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1
Malik, Wasim Shahid. Monetary policy objectives in Pakistan: An empirical investigation. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2007.
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2
Bisignano, Joseph. Varieties of monetary policy operating procedures: Balancing monetary objectives with market efficiency. Basle, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Dept., 1996.
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3
Canada, Bank of. Identifying policy-makers' objectives: An application to the Bank of Canada. Ottawa: Bank of Canada, 2000.
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4
Chile, Banco Central de. Monetary policy of the Central Bank of Chile: Objectives and transmission. Chile]: The Bank, 2000.
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5
Silva, Jorge Marshall. Banco central: Concepto, evolución y objectivos. Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas, Editorial de Economía y Administración, 1991.
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6
Kieler, Mads. The ECB's inflation objective. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, European I Department, 2003.
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7
Crockett, Andrew. Strengthening the international monetary system: Exchange rates, surveillance and objective indicators. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1987.
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8
1944-, Goldstein Morris, and International Monetary Fund, eds. Strengthening the international monetary system: Exchange rates, surveillance, and objective indicators. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, 1987.
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9
Buiter, Willem H. The elusive welfare economics of price stability as a monetary policy objective: Should new keynesian central bankers pursue price stability? Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.
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10
Buiter, Willem H. The elusive welfare economics of price stability as a monetary policy objective: Should new Keynesian central bankers pursue price stability? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.
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11
Palmqvist, Stefan. Why central banks announce their objectives: Monetary policy with discretionary signalling. Stockholm (Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm, 1999.
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12
Berg, Andrew, and Rafael Portillo. Monetary Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785811.003.0001.
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Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made great progress in stabilizing inflation over the past two decades. In about half, a hard peg provides the nominal anchor. In the rest, which are the focus of this book, policymakers have more recently been asking more of monetary policy—to avoid policy misalignments and respond appropriately to shocks such as export and food price spikes and swings in fiscal policy—in support of overall stability and growth. And they are, in many cases, finding current regimes lacking, with opaque and sometimes inconsistent objectives, inadequate transmission of policy to the economy, and difficulties in responding to supply shocks. This chapter reviews this history and the analytic and policy challenges of modernizing monetary policy regimes in the region. Drawing on the results from the rest of this book, it charts a way forward.
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Berg, Andrew, and Rafael Portillo, eds. Monetary Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785811.001.0001.
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Having broadly stabilized inflation over the past two decades, many policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa are now asking more of their monetary policy frameworks. They are looking to avoid policy misalignments and respond appropriately to both domestic and external shocks, including swings in fiscal policy and spikes in food and export prices. In many cases they are finding current regimes—often characterized as ‘money targeting’—lacking, with opaque and sometimes inconsistent objectives, inadequate transmission of policy to the economy, and difficulties in responding to supply shocks. At the same time, little existing research on monetary policy is targeted to low-income countries. What do we know about the empirics of monetary transmission in low-income countries? (How) Does monetary policy work in countries characterized by a huge share of food in consumption, underdeveloped financial markets, and opaque policy regimes? (How) Can we use methods largely derived in advanced countries to answer these questions? And (how) can we use the results to guide policymakers? This book draws on years of research and practice at the IMF and in central banks from the region to shed empirical and theoretical light on these questions and to provide practical tools and policy guidance. A key feature of the book is the application of dynamic general equilibrium models, suitably adapted to reflect key features of low-income countries, for the analysis of monetary policy in sub-Saharan African countries.
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Siklos, Pierre L. The Anatomy of Financial Crises and the Role of Monetary Policy. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190228835.003.0003.
