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Journal articles on the topic 'Moral Sentimentalism'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Bikauskaitė, Renata. "RŪPESČIO ETIKOS IR SENTIMENTALIZMO SANTYKIS." Problemos 85 (January 1, 2013): 57–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2014.0.2922.

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Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama ryškėjanti tendencija sutapatinanti rūpesčio etiką su sentimentalizmu. Lyginant šios tendencijos atstovo Michaelo Slote’o ir vienos iš rūpesčio etikos kūrėjų Nel Noddings filosofiją, analizuojamas rūpesčio etikos ir sentimentalizmo santykis, pastarojo galimybės adekvačiai konceptualizuoti rūpesčio / rūpinimosi specifiką. Teigiama, kad sentimentalizmo konceptualinis žodynas, grindžiamas empatijos sąvoka, užgožia reliacinį rūpesčio etikos pobūdį. Straipsnyje empatijos sąvokai priešpriešinama dėmesio sąvoka, kurią nemaža dalis rūpesčio etikos atstovų pasitelkia apibrėžti moralinį rūpestį / rūpinimąsi. Analizuojant Simone Weil ir Iris Murdoch filosofiją, atskleidžiama dėmesio sąvokos reikšmė rūpesčio etikai.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: rūpesčio etika, sentimentalizmas, Slote, Noddings. The Relationship Between Ethics of Care and SentimentalismRenata Bikauskaitė AbstractThe article analyses the currently emerging tendency to identify ethics of care with sentimentalism. Through comparison of philosophy represented by one of the most prominent representative of this trend, Michael Slote, with the ideas of Nel Noddings, one of the founders of ethics of care, the relationship between ethics of care and sentimentalism is identified. The question arises whether sentimentalist moral vocabulary is adequate for conceptualising the peculiarities of ethics of care? The paper argues that any attempt to elaborate ethics of care while at the same time invoking the conceptual apparatus of sentimentalism, which is based on the notion of empathy, actually conceals the relational nature of this ethics. Further analysis of the notion of attention found in the works of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch highlights the theoretical influence of this notion to ethics of care in general.Keywords: ethics of care, sentimentalism, Michael Slote, Nel Noddings.

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2

Slote, Michael. "Moral Sentimentalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7, no. 1 (March 2004): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:etta.0000019982.56628.c3.

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3

Schroeder, M. "Moral Sentimentalism." Philosophical Review 120, no. 3 (January 1, 2011): 452–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1263710.

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4

Driver, Julia. "IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (December 20, 2007): 301–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052508080114.

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Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.

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5

Daniel Shaw. "Hume's Moral Sentimentalism." Hume Studies 19, no. 1 (1993): 31–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0406.

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6

Golub, Camil. "Reid on Moral Sentimentalism." Res Philosophica 96, no. 4 (2019): 431–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1815.

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7

Vogelstein, Eric. "A new moral sentimentalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 3 (June 2016): 346–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1169383.

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AbstractThis paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.

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8

Szigeti, András. "Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas." Dialectica 69, no. 1 (March 2015): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12087.

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9

Quigley, James G. "Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14, no. 4 (February 27, 2011): 483–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9272-0.

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10

Howard, Nathan Robert. "Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21, no. 5 (November 2018): 1065–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9946-y.

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11

Slote, Michael. "Sentimentalist moral education." Theory and Research in Education 8, no. 2 (July 2010): 125–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878510368611.

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Care ethics, and moral sentimentalism more generally, have not developed a picture of moral education that is comparable in scope or depth to the rationalist/Kantian/Rawlsian account of moral education that has been offered by Lawrence Kohlberg. But it is possible to do so if one borrows from the work of Martin Hoffman and makes systematic use of Hume’s earlier sentimentalist ideas. Kohlberg and Rawls offer accounts of moral learning that leave moral motivation largely unexplained or mysterious, but an emphasis on the psychology of empathy can help us to better understand both the content of our morality and the ways in which children and adults can become and be morally motivated. Parents can in a number of ways evoke and strengthen children’s empathic moral tendencies, and such processes can also occur and need to occur in schools and later on in life. In addition, a sentimentalist understanding of the meaning of moral terms can show how moral rules, principles, and injunctions can strongly reinforce the sorts of empathic/moral tendencies that are at least initially based in other elements of human psychology.

