Academic literature on the topic 'Multi-unit'

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Journal articles on the topic "Multi-unit"

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McCannon, Bryan C. "Multi-unit pricing." Managerial and Decision Economics 30, no. 2 (March 2009): 135–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1449.

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Umbreit, W. Terry. "Multi-Unit Management." Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 30, no. 1 (May 1989): 52–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001088048903000115.

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Lefever, Michael M. "Multi-Unit Management." Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 30, no. 1 (May 1989): 60–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001088048903000116.

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Gerstgrasser, Matthias, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart De Keijzer, Philip Lazos, and Alexander Skopalik. "Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (July 17, 2019): 1973–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.

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We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific class of valuations that are increasing and submodular.Furthermore, we present some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1 − e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting.
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Mandelli, D., C. Parisi, A. Alfonsi, D. Maljovec, R. Boring, S. Ewing, S. St Germain, C. Smith, C. Rabiti, and M. Rasmussen. "Multi-unit dynamic PRA." Reliability Engineering & System Safety 185 (May 2019): 303–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2018.12.029.

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Dunn, Jonathan. "Multi-unit association measures." International Journal of Corpus Linguistics 23, no. 2 (October 5, 2018): 183–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ijcl.16098.dun.

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AbstractThis paper formulates and evaluates a series of multi-unit measures of directional association, building on the pairwiseΔPmeasure, that are able to quantify association in sequences of varying length and type of representation. Multi-unit measures face an additional segmentation problem: once the implicit length constraint of pairwise measures is abandoned, association measures must also identify the borders of meaningful sequences. This paper takes a vector-based approach to the segmentation problem by using 18 unique measures to describe different aspects of multi-unit association. An examination of these measures across eight languages shows that they are stable across languages and that each provides a unique rank of associated sequences. Taken together, these measures expand corpus-based approaches to association by generalizing across varying lengths and types of representation.
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Ezra, Tomer, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, and Warut Suksompong. "Pricing Multi-Unit Markets." ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 7, no. 4 (February 2, 2020): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3373715.

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Lee, F. N., and Q. Feng. "Multi-area unit commitment." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 7, no. 2 (May 1992): 591–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/59.141764.

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Zhang, Zhuoxiu, and Mingzhou Jin. "Iterative Multi-AttRibute Multi-Unit Reverse Auctions." Engineering Economist 52, no. 4 (November 26, 2007): 333–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00137910701675239.

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Dobzinski, S., and N. Nisan. "Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 37 (February 18, 2010): 85–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2950.

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We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appropriately chosen sub-range of possible allocations and then uses VCG payments over this sub-range. We show that obtaining a fully polynomial-time incentive-compatible approximation scheme, at least using VCG payments, is NP-hard. For the case of valuations given by black boxes, we give a polynomial-time incentive-compatible 2-approximation mechanism and show that no better is possible, at least using VCG payments.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Multi-unit"

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Murillo, Espinar Javier. "Egalitarian behaviour in multi unit combinatorial auctions." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Girona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7752.

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En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.
In environments where resources are perishable and the allocation of resources is repeated over time with the same set or a very similar set of agents, recurrent auctions come up. A recurrent auction is a sequence of auctions where the result of one auction can influence the following ones. These kinds of auctions have particular problems, however, when the wealth of the agents is unevenly distributed and resources are perishable. In this thesis some fair mechanisms are proposed to deal with these problems. In a recurrent auction a fair solution means that at long term, all participants accomplish their goals in the most equal possible degree, independently of their wealth. We have experimentally shown how the inclusion of fairness incentives to bidders stay in the auction minimizing the problems of recurrent auctions.
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Tutam, Mahmut. "Configuring Traditional Multi-Dock, Unit-Load Warehouses." Thesis, University of Arkansas, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10839559.

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The development of expected-distance formulas for multi-dock-door, unit-load warehouse configurations is the focus of the dissertation. From formulations derived, the width-to-depth ratios minimizing expected distances are obtained for rectangle-shaped, unit-load warehouse configurations. Partitioning the storage region in the warehouse into three classes, the performance of a multi-dock-door, unit-load warehouse is studied when storage regions can be either rectangle-shaped or contour-line-shaped.

Our first contribution is the development of formulas for expected distance traveled in storing and retrieving unit loads in a rectangle-shaped warehouse having multiple dock doors along one warehouse wall and storage racks aligned perpendicular to that wall. Two formulations of the optimization problem of minimizing expected distance are considered: a discrete formulation and a continuous formulation with decision variables being the width and depth of the warehouse for single- and dual-command travel. Based on dock door configurations treated in the literature and used in practice, three scenarios are considered for the locations of dock doors: 1) uniformly distributed over the entire width of a wall; 2) centrally located on a wall with a fixed distance between adjacent dock doors; and 3) not centrally located on a wall, but with a specified distance between adjacent dock doors.

