Journal articles: 'Mixed electoral systems'

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Blais, André, and Louis Massicotte. "Mixed electoral systems: An overview." Representation 33, no. 4 (March 1996): 115–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344899608522970.

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Thames, Frank C., and Martin S. Edwards. "Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems." Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 7 (September 2006): 905–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414005282383.

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The increasing use of mixed-member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects. Yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems, even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems. An analysis of mixed-member system policy effects is problematic, given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems. This article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems lead to differences in policy outputs. The political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality. Our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed-member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that MMP systems, which are more proportional than MMM systems, are correlated with higher levels of government spending. Thus the MMM-MMP distinction produces significant policy differences.

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Usova, V. А. "MIXED INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARISM." Вестник Пермского университета. Политология 15, no. 1 (2021): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2218-1067-2021-1-19-34.

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Over the past decade, the mixed system became the fastest growing variety of electoral systems used in elections for national legislatures. Opinions about the reasons for the popularity of mixed systems in the research literature still vary. There are no cross-national studies in political science that would link the use of a mixed independent electoral system with the consolidation of an authoritarian order. Under authoritarianism, elections perform three functions: imitation, control and signaling. These functions set the structure of incentives for choosing an electoral formula. The purpose of my study is to determine the structure of incentives for the employment of mixed independent electoral systems under conditions of electoral authoritarianism. One of the main results of the study is that, in comparison with democracies, mixed independent electoral systems are more often used in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that mixed independent electoral system provides an opportunity to effectively realize the imitation, control and signaling functions of elections under electoral authoritarianism.

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Michalak, Bartłomiej. "Mixed Electoral Systems: A Hybrid or a New Family of Electoral Systems?" World Political Science 12, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/wps-2015-0012.

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AbstractThe main research question posed in the article is whether the mixed electoral systems are separate third class of electoral systems? Although, they were primarily designed as a tool for implementing completely contradictory objectives of the majoritarian and proportional representation, as a consequence, they created fully new quality, which cannot be reduced to the sum of effects being produced by their components. Reasons for this include, among others, their genesis and political purpose (the desire to combine the best features and characteristics of the majoritarian and proportional systems into one system), mechanics (multi-formula and multiple-tiered seat allocation mechanism), multiplicity of variants and detailed technical solutions (presence or lack of mandate transfer and/or of vote transfer between majoritarian and proportional subsystems). The distinctiveness of mixed electoral systems is, however, determined primarily by self-relevant political consequences generated within strategies of nominating party candidates (the number of candidates listed within single-mandate constituencies of the majority part has a positive effect on the party’s results in proportional subsystem), electorate voting behaviors (the psychological effect is acting on voters toward honest and not strategic voting), the level of disproportionality of election results (the mixed system are in general less proportional than traditional systems of proportional representation, however, they are more proportional than the majoritarian voting systems) and the degree of party dispersion (the mixed systems are usually correlated with three-body format of the party system).

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Bochsler, Daniel. "BENDING THE RULES: ELECTORAL STRATEGIES UNDER MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS." Representation 51, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 261–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2015.1064223.

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Crisp, Brian F. "Incentives in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems." Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 12 (September 17, 2007): 1460–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007301703.

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Mixed-member systems have been characterized as encouraging politicians to balance the activities that enhance their personal reputations and those of their parties. Another literature challenges that legislators from one tier are not likely to behave differently from those of the other. After summarizing this debate, data from Venezuela are used to look for evidence supporting either side in a series of behaviors that span the entire legislative process—from bill initiation to committee consideration to final vote. The author concludes that the “best of both worlds” versus “contamination” debate has led to a focus on mixed-member institutions, to the exclusion of other incentive structures confronting legislators and that we need to engage in more careful theorizing about when and where they should expect the electoral tier to have an impact on legislator behavior.

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Norris, Pippa. "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems." International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (July 1997): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019251297018003005.

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PEKKANEN, ROBERT, BENJAMIN NYBLADE, and ELLIS S. KRAUSS. "Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan." American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (May 2006): 183–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055406062095.

