Relevant bibliographies by topics / Moral Sentimentalism

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
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  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Moral Sentimentalism'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Moral Sentimentalism"

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Bikauskaitė, Renata. "RŪPESČIO ETIKOS IR SENTIMENTALIZMO SANTYKIS." Problemos 85 (January 1, 2013): 57–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2014.0.2922.

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Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama ryškėjanti tendencija sutapatinanti rūpesčio etiką su sentimentalizmu. Lyginant šios tendencijos atstovo Michaelo Slote’o ir vienos iš rūpesčio etikos kūrėjų Nel Noddings filosofiją, analizuojamas rūpesčio etikos ir sentimentalizmo santykis, pastarojo galimybės adekvačiai konceptualizuoti rūpesčio / rūpinimosi specifiką. Teigiama, kad sentimentalizmo konceptualinis žodynas, grindžiamas empatijos sąvoka, užgožia reliacinį rūpesčio etikos pobūdį. Straipsnyje empatijos sąvokai priešpriešinama dėmesio sąvoka, kurią nemaža dalis rūpesčio etikos atstovų pasitelkia apibrėžti moralinį rūpestį / rūpinimąsi. Analizuojant Simone Weil ir Iris Murdoch filosofiją, atskleidžiama dėmesio sąvokos reikšmė rūpesčio etikai.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: rūpesčio etika, sentimentalizmas, Slote, Noddings. The Relationship Between Ethics of Care and SentimentalismRenata Bikauskaitė AbstractThe article analyses the currently emerging tendency to identify ethics of care with sentimentalism. Through comparison of philosophy represented by one of the most prominent representative of this trend, Michael Slote, with the ideas of Nel Noddings, one of the founders of ethics of care, the relationship between ethics of care and sentimentalism is identified. The question arises whether sentimentalist moral vocabulary is adequate for conceptualising the peculiarities of ethics of care? The paper argues that any attempt to elaborate ethics of care while at the same time invoking the conceptual apparatus of sentimentalism, which is based on the notion of empathy, actually conceals the relational nature of this ethics. Further analysis of the notion of attention found in the works of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch highlights the theoretical influence of this notion to ethics of care in general.Keywords: ethics of care, sentimentalism, Michael Slote, Nel Noddings.
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Slote, Michael. "Moral Sentimentalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7, no. 1 (March 2004): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:etta.0000019982.56628.c3.

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Schroeder, M. "Moral Sentimentalism." Philosophical Review 120, no. 3 (January 1, 2011): 452–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1263710.

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Driver, Julia. "IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (December 20, 2007): 301–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052508080114.

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Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.
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Daniel Shaw. "Hume's Moral Sentimentalism." Hume Studies 19, no. 1 (1993): 31–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0406.

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Golub, Camil. "Reid on Moral Sentimentalism." Res Philosophica 96, no. 4 (2019): 431–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1815.

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Vogelstein, Eric. "A new moral sentimentalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 3 (June 2016): 346–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1169383.

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AbstractThis paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.
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Szigeti, András. "Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas." Dialectica 69, no. 1 (March 2015): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12087.

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Quigley, James G. "Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14, no. 4 (February 27, 2011): 483–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9272-0.

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Howard, Nathan Robert. "Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21, no. 5 (November 2018): 1065–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9946-y.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Moral Sentimentalism"

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Zhou, Yuqing, and 周玉清. "Hume's sentimentalism and moral motivation." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/195973.

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Why should I be moral? My thesis is dedicated to exploring how David Hume’s moral theory may answer this question. According to Hume’s psychology of action, only passions, desires and dispositions have motivational force, but reason alone has not. As Hume believes that morality is action-guided, he bases his moral theory on sentiments. The advantage of a sentiment-based theory is that it easily explains why we follow morality: as we have moral sentiments, we already have a motive to follow morality. However, it seems that a moral theory based on sentiments hardly explains why we follow impartial judgments, for original sentiments arising from sympathy are always partial. proposes a general point of view to correct unregulated sympathy. Adopting a general point of view, we leave aside personal interest and view a person through the eyes of those who are in his narrow circle according to the effects his character tends to cause. However, there seems be tension between sentimentalism and Hume’s general point of view. It is doubtful whether the judgments made from a general point of view are still sentiment-based and how we are moved to leave our personal standpoint to take up a general point of view when we are naturally more concerned with our own self-interest. Hence, the main difficulty for Hume’s moral theory is to explain what causes us to adopt a general point of view and act morally in a sentimentalist framework. I suggest that to get rid of the contradiction in the soul caused by our sympathy with others’ sentiments is the primary motive for us to adopt a general point of view. Moreover, understanding the limitations of human nature, we do not have overly high expectation of people; hence, we are satisfied with a person if he benefits his narrow circle and therefore limit ourselves to a general point view.
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Kretschmer, Fritz Martin. "Sentimentalism : a human analysis of moral belief." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.321786.

