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1
Mohd K. Shambour, Mohd K. Shambour. "A Heuristic Approach for Distributing Pilgrims over Mina Tents." journal of King Abdulaziz University Engineering Science 30, no. 2 (2019): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.4197/eng.30-2.2.
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t. Every year, more than two million Muslims come to the holy city, Makkah, to perform Hajj (the Islamic pilgrimage). One of Hajj rituals is to spend two to three nights in Mina, one of the holy sites. Distributing Muslim pilgrims in Mina, respecting different kinds of constraints, over limited number of tents is a real-world optimization problem. In this paper, a heuristic based algorithm is proposed, called Mina Tent Distribution Algorithm (MTDA), attempting to better utilize the available capacity of Mina’s area in the best possible way with an efficient use of the available resources. MTDA employs seven functions during the search process to find the best fit accommodation for pilgrims on the available tents of Mina. Experimental results revealed that MTDA achieves better performance compared with eight algorithm schemes in all experimental cases. The best result of MTDA was obtained through allocating 80% of the total number of pilgrims over 76.2% of the total available accommodation space of Mina area.
2
Harsritanto, Bangun Indrakusumo Radityo, Satrio Nugroho, Favian Dewanta, and Aditya Rio Prabowo. "Mosque design strategy for energy and water saving." Open Engineering 11, no. 1 (2021): 723–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/eng-2021-0070.
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Abstract The built environment plays an essential role as a climate change agent. Natural resource exploitation, energy consumptions, and waste management need to be built for more environment-friendly. The Mosque is a religious building built in every space on earth since a quarter of the world population is Muslim. This situation brought an urgency for making Mosques more sustainable and friendly to the natural environment. Carrying these facts, this study aimed to suggest a design strategy for making a sustainable mosque. Through a collaboration of passive design strategy, present technologies work of literature, and a study case, this study shortlisted primary design strategies in (1) building layouts, (2) lighting strategy, (3) HVAC strategy, (4) water conservation strategy, and (5) IT strategy. By keeping these major design strategies, Mosques can be made more environmentally sustainable. Several design recommendations are suggested in each major design strategy that may bring help for making sustainable Mosque on every space on this earth.
3
Salma, Umme. "English Literature from the Other Perspective: A Thought and an Approach." IIUC Studies 9 (July 10, 2015): 261–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/iiucs.v9i0.24031.
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English Literature as the knowledge of the former master is an exclusively challenging discipline to be focused from the Other perspective, from Muslim perspective, one among many Others. It is a bellicose field because in the postcolonial world its presence reminds of the colonial past, and declares the continuance of the myriad ideological projections and paradigmatic speculations of that past in the neocolonial form. Still postcolonial Indian Muslim societies are promoting and propagating English knowledge in every stage of educational institutions, and thus creating a culturally hybrid/syncretic nation which can neither accept Englishness entirely nor reject its own cultural inheritance and realities totally. Whereas other postcolonial nations can approve, accept and accelerate the mixed-up jumbled cultural syncretism gradually losing or conforming their native cultural signifiers with Western culture, Muslims cannot because the ideology and approach to life of Islam are straightly opposite to the English knowledge, emanated from the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Latin cultural heritage. Keeping in view the aforementioned ideas, the paper argues that this is high time to review this epistemological crisis from historical set up and to read English literature from the Other point of view. Therefore, it proposes some ways to re-read the English canonical compositions and puts forward as specimen the re-reading/teaching method of ENG: 2420, titled English Poetry: 17th &18th Centuries from the undergraduate syllabus of IIUC.IIUC Studies Vol.9 December 2012: 261-278
4
Balicki, Ks Janusz. "Christian-Muslin co-operation in a secular age. Areas of collaboration." Chrześcijaństwo, Świat, Polityka, no. 20 (May 13, 2017): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/csp.2016.20.1.03.
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In recent years, the Muslim population in Europe has increased in a significant way due to the large inflow of immigrants from Muslim countries caused by the war in Syria and the activity of the Islamic State. In the long history of Christian-Muslim relations, these two religions, with their respective political powers, were involved in many conflicts. Europe has become very secular and lost some of her Christian values. It would be interesting to see if the influxof Muslims with strong religious values creates an opportunity for Christians to co-operate in some areas and to strengthen common beliefs. The aim of this article is to identify possible areas of co-operation between Christians and Muslims in the secular Europe and the basic conditions that must be met to make this co-operation possible. The answer is given through the analysis of the following issues: main disputes between Christian churches and liberallegislation regarding marriage, family values and the protection of human life; analysis of the world wide Muslim beliefs and attitude to family and protection of life; analysis of the co-operation of Christians and Muslims at the UN, in different States or NGOs in the area of legislation protection as well as the co-operation of Christians and Muslims in Great Britain at the basic level. At the end of the article, the main results and conclusions are presented.