Our second contribution is the investigation of the effect on the optimal width-to-depth ratio (shape factor) of the number and locations of dock doors located along one wall or two adjacent walls of the warehouse. Inserting a middle-cross-aisle in the storage area, storage racks are aligned either perpendicular or parallel to warehouse walls containing dock doors. As with the warehouse having storage racks aligned perpendicular to the warehouse wall, discrete and continuous formulations of the optimization problem are developed for both single- and dual-command travel and three scenarios for dock-door locations are investigated.

Our final contribution is the analysis of the performance of a unit-load warehouse when a storage region or storage regions can be either rectangle-shaped or contour-line-shaped. Particularly, we consider two cases for the locations of dock doors: equally spaced over an entire wall of the warehouse and centrally located on a wall, but with a specified distance between adjacent dock doors. Minimizing expected distance, the best rectangle-shaped configuration is determined and its expected distance is compared with the expected distance in its counterpart contour-line-shaped configuration.

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Ghosh, Gagan Pratap. "Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders." Diss., University of Iowa, 2012. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3298.

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In my dissertation, I investigate the effects of budget-constraints in multi-unit auctions. This is done in three parts. First, I analyze a case where all bidders have a common budget constraint. Precisely, I analyze an auction where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed bid, first-price auctions, to bidders who have demand for both units. Bidders differ with respect to their valuations for the units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint which binds their ability to spend in the auction. I show that if valuation distribution is atom-less, then their does not exist any symmetric equilibrium in this auction game. In the second and third parts of my thesis, I analyze the sale of licenses for the right to drill for oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the United States. These sales are conducted using simultaneous sealed-bid first-price auctions for multiple licenses, each representing a specific area (called a tract). Using aspects of observed bidding-behavior, I first make a prima facie case that bidders are budget-constrained in these auctions. In order to formalize this argument, I develop a simple extension of the standard model (where bidders differ in their valuations for the objects) by incorporating (random) budgets for the bidders. The auction-game then has a two-dimensional set of types for each player. I study the theoretical properties of this auction, assuming for simplicity that two units are being sold. I show that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies that is symmetric with respect to the players and with respect to the units. The strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a permutation) of his budget between the two auctions. I then characterize the equilibrium in terms of the bid-distribution and iso-bid curves in the value-budget space. I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild assumptions, there always exist bidder-types who submit unequal bids in equilibrium, (2) the equilibrium is monotonic in the sense that bidders with higher valuations prefer more unequal splits of their budgets than bidders with lower valuations and the same budget-level. With a formal theory in place, I carry out a quantitative exercise, using data from the 1970 OCS auction. I show that the model is able to match many aspects of the data. (1) In the data, the number of tracts bidders submit bids on is positively correlated with budgets (an R² of 0.84), even though this relationship is non-monotonic; my model is able to capture this non-monotonicity, while producing an R² of 0.89 (2) In the data, the average number of bids per tract is 8.21; for the model, this number is 10.09. (3) Auction revenue in the data was $1.927 billion; the model produced a mean revenue of $1.944 billion
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Vlachos, Georgios M. Eng Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392.

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This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).
by Georgios Vlachos.
M. Eng.
M.Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Ahlberg, Joakim. "Multi-unit common value auctions : theory and experiments." Doctoral thesis, Örebro universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Örebro Universitet, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-26015.

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Research on auctions that involve more than one identical item for sale was,almost non-existing in the 90’s, but has since then been getting increasing attention. External incentives for this research have come from the US spectrum, sales, the European 3G mobile-phone auctions,  and Internet auctions. The policy relevance and the huge amount of money involved in many of them have helped the theory and experimental research advance. But in auctions where values are equal across bidders, common value auctions, that is, when the value depends on some outside parameter, equal to all bidders, the research is still embryonic. This thesis contributes to the topic with three studies. The first uses a Bayesian game to model a simple multi-unit common value auction, the task being to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue from three auction formats; the discriminatory, the uniform and the Vickrey auction. The second study conducts an economic laboratory experiment on basis of the first study. The third study comprises an experiment on the multi-unit common value uniform auction and compares the dynamic and the static environments of this format. The most salient result in both experiments is that subjects overbid. They are victims of the winner’s curse and bid above the expected value, thus earning a negative profit. There is some learning, but most bidders continue to earn a negative profit also in later rounds. The competitive effect when participating in an auction seems to be stronger than the rationality concerns. In the first experiment, subjects in the Vickrey auction do somewhat better in small groups than subjects in the other auction types and, in the second experiment, subjects in the dynamic auction format perform much better than subjects in the static auction format; but still, they overbid. Due to this overbidding, the theoretical (but not the behavioral) prediction that the dynamic auction should render more revenue than the static fails inthe second experiment. Nonetheless, the higher revenue of the static auction comes at a cost; half of the auctions yield negative profits to the bidders, and the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in this format. Besides, only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.The bottom line is that the choice between the open and sealed-bid formats may be more important than the choice of price mechanism, especially in common value settings.
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Shi, Tongjia. "Stochastically Equivalent Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1170.

