Journal articles on the topic 'Monitor republicano'

<p>El presente artículo analiza a través de fuentes hemerográficas el papel que desempeñó en la sucesión presidencial de 1920 uno de los generales más importantes de la revolución mexicana, Pablo González Garza. Dicho militar era uno de los candidatos naturales —junto con Álvaro Obregón— para suceder a Venustiano Carranza debido al ascendente político que había ganado durante la lucha armada. Al iniciar su campaña optó por una actitud legalista, pero silenciosa y parsimoniosa. Posteriormente, debido al apoyo que Carranza ofreció el ingeniero Ignacio Bonillas para que ocupara la silla más codiciada del país optó por pactar con Obregón y ocupar la capital del país en mayo de 1920 aunque finalmente renunció a su candidatura debido a la imposibilidad de triunfar. Mediante el uso de fuentes poco examinadas, como los periódicos El Heraldo de México, El Monitor Republicano y México Nuevo, se analizan la campaña, la plataforma (la Liga Democrática) y la postura de la prensa gonzalista en dicha coyuntura electoral, temas hasta ahora poco estudiados, incluso olvidados, debido al triunfo del Grupo Sonora.</p>

AbstractThis article scrutinizes election district and inspection district reports written by the deputies of the Turkish single-party government and the role of these reports in state decision making. Underscoring social discontent and the fragile hegemony of the new regime—both of which motivated the republican elite to monitor state and party administrations and public opinion—the article argues that the practice of reporting was neither a project of social engineering nor a practice peculiar to the Turkish state but rather a requirement of a polity concerned with the opinion of its citizens. In the absence of direct political participation of the people in government, the reports mediated between the state and society. Contrary to conventional accounts of the single-party period, the article argues that the republican elite did not govern the country through top-down decrees but instead sought to ascertain public opinion and its own administrative defects so as to consolidate its fragile hegemony. Based on these findings, I propose that we redefine the early republican state as a flexible authoritarian regime that was not detached from the society.

Among other things, the revolutionary period in France is notorious for two practices: the development of a civil religion and a project of linguistic standardization. The substitution of republican for religious symbols, the creation of public space for republican worship, the hostility towards intermediary bodies, all of this sought to ground a more direct relationship between the citizen and the republic. At the same time, the new order sought to consolidate its control of the church. An oath of loyalty to the republic was required from priests, as part of a plan to make priests functionaries of the state. The protest evoked, and its association with counterrevolution, however, produced equivocation on the part of regimes until the Concordat, which acknowledged the place of Catholicism in French society, without providing official recognition as the state religion, and which sought to monitor the activity of the clergy.

There is mounting concern that social media sites contribute to political polarization by creating “echo chambers” that insulate people from opposing views about current events. We surveyed a large sample of Democrats and Republicans who visit Twitter at least three times each week about a range of social policy issues. One week later, we randomly assigned respondents to a treatment condition in which they were offered financial incentives to follow a Twitter bot for 1 month that exposed them to messages from those with opposing political ideologies (e.g., elected officials, opinion leaders, media organizations, and nonprofit groups). Respondents were resurveyed at the end of the month to measure the effect of this treatment, and at regular intervals throughout the study period to monitor treatment compliance. We find that Republicans who followed a liberal Twitter bot became substantially more conservative posttreatment. Democrats exhibited slight increases in liberal attitudes after following a conservative Twitter bot, although these effects are not statistically significant. Notwithstanding important limitations of our study, these findings have significant implications for the interdisciplinary literature on political polarization and the emerging field of computational social science.

Researchers have noted that an individual’s processing of political media messages occurs through various filters including partisanship, interest, and cynicism. The phenomenon of motivated processing, however, is understudied particularly in the context of televised presidential debates. As major campaign events, presidential debates have been linked to increases in viewers’ political knowledge, political information efficacy, and changes in candidate evaluation. Yet individual’s information processing, largely unexplored in the extant debate literature, may well influence these outcomes. In the present study, we manipulate processing of a political debate and monitor the effects through participant engagement with social media. Researchers asked debate viewers to tweet while watching 2016 Democrat and Republican presidential primary debates following instructions designed to prime either directional motivated processing or accuracy motivated processing. The results demonstrate that the accuracy prompt reduced issue-based tweeting and therefore reduced knowledge acquisition. Conversely, the directional prompt increased issue-based tweeting and therefore increased knowledge acquisition.