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Menken, Kyle. "Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments." Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/2817.

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Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be justified in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable.
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Silveira, Matheus de Mesquita. "O papel dos mecanismos psicobiológicos de sociabilidade no comportamento moral." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2015. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/4845.

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Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-10-16T14:04:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MATHEUS DE MESQUITA SILVEIRA_.pdf: 3195256 bytes, checksum: 93215bf3d853defd937188616055e161 (MD5)
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Esta tese visa apresentar uma visão “sentimentalista-evolucionista” do comportamento moral, a fim de defender que os vínculos emocionais propiciados pela empatia constituem a base da moralidade. O argumento parte do conceito de moral adotado por Adriano Naves de Brito, a partir do trabalho de Ernst Tugendhat, para quem a moral é uma relação de exigências recíprocas presente em pequenos grupos. Minha proposta é alargar essa concepção de modo a abarcar não só seres humanos, mas também mamíferos de vida social complexa. A investigação do fundamento motivacional da moralidade será feita a partir dos escritos de David Hume, para quem as emoções representam, em última instância, a fonte que inclina os indivíduos a aprovar e censurar ações. Uma tese de proposta naturalista precisa compatibilizar sua base teórica com conceitos centrais do evolucionismo. Por esse motivo, a leitura desses autores e os argumentos desenvolvidos no decorrer dessa investigação estarão enraizados em conceitos centrais da teoria evolucionista, conforme proposta por Charles Darwin. Considerando a importância que as emoções e a empatia possuem na discussão metaética sobre o comportamento moral, é necessário explicá-las a partir de uma conceptualização naturalista. A discussão entre o construtivismo social e a psicologia evolucionista é relevante a essa questão. Utilizarei estudos sobre a fisiologia das emoções socialmente relevantes da culpa, vergonha e raiva, para defender um fundamento biológico para as mesmas. Considerando que um efeito não possui uma natureza diferente de sua causa, demonstrar que elas são expressas e reconhecidas de maneira inata é um forte argumento em favor da defesa de sua origem natural. Contudo, ainda que sejam expressas e reconhecidas de maneira inata, é preciso que os indivíduos não sejam indiferentes à sua manifestação. Mecanismos psicobiológicos de sociabilidade consistem nos candidatos ideais para explicar a vinculação emocional inerente a pequenos grupo e central a moralidade explicada em bases naturais compatíveis com a teoria evolucionista. Caso seja possível explicar os elementos constituintes dos comportamentos normativos em moldes “sentimentalista-evolucionista”, então se obterá um real avanço no projeto mais amplo de naturalização da moral.
This dissertation aims to present a “sentimentalist-evolutionist” view of moral behavior, in order to argue that the emotional bonds elicited by empathy constitute the ground of morality. The argument starts from the concept of morals adopted by Adriano Naves de Brito, from Ernst Tugendhat's work, for whom morality is a relation of reciprocal demands presents in small groups. My proposal is to extend this concept in order to include not only human beings, but also mammals with complex social lives. The investigation of the motivational foundation of morality will be done from the writings of David Hume, for whom emotions ultimately represent the bases that lean individuals to approve or censor actions. A dissertation with a naturalistic proposal needs compatibilize its theoretical base with central concepts of evolutionism. Therefore, the reading of these authors and the arguments developed in the course of this investigation will be rooted in central concepts of the evolutionist theory, as proposed by Charles Darwin. Considering the importance that emotions and empathy have in the metaethical discussions about moral behavior, it is necessary to explain them from a naturalistic conceptualization. The debate between social constructivism and evolutionist psychology is relevant to this question. I will use studies on the physiology of socially relevant emotions of guilt, shame and anger, in order to defend its biological bases. Considering that an effect does not have a different nature of its cause, to show that emotions are expressed and recognized innately is a strong argument in the defense of its natural origin. However, even if emotions are expressed and recognized innately, it is important that individuals do not be indifferent toward its manifestation. Mechanisms psychobiological of sociability consists in an ideal candidate to explain the emotional bond inherent to small groups and central to a morality, explained in natural bases and compatible with evolutionist’s theories. In case one can explain the elements of normative behaviors in the ways of a “sentimentalist-evolutionist” approach, then it will obtain a real advance in the wider project of naturalization of morality.
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Montello, Maria L. "Rational Requirements for Moral Motivation: The Psychopath's Open Question." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/93.

