Academic literature on the topic 'Monetary and Fiscal Policy'
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Journal articles on the topic "Monetary and Fiscal Policy"
Yunanto, Muhamad, and Henny Medyawati. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy: Sensitivity Analysis." International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 6, no. 2 (April 2015): 79–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.7763/ijtef.2015.v6.447.
Full textMochtar, Firman. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction : Evidences and Implication for Inflation Targeting in Indonesia." Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan 7, no. 3 (May 20, 2005): 359–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v7i3.114.
Full textEromosele, Harrison Ogbeide, and David Umoru. "DO FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES COOPERATE OR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER IN NIGERIAN ECONOMY?" SRIWIJAYA INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DYNAMIC ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 3, no. 1 (March 26, 2019): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.29259/sijdeb.v3i1.15-30.
Full textJevđović, Gordana, and Ivan Milenković. "MONETARY VERSUS FISCAL DOMINANCE IN EMERGING EUROPEAN ECONOMIES." Facta Universitatis, Series: Economics and Organization, no. 1 (September 26, 2018): 125. http://dx.doi.org/10.22190/fueo1802125j.
Full textMcMillin, W. Douglas, and Douglas Fisher. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy." Southern Economic Journal 55, no. 4 (April 1989): 1071. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1059500.
Full textDavig, Troy, and Eric M. Leeper. "Monetary–fiscal policy interactions and fiscal stimulus." European Economic Review 55, no. 2 (February 2011): 211–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.04.004.
Full textBRANCH, WILLIAM A., TROY DAVIG, and BRUCE McGOUGH. "Monetary–Fiscal Policy Interactions under Implementable Monetary Policy Rules." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40, no. 5 (August 2008): 1095–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00149.x.
Full textOtsubo, Kansho Piotr. "The Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan: What Combination of Policies Should Be Used?" Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy 09, no. 01n02 (February 2018): 1850004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793993318500047.
Full textAdam, Klaus, and Roberto M. Billi. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy." Journal of Monetary Economics 55, no. 8 (November 2008): 1376–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2008.09.003.
Full textCHUNG, HESS, TROY DAVIG, and ERIC M. LEEPER. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39, no. 4 (June 2007): 809–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00047.x.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Monetary and Fiscal Policy"
CAVALLARI, MATHEUS DE CARVALHO LEME. "OPTIMAL FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2004. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=5393@1.
Full textO presente trabalho tem objetivo de caracterizar as políticas fiscal e monetária ótimas e avaliar o comportamento do ganho de bem estar fruto do uso destas políticas. Para isto, utilizamos um modelo com rigidez de preços e concorrência monopolística em que a taxa de juros nominal e gasto público tem efeitos reais na economia, seguindo a literatura Novo- Keynesiana. Observamos que existe ganho no uso conjunto das políticas fiscal e monetária vis-à-vis o caso de independência destas políticas. Quanto maior a potência da política fiscal, maior a substituição do instrumento monetário pelo instrumento fiscal na gestão das políticas ótimas. Finalmente, quanto menor a persistência e/ou maior a volatilidade relativa da política fiscal no caso de independência, maior o ganho de bem estar em adotar as políticas ótimas.
The purpose of this work is to identify the optimal monetary and fiscal policy and to evaluate the welfare gains resulting from the cooperation of such policies. Based on a New-Keynesian approach, we investigate a model with price rigidity and monopolistic competition in which the nominal interest rate and the public spending have real effects on the economy. We found gains in the use of both fiscal and monetary instruments, compared to a framework of independence. As the power of the fiscal policy increases, there are welfare gains in substituting interest rate setting by public spending. There are also increasing welfare gains in cooperation when the fiscal policy is less persistent and/or more volatile in relation to other shocks.
Blas, Pérez Beatriz de. "Essays on Monetary and Fiscal Policy." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4035.
Full textEl Capítulo 1 analiza numéricamente el funcionamiento de reglas de política monetaria en economías con y sin imperfecciones financieras. El capítulo compara una política monetaria endógena con una regla de crecimiento del dinero constante en un escenario de participación limitada. Las imperfecciones surgen por información asimétrica en la producción de capital. El modelo se ajusta bastante bien a los datos de EE.UU. El escenario con imperfecciones financieras es capaz de reflejar algunos hechos estilizados del ciclo económico, como la relación negativa entre producto y prima de riesgo, que no aparecen en el caso estándar sin fricciones. El uso de reglas de tipos de interés en un modelo de participación limitada tiene efectos estabilizadores contrarios a los de los modelos neo-Keynesianos. Concretamente, en un modelo de participación limitada, usar reglas de tipos de interés ayuda a estabilizar producto e inflación frente a un shock tecnológico, mientras que existe un trade-off entre estabilizar producto e inflación si el shock es a la demanda de dinero. Finalmente, los efectos de una regla de Taylor son más fuertes -más estabilizadores o más desestabilizadores- cuando hay fricciones financieras.
