Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Modularity of mind / Journal articles

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Modularity of mind.

Journal articles on the topic 'Modularity of mind'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 29 January 2023

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Modularity of mind.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Palecek, Martin. "Modularity of Mind." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47, no. 2 (2016): 132–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672833.

Full text

Abstract:

This article evaluates the idea of the modularity of mind and domain specificity. This concept has penetrated the behavioral disciplines, and in the case of some of these—for example, the cognitive study of religion—has even formed their foundation. Although the theoretical debate relating to the idea of modularity is ongoing, this debate has not been reflected in the use of modularity in behavioral research. The idea of domain specificity or modularity of mind is not without its controversies, and there is no consensus regarding its acceptance. Many neuroscientists, as well as several evoluti

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Cummins, Robert, and Jerry Fodor. "The Modularity of Mind." Philosophical Review 94, no. 1 (1985): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2184717.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

BENNETT, LAURA J. "Modularity of Mind Revisited." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41, no. 3 (1990): 429–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/41.3.429.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Johnson-Laird, P. N. "Modularity of brain and mind." Nature 318, no. 6042 (1985): 115–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/318115a0.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Kurzban, Robert, and C. Athena Aktipis. "Modularity and the Social Mind." Personality and Social Psychology Review 11, no. 2 (2007): 131–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868306294906.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson. "Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind‐reading." Mind & Language 17, no. 1‐2 (2002): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00186.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Chiao, Joan Y., and Mary Helen Immordino-Yang. "Modularity and the Cultural Mind." Perspectives on Psychological Science 8, no. 1 (2013): 56–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691612469032.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Fodor, Jerry A. "Précis of The Modularity of Mind." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8, no. 1 (1985): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x0001921x.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThe Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily se

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

ALBajjari, Ismael F. Hussain. "A Cognitive-Functionalist Interpretation of Modularity." Journal of Tikrit University for Humanities 27, no. 2 (2020): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/jtuh.27.2.2020.23.

Full text

Abstract:

Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in philosophy, psychology, and especially, in the cognitive sciences since the early 1980s, due to the publication of Fodor's ground-breaking book The Modularity of Mind (1983). However, in most cases of such modular views of the mind, misunderstandings have impeded an access to a more conceptually plausible account of modularity; a case that concerns us most here. This paper identifies the most striking arguments in the relevant literature, with special attention on the modularity argument proclaimed by J. Fodor (1983) that has been either lim

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Scholl, Brian J., and Alan M. Leslie. "Modularity, Development and 'Theory of Mind'." Mind and Language 14, no. 1 (1999): 131–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00106.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Olsson, Erik J. "Coherence and the modularity of mind." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75, no. 3 (1997): 404–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409712347991.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

SHANON, BENNY. "Remarks on the Modularity of Mind." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 3 (1988): 331–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/39.3.331.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Carruthers, Peter. "Moderately Massive Modularity." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 (September 2003): 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008274.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind's structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Zerilli, John. "Neural Reuse and the Modularity of Mind: Where to Next for Modularity?" Biological Theory 14, no. 1 (2018): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13752-018-0309-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Pietraszewski, David, and Annie E. Wertz. "Why Evolutionary Psychology Should Abandon Modularity." Perspectives on Psychological Science 17, no. 2 (2021): 465–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691621997113.

Full text

Abstract:

A debate surrounding modularity—the notion that the mind may be exclusively composed of distinct systems or modules—has held philosophers and psychologists captive for nearly 40 years. Concern about this thesis—which has come to be known as the massive modularity debate—serves as the primary grounds for skepticism of evolutionary psychology’s claims about the mind. In this article we argue that the entirety of this debate, and the very notion of massive modularity itself, is ill-posed and confused. In particular, it is based on a confusion about the level of analysis (or reduction) at which on

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Adams, Marcus P. "Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder." Philosophy of Science 78, no. 5 (2011): 763–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/662269.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Evans, Jonathan St B. T., and David E. Over. "Whole mind theory: Massive modularity meets dual processes." Thinking & Reasoning 14, no. 2 (2008): 200–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780701652563.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Wilson, Robert A. "What Computations (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 30 (2004): 407–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10717612.