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12

Smith, A. M. "Moral Sentimentalism * By MICHAEL SLOTE." Analysis 71, no. 1 (July 2, 2010): 197–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq059.

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13

Gill, Michael B. "From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 13–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1479665109000487.

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The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to the Cambridge Platonists only briefly and in passing. The surface of Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith's texts can give the impression that the Cambridge Platonists were fairly distant intellectual relatives of the Scottish sentimentalists – great great-uncles, perhaps, and uncles of a decidedly foreign ilk. But this surface appearance is deceiving. There were deeply significant philosophical connections between the Cambridge Platonists and the Scottish sentimentalists, even if the Scottish sentimentalists themselves did not always make it perfectly explicit.

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14

WATSON, LORI. "COMMENTS ON MICHAEL SLOTE'S MORAL SENTIMENTALISM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (September 2011): 142–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00063.x.

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15

Olson, Jonas. "Hume's sentimentalism: Not non-cognitivism." Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1, no. 34 (2021): 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2134095o.

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This paper considers and argues against old and recent readings of Hume according to which his account of moral judgement is non-cognitivist. In previous discussions of this topic, crucial metaethical distinctions-between sentimentalism and non-cognitivism and between psychological and semantic non-cognitivism-are often blurred. The paper aims to remedy this and argues that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations of Hume. The paper focuses in particular on Hume's so-called 'motivation argument' and argues that it is a poor basis for non-cognitivist interpretations. While there is textual support for attributing to Hume what may be called 'modally weak' motivational internalism, there is no solid textual support for attributing to him either psychological or semantic non-cognitivism. The paper also challenges briefly some further alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations. It concludes by offering some positive evidence against such interpretations, namely that Hume appears to hold that there are moral beliefs and moral knowledge.

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16

Noddings, Nel. "Moral education and caring." Theory and Research in Education 8, no. 2 (July 2010): 145–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878510368617.

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Michael Slote’s very interesting work on moral sentimentalism and moral education raises some important questions on the meaning of empathy, the limitations of ‘inductions’, and the development of moral education from the perspective of care ethics. These questions are addressed in this commentary.

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17

Crowe, Benjamin D. "Herder's Moral Philosophy: Perfectionism, Sentimentalism and Theism." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 6 (December 2012): 1141–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2012.731243.

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18

D'ARMS, JUSTIN. "EMPATHY, APPROVAL, AND DISAPPROVAL IN MORAL SENTIMENTALISM." Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (September 2011): 134–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00062.x.

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19

Gill, Michael B. "Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking." Hume Studies 37, no. 2 (2011): 165–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0656.

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20

Dohrn, Daniel. "Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled." Philosophia 46, no. 1 (October 13, 2017): 69–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9913-1.

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21

Debes, Remy. "Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10, no. 1 (March 2012): 91–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2012.0029.

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By founding morality on the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith implied that the nature of moral judgment was far more intuitive and accessible than their rationalist predecessors and contemporaries would, or at least easily could, allow. And yet, these ‘Sentimentalists’ faced the longstanding belief that the human affective psyche is a veritable labyrinth – an obstacle to practical morality if not something literally brutish in us. The Scottish Sentimentalists thus implicitly tasked themselves with distinguishing and locating the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation in the human psyche. In this paper, I argue that this task led Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith to adopt a remarkable thesis when it came to the nature of the moral sentiments, namely, that the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation are peculiar – somehow radically unlike other sentiments.

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22

CALLCUT, DANIEL. "Mill, Sentimentalism and the Problem of Moral Authority." Utilitas 21, no. 1 (March 2009): 22–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820808003348.

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Mill's aim in chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation. Chapter 3 emphasizes two claims: (1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs and (2) Ethical feelings are highly malleable. I provide a critical examination of Mill's use of these claims to support his argument that Utilitarianism can preserve morality's authority. I show how the two claims, intended to form a significant rebuttal to the worry about Utilitarianism, can in fact be combined to raise powerful skeptical concerns. I explain how Mill evades the skepticism, and why contemporary philosophers who lack Millian optimism about human nature find it harder to avoid the skeptical outcome.

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23

Yang, Sunny. "The Appropriateness of Moral Emotion and Humean Sentimentalism." Journal of Value Inquiry 43, no. 1 (February 13, 2009): 67–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9144-1.

