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Journal articles on the topic 'Minilateralismo'

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1

Téllez Núñez, Andrés. "La amistad entre los Estados nación y la teoría del bien público internacional: un acto de equilibrio entre el minilateralismo y el multilateralismo." Revista de Derecho Uninorte 61 (May 9, 2024): 171–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.14482/dere.61.222.159.

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Esta investigación tiene como objetivo mostrar que ante la fragmentación del multilateralismo clásico en el derecho internacional de la política y del comercio, un minilateralismo emergente, que dé un alcance renovador y justo a las relaciones entre Estados, es jurídica y moralmente aceptable en cuanto se considere que la dignidad humana sea tanto valor como fuente del derecho. Mediante una metodología de investigación dogmático-hermenéutica, y una vez expuestas las características de la tensión entre el multilateralismo y el minilateralismo, los argumentos que fundamentan un nacionalismo bueno, y la vinculación de estas nociones con un estudio de la teoría de los bienes públicos en el contexto de una amistad internacional que proclama que ellos son objetivamente buenos con base en algunas aproximaciones de una teoría clásica (platónica) de justicia y la utilización de algunas herramientas del derecho económico, se descubre que los Estados y sus representantes continuamente llevan a cabo una serie de cálculos en aras de obtener y conservar lo que ellos perciben como bueno y como beneficio, y se concluye que una posición intermedia entre un minilateralismo y un multilateralismo es aceptable siempre y cuando se considere que la dignidad humana es fuente y valor del derecho.
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2

Andrés, Téllez-Núñez. "Comercio internacional y justicia como sinónimos de bienestar La búsqueda de un término medio entre el multilateralismo y el minilateralismo." Estudios de Derecho 79, no. 173 (2022): 84–109. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.esde.v79n173a04.

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Con una metodología fenomenológico-hermenéutica y con el objetivo de encontrar un término medio entre un multilateralismo clásico y un minilateralismo moderno en el contexto de las relaciones económicas internacionales, en aras del logro de situaciones de justicia, orden y, en general, de bienestar glob al, se propone una hipótesis de trabajo según la cual, siempre que en los acuerdos internacionales se incluyan disposiciones de protección de los derechos humanos a manera de obligaciones erga omnes y considerando la dignidad humana como fuente y valor supremos del derecho, por un lado, se mitiga la posibilidad de erosionar el sistema mediante artilugios propios de la teoría de la elección pública y, por otro lado, se descubre que se le da un sentido de justicia a una fría meta de liberalización comercial en los términos del artículo II del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio. Con esta aproximación a los acuerdos internacionales de comercio puede llegarse a una sinonimia entre comercio justo y comercio libre.
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3

Falkner, Robert. "A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy." Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 87–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592715003242.

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Gridlock in the multilateral climate negotiations has created growing scholarly and practical interest in the use of minilateral forums. A large variety of climate club proposals have been developed in recent years, which promise more effective bargaining among the main climate powers, better incentives to encourage mitigation efforts and discourage free-riding, and new ways to align international power asymmetries with the interests of the global climate regime. I investigate the three dominant rationales that underpin minilateralist proposals. I offer a critical review of their potential as well as their limitations in promoting global climate action. I argue that minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers to a comprehensive and ambitious international climate agreement. However, climate clubs can enhance political dialogue in the context of multilateral negotiations and can provide a more conducive environment for great power bargaining. They can create club benefits that strengthen mitigation strategies and help reduce the dangers of free-riding for so-called coalitions of the willing. And they can help re-legitimate the global climate regime against the background of profound power shifts that have slowed down progress in the multilateral negotiations.
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4

Danieladi, Wim Tohari. "Kesepakatan Nuklir Iran 14 Juli 2015 Sebagai Model Perundingan Minilateral yang Efektif Meredam Dinamika Politik dan Keamanan Kawasan." Global Political Studies Journal 7, no. 2 (2023): 180–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.34010/gpsjournal.v7i2.11325.

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Minilateralisme adalah sebuah konsep hubungan internasional yang melibatkan sekelompok kecil negara yang berkolaborasi untuk mengatasi masalah atau mencapai tujuan bersama. Pada prakteknya, minilateralisme memang memiliki kelemahan. Salah satu risikonya adalah bahwa hal ini dapat bersifat eksklusif dan memperburuk ketidakseimbangan kekuasaan sehingga berpotensi mengutamakan kepentingan jangka pendek dibandingkan tujuan jangka panjang. Meski demikian, manfaat minilateralisme lebih besar daripada kelemahannya. Dimana minilateralisme adalah pendekatan yang lebih cerdas dan tepat sasaran, yaitu menghadirkan sejumlah kecil negara yang diperlukan agar dapat memberikan dampak sebesar-besarnya dalam penyelesaian suatu masalah tertentu. Inilah angka ajaib (magic number) minilateralisme, yang tentu saja akan sangat bervariasi, tergantung masalahnya. Dalam kasus kesepakatan Nuklir Iran 14 Juli 2014, konsep minilateralisme ini menunjukan keajaibannya. Dimana ketergangan yang sudah berlangsung lebih dari empat decade antara Amerika Serikat dan sekutunya dengan Iran, berhasil mencapai common interest untuk menghasilkan kesepakatan yang optimal.
 Kata kunci—Common Interest, Iran 14 Juli 2014, Kesepakatan Nuklir, Konstruktivisme, Minilateralisme, Multilateralisme
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5

Falkner, Robert. "Towards minilateralism." Nature Climate Change 5, no. 9 (2015): 805–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2767.

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6

Eckersley, Robyn. "Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?" Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 2 (2012): 24–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00107.