Full text

Abstract:

Jerry Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way (2000; hereafter Mind) purports to do a number of things. To name three: First, it aims to show what is problematic about recent evolutionary psychology, especially as popularized in Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works (1997). Fodor's particular target here is the rose-coloured view of evolutionary psychology as offering a “new synthesis” in integrating computational psychology with evolutionary theory. Second, Fodor's book poses a series of related, in-principle problems for any cognitive theory that revolve around the putative tension between the l

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Pléh, Csaba. "Modularity and pragmatics." Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) 10, no. 4 (2000): 415–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/prag.10.4.04ple.

Full text

Abstract:

The modular approach to language in its career of 30 years had alternating and rivaling views regarding the place of pragmatics. A first approach basically is the one outlined by Fodor (1983) that would pack pragmatic aspects of language use under the rubric of the mushy General Problem Solver component of the architecture, thus extracting it from considerations of modularity altogether. The rival Massive Modular approaches such as Dan Sperber’s would be willing to treat pragmatic aspects as one crucial module as part of a general architecture with modularity all over the place. The paper afte

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

M., D. W., and Jerry A. Fodor. "The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology." American Journal of Psychology 99, no. 3 (1986): 435. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1422496.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Scher, J. Steven. "A Lego Model of the Modularity of the Mind." Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 2, no. 3 (2004): 249–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/jcep.2.2004.3-4.5.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Garlock, Victoria M., Elaina M. Frieda, Neil Smith, and Ianthi-Maria Tsimpli. "The Mind of a Savant: Language Learning and Modularity." Language 73, no. 4 (1997): 849. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/417333.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Currie, Gregory, and Kim Sterelny. "How to think about the Modularity of Mind-Reading." Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 199 (2000): 145–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00176.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Keane, Brian. "Contour interpolation: A case study in Modularity of Mind." Journal of Vision 17, no. 10 (2017): 1366. http://dx.doi.org/10.1167/17.10.1366.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Capone, Alessandro. "The pragmatics of quotation, explicatures and modularity of mind." Pragmatics and Society 4, no. 3 (2013): 259–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ps.4.3.01cap.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper presents a purely pragmatic account of quotation which, it is argued, will be able to accommodate all relevant linguistic phenomena. Given that it is more parsimonious to explain the data by reference to pragmatic principles only than to explain them by reference to both pragmatic and semantic principles, as is common in the literature, I conclude that the account of quotation I present is to be preferred to the more standard accounts (including the alternative theories of quotation, discussed here).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Keane, Brian P. "Contour interpolation: A case study in Modularity of Mind." Cognition 174 (May 2018): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.01.008.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Fromkin, Victoria A. "The mind of a Savant: Language learning and modularity." Lingua 99, no. 4 (1996): 263–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0024-3841(96)84202-1.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Harley, Heidi, and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. "Innateness, abstract names, and syntactic cues in How Children Learn the Meanings of Words." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 6 (2001): 1107–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x01260130.

Full text

Abstract:

Bloom masterfully captures the state-of-the-art in the study of lexical acquisition. He also exposes the extent of our ignorance about the learning of names for non-observables. HCLMW adopts an innatist position without adopting modularity of mind; however, it seems likely that modularity is needed to bridge the gap between object names and the rest of the lexicon.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Truscott, John. "Modularity, working memory, and second language acquisition: A research program." Second Language Research 33, no. 3 (2017): 313–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0267658317696127.