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Psychopaths pose a challenge to those who make claims about the strength of moral assessments. These individuals are entirely unmoved by the moral rules that they articulate and purportedly espouse. Psychopaths appear rationally intact but are emotionally broken. In some cases, they commit horrendous crimes yet show no guilt, no remorse. Sentimentalists claim that the empirical evidence about psychopaths’ affective deficits supports that moral judgment is rooted in emotion and that psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments—they can’t. Here, I challenge an explanation of psychopathy that indicts psychopaths’ emotional impairments alone. I conclude that there are rational requirements for moral motivation and that psychological and neuroscientific research support that psychopaths do not make the grade.
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Andrade, Pedro Fior Mota de. "Sentimentos morais e o conceito de justiça na filosofia moral de David Hume." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2014. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=8561.

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Esta dissertação objetiva descrever e analisar criticamente o conceito de justiça no contexto da filosofia moral de David Hume. Com o propósito de fornecer uma explicação completa e consistente de sua teoria da justiça, pretende-se, em primeiro lugar, apresentar a teoria moral sentimentalista de Hume e explicar de que forma sua concepção de justiça se associa com os princípios fundamentais da moralidade. O primeiro capítulo da dissertação consiste, primeiramente, em uma breve exposição do problema do livre-arbítrio e do determinismo e, em segundo lugar, na apresentação da alternativa compatibilista de Hume. Conforme se pretende demonstrar ao longo deste capítulo, a estratégia da solução compatibilista de Hume deve necessariamente envolver a noção de sentimento moral, cujo conceito é central em seu sistema moral. Em seguida, no segundo capítulo, será examinada a teoria moral de Hume, a qual se estrutura em duas hipóteses principais: a tese negativa que contesta a ideia de que o fundamento da moralidade se baseie exclusivamente nas operações da razão (relações de ideias e questões de fato); e a tese positiva que afirma que a fonte da moralidade reside em nossas paixões, sentimentos e afetos de prazer e dor ao contemplarmos caracteres virtuosos e viciosos. O terceiro capítulo visa apresentar a teoria da justiça de Hume, objeto principal desta dissertação. A hipótese central que Hume sugere é que a virtude da justiça não é instintiva ou natural nos seres humanos. Ela é possível unicamente por intermédio de acordos, convenções e artifícios humanos motivados pelo auto-interesse. A tese de Hume é exatamente que a origem da justiça, enquanto uma convenção social, só pode ser explicada com base em dois fatores: a atuação dos sentimentos de nossa disposição interna e a circunstância externa caracterizada pela escassez relativa de bens materiais. Finalmente, o último capítulo desta dissertação visa discutir a teoria política de Hume com o propósito de complementar sua teoria da justiça. Hume defende que a justificação da instituição da autoridade soberana e dos deveres civis se funda nos mesmos princípios da convenção de justiça: eles também são artifícios criados exclusivamente para servir ao nosso próprio interesse.
This dissertation aims to describe and critically analyze the concept of justice in the context of David Humes moral philosophy. In order to provide a complete and consistent account of his theory of justice, I intend to present Humes sentimentalist moral theory and explain how his conception of justice relates with the fundamental principles of morality. The first chapter of the dissertation consists, in first place, in a short exposition of the problem of free-will and determinism and, in second place, in a presentation of Humes compatibilist alternative. As I intend to show throughout the chapter, the strategy of Humes compatibilist solution should necessarily involve the notion of moral sentiment, whose concept is central in his moral system. Then, in the second chapter it will be examined Humes moral theory, which is structured in two main hypotheses: the negative thesis that rejects the idea that the foundation of morality is based exclusively on the operations of reason (relations of ideas and matters of facts); and the positive thesis that affirms that the source of morality lies in our passions, sentiments and affections of pleasure and pain when we contemplate virtuous and vicious characters. The third chapter aims to present Humes theory of justice, the main subject of this dissertation. The central hypothesis advanced by Hume is that the virtue of justice is not instinctive or natural in the human beings. It is only possible through human agreements, conventions and artifices motivated by self-interest. Humes thesis is precisely that the origin of justice, as a social convention, can be only explained based on two factors: the operation of the sentiments of our internal disposition and the external circumstances of relative scarcity of material goods. Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation aims to discuss Humes political theory in order to supplement his theory of justice. Hume claims that the justification of the institution of the sovereign authority and the civil obligations are grounded in the same principles held in the convention of justice: they are also artifices created solely to serve our own interests.
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Li, Shaobing. "Experiential Moral Character: Reconceptualization and Measurement Justification." Miami University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1574794255368781.

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Richards, Samuel. "Can Adam Smith Answer the Normative Question?" Digital Archive @ GSU, 2013. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/131.

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In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of morality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory.
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Silva, Jean Pedro Malavolta e. "Simpatia e sentimentos morais em David Hume." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156341.

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O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação.
The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.
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Weber, Elijah. "Resentment and Morality." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1427798481.

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Books on the topic "Moral Sentimentalism"

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Moral sentimentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Sentimental Twain: Samuel Clemens in the maze of moral philosophy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.

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Proper Mark Twain. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999.