5
Friedman, Francine. "The Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with Reference to the Sandžak of Novi Pazar): Islam as National Identity." Nationalities Papers 28, no. 1 (2000): 165–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990050002498.
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The Bosnian Muslims have only fairly recently become internationally identified as a national group. As a matter of fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina itself has had until lately a low recognition value to most people not living in southeastern Europe. Indeed, to many it has become a shock to discover that a fairly large group of Muslims resides in the middle of Europe, not to mention that they have become the object of ethnonationalistic violence at the end of the twentieth century. A further seeming incongruity in the international arena is the claim by many Bosnian Muslims that they should not be confused with Muslims of the Arab-speaking world, since Bosnian Muslims are indigenous Serbo-Croatian-speaking (now Bosnian-speaking) Slavic people, just like the Serbs or Croats who have committed the recent acts of violence against them in the name of ethnic purity. The Bosnian Muslim claim that the designation “Muslim” is more a national than a religious identification is confusing to the world at large. This article will trace the formation of the Bosnian Muslim national identification and set forth the issues faced by the Bosnian Muslims in their attempts to claim and defend it.
6
Marsh, Robert M. "Muslim Values in Islamic and Non-Islamic Societies." Comparative Sociology 11, no. 1 (2012): 29–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156913310x502842.
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Abstract Values are conceptions of the desirable in various domains of life. This study tests the hypotheses that (1) when Muslims are a minority living in a non-Islamic society (e.g., India, Singapore, Uganda), their values are more similar to those of the non-Muslim majority religion in their society than to those of Muslims in Muslim-majority Islamic societies (e.g., Iran, Morocco, Pakistan); and (2) this tendency toward value assimilation is more pronounced when the Muslim minority is socially included, rather than excluded, by the non-Muslim majority. Data from representative samples of the population of nine Muslim-majority societies and nine Muslim-minority societies in the 2000 (fourth) wave of the World Values Surveys are used to construct scales for three domains of cultural values: religious values, family values, and gender values, and measures of social exclusion. The findings largely confirm hypothesis 1 and lend some support to hypothesis 2.
7
Kroemer, James. "Vanquish the Haughty and Spare the Subjected: A Study of Bernard of Clairvaux’s Position on Muslims and Jews." Medieval Encounters 18, no. 1 (2012): 55–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006712x634567.
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Abstract The Jews and the Muslims drew the attention of the twelfth Century Cistercian abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, and his words and actions had consequences for both communities. Despite his many demeaning comments about Jews and Judaism, he defended Jews from Crusader attacks, and he believed that Jews would convert to Christianity prior to the end of the world. On the other hand, he promoted the Second Crusade for the purpose of defending Jerusalem from Muslim invasion. He had no interest in converting Muslims to Christianity, only killing them if they continued their threat on the Holy Land. A close examination of Bernard’s writings reveals that his position on Jews and Muslims was not merely a reflection of church policy, but a means to advance his personal spiritual desire of union with God.
8
KHAN, MUHAMMAD TARIQ. "Halal Food Products and their Market Extent - Opportunities in the World." International Review of Management and Business Research 9, no. 4 (2020): 95–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.30543/9-4(2020)-10.
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Halal in Islam is a central concept, referring to any permissible to use e.g. thing, entity, object or action in accordance with Islamic principles & practices, because Islam has a unique consumption & dietary system different from other ethnic consumption & dietary systems so what Muslims can eat is defined in halal food regulations because there are ingredients of food and processes of preparation and both must be halal, therefore all the Muslims are required to ensure that their food comes from halal sources according to principles of Shariah both its ingredients & its whole preparation process. And now world community has recognized the importance of Muslims dietary & other consumption needs. Muslim consumers towards halal food products have more positive intention & attitude than non food products though halal concept is applicable to all products including food, pharmaceuticals, fashion, banking, insurance, entertainment and tourism. However what an overall concept encouraging, Muslims to seek & use goods & services is promoting ‘cleanliness’ in all the aspect of human life hence halal food is produced in a clean environment is of quality & safe to consume. Now the term halal has attracted attention and certified halal food and other products market is increasingly growing both internationally & domestically. Halal rules govern the tastes & preferences of Muslim consumers so where Muslim consumers exist, market for halal food also exists. Therefore Market for halal products is very fast growing market and is to the tune of trillion dollars. This paper encompasses the points i.e. what is halal? What is origin of halal food such as animal food or plants food? What is extent of halal products market in the world? Keywords: Halal, Food, Products, Markets, Consumption.
9
Djokovic, Emilija. "Ethnic and religious structure of Tutin municipality." Glasnik Srpskog geografskog drustva 83, no. 1 (2003): 73–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/gsgd0301073d.
