Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Moral Sentimentalism'

Why should I be moral? My thesis is dedicated to exploring how David Hume’s moral theory may answer this question. According to Hume’s psychology of action, only passions, desires and dispositions have motivational force, but reason alone has not. As Hume believes that morality is action-guided, he bases his moral theory on sentiments. The advantage of a sentiment-based theory is that it easily explains why we follow morality: as we have moral sentiments, we already have a motive to follow morality. However, it seems that a moral theory based on sentiments hardly explains why we follow impartial judgments, for original sentiments arising from sympathy are always partial. proposes a general point of view to correct unregulated sympathy. Adopting a general point of view, we leave aside personal interest and view a person through the eyes of those who are in his narrow circle according to the effects his character tends to cause. However, there seems be tension between sentimentalism and Hume’s general point of view. It is doubtful whether the judgments made from a general point of view are still sentiment-based and how we are moved to leave our personal standpoint to take up a general point of view when we are naturally more concerned with our own self-interest. Hence, the main difficulty for Hume’s moral theory is to explain what causes us to adopt a general point of view and act morally in a sentimentalist framework. I suggest that to get rid of the contradiction in the soul caused by our sympathy with others’ sentiments is the primary motive for us to adopt a general point of view. Moreover, understanding the limitations of human nature, we do not have overly high expectation of people; hence, we are satisfied with a person if he benefits his narrow circle and therefore limit ourselves to a general point view.
published_or_final_version
Philosophy
Master
Master of Philosophy

Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be justified in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-10-16T14:04:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MATHEUS DE MESQUITA SILVEIRA_.pdf: 3195256 bytes, checksum: 93215bf3d853defd937188616055e161 (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-10-16T14:04:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MATHEUS DE MESQUITA SILVEIRA_.pdf: 3195256 bytes, checksum: 93215bf3d853defd937188616055e161 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-28
CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos
Esta tese visa apresentar uma visão “sentimentalista-evolucionista” do comportamento moral, a fim de defender que os vínculos emocionais propiciados pela empatia constituem a base da moralidade. O argumento parte do conceito de moral adotado por Adriano Naves de Brito, a partir do trabalho de Ernst Tugendhat, para quem a moral é uma relação de exigências recíprocas presente em pequenos grupos. Minha proposta é alargar essa concepção de modo a abarcar não só seres humanos, mas também mamíferos de vida social complexa. A investigação do fundamento motivacional da moralidade será feita a partir dos escritos de David Hume, para quem as emoções representam, em última instância, a fonte que inclina os indivíduos a aprovar e censurar ações. Uma tese de proposta naturalista precisa compatibilizar sua base teórica com conceitos centrais do evolucionismo. Por esse motivo, a leitura desses autores e os argumentos desenvolvidos no decorrer dessa investigação estarão enraizados em conceitos centrais da teoria evolucionista, conforme proposta por Charles Darwin. Considerando a importância que as emoções e a empatia possuem na discussão metaética sobre o comportamento moral, é necessário explicá-las a partir de uma conceptualização naturalista. A discussão entre o construtivismo social e a psicologia evolucionista é relevante a essa questão. Utilizarei estudos sobre a fisiologia das emoções socialmente relevantes da culpa, vergonha e raiva, para defender um fundamento biológico para as mesmas. Considerando que um efeito não possui uma natureza diferente de sua causa, demonstrar que elas são expressas e reconhecidas de maneira inata é um forte argumento em favor da defesa de sua origem natural. Contudo, ainda que sejam expressas e reconhecidas de maneira inata, é preciso que os indivíduos não sejam indiferentes à sua manifestação. Mecanismos psicobiológicos de sociabilidade consistem nos candidatos ideais para explicar a vinculação emocional inerente a pequenos grupo e central a moralidade explicada em bases naturais compatíveis com a teoria evolucionista. Caso seja possível explicar os elementos constituintes dos comportamentos normativos em moldes “sentimentalista-evolucionista”, então se obterá um real avanço no projeto mais amplo de naturalização da moral.
This dissertation aims to present a “sentimentalist-evolutionist” view of moral behavior, in order to argue that the emotional bonds elicited by empathy constitute the ground of morality. The argument starts from the concept of morals adopted by Adriano Naves de Brito, from Ernst Tugendhat's work, for whom morality is a relation of reciprocal demands presents in small groups. My proposal is to extend this concept in order to include not only human beings, but also mammals with complex social lives. The investigation of the motivational foundation of morality will be done from the writings of David Hume, for whom emotions ultimately represent the bases that lean individuals to approve or censor actions. A dissertation with a naturalistic proposal needs compatibilize its theoretical base with central concepts of evolutionism. Therefore, the reading of these authors and the arguments developed in the course of this investigation will be rooted in central concepts of the evolutionist theory, as proposed by Charles Darwin. Considering the importance that emotions and empathy have in the metaethical discussions about moral behavior, it is necessary to explain them from a naturalistic conceptualization. The debate between social constructivism and evolutionist psychology is relevant to this question. I will use studies on the physiology of socially relevant emotions of guilt, shame and anger, in order to defend its biological bases. Considering that an effect does not have a different nature of its cause, to show that emotions are expressed and recognized innately is a strong argument in the defense of its natural origin. However, even if emotions are expressed and recognized innately, it is important that individuals do not be indifferent toward its manifestation. Mechanisms psychobiological of sociability consists in an ideal candidate to explain the emotional bond inherent to small groups and central to a morality, explained in natural bases and compatible with evolutionist’s theories. In case one can explain the elements of normative behaviors in the ways of a “sentimentalist-evolutionist” approach, then it will obtain a real advance in the wider project of naturalization of morality.