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24

Gill, Michael B. "Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty?" Philosophy Compass 2, no. 1 (January 2007): 16–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00052.x.

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25

Fricke, Christel, and Maria Alejandra Carrasco. "Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19, no. 1 (March 2021): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2021.0287.

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We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making perceptual and moral judgments requires focusing on frequently co-occurring impressions (perceptions of objects or reactive sentiments) for tracking an existing object with its perceptual properties or an agent's character traits. Smith uses visual perception for the purpose of illustrating one source of the partiality of the sentiments people feel in response to actions. Before making a moral judgment, people have to disregard this partiality and accept that they are all equally important. Smith and Hume's different ways of relying on the same analogy reveals the still-overlooked and yet profound differences between their moral theories.

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26

Haara, Heikki, and Aino Lahdenranta. "Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated: Pufendorf on the Desire for Esteem and Moral Conduct." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16, no. 1 (March 2018): 19–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2018.0181.

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In this paper, we argue that Samuel Pufendorf's works on natural law contain a sentimentalist theory of morality that is Smithian in its moral psychology. Pufendorf's account of how ordinary people make moral judgements and come to act sociably is surprisingly similar to Smith's. Both thinkers maintain that the human desire for esteem, manifested by resentment and gratitude, informs people of the content of central moral norms and can motivate them to act accordingly. Finally, we suggest that given Pufendorf's theory of socially imposed moral entities, he has all the resources for a sentimentalist theory of morality.

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27

STUEBER, KARSTEN R. "MORAL APPROVAL AND THE DIMENSIONS OF EMPATHY: COMMENTS ON MICHAEL SLOTE'S MORAL SENTIMENTALISM." Analytic Philosophy 52, no. 4 (December 2011): 328–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960x.2011.00540.x.

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28

Hutton, Sarah. "From Cudworth to Hume: Cambridge Platonism and the Scottish Enlightenment." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42, S1 (February 2012): 8–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2012.981009.

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This paper argues that the Cambridge Platonists had stronger philosophical links to Scottish moral philosophy than the received history allows. Building on the work of Michael Gill who has demonstrated links between ethical thought of More, Cudworth and Smith and moral sentimentalism, I outline some links between the Cambridge Platonists and Scottish thinkers in both the seventeenth century (e.g., James Nairn, Henry Scougal) and the eighteenth century (e.g., Smith, Blair, Stewart). I then discuss Hume's knowledge of Cudworth, in Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, The Natural History of Religion and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.

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29

Yang, Sunny. "Naturalism, Moral Value and Normativity - Hume’s Naturalism and Neo-Sentimentalism -." Korean Journal of Philosophy 139 (May 31, 2019): 91–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.18694/kjp.2019.05.139.91.

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30

HELD, VIRGINIA. "CARE, EMPATHY, AND JUSTICE: COMMENT ON MICHAEL SLOTE'S MORAL SENTIMENTALISM." Analytic Philosophy 52, no. 4 (December 2011): 312–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960x.2011.00539.x.

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31

Isomaa, Saija. "Suffering Daughters and Wives. Sentimental Themes in Finnish and Nordic Realism." Nordlit 14, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.7557/13.1048.

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This article examines sentimental themes and scenarios in Nordic nineteenthcentury literature, focusing on Finnish realism. The main claim of the article is that the treatment of the Woman Question in Nordic literature is thematically connected to French sentimentalism that depicted upper-class women caught in the conflict between personal freedom and familial duties. Typical scenarios were family barrier to marriage and love triangle, in which an unhappily married woman fell in love with another man. French sentimental social novels took a stance on the position of women. Similar themes and scenarios can be found in Nordic nineteenth-century novels and plays. The ‘daughter novel’ tradition from Fredrika Bremer’s The President’s Daughters (1834) to Minna Canth’s Hanna (1886) depict the sufferings of upper-class girls in patriarchal family and society. A Doll’s House (1879) by Henrik Ibsen centers on the theme of conflicting duties, depicting the moral awakening of a doll-like wife, and Papin rouva (1893, ‘The Wife of a Clergyman’) by Juhani Aho concentrates on the sufferings and moral considerations of the unhappily married Elli. The article suggests that the sentimentalist legacy informs the Nordic nineteenth-century literature and should be taken into account in the scholarship.

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32

Vogelmann, Rafael Graebin. "Hume as an Error Theorist." Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 22, no. 2 (August 5, 2020): 84–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.84-113.