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Tutin municipality is settled in southwest Serbia. It is one of Serbian municipality with one dominancy one ethnic group over another - Muslim group in this case. Muslims were dominated over Serbian in Tutin even before The Second World War, but these differences became more distinctly by the end of XX century. The reasons for such situation are numerous: population increase which is bigger among Muslim than among Serbian population, high migration saldo (for the period 1961-1981), emigration processes from villages to only town centre in municipality - Tutin. Ethnic structure on the settlement level is, more or less, the same as on the level of municipality. There are only five out of 93 settlement in the municipality with dominant Serbian population. The other 88 settlement are with absolute dominancy of Muslims. Religious structure follows the course of ethnic structure in Tutin municipality. Muslims are absolutely dominant religious group with 95% of Tutin population, and only 4,31% of population are orthodox Christians. If all these processes continue in the future, there will be absolute dominancy of only one ethnic group by the end of the next decade. On the other side, the area of Raska region is one of the most important geostrategic area in Serbia, and for that reason it would be good to pay more attention to building spirit of tolerance between different ethnic and religious groups.
10
Abdirashidov, Z. Sh. "Image of a Chinese Muslim in Late Ottoman Press." Turkology 5, no. 103 (2020): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.47526/2020/2664-3162.014.
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At the end of the XIX century, the Muslim world, which fell into deep political and intellectual stagnation, was looking for ways out of this situation and raising the scientific potential of the Muslim community. The political crisis in the internal and external affairs of the most powerful Muslim state – Turkey, led in 1908 to the 2nd Constitutional Revolution. During this period that a press arose in Istanbul aimed at agitating or promoting the unity of Muslims under the rule of the Ottoman Sultan. The Turkish press, in order to fulfill the tasks assigned to it, first of all began to familiarize the Ottoman public with the life, political and social situation of Muslims living mainly in the southeastern territories of Asia. This article provides a preliminary analysis of the materials of the Turkish press, in particular, the magazines Ṣırāṭ-ı Müstaqīm, Ta‘āruf-i Müslimīn and Ḥikmet about Chinese Muslims, as well as made an attempt to identify the main ideological aspects of Ottoman society, their attitude to the socio-political situation of Chinese Muslims.
11
Abdirashidov, Z. Sh. "Image of a Chinese Muslim in Late Ottoman Press." Turkology 5, no. 103 (2020): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.47526/2020/2664-3162.014.
Full textAbstract:
At the end of the XIX century, the Muslim world, which fell into deep political and intellectual stagnation, was looking for ways out of this situation and raising the scientific potential of the Muslim community. The political crisis in the internal and external affairs of the most powerful Muslim state – Turkey, led in 1908 to the 2nd Constitutional Revolution. During this period that a press arose in Istanbul aimed at agitating or promoting the unity of Muslims under the rule of the Ottoman Sultan. The Turkish press, in order to fulfill the tasks assigned to it, first of all began to familiarize the Ottoman public with the life, political and social situation of Muslims living mainly in the southeastern territories of Asia. This article provides a preliminary analysis of the materials of the Turkish press, in particular, the magazines Ṣırāṭ-ı Müstaqīm, Ta‘āruf-i Müslimīn and Ḥikmet about Chinese Muslims, as well as made an attempt to identify the main ideological aspects of Ottoman society, their attitude to the socio-political situation of Chinese Muslims.
12
Ayub, Mohd Nasir, Surita Hartini Mat Hassan, and Mohd Asmadi Yakob. "Gagasan Madrasah al-Zahra’: Pemikiran Said Nursi dalam Pendidikan." Journal of Contemporary Islamic Studies 6, no. 1 (2020): 111–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.24191/jcis.v6i1.7.
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Islamic education has been strongly emphasized in Muslim communities. The quality of education and adherence to the Islamic worldview will shape Muslim personalities towards the true meaning of excellence in this world and the hereafter. In the broader context of the establishment of the university as a more systematic field of knowledge has long been practiced in Muslim countries, in particular with the existence of Al-Azhar University, which is the oldest university in the world. However, whether the establishment of a university in a Muslim country now fulfill the needs of the Muslims themselves, while still meeting the characteristics of Islamic civilization. This paper aims to analyze the idea of education of an Islamic thinker at the end of the Ottoman Turkish government, namely Sheikh Badiuzzaman Said Nursi who is considered a figure who tried to integrate the religious and scientific knowledge in a single framework based on Madrasah al Zahra's model. This study is adopted a library research and its analysis is based on a content analysis framework. The study found that the idea of establishing Madrasah al Zahra Islamic University by Sheikh Badiuzzaman Said Nursi was in line with religious demands, to cater the needs of Muslims and restoring the strength of Muslims in leading the occupation of Western powers at that time.