Full text

Abstract:

Considerable reason exists to view the mind, and language within it, as modular, and this view has an important place in research and theory in second language acquisition (SLA) and beyond. But it has had very little impact on the study of working memory and its role in SLA. This article considers the need for modular study of working memory, looking at the state of common approaches to the subject and the evidence for modularity, and then considering what working memory should look like in a modular mind. It then sketches a research program to explore working memory within a modular mind and

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Capone, Alessandro. "The Attributive/Referential Distinction, Pragmatics, Modularity of Mind and Modularization." Australian Journal of Linguistics 31, no. 2 (2011): 153–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07268602.2011.560827.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Hodges, John R., Karalyn Patterson, and Lorraine K. Tyler. "Loss of semantic memory: implications for the modularity of mind." Cognitive Neuropsychology 11, no. 5 (1994): 505–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02643299408251984.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Hodges, J. R. "Loss of semantic memory: implications for the modularity of mind." Neurocase 1, no. 1 (1995): 39h—54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/neucas/1.1.39-h.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Kurzban, Robert. "Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition." Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 11, no. 2 (2008): 303–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jlin.2001.11.2.303.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Hildebrandt, Helmut. "Organology and modularity: One picture of the mind or two?" Philosophical Psychology 7, no. 1 (1994): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089408573108.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Atran, Scott. "A metamodule for conceptual integration: Language or theory of mind?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, no. 6 (2002): 674–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x02220129.

Full text

Abstract:

Those who assume domain specificity or conceptual modularity face Fodor’ Paradox (the problem of “combinatorial explosion”). One strategy involves postulating a metamodule that evolved to take as input the output of all other specialized conceptual modules, then integrates these outputs into cross-domain thoughts. It’ difficult to see whether this proposed metamodular capacity stems from language or theory of mind.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Griffiths, Max Skipper. "Review of Carruthers’ Massive Modularity Thesis." Perspectives 6, no. 1 (2016): 36–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pipjp-2016-0005.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract According to Carruthers’ (2006) massive modularity (MM) thesis, the central systems of the mind are widely encapsulated and operate via heuristics and approximation techniques similar to those found in computer science. It follows from this, he claims, that widely encapsulated central systems are feasibly tractable. I argue that insofar as Carruthers uses this weakened definition of encapsulation, his thesis faces a dilemma: either is a misnomer (Prinz, 2006) and therefore unrecognisable as a version of MM, or it isn’t, and must put forward a convincing version of MM (Samuels, 2006).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Geary, David C., and Kelly J. Huffman. "Brain and cognitive evolution: Forms of modularity and functions of mind." Psychological Bulletin 128, no. 5 (2002): 667–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.5.667.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Greve, Werner. "Book Review: Unity and Modularity in the Mind and the Self." International Journal of Behavioral Development 26, no. 4 (2002): 382–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01650250143000238.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Schiff, Nicholas, Urs Ribary, Fred Plum, and Rodolfo Llinás. "Words without Mind." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 11, no. 6 (1999): 650–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/089892999563715.

Full text

Abstract:

A woman (LR), unconscious for 20 years, spontaneously produces infrequent, isolated words unrelated to any environmental context. Fluorodeoxy-glucose-positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) imaging coregistered with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) revealed a mean brain metabolism equivalent to deep anesthesia. Nevertheless, PET imaging demonstrated islands of modestly higher metabolism that included Broca's and Wernicke's areas. Functional brain imaging with magnetoencephalographic (MEG) imaging, a technique providing a temporal resolution of better than 1 msec, identified preserved dynamic pa

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Kiianlinna, Onerva. "Contradiction That Never Was: Epigenesis versus Modularity in Evolutionary Aesthetics." Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell’estetico 14, no. 2 (2022): 79–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/aisthesis-13054.

Full text

Abstract:

Coevolutionary aesthetics has been forming since the early 2010s. Its contribution of great value has been the inclusion of cultural evolution into Darwinian theories on the origins of art and aesthetic judgement. Coevolutionary aesthetics – or non-modular evolutionary aesthetics as it is sometimes called – emphasizes that aesthetic behavior develops in a specific social environment. Coevolutionary aesthetics suggests that traditional evolutionary aesthetics, drawing from evolutionary psychology, has ignored this. The critical position stems from the widely accepted notions that humans adapt p

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Shettleworth, Sara J. "Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 367, no. 1603 (2012): 2794–802. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0211.