El Capítulo 2 utiliza datos de EE.UU. de posguerra para analizar si las fricciones financieras pueden haber contribuido a reducir la variabilidad del producto y la inflación desde los 80. Los datos sobre producto, inflación, tipo de interés y prima de riesgo indican un punto de ruptura en 1981:2, tras el cual estas variables son menos volátiles. El modelo anterior se utiliza aquí para calibrar una regla de tipos de interés para cada submuestra. Sin fricciones financieras, los resultados confirman el reconocido cambio en la política monetaria al presentar reglas bastante diferentes antes y después de 1981:2. Sin embargo, en contraste con la literatura empírica, la calibración no refleja un mayor peso sobre la estabilización de la inflación después de 1981:2. Sorprendentemente, con un nivel positivo de costes de control, la calibración presenta dos reglas mucho menos distintas que aquellas encontradas en ausencia de imperfecciones. Las reglas calibradas sí que asignan un mayor peso a la estabilización de la inflación y menor a la del producto tras 1981:2, a diferencia del caso de costes de control cero. Cuando la regla, costes de control, y shocks cambian entre submuestras, la calibración presenta dos reglas con más peso a la estabilización de la inflación y menos a la del producto después de 1981:2. El grado de fricciones financieras cae un 10% tras 1981:2.
El Capítulo 3 estudia las consecuencias en crecimiento y bienestar de imponer límites de deuda a la restricción presupuestaria del gobierno. El modelo presenta crecimiento endógeno y permite al gasto público tener dos papeles diferentes, bien como factor productivo o bien como servicios en la función de utilidad (en este caso, el capital privado genera crecimiento.) En el largo plazo, sin límites de deuda, mayores impuestos sobre el trabajo reducen el crecimiento, independientemente del papel desempeñado por el gasto público. Con límites de deuda, mayores impuestos sobre el trabajo aumentan el crecimiento si el gasto público es productivo. También se analiza la dinámica de una política fiscal más restrictiva para alcanzar un límite de deuda menor, cuando el gasto público es productivo. Mayores impuestos sobre el trabajo para reducir la deuda llevan a un nuevo estado estacionario con mayor crecimiento y menores impuestos, debido al papel productivo del gasto público. Igualmente, un menor ratio de gasto público-producto reduce el crecimiento y producto. Mayores impuestos sobre el trabajo conllevan menos costes de bienestar que cortes en el gasto público para reducir la deuda.
This dissertation analyzes monetary and fiscal policy issues in macroeconomies with financial frictions.
Chapter 1 analyzes numerically the performance of monetary policy rules in economies with and without financial imperfections. Endogenously driven monetary policy is compared to a constant money growth rule in a limited participation framework. The imperfections arise due to asymmetric information emerging in the production of capital. The model economy fits US data reasonably well. The setup with financial imperfections is able to account for some stylized facts of the business cycle, like the negative correlation between output and risk premium, which are absent in the standard frictionless case. The use of interest rate rules in a limited participation model has the opposite stabilization effects compared with new Keynesian models. More concretely, in a limited participation model, using interest rate rules helps stabilize both output and inflation in the face of technology shocks, whereas there is a trade-off between stabilizing output and inflation if the shock is to money demand. Finally, the effects of a Taylor rule are stronger -either more strongly stabilizing or more strongly destabilizing- when there are financial frictions in the economy.
In Chapter 2, postwar US data are employed to analyze whether financial frictions may have contributed to reduce the variability of output and inflation since the 1980s. Data on output, inflation, interest rate, and risk premium indicate a structural break at 1981:2, after which these variables become less volatile. The model economy of Chapter 1 is used to calibrate an interest rate rule for each subsample. Without financial frictions, the results confirm the widely recognized change in the conduct of monetary policy by reporting substantially different rules before and after 1981:2. However, in contrast with empirical literature, the calibration fails to assign more weight to inflation stabilization after 1981:2. Interestingly, when a positive level of monitoring costs is introduced, the procedure yields two calibrated rules that are much less different than those found in the absence of frictions. Furthermore, the calibrated rules do report a stronger weight to inflation and less to output stabilization after 1981:2, as opposed to the zero monitoring costs case. When the rule, monitoring costs, and shocks are allowed to change across subsamples, the calibration reports two interest rate rules that assign more weight to inflation and less to output stabilization after 1981:2. Also, the degree of financial frictions is 10% less after 1981:2.
