Academic literature on the topic 'Monothematic delusions'

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Journal articles on the topic "Monothematic delusions"

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Coltheart, M., R. Langdon, and R. McKay. "Schizophrenia and Monothematic Delusions." Schizophrenia Bulletin 33, no. 3 (2007): 642–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbm017.

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Davies, Martin, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, and Nora Breen. "Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8, no. 2 (2001): 133–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2001.0007.

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Coltheart, Max. "On the Distinction between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions." Mind & Language 28, no. 1 (2013): 103–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mila.12011.

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Coltheart, Max. "Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on polythematic and monothematic delusions." World Psychiatry 14, no. 2 (2015): 186–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wps.20214.

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Bayne, Tim, and Elisabeth Pacherie. "Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11, no. 1 (2004): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2004.0033.

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Neustadter, Eli, Juno Pinder, and Philip Corlett. "SU34. A Systematic Review of Behavioral Research and Lesion Evidence for the 2-Factor Theory of Monothematic Delusions." Schizophrenia Bulletin 43, suppl_1 (2017): S173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbx024.032.

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Sullivan-Bissett, Ema. "Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience." Philosophical Psychology 31, no. 6 (2018): 920–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1468024.

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Bell, Vaughan, Caryl Marshall, Zara Kanji, Sam Wilkinson, Peter Halligan, and Quinton Deeley. "Uncovering Capgras delusion using a large-scale medical records database." BJPsych Open 3, no. 4 (2017): 179–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjpo.bp.117.005041.

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BackgroundCapgras delusion is scientifically important but most commonly reported as single case studies. Studies analysing large clinical records databases focus on common disorders but none have investigated rare syndromes.AimsIdentify cases of Capgras delusion and associated psychopathology, demographics, cognitive function and neuropathology in light of existing models.MethodCombined computational data extraction and qualitative classification using 250 000 case records from South London and Maudsley Clinical Record Interactive Search (CRIS) database.ResultsWe identified 84 individuals and extracted diagnosis-matched comparison groups. Capgras was not ‘monothematic’ in the majority of cases. Most cases involved misidentified family members or close partners but others were misidentified in 25% of cases, contrary to dual-route face recognition models. Neuroimaging provided no evidence for predominantly right hemisphere damage. Individuals were ethnically diverse with a range of psychosis spectrum diagnoses.ConclusionsCapgras is more diverse than current models assume. Identification of rare syndromes complements existing ‘big data’ approaches in psychiatry.
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Noordhof, Paul, and Ema Sullivan-Bissett. "The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions." Synthese, June 21, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03245-x.

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AbstractMonothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypical, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest (monothematic delusion) and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all wanting. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which ‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a certain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion formation and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic delusion to be present.
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Azzam, H. M. E., M. A. Hamed, Y. A. Elhawary, and A. H. A. Mohammed. "Delusions in a Sample of Patients with Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder: The same or different?" QJM: An International Journal of Medicine 113, Supplement_1 (2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qjmed/hcaa054.025.

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Abstract Background Growing evidences indicate that there is overlapping between schizophrenia (SCZ) and bipolar disorder (BP) in neurobiology, phenomenology or even in changing of diagnosis from schizophrenia to bipolar disorder or vice versa. Psychotic symptoms can be observed during manic or depressive episodes in bipolar disorder. While manic or depressive episodes can be observed between or during psychotic episodes in schizophrenia. Aim of the work To describe delusional types present in both groups of study sample: a group of patients with schizophrenia and a group of patients with bipolar disorder accompanied by psychotic features. Also to compare between types of delusions in patients with schizophrenia and patients with bipolar disorder accompanied by psychotic features. Patients and Methods total 80 patients (40 in group of Schizophrenia and 40 in group of bipolar disorder accompanied by psychotic features) were selected as convenient sampling from patients during the first two weeks of their admission in the Institute of Psychiatry, Ain Shams University Hospitals. Nature and types of the delusions were assessed by using Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS), Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and Young Mania Rating Scale (YMRS) in study period from 1st of October 2017 till 1st of April 2018. Results Delusion of persecution is the commonest delusion in group of SCZ (37.5%), while delusion of grandiosity is the commonest delusion in group of BP accompanied by psychotic features (32.5%). Monothematic delusions are doubling frequent in group of BP accompanied by psychotic features (75%) if it compared to group of SCZ (35%). Non systematized delusions are the dominant in group of SCZ (45%) while most delusions in other group are some systematized (45%). Delusions of most patients in group of SCZ are incongruent with mood (77.5%). While delusions of most patients in group of BP accompanied by psychotic features are congruent with mood (65%). The presence of delusion is positively correlated to higher score of: SANS (in both groups), PANSS (in both groups) and YMRS (in BP accompanied by psychotic features). Conclusion delusions of schizophrenia are different in nature and types when it compared to delusions of bipolar disorder.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Monothematic delusions"

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Wilkinson, Sam Luis John. "Monothematic delusions and the nature of belief." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/8919.