Over the past two decades we have heard an historically unprecedented volume of talk about and praise of democracy, and many governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations have been engaged in democracy promotion. Democracy is a subject that crosses the boundaries in political science, and within my own field of political theory there has been a major revival of democratic theory. In political theory, argument about “democracy” is usually now qualified by one of an array of adjectives, which include cosmopolitan, agonistic, republican, and monitory. But the new form that has been by far the most successful is deliberative democracy. By 2007 John Dryzek could write that “deliberative democracy now constitutes the most active area of political theory in its entirety (not just democratic theory).” Not only is there an extremely large and rapidly growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, on deliberative democracy, but its influence has spread far outside universities.

This paper presents experimentation carried out at the Roman Republican city of La Caridad (Teruel, Spain), where different tools have been applied to obtain multispectral and thermal aerial images to enhance detection of archaeological cropmarks. Two different drone systems were used: a Mikrokopter designed by Tecnitop SA (Zaragoza, Spain) and an eBee produced by SenseFly Company (Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne, Switzerland). Thus, in this study, we have combined in-house manufacturing with commercial products. Six drone sensors were tested and compared in terms of their ability to identify buried remains in archaeological settlements by means of visual recognition. The sensors have different spectral ranges and spatial resolutions. This paper compares the images captured with different spectral range sensors to test the potential of this technology for archaeological benefits. The method used for the comparison of the tools has been based on direct visual inspection, as in traditional aerial archaeology. Through interpretation of the resulting data, our aim has been to determine which drones and sensors obtained the best results in the visualization of archaeological cropmarks. The experiment in La Caridad therefore demonstrates the benefit of using drones with different sensors to monitor archaeological cropmarks for a more cost-effective assessment, best spatial resolution and digital recording of buried archaeological remains.

The forecast of the development of energy balances of the world, Europe and Ukraine is presented. It is emphasized that in its development, the energy industry passes through bifurcation points, the exit from which can change the development scenarios up to the termination of work in a number of scientific areas and technologies. The behavior of systems passing along the path of their development of the bifurcation point, detailed research by the Nobel Prize laureate, physicist and chemist I.R. Prigogine. In its dynamics of development, the energy sector of Ukraine has already passed bifurcation points. Global political changes in the USSR and in the world (the era of "perestroika", the collapse of the USSR and the entire socialist camp) made it impossible to fulfill the main provisions of the USSR Energy Program for the long term and the republican target complex scientific and technical program "Energocomplex", as well as the creation of a new production technology electric power (thermal power plant with combined cycle - MHD generator as a superstructure above the steam power unit). 2020 may also be a bifurcation point in the development of energy in the world and in the regions. Already now, global changes in real GDP and CO2 emissions clearly correspond to global geopolitical, economic and environmental shocks in the world, including the impending Covid-19 pandom. The energy policy of Ukraine (energy strategy) depends on the energy circuits of the new world - on the challenges and risks of a global and local nature. Geopolitical and economic turbulence in the world makes it necessary to promptly monitor and, if necessary, make adjustments to the forecasts for the development of the economies of countries and the world as a whole, including the basic component of the economy - energy. Suggestions are made for the need to support the energy strategy, including the energy strategy adopted in Ukraine in 2017 for the period up to 2035, by working documents - operational sliding forecast plans (roadmaps) to manage and monitor its implementation at intermediate time intervals, creating perhaps a specialized structure for these purposes.

Objective. Intensive therapy of severe traumatic brain injury belongs to the most difficult section of resuscitation. Therefore, the main purpose of intensive care during the implementation is to eliminate disorders of Rheosorbilact homeostasis. Materials and methods. We analyzed 30 patients with traumatic brain injury in the intensive care unit of the Republican Clinical Hospital between 2018 and 2019. All patients were divided into two groups: 1st – control group (16 patients) – received complex intensive therapy without Rheosorbilact, while 2nd group (14 patients), received Rheosorbilact in a comprehensive intensive therapy. The main pharmacologically active substances of the drug are sorbitol, basic cations (Na, K, Ca, Mg), and sodium lactate. Thanks to these components, the drug has a hyperosmolar effect, causing fluid from the intercellular space to enter the vascular channel and thus improves microcirculation and perfusion of brain tissue. In order to monitor the effectiveness of the therapy in the dynamics evaluated indicators of hemodynamics (level of consciousness and diuresis), laboratory data (hemotocrit, electrolyte composition of blood, acid-alkaline blood condition, coagulogram), and MRI data. Rheosorbilact was used as part of a complex therapy in an infusion-transfusion program in the amount of 200-400 ml daily intravenous drip. Results. In patients, whom after the beginning of complex intensive therapy was included Rheosorbilact, was observed earlier (the first 6 h) compared to the control group, which did not use Rheosorbilact, stabilization of hemodynamics. Conclusions. Infusion therapy with Rheosorbilact in patients with traumatic brain injury contributed primarily to stabilization of hemodynamics and faster normalization of vital functions of the body.