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The slow progress of the international climate negotiations has generated calls for a shift from large-n multilateralism (inclusive multilateralism) to more streamlined negotiations that are confined to the major emitters whose support is crucial for an effective climate treaty (exclusive minilateralism). This article pushes critical theory in an applied direction to explore under what circumstances, if any, minilateralism might help to advance the climate negotiations. I show that inclusive multilateralism is unlikely to produce a timely climate treaty, while exclusive minilateralism is elitist, procedurally unjust, and likely to be self-serving. Instead, I defend inclusive minilateralism, based on “common but differentiated representation,” or representation by the most capable, the most responsible, and the most vulnerable. I also offer some practical suggestions as to how a minilateral climate council might be constituted, what its remit should be, and how it might be embedded in and answerable to the UNFCCC.
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7

Charalampaki, Effie. "Minilateralism for Multilateralism: What Role for the EU in the Instrumentalization of the Japan-Australia Strategic Partnership." HAPSc Policy Briefs Series 3, no. 2 (2022): 103–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33789.

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The era of “permacrisis” gives rise to minilateral arrangements increasingly at the expense of embedded multilateralism in regional governance. The area of the Indo-Pacific has become the bedrock of minilateral security cooperation. The 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) between Japan and Australia compliments the hub-and-spokes system and poses an opportunity for the European Union to advance its own strategic compass and address regional security and economic issues in transformative and dynamic ways. Minilateralism poses opportunities and challenges. The paper presents policy recommendations for the EU so as to instrumentalize the 2022 JDSC and concludes that despite the merits of informal and non-binding minilateral arrangements, minilateralism should be used to overcome the stalemates in multilateralism rather than replacing inclusive, legally binding, formal agreements that aim at an order-building architecture which advances the role of international institutions.
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8

Gampfer, Robert. "Minilateralism or the UNFCCC? The Political Feasibility of Climate Clubs." Global Environmental Politics 16, no. 3 (2016): 62–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00366.

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Climate clubs, or “minilateralism,” are increasingly advocated as a way to move global climate governance forward. Minilateralism supposedly carries structural advantages that facilitate effective climate governance. Some have cautioned, however, that climate clubs lack political legitimacy, commanding little domestic public support. Consequently, small coalitions might not always be politically feasible, even if they could deliver substantial mitigation. Design features like the emission share regulated, commitment structure, club goods, and sanctions against nonmembers could help mitigate this deficit. I report results from conjoint experiments testing these propositions that were conducted with nationally representative samples in the United States and India. The findings indicate that minilateral approaches per se tend to receive low public support, but that support can be increased by certain configurations of design elements, especially through a combination of club goods for members and sanctions against nonmember countries. Climate clubs therefore need careful institutional design to be politically feasible.
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9

Mafuang, Supatat. "Ontological Security: Genesis, Application in International Relations and Multilateralism and Minilateralism Studies." Общество: политика, экономика, право, no. 1 (January 22, 2025): 64–74. https://doi.org/10.24158/pep.2025.1.8.

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Why is minilateralism “exclusive, flexible, resilient, and functional” by nature? This article seeks to understand how these elements are constructed in the paradigm of cooperation in a minilateral format. It is emphasized that the concept of ontological security was originally formulated by R.D. Laing in the 1960s, becoming a com-ponent of the therapeutic approach to patients suffering from schizoid disorders and simultaneously part of the anti-psychiatric movement. In the 1980s, E. Giddens reinterpreted ontological security in his structuration theo-ry. In the 2000s, Brent J. Steele and J. Mitzen pioneered the application of ontological security in international relations, focusing on global politics, conflict, and security studies. Recently, Nina S. Krickel-Choi has redefined ontological security, reviving some aspects of its theoretical foundation. Accordingly, the author assesses and interprets ontological security in terms of multilateralism and minilateralism with the aim of rethinking the para-digm of minilateral cooperation.
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10

KOGA, Kei. "Quad 3.0: Japan, Indo-Pacific and Minilateralism." East Asian Policy 14, no. 01 (2022): 20–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930522000022.

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Japan under the first and second Abe administration in 2006–07 and 2012–20, respectively, played a pivotal leading role in creating and institutionalising the Quad. While Japan has taken on a more supportive role in the post-Abe administrations, there are unique roles that Japan could still play in coordinating and shaping the strategic role of the Quad, such as configuring its institutional relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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11

Fathah, M. Abdul. "From Multilateralism to Minilateralism- A Conceptual Paradigm." Electronic Journal of Social and Strategic Studies 03, no. 01 (2022): 105–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.47362/ejsss.2022.3107.

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Scholars have always struggled with the dilemma of interdependence in a world where nation-states have been the basic unit of political organization for over two centuries. As the primacy of the states continued and complex powers shift recurred, the initial optimism in a world government has come crashing down. Scholars have since then turned into diplomatic interaction between the states to analyze how they relate to each other and form cooperative international organizations, among them the multilaterals and its new avatar, the minilaterals. Considering that it is not the absence of platforms for the states to relate each other, but their astonishing diversity that concerns us, we must look into efficiency of each one of them and why states have prioritized some above the others.
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12

Fioretos, Orfeo. "Minilateralism and informality in international monetary cooperation." Review of International Political Economy 26, no. 6 (2019): 1136–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1616599.

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13

Kulkarni, Dnyanashri. "The emergence of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific." Jindal Journal of International Affairs 1, no. 6 (2022): 51–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.54945/jjia.v1i6.59.

