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1

Ferrara, Federico, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa. Mixed Electoral Systems. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403978851.

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2

S, Herron Erik, and Nishikawa Misa, eds. Mixed electoral systems: Contamination and its consequences. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

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3

Egeland, Inger Marethe. Mixed systems, different experiences: A comparative study of mixed-member electoral systems in Russia, Eastern and Central Europe. Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 2003.

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4

McAllister, Ian. Mixed member electoral system in Russia. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1999.

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5

Pogorelis, Robertas. Electoral alliances in a mixed electoral system: The case of Lithuania. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 2004.

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6

Ferrara, F., E. Herron, and M. Nishikawa. Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and its Consequences. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

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7

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context. University of Michigan Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/book.52095.

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8

Ferrara, Federico, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa. Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

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9

(Editor), Matthew Soberg Shugart, and Martin P. Wattenberg (Editor), eds. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? (Comparative Politics). Oxford University Press, USA, 2001.

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10

Tan, Alexander C., Chi Huang, Gary W. Cox, and Nathan F. Batto. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond. University of Michigan Press, 2016.

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11

Plescia, Carolina. Split-Ticket Voting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Theoretical and Methodological Investigation. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2016.

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12

Split-Ticket Voting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Theoretical and Methodological Investigation. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2016.

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13

(Editor), Matthew Soberg Shugart, and Martin P. Wattenberg (Editor), eds. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? (Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press).). Oxford University Press, USA, 2003.

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14

Mixed Rules, Mixed Strategies: Parties and Candidates in Germany's Electoral System. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2015.

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15

Riera, Pedro. Tactical Voting. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.013.55.

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This article reviews comparative research on electoral systems and voting behavior, identifying analytical gaps in the tactical voting literature. It starts by examining the core assumptions underpinning the classic approach to tactical voting. It then displays some empirical data about the estimates of this behavior reported in the literature. Contrasting experiences of theoretical and methodological issues in majoritarian and non-majoritarian systems are discussed. Focusing on some difficulties in the application of the “avoiding wasted vote” motivations under PR and mixed-member rules, the article furthers the consolidation of research on tactical voting beyond FPTP systems. The last section suggests that future scholarship in this field should move beyond the “wasted vote” approach to tactical voting and distinguish between instrumental and expressive motivations, consider the long-term consequences of tactical voting, and stress the endogenous nature of tactical voting and the role of parties and media in spreading it.
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16

Thorlakson, Lori. Multi-Level Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833505.001.0001.

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All federal systems face an internal tension between divisive and integrative political forces, striking a balance between providing local autonomy and representation on one hand and maintaining an integrated political community on the other hand. How multi-level systems strike this balance depends on the development of styles of either integrated politics, which creates a shared framework for political competition across the units of a federation, or independent politics, preserving highly autonomous arenas of political life. This book argues that the long-term development of integrated or independent styles of politics in multi-level systems can be shaped by two key elements of federal institutional design: the degree of fiscal decentralization, or how much is ‘at stake’ at each level of government, and the degree to which the allocation of policy jurisdiction creates legislative or administrative interdependence or autonomy. These elements of federal institutional design shape integrated and independent politics at the level of party organizations, party systems, and voter behaviour. This book tests these arguments using a mixed-method approach, drawing on original survey data from 250 subnational party leaders and aggregate electoral data from over 2,200 subnational elections in seven multi-level systems: Canada, the United States, Australia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain. It supplements this with configurational analysis and qualitative case studies.
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17

Langston, Joy K. Comparing the PRI Experience to Kenya and Taiwan. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190628512.003.0010.

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The final chapter applies the argument based on the Mexican experience to other authoritarian regimes with strong parties that transitioned to democracy: Kenya and Taiwan. Kenya African National Union (KANU) practically disappeared because electoral rules allowed politicians to win elections without strong labels. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang survived and returned to power after two terms out of executive power, in large part because its divisions did not lead to fragmentation and because voters continued to support the label. Thus, the work’s argument: that party leaders must learn to garner electoral victories under democratic circumstances while avoiding the pressures to fragment, holds. Federalism, the mixed-member electoral system, and generous party financing all play a role in determining how electoral competition creates winners and losers within the party organization. These institutions also reduce the impact of the electoral opening on the party’s tendency to fragment.
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18

Langston, Joy K. The Challenges of (Authoritarian) Party Survival after Democratization. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190628512.003.0005.

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After the defeat of the PRI’s presidential candidate in 2000, the party experienced several dangerous trends: politicians began to leave the party in greater numbers and the party continued to lose gubernatorial and mayoral elections where it had never been defeated. The two strongest political factions battled over the future of the party and the takeover of the national party office. Yet, the PRI did not suffer terrible fractures and voters did not desert the label. Political institutions play a critical role in explaining why the PRI survived the difficult transition to democracy. Federalism promotes strong state political arenas; thus, the party’s governors became one of the important bases of party survival. The nation’s unique set of electoral rules—the mixed electoral system, generous public funding for parties, and single-term limits—allowed the national party to remain strong, while the governors minded the municipal and state political arenas.
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19

Mares, Isabela, and Lauren E. Young. Conditionality & Coercion. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198832775.001.0001.

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In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the “wrong” way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? This book uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that clientelistic strategies must be disaggregated based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. The authors document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions, and also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians’ personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous studies have argued.
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