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Journal articles on the topic 'Most-favored-nation clause'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 19 February 2022

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1

Bakhshali Zeynalli, Nargiz. "MOST-FAVORED NATION TREATMENT CLAUSE IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION." SCIENTIFIC WORK 65, no. 04 (2021): 379–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/2663-4619/65/379-382.

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Bilateral and regional investment agreements have proliferated in the last decade and new ones are still being negotiated. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses link investment agreements by ensuring that the parties to one treaty provide treatment no less favorable than the treatment they provide under other treaties in areas covered by the clause. MFN clauses have thus become a significant instrument of economic liberalization in the investment area. Moreover, by giving the investors of all the parties benefiting from a country’s MFN clause the right, in similar circumstances, to treatment no le

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2

Saggi, Kamal. "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause." Journal of International Economics 63, no. 2 (2004): 341–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(03)00057-6.

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3

Ludema, Rodney D. "INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE." Economics and Politics 3, no. 1 (1991): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00036.x.

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4

McCalman, Phillip. "Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Favored Nation clause." Journal of International Economics 57, no. 1 (2002): 151–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00129-5.

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5

Horn, Henrik, and Petros C. Mavroidis. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause." European Journal of Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2001): 233–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00028-3.

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6

Hochman, Gal. "Trade negotiations, domestic policies, and the Most Favored Nation clause." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 41, no. 3 (2008): 781–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00485.x.

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7

Skrynka, D. V. "HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF NON-VIOLATION COMPLAINTS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW." Actual Problems of International Relations, no. 138 (2019): 135–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2018.138.0.135-143.

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The article contains a brief review of historical roots and process of development of the non-violation clauses in various international legal agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other WTO agreements. It points out the connection between the gradual transition from conditional to unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and the introduction of the clause about nullification or impairment of benefits. Finally, the article points out the fact that even though the WTO system of legal rules is much more detailed than the GATT system of legal rules, the non-non-v

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8

Oganezova, S. R. "Most-Favored-Nation Clause in the Practice of Establishing the Jurisdiction of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)." Actual Problems of Russian Law 16, no. 3 (2021): 160–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/10.17803/19941471.2021.124.3.160-167.

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Based on the analysis of arbitration practice and doctrine, the author identifies the principles of interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause in order to resolve the issue of the jurisdiction of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) by arbitration. The author concludes that the arbitration should be guided not only by the principle of literal interpretation of the international investment agreement and, in case of uncertainty, establish the intention of the contracting states to apply the most-favored-nation clause to the process of resolving investm

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9

Choi, Jay Pil. "Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the ‘Most Favored Nation’ clause." Journal of International Economics 38, no. 1-2 (1995): 143–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(94)01335-p.

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10

Saggi, Kamal. "Erratum to “Tariffs and the Most Favored Nation clause” [J. Int. Econ. 63 (2004) 341–368]." Journal of International Economics 67, no. 2 (2005): 513–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.01.001.

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11

Waibel, Michael. "Putting the MFN Genie Back in the Bottle." AJIL Unbound 112 (2018): 60–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.29.

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This essay underscores the importance of background understandings in general international law for interpreting brief, open-ended clauses such as most favored nation (MFN) clauses. Contrary to Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath's claim, I suggest that often interpreters of MFN clauses cannot limit themselves to the text, context, and preparatory materials of a specific MFN clause. A common international negotiating technique, including for investment treaties, is to rely on the general background understanding of what a clause typically means in international law—its default meaning. I also a

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12

Zhang, Man, та Hyun-Soo Ha. "Study on the Applicability of Most-Favored-Nation clause in Investor-State Dispute Settlement under Chinaʼs BIT". Institute of Management and Economy Research 10, № 1 (2019): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.32599/apjb.10.1.201903.117.

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13

Accominotti, Olivier, and Marc Flandreau. "Bilateral Treaties and The Most-Favored-Nation Clause: The Myth of Trade Liberalization in the Nineteenth Century." World Politics 60, no. 2 (2008): 147–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.0.0010.