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From the League of Nations in the aftermath of World War I to the formation of the United Nations and several other multilateral frameworks in the post-World War II period, these forums introduced new dawn for global governance and ensuring cooperation among nations. International cooperation flourished as states employed multilateral architectures to meet the rising global problems. One of the key achievements of these multilateral forums has been the globalisation and development of international economic cooperation. However, more recently, the changing power dynamics at the regional and global levels have impacted the functioning of multilateral institutions
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14

Koga, Kei. "A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific." Asia Policy 29, no. 4 (2022): 27–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0063.

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15

Laksmana, Evan A. "Fit for Purpose: Can Southeast Asian Minilateralism Deter?" Asia Policy 29, no. 4 (2022): 35–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0064.

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16

Lee-Brown, Troy. "Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific." East Asia 35, no. 2 (2018): 163–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9290-9.

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17

Sychova, A. O. "MINILATERALISM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF MULTILATERALISM: SYNTHESIS OF TRENDS." International and Political Studies, no. 37 (2024): 40–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.32782/2707-5206.2024.37.4.

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18

Tzinieris, Sarah, Rishika Chauhan, and Eirini Athanasiadou. "India’s A La Carte Minilateralism: AUKUS and the Quad." Washington Quarterly 46, no. 4 (2023): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2023.2285540.

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19

Helwig, Niklas. "Germany in European Diplomacy: Minilateralism as a Tool for Leadership." German Politics 29, no. 1 (2019): 25–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1563891.

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20

Engelbrekt, Kjell. "Minilateralism matters more? Exploring opportunities to end climate negotiations gridlock." Global Affairs 1, no. 4-5 (2015): 399–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2015.1077607.

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21

Kim, Sung-Mi, Sebastian Haug, and Susan Harris Rimmer. "Minilateralism Revisited: MIKTA as Slender Diplomacy in a Multiplex World." Global Governance 24, no. 4 (2018): 475–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02404001.

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Abstract Based on over seventy interviews with diplomats and experts from all five MIKTA member countries, we find that MIKTA is used as a value-for-money minilateral mechanism for the world’s lesser powers grappling with the heightened global uncertainty and deepening interdependency. MIKTA foreign ministries have used the group as an ad hoc capacity-building and network-sharing scheme; and as a low-cost toolkit to diversify their traditional diplomatic channels and increase global visibility in various multilateral forums. However, MIKTA’s flexible, but precarious, institutional realities also suggest that minilateral arrangements that share MIKTA’s operational characteristics are likely to be short-lived and suffer from weak member commitment, resource constraints, forum-shopping risks, and a leadership vacuum.
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22

Jaknanihan, Arrizal Anugerah. "Minilateralism and Great Power Competition during the COVID-19 Pandemic." Journal of Integrative International Relations 7, no. 1 (2022): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/jiir.2022.7.1.1-20.

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Minilateral institutions such as Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and Lower Mekong Initiative have an indispensable role in channeling the influence of external powers to the Mekong region. This article analyzes the impact of US-China competition on minilateral institutions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. By using institutional balancing theory, this article explains the geopolitical and geoeconomic imperative behind the minilateral cooperation in Mekong during the pandemic. As the external powers compete for influence, the range of minilateral cooperation has expanded to solve the issues brought by the pandemic, especially health security and economic recovery. However, notwithstanding the assistance, Mekong countries remain steadfast in maintaining their autonomy. Regional powers such as Vietnam and Thailand did this by harnessing the intra-regional institution and diversifying their partners.
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23

Dey, Ainesh. "Diplomacy in the Indo Pacific and the Rise of Minilateralism." International Journal of Political Science and Public Administration 3, no. 1 (2023): 86–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.51483/ijpspa.3.1.2023.86-88.

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24

Baba, Gürol. "Middle East–South Asia Relations: Transregional Minilateralism Cemented with Bilateralism." Journal of Asian and African Studies 58, no. 4 (2023): 491–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00219096231162100.

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The politico-economically uneven structure, fragile inter-state affairs and weak regionalism of the Middle East make it difficult to explain its interactions with South Asia within a single theoretical pattern. Neither interregionalism nor multilateralism could illuminate these interactions individually. This study merges recently popularized interaction schemes of minilateralism and bilateralism on a transregional basis to provide an eclectic and flexible conceptual framework to explain the patterns of Middle East–South Asia inter-state affairs. It argues that regardless of its weak regionalism and intra-regional power games, the Middle East, with these trendy interaction schemes, could still develop effective inter-state relations with South Asia. The study utilizes the empirical analysis method to interpret various levels and types of interactions between actors of various capabilities. In addition, it also uses case studies to produce a deeper context-dependent knowledge of Middle Eastern – South Asian actors.
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Loshkariov, Ivan. "The Alliance of Sahel States as a “Laboratory” of Minilateralism." Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost, no. 5 (2024): 108. https://doi.org/10.31696/s086919080030925-4.

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The article is devoted to the problem of institutionalization of the Alliance of Sahel States, created by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in September 2023. The study’s relevance is connect to the fact that this military-political organization is becoming an important factor in the regional security architecture, but at the same time does not have many characteristic elements of military-political alliances. Moreover, the Alliance of Sahel States is increasingly working on the economic and political integration of participating countries, that is, going beyond the framework of a classic military alliance. In this regard, the activities of the Alliance are viewed from the perspective of the theory of minilateralism, which explains the incentives and limitations of cooperation in flexible formats of interaction. The research methodology is based on an interdisciplinary approach, including historical and political aspects. To analyze the main areas of interaction between member countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, historical, genetic and comparative methods are used, making it possible to identify common interests and disagreements between states on individual issues. In the fight against international terrorism, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have achieved a high level of coordination of operations. On the issue of political integration and the potential formation of a confederation, serious contradictions arose between Niger and Burkina Faso, leading to increased sectoral and bilateral cooperation. In conclusion, it is pointed out that the Alliance of Sahel States differs in many ways from the well-known examples of minilateralism and represents its new form.
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26

Jose, Hino Samuel, and Sigit Aris Prasetyo. "A STRATEGIC VIEW OF MINILATERALISM: INDONESIA, QUAD, ASEAN, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN, AND IMPEDIMENT TO ASEAN CENTRALITY?" Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Keimigrasian 4, no. 2 (2021): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.52617/jikk.v5i2.268.