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In this thesis I argue that our philosophical account of the nature and norms of belief should both inform and be informed by our scientific understanding of monothematic delusions. In Chapter 1, I examine and criticise standard attempts to answer the question “What is delusion?” In particular, I claim that such attempts are misguided because they misunderstand the kind of term that “delusion” is. In Chapter 2, I look at the nature of explanation in psychology and apply it to delusions. In particular I look at the constraints on a successful explanation of a person’s psychological state in terms of brain damage or dysfunction. I then propose, in Chapter 3, a way of understanding how delusions of misidentification arise. In particular, I criticise the standard view that they are formed via inference (in the relevant sense of “inference”) on the basis of anomalous experience. I draw on empirical work on object and individual tracking, on dreams, and on the Frégoli delusion, and argue that inference is not only un-necessary, but is actually often bypassed in humans, for judgments of identification. The result is a non-inferential file-retrieval view. On certain views of belief, this would mean that the Capgras delusion lacks the right functional role to count as a genuine belief. In Chapter 4, I criticise such views of belief, and put forward a “downstream only” view. Roughly, something is a case of believing if and only if it disposes people to act in certain ways. I defend such a view against two serious and influential objections. In Chapter 5, I ask whether this means that the Capgras delusion can therefore safely be called a belief. I argue that there is a risk – even if one accepts the downstream only view of belief – that it still won’t count as a belief, as a result of the subject’s “incoherence” or “agentive inertia.” However, I then distinguish egocentric from encyclopaedic doxastic states. This opens the possibility that one can truly say that the subject has the egocentric belief, “This man is not my father”, but may fail to have the encyclopaedic belief, “My father has been replaced by an impostor”. It also demonstrates that the question “Are delusions beliefs?” has been approached in an unhelpful way by the main participants in the debate. This thesis is important because it shows the extent to which real-world phenomena can inform and be informed by central philosophical notions like belief. More precisely, it shows that the most plausible way of accounting for monothematic delusions involves abandoning both a strong normativism, and a discrete representationalism, about belief.
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Books on the topic "Monothematic delusions"

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Sass, Louis A., and Elizabeth Pienkos. Delusion. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, et al. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0039.

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This chapter offers an overview of the phenomenological approach to delusions, emphasizing what Karl Jaspers called the "true delusions" of schizophrenia. Phenomenological psychopathology focuses on theexperienceof delusions and the delusional world. Several features of this approach are surveyed, including emphasis on formal qualities of subjective life (e.g., mutations of time, space, causality, self-experience, or sense of reality) and questioning of standard assumptions about delusions as erroneous belief (the traditional doxastic view, or "poor reality-testing" formula). The altered modalities of world-oriented and self-oriented experience that precede and ground delusions in schizophrenia, especially the experiences of revelation that Klaus Conrad termed the outer and innerapophany, are then discussed. The chapter first considers the famous "delusional mood" (feelings of strangeness and tension, and a sense of tantalizing yet ineffable meaning ), then the role of ipseity-disturbance (altered minimal or core self, of the basic, pre-reflective sense of existing as a unified and vitalsubjectof experience). In both cases it is explained how delusions can develop out of these distinctive alterations of perception and feeling. The classic question of the understandability or comprehensibility of schizophrenic delusion, together with the related issues of wish-fulfillment and rationalizing motives are then considered. The chapter addresses the crucial but neglected issue of the felt reality-status of delusions or the delusional world, discussing derealization, "double bookkeeping" (in which the patient experiences delusional reality as existing in a different ontological domain from everyday reality), and "double exposure" (merging of two perspectives on reality, with the potential for confusion this implies). The chapter concludes by discussing delusions typically found in paranoid and affective psychoses, and monothematic delusions found in certain organic conditions.
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Book chapters on the topic "Monothematic delusions"

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"Monothematic Delusions and Existential Feelings." In Delusion and Self-Deception. Psychology Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203838044-14.

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Bortolotti, Lisa. "Motivated Delusional Beliefs." In The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863984.003.0005.

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In this chapter, the author argues that monothematic delusions that have been construed as responses to trauma or adversity have the potential for epistemic innocence. So-called ‘motivated’ delusions are irrational because they are the output of a mechanism enabling an agent’s desires to influence the agent’s beliefs, independent of the evidence available. Two examples are discussed in the chapter, erotomania and anosognosia. It is found that the adoption of motivated delusions contributes to managing negative emotions that could otherwise become overwhelming and negatively affect the agent’s epistemic functionality by causing depression. By presenting reality as better than it is, the motivated delusion prevents the agent’s disengagement from the surrounding environment and can be seen as temporarily beneficial.
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Marneros, Andreas. "Delusional disorders." In New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, edited by John R. Geddes, Nancy C. Andreasen, and Guy M. Goodwin. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198713005.003.0062.

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Delusional disorders are psychotic disorders, characterized by well-systematized and long-lasting delusions, whereas other mental and personality domains usually remain intact. Their main characteristics are: (1) chronicity—they may last several months, years, or decades, and in some patients even lifelong; (2) stability—they usually are stable, that is, they only rarely shift into another psychotic disorder; (3) monosymptomatic—delusions are the only symptom; in some rare cases, they could be accompanied by other symptoms, like hallucinations, but if they occur, they are not prominent and usually derivable from the delusions; (4) monothematic—the delusions have a single theme and only rarely a combination; (5) they are difficult to be treated; and (6) they are autochthonous, that is, independent, and autonomous, having their own clinical features and rules. Their main phenomenological types are: erotomanic, jealous, persecutory and related types, somatic, mixed, and unspecified, whereas the existence of an independent grandiose type is uncertain.
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