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1

전현희. "Chutzu's Theory of Human Mind and Moral Mind." JOURNAL OF KOREAN PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY ll, no. 31 (2011): 289–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.35504/kph.2011..31.011.

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Young, R. "Review: Moral Animals: Ideals and Constraints in Moral Theory." Mind 116, no. 461 (2007): 240–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm240.

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Seo, Young Yi. "Monistic Theory of Human Mind-Moral Mind : Experiential Reading of Noh Susin"s Mind Theory." Journal Of pan-Korean Philosophical Society 91 (December 31, 2018): 75–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.17745/pkps.2018.12.91.75.

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Shaver, R. "Book Review. Moral Theory David S. Oderberg." Mind 110, no. 438 (2001): 531–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/110.438.531.

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Brady, M. "Book Review. Moral Theory and Anomaly Tom Sorell." Mind 110, no. 438 (2001): 562–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/110.438.562.

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Levisen, Carsten, and Melissa Reshma Jogie. "The Trinidadian ‘Theory of Mind’." International Journal of Language and Culture 2, no. 2 (2015): 169–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ijolc.2.2.02lev.

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In this paper, we study the cultural semantics of the personhood construct mind in Trinidadian creole. We analyze the lexical semantics of the word and explore the wider cultural meanings of the concept in contrastive comparison with the Anglo concept. Our analysis demonstrates that the Anglo concept is a cognitively oriented construct with a semantic configuration based on ‘thinking’ and ‘knowing’, whereas the Trinidadian mind is a moral concept configured around perceptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. We further explore the Trinidadian moral discourse of bad mind and good mind, and articulate a set of cultural scripts for the cultural values linked with personhood in the Trinidadian context. Taking a postcolonial approach to the semantics of personhood, we critically engage with Anglo-international discourses of the mind, exposing the conceptual stranglehold of the colonial language (i.e., English) and its distorting semantic grip on global discourse. We argue that creole categories of values and personhood — such as the Trinidadian concept of mind — provide a new venue for critical mind studies as well as for new studies in creole semantics and cultural diversity.
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전현희. "Establishment step of Chu Hsi's Theory of Human mind & Moral mind." Studies in Philosophy East-West ll, no. 45 (2007): 45–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.15841/kspew..45.200709.45.

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Fitzpatrick, William J. "Review: The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory." Mind 116, no. 464 (2007): 1098–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm1098.

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Hughes, P. M. "A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation, by Colleen Murphy." Mind 124, no. 494 (2015): 663–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv014.

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Upton, C. L. "Moral Character: An Empirical Theory, by Christian B. Miller * Character and Moral Psychology, by Christian B. Miller." Mind 124, no. 494 (2015): 656–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv013.

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Norman, R. "Review: Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self." Mind 111, no. 442 (2002): 403–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/111.442.403.

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Timmons, Mark. "Review: Andrews Reath: Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory." Mind 117, no. 467 (2008): 722–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzn101.

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13

Knobe, Joshua. "Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, no. 8 (2005): 357–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.06.011.

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14

Chee, Chew Sim, and Tamar Murachver. "Intention Attribution in Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment." Psychological Studies 57, no. 1 (2011): 40–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12646-011-0133-7.

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15

Nicki, Andrea. "The Abused Mind: Feminist Theory, Psychiatric Disability, and Trauma." Hypatia 16, no. 4 (2001): 80–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.tb00754.x.

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I show how much psychiatric disability is informed by trauma, marginalization, sexist norms, social inequalities, concepts of irrationality and normalcy, oppositional mind-body dualism, and mainstream moral values. Drawing on feminist discussion of physical disability, I present a feminist theory of psychiatric disability that serves to liberate not only those who are psychiatrically disabled but also the mind and moral consciousness restricted in their ranges of rational possibilities.
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16

Beebe, John. "Jung’s Compensatory Ethical Theory." International Journal of Jungian Studies 10, no. 2 (2018): 143–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19409052.2018.1446504.