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This paper elaborates on how Indonesia and ASEAN could synergize their role on a more strategic views in ensuring ASEAN-led centrality. With minilateralism concerns growing, this paper addresses the importance of maintaining external relations for constructive dialogue and how foreign policy restructurization of Indonesia should be executed in a more normative and ideational level. This paper employs qualitative analysis through document-based research on previous literatures to formulate the contention and discussions that has been very Comprehensive and wide in scholarly analyses. Will Indo-Pacific prevail with ASEAN as the central player? What Jakarta has to do about it?
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27

Wuthnow, Joel. "U.S. ‘Minilateralism’ in Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma?" Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 115 (2018): 133–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497916.

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28

Campanella, Miriam L. "The Effects of Globalization and Turbulence on Policy‐Making Processes." Government and Opposition 28, no. 2 (1993): 190–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1993.tb01277.x.

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During Recent Years, Analysts of World Politics Have noted increasing tensions and conflicts between the countries of the OECD area. As the process of globalization is extending to include several new sectors of domestic economies, multilateralism is deteriorating and perhaps, in some sectors, reaching breaking-point. Globalization, widely acknowledged as a powerful engine for the growth of the world economy during the 1970s and 1980s is now splitting up into trading blocs and much more limited minilateralism. This contribution aims at analysing the extent to which policy-making could be improved so that it can address and deal with the effects of globalization and turbulence on domestic and international environments.
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29

HELLMANN, Gunther. "Normative Powers and European Foreign Policy in a Minilateralist World." EU Studies in Japan 2016, no. 36 (2016): 29–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5135/eusj.2016.29.

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30

Andriyanto, Kristoforus Evan, Rodon Pedrason, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, and Oktaheroe Ramsi. "The Philippines - United States - Japan - Australia Defense Diplomacy through “the Squad” : Actor, Process, and Issue." Formosa Journal of Applied Sciences 4, no. 4 (2025): 1057–66. https://doi.org/10.55927/fjas.v4i4.99.

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To counter China's aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific, the United States, the Philippines, Japan, and Australia have formed a security partnership called “The Squad.” This study utilizes an intrinsic case study approach in qualitative methods to investigate the key actors, processes, and issues within The Squad, as well as its potential benefits and risks. Defense diplomacy and minilateralism are essential tools The Squad uses to achieve its strategic objectives. By leveraging their historical ties and shared interests, these countries aim to uphold a rules-based order, deter aggression, and ensure freedom of navigation. However, The Squad must also consider broader regional dynamics and the principles of ASEAN. Its success will depend on effective cooperation, adaptability to geopolitical dynamics, and the ability to tackle emerging challenges.
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Andriyanto, Kristoforus Evan, Rodon Pedrason, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, and Oktaheroe Ramsi. "The Philippines - United States - Japan - Australia Defense Diplomacy through “The Squad” : Actor, Process, and Issue." International Journal of Applied and Advanced Multidisciplinary Research 2, no. 11 (2024): 811–22. https://doi.org/10.59890/ijaamr.v2i11.59.

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To counter China's aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific, the United States, the Philippines, Japan, and Australia have formed a security partnership called “The Squad.” This study utilizes an intrinsic case study approach in qualitative methods to investigate the key actors, processes, and issues within The Squad, as well as its potential benefits and risks. Defense diplomacy and minilateralism are essential tools The Squad uses to achieve its strategic objectives. By leveraging their historical ties and shared interests, these countries aim to uphold a rules-based order, deter aggression, and ensure freedom of navigation. However, The Squad must also consider broader regional dynamics and the principles of ASEAN. Its success will depend on effective cooperation, adaptability to geopolitical dynamics, and the ability to tackle emerging challenges
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32

Mulgan, Aurelia George. "Breaking the Mould: Japan´ s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism." Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 1 (2008): 52–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/cs30-1c.

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33

Hino Samuel Jose. "FROM INDO-PACIFIC CENTRALITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: ASEAN – US PERSPECTIVE." Indonesian Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2022): 205–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32787/ijir.v6i1.311.

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Indo-Pacific is indeed a versatile region with vast geoeconomic and geopolitical advantages and potentials, with ASEAN at its center. Strategic engagement of countries whether to bandwagon or balance major power’s rivalries are pretty much a pertinent deliberation for the last and next decades to come as the global shifting is now moving towards the Indo-Pacific region. This paper employs qualitative analysis to answer the main contentions of: (1) how minilateralism affects Indo-Pacific, and what ASEAN-US role can be explored; and (2) does ASEAN-US matter and how it could actively find convergences in navigating forward in the rules-based region. The author suggests that looking west and being concerned the east or the other way around can be a sufficient strategy in constructing ASEAN-US engagement amid the rising minilateral groupings and concerns against the “crippled” ASEAN centrality since AUKUS and the recent developments in the region.
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Matchett, Leah. "Minilateralism and Backlash in the Nuclear Security Summit: The Consequences of Nuclear Governance outside the IAEA." Security Studies 30, no. 5 (2021): 823–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.2019827.