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Crises come in a variety of forms. A focus on the incidence of financial crises underemphasizes the cross-border element in financial crises. How important is the exchange-rate regime in monetary policy strategies? Is the EMU experience a cautionary tale? The exchange-rate regime matters less than we think because financial globalization has conspired to effectively reduce the scope for an independent monetary policy. The EMU is unlikely to survive in its current form. Politicians seek coordinated solutions in a system that is built on policy cooperation. International coordination is only practical in emergency or crisis conditions. Cooperation is desirable only if common standards or objectives are combined with escape clauses to render them realistic. This is a goal worth pursuing. Exiting from post-GFC is a reminder that the focus on policy spillovers is misplaced. Business cycles are rarely synchronized and there cannot be a one-size fits all monetary policy.
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Chami, Ralph, Raphael Espinoza, and Peter J. Montiel, eds. Macroeconomic Policy in Fragile States. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198853091.001.0001.
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Setting macroeconomic policy is especially difficult in fragile states. Political legitimacy concerns are heightened, raising issues such as who the policymakers are, what incentives move them, and how the process of policymaking is likely to work under limited legitimacy and high uncertainty both about the macroeconomic environment and about policy effectiveness. In addition, fragility expands the range of policy objectives in ways that may constrain the attainment of standard macroeconomic objectives. Specifically, in the context of fragility policymakers also need to focus on measures to mitigate fragility itself—namely, they need to address issues such as regional and ethnic economic disparities, youth unemployment, and food price inflation. Socio-political developments around the world have thus pushed policymakers to broaden their toolkit to improve the effectiveness of macroeconomic management in the face of these constraints. The chapters in this book address these issues, both by giving an analytical context from which policymakers can build to answer the questions they face in fragile situations as well as by providing lessons drawn from empirical analyses and case studies. The first section of the volume discusses the interactions between political economy considerations and macroeconomic policymaking. The second section covers the private sector environment in fragile states. The third section focuses on macroeconomic policy, especially fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, external flows, and aid effectiveness. The last section explains the role of the IMF in fragile states and concludes by presenting case studies from the Middle East and from Sub-Saharan Africa. The contributors to the volume are economists and political scientists from academia as well as policymakers from international organizations and from countries affected by fragility.
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Dietsch, Peter. Normative dimensions of central banking: How the guardians of financial markets affect justice. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198755661.003.0010.
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Monetary policy, and the response it elicits from financial markets, raises normative questions. This chapter, building on an introductory section on the objectives and instruments of monetary policy, analyzes two such questions. First, it assesses the impact of monetary policy on inequality and argues that the unconventional policies adopted in the wake of the financial crisis exacerbate inequalities in income and wealth. Depending on the theory of justice one holds, this impact is problematic. Should monetary policy be sensitive to inequalities and, if so, how? Second, the chapter argues that the leverage that financial markets have today over the monetary policy agenda undermines democratic legitimacy.
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Alichi, Ali, Marshall Mills, Douglas Laxton, and Hans Weisfeld. Inflation Forecast Targeting in a Low-Income Country. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785811.003.0019.
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A model in which monetary policy pursues fully fledged inflation targeting is adapted to Ghana. Model features include: endogenous policy credibility; non-linearities in the inflation process; and a policy loss function that aims to minimize the variability of output and the interest rate, as well as deviations of inflation from the long-term low-inflation target. The optimal approach from initial high inflation to the ultimate target is gradual; and transitional inflation-reduction objectives are flexible. Over time, as policy earns credibility, expectations of inflation converge towards the long-run target, the output-inflation variability trade-off improves, and optimal policy responses to shocks moderate.
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Charles, Proctor. Part A Regulatory Matters, 8 The Market Regulators. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199685585.003.0008.
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This chapter explains the various authorities involved in UK banking market regulation. It first considers the role of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), including its statutory objectives and powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It then discusses the role of the Bank of England in the fields of financial stability and monetary policy; the role of Her Majesty's Treasury; the development of regulatory bodies at the European level, largely in response to the credit crunch and the problems to which it gave rise; and some recent international initiatives.
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Yoshino, Naoyuki, Pornpinun Chantapacdepong, and Matthias Helble, eds. Macroeconomic Shocks and Unconventional Monetary Policy. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198838104.001.0001.