Chapter 3 studies the growth and welfare consequences of imposing debt limits on the government budget constraint. The model economy displays endogenous growth and allows public spending to have two different roles, either as productive input or as services in the utility function (in this case private capital drives growth). Introducing debt limits is determinant for the growth effects of different fiscal policies. In the long run, without debt limits, the growth effects of raising taxes on labor income are negative regardless of the role of government spending. Interestingly, with debt limits, higher labor tax rates affect positively growth if government spending is productive. The chapter also analyzes the dynamic effects of imposing a more restrictive fiscal policy in order to attain a debt limit with a lower debt to output ratio, for the case of productive government spending. Raising taxes to lower debt leads to a new balanced growth path with higher growth and lower taxes, because of the productive role of government spending. By the same reason, a fiscal policy consisting of reducing government spending over output has the opposite effects, reducing growth and output. Finally, raising labor income taxes implies a lower welfare cost of reducing debt than does cutting spending.
Pescatori, Andrea. "Essays on monetary and fiscal policy." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7346.
Full text1) I study how monetary policy should be optimally designed when households show financial wealth heterogeneity.
Main results: thanks to its ability to affect interest payments volatility, monetary policy has real effects even in a flexible-price cashless-limit environment; second, in a setup with nominal rigidities, price stability is no longer optimal. The extent of deviation from price stability depends on the initial level of debt dispersion.
2) I assess the role of housing price movements in influencing the optimal design of monetary policy.
Under the optimal simple rule, housing price movements should not be a separate target variable in addition to inflation. Furthermore, the welfare loss arising from targeting housing prices becomes quantitatively more significant the higher the degree of access to the credit market.
3) I analyze the effects of fiscal policy in a currency area.
Results: a public spending shock in one region increases private agents demand for imports and appreciates the terms of trade; second, a countercyclical fiscal rule can restore the Taylor principle, the uniqueness of the equilibrium and reduce macro-volatility.
Matveev, Dmitry. "Essays in monetary and fiscal policy." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/310412.
Full textThis thesis contributes to the literature on the joint analysis of monetary and fiscal policy. Since the onset of the global economic downturn in 2007-2008, many advanced economies experienced large economic fluctuations. Stabilizing policy responses in those countries often included large fiscal stimulus packages that in turn triggered discussions of the policy measures---including monetary policy---that would ensure debt sustainability or perform debt adjustment if required. In my work I study policy design in the framework of dynamic general equilibrium models that capture such pressing policy issues. In the first chapter I study optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model with an occasionally binding zero lower bound that leads to liquidity trap episodes. I analyze the use of government spending and labor income tax as components of the discretionary fiscal stimulus package at the liquidity trap. Reliance on either of these instruments depends on whether the government budget is relaxed or has to be balanced. If the government has to balance its budget period by period, it relies more on the spending instrument. Varying the debt burden across time makes the government rely more on the use of labor taxes because discretionary incentives introduced by debt help to reduce the time-inconsistency problem of the tax rate response at the liquidity trap. Moreover, I show that the risk of falling into the liquidity trap leads to the accumulation of the optimal long run government debt buffer that reduces the frequency of reaching the zero lower bound. In the second chapter I study how the speed of optimal government debt adjustment and the monetary-fiscal policy mix that implements it depend on the maturity structure of debt when policy is chosen discretionary. Under the assumption of debt taking the form of one-period nominal bonds, for plausible levels of debt, fiscal sustainability requires prompt adjustment of debt and monetary policy bears a significant burden of implementing the adjustment. Higher average maturity reduces both the incentive of the government to alter current policy and the incentive to strategically affect future self so as to improve the price of borrowing. Accounting for a plausible average maturity makes the optimal debt adjustment much more gradual, which is in line with the existing empirical evidence on the persistence of government debt. In the case of bond portfolios with the average maturity ranging from several years and higher, it is no longer optimal for monetary policy to accommodate debt adjustment. In the thirds chapter I extend a fiscal theory of the sovereign risk by Uribe (2006) into the setting of a monetary union with incomplete markets. Default policy then not only serves the purpose of securing fiscal sustainability and escaping explosive inflation paths but at the same time can take on the role of insuring households across the union against country-specific fiscal risk. I characterize analytically a solution to the model's first-order dynamics and compare equilibrium consumption allocation against a benchmark of the perfect risk-sharing. For these two to coincide one necessary condition has to be satisfied, namely default policy has to be imperfectly discriminatory. The companion result is that, under imperfectly discriminatory default, changes in the monetary policy rule affect real economic activity during the periods of debt adjustment despite the absence of nominal rigidities. Finally, I discuss design of a simple default rule that attains perfect risk-sharing in equilibrium.