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35

Popa, Octavian. "ROMANIA AND THE CONCEPT OF MINILATERALISM. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTRY’S REGIONAL COOPERATION STRATEGY (1990-2022)." Annals of the „Ovidius” University of Constanta – Political Science Series 2022, no. 11 (2022): 129–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.61801/auoc-sp.2022.05.

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36

Arrizal, Anugerah Jaknanihan. "Minilateralism and Great Power Competition during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of Mekong Region." Journal of Integrative International Relations 7, no. 1 (2022): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6621336.

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<em>Minilateral institutions such as Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and Lower Mekong Initiative have an indispensable role in channeling the influence of external powers to the Mekong region. This article analyzes the impact of US-China competition on minilateral institutions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. By using institutional balancing theory, this article explains the geopolitical and geoeconomic imperative behind the minilateral cooperation in Mekong during the pandemic. As the external powers compete for influence, the range of minilateral cooperation has expanded to solve the issues brought by the pandemic, especially health security and economic recovery. However, notwithstanding the assistance, Mekong countries remain steadfast in maintaining their autonomy. Regional powers such as Vietnam and Thailand did this by harnessing the intra-regional institution and diversifying their partners.</em>
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37

Huang, Jiali. "A Comparative Analysis of China's New Era Economic Diplomacy and the Economic Diplomacy Strategy of the Biden Administration." Journal of Modern Social Sciences 2, no. 2 (2025): 126–31. https://doi.org/10.71113/jmss.v2i2.257.

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Against the backdrop of intensifying Sino-US strategic competition, the Biden administration's economic diplomacy exhibits a pronounced inclination toward exclusive minilateralism. At the global level, it advocates the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), while at the regional level, it establishes the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to collectively counter China's developmental advantages and form exclusive, targeted economic alliances. In contrast, China's economic diplomacy in the new era is guided by the principles of inclusivity and open multilateralism. Globally, it actively promotes the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), fostering inclusive and equitable development across nations. Concurrently, China continues to expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), transforming it from a regional cooperation platform into a globally recognized public good that facilitates pragmatic development. A comparative analysis of the economic diplomacy approaches of the two countries facilitates a clearer understanding of the divergent pathways of Sino-US economic development and external cooperation under complex geopolitical conditions, while also providing insights into the evolving trajectory of their economic diplomacy amid great power competition.
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38

Paik, Wooyeal, and Jae Jeok Park. "The Quad’s Search for Non-Military Roles and China’s Strategic Response: Minilateralism, Infrastructure Investment, and Regional Balancing." Journal of Contemporary China 30, no. 127 (2020): 36–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1766908.

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39

Astramowicz-Leyk, Teresa, Yaryna Turchyn, Olha Ivasechko, and Oleh Tsebenko. "Activation of Minilateral Alliances with the Participation of European Countries and Ukraine in the Context of Russia’s Armed Aggression: Security Dimension." Studia Warmińskie 61 (December 31, 2024): 511–31. https://doi.org/10.31648/sw.9954.

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The article is devoted to the analysis of the activities of minilateral alliances, the member states of which are Ukraine and European countries seen through the prism of the security dimension. The definition of minilateralism, the origins of the concept, its strengths and weaknesses are presented. The authors focused on the importance and priorities of mini-alliance cooperation, in particular, the security dimension of Ukraine's cooperation within such alliances as: "The Lublin Triangle", "Associated Trio", "Quadriga", Tripartite Alliance, The Romania-Republic of Moldova-Ukraine Alliance, the Great Britain-Poland-Ukraine Alliance. The criteria of political, economic, military, and sanctions support of Ukraine by the countries-participants of minilateral alliances during the war are presented. The key challenges to the functioning of alliances and promising areas for further cooperation are highlighted. The authors used systemic, institutional, comparative and statistical methods, as well as method of document analysis and case study, to characterize the process of current activation of minilateral alliances within the Ukraine-European countries framework. The research paper summarizes the positive consequences of Ukraine’s minilateral cooperation with European countries, which contribute to overcoming modern security challenges.
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40

Kulovesi, Kati. "Addressing Sectoral Emissions outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: What Roles for Multilateralism, Minilateralism and Unilateralism?" Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 21, no. 3 (2012): 193–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/reel.12005.

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41

Ivasechko, Olga, and Halyna Danchuk. "MINILATERALISM AS A MODERN TREND IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (ON THE EXAMPLE OF MODERN INTEGRATION ASSOCIATIONS IN INDO-PACIFIC REGION)." Visnyk of the Lviv University, no. 52 (2024): 344–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/pps.2024.52.43.

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42

Ifdal, Abdurrahman Al-Fatih. "Indonesia's 2023 MIKTA Chairmanship as A Middle Power Foreign Policy: Advancing Multilateralism From A Like- Minded Partnership Standpoint." JURNAL HUBUNGAN LUAR NEGERI 8, no. 1 (2023): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.70836/jh.v8i1.3.