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ABSTRACTThe author, reviewing a book on Jung’s moral psychology by the psychoanalyst Dan Merkur, concludes that Jung’s idea of a divergence in aim between conscious and unconscious creates in the psyche a conflict of duties, toward the ego and its persona, on the one hand, and toward the self and its soul, on the other. An individual mind can reconcile this conflict only by ethical position-taking, which is arrived at through moral effort that fosters a growth of consciousness but is never without ambivalence and uncertainty as to the principles that have informed it. Jung’s idea that the unconscious is there to compensate for any ethical position taken by the conscious mind is echoed by contemporary psychoanalytic notions of collaboration between superego and ego in producing moral stances. Merkur is praised for recognizing Jung’s priority at countering Freud’s position that the unconscious cannot think about the ethical conflicts that are experienced by the ego.
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17

Choi, Young-Jin. "An Analysis of Zhu Xi’s Theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind." Korean Journal of Philosophy 130 (February 28, 2017): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.18694/kjp.2017.02.130.1.

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18

Astington, Janet Wilde. "Bridging the gap between theory of mind and moral reasoning." New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 2004, no. 103 (2004): 63–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/cd.98.

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19

Ridinger, Garret. "Shame and Theory-of-Mind Predicts Rule-Following Behavior." Games 11, no. 3 (2020): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11030036.

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This paper examines the idea that adherence to social rules is in part driven by moral emotions and the ability to recognize the emotions of others. Moral emotions like shame and guilt produce negative feelings when social rules are transgressed. The ability to recognize and understand the emotions of others is known as affective theory of mind (ToM). ToM is necessary for people to understand how others are affected by the violations of social rules. Using a laboratory experiment, individuals participated in a rule-following task designed to capture the propensity to follow costly social rules and completed psychometric measures of guilt, shame, and ToM. The results show that individuals who feel more shame and have higher ToM are more likely to follow the rules. The results from this experiment suggest that both shame and ToM are important in understanding rule-following.
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20

이행훈. "Jeong Yak-yong’s Mental Theory: Reinterpretation of the Theory of Human Mind · Moral Mind and His Preference Theory of Human Nature." Journal of Eastern Philosophy 00, no. 84 (2015): 41–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.17299/tsep.00.84.201511.41.

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21

Wilson, Catherine. "Managing Expectations: Locke on the Material Mind and Moral Mediocrity." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78 (July 2016): 127–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246116000357.

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AbstractLocke's insistence on the limits of knowledge and the ‘mediocrity’ of our epistemological equipment is well understood; it is rightly seen as integrated with his causal theory of ideas and his theory of judgment. Less attention has been paid to the mediocrity theme as it arises in his theory of moral agency. Locke sees definite limits to human willpower. This is in keeping with post-Puritan theology with its new emphasis on divine mercy as opposed to divine justice and recrimination. It also reflects his view that human beings are (probably) essentially material machines.
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22

Moran, J. M., L. L. Young, R. Saxe, et al. "Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 7 (2011): 2688–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1011734108.

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23

MINGRAN, TAN. "A REEVALUATION OF XUNZI'S MORAL THEORY FROM THE ASPECT OF MIND." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35, no. 1 (2008): 121–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2007.00466.x.

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24

Fu, Genyue, Wen S. Xiao, Melanie Killen, and Kang Lee. "Moral judgment and its relation to second-order theory of mind." Developmental Psychology 50, no. 8 (2014): 2085–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037077.

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25

Mingran, Tan. "A Reevaluation of Xunzi’s Moral Theory from the Aspect of Mind." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35, no. 1 (2008): 121–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03501010.

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26

Stadler, Jane. "“Mind the Gap”." Projections 12, no. 2 (2018): 86–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/proj.2018.120211.