Psychopaths pose a challenge to those who make claims about the strength of moral assessments. These individuals are entirely unmoved by the moral rules that they articulate and purportedly espouse. Psychopaths appear rationally intact but are emotionally broken. In some cases, they commit horrendous crimes yet show no guilt, no remorse. Sentimentalists claim that the empirical evidence about psychopaths’ affective deficits supports that moral judgment is rooted in emotion and that psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments—they can’t. Here, I challenge an explanation of psychopathy that indicts psychopaths’ emotional impairments alone. I conclude that there are rational requirements for moral motivation and that psychological and neuroscientific research support that psychopaths do not make the grade.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Esta dissertação objetiva descrever e analisar criticamente o conceito de justiça no contexto da filosofia moral de David Hume. Com o propósito de fornecer uma explicação completa e consistente de sua teoria da justiça, pretende-se, em primeiro lugar, apresentar a teoria moral sentimentalista de Hume e explicar de que forma sua concepção de justiça se associa com os princípios fundamentais da moralidade. O primeiro capítulo da dissertação consiste, primeiramente, em uma breve exposição do problema do livre-arbítrio e do determinismo e, em segundo lugar, na apresentação da alternativa compatibilista de Hume. Conforme se pretende demonstrar ao longo deste capítulo, a estratégia da solução compatibilista de Hume deve necessariamente envolver a noção de sentimento moral, cujo conceito é central em seu sistema moral. Em seguida, no segundo capítulo, será examinada a teoria moral de Hume, a qual se estrutura em duas hipóteses principais: a tese negativa que contesta a ideia de que o fundamento da moralidade se baseie exclusivamente nas operações da razão (relações de ideias e questões de fato); e a tese positiva que afirma que a fonte da moralidade reside em nossas paixões, sentimentos e afetos de prazer e dor ao contemplarmos caracteres virtuosos e viciosos. O terceiro capítulo visa apresentar a teoria da justiça de Hume, objeto principal desta dissertação. A hipótese central que Hume sugere é que a virtude da justiça não é instintiva ou natural nos seres humanos. Ela é possível unicamente por intermédio de acordos, convenções e artifícios humanos motivados pelo auto-interesse. A tese de Hume é exatamente que a origem da justiça, enquanto uma convenção social, só pode ser explicada com base em dois fatores: a atuação dos sentimentos de nossa disposição interna e a circunstância externa caracterizada pela escassez relativa de bens materiais. Finalmente, o último capítulo desta dissertação visa discutir a teoria política de Hume com o propósito de complementar sua teoria da justiça. Hume defende que a justificação da instituição da autoridade soberana e dos deveres civis se funda nos mesmos princípios da convenção de justiça: eles também são artifícios criados exclusivamente para servir ao nosso próprio interesse.
This dissertation aims to describe and critically analyze the concept of justice in the context of David Humes moral philosophy. In order to provide a complete and consistent account of his theory of justice, I intend to present Humes sentimentalist moral theory and explain how his conception of justice relates with the fundamental principles of morality. The first chapter of the dissertation consists, in first place, in a short exposition of the problem of free-will and determinism and, in second place, in a presentation of Humes compatibilist alternative. As I intend to show throughout the chapter, the strategy of Humes compatibilist solution should necessarily involve the notion of moral sentiment, whose concept is central in his moral system. Then, in the second chapter it will be examined Humes moral theory, which is structured in two main hypotheses: the negative thesis that rejects the idea that the foundation of morality is based exclusively on the operations of reason (relations of ideas and matters of facts); and the positive thesis that affirms that the source of morality lies in our passions, sentiments and affections of pleasure and pain when we contemplate virtuous and vicious characters. The third chapter aims to present Humes theory of justice, the main subject of this dissertation. The central hypothesis advanced by Hume is that the virtue of justice is not instinctive or natural in the human beings. It is only possible through human agreements, conventions and artifices motivated by self-interest. Humes thesis is precisely that the origin of justice, as a social convention, can be only explained based on two factors: the operation of the sentiments of our internal disposition and the external circumstances of relative scarcity of material goods. Finally, the last chapter of this dissertation aims to discuss Humes political theory in order to supplement his theory of justice. Hume claims that the justification of the institution of the sovereign authority and the civil obligations are grounded in the same principles held in the convention of justice: they are also artifices created solely to serve our own interests.