Rossi, Raffaele. "Essays on monetary and fiscal policy." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2010. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1638/.
Full textSum, Kin. "Essays on Monetary and Fiscal Policy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.508759.
Full textMENDES, ARTHUR GALEGO. "ESSAYS ON MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2018. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=36204@1.
Full textCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
PROGRAMA DE EXCELENCIA ACADEMICA
Esta tese é composta por 3 capítulos. No primeiro capítulo mostro que quando um banco central não é totalmente apoiado financeiramente pelo tesouro e enfrenta uma restrição de solvência, um aumento no tamanho ou uma mudança na composição de seu balanço pode servir como um mecanismo de compromisso em um cenário de armadilha de liquidez. Em particular, quando a taxa de juros de curto prazo está em zero, operações de mercado aberto do banco central que envolvam compras de títulos de longo prazo podem ajudar a mitigar a deflação e recessão sob um equilíbrio de política discricionária. Usando um modelo simples com produto exógeno, mostramos que uma mudança no balanço do banco central, que aumenta seu tamanho e duração, incentiva o banco central a manter as taxas de juros baixas no futuro, a fim de evitar perdas e satisfazer a restrição de solvência, aproximando-se de sua política ótima de commitment. No segundo capítulo da tese, eu testo a validade do novo mecanismo desenvolvido no capítulo 1, incorporando um banco central financeiramente independente em um modelo DSGE de média escala baseado em Smets e Wouters (2007), e calibrando-o para replicar principais características da expansão do tamanho e composição do balanço do Federal Reserve no período pós-2008. Eu observo que os programas QE 2 e 3 geraram efeitos positivos na dinâmica da inflação, mas impacto modesto no hiato do produto. O terceiro capítulo da tese avalia as consequências em termos de bem-estar de regras fiscais simples em um modelo de um pequeno país exportador de commodities com uma parcela da população sem acesso ao mercado financeiro, onde a política fiscal assume a forma de transferências. Uma constatação principal é que as regras orçamentárias equilibradas para as receitas de commodities geralmente superam as regras fiscais mais sofisticadas, em que as receitas de commodities são salvas em um Fundo de Riqueza Soberana. Como os choques nos preços das commodities são tipicamente altamente persistentes, a renda atual das famílias está próxima de sua renda permanente, tornando as regras orçamentárias equilibradas próximas do ideal.
This thesis is composed of 3 chapters. In the first chapter, It s shown that when a central bank is not fully financially backed by the treasury and faces a solvency constraint, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of its balance sheet (quantitative easing - QE) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is at the zero lower bound, open market operations by the central bank that involve purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate deflation and recession under a discretionary policy equilibrium. Using a simple endowment-economy model, it s shown that a change in the central bank balance sheet, which increases its size and duration, provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in the future to avoid losses and satisfy its solvency constraints, approximating its full commitment policy. In the second chapter, the validity of the novel mechanism developed in chapter 1 is tested by incorporating a financiallyindependent central bank into a medium-scale DSGE model based on Smets and Wouters (2007), and calibrating it to replicate key features of the expansion of size and composition of the Federal Reserve s balance sheet in the post-2008 period. I find that the programs QE 2 and 3 generated positive effects on the dynamics of inflation, but mild effects on the output gap. The third chapter of the thesis evaluates the welfare consequences of simple fiscal rules in a model of a small commodity-exporting country with a share of financially constrained households, where fiscal policy takes the form of transfers. The main finding is that balanced budget rules for commodity revenues often outperform more sophisticated fiscal rules where commodity revenues are saved in a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Because commodity price shocks are typically highly persistent, the households current income is close to their permanent income, so commodity price shocks don t need smoothing, making simple balanced budget rules close to optimal.
Auclert, Adrien. "Essays in monetary and fiscal policy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98695.