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A sphere of multilateralism is often construed as a prerequisite for a like-minded middle power partnership. It reflects the very nature of middle power partnerships. This paper seeks to explore Indonesia’s middle power foreign policy in advancing multilateralism through its MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) chairmanship in 2023. This paper thus collects relevant data from MIKTA’s resources and documents to further scrutinize its middle power agenda. It should be noted that MIKTA’s flexibility in organizing its agenda is an indispensable part of itself. Thus, this paper provides in-depth research on geopolitical trends of a middle powers partnership that is like-minded in nature. It then concludes how such trends influence Indonesia’s chairmanship in MIKTA. This paper is structured to understand and interpret Indonesia’s 2023 MIKTA chairmanship from the perspective of like-mindedness in foreign policy analysis. For such, the paper will use a foreign policy action analysis with a primary focus on actions conducted by and/or in relation to MIKTA. This paper shows that Indonesia’s 2023 chairmanship in MIKTA is a quest to demonstrate Indonesia’s middle power foreign policy. This paper recommends for Indonesia’s 2023 MIKTA chairmanship to critically transform MIKTA’s minilateralism approach in order to produce concrete deliverables by starting to utilize multilateralism as a means to fulfill Indonesia’s interests as a middle power and MIKTA’s institutional purposes as a norm- builder in addressing major global issues.
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43

Nurhayati, Ema. "Kewenangan ASEAN Political-Security Community dalam Menghadapi Klaim Nine-Dash Line China." Jurnal JURISTIC 6, no. 01 (2025): 19. https://doi.org/10.56444/jrs.v6i01.5984.

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&lt;div&gt;&lt;table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" align="left"&gt;&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td align="left" valign="top"&gt;&lt;p class="AbstractText"&gt;This research analyzes the jurisdictional limitations of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in addressing China's Nine-Dash Line claim in the South China Sea. Through a qualitative approach examining policy documents and recent academic literature, this study evaluates the effectiveness of instruments developed by APSC such as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) and the Code of Conduct (COC) negotiation process. The findings indicate that APSC's authority is constrained by several fundamental factors: the principles of non-intervention and consensus-based decision-making that create structural weaknesses, limitations in UNCLOS implementation due to China's rejection of the 2016 arbitration ruling, the dilemma of balancing "ASEAN centrality" with the need to involve external powers, and the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. Based on these findings, this research recommends: (1) development of a regional dispute resolution mechanism based on UNCLOS that can overcome jurisdictional limitations, (2) implementation of a "minilateralism" model involving directly affected ASEAN countries to address consensus barriers, and (3) strengthening APSC's institutional capacity through establishing dedicated monitoring bodies, rapid response protocols for maritime incidents, and integrating non-traditional security approaches as starting points for building trust among conflicting parties.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
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44

Mafuang, Supatat. "Signaling and Tactical Hedging as Political Tools in the Formation of Minilateral Security Coalitions: Quad and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific Region." Мировая политика, no. 4 (April 2024): 30–40. https://doi.org/10.25136/2409-8671.2024.4.72184.

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This article explores the dynamics of minilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS). As the global order shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity, finding truly “like-minded” allies for strategic coordination remains a challenging task. Thus, states as hedgers deploy signaling and tactical hedging to build mutual trust and “like-minded allies”. The revival of QUAD in 2017 was a response to strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, where China is increasingly influencing the regional security architecture. The recent creation of AUKUS can be seen as a tactical hedging by the US, UK and Australia against challenges from China in the South China Sea disputes. In this article, signaling and tactical hedging approaches are considered as a means of assessing the readiness of allies to cooperate in a minilateral format. Minilateral partnerships facilitate cooperation among key regional actors, while signaling mechanisms are used to convey intentions and deter adversaries. Additionally, the concept of tactical hedging is analyzed, highlighting the nuanced strategies used by countries to navigate a complex security environment. The analysis shows that states resort to tactical signaling and hedging maneuvers to advance their interests and limit the influence of competitors, while avoiding unnecessary confrontation. For instance, the implications of minilateralism extend beyond mere military cooperation; they also encompass economic and diplomatic dimensions that can shape regional stability. For instance, while QUAD emphasizes a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), its focus on non-traditional security issues such as climate change and health policy. Minilateral formats like QUAD and AUKUS are thus increasingly important as flexible cooperation tools for regulating security in the region. By exploring these interrelated elements, the article aims to provide insights into the evolving security architecture of QUAD and AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific.
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45

Wilkins, Thomas. "U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateralism: The Inner Core of Regional Order Building and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific." Asia Policy 19, no. 2 (2024): 159–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a927099.

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executive summary: This article examines the state of security cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and Australia through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), and finds that even though the TSD maintains a relatively low profile, this minilateral alignment effectively forms the inner core of regional order building and deterrence within the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance network. main argument Since its formal establishment in 2002, the TSD has come to function as the inner core of coordination among allies in the face of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. It possesses significant capability to shape the regional security environment, as seen in terms of normative efforts at order building under the "free and open Indo-Pacific" banner, and is underwritten by a combined commitment to regional deterrence. Compared with the Quad and coordination between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. (AUKUS), the TSD is overlooked and underanalyzed as an exemplar of strategically orientated minilateral cooperation. To remedy this oversight, this article details how the TSD is being employed as a tool of strategic competition by capturing its primary functions while evaluating its capabilities, potential, and weaknesses. Because the TSD would likely form the nucleus of any U.S.-led collective response to a regional contingency, it is the most consequential example of "strategic minilateralism" within the Indo-Pacific security architecture. policy implications • Policymakers are increasingly recognizing the potential of minilateral security configurations as purposeful tools through which to prosecute strategic competition. • Mature minilaterals like the TSD can provide capable and multifaceted forums to achieve combined strategic objectives, such as regional order building and enhanced deterrence. • These tasks are inextricably interlinked, and while TSD partners strive to maintain the regional order, they must increase their efforts to credibly deter conflict and be adequately prepared to respond accordingly should deterrence fail.
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46

Thapa, Ranjit. "Uncommon Reality: Finding the Unipolar World in Bipolar and Multipolar Discourses." Unity Journal 6, no. 1 (2025): 184–201. https://doi.org/10.3126/unityj.v6i1.75592.

