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Books on the topic 'Monetary Policy Reaction Function'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 5 February 2022

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1

Ouma, Shem. Monetary policy reaction function for Kenya. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, 2006.

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2

An econometric analysis of the monetary policy reaction function in Nigeria. Nairobi, Kenya: African Economic Research Consortium, 2011.

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3

Itō, Takatoshi. What promotes Japan to intervene in the forex market? a new approach to a reaction function. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.

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4

Rigobón, Roberto. Measuring the reaction of monetary policy to the stock market. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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5

Bernanke, Ben S. What explains the stock market's reaction to Federal Reserve policy? Washington, D.C: Federal Reserve Board, 2004.

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6

Bernanke, Ben S. What explains the stock market's reaction to Federal Reserve Policy? [New York, N.Y.]: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2003.

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7

Bernanke, Ben S. What explains the stock market's reaction to Federal Reserve policy? Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.

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8

Bernanke, Ben S. What explains the stock market's reaction to Federal Reserve policy? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004.

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9

Sánchez-Fung, José R. Monetary policy reaction dynamics in a developing economy: Evidence for the Dominican Republic. Kingston upon Thames: Kingston University,Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, 1998.

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10

Kujo chojŏng kwa kamdok kinŭng: Restructuring and supervisory function. Sŏul: Pŏmnyul SOS, 2004.

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11

Mutoti, Noah. An econometric analysis of the money demand function for Zambia. Lusaka: Study Fund of the Social Recovery Project, 1998.

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12

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy. Third World debt: Public reaction to the Brady Plan : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session, April 5, 1989. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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13

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy. Third World debt: Public reaction to the Brady Plan : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session, April 5, 1989. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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14

United, States Congress House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on International Development Finance Trade and Monetary Policy. Third World debt: Public reaction to the Brady Plan : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session, April 5, 1989. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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15

Ontology and Function of Money: The Philosophical Fundamentals of Monetary Institutions. Lexington Books/Fortress Academic, 2015.

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16

Portillo, Rafael, Luis-Felipe Zanna, Stephen O’Connell, and Richard Peck. Implications of Food Subsistence for Monetary Policy and Inflation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785811.003.0011.

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The chapter introduces subsistence requirements in food consumption into a simple New Keynesian model with flexible food and sticky non-food prices. It shows how the endogenous structural transformation that results from subsistence affects the dynamics of the economy, the design of monetary policy, and the properties of inflation at different levels of development. A calibrated version of the model encompasses both rich and poor countries and broadly replicates the properties of inflation across the development spectrum, including the dominant role played by changes in the relative price of food in poor countries. The authors derive a welfare-based loss function for the monetary authority and show that optimal policy calls for complete (in some cases near-complete) stabilization of sticky-price non-food inflation, despite the presence of a food-subsistence threshold. Subsistence amplifies the welfare losses of policy mistakes, however, raising the stakes for monetary policy at earlier stages of development.
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17

Alichi, Ali, Marshall Mills, Douglas Laxton, and Hans Weisfeld. Inflation Forecast Targeting in a Low-Income Country. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785811.003.0019.

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A model in which monetary policy pursues fully fledged inflation targeting is adapted to Ghana. Model features include: endogenous policy credibility; non-linearities in the inflation process; and a policy loss function that aims to minimize the variability of output and the interest rate, as well as deviations of inflation from the long-term low-inflation target. The optimal approach from initial high inflation to the ultimate target is gradual; and transitional inflation-reduction objectives are flexible. Over time, as policy earns credibility, expectations of inflation converge towards the long-run target, the output-inflation variability trade-off improves, and optimal policy responses to shocks moderate.
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18

Siklos, Pierre L. Central Banks into the Breach. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190228835.001.0001.

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The book covers the global economy and the various pressures faced by central banks. It also provides some ideas for reforming existing monetary policy strategies. The events of the past fifteen years in monetary policy are essentially the story of two mistakes, one triumph, and the real possibility of another mistake to come. Prior to the global financial crisis, many central bankers were glib about the connection between finance and the real economy. This is partly because the last three decades saw many financial crises with apparently little lasting impact on the global economy. Another mistake was the failure to adequately appreciate how interconnected the world’s financial systems had become. The triumph was the recognition that price stability is a desirable objective. Whether low and stable inflation is the cause or the consequence of economic performance during the past three decades remains hotly debated, however. There is also the prospect of another financial shock to come. The outlook at the end of 2016 is clouded by at least three sets of forces. On the domestic front, central banks face a difficult and protracted exit from ultra-loose monetary policies; it is largely a problem of their own making. There is also an unwillingness to implement needed structural economic reforms that lie outside the scope of monetary policy. On the international front, there is limited appetite for cooperation and differences in views about the proper role and function of central banks. Central banking is not broken, but it is in need of repair.
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19

Snaith, Holly. Depoliticization as a Coordination Problem. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198748977.003.0008.