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Textbook accounts of the Anglo-French trade agreement of 1860 argue that it heralded the beginning of a liberal trading order. This alleged success holds much interest from a modern policy point of view, for it rested on bilateral negotiations and most-favored-nation clauses. With the help of new data on international trade (the RICardo database), the authors provide empirical evidence and find that the treaty and subsequent network of MFN trade agreements coincided with the end of a period of unilateral liberalization across the world. They also find that it did not contribute to expanding tr

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14

Schill, Stephan W. "MFN Clauses as Bilateral Commitments to Multilateralism: A Reply to Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath." American Journal of International Law 111, no. 4 (2017): 914–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.94.

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Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have been included in international commercial treaties for many centuries. They also figure prominently as standard provisions in almost any international investment agreement (IIA). Their longstanding and widespread use notwithstanding, investment law doctrine and arbitral practice continue to struggle with the clauses’ application and interpretation, in particular as regards their scope of application. What Stanley Hornbeck observed more than one hundred years ago in this Journal, that “there appear[s] constant disagreements and ever-recurring irritation ov

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15

Coutain, Bryan. "The Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Maintenance of the Liberal Trade Regime in the Postwar 1870s." International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 139–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309090055.

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AbstractInternational institutions within the past thirty years become the subject of renewed interest as scholars vigorously dispute their utility. Neorealists draw on the post–World War II era to advance sweeping general claims of institutional inefficacy. This study, by contrast, deploys the same hard-test method Grieco applied to the 1970s Tokyo Round negotiations to the crisis-rife 1870s to construct a unique methodological objective: a rigorous hard-test of nineteenth-century institutional autonomy. Three principal findings emerged. First, the maintenance of a liberal world economy in th

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16

Chaisse, Julien, and Jamieson Kirkwood. "CHINESE PUZZLE: ANATOMY OF THE (INVISIBLE) BELT AND ROAD INVESTMENT TREATY1." Journal of International Economic Law 23, no. 1 (2020): 245–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgz047.

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Abstract This article makes a major contribution to the emerging Belt and Road Initiative scholarship (and international economic law) by highlighting that (i) China’s existing investment treaty network along the Belt and Road is dated, (ii) many or most of those treaties include Most Favored Nation provisions, (iii) these treaties have hitherto been subject to a static three generations analysis which does not reflect the reality, and (iv) there is significant authority supporting the use of the Most Favoured Nation provisions by Chinese investors to upgrade the Belt and Road Initiative inves

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17

Viaene, Jean-Marie, and José L. Moraga-González. "On the Pro-competitive Effects of Regional Trading Agreements." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Economics and Business 1, no. 1 (2013): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/auseb-2014-0001.

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Abstract We explore the pro-competitive effects of trade policies in a model where a competitive fringe of domestic firms compete with a foreign duopoly exporting vertically differentiated goods. We show that discriminatory nonuniform tariff policies are preferred over the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause because, besides extracting rents from foreign firms, they foster competition in the market. Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs), which favor members relative to non-members, are examples of such nonuniform tariff policies.

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18

BELAAZE, Khayreddine, and Rabah KHOUNI. "L’Algérie et les défis du commerce mondial." Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 17, no. 4 (2014): 43–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5782/2223-2621.2014.17.4.43.

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This contribution aims to put light on an major challenge facing global trade today is a conflict between multilateral agreements and regional agreements, preferences granted under regional trade agreements are incompatible with the principles of World trade Organization which is the clause in the most favored nation, preferential tariffs of member states in regional agreements are often lower than MFN rates, meanwhile, the number of regional agreements has doubled since 1995 date creation of the WTO, and became a conflict between regionalism and multilateralism is imminent, Algeria through to

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19

이기평. "A Study on the Application of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment Clause to the Investor-State Disputes Settlement Procedure on the Investment Chapter of the Korea-China FTA." KYUNGPOOK NATIONAL UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ll, no. 40 (2012): 713–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17248/knulaw..40.201210.713.

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20

Pahre, Robert. "Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations." International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 859–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193628.