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Barely two decades after the Asian financial crisis Asia was suddenly confronted with multiple challenges originating outside the region: the 2008 global financial crisis, the European debt crisis, and, finally developed economies’ implementation of unconventional monetary policies. Especially the implementation of quantitative easing (QE), ultra-low interest rate policies, and negative interest rate policies by a number of large central banks has given rise to concerns over financial stability and international capital flows. One of the regions most profoundly affected by the crisis was Asia due to its high dependence on international trade and international financial linkages. The objective of this book is to explain how macroeconomic shocks stemming from the global financial crisis and recent unconventional monetary policies in developed economies have affected macroeconomic and financial stability in emerging markets, with a particular focus on Asia. In particular, the book covers the following thematic areas: (i) the spillover effects of macroeconomic shocks on financial markets and flows in emerging economies; (ii) the impact of recent macroeconomic shocks on real economies in emerging markets; and (iii) key challenges for the monetary, exchange rate, trade, and macroprudential policies of developing economies, especially Asian economies, and suggestions and recommendations to increase resiliency against external shocks.
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Siklos, Pierre L. The Over-Burdened Central Bank and the Shift Away from Autonomy. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190228835.003.0005.
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Many central banks took on additional responsibilities. Inadequate self-assessments remain unfinished almost a decade after the crisis erupted. Government-central bank relationships need to be conditioned on whether times are normal versus crisis conditions. Transparency confronts ambiguity when central banks must communicate the outlook and the conditionality of their decisions. Forward guidance was taken too far and ended up being futile. Central bankers simply exhausted their ability to influence behavior through mere words or ambiguous statements. This is a self-inflicted wound for institutions that are seen as overburdened. These forces leave central banking more vulnerable than is commonly acknowledged. Squaring the conventional objectives of monetary policy with the unclear aims of financial stability is difficult. Adequate limitations on the authority of central banks have yet to be thoroughly debated. We are nowhere near resolving the inherent tensions between old and new sets of central bank objectives.
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Brownbridge, Martin, and Louis Kasekende. Inflation Targeting in Uganda. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785811.003.0002.
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The Bank of Uganda introduced an inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy framework in 2011, replacing a decades-old money targeting framework. This chapter reviews Uganda’s experience and concludes that an IT framework is feasible for Uganda, despite shallow financial markets, volatile exchange rates, supply price shocks which make inflation more volatile and difficult to forecast, and lack of data. Key prerequisites were the operational independence of the central bank and the primacy of the core inflation objective for monetary policy. The successful adoption of IT in Uganda depended on the adoption of a set of basic principles, including: the primacy of the inflation forecast in setting policy; the separation of monetary from fiscal operations; the adoption of a short-term interest rate as the sole operating target, rather than e.g. a mix of interest rates and monetary aggregates; and an emphasis on clear communications.
22
Ocampo, José Antonio. Capital Account Liberalization and Management. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198718116.003.0004.
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This chapter looks at the transition from the acceptance at Bretton Woods of capital account management as a normal policy instrument to the liberalization of the capital account, first in developed countries and later in developing countries. It then analyses the risks of capital account liberalization, particularly the relation between capital account liberalization and the boom–bust cycles in global finance which have severely affected emerging and developing countries since the 1970s. It finally reviews the controversies around the effects of capital account liberalization and the evidence of success or failure with capital account management. Overall, there is significant evidence that capital account regulations improve the composition of capital flows towards less reversible flows and increase monetary independence without sacrifising exchange rate objectives. They also may have a desirable effect on the magnitude of flows and on exchange rates, but these effects are contested by some authors.
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Ocampo, José Antonio. Global Monetary Cooperation and the Exchange Rate System. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198718116.003.0003.