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Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com quem embora convicções morais sejam crenças elas jamais são verdadeiras. Em contraste com teorias do erro contemporâneas, contudo, a tese de Hume não se baseia em uma alegação metafísica para efeito de que não há propriedades morais. Antes, ele sustenta que ideias morais não são ideias de qualidades que possam ser corretamente predicadas de ações ou traços de caráter, mas ideias de sentimentos e que, portanto, crenças morais incorporam sistematicamente um erro categorial. AbstractIn this paper I consider and reject a noncognitivist reading of Hume’ s moral sentimentalism (according to which he identifies moral convictions with impressions of particular kind) as well as a dispositional reading (according to which Hume takes moral convictions to be causal beliefs about the power of character traits to produce certain feelings in suitable spectators). I argue that the shortcomings of these views show that Hume is best understood as an error theorist, according to whom although moral convictions are beliefs they are never true. In contrast with contemporary error theories, however, Hume’s view is not grounded on a metaphysical claim to the effect that there are no moral properties. He holds instead that moral ideas are not at all ideas of qualities that could be truthfully predicated of actions or character traits but rather ideas of feelings and, therefore, that moral beliefs systematically incorporate a category error.

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Gill, Michael B. "Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty?" Philosophy Compass 3, no. 2 (March 2008): 397–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00128.x.

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CUNEO, TERENCE. "INTUITIONISM'S BURDEN: THOMAS REID ON THE PROBLEM OF MORAL MOTIVATION." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6, no. 1 (March 2008): 21–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1479665108000067.

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Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable. 1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early intuitionists made little progress towards solving it. In this essay, I wish to challenge this assumption by examining one of the more subtle intuitionist responses to Hume, viz., that offered by Thomas Reid. For reasons that remain unclear to me, Reid's response to Hume on this issue has been almost entirely neglected. I shall argue that it is nonetheless one that merits our attention, for at least two reasons. In the first place, Reid's response to Hume's challenge to rational intuitionism bears a close affinity to the type of response that he offers to Hume's broadly skeptical challenge to realist views regarding our perception of the external world. Since Reid's strategy in the latter case is widely regarded as exhibiting significant promise, it is natural to wonder whether, when applied to the moral domain, this type of strategy displays similar promise. 2 I will suggest that it does. That is, I will suggest that since Reid's broadly nativist position in perception is one well worth considering, then so also is his broadly nativist account of moral motivation. Second, Reid's position regarding moral motivation represents an intriguing attempt to blend a broadly intuitionist view with important insights from the sentimentalist tradition. In this respect, Reid's view is a genuine hybrid position unlike that offered by other intuitionists such as Richard Price. The synthetic character of Reid's position, I claim, gives it a unique type of theoretical richness, since it incorporates some very attractive features of both rational intuitionism and sentimentalism.

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35

Sauer, Hanno. "The Wrong Kind of Mistake: A Problem for Robust Sentimentalism about Moral Judgment." Journal of Value Inquiry 48, no. 2 (April 30, 2014): 247–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9421-5.

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36

TenHouten, Warren D. "Alienation and Emotion: Hegel Versus Sentimentalism and Romanticism." Review of European Studies 11, no. 3 (June 18, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/res.v11n3p1.

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The structuralist and social-psychological perspectives on alienation are described, with attention to Seeman’s contention that the experience of alienation is based more on sentiment than on reason. The passions in early modernity are described, and the eighteenth-century moral sentimentalists Hume, Smith, and Kant are discussed. Romanticism is described as the first self-critique of modernity, as it opposed Enlightenment science, rationalism, and uniformitarianism; it is linked to interiorized emotionality and to diversitarianism. Romantic concepts of alienation include inhibition of natural sexuality, oppressive condition of work, and the loss of an imagined Golden Age before human alienation. Hegel’s Phenomenology outlines a four-stage mode of the undoing of social domination which has a narrative structure consistent with romantic story-telling, but was grounded not in romanticism but in Gnosticism and Lutheran dialectics. Hegel’s critique of sentimentalism and romantism is explored, with Hegel emerging as a dedicated anti-romantic who condemned the sophistry of Schlegel and Novalis’s ‘beautiful soul’, arguing that the self, to be viable, cannot remain encapsulated in inner subjectivity but must rather engage in emotion-laden confrontation with self-willed others in the social world; this requires a positive kind of alienation of the self from itself. Romantic effort to keep the self in itself as protection from the corrupted and corrupting social world was misguided. Hegel was right in asserting that the self is necessarily both subjective and objective, both inner and outer, but wrong in his contention that the self can progress by resolving inner contradictions, for the self, as the core of our personality, rather progresses through incorporating and elaborating contradictions, ambiguities, and polysemantic meanings.