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How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

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Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems." Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 9 (November 2002): 1027–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001041402237505.

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The past decade has witnessed a surprising growth in the popularity of mixed-member electoral systems. Under these systems, voters choose representatives simultaneously under both proportional representation (PR) and single-member district plurality (SMDP) rules. It is widely accepted that SMDP rules tend to winnow competition down toward two large parties, and evidence from mixed systems suggests that this Duvergerian “gravity” reduces the number of parties surviving SMDP competition under mixed systems as well. Nevertheless, we argue, simultaneous balloting under PR rules softens this winnowing effect, operating as a “centrifugal force” that prevents Duvergerian gravity from reducing competition to the degree it does under pure SMDP systems. Thus, these newsystems produce effects unanticipated by their designers. To test for the presence of this centrifugal force, we examine elite-level electoral strategies in Germany, Japan, and Italy and compare district-level SMDP election results from pure systems with those of mixed-member systems.

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Stoffel, Michael F. "MP behavior in mixed-member electoral systems." Electoral Studies 35 (September 2014): 78–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.05.003.

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Nishikawa, Misa, and Erik S. Herron. "Mixed electoral rules’ impact on party systems." Electoral Studies 23, no. 4 (December 2004): 753–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2003.10.004.

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Mudambi, Ram, and Pietro Navarra. "Electoral strategies in mixed systems of representation." European Journal of Political Economy 20, no. 1 (March 2004): 227–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.05.002.

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Dunleavy, Patrick, and Helen Margetts. "Mixed Electoral Systems in Britain and the Jenkins Commission on Electoral Reform." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1, no. 1 (April 1999): 12–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.00002.

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Bedock, Camille, and Nicolas Sauger. "ELECTORAL SYSTEMS WITH A MAJORITY BONUS AS UNCONVENTIONAL MIXED SYSTEMS." Representation 50, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 99–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902220.

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15

Stumpf, Peter Bence. "Strategic Split-Ticket Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems." International Journal of Political Activism and Engagement 7, no. 2 (April 2020): 47–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijpae.20200401.oa.

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This article aims to examine strategic split-voting in mixed systems by analyzing the results of elections in three countries using mixed electoral systems—Germany, Hungary, and Lithuania—to further improve researchers' understanding of the relationship between strategic voting and ticket splitting. This is achieved by exploring new quantitative measures. The three selected countries do not use identical electoral systems, but their common characteristic is that they provide an opportunity for voters to split their ballot between an individual candidate running in a single-member constituency and a party list. This makes it possible to compare the two different types of votes and to search for patterns indicating strategic behavior. In this article, the authors introduce two analytic tools: one for determining the approximate quantity of split ballots and another for measuring strategic voting patterns based on the concentration of split tickets.

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Massicotte, Louis, and André Blais. "Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey." Electoral Studies 18, no. 3 (September 1999): 341–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(98)00063-8.

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17

Kim, Jin-Hyuk. "A welfare simulation of mixed-member electoral systems." Public Choice 136, no. 3-4 (April 1, 2008): 447–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9305-y.

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Catalinac, Amy, and Lucia Motolinia. "Geographically Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems." World Politics 73, no. 4 (September 1, 2021): 668–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000113.

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ABSTRACTCan governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (mmm) electoral systems use geographically targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office, and if so, how? Although twenty-eight countries use mmm electoral systems, scant research has addressed this question. The authors explain how mmm’s combination of electoral systems in two unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large party and a small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both. They then explain how governing parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically targeted spending to cement it. These propositions are tested using original data from Japan (2003–2013) and Mexico (2012–2016). In both cases, municipalities in which the supporters of governing parties split their ballots as instructed were found to have received more money after elections. The findings have broad implications for research on mmm electoral systems, distributive politics, and the politics of Japan and Mexico.

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Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. "Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis." Electoral Studies 23, no. 4 (December 2004): 575–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(03)00056-8.

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Vengroff, Richard, Lucy Creevey, and Henry Krisch. "Electoral System Effects on Gender Representation: The Case of Mixed Systems." Japanese Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (November 2000): 197–227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109900002024.

