’s Idea of Mind: An Appraisal." Philosophy International Journal 6, no. 3 (2023): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000306.

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This paper attempts to explore the idea of mind on the basis of René Descartes and Gilbert Ryle’s vision. Descartes, a 17thcentury philosopher, developed a dualistic theory that posits the mind and body as distinct entities. According to him, the mind is an immaterial, non- extended entity with consciousness and rational thought, while the body is a material substance subject to physical laws. In contrast, 20th-century philosopher Ryle rejected the idea of a separate mental realm and argued for the unity of mind and body. He criticized Cartesian dualism, proposing that mental states and mental

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Khuramy, Mustafa. "Self-localisation without Property Dualism." Journal of NeuroPhilosophy 3, no. 2 (2024): 319–22. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14330753.

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In this journal, Bucci (2022) has argued that two famous experiments in the neuroscientific literature can be used to support property dualism about the mind. In what follows, I attempt to illustrate that those experiments are completely compatible with a naive identity mind-brain/body identity theory

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Baab, Florian. "Vater des Substanzdualismus? Eine kontextuelle Analyse von Descartes’ Thesen zum Geist-Materie-Verhältnis." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, no. 2 (2016): 352–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2016-2-352.

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Abstract. The fact that Descartes describes mind and body as two fundamentally different entities has mostly led to the view that he has to be seen not only as the father of modern Philosophy, but also as the father of substance dualism. Against this commonsense view, I will argue that Descartes’ dualism does not primarily aim to prove an ontological, but a transcendental distinction between mind and body as a constitutional fact of human existence. As a consequence, Descartes’ dualism has to be seen as a kind of perspectivism: Depending on one’s point of view, the human mind can, according to

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Gorham, Geoffrey. "Mind-Body Dualism and the Harvey-Descartes Controversy." Journal of the History of Ideas 55, no. 2 (1994): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2709897.

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Barrett, Jeffrey A. "A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism." Erkenntnis 65, no. 1 (2006): 97–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9016-z.

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Money, John. "Mind-body dualism and the unity of bodymind." Behavioral Science 1, no. 3 (2007): 212–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830010304.

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Monnoyeur, Françoise. "The Substance-attributes Relationship in Cartesian Dualism." Journal of Philosophical Research 43 (2018): 177–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201882124.

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In their book on Descartes’s Changing Mind, Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. Descartes famously proposed that there are two separate substances, mind and body, with distinct attributes of thought and extension (Principles of Philosophy). According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitations of our intellect, we cannot have insight into the nature of either substance. After reviewing their argument in some detail, I will argue that Descartes did not relinquish his favorite doctrine but may have actually fooled himself a

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Gut, Arkadiusz, Andrew Lambert, Oleg Gorbaniuk, and Robert Mirski. "Folk Beliefs about Soul and Mind: Cross-Cultural Comparison of Folk Intuitions about the Ontology of the Person." Journal of Cognition and Culture 21, no. 3-4 (2021): 346–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12340116.

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Abstract The present study addressed two related problems: The status of the concept of the soul in folk psychological conceptualizations across cultures, and the nature of mind-body dualism within Chinese folk psychology. We compared folk intuitions about three concepts – mind, body, and soul – among adults from China (N=257) and Poland (N=225). The questionnaire study comprised of questions about the functional and ontological nature of the three entities. The results show that the mind and soul are conceptualized differently in the two countries: The Chinese appear to think of the soul simi

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MORELAND, J. P. "Topic neutrality and the parity thesis: a surrejoinder to Williams." Religious Studies 37, no. 1 (2001): 93–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500005515.

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In an important paper, Clifford Williams advanced a Lockean-style argument to justify the parity thesis, viz., that there is no intellectual advantage to Christian physicalism or Christian dualism. In an article in Religious Studies I offered a critique of Williams's parity thesis and he has published a rejoinder to me in the same journal centring on my rejection of topic neutrality as an appropriate way to set up the mind–body debate. In this surrejoinder to Williams, I present his three main arguments and respond to each: (1) The dualist rejection of topic neutrality is flawed because it exp

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Taliaferro, Charles. "Dualism and the Problem of Individuation." Religious Studies 22, no. 2 (1986): 263–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018254.