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Though substantively important, centralized negotiations have received less theoretical attention than problems of centralized monitoring and enforcement. I address this gap by examining variation in a particular form of centralized negotiations that I call “clustering.” Clustering occurs when a state negotiates with several other states at the same time. Clustering enables states to avoid having to make concessions on the same issue to one state after another, and therefore has important distributional advantages. Clustering also centralizes bargaining within a regime, especially when several

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21

SFIKAS, PETER M. "MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSES AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT." Journal of the American Dental Association 127, no. 7 (1996): 1118–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14219/jada.archive.1996.0339.

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22

Grossman, Gene M., and Alan O. Sykes. "European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R)." World Trade Review 5, S1 (2006): 220–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745606001455.

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The WTO case brought by India in 2002 to challenge aspects of the European Communities’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) brings fresh scrutiny to a policy area that has received little attention in recent years – trade preferences for developing countries. The idea for such preferences emerged from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The ensuing negotiations led to Resolution 21(ii) at the second session of UNCTAD in 1968, acknowledging “unanimous agreement” in favor of the establishment of preferential arrangements. Tariff discrimination viola

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23

Stenger, Susan E. "Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Monopsonistic Power: An Unhealthy Mix?" American Journal of Law & Medicine 15, no. 1 (1989): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0098858800008467.

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Most-favored-nations clauses appear in health insurance contracts allegedly to prevent price discrimination by health care providers among competing insurers. In fact, use of these provisions often works to exclude competitors from the health insurance market. This Note examines the antitrust implications of most-favored-nations clauses as used in the health insurance industry.

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24

Dolzer, R., and T. Myers. "After Tecmed: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Investment Protection Agreements." ICSID Review 19, no. 1 (2004): 49–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/19.1.49.

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25

Spier, Kathryn E. "The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation." RAND Journal of Economics 34, no. 1 (2003): 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3087444.

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26

Spier, Kathryn E. "“Tied to the Mast”: Most‐Favored‐Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts." Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 1 (2003): 91–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/345678.

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27

Foros, Øystein, Hans Jarle Kind, and Greg Shaffer. "Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses." RAND Journal of Economics 48, no. 3 (2017): 673–703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12195.

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28

Boik, Andre, and Kenneth S. Corts. "The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry." Journal of Law and Economics 59, no. 1 (2016): 105–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686971.

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29

Daughety, Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum. "Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining." RAND Journal of Economics 35, no. 3 (2004): 467. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1593703.

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30

Avilés-Lucero, Felipe, and Andre Boik. "Wholesale most-favored-nation clauses and price discrimination with negative consumption externalities: equivalence results." Journal of Regulatory Economics 54, no. 3 (2018): 266–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9371-0.

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31

Gürkaynak, Gönenç, Ayşe Güner, Sinan Diniz, and Janelle Filson. "Most-favored-nation clauses in commercial contracts: legal and economic analysis and proposal for a guideline." European Journal of Law and Economics 42, no. 1 (2015): 129–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9515-y.

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32

Crocker, Keith J., and Thomas P. Lyon. "What Do "Facilitating Practices" Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts." Journal of Law and Economics 37, no. 2 (1994): 297–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467315.

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33

Young, James Drew. "Most Favored Nation Clauses in Self-Funded Health Insurance Policies: A Useful Tool Still Available to Indiana Employers." Indiana Law Review 49, no. 3 (2016): 823. http://dx.doi.org/10.18060/4806.0108.

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34

Pérez-Aznar, Facundo. "The Fictions and Realities of MFN Clauses in International Investment Agreements." AJIL Unbound 112 (2018): 55–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.30.

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In an article published concurrently in the Journal of International Economic Law, I reach many of the same conclusions as Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath regarding the use of most favored nation (MFN) clauses to import substantive provisions from other treaties. However, although our conclusions are similar, our reasoning differs in several important respects. In my view, the reasons why MFN clauses cannot be used to import treaty provisions have more to do with the nature of these clauses than their specific text. MFN clauses are primary rules that require performing a comparison and dete

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35

Paparinskis, Martins. "MFN Clauses and Substantive Treatment: A Law of Treaties Perspective of the “Conventional Wisdom”." AJIL Unbound 112 (2018): 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.28.