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Past empirical analysis show that in contrast to the theory predictions; prices tend to decline in some sequential auctions, a puzzle known as the declining price anomaly. Several theoretical explanations were proposed demonstrating the possibility of a declining price pattern under certain assumptions. In this paper, we demonstrate that when bidders have private values and multi-unit demand, expected selling price can be increasing, constant, decreasing or even non-monotonic. In our model, price pattern depends on the distributions from which bidder valuations are drawn (including the size of the bidders demand reduction), and the number of bidders.
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Bae, Jinsoo. "Essays on Multi-unit Auctions: Theory and Experiment." The Ohio State University, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1587029403168965.

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Sung, Ho-Joon. "Optimal maintenance of a multi-unit system under dependencies." Diss., Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/26511.

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Thesis (Ph.D)--Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009.
Committee Chair: Schrage, Daniel; Committee Member: Loewy, Robert; Committee Member: O'Neill, Gary; Committee Member: Saleh, Joseph; Committee Member: Volovoi, Vitali. Part of the SMARTech Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Collection.
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Dahlmann, Irina. "Towards a multi-word unit inventory of spoken discourse." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.582842.

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Kanarat, Amnart. "Modeling and Simulation of a Multi-Unit Tracked Vehicle." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9755.

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A multi-unit tracked vehicle such as a continuous haulage system is widely used in underground mining applications due to its high mobility and payload capacity on rugged and soft terrain. To automate such a system, a high fidelity model of a tracked vehicle is essential in designing a controller for each tracked vehicle in the system, and a system model is required to simulate its response to input commands. This thesis presents the 2-D mathematical models of a tracked vehicle and a multi-unit tracked vehicle. All existing track-terrain interaction models are investigated and modified. By employing the modified track-terrain interaction model and applying Newton's second law of motion, the equations of motion of both single and multi-unit tracked vehicles can be derived. Computer programs for simulating the motions of these tracked vehicles on level ground have been implemented on a digital computer based on the derived system of differential equations. The fourth-order Runge-Kutta and Keun's methods are adopted to numerically integrate these differential equations. The simulation results clearly show that the programs can accurately predict the motion of a tracked vehicle maneuvered on horizontal plane, and closely predict the response of a multi-unit tracked vehicle operated on level ground its command inputs.
Master of Science
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Books on the topic "Multi-unit"

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Franco, Betsy. Japan: A literature based multi-cultural unit. Monterey, CA: Evan-Moor Corp., 1993.

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Franco, Betsy. China: A literature based multi-cultural unit. Monterey, CA: Evan-Moor, 1993.

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Effective multi-unit leadership: Commitment, control, and change in multi-site situations. Burlington, VT: Gower, 2012.

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1966-, Lévai-Kanyó Judit, and Lévai-Kanyó Judit 1966-, eds. Többlakásos házak: Multi-unit houses / edited and written by Lévai-Kanyó Judit. Budapest: Terc, 2012.

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Great Britain. Office of Public Service and Science. Efficiency Unit. Multi-departmental scrutiny of public sector research establishments: An Efficiency Unit scrutiny. London: HMSO, 1994.

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Daripa, Arupratan. Multi-unit auctions under proprietary information: Informational free rides and revenue banking. London: Institute for Financial Research, Birkbeck College, University of London, 1996.

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Great Britain. Department of Health and Social Services, Northern Ireland. Social Services Inspectorate. Causeway Unit of management multi-disciplinary inspection of assessnent and care management arrangements. Belfast: DHSS, 1995.

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Cowlishaw, J. T. Responsive evaluation of an art and design curriculum unit for multi-cultural education. Leicester: Leicester Polytechnic, 1986.

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Longueira, Nancy. Investigation of a dynamic wall retrofit strategy for existing multi-unit residential buildings. Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 1994.

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Great, Britain Department of Health and Social Services Northern Ireland Social Services Inspectorate. Foyle Unit of management multi-disciplinary inspection of assessnent and care management arrangements. Belfast: DHSS, 1995.

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Book chapters on the topic "Multi-unit"

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Miller, Dini M. "Multi-Unit Housing." In Advances in the Biology and Management of Modern Bed Bugs, 341–45. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119171539.ch34.

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Leblois, Arthur, and Christophe Pouzat. "Multi-Unit Recording." In Neurobiology of Motor Control, 55–73. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118873397.ch3.

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Choi, Pak-Sing, and Felix Munoz-Garcia. "Multi-Unit Auctions." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 225–36. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0_8.