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Electoral systems as endogenous re-distributive institutions (Tsebelis, 1990) help to define the rules of the game. In this manner they have an important impact among regional, class, ethnic, gender, and other sub-groups of the general population on the distribution and variation in outcome of who is nominated for, and elected to, national office. In particular, there is a well-established and growing literature on the impact of electoral systems and electoral system reform on the representation of women in national legislative bodies (Darcy, Welch, and Clarke 1994; Matland and Taylor 1997; Caul 1998; Rule 1987; Matland 1998). In general, these studies have concluded that more women are elected in proportional rather than in plurality or majority electoral systems. However, a major difficulty in interpreting these findings is created by the historical, cultural, economic, and institutional differences among cases chosen for comparison.

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KULAS, Bartłomiej. "REVIEW OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 2020." Revista Română de Geografie Politică 22, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 71–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.30892/rrgp.222103-343.

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A large number of different electoral systems operate in the world in 2020. The main types of electoral systems are majoritarian, mixed and proportional, but the division is imperfect. In the group of countries using the FPTP system, a political scene with two parties is most often created, similar to the Alternative Vote. The situation is different in the STV, Mixed-Member Proportional and Parallel systems, where different party systems can arise. Pure multiparty is most often achieved in the List Proportional system. The comparison of the electoral systems proves that even within the same group, the party system can be significantly differentiated due to the essential details of electoral law, the population of the state, and even the degree of maturity of its democracy.

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Shugart, Matthew Soberg. "Electoral “efficiency” and the move to mixed-member systems." Electoral Studies 20, no. 2 (June 2001): 173–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(00)00007-x.

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King, Loren. "Hopeful Losers? A Moral Case for Mixed Electoral Systems." Les ateliers de l'éthique 10, no. 2 (February 29, 2016): 107–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1035330ar.

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Liberal democracies encourage citizen participation and protect our freedoms, yet these regimes elect politicians and decide important issues with electoral and legislative systems that are less inclusive than other arrangements. Some citizens inevitably have more influence than others. Is this a problem? Yes, because similarly just but more inclusive systems are possible. Political theorists and philosophers should be arguing for particular institutional forms, with particular geographies, consistent with justice.

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Johnston, Ron. "Mixed‐Member electoral systems: The best of both worlds?" Representation 38, no. 4 (January 2002): 357–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344890208523202.

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Umeda, Michio. "District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties." Japanese Journal of Political Science 22, no. 2 (May 18, 2021): 57–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109921000074.

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AbstractThis paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

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Khudoley, D. M., and K. M. Khudoley. "FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ELECTORAL LAW AS IMPLEMENTED IN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS." Вестник Пермского университета. Юридические науки, no. 49 (2020): 442–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/1995-4190-2020-49-442-475.

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Introduction: the article analyzes the fundamental principles of electoral law and how they are implemented in various electoral systems. Purpose: to identify the objective criteria a democratic electoral system must meet. Methods: along with general scientific methods, there have been used specific scientific methods, including comparative legal and systemic ones. Results: there have been identified three principles of electoral law that can be recognized as fundamental: the principles of equal, free, and fair election. They mutually presuppose, guarantee, and supplement each other. Moreover, provisions of one principle can be corrected by provisions of the others. Thus, the principles of equal, free and fair election form an integral sustainable system whose elements are in a dialectical unity. These principles cover all the subjects of electoral law and electoral process and they must be followed at each stage of elections. Furthermore, they are complex and include provisions of a number of secondary principles (the principles of universal, equal, direct suffrage in a secret ballot, etc.). Conclusions: the above principles are implemented to the greatest extent in ranked voting. Some ranked voting systems ensure proportional representation of parties. Elections held based on such voting assure free and equal participation of both independent and party candidates. Many other majoritarian, proportional or mixed-member electoral systems do not meet the abovementioned criteria.

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VINNYK, Ivan. "Legal aspects of formation and development of electoral systems in Ukraine." Economics. Finances. Law, no. 1/2 (January 31, 2020): 6–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.37634/efp.2020.1(2).1.