Full text2nd and 3rd chapter co-authored with Matthew Rognlie. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis consists of three chapters on monetary and fiscal policy. The first chapter explores the importance of redistribution in explaining why monetary policy has aggregate effects on household consumption. I argue that traditional representative agent models focusing on substitution effects ignore a key component of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, which exists because those who gain from accommodative monetary policy have higher marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) than those who lose. I use a sufficient statistic approach to show that, provided households' elasticities of intertemporal substitution are reasonably small, redistributive effects can be as important as substitution effects in explaining the response of aggregate consumption to real interest rate changes in the U.S. My calibrated general equilibrium model predicts that, if U.S. mortgages all had adjustable rates, the effect of interest-rate changes on consumer spending would more than double and would be asymmetric, with rate increases reducing spending by more than cuts would increase it. The second chapter, joint with Matthew Rognlie, explains why a monetary union between countries (such as the Eurozone today) may lead to a stronger fiscal union. Since exchange rates can no longer adjust to offset shocks, the presence of nominal rigidities implies that fiscal risk-sharing becomes more valuable in a monetary union. As a result, countries in such a union are capable of overcoming their lack of commitment to fiscal transfers. However, inefficient equilibria without fiscal transfers remain possible. We derive implications for the optimal policy of the central bank when the fiscal union is under stress. The third chapter, also joint with Matthew Rognlie, studies the possibility that feedbacks between sovereign bond spreads and governments' desire to default may lead to multiple equilibria in sovereign debt markets. We show that such multiplicity does not exist in the infinite-horizon model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), a widely adopted benchmark for quantitative analyses of these markets. Our proof may be important to understand Euro government bond markets, and calls for renewed attention on the theoretical conditions that are needed for sovereign debt models to generate multiple equilibria.
by Adrien Auclert.
Chapter 1. Monetary policy and the redistribution channel -- Chapter 2. Monetary union begets fiscal union -- Chapter 3.Unique equilibrium in the Eaton-Gersovitz model of sovereign debt.
Ph. D.
Balhote, Raquel de Oliveira. "Interactions between fiscal and monetary policy." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/11594.
Full textO desempenho económico de um país depende sobretudo da relação entre as autoridades monetária e fiscal. Usando dados de painel e um conjunto individual de 14 países da União Europeia desde 1970 a 2012, estudámos as políticas de ambas as autoridades e como as mesmas são influenciadas por determinadas variáveis económicas e eventos (Tratado de Maastricht, Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento, euro e crises). Os resultados mostram que a inflação tem um impacto significativo na política monetária e que os governos aumentam o seu saldo primário diante de crescimentos da dívida. Um outro objectivo é caracterizar as interacções que os bancos centrais e os governos nacionais estabelecem, ou seja, se as suas políticas se complementam ou se existe uma política dominante. As nossas provas apresentam uma relação de substituição entre as duas autoridades, onde o banco central assume um papel mais rígido, especialmente no caso de níveis elevados de dívida.
The economic performance of a country depends notably on the relation between monetary and fiscal authorities. Using a panel data and an individual set of 14 EU countries from 1970 to 2012, we study the type of policies of both authorities, and how they are influenced by certain economic variables and events (Maastricht Treaty, Stability and Growth Pact, euro and crises). Results show that inflation has a significant impact on monetary policy, and that governments raise their primary balance when facing debt increases. Another goal is to characterize the type of interactions central banks and national governments establish, i.e. if their policies complement one another or if there is a more dominant one. Our evidence shows a substitution relation between both authorities, where central bank assumes a demanding role, especially in the case of higher levels of debt.
Kanda, Daniel Stanley. "Optimal fiscal policy propagation of monetary policy shocks." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ35965.pdf.
Full textBooks on the topic "Monetary and Fiscal Policy"
Friedman, Benjamin M. Monetary policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.
Find full textJohn, Sargent, ed. Fiscal and monetary policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.
Find full textFisher, Douglas. Monetary and Fiscal Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05733-7.
Full textTorsten, Persson, and Tabellini Guido Enrico 1956-, eds. Monetary and fiscal policy. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994.
Find full text1927-, Mayer Thomas, and Sheffrin Steven M, eds. Fiscal and monetary policy. Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar, 1995.
Find full text1934-, Fisher Douglas, ed. Monetary and fiscal policy. New York: New York University Press, 1988.