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Murray Smith’s Film, Art, and the Third Culture makes a significant contribution to cognitive film theory and philosophical aesthetics, expanding the conceptual tools of film analysis to include perspectives from neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. Smith probes assumptions about how cinema affects spectators by examining aspects of experience and neurophysiological responses that are unavailable to conscious, systematic reflection. This article interrogates Smith’s account of emotion, empathy, and imagination in cinematic representation and film spectatorship, placing his work in dialogue with other recent interventions in the fields of cinema studies and embodied cognition. Smith’s contribution to understanding the role of emotion in screen studies is vital, and when read in conjunction with recent publications by Carl Plantinga and Mark Johnson on ethical engagement and the moral imagination, this new work constitutes a notable advance in film theory.
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27

McElwee, Brian. "Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory, by Samuel Scheffler." Mind 124, no. 496 (2015): 1385–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv073.

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28

Signorelli, M., A. Geraci, and E. Aguglia. "P01-248-Theory of mind, moral judgments and neuropsychological functioning in patients with bipolar disorders." European Psychiatry 26, S2 (2011): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0924-9338(11)71959-9.

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IntroductionSeveral studies revealed that cognitive functioning in BPD are impaired not only in the acute phase but over time (Mur et al., 2008). On Theory of Mind (ToM) recent studies found a impairment of this ability in remitted patients, supporting the theory that ToM deficits are trait-dependent (Bora et al., 2009) in contrast with another study that suggest a partially dependence(Wolf et al. 2010).ObjectivesWe explored: a) ToM in BPD investigating two cognitive processes: emotional recognition, second order beliefs attribution; b) Moral judgments in BPD; c) possible effects of neuropsychological functioning on ToM task and moral dilemmas.AimsThe principal aim is to investigate the domain specificity of ToM and Moral sense, studying selective impairments.MethodA total of 20 patients with bipolar I disorder were tested and 20 healthy controls. We use a complete neuropsychological assessment, two ToM tasks (Eyes test, Sullivan's stories) and we added two moral dilemmas to asses moral judgment Results: We found ToM deficits in BDP, with a multiple correlation between ToM and neuropsychological functioning. Also we found for the first time a impairment on personal moral dilemma, with a correlation between emotional recognition and moral judgments.ConclusionPatients with BPD are impaired in ToM partially independent of other cognitive dysfunctions and in moral reasoning.
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29

Alper, Sinan, and Onurcan Yilmaz. "Does an Abstract Mind-Set Increase the Internal Consistency of Moral Attitudes and Strengthen Individualizing Foundations?" Social Psychological and Personality Science 11, no. 3 (2019): 326–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550619856309.

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Recent research suggests that experimentally inducing an abstract (vs. a concrete) mind-set enhances political sophistication by increasing the consistency in political attitudes; it also enhances individualizing moral foundations and decreases binding moral foundations. However, the evidence is mixed regarding whether abstract mind-set increases or decreases the strength of moral convictions in general. In this context, the aim of this study was 2-fold. In two preregistered studies on U.S. American and Turkish samples (aggregate N = 694), we tested (1) whether abstract mind-set increases the consistency in moral convictions, similar to the case of political attitudes, and (2) whether inducing an abstract mind-set increases individualizing and decreases binding foundations. The results did not provide support for any of the hypotheses and the past findings were not reproduced. Potential implications of these findings for construal level theory literature are discussed.
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30

Dungan, James A., and Liane Young. "Asking ‘why?’ enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 14, no. 7 (2019): 699–708. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsz048.

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Abstract Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g. assault) than purity violations (e.g. incest). Here, we manipulate the instructions provided to participants for a moral judgment task to further probe the boundary conditions of this intent effect. Specifically, we instructed participants undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging to attend to either a violator’s mental states (why they acted that way) or their low-level behavior (how they acted) before delivering moral judgments. Results revealed that task instructions enhanced rather than diminished differences between how harm and purity violations are processed in brain regions for mental state reasoning or theory of mind. In particular, activity in the right temporoparietal junction increased when participants were instructed to attend to why vs how a violator acted to a greater extent for harm than for purity violations. This result constrains the potential accounts of why intentions matter less for purity violations compared to harm violations and provide further insight into the differences between distinct moral norms.
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Wein, Sheldon. "Humean Minds and Moral Theory." Philosophy Research Archives 14 (1988): 229–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pra1988/1989143.