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37

장금희. "Moral Code between Morality and Sentimentalism in Farquhar’s The Beaux’ Stratagem and Restoration Comedies." English21 26, no. 3 (September 2013): 125–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.35771/engdoi.2013.26.3.006.

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Beever, Jonathan, Morten Tønnessen, Yogi Hale Hendlin, and Wendy Wheeler. "Interview on biosemiotic ethics with Wendy Wheeler." Zeitschrift für Semiotik 37, no. 3-4 (August 3, 2018): 177–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.14464/zsem.v37i3-4.386.

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In this interview, Wendy Wheeler, London Metropolitan University Emerita Professor of English Literature and Cultural Inquiry, discusses her thoughts on biosemiotics and its relevance for ethics. In Wheeler’s perspective, biosemiotics can ground ethics because it offers an alternative and fitting ontology of relations. She shares her thoughts on Peirce as a foundational figure for biosemiotics, and explains why she doubts that an ecological ethics can be framed in terms of laws. Further, she discusses her views on moral agency in nonhumans, and warns against ideas based on human exceptionalism, sentimentalism and puritanism. Wheeler thinks that a biosemiotic ethics can posit a more located, or systemically nested, sense of semiotic value. Her moral question, she explains, would always be something like: Is this growing? Is this lively?

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Schönle, Andreas. "The Scare of the Self: Sentimentalism, Privacy, and Private Life in Russian Culture, 1780-1820." Slavic Review 57, no. 4 (1998): 723–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2501044.

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This century may be called the century of openness in the physical and moral sense: look at our sweet beauties! … Before people used to hide in dark homes behind the cover of high fences. Nowadays, one sees bright homes everywhere with large windows facing the street: please look in! We want to live, act, and think behind a transparent glass–Nikolai Karamzin, Moia ispoved

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40

Dupouy, Stéphanie. "The naturalist and the nuances: Sentimentalism, moral values, and emotional expression in Darwin and the anatomists." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 47, no. 4 (September 2011): 335–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.20515.

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41

Navari, Cornelia. "Hans Morgenthau and the National Interest." Ethics & International Affairs 30, no. 1 (2016): 47–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s089267941500060x.

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Hans Morgenthau's concept of “the national interest” first appeared, somewhat like thunder out of China, in the essay “The Primacy of the National Interest” as part of a forum in the Spring 1949 issue of The American Scholar titled “The National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy.” As William Scheuerman observes, “The concept of the ‘national interest’ first takes on a special analytic status in this essay.” In the essay, the national interest is first presented as a necessary corrective to what Morgenthau had already characterized in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics as legalism, moralism, and sentimentalism in American politics, and as a more effective guide to foreign policy than the American tradition seemed able to provide.

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Suzuki, Makoto. "Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 184 pages. ISBN: 9780195391442 (hbk.). Hardback: $65.00." Journal of Moral Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2012): 131–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552412x619120.

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Mekh, Nataliia. "«Natalka Poltavka» by Ivan Kotlyarevsky in the Ukrainian linguistic and cultural space." Culture of the Word, no. 91 (2019): 57–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.37919/0201-419x-2019.91.5.

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The article attempts to look at Natalka Poltavka's play in a broad linguistic and cultural dimension. The work is considered as the first attempt in a new Ukrainian language to speak about Ukrainian truthfully, brightly and wisely. Particular attention is paid to songs of drama that live separate artistic lives. The importance of the work of I. Kotlyarevsky for the musical realm, in particular, the opera of Mykola Lysenko based on the play "Natalka Poltavka" as a landmark event in the Ukrainian cultural space, is considered. Natalka Poltavka Opera is a real pearl of Ukrainian music. It clearly reveals national life, typical characters and traditions thanks to the folklore-based music. Key opera songs have long gone beyond it and are perceived in various parts of the world as symbols of Ukrainian culture. Natalka Poltavka is the first work of the new Ukrainian dramaturgy, combining signs of sentimentalism and educational realism. At the time when the play was written, sentimentalism began to develop rapidly in European literature, which was characterized by the desire to recreate the world of the feelings of the common man and to evoke sympathy for the heroes of the work. We notice these tendencies in drama, watching I. Kotlyarevsky appeal to human feelings, focusing on their strength, sincerity and depth. Respect for moral purity, spiritual strength, popular wisdom and language, love and respect for ordinary people are all we see in Ivan Kotlyarevsky's talented play.