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This chapter looks at historical and current frameworks to manage macroeconomic linkages among economies. The basic objective of cooperation in this area is to guarantee the consistency of the macroeconomic policies of major economies, to avoid both unsustainable global booms and crises. This requires an adequate supply of liquidity at the international level, the topic analysed in Chapter 2, as well sustainable payments balances and an adequate exchange rate system, two areas of cooperation analysed here. The chapter looks first at the evolving nature of global imbalances. It then analyses the mechanisms that have been put in place at different times to manage macroeconomic linkages among major economies, before finally considering the current exchange rate ‘non-system’. The chapter claims that exchange rate policy is perhaps the most critical area for which macroeconomic policy cooperation should be strengthened, particularly by moving to a system of reference rates among major currencies.
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Homburg, Stefan. A Study in Monetary Macroeconomics. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807537.001.0001.
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The Great Recession of 2008/09 and its aftermath present a major challenge to macroeconomics. Many researchers think that prevailing models fail to grasp essential aspects of recent developments, including unprecedented monetary policies and interest rates at the zero lower bound. Approaches that focus on steady states, rational expectations, and individuals planning over infinite horizons are not suitable for analyzing such abnormal situations. This text does not criticize the traditional approach but aims at improvement. The study’s distinctive feature is a rich institutional structure that includes elements such as credit money, external finance, borrowing constraints, net worth, real estate, and commercial banks. To cope with such a complex setting, the text reduces rationality requirements but adheres to the method of dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) with optimizing agents and fully specified models. Results are derived from mathematical reasoning and simulations. Starting with a simple baseline model, the argument is developed step by step in a unified framework that covers almost everything of interest for monetary macroeconomists. The topics discussed include the superneutrality of money, the Tobin effect, monetary policy under sticky prices and wages, but also liquidity traps with borrowing constraints, Fisherian debt-deflations, housing cycles, and environments with excess bank reserves. The text addresses researchers worldwide and may prove useful for teaching postgraduate and advanced graduate courses. The principle objective is to demonstrate that a “not-too-rational” DGE approach makes it possible to develop clean models that work outside steady states and are appropriate for answering macroeconomic questions of actual interest.
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Siklos, Pierre L. Central Banks into the Breach. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190228835.001.0001.
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The book covers the global economy and the various pressures faced by central banks. It also provides some ideas for reforming existing monetary policy strategies. The events of the past fifteen years in monetary policy are essentially the story of two mistakes, one triumph, and the real possibility of another mistake to come. Prior to the global financial crisis, many central bankers were glib about the connection between finance and the real economy. This is partly because the last three decades saw many financial crises with apparently little lasting impact on the global economy. Another mistake was the failure to adequately appreciate how interconnected the world’s financial systems had become. The triumph was the recognition that price stability is a desirable objective. Whether low and stable inflation is the cause or the consequence of economic performance during the past three decades remains hotly debated, however. There is also the prospect of another financial shock to come. The outlook at the end of 2016 is clouded by at least three sets of forces. On the domestic front, central banks face a difficult and protracted exit from ultra-loose monetary policies; it is largely a problem of their own making. There is also an unwillingness to implement needed structural economic reforms that lie outside the scope of monetary policy. On the international front, there is limited appetite for cooperation and differences in views about the proper role and function of central banks. Central banking is not broken, but it is in need of repair.
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Siklos, Pierre L. Disquiet on All Fronts? Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190228835.003.0006.
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The state of central banking is fragile and fraught with reasons to take a dim view of their stature. Low economic growth, an insufficiently unsubstantiated expansion of central bank responsibilities, and worries over future financial instability are sources of concern. Institutional and other objective measures point to a loss of confidence in the monetary authorities around the globe. Several central banks are unable to match words with deeds. The willingness of policymakers and central banks to take accountability seriously remains in doubt, at least in some of the most systematically important regions of the world. The financial crisis has awakened a desire to find a way to have central banks find a proper mix for conducting monetary policy and macroprudential policies. A decade after the crisis, no coherent new framework has emerged, and reforms have hardly dented an overall impression of disquiet about the state of central banking.