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32

ISH-SHALOM, PIKI. "Theoreticians' obligation of transparency: when parsimony, reflexivity, transparency and reciprocity meet." Review of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2010): 973–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210510001026.

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AbstractOne way to describe the role of the social sciences (international relations included) is by relating to its function of rendering the social world transparent. This is a major conception of moral significance. The social world is a world of moral subjects. To render this world of moral subjects transparent involves exposing the inner states of the human mind. Moreover, according to the moral principle of reciprocity, those who make others transparent should be also transparent themselves. Furthermore, as facts do not order themselves objectively into parsimonious theory, the social scientist requires an extra-theoretical mechanism to classify and filter out data on the way to constructing theory. This extra-mechanism comprises the scientist'sa prioriassumptions of normative, ontological, and epistemological types:a prioriassumptions that constitute the inner states of the theoretician's mind and necessarily precede theory. It is argued here that according to the moral and social principle of reciprocity, theoreticians have an individual and communal moral obligation to ensure that theory and theorising are transparent; an obligation attainable and preceded by strong individual and communal reflexivity. The extra-theoretical mechanism, and especially the ideological inclinations and normative convictions of theoreticians that allows parsimonious theory to be constructed from unbounded social complexity, should be made visible to the public.
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Smetana, Judith G., Marc Jambon, Clare Conry-Murray, and Melissa L. Sturge-Apple. "Reciprocal associations between young children's developing moral judgments and theory of mind." Developmental Psychology 48, no. 4 (2012): 1144–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025891.

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34

Lane, Jonathan D., Henry M. Wellman, Sheryl L. Olson, Jennifer LaBounty, and David C. R. Kerr. "Theory of mind and emotion understanding predict moral development in early childhood." British Journal of Developmental Psychology 28, no. 4 (2010): 871–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/026151009x483056.

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35

Ishii, Tatsunori, and Katsumi Watanabe. "Theory of Mind or Moral Concern? Social Cognitive Ability and Religious Belief." Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 83 (September 11, 2019): 2D—049–2D—049. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.83.0_2d-049.

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36

Chang, Sung-Mo. "The Neo-Confucian Theory of Human Mind-Nature and The Moral Education." Journal of Moral Education 22, no. 2 (2011): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.17715/jme.2011.02.22.2.31.

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37

Epa, Roksana, and Dominika Dudek. "Theory of mind, empathy and moral emotions in patients with affective disorders." Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy 17, no. 2 (2015): 49–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.12740/app/44569.

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38

Binkley, Robert W. "David Copp on Moral Judgements." Dialogue 37, no. 4 (1998): 769–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300009811.

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The task of giving a philosophical account of moral judgements—both of the language used to express such judgements and of what must be in the mind and surrounding circumstances of the agent who makes them—has been high on the agenda of ethical theory for some time. David Copp proposes to take care of that item in this book. The result is a theory which, at the analytic level, endorses cognitivism, realism, naturalism, relativism, and motivational externalism. At the normative level, it is perhaps closest to rule utilitarianism, though it does not strictly conform to any of the usual definitions. The book moves always at the level of theory, without taking up applications to real moral issues, though it is easy to see how there might be such applications.
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Cova, Florian, Emmanuel Dupoux, and Pierre Jacob. "Moral evaluation shapes linguistic reports of others' psychological states, not theory-of-mind judgments." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 4 (2010): 334–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10001718.

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AbstractWe use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.
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GOLDMAN, E. "EXPLAINING MENTAL ILLNESS." Nineteenth-Century Literature 59, no. 1 (2004): 27–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ncl.2004.59.1.27.