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In the wake of a few critical intersecting global issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the rise of China along with middle powers and power diffusion into many actors, the argument revolves around the emerging world order–the multipolar world already on its way. However, the epistemological underpinning of the central question that finds a broader scholarly debate lacks clarity. Is the world unipolar, bipolar, or transitioning? to a multipolar? While methodically reviewing various published literary documents and scholarly papers accessed through open sources and data triangulation, this article attempts to qualitatively examine key global strategic issues and scenarios to draw an analogy of the world's various polarity conditions. Furthermore, it intends to drive a critical discourse on the contemplated world order, especially the multipolar world. It also dwells on other crucial aspects, such as strategic partners, alliances, and minilateralism. It argues that, on the one hand, there remains a continuing friction in defining the world order in bipolarity and multipolarity discourses; on the other hand, these conditions will be challenging to resonate in reality. While offering policy contours, the article concludes by advancing a strong assertion that the world order will continue to remain unipolar, constructed on the very core of established conditions such as the knowledge economy, democratic power, and values of human freedom and open dialogue for peace and stability, as well as prearranged rules that are widely inherited in a democratic culture. Moreover, the debate on defining the world order will continue to hinge on the actor who significantly possesses these qualities, values, and characteristics. However, the world order will experience the complexities of middle and small powers, finding dilemmas in their alignment and realignment between established unipolar and emerging powers. Meanwhile, Nepal, wedged between two emerging powers, China and India, and the increasing interest of world powers in the region can no longer ignore global events and ongoing power competitions. While maturing its democratic practices, skillfully designed and carefully balanced diplomacy, and a closer look at ‘strategic hedging’ in its foreign policy, Nepal should support a rules-based international order that contributes to preserving its territorial integrity and national unity In the wake of a few critical intersecting global issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and the rise of China along with middle powers and power diffusion into many actors, the argument revolves around the emerging world order—the multipolar world already on its way. However, the epistemological underpinning of the central question that Finds a broader scholarly debate lacks clarity. Is the world unipolar or bipolar, or transitioning to a multipolar? While methodically reviewing various published literary documents and scholarly papers accessed through open sources and data triangulation, this article attempts to qualitatively examine key global strategic issues and scenarios to draw an analogy of the world's various polarity conditions. Furthermore, it intends to drive a critical discourse on the contemplated world order, especially the multipolar world. It also dwells on other crucial aspects, such as strategic partners, alliances, and minilateralism. It argues that, on the one hand, there remains a continuing friction in defining the world order in bipolarity and multipolarity discourses; on the other hand, these conditions will be challenging to resonate in reality. While offering policy contours, the article concludes by advancing a strong assertion that the world order will continue to remain unipolar, constructed on the very core of established conditions such as the knowledge economy, democratic power, and values of human freedom and open dialogue for peace and stability, as well as prearranged rules that are widely inherited in a democratic culture. Moreover, the debate on defining the world order will continue to hinge on the actor who significantly possesses these qualities, values, and characteristics. However, the world order will experience the complexities of middle and small powers, finding dilemmas in their alignment and realignment between established unipolar and emerging powers. Meanwhile, Nepal, wedged between two emerging powers, China and India, and the increasing interest of world powers in the region, can no longer ignore global events and ongoing power competitions. While maturing its democratic practices, skillfully designed and carefully balanced diplomacy, and a closer look at ‘strategic hedging’ in its foreign policy, Nepal should support a rules-based international order that contributes to preserving its territorial integrity and national unity.
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47

Özoflu, Melek Aylin. "Slavkov Triangle as a Minilateral Grouping Within the European Union: A Quantitative Analysis." Köz-gazdaság 18, no. 2 (2023): 97–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.14267/retp2023.02.06.

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By taking the main aspirations of the minilateralism as a theoretical framework, this research aims to investigate the origins and prospects of the Slavkov Triangle, which was initiated as a new regional platform between Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia in 2015. The main motivation of the grouping has been to enhance the cooperation of these States in various areas, ranging from energy security, transport infrastructure, youth employment and cross-border relations to the social dimension of European integration. The regional platform was regarded as problematic as an alternative to the Visegrad cooperation, since it would imply the isolation of Hungary and Poland. Forming a response to these inquiries, this article aims to find out whether the Slavkov Triangle presents a new, sustainable and alternative central European format. In this respect, the focal point of the research is to answer the question whether the Slavkov Triangle fits theoretically to the traditional ‘minilateral’ grouping definition within the European Union (EU). To reveal whether the members of the Triangle have adopted a concrete joint position in EU decision-making, this paper examines the voting patterns of the members of the Triangle by conducting a quantitative analysis of the voting record of the members of the Triangle in the Council of the EU. The empirical analysis will show the degree to which these countries vote together as a minilateral group. The time frame is designated in two-time spans. The first time span focuses on the time between 2010 and 2015, while the second time span covers voting records from 2015 (the beginning of the initiative) until 2022 November (the most recent date of the voting data that is publicly available). This would help grasp the comparative case basis of voting records of these member states before and after the Triangle. In this way, the current study empirically contributes to the burgeoning scholarly literature on regional groupings within the EU.
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48

Leal-Arcas, Rafael, and Andrew Filis. "International Cooperation on Climate Change Mitigation: The Role of Climate Clubs." European Energy and Environmental Law Review 30, Issue 5 (2021): 195–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eelr2021020.