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Njoroge, Patrick, and Victor Murinde, eds. 50 Years of Central Banking in Kenya. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851820.001.0001.
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This book documents important milestones in the epic journey traversed by the Central Bank of Kenya over the last 50 years, putting into perspective the evolution of central banking globally and within the East African region, and contemplating future prospects and challenges. The book is timely, mainly because the global financial landscape has shifted. Central bankers have expanded their mandates, beyond the singular focus on inflation and consider economic growth as their other important objective. Financial crises have continued to disrupt the functioning of financial institutions and markets, the most devastating episodes being the global financial crisis, which broke out in 2008 and from which the global financial system has not fully recovered, and the unprecedented challenges posed by the global coronavirus pandemic. Bank regulation has moved from Basel I, to Basel II, and somehow migrated to Basel III, although some countries are still at the crossroads. The book originated from the wide-ranging discussions on central banking, from a symposium to celebrate the 50 year anniversary on 13 September 2016 in Nairobi. The participants at the symposium included current and former central bank governors from Kenya and the Eastern Africa region, high-level officials from multilateral financial institutions, policy-makers, bank executives, civil society actors, researchers and students. The book is an invaluable resource for policy-makers, practitioners, and researchers, on how monetary policy and financial practices in vogue today in Kenya have evolved through time and worked very well, but also about some pitfalls.
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Cukierman, Alex. Central Banks. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.64.
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The first CBs were private institutions that were given a monopoly over the issuance of currency by government in return for help in financing the budget and adherence to the rules of the gold standard. Under this standard the price of gold in terms of currency was fixed and the CB could issue or retire domestic currency only in line with gold inflows or outflows. Due to the scarcity of gold this system assured price stability as long as it functioned. Wars and depressions led to the replacement of the gold standard by the more flexible gold exchange standard. Along with restrictions on international capital flows this standard became a major pillar of the post–WWII Bretton Woods system. Under this system the U.S. dollar (USD) was pegged to gold, and other countries’ exchange rates were pegged to the USD. In many developing economies CBs functioned as governmental development banks.Following the world inflation of the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, eradication of inflation gradually became the explicit number one priority of CBs. The hyperinflationary experiences of the first half of the 20th century, which were mainly caused by over-utilization of the printing press to finance budgetary expenditures, convinced policymakers in developed economies, following Germany’s lead, that the conduct of monetary policy should be delegated to instrument independent CBs, that governments should be prohibited from borrowing from them, and that the main goal of the CB should be price stability. During the late 1980s and the 1990s numerous CBs obtained instrument independence and started to operate on inflation targeting systems. Under this system the CB is expected to use interest rate policy to deliver a low inflation rate in the long run and to stabilize fluctuations in economic activity in the short and medium terms. In parallel the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system were replaced by flexible rates or dirty floats. The conjunction of more flexible rates and IT effectively moved the control over exchange rates from governments to CBs.The global financial crisis reminded policymakers that, of all public institutions, the CB has a comparative advantage in swiftly preventing the crisis from becoming a generalized panic that would seriously cripple the financial system. The crisis precipitated the financial stability motive into the forefront of CBs’ policy concerns and revived the explicit recognition of the lender of last resort function of the CB in the face of shocks to the financial system. Although the financial stability objective appeared in CBs’ charters, along with the price stability objective, also prior to the crisis, the crisis highlighted the critical importance of the supervisory and regulatory functions of CBs and other regulators. An important lesson from the crisis was that micro-prudential supervision and regulation should be supplemented with macro-prudential regulation and that the CB is the choice institution to perform this function. The crisis led CBs of major developed economies to reduce their policy rates to zero (and even to negative values in some cases) and to engage in large-scale asset purchases that bloat their balance sheets to this day. It also induced CBs of small open economies to supplement their interest rate policies with occasional foreign exchange interventions.