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Introduction. The history of the Ukrainian Parliament functioning counts many electoral systems. The constant change of one kind or another was supposed to eliminate the shortcomings that were revealed during the preparation and carrying out the last elections. For a long time elections were holding under a mixed electoral system, but the combination of proportional and majoritarian components in it did not allow to provide the real expression of the citizens’ will and the effective parliament functioning. Therefore the legislator has been tasked with introducing a more optimal voting model. The result in this area was the adoption the Electoral Code of Ukraine in 2019. The purpose of the paper is to identify the main disadvantages of a mixed electoral system. to carry out the comparative analysis of the activity of deputies, which elected by different components of the mixed electoral system, to investigate the key points of the Electoral Code of Ukraine that will form the basis of legal regulation of the preparation and holding the elections to the Ukrainian Parliament and to compare them with the previous electoral system features. Results. Despite the combination of proportional and majoritarian electoral systems, theirinherent negative features remained relevant. We are talking about the lack of opportunity to select specific candidates from the electoral lists of parties, whose votes were not supported by another candidate in the single-member district etc. At the same time there was a pronounced preference for the proportional system over the majority one, because thanks to the popularity of the political party candidates could obtain a mandate without “special” effort. It is determined, that the points of the new Electoral Code of Ukraine provide the introduction of a new electoral system that will allow citizens to independently determine the priority of a candidate on the list during the distribution of mandates. At the same time the analysis of the Electoral Code shows that in some cases it will still be possible to keep "closed" lists. Conclusion. The Electoral Code of Ukraine, approved by the People's Deputies, is another testimony to the prudence of their political will and readiness to take into account the demands of society. During the analysis of the codified act it was found out that it will promote the political will of the citizens in the elections and ensure the efficiency of the deputies themselves.

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Kubo, Hiroki. "The logic of delegation and institutional contexts: Ministerial selection under mixed-member systems in Japan." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4, no. 4 (December 9, 2018): 303–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891118811686.

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How do electoral systems and legislative institutions modify the logic of delegation in ministerial selection processes? This study argues that candidate-centered electoral systems and bicameralism increase the risk of agency loss. I reveal how these two institutional contexts mediate party leaders’ strategies on the allocation of ministerial posts by analyzing Japan’s ministerial-selection data and survey-based ideal point estimates from 2003 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that, under the party-centered electoral systems of the lower house, individuals’ ideological proximity to the party leadership increases the probability of their joining a cabinet. However, party leaders allocate cabinet posts to ideological outliers in the upper house and also select MPs who are ideologically distant from the party leadership under the candidate-centered electoral systems in order to maintain party unity.

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Rich, Timothy S. "COATTAILS AND MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN'S 2016 ELECTION." Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (January 9, 2018): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2017.25.

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AbstractTo what extent do presidential candidates influence voting in mixed member legislative elections? A sizable literature addresses presidential–legislative coattail effects in the American context, with less attention given to this interaction in non-Western democracies. Nor is the role of past voting behavior adequately assessed in the literature. Taiwan's historic 2016 election allows for an analysis of the extent in which the popularity of presidential candidates influences coattail voting in the more complex electoral environment of two-vote mixed legislative systems. Evidence finds that, controlling for partisanship and previous voting behavior, voters who supported a presidential candidate were more likely to also support the party's legislative candidates, although this influence is stronger in regards to Democratic Progressive Party's Tsai Ing-wen.

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Linhart, Eric, Johannes Raabe, and Patrick Statsch. "Mixed-member proportional electoral systems – the best of both worlds?" Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 29, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 21–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2018.1443464.

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Coffé, Hilde, and Louise K. Davidson-Schmich. "The gendered political ambition cycle in mixed-member electoral systems." European Journal of Politics and Gender 3, no. 1 (February 1, 2020): 79–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251510819x15705394695400.