Full text

Abstract:

Darwin's claim ‘that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals … is certainly one of degree and not of kind’ is at the core of the comparative study of cognition. Recent research provides unprecedented support for Darwin's claim as well as new reasons to question it, stimulating new theories of human cognitive uniqueness. This article compares and evaluates approaches to such theories. Some prominent theories propose sweeping domain-general characterizations of the difference in cognitive capabilities and/or mechanisms between adult humans and other animals. Dual-process theori

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Capone, Alessando. "What Can Modularity of Mind Tell Us about the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate?" Australian Journal of Linguistics 30, no. 4 (2010): 497–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07268602.2010.522971.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Anselme, Patrick. "Modularity of mind and the role of incentive motivation in representing novelty." Animal Cognition 15, no. 4 (2012): 443–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10071-012-0499-5.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Karmiloff-Smith, Annette. "Précis ofBeyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, no. 4 (1994): 693–707. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00036621.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractBeyond modularityattempts a synthesis of Fodor's anticonstructivist nativism and Piaget's antinativist constructivism. Contra Fodor, I argue that: (1) the study of cognitive development is essential to cognitive science, (2) the module/central processing dichotomy is too rigid, and (3) the mind does not begin with prespecified modules; rather, development involves a gradual process of “modularization.” Contra Piaget, I argue that: (1) development rarely involves stagelike domain-general change and (2) domainspecific predispositions give development a small but significant kickstart by

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Van Eyghen, Hans. "What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey." Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 3 (2018): 387–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01503007.

Full text

Abstract:

I use three ideas from philosopher John Dewey that are of service for Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). I discuss how Dewey’s ideas on embodied cognition, embedded cognition can be put to work to get a fuller understanding of religious cognition. I also use his ideas to criticize CSR’s reliance on the modularity of mind thesis

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Burzio, Luigi. "English stress, vowel length and modularity." Journal of Linguistics 29, no. 2 (1993): 359–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022226700000360.

Full text

Abstract:

The evolution of phonological theory over the past fifteen years or so mirrors in important respects that of syntactic theory. The common evolutionary characteristic is the emergence of modularity. As is frequently noted following Chomsky (1986: ch. 3), in syntax, rich systems of rules have been supplanted by a relatively small number of discrete sub-theories, such as the theories of thematic relations, Case, Binding, Government, and the theory of empty categories. Characteristically, each sub-theory regulates one specific aspect of syntactic structure, at one or more levels of representation,

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Schwartz, Bonnie D. "LET'S MAKE UP YOUR MIND." Studies in Second Language Acquisition 21, no. 4 (1999): 635–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0272263199004052.

Full text

Abstract:

This essay defends the idea that language is a unique, genetically underwritten (informationally encapsulated) “module of the mind” and considers some consequences such a stance holds for the psycholinguistic study of nonnative language (L2) acquisition. As is well known, language as conceived within the tradition of generative grammar (e.g., Chomsky, 1965, 1975, 1980, 1986) is unlike other types of cognition and its basis (viz., Universal Grammar) is innately given; this is the position I support in this paper. Specifically, I begin by summarizing the main arguments for this position, after w

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Yim, Yin Bae. "The Analysis of Storytelling Experiential Exhibition use a Theory Modularity of the Mind." KOREA SCIENCE & ART FORUM 4 (December 31, 2008): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.17548/ksaf.2008.12.4.119.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Wagner, Wolfgang, and Günther P. Wagner. "Examining the Modularity Concept in Evolutionary Psychology: The Level of Genes, Mind, and Culture." Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1, no. 3 (2003): 135–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/jcep.1.2003.3-4.1.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

CARRUTHERS, PETER. "Précis of The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought." Mind & Language 23, no. 3 (2008): 257–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00340.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!