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Although work on depoliticization arises most frequently from the literature on governance as a function of the differentiated polity, it also has resonance with that on multilevel governance (MLG). This indicates a distinction between ‘two types’ of MLG: from forms of territorialized federal governance and from more ad hoc actions of delegated governance. Setting the literature on arena-shifting within a framework inspired by the MLG literature on the European Union demonstrates that depoliticization may be fostered at the nexus of different types of policy devolution, due to the functional interdependence between policy fields. The fundamental argument of this chapter is that depoliticization assumes intention on the part of key actors to effect strategies of depoliticization, and this assumption is problematic. The example of monetary and fiscal governance is (re)used to demonstrate the strategic interactions between territorialized and a-territorialized forms of policy governance and the problems that arise between the two.
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20

Holmes, Douglas R. A Tractable Future. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198820802.003.0008.

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Markets are a function of language. This chapter examines ethnographically how central bankers create and enter a communicative field in which market participants and members of the public model economic phenomena for their own purposes, employing their own pragmatic insights. Central banks increasingly manage the expectations of others with official statements and forward guidance constructed in words. But this chapter focuses also on the role of conversation both within central banks and between the central banks and their publics and shows how this discursive input is crucial to central bankers’ own sense of the future. The influential stories that policy-makers tell are partly the product of internal conversation and listening to the way other market protagonists envisage the future. The efficacy of monetary policy rests on a two-way discursive interaction between central bankers and other market protagonists, who together must orchestrate prospectively the contingencies of economic stability and growth.
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21

Cukierman, Alex. Central Banks. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.64.

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The first CBs were private institutions that were given a monopoly over the issuance of currency by government in return for help in financing the budget and adherence to the rules of the gold standard. Under this standard the price of gold in terms of currency was fixed and the CB could issue or retire domestic currency only in line with gold inflows or outflows. Due to the scarcity of gold this system assured price stability as long as it functioned. Wars and depressions led to the replacement of the gold standard by the more flexible gold exchange standard. Along with restrictions on international capital flows this standard became a major pillar of the post–WWII Bretton Woods system. Under this system the U.S. dollar (USD) was pegged to gold, and other countries’ exchange rates were pegged to the USD. In many developing economies CBs functioned as governmental development banks.Following the world inflation of the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, eradication of inflation gradually became the explicit number one priority of CBs. The hyperinflationary experiences of the first half of the 20th century, which were mainly caused by over-utilization of the printing press to finance budgetary expenditures, convinced policymakers in developed economies, following Germany’s lead, that the conduct of monetary policy should be delegated to instrument independent CBs, that governments should be prohibited from borrowing from them, and that the main goal of the CB should be price stability. During the late 1980s and the 1990s numerous CBs obtained instrument independence and started to operate on inflation targeting systems. Under this system the CB is expected to use interest rate policy to deliver a low inflation rate in the long run and to stabilize fluctuations in economic activity in the short and medium terms. In parallel the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system were replaced by flexible rates or dirty floats. The conjunction of more flexible rates and IT effectively moved the control over exchange rates from governments to CBs.The global financial crisis reminded policymakers that, of all public institutions, the CB has a comparative advantage in swiftly preventing the crisis from becoming a generalized panic that would seriously cripple the financial system. The crisis precipitated the financial stability motive into the forefront of CBs’ policy concerns and revived the explicit recognition of the lender of last resort function of the CB in the face of shocks to the financial system. Although the financial stability objective appeared in CBs’ charters, along with the price stability objective, also prior to the crisis, the crisis highlighted the critical importance of the supervisory and regulatory functions of CBs and other regulators. An important lesson from the crisis was that micro-prudential supervision and regulation should be supplemented with macro-prudential regulation and that the CB is the choice institution to perform this function. The crisis led CBs of major developed economies to reduce their policy rates to zero (and even to negative values in some cases) and to engage in large-scale asset purchases that bloat their balance sheets to this day. It also induced CBs of small open economies to supplement their interest rate policies with occasional foreign exchange interventions.
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