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This article introduces a theoretical model that shows how four mechanisms (work–life balance, psychological, gatekeeper bias and diversity mechanisms) explain why pursuing a nomination as list Members of Parliament is the more attractive option for women in mixed-member electoral systems. It also demonstrates how women’s resulting greater likelihood of being list Members of Parliament creates what we call a gendered cycle, further reducing women’s interest in the single-member district tier. To empirically test our model, we present quantitative data for the case of New Zealand and Germany, as well as qualitative interview data collected from members of German parties’ women’s auxiliary organisations.

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Lundberg, Thomas Carl. "POST‐COMMUNISM AND THE ABANDONMENT OF MIXED‐MEMBER ELECTORAL SYSTEMS." Representation 45, no. 1 (April 2009): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344890802709831.

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Никитенко and Aleksey Nikitenko. "FEATURES OF MODERN ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (ON THE EXAMPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY)." Central Russian Journal of Social Sciences 10, no. 5 (October 20, 2015): 50–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/14294.

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The article is devoted to comparative analysis of electoral systems in leading Western European countries: Great Britain, France and Germany. The author examines different electoral systems existing in world-wide practice, points out that their existence in pure form is limited by only few countries; at the same time the states use mixed, “combined” models of electoral systems, introducing new particular and specified elements. Particular attention is paid to studying of modern normative legal documents of electoral systems. Key reforms and trends in national legislations of modern period are analyzed; strengths and weaknesses of each system are mentioned. The author came to the conclusion that it is possible to apply best practices of the European electoral technologies for Russian electoral system and social and political life of the Russian society.

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Djukanovic, Dragan. "Electoral systems in the countries created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." Medjunarodni problemi 58, no. 4 (2006): 513–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp0604513d.

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The author explores the genesis and development of electoral systems in the states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The paper does a comparative analysis of the most significant components and characteristics of the electoral systems in the South Slavic states - the highest averages methods, forms of candidature, modes of voting, levels of electoral constituency, methods of translating votes into seats and levels of a qualified suffrage. It also deals with the effects of implementation of the majority, mixed and proportional electoral systems in the mentioned group of countries during the last decade, particularly considering the representation of minority ethnic communities in their supreme legislative bodies.

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Jastramskis, Mažvydas. "Effects of the Mixed Parallel Electoral System in Lithuania: The Worst of All Worlds?" Parliamentary Affairs 72, no. 3 (August 29, 2018): 561–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy030.

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Abstract This article analyses the political effects of the mixed parallel electoral system in Lithuania. According to the ‘best of both worlds’ logic, mixed systems could combine advantages from both the majoritarian and proportional formulas. However, counterarguments were also presented in the literature, pointing to the possibility of the ‘worst of both worlds’. According to presented analysis of Lithuanian parliamentary elections between 1992 and 2016, the pessimistic scenario is expected when a mixed parallel electoral system is used in a new democracy with a weakly institutionalised party system and high volatility. Lithuania’s mixed parallel system produces relatively disproportional election results. However, it also facilitates the fragmentation of party system. Moreover, the effects in a concrete election are hardly predictable, especially the seat bonus of election winner. Evidence in the article points to a conclusion that mixed parallel electoral systems could contribute to the ‘worst of all worlds’ and new democracies should avoid them.

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Cunial, Nicolas Alejandro, and Raffaele Terreo. "I sistemi elettorali nelle regioni a statuto ordinario." Quaderni dell'Osservatorio elettorale. QOE - IJES 75, no. 1 (June 30, 2016): 85–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-9275.

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The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: what are the regional electoral systems in Italy now? After sixteen years of «electoral federalism», the electoral systems used to elect the President and the Regional Council have suffered more than a simple change over the years. Seven indicators are used to compare and contrast each of the systems: the broad family of systems it belongs to (majoritarian; proportional; mixed); the electoral constituencies; the structure of the electoral formula(s); the «second best candidate» clause; the majority prize; the electoral thresholds; the modes of vote's expression. Even though the goals that electoral reforms have set twenty years ago are still valid today – a higher bipolarity degree in the competition; high stability of the regional government; lower party fragmentation – a real progress has not been made towards these matters. The overview that emerges is clear: regions are adopting electoral systems that are more similar with respect to some indicators, and completely different with respect to others. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to clarify how current electoral rules work in the Italian regions, and to highlight the trends of electoral reforms.