The article is devoted to the quality of natural science education at universities. Moreover, this article reveals the causes and consequences of the decline in the level of mastery of these disciplines. The modernization of education efficiency aimed at improving the quality and accessibility of education itself largely depends on the way of using the objective information. This information can be received in the framework of studies of various types of education results such as monitoring studies of the republican level and international comparative studies. All these studies provide the information on the state of education; they allow correlating the planned and achieved results and based on that identifying the most significant education problems that need to be solved. The monitoring of the education quality implies the development of criteria for the assessments of knowledge for any stage of education. The calculation of students' progress rating can be one of the approaches to this problem. The assessment of the output knowledge of the students' progress rating can be done by using the electronic journal, which is the part of a university's automated information system. The standardization of the final rating on a scale of 0 to 100 creates an optimal opportunity to compare the results of educational progress at all stages of training. The use of virtual tools and software products is one of the essential interactive elements of the e-learning course in the virtual educational environment, which is particularly important in the study of natural sciences. These tools combine methodological and pedagogical technologies, information resources and modern software and help to monitor the educational process and find the solution to the issues of its quality.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relevance of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) in East Timor and proposes a set of ESD indicators to be implemented in the formal education sector. Design/methodology/approach – A detailed analysis of relevant literature concerning national development plans (Republica Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2011), literature centred in East Timor and international perspectives about ESD principles, policies and values (UN reports) was carried, in order to examine the relevance of ESD in East Timor and to assist the selection of a set of ESD indicators. These indicators are proposed in order to assess and monitor if the current national policies, educational programmes, secondary school content, learning goals and activities in formal education express concerns related with ESD promotion in terms of specific curricular themes, learning characteristics, learning resources, skills, values and attitudes. Findings – This paper argues that the East Timor government has intentions in ESD promotion and implementation. Thus, ESD indicators could be helpful in assessment of new curricular practices. However, even though ESDI may indicate that secondary school programmes, content, learning goals or activities are aligned with ESD principles, it is also important to assess if they then contribute effectively to sustainable development. Originality/value – The case study of East Timor adds to the literature about the current interests of young countries such as this in progressing towards a sustainable future, starting from the selection and implementation of ESD indicators in the current curriculum reform. If it is successful, ESD will contribute to transforming not only education but also the quality of life of the East Timorese.

Background. Infectious complications remain a serious post-transplant problem and make a major cause of poor outcome. Given the active development of transplant services at a regional level, the problem of infectious complications becomes increasingly important and requires monitoring of the etiological structure and level of antibiotic resistance in each hospital dealing with this problem.The purpose was to analyze the changes over time in the structure and antimicrobial resistance of the most common pathogens in various nosology, including in patients after organ transplantation, regardless gender and age.Material and methods. The study included 37,103 patients, of whom 8,091 (21.8%) were treated in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of the Vitebsk Regional Clinical Hospital (VRCH) for the period from 2015 to 2017; infectious complications after organ transplantation made 3%. The clinical samples were studied for bacteriology in the Republican Scientific and Practical Center "Infection in Surgery"; 20,280 clinical isolates were investigated.Results. Staphylococcus aureus (20.96%) dominated in the general structure of microorganisms cultured mainly from the wound surface in thermal burns; meanwhile, in the ICU, gram-negative microflora dominated and was presented with Acinetobacter spp. (22.75%) and Pseudomonas aeruginosa (22.74%) in the majority of cases. By 2017, there had been an increase in resistant isolates of Klebsiella spp. (22.87%) and Acinetobacter spp. (23.09%) and a reduction of P. aeruginosa (13.31%) and S. aureus (18.88%) seeding. The protocol of the antibacterial therapy initiation was set up in the ICU of Vitebsk Regional Clinical Hospital, based on the obtained results demonstrating that all S. aureus isolates were sensitive to linezolid, vancomycin and teicoplanin, while P. aeruginosa was sensitive to colistin. All isolated Acinetobacter spp. were sensitive to colistin and 80% of the isolates were sensitive to sulbactam. More than 95% of K. pneumonia isolates were sensitive to colistin and tigecycline.Conclusion. The current epidemiology is characterized by the prevalence of S. aureus (20.96%) in the overall structure of microorganisms, while Acinetobacter spp. (22.25%) and P. aeruginosa (22.74%) dominate in the ICU. Based on the microbiology study results, the protocol of antibacterial therapy initiation was established in the ICU of Vitebsk Regional Clinical Hospital. It is necessary to monitor the resistance of common microorganisms to certain antibiotics in order to develop algorithms for rational antibacterial treatment in each hospital.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.