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H. D. Lewis once remarked he did not think ‘any case for immortality can get off the ground if we fail to make a case for dualism’. Lewis vigorously defended both mind body dualism, the theory that minds (or persons) are nonphysical, spatially unextended things in causal interaction with physical, spatially extended things, as well as the conceivability of an after life. Lewis defended the intelligibility of supposing distinct, individual persons continue existing after bodily death, possibly even after all physical objects pass out of existence. Prominent philosophers such as Plato, Augustine

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Mehta, Neeta. "Mind-body dualism: A critique from a health perspectiveFNx08." Mens Sana Monographs 9, no. 1 (2011): 202. http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0973-1229.77436.

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Slingerland, Edward, and Maciej Chudek. "The Prevalence of Mind-Body Dualism in Early China." Cognitive Science 35, no. 5 (2011): 997–1007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01186.x.

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Honderich, Ted. "YOUR BEING CONSCIOUS: MIND-BODY DUALISM, AND OBJECTIVE PHYSICALISM." Think 14, no. 41 (2015): 31–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000202.

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Descartes believed not only that I think therefore I am but also that consciousness is not physical, unlike the brain. That makes consciousness different, which evidently it is, but also incapable of causing arm movements, which is unbelievable. Abstract functionalism is in the same boat. Disagreement between these and more ideas and theories surely has much to do with not talking about the same thing, no adequate initial clarification of the subject matter. We can get such a thing from a database. Consciousness is therefore something's being actual. What that comes to on further reflection is

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D'Oro, Giuseppina. "Collingwood's “solution” to the problem of mind-body dualism." Philosophia 32, no. 1-4 (2005): 349–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02641630.

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BENDELOW, GILLIAN, and SIMON WILLIAMS. "Pain and the Mind-Body Dualism: A Sociological Approach." Body & Society 1, no. 2 (1995): 83–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034x95001002004.

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Dings, Roy, and Leon de Bruin. "Going Beyond Mind–Body Dualism Requires Revising the Self." AJOB Neuroscience 5, no. 4 (2014): 48–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2014.951781.

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RL, Tripathi. "The Mind: From Cartesian Dualism to Piccinini’s Computational Functionalism." Philosophy International Journal 7, no. 3 (2024): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000333.

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The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting v

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Putri, Retno Daru Dewi G. S. "Penolakan Konsep Ketubuhan Patriarkis di dalam Proses Menjadi Perempuan Melalui Pemikiran Merleau-Ponty dan Simone De Beauvoir." Jurnal Filsafat 28, no. 2 (2018): 200. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jf.31812.

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Descartes’ dualism of mind and body implies relationship of mind and body in the articulation of human thinking. While seemingly reflects both men and women, this concept of dualism has in practice changed due to the existing social construction that differentiate human based on their sex. The ongoing social discrimination against women implies philosophy’s deficiency in addressing human universal issues. In addressing this issue, this research emplyos Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied perception and Beauvoir’s conception on ambiguity to argue on the importance of women’s body freedom in unde

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Гусев, Александр Андреевич. "Репрезентационализм и природа ментальных состояний". Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 60, № 4 (2023): 69–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202360459.

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The paper explores representationalist theories of mind in the context of the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind-body problem is related to the substantial dualism, according to which there are two independent types of objects – physical and mental. For a materialistically oriented metaphysics, such a dualism was unacceptable. In the second half of the twentieth century. a new version of dualism appeared – the dualism of properties. Its essence lies in the fact that it is not the existence of mental substances that is affirmed, but the existence of phenomenal pro

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Gaudemard, Lynda. "Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, no. 2 (2018): 146–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-2002.

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Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian Dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the min

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Craffert, Pieter F. "A Neuroscientific Image of Human Beings Worth Standing Up For: The Nested Assumptions of 'You Are (Not) Your Brain'." Journal of Consciousness Studies 32, no. 1 (2025): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.32.1.006.

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Within the neuroscience of consciousness there are two incompatible views of human beings: you are your brain (neurocentric) and you are not your brain but you have a brain (humanistic). Neurocentric views are trapped in the Cartesian legacy of the mental– physical duality as well as the mind–body dualism that manifests in the mind–brain and brain–body dualisms. A version of physicalism coupled with idealism and scientism wraps these views into modern versions of the Cartesian image they seek to overcome. A humanistic view sees humans as living systems that consist of parts and wholes where th

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Rangarajan, Sudarsan. "The Mind-Body Dualism in Cyrano de Bergerac: Anticipating Artaud." French Review 95, no. 2 (2021): 189–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tfr.2021.0271.

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Yoo, Jae-Bong. "The Mind-Body Problem in Education: Beyond Dualism and Physicalism." Korean Society for the Study of Moral Education 32, no. 1 (2020): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.17715/jme.2020.3.32.1.1.

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