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Calabrò, Marco. "Sistemi elettorali e comportamento di voto: una comparazione fra Germania e Nuova Zelanda." Quaderni dell Osservatorio elettorale QOE - IJES 69, no. 1 (June 30, 2013): 63–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-9513.

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The article analyses the impact of mixed-member proportional electoral systems (MMP) on the party systems and electoral behaviors in Germany and New Zealand. The MMP grants proportional representation while reducing party fragmentation. The latter effect is stronger in Germany than in New Zealand, due to a difference in the electoral thresholds. Mixed member systems that allow citizens to cast two ballots for two different competitive arenas are much interesting for analyzing the impact of electoral systems on electoral behaviors. A voter can choose to split her vote, thus supporting a party in the multimember constituency and the candidate of another party in the single-mandate constituency. MMP is not theoretically supposed to strongly favor such choice. Yet, in the two countries many citizens split their votes; thus, in single-mandate constituencies votes typically concentrate on fewer candidates than in the proportional arena. This seems to be particularly the case in New Zealand. Voters act strategically while splitting their vote. There are evidences that this can be due both to a seat maximizing and to a localistic logic. Evidences are stronger for the latter.

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Maeda, Ko. "Voter turnout and district-level competitiveness in mixed-member electoral systems." Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 26, no. 4 (May 30, 2016): 452–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2016.1189919.

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Bernauer, Julian, and Simon Munzert. "LOYAL TO THE GAME? STRATEGIC POLICY REPRESENTATION IN MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS." Representation 50, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2014.902221.

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Barker, Fiona, and Hilde Coffé. "Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems: The Case of New Zealand." Parliamentary Affairs 71, no. 3 (December 28, 2017): 603–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx073.

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Alfano, Maria Rosaria, Anna Laura Baraldi, and Erasmo Papagni. "Effect of the proportionality degree of electoral systems on corruption." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 34, no. 8 (July 26, 2016): 1895–916. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263774x16642771.

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This work makes two major innovations within the empirical literature on the effect of electoral systems on corruption. First, in order to distinguish electoral systems, we propose to measure their degree of proportionality, instead of using dummy variables. A measure of the proportionality degree seems the appropriate way to identify electoral systems in an empirical setting because it allows all their variants to be considered. Second, alongside a parametric panel data approach, we provide a new (in this field) semi-parametric technique to estimate a non-linear relationship between the proportionality degree of electoral systems and corruption. Our results show that, when we increase plurality elements into proportional, both voters’ and opponents’ monitoring power induce politicians to avoid corrupt behaviour. But it is beneficial only up to certain proportionality degrees, after which this effect stops. Moreover, data show that the ‘best’ range of proportionality degrees is most likely found under mixed electoral rules. For governors the choice of the proportionality degree therefore becomes fundamental.

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Piattoni, Simona, and Matteo Fabio Nels Giglioli. "Does Changing Electoral Systems Affect (Corrupt) Particularistic Exchanges? Evidence from the Italian Case." Politics and Governance 8, no. 2 (May 28, 2020): 78–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2913.

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The literature on forms of particularism explores the impact of institutional variables on what is denoted, alternatively, as constituency service, pork-barrel politics, or corruption. Attention has mostly been given to electoral systems, but other institutional provisions and political factors, such as party strength, are also relevant. The present contribution investigates the likely effects of electoral reforms on corruption control and seeks confirmation of the hypothesis that single member plurality (even within mixed member) systems are conducive to a type of particularism that might help fight corruption, taking Italy as a case. We test the impact of two electoral reforms and three electoral systems enacted in Italy between 1996 and 2016, whose primary aim was bolstering enfeebled party leaderships and facilitating the formation of durable governments, and we compare the effort at corruption control of the Italian governments born under these different electoral systems with those of other European democracies.

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YU, CHING-HSIN, ERIC CHEN-HUA YU, and KAORI SHOJI. "Innovations of Candidate Selection Methods: Polling Primary and Kobo under the New Electoral Rules in Taiwan and Japan." Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 4 (November 5, 2014): 635–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109914000280.