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Like late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century doctors such as Benjamin Rush and Amariah Brigham, Nathaniel Hawthorne recognized the pathogenic potential of excessive religious zeal. In much of his short fiction Hawthorne offers a medical perspective of characters who obsessively find sin either in themselves or others. Yet he was skeptical about a new medical perspective of the human mind that potentially obscured the moral symbolism, or what he referred to as the ““moral signification,”” of apparent mental illness. In his short fiction Hawthorne thus tries to resolve an implicit dialogue between medical and theological views of the mind by fusing the Puritan sensitivity to symbol and moral signification with a keen medical awareness of the dangers of religious enthusiasm and unhealthy obsession with discovering moral signification. His mode of narration ““saneitizes”” the insane search for moral signification exemplified by characters such as Ethan Brand, Roderick Elliston, and the Minister Hooper.
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Seo, Sarah A., and John Fabian Witt. "The Metaphysics of Mind and the Practical Science of the Law." Law and History Review 26, no. 1 (2008): 161–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248000003588.

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In “Mind of a Moral Agent,” Susanna Blumenthal elegantly limns the rise and partial fall of the common sense theory of moral responsibility in American law. As Blumenthal convincingly describes it, the problem for early American jurists was nothing less than to solve the paradox of determinism and free will. How can the law declare someone morally culpable unless we are free to choose our own ends?
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Ridge, Michael. "Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's ‘Do so as well!’." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 4 (2003): 563–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716555.

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Meta-ethical non-cognitivism makes two claims—a negative one and a positive one. The negative claim is that moral utterances do not express beliefs which provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. The positive claim is that the primary function of such utterances is to express certain of the speaker's desire-like states of mind. Non-cognitivism is officially a theory about the meanings of moral words, but non-cognitivists also maintain that moral states of mind are themselves at least partially constituted by desire-like states to which moral utterances give voice. Non-cognitivists need a plausible account of what distinguishes whims, addictions and cravings from genuinely moral judgments. For while non-cognitivists maintain that in a suitably broad sense moral judgments just are constituted by desire-like states they also insist that not any old desire constitutes a genuinely moral judgment. Since the challenge is to demarcate what is distinctive about moral attitudes we might usefully call this the demarcation challenge.
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Hammond, Sarah, and Nigel Beail. "Social-moral awareness and theory of mind in adult offenders who have intellectual disabilities." Journal of Intellectual Disabilities and Offending Behaviour 8, no. 3 (2017): 111–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jidob-12-2016-0024.

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Purpose There has been little empirical investigation into the theoretical relationship between moral reasoning and offending in people with intellectual disabilities (ID). The purpose of this paper is to compare offending and non-offending ID groups on a new measure of social-moral awareness, and on theory of mind (ToM). Design/methodology/approach A between groups design was used. The scores of 21 male offenders and 21 male non-offenders, all with ID and matched for IQ, were compared on the Social-Moral Awareness Test (SMAT) and on two ToM tasks. Findings There was no significant difference in SMAT scores or on first- or second-order ToM tasks between offending and non-offending groups. Better ToM performance significantly predicted higher SMAT scores and non-offending groups. Better ToM performance significantly predicted higher SMAT scores. Research limitations/implications Results were inconsistent with previous research. Further work is required to establish the validity and theoretical underpinnings of the SMAT. Development in the measurement of ToM for people with ID is also required. Originality/value This is the first use of the SMAT with a population of offenders who have ID. The findings suggest caution in its use in clinical settings.
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Young, L., F. Cushman, M. Hauser, and R. Saxe. "The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 20 (2007): 8235–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701408104.

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Rosen, Jan B., Matthias Brand, Christin Polzer, Georg Ebersbach, and Elke Kalbe. "Moral decision-making and theory of mind in patients with idiopathic Parkinson’s disease." Neuropsychology 27, no. 5 (2013): 562–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033595.

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46

Gaesser, Brendan, Kerri Keeler, and Liane Young. "Moral imagination: Facilitating prosocial decision-making through scene imagery and theory of mind." Cognition 171 (February 2018): 180–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.11.004.

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47

SERNELJ, Tea. "The Unity of Body and Mind in Xu Fuguan’s Theory." Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2014): 83–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2014.2.1.83-95.