<span>Abraham Téllez Aguilar presenta un desplegado aparecido en el periódico </span><em>El Monitor Republicano </em><span>en 1861, el cual proclamaba la fundación de una nueva Iglesia en Tamaulipas de carácter contrario al fanatismo religioso y a las congregaciones no apegadas a las Leyes de Reforma.</span>

El presente artículo muestra una de las facetas menos estudiadas del general Salvador Alvarado: su papel en la sucesión presidencial de 1920. A través de la revisión de fuentes poco exploradas como los periódicos El Heraldo de México y El Monitor Republicano podrá observarse la complejidad y tensión del ambiente político en la coyuntura electoral. Alvarado modificó su postura conforme avanzó la contienda, de una actitud belicosa que lo llevó a crear su propio partido político contra los generales Pablo González y Álvaro Obregón, pasó a ser un aliado del grupo sonorense en la lucha contra la imposición del candidato carrancista, Ignacio Bonillas. Además de comprender a un Alvarado interesado en la silla presidencial, este trabajo muestra el accionar de los periódicos capitalinos como espacios de discusión e impulsores de plataformas políticas en las elecciones que posicionaron a los sonorenses en la cúspide del poder.

The liability of the shipper in Roman law begins to be discussed with the development of maritime trade and following legal regulations. The development of navigation with the Romans came after the conquest of Carthage (146 BC), and this development lasted until the passing of Justinian’s compilation (527 BC). In this long period of time, the issue of the shipper’s liability did not always have the same legal treatment. Namely, bearing in mind all the social and economic circumstances in which maritime navigation has developed, the shipper’s liability was based on different legal principles. Thus, during the late republic, it represented a deviation from the principle of alteri stipulari nemo potest; in the classical period, it was based on the exclusive voluntas of the shipper, which was reflected in the appointment of the captain of the ship, while in the post-classical period of the development of the Roman law, this type of responsibility was based on the principles of safety and protection of the interests of passengers and goods in maritime transport, which is understandable given the social circumstances of this period (uncertainty of navigation by sea due to the recurrence of pirates). For this reason, this issue will be addressed through appropriate time frames (the late republican period, classical and post-classical law), so the creation and development of the institute of the shipper's liability would be easy to monitor and understand.

ObjectiveSchmallenberg virus (SBV) is an orthobunyavirus that primarily infects domestic and wild ruminants and causes symptoms such as transient fever, diarrhea, reduced milk production, congenital malformations and abortion. The first virus was identified in 2011 at the onset of a major outbreak in Europe (Germany, Hungary, and France).IntroductionIn 2012 - 2017 in Azerbaijan there was an unexpected increase of abortions in cattle and sheep that was unrelated to brucellosis or chlamydia infection. The first confirmed case of Schmallenberg disease was received from Beylagan district of Azerbaijan in October 2012. The import of cattle from Europe to Azerbaijan has commenced in 2012. Therefore, the surveillance study was launched to determine spread of infection among cattle and sheep and to monitor the situation in the country.MethodsState Veterinary Control Service notified 42 Regional Veterinary Offices of Azerbaijan to commence the monitoring of Schmallenberg disease. Blood samples were collected from sheep, and cattle and biopsies of heads or necks from aborted fetuses were sampled too.. The collected samples were tested in the Republican Veterinary Laboratory. ELISA was used to investigate the presence of specific antibodies against Schmallenberg virus in the blood samples using IDEXX Schmallenberg Ab Test Kit. The commercially available real-time PCR kits (VetMAX™ Schmallenberg Virus Kit) were applied to test the biopsy samples. Both tests were recommended by the World Organization for Animal Health.ResultsTotal, 40,257 blood samples were collected from suspicious cattle and sheep. 671 biopsies samples were taken from fetuses. 4,281 cattle and 999 sheep with antibodies against SBVwere detected. The PCR results showed that the 77 biopsies samples were positive for SBV. The highest numbers of seropositive animals were found in Ganja, Aghdash, Barda, and Baku.ConclusionsThis biosurveillance study determined SBV in the samples of cattle and sheep in Azerbaijan, therefore, it is important to carry out annual seromonitoring and start the vaccination program. It is essential to check the passport of imported cattle, which has the disease history and seroprevalence of SBV.ReferencesLaloy, E., Breard, E., Sailleau, C., Viarouge, C., Desprat, A., Zientara, S., Klein, F., Hars, J., Rossi, S., 2014. Schmallenberg virus infection among red deer, France, 2010-2012. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 20, 131–134. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2001.130411Larska, M., Krzysiak, M.K., Kesik-Maliszewska, J., Rola, J., 2014. Cross-sectional study of Schmallenberg virus seroprevalence in wild ruminants in Poland at the end of the vector season of 2013. BMC Vet. Res. 10, 967. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12917-014-0307-3