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Civilized creatures: Urban animals, sentimental culture, and American literature, 1850-1900. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

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Slote, Michael. Moral Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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Slote, Michael. Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325911.003.0009.

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Driver, Julia. Moral Sense and Sentimentalism. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199545971.013.0017.

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Kristjánsson, Kristján. Emotions and Moral Value. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809678.003.0002.

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Chapter 2 explores questions about the relationship between emotion and moral value. For an emotion to be virtuous, it must be getting moral value right, but what exactly does ‘getting moral value right’ mean? The debate about the moral epistemology of emotions is waged between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism. Rationalists believe that moral facts exist independently of our emotions, and that those facts can be tracked by human reason. Sentimentalists believe either that no moral facts exist at all or, alternatively, that moral facts are created by our emotions and exist in our minds. It is helpful to distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of both moral rationalism and sentimentalism. This chapter argues that Aristotelianism is best understood as a form of ‘soft rationalism’—and that it can offer it as an antidote to currently fashionable forms of ‘hard sentimentalism’.
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Graham, Gordon. Was Reid a Moral Realist? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198783909.003.0003.

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This chapter argues that, contrary to a very widely held view, Reid’s express disagreement with Hume on the matter of morality cannot satisfactorily be pressed into the “realism versus sentimentalism” dichotomy. Hume is certainly a sentimentalist, but there is good reason to interpret Reid’s use of the analogy between moral sense and sense perception in a way that does not imply the existence of “real” moral properties. Reid makes judgment central to the analogy, and this gives the exercise of an intellectual “power” primacy over passive sensual experience. The analogy thus allows him to apply the concepts “true” and “false” to moral judgments, without any quasi-realist appeal to moral facts.
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Forster, Michael N. Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199588367.003.0008.

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Herder develops a number of very important principles both in meta-ethics and in first-order morality. In meta-ethics he argues for a form of sentimentalism, but a form of it that acknowledges a role for cognition in the sentiments involved and which emphasizes their radical variability between periods and cultures. He also invents a “genetic” or “genealogical” method predicated on such variability and applies it to moral values in particular in order to make them better understood. And finally, he develops an ambitious theory and practice of moral pedagogy that rests on his sentimentalism and which accordingly focuses on causal influences on moral character formation, such as role models and literature. In first-order morality he invents an important pluralistic form of cosmopolitanism to replace the more usual but problematic homogenizing cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment; an influential ideal of individual Bildung, or self-formation; and a distinctive ideal of humanity.
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Book chapters on the topic "Moral Sentimentalism"

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Fleischacker, Samuel. "Moral sentimentalism." In Adam Smith, 61–74. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315225876-3.

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2

Baillie, James. "Hume’s moral sentimentalism." In The Humean Mind, 236–47. First edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: The Routledge philosophical minds: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781138323032-19.

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3

Haschemi Yekani, Elahe. "Introduction: Provincialising the Rise of the British Novel in the Transatlantic Public Sphere." In Familial Feeling, 1–66. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58641-6_1.

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Abstract:
AbstractIn the introduction to Familial Feeling, Haschemi Yekani proposes a transatlantic reframing of Ian Watt’s famous work on the rise of the novel. Offering a critical overview of the intertwined histories of enslavement and modernity, this chapter proposes a focus on transatlantic entanglement already in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century to challenge the more prevalent retrospective paradigm of “writing back” in postcolonial studies. Introducing the concepts of familial feeling and entangled tonalities, Haschemi Yekani describes the affective dimension of literature that shapes notions of national belonging. This is then discussed in the book in relation to the four entangled aesthetic tonalities of familial feeling in early Black Atlantic writing and canonical British novels by Daniel Defoe, Olaudah Equiano, Ignatius Sancho, Laurence Sterne, Jane Austen, Robert Wedderburn, Charles Dickens, and Mary Seacole. To provide context for the following literary readings, scholarship on sentimentalism and the abolition of slavery is introduced and significantly extended, especially in relation to the shifts from moral sentiment and the abolition of the slave trade in the eighteenth century to social reform and the rise of the new imperialism and colonial expansion in the nineteenth century.
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4

"Sentimentalism Naturalized." In Moral Psychology. The MIT Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/7573.003.0007.

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5

Slote, Michael. "Introduction." In Moral Sentimentalism, 3–12. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0001.

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Slote, Michael. "Empathy." In Moral Sentimentalism, 13–26. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0002.

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7

Slote, Michael. "Moral Approval and Disapproval." In Moral Sentimentalism, 27–44. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0003.

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Slote, Michael. "Empathy in Moral Judgment." In Moral Sentimentalism, 45–56. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0004.

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9

Slote, Michael. "A New Kind of Reference‐Fixing." In Moral Sentimentalism, 57–68. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0005.

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10

Slote, Michael. "How To Derive “Ought” from “Is”." In Moral Sentimentalism, 69–82. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0006.

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