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Rydenfelt, Henrik. "Emotional interpretants and ethical inquiry." Sign Systems Studies 43, no. 4 (December 31, 2015): 501–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/sss.2015.43.4.08.

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The connection between emotions and ethical views or ethical inquiry has been considered intimate by a number of philosophers. Based on Peirce’s discussion on the emotional interpretants in MS 318, I will suggest that such interpretants could be exploited in ethical inquiry. I will first argue, drawing on T. L. Short’s interpretation of Peirce, that there are final emotional interpretants, and such emotional interpretants actually formed (or dynamical) can be more or less appropriate concerning the sign’s (dynamical) objects. I will then explore the prospect that emotional interpretants could be harnessed for the particular cognitive purpose of ethical inquiry, concluding that normative judgments based on feelings could serve as its observational part.Includes: Comment. A note on moral sentimentalism in the light of the emotional interpretant by Jean-Marie Chevalier (pp. 513–517).

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Antadze, Nino. "Who is the Other in the age of the Anthropocene? Introducing the Unknown Other in climate justice discourse." Anthropocene Review 6, no. 1-2 (April 2019): 38–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2053019619843679.

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This paper contributes to advancing the research agenda on ethics in the Anthropocene (Schmidt JJ, Brown PG and Orr CJ (2016) Ethics in the Anthropocene: A research agenda. The Anthropocene Review 3(3): 188–200). Specifically, it responds to the call to explore ‘the new human condition’ (Palsson G, Szerszynski B, Sörlin S et al. (2013) Reconceptualizing the ‘Anthropos’ in the Anthropocene: Integrating the social sciences and humanities in global environmental change research. Environmental Science & Policy 28: 8) in the age of the Anthropocene by rethinking the relational ontology within the context of climate change. I propose that given the global and long-term implications of climate change, climate justice discourse should go beyond the Self–Other binary and incorporate the notion of the Unknown Other. By drawing on the moral philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and moral sentimentalism scholarship, I theorize the ethical relationship with the Unknown Other. I propose that the encounter with the ‘face’ (identity, experience, voice) of the Unknown Other is conditioned by the Self’s contribution to climate change. Therefore, the encounter with the Unknown Other is not physical and corporeal but ethical, and thus triggers a moral engagement that has a dual base – responsibility and emotion. The former is expressed in the form of asymmetrical responsibility and the latter in the form of empathy.

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Sinitsyna, Mariia V. "V. S. PODSHIVALOV’S ESSAYS IN THE MAGAZINE ‘PLEASANT AND USEFUL PASTIME’." Вестник Пермского университета. Российская и зарубежная филология 13, no. 1 (2021): 119–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2073-6681-2021-1-119-125.

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The article discusses the essays written by V. S. Podshivalov, the editor of the Moscow University magazine Pleasant and Useful Pastime and a supporter of N. M. Karamzin. The aim of this paper is to study the poetics of the essays and to show their significance in the context of the magazine. Podshivalov’s essays serve as material for researching the problem of the formation of sentimental aesthetics on the Enlightenment basis. The structure and methodology of the article are determined by the task of complex analysis of the text in the aspects of composition, rhetorical devices, themes and literary connections. The essays can be viewed as manifestos of sentimentalism. In his writings, Podshivalov develops a sentimental personality concept. All the essays are shown to be similar in terms of composition, developing a cumulative model where homogeneous structures of motives are gradually added. These structures are usually grouped into triads based on the repetition of key words. Series of such structures are, in turn, compared with each other on the principle of antithesis. The subject matter of the essays is related to the didactic literature of the Enlightenment: they concern traditional themes such as kindness, charity or, conversely, miserliness, cruelty. Satirical types of a miser, a hypocrite or an unfair critic are exposed by contrasting them with sentimental values (a sensitive heart, privacy and a close circle of friends). Podshivalov combines two traditions: Enlightenment didacticism and sentimentalism, transferring didactic issues to the sentimental conceptual sphere. The essays contain reminiscences from the works of N. M. Karamzin published around the same time as the first parts of the magazine. References to Karamzin in the university publication strengthened his moral and literary authority. The aesthetic effect of the essays is achieved by combining two contrasting elements – simplicity of content and complexity of form.