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The present article deals with the philosophical theory and epistemological methodology of the Modern Confucian Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), a significant Taiwanese philosopher of the 20th century whose theoretical contributions are in the center of academic interests in China and Taiwan, though almost completely unexplored in the West. The article’s main focus is on Xu’s interpretation of the concepts of bodily recognition and the creative potential qi that are forming the basis of the unification of body and mind as a fundamental method of traditional Chinese perception of reality. For Xu Fuguan, this unification represented the proper way to achieve the awareness of the Moral Self and to thoroughly act in accordance with humanness (ren).
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48

Spenser, Karin A., Ray Bull, Lucy Betts, and Belinda Winder. "Executive functioning as a predictive measure of offending behaviour." Journal of Criminal Psychology 9, no. 1 (2019): 10–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcp-07-2018-0032.

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PurposeProsociality is considered important in the study of offenders and associated cognitive skills: theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning, are said to enable self-control and reduce the risk of offending behaviours. Previous research has made associations between these skills and executive functioning; however, research into a link between them, in an offending population, is limited. The paper aims to discuss this issue.Design/methodology/approachTo further understand the practicalities of this, the present study considered the predictive abilities of the constructs believed to underpin executive functioning: working memory, cognitive flexibility and inhibitory control, in relation to theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning. In total, 200 male and female offenders completed measures in all six constructs.FindingsUsing path analysis working memory was demonstrated to be predictive of theory of mind and empathic understanding, cognitive flexibility was found to be predictive of theory of mind, and inhibitory control was found to be predictive of theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning.Research limitations/implicationsThe study focussed on offenders serving a custodial sentence of six months or less and did not differentiate between crime categories or take into consideration the socio-environmental backgrounds or ethnicity. Therefore, considering these things could further establish the generalisability of the current findings. It is noted that the more focussed the intervention is to the specific needs of an offender, the greater the impact will be. Therefore, pre-screening tests for the constructs discussed may be able to more accurately assess an offenders’ suitability for a programme, or indeed tailor it to meet the specific needs of that person.Practical implicationsThese findings may enable practitioners to more accurately assess offenders’ suitability for interventions aimed at reducing offending behaviours by improving levels of prosociality and develop more focussed programmes to meet the specific needs of individual offenders to reduce re-offending.Social implicationsAs recommended in the study, a more tailored approach to offender rehabilitation may be a potential aid to reducing levels of recidivism.Originality/valueThe present study adds to the literature as it is the first to consider whether the constructs of executive functioning can predict levels of theory of mind, empathic understanding and moral reasoning and so provide a more accurate method in assessing the cognitive abilities of offenders prior to participation in rehabilitative interventions.
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Young, Liane, and Rebecca Saxe. "An fMRI Investigation of Spontaneous Mental State Inference for Moral Judgment." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 21, no. 7 (2009): 1396–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21137.

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Human moral judgment depends critically on “theory of mind,” the capacity to represent the mental states of agents. Recent studies suggest that the right TPJ (RTPJ) and, to lesser extent, the left TPJ (LTPJ), the precuneus (PC), and the medial pFC (MPFC) are robustly recruited when participants read explicit statements of an agent's beliefs and then judge the moral status of the agent's action. Real-world interactions, by contrast, often require social partners to infer each other's mental states. The current study uses fMRI to probe the role of these brain regions in supporting spontaneous mental state inference in the service of moral judgment. Participants read descriptions of a protagonist's action and then either (i) “moral” facts about the action's effect on another person or (ii) “nonmoral” facts about the situation. The RTPJ, PC, and MPFC were recruited selectively for moral over nonmoral facts, suggesting that processing moral stimuli elicits spontaneous mental state inference. In a second experiment, participants read the same scenarios, but explicit statements of belief preceded the facts: Protagonists believed their actions would cause harm or not. The response in the RTPJ, PC, and LTPJ was again higher for moral facts but also distinguished between neutral and negative outcomes. Together, the results illuminate two aspects of theory of mind in moral judgment: (1) spontaneous belief inference and (2) stimulus-driven belief integration.
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최보경. "Luo Jin Shun(羅欽順) and Yulgok(栗谷)'s the theory of Moral mind and Human mind". JOURNAL OF ASIAN PHILOSOPHY IN KOREA ll, № 44 (2015): 209–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.19065/japk..44.201512.209.

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