Find full textChari, V. V. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Find full textDavig, Troy. Monetary and fiscal policy switching. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Monetary and Fiscal Policy"
Carlberg, Michael. "Monetary Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Dynamics, 70–75. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47689-1_14.
Full textCarlberg, Michael. "Monetary Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Dynamics, 119–22. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47689-1_23.
Full textCarlberg, Michael. "Fiscal Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Dynamics, 123–36. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47689-1_24.
Full textChang, Michele. "Fiscal Policy Coordination." In Economic and Monetary Union, 121–41. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-34295-9_6.
Full textCarlberg, Michael. "Monetary Policy Versus Fiscal Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Dynamics, 137–38. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47689-1_25.
Full textKocherlakota, Narayana R. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Overview." In Monetary Economics, 164–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230280854_21.
Full textCarlberg, Michael. "Fiscal Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Strategies in the World Economy, 18–22. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10476-3_3.
Full textCarlberg, Michael. "Fiscal Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Strategies in the World Economy, 35–40. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10476-3_6.
Full textCarlberg, Michael. "Monetary Policy." In Monetary and Fiscal Strategies in the World Economy, 13–17. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10476-3_2.
Full textKiefer, David. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy." In Macroeconomic Policy and Public Choice, 105–24. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60564-2_6.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Monetary and Fiscal Policy"
Gao, Ceyue, and Yimiao Que. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy of the UK." In 2022 7th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2022). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.370.
Full textHiç Birol, Assist Prof Dr Özlen, and Assoc Prof Dr Ayşen Hiç Gencer. "THE KEYNESIAN SYSTEM: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY GUIDELINES." In 4th Annual International Conference on Qualitative and Quantitative Economics Research (QQE 2014). Global Science & Technology Forum (GSTF), 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5176/2251-2012_qqe14.12.
Full textKumi, Evis. "The Effectiveness of the Albanian Monetary Policy." In 9th International Scientific Conference ERAZ - Knowledge Based Sustainable Development. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/eraz.2023.97.
Full textLopotenco, Viorica. "Interacțiunea politicii monetare cu politica fiscală în țările mici cu economii deschise." In International Scientific-Practical Conference "Economic growth in the conditions of globalization". National Institute for Economic Research, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36004/nier.cecg.iii.2023.17.1.
Full textIing-yi, Liu, and Jian Zhi-hong. "Optimal combination of fiscal and monetary policy in China." In 2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2013.6586469.
Full text"Housing Prices and Monetary and Fiscal Policy. The Swedish Experience." In 20th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference: ERES Conference 2013. ÖKK-Editions, Vienna, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2013_ind_100.
Full textKurtucz, Csaba. "The Lessons Learned from the Great Recession." In 7th International Scientific Conference ERAZ - Knowledge Based Sustainable Development. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/eraz.2021.77.
Full textBlueschke, Dmitri, Viktoria Blueschke-Nikolaeva, and Reinhard Neck. "Macroeconomic Policy Strategies In A Monetary Union: Simulations With A Dynamic-Game Model." In 37th ECMS International Conference on Modelling and Simulation. ECMS, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.7148/2023-0083.
Full textCsápai, Ádám. "Analyzing the Interactions of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy Using a DSGE Model." In EDAMBA 2021 : 24th International Scientific Conference for Doctoral Students and Post-Doctoral Scholars. University of Economics in Bratislava, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.53465/edamba.2021.9788022549301.63-72.
Full textHiç, Özlen, and Ayşen Hiç Gencer. "Anti-Keynesian Views: Fiscal and Monetary Guidelines." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.00849.
Full textReports on the topic "Monetary and Fiscal Policy"
Davig, Troy, and Eric Leeper. Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and Fiscal Stimulus. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15133.
Full textDavig, Troy, Eric Leeper, and Hess Chung. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Switching. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10362.
Full textChari, V., and Patrick Kehoe. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6891.
Full textLeeper, Eric. Fiscal Limits and Monetary Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18877.
Full textDupor, Bill, Rong Li, and Jingchao Li. Sticky Wages, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy Multipliers. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2017.007.
Full textLeeper, Eric. Sweden's Fiscal Framework and Monetary Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24743.
Full textBassetto, Marco, and Thomas Sargent. Shotgun Wedding: Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27004.
Full textElenev, Vadim, Tim Landvoigt, Patrick Shultz, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Can Monetary Policy Create Fiscal Capacity? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29129.
Full textWu, Jing Cynthia, and Yinxi Xie. (Un)Conventional Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30706.
Full textGali, Jordi, and Roberto Perotti. Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9773.
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