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On the big questions, Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath are plainly right. Dogmatic presumptions about the necessary effect of particular clauses and woolly notions of systemic teleology may distract the interpreter from the task of finding the meaning that represents the intentions of the parties, best articulated in the specific terms chosen. Customary rules on treaty interpretation, reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), are meant to be flexibly adapted to the case in hand. But in applying their insight to the small print of the interpretati

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36

GOMÓŁKA, Krystyna. "ECONOMIC CONTACTS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION." Historical and social-educational ideas 10, no. 6/2 (2019): 53–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.17748/2075-9908-2018-10-6/2-53-61.

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After regaining independence in the early 1990s, the Republic of Azerbaijan signed many international agreements. It also established relations with the European Union. Economic contacts between the partners were revived by the partnership and cooperation agreement’s entry into force in 1999. It assumed political dialogue, assistance in building democracy, cooperation in the sphere of economy and investment. In terms of trade in goods and services, the country have granted each other most-favored-nation clauses in the collection of customs duties and charges, transit clearance, composition and

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37

McCalman, Phillip. "Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.261955.

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38

Nahm, Sihoon, Seung-Gyu (Andrew) Sim, and Jeongmeen Suh. "The 'Most Favored Nation' Clause under Multilateral vs Multiple Bilateral Trade Agreements." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565589.

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39

Hernandez, Luis Amadeo. "The Japan-Mexico Treaty 1888 and the Most Favored Nation Clause in the Unequal Treaties." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1763219.

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40

Ivanov, Ivaylo, and Irina Atanasova. "HOTEL RESERVATIONS VIA ONLINE TRAVEL AGENCY BOOKING.COM. EU DIMENSIONS OF THE “BEST PRICE” CLAUSE." CBU International Conference Proceedings 7 (September 30, 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.12955/cbup.v7.1354.

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The use of online reservation systems has become a must for hospitality businesses. This article is focused on the use of www.booking.com as an online search engine for accommodation in a family hotel in Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. The aim of the research is to analyze the behavior of people, using one of the best performing online travel agencies in the world for hotel room reservation. The article reveals interesting statistical facts about the nationality of the guests and how far ahead of time reservations are made. Data for the electronic device, which is used to make a reservation, is stated

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41

Ezrielev, Jay. "Most Favored Nation Clauses and Investment." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3043394.

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42

Boik, Andre. "Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Health Care Provider Contracts." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2073380.

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43

"Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in the International Trade System." Russian Journal of Legal Studies 6, no. 1 (2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.13187/rjls.2019.1.35.

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44

Spier, Kathryn E. "The Use of 'Most-Favored-Nation' Clauses in Settlement of Litigation." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289016.

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45

SCHILL, Stephan W. "Most-Favored-Nation Clauses as a Basis of Jurisdiction in Investment Treaty Arbitration." Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2009, vii—225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221190009x00141.

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46

Daughety, Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum. "Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signaling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.346260.

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47

Aviles Lucero, Felipe. "Wholesale Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Third Degree Price Discrimination with Negative Consumption Externalities: A Duality Result." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2820175.

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48

Sim, Justina, Lip Hang Poh, and Calvin Tay. "Do Retail MFN Clauses Lead to Softening of Competition?" Asian Journal of Law and Economics 7, no. 1 (2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2015-0020.

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AbstractRetail most favored nation (“RMFN”) clauses are commonly found in vertical agreements inked between downstream e-commerce platform providers and upstream suppliers. Competition authorities in Europe have investigated RMFN clauses in e-commerce markets on grounds that they can foreclose competitors from the market, lead to collusion or soften competition amongst competitors. We present an assessment of RMFN clauses under Singapore’s competition law framework. We find that Singapore’s competition law can adequately deal with collusion and foreclosure concerns. However, the vertical agree

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