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AbstractThis paper explores the linkage between electoral systems and candidate selection methods (CSMs) by analyzing two innovations of CSMs in Taiwan and Japan: polling primary and kobo, respectively. With an assumption that parties’ CSMs reflect their strategies to win elections, this article offers the rationale behind why and how major parties in Taiwan and Japan adjusted their CSMs to meet the challenges posed by the transition of electoral rules in each country from single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems to mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. We argue that a party's choice of CSMs reflects its rationale for maximizing the prospects of winning under the given electoral rule, which counters the ‘no-finding’ conclusion in some previous large-N studies on the linkage between electoral systems and choices of CSMs. Additionally, our findings highlight the importance of institutional factors, such as electoral systems, in explaining CSM reforms in a comparative perspective.

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Clark, Terry D., and Jill N. Wittrock. "Presidentialism and the Effect of Electoral Law in Postcommunist Systems." Comparative Political Studies 38, no. 2 (March 2005): 171–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414004271076.

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Efforts to test Duverger’s law in the new democracies of postcommunist Europe have had mixed results. Research argues that mixed systems have an effect on the number of effective parties that is distinct from that of single-mandate district and proportional representation systems. Less attention has been given to the effect of other institutions on the party system, particularly strong presidents. Analyzing election results in postcommunist Europe, the authors find support for Duverger’s law after controlling for the strength of the executive. They argue that strong presidents substantially reduce the incentive for parties to seize control of the legislative agenda. Hence, the restraint that electoral systems exercise on the proliferation of parties and independent candidates is weakened. The authors find that a further consequence of strong presidents is that the incentive for majority control of committees and the legislative agenda is weakened.

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Golosov, Grigorii V. "Party nationalization and the translation of votes into seats under single-member plurality electoral rules." Party Politics 24, no. 2 (April 12, 2016): 118–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816642808.

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This study uses empirical evidence from a nearly comprehensive set of electoral democracies that use single-member plurality systems or mixed electoral systems with single-member plurality components in order to establish empirically the impact of territorial patterns of electoral support upon vote-to-seat conversion. The analysis, employing individual parties as units of analysis and multiple linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors as its main methodological tool, confirms the hypothesis that single-member plurality rules give a representational bonus to parties with low levels of nationalization. This effect is contingent upon absolute and relative party size, so that very large parties, and particularly frontrunners in party competition, receive an advantage irrespective of their nationalization. Mixed electoral rules further facilitate their advantage, while the gains of very small parties tend to be enhanced by large assembly size. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of party system development under Duvergerian conditions.

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JUN, HAE-WON, and SIMON HIX. "Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System." Japanese Journal of Political Science 11, no. 2 (July 2, 2010): 153–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109910000058.

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AbstractA growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

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Martínez i Coma, Ferran, and Ignacio Lago. "Gerrymandering in comparative perspective." Party Politics 24, no. 2 (April 12, 2016): 99–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816642806.

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Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project, we measure the level of gerrymandering according to country expert surveys in Lower House elections in 54 democracies from the second half of 2012 until the first half of 2015. We show that majoritarian systems are more prone to gerrymandering than mixed-member and above all in Proportional Representation (PR) systems. When majoritarian systems are employed in large countries, gerrymandering is exacerbated. Per capita GDP and the age of electoral systems do not significantly affect gerrymandering.

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Bochsler, Daniel. "A quasi-proportional electoral system ‘only for honest men’? The hidden potential for manipulating mixed compensatory electoral systems." International Political Science Review 33, no. 4 (April 13, 2012): 401–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512111420770.

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MOSER, ROBERT G., and ETHAN SCHEINER. "Strategic Ticket Splitting and the Personal Vote in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems." Legislative Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (May 2005): 259–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298005x201545.

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Herron, Erik S., and Misa Nishikawa. "Contamination effects and the number of parties in mixed-superposition electoral systems." Electoral Studies 20, no. 1 (March 2001): 63–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0261-3794(00)00002-0.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Mixed electoral systems'

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