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Vargo, Gregory. "QUESTIONS FROM WORKERS WHO READ: EDUCATION AND SELF-FORMATION IN CHARTIST PRINT CULTURE AND ELIZABETH GASKELL’S MARY BARTON." Victorian Literature and Culture 44, no. 1 (January 28, 2016): 133–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150315000467.

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Although the Chartist organ the Northern Star was a careful observer of literary developments, especially concerning social-problem fiction, it failed to comment on the publication of Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton, today the best-known literary work to treat Chartism. The popular and controversial novel about the consequences of an assassination committed by a disillusioned activist slipped by the radical paper unnoticed in the tumult of the fall of 1848. But the Star was not as unfamiliar with Mary Barton as its initial silence suggests. Two years later, when the paper reviewed The Moorland Cottage, it praised Gaskell's earlier book as “a powerful and truthful exposition of the evils inherent in the factory system,” adding that “the graphic manner in which the writer placed before the public the domestic, moral, and social results of factory life, brought down from the upholders of the factory system many sneers at her political economy and her sentimentalism; but none denied the unquestionable genius and superior discrimination of character and motives which pervaded the work” (Dec. 28, 1850).

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Joshi, Dipak Raj. "Politics of Affect in Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1, no. 4 (August 27, 2021): 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejsocial.2021.1.4.125.

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This paper analyzes The Rime of the Ancient Mariner in terms of Coleridge’s imaginative plea for a modification of consciousness about racial slavery prevalent in the then British society. What lends muscle to the plea is the use of gothic supernaturalism, which helps bring about a transformation in the Mariner. The gothic-actuated transformation, this paper claims, derives from Coleridge’s own ambiguous attitude to English imperialism—an ambivalence which results into systematic portrayal of the violator as the rightful beneficiary of the reader’s sympathy. The paper concludes that the poem’s turn to the affect of moral sentimentalism intends to make the reader of Coleridge’s time acquiesce in accepting colonial guilt as the spiritual politics of quietism, thereby averting the possibility of a violent reaction both from the hapless victims and some conscientious victimizers. There was not much thrust on an economic and political upgrading of the status of the slaves; instead, the affects of outrage, disgust, horror, and shame were evoked in the white anti-slavery texts so that the ugliness of imperialism and the concomitant slavery were criticized without really writing them off.

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Wren, Thomas. "Michael Slote and ‘Sentimentalist moral education’." Theory and Research in Education 8, no. 2 (July 2010): 163–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878510368622.

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Although I think most of what Michael Slote asserts in his article ‘Sentimentalist moral education’ is correct, I worry about three important ideas that are conspicuous by their absence. The first is the possibility that human emotions and feelings are inherently cognitive, which is never considered in his psychological account of empathy. The second is that his metaethical claim that ‘our very understanding of moral terms and moral principles rests on a foundation of empathy’ fails to recognize the culture-specific character of the very concept of morality. My third misgiving is that Slote overstates the now-standard distinction between the ethics of care and the ethics of principles, which I argue is a matter of emphasis, not opposition, especially in the context of moral education.

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Slote, Michael. "Reply to Noddings, Darwall, Wren, and Fullinwider." Theory and Research in Education 8, no. 2 (July 2010): 187–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878510368626.

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I respond to Noddings with further clarification of the notion of empathy and also argue that previous care ethics has put too much of an exclusive emphasis on relationships. I respond to Darwall by pointing out some implausible implications of his own and Kantian views about respect and by showing how a sentimentalist approach can avoid those difficulties. In my reply to Wren I indicate how a sentimentalist metaethics can be accurate to what we mean by ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ even if Kantians and others would emphatically deny what it says about these terms. And, finally, I argue that Fullinwider’s dismissive remarks on moral theories fail to reckon with what is significant and important about moral theorizing and also point out how a sentimentalist ethics and its view of moral education can, pace Fullinwider, be of some practical use to moral educators.

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