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Ezra, Tomer, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, and Warut Suksompong. "Pricing Multi-unit Markets." In Web and Internet Economics, 140–53. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_10.

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Funaro, Liran, Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, and Assaf Schuster. "Efficient Multi-resource, Multi-unit VCG Auction." In Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, 231–46. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36027-6_20.

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Grant, John H. "Managing Multi-Unit American Corporations." In Konzernhandbuch, 693–708. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84739-3_21.

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Chan, Hau, and Jing Chen. "Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets." In Web and Internet Economics, 89–105. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_7.

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Lin, Kun-Yu, Chang-Dong Wang, Yu-Qin Meng, and Zhi-Lin Zhao. "Multi-view Unit Intact Space Learning." In Knowledge Science, Engineering and Management, 211–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63558-3_18.

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Amason, Allen C., and Andrew Ward. "Corporate and Multi-Business Unit Strategy." In Strategic Management, 175–201. Second Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2020. | Revised edition of Strategic management, 2011.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003000594-7.

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de Keijzer, Bart, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, and Orestis Telelis. "Inefficiency of Standard Multi-unit Auctions." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 385–96. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40450-4_33.

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Conference papers on the topic "Multi-unit"

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Dobzinski, Shahar, and Noam Nisan. "Multi-unit auctions." In the 12th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993611.

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Wang, Haiqing, Omar N. Malik, and Alexander Nareyek. "Multi-unit tactical pathplanning." In 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2009.5286454.

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Dobzinski, Shahar, and Noam Nisan. "Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions." In the 8th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1250910.1250960.

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Petter, T., H. Raffel, and B. Orlik. "Multi-level converter power unit." In 2005 IEEE 11th European Conference on Power Electronics and Applications. IEEE, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/epe.2005.219324.

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Powell, D., G. Gilbreath, and M. Bruch. "Multi-robot operator control unit." In Defense and Security Symposium, edited by Grant R. Gerhart, Charles M. Shoemaker, and Douglas W. Gage. SPIE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.663817.

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Riala, Nour Abu, Mahmoud Al-Ayyoub, Yaser Jararweh, and Haythem Bany Salameh. "MUMBA: Multi-unit multi-broker auctions for CRNs." In 2017 8th International Conference on Information and Communication Systems (ICICS). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iacs.2017.7921983.

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Jung, K., D. Kim, and Y. Lee. "Off-Site Consequence Analysis for Multi-Unit Considering Inter-Unit Dependency." In Tranactions - 2019 Winter Meeting. AMNS, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.13182/t30456.

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Mizuno, Jun, Kay Nottmeyer, Cleopatra Cabuz, Kazuyuki Minami, Takashi Kobayashi, and Masayoshi Esashi. "Inertial Unit for Multi-Motion Detection." In International Congress & Exposition. 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, United States: SAE International, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/960548.

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Stojcevski, B., and A. Kalam. "Multi-vendor portable IEC61850 testing unit." In 2011 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT Australia). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isgt-asia.2011.6167074.

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Mahdian, Mohammad, and Amin Saberi. "Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply." In the 7th ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134734.

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Reports on the topic "Multi-unit"

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Gilmore, Walter E., Thomas C. Bennett, and Nathan Gregory Brannon. Multi-unit operations considerations. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), September 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/923174.

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Bhattacharya, Sayan, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan Kulkarni, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, and Xiaoming Xu. Prior-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, May 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada609365.

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Beauchemin, M., D. Pan, and K. B. Fung. Unsupervised Landscape Unit Mapping Based on Multi-scale Analysis. Natural Resources Canada/ESS/Scientific and Technical Publishing Services, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.4095/219807.

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Zama, Anri. A Relevance Rule Organizing Responsive Behavior During Projectably Multi-Unit Tellings. Portland State University Library, January 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.2751.

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Shaked, Moshe. Dynamic Modeling of Joint Lifetimes of Marginalization and of Multi-Unit Minimal Repairs. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada273428.

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6

Wolfram, Catherine. Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6269.

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Kalnins, Arturs, and Francine Lafontaine. The Characteristics of Multi-Unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from Fast-Food Restaurants in Texas. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5859.

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8

Shaked, Proessor M. Imperfect Repair for Multi-Unit Systems and Description of Life Lengths by Conditional Failure Rates. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, May 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada216814.

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9

Silsdorf, Maria E. Use of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory to Quantify the Desirability of Boiling Water Reactor Hydraulic Control Unit Maintenance Options. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada410662.

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10

Scott R. Reeves. Demonstration of a Novel, Integrated, Multi-Scale Procedure for High-Resolution 3D Reservoir Characterization and Improved CO2-EOR/Sequestration Management, SACROC Unit. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), September 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/934592.

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