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We know the science of climate change; we know the economics of climate change; we also know the law of climate change. However, we do not know how countries may come together to cooperate on climatechange mitigation. One way of doing so successfully is by putting together the climate regime with the international trading system via the creation of climate clubs, namely the coalition of the willing. This article aims to explain that, by building climate clubs and making use of the international trading system, we can reach a better future for all. Through the lens of international trade, this article explores how smaller coalitions (so-called climate clubs) – unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral, rather than multilateral regimes – of states/non-state actors can catalyze or influence action on climate change. The premise of this article is that global action on climate change has not been effectively implemented, as it relies on consensus from too many actors. Thus, it proposes how international trade mechanisms may be re-oriented to address climate change. The article challenges the assumptions about the existing multilateralagreement regime, and argues that reducing dependence on these multilateral mechanisms may influence greater attainment of sustainability goals (more flexible, not reliant on difficult-to-gain consensus among many actors). The article, therefore, examines the future of international regimes and how they may contribute to climate-change mitigation. Its forwardlooking orientation – how international trade can leverage climate-change mitigation – is an important and novel contribution in examining how environmental concerns can be included into international regimes. What changes will look like and how change is attained (through policy, regulations, law, agreements, incentives) may contribute to developing global- level institutional solutions for how climate-change mitigation is framed in international regimes and discourses. The article also addresses emerging academic research into climate clubs in international climatechange mitigation institutions/regimes. The article contributes to growing discourses in global climate governance for how these arrangements and agreements should look/be designed to create real action on climate-change mitigation. Therefore, it expands on existing scholarship through taking a specific lens (international trade) and how it may contribute to mitigating climate change through coalitions (climate clubs) beyond how the existing international regime is configured. climate clubs, minilateralism, legitimacy, multilateralism, accountability, international trade
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49

Howe, Brendan. "Promoting Public Value Through International Organization." Korea Association for Public Value 5 (June 30, 2023): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.53581/jopv.2023.5.1.1.

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Purpose: This article explores the evolution of practical global governance measures aimed at promoting public values in an anarchic (in the sense of without government) international operating environment. The process of international organization has occupied a central position in the discourse, and the physical manifestations of various formal international organizations and informal institutions have provided practical experiments in policy implementation. From the starting point of the universal lowest common denominator of values generated by an overlapping consensus of competing epistemological traditions (that of avoiding interstate war), the process of international organization has gradually expanded to embrace non-traditional security public values. Middle powers have played a key role in the expansion of the global governance paradigm, and aspirations for more comprehensive public value generation. The centrality of multilateralism and the roles of middle powers have, however, increasingly come under pressure from the realities of great power contestation in the international operating environment. The relatively new “minilateral” manifestations of international organization are also demonstrated as coming up short when providing public value promotion. This article, therefore, asks and attempts to answer the central global governance question of how can public values be promoted in the international operating environment in the absence of a central governing authority?&#x0D; Method: This research project used a qualitative approach consisting of literature review and document analysis. The results of this study should be supplemented by quantitative and qualitative studies in the future. The literature review consists of a comprehensive assessment of scholarly academic publications from competing perspectives in the fields of political and moral philosophy, public administration, and international relations. The document survey is mainly related to the policy documentation output of national governments and international organizations, as well as media reports.&#x0D; Results: The research identifies how new practical challenges to established multilateral manifestations of international organization and the global normative aspirations of middle powers, as well as shortcomings of the more recent minilateral arrangements require radical out of the box thinking. Hence, new modalities and conceptualizations are proposed to address the challenges of public value provision through the process of international organization. These include non-traditional security minilaterals, regional international commissions, and a central role for the new conceptualization of “second-tier” powers.&#x0D; Conclusion: Global public values are generated at the international level, in the absence of global government, through the process of international organization. Various models of practical manifestation of the related theoretical concepts have been proposed, and have been implemented, with varying degrees of success. In a time of increased great power contestation, however, multilateral institutions and middle powers, their chief proponents, have been undermined. The proliferation of minilaterals and minilateralism has proven to be an inadequate procedural replacement. Hence the need to explore additional agencies of “disruptive innovation.”
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50

Lanko, Dmitry, Natalia Nemirova, and Дарья Зотова. "Baltic states on the way towards energy isolationism: united or divided?" Baltic Region 17, no. 1 (2025): 19–43. https://doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2025-1-2.

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The flip side of the European Union&rsquo;s policy aimed at accelerating the fourth energytransition has been energy isolationism &mdash; namely, the pursuit of quantitative indicatorscharacterising a country&rsquo;s energy balance without considering their impact on the energybalance of neighbouring countries. This article examines energy isolationism using theexample of Lithuania&rsquo;s 2022 initiative, which called on the three Baltic States to disconnect from the BRELL synchronous power grid &mdash; linking them to Russia and Belarus &mdash;before 2025. According to a plan developed in 2018, they were originally scheduled todisconnect in 2025. However, Latvia and Estonia did not support Lithuania&rsquo;s initiativeand, after negotiations lasting until mid-2023, agreed to adhere to the original timeline. The article analyses these negotiations as minilateral &mdash; multilateral discussionsinvolving a small number of participants &mdash; which differ in nature from both bilateralnegotiations and large-scale multilateral negotiations with numerous participants. Usinggame theory, the article presents a model of these negotiations. In practical terms, the&lsquo;three-player, three-option&rsquo; model explains why the failure of negotiations followed byLithuania&rsquo;s unilateral desynchronisation from BRELL was the least probable scenariofrom the outset. More broadly, the model demonstrates that no two Baltic States withsimilar negotiating positions could accept any outcome other than their most preferredone, even if accepting a different outcome would allow the third state &mdash; with a divergentnegotiating stance &mdash; to avoid its least preferred option. The article concludes that the inability of the majority to compromise with the minority prevents minilateral cooperationamong the three Baltic States from evolving to a higher level &mdash; comparable to the moreadvanced minilateral cooperation seen among the Nordic countries.
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