In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of morality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação.
The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Ce travail propose une présentation et une défense du "sentimentalisme", c’est-à-dire de la théorie philosophique selon laquelle les émotions constituent notre principal accès aux valeurs, et la source de nos jugements évaluatifs. Après avoir brièvement retracé les origines historiques de ce courant (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, et Adam Smith), j’examine la littérature psychologique et philosophique actuelle portant sur les émotions. Je propose une définition de la fonction des émotions, en soutenant que ce sont des "attitudes" corporelles et cognitives dotées d’une intentionnalité évaluative. Elles nous permettent ainsi d’apprécier la valeur des objets en fonction de leur pertinence pour nos états motivationnels, tels que nos désirs ou nos sentiments. Je procède ensuite à une analyse des conséquences épistémologiques et métaphysiques que l’on peut dériver de cette thèse. Je montre que les émotions sont susceptibles de jouer un rôle crucial dans notre connaissance des valeurs, en étudiant le débat relatif aux "conditions de correction" des émotions. Je propose de distinguer ici deux caractérisations des conditions de correction qui ne sont généralement pas explicitées dans les débats actuels, que j’appelle la conception "indépendantiste" et la conception "motivationnelle". J’argumente en faveur de la deuxième approche, et je défends la thèse selon laquelle les émotions constituent un accès fiable aux valeurs, lorsqu’elles sont basées sur des motivations qui sont elles-mêmes correctes ou appropriées. Selon cette approche, les valeurs doivent être comprises comme des propriétés réelles et relationnelles. Je m’intéresse enfin plus particulièrement au rôle que les émotions sont susceptibles de jouer dans les jugements moraux. Après avoir écarté les théories innéistes au sujet de la morale, je soutiens que les émotions sont des conditions nécessaires au développement de la moralité
This dissertation is both a presentation and a defense of "sentimentalism", the philosophical theory according to which emotions constitute our main access to values, and the source of our evaluative judgments. After considering briefly the historical origins of this philosophical approach (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith), I review the current psychological and philosophical literature about emotions. I define the function of emotions, arguing that they are bodily and cognitive "attitudes" that possess an evaluative intentionality. They allow us to appraise the value of objects according to their relevance for our motivational states, like our desires or sentiments. I proceed then to an analysis of the epistemological and metaphysical consequences that we can draw from this thesis. I show that emotions are likely to play a crucial role in our knowledge of values, focusing on the debate about the "correctness conditions" of emotions. I propose a distinction between two characterizations of correctness conditions, which are generally not explicit in the literature, and which I name the "independence" approach and the "motivational" approach. I argue in favor of the latter and I defend the thesis that emotions constitute a reliable access to values, when they are based on motivations that are themselves correct or appropriate. According to this view, values should be conceived as real and relational properties. Finally, I consider the role which emotions may play in our moral judgments in particular. After having rejected nativist accounts of our moral competence, I claim that emotions are necessary conditions to the development of our moral life

Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve metaethical disputes about the nature of moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we do make moral judgments is often overlooked in these debates. In the wake of recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology, however, some empirically-minded philosophers are beginning to use neural findings in support of their theories of moral judgment. The intent of this thesis is to explore how this empirical evidence can be integrated effectively into philosophical discussions about moral judgment. In the first chapter of my thesis, I review the moral judgment debate in both philosophy and moral psychology, focusing specifically on contemporary sentimentalist solutions to this problem. This review sets the stage for my critique of Prinz’s sentimentalist account of moral judgment in the second chapter. I argue that Prinz uses neural evidence to support his sentimentalist thesis inappropriately, altering the evidence to fit his theory, rather than using the evidence to inform his theory. In the third chapter, I examine Prinz’s somatic theory of emotion and how this is related to his theory of moral judgment. I argue that neural evidence indicates that a theory of emotion that incorporates aspects of both cognitive appraisal and somatic theories is more empirically accurate than either view in isolation. Finally, I discuss the implications that a neural account of emotion could have on future debates about the nature of moral judgment.

David Hume argues that reflections upon public utility explain the psychological foundations of justice and the moral feelings attendant on it. Adam Smith objects that Hume’s theory of justice is psychologically implausible. A just punishment attracts the approval of every citizen on Hume’s alleged view. Not every citizen can consider the abstract public interest every time, Smith observes, so Hume can’t have explained all of justice. I argue, in response, that Smith’s objection has not accounted for all of the causal processes that Hume draws upon in support of reflections upon public utility. Conventions establish the very possibility of public interest, and socializing processes lend the public interest its moral salience. Human nature includes a species-general passion for acquiring property for the sake of family. The motivational centrality and universal scope of this passion, coupled with the dramatic psychological power of sympathy, generates the first moral feelings. Social conditioning develops those feelings into attitudes about reward and punishment. Hume’s theory of justice, with his conjectures about sociocultural processes, is both psychologically plausible and more complex than commentators tend to appreciate.

Ce mémoire porte sur les fondements naturels du jugement moral et l'objectif principal de ce travail est de faire ressortir l'importance de revoir nos conceptions philosophiques sur ce sujet. C'est en nous appuyant sur deux principaux modèles philosophiques, le sentimentalisme et le rationalisme, que nous identifions les éléments constitutifs du jugement moral. L'étude de ces modèles se réfère aux travaux de David Hume et Emmanuel Kant et permet de souligner que la définition du rôle des émotions et de la raison dans la formation du jugement moral diffère dans chacune de ces conceptions. Ensuite, c'est en nous appuyant sur le modèle intuitionniste social proposé par Jonathan Haidt que nous étudions l'influence humienne sur la conception contemporaine du jugement moral. La problématique soulevée se trouvant essentiellement dans une dichotomie entre les définitions que proposent les modèles sentimentaliste et rationaliste en ce qui a trait aux rôles respectifs des émotions et de la raison, nous tentons d'éclairer le problème en exposant différentes études neuroscientifiques sur la question afin de reconsidérer les définitions présentées. Pour ce faire, nous nous intéressons à la question morale d'un point de vue phylogénique et ontogénique. D'abord, en étudiant les fondements génétiques, les bases neuronales, les fondements émotionnels et les mécanismes fondamentaux, ensuite en étudiant les déterminants sociaux et culturels. Finalement, nous concluons avec l'idée que les théories philosophiques contemporaines peuvent tirer certains bénéfices en considérant les observations scientifiques récentes au sujet des fondements du jugement moral. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Jugement moral, sentimentalisme, rationalisme, intuitionnisme social, neurosciences.