13
Jan, Abid Ullah. "Moderate Islam." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (2005): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.467.
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The Debate
 Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.
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Jan, Abid Ullah. "Moderate Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (2005): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.467.
Full textAbstract:
The Debate
 Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.
15
Rey-Schirr, Catherine. "The ICRC's activities on the Indian subcontinent following partition (1947–1949)." International Review of the Red Cross 38, no. 323 (1998): 267–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020860400091026.
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In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the British government clearly stated its intention of granting independence to India.The conflict between the British and the Indian nationalists receded into the background, while the increasing antagonism between Hindus and Muslims came to the fore. The Hindus, centred round the Congress Party led by Jawaharlal Nehru, wanted to maintain the unity of India by establishing a government made up of representatives of the two communities. The Muslims, under the banner of the Muslim League and its President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, demanded the creation of a separate Muslim State, Pakistan. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the approximately 300 million Hindus, 6 million Sikhs and 100 million Muslims in British India were not living in geographically distinct regions, especially in Punjab and Bengal, where the population was mixed.
16
Lee Ehinger, Jessica. "Revolutionizing the Status Quo." Studies in Late Antiquity 3, no. 1 (2019): 17–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/sla.2019.3.1.17.
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The works of Anastasius of Sinai offer an important window into the lives of Christians living under Muslim rule at the end of the seventh century. Writing after spending several decades traveling the Muslim-conquered Near East, Anastasius produced works that spoke simultaneously to both the theological significance of Muslim rule and to the continued doctrinal debates between Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians. This article focuses on comparing how Anastasius characterizes Muslims and anti-Chalcedonian Christians, particularly in his Viae dux and collections of edifying tales. Although he often discusses Muslims in connection to demons or other evil forces, these references lack any real sense of horror. Moreover, his works have only limited references to Muslims, and he often use their presence as a pretext to discuss doctrinal variation and heresy instead. It is worth noting that modern study of Anastasius’ corpus has been complicated by confusion over authorship because his works also often lack internal historical references that could be used for consistent dating. Moreover, many aspects of his theology relate to post-Chalcedon doctrine, and therefore could easily be attributed to an author of the sixth century. However, given the monk's travels, which took place during the height of the Muslim incursion into the Levant, the Muslims’ absence may not be merely an accidental omission, but may rather represent a conscious choice by Anastasius to create works that echo pre-Islamic writing, in order to create a sense of continuity and a unified Christian world that was, in reality, disrupted by Muslim rule.
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Mukran H. Usman, Aswar Aswar, and Zulfiah Sam. "Covid-19 dalam Perjalanan Akhir Zaman: Sebab, Dampak dan Anjuran Syariat dalam Menghadapinya." BUSTANUL FUQAHA: Jurnal Bidang Hukum Islam 1, no. 2 (2020): 137–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.36701/bustanul.v1i2.142.
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Rasulullah saw. had informed muslims about the occurrences that will befall mankind on their way to the end of time, including the evil disasters that will hit the earth, kill, and destroy the human being. As a muslim, there is no word except that we believe in the occurrences and phases of the journey towards the end of the time. This study aimed to explain one of the occurrences of the journey towards the end of time that befall the world and mankind today, which is one of the deadly infectious outbreaks so-called coronavirus or covid-19, which has destroyed many people, imprisoned people in cities and countries, and caused various disasters and havocs as the result of the outbreak. The research method used was library research which was through a literature review related to the research. The results showed that the information of the journey towards the end of time would appear one by one in the range of human life, how they live, so thus Allah swt. shows them the meaning of the age they lived in. The worse human life is, the more Allah swt. show the badness of that era to the point where it is rampant engulfing the world and mankind, even though among those times are pious people, whether in an Islamic country or groups. Muslims are encouraged to follow the Shari'a when an epidemic strikes a country, namely: 1) not entering a country affected by disaster; 2) close the container where the water is; 3) pray a lot and recite; and 4) living in the city of Medina; stay indoors. Finally, the effects of the plague at the end of time are: 1) the number of sudden deaths; and 2) humans are isolated.
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Caringal, Sharon Advincula. "Shifting Paradigms: Solidarity Groups and the Muslim Secessionist Problem in the Philippines." Comparative Islamic Studies 7, no. 1-2 (2012): 209–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/cis.v7i1-2.209.
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This article gives a summation of the Filipino experience in handling the secessionist movement in Muslim Mindanao and the key role played by the international, regional and national solidarity organizations in facilitating a peaceful resolution to this long standing Muslim problem. It discusses the nature of the Muslims’ struggle, their aspirations and their real condition with the end in view of identifying the lessons that can be drawn from it. I factor in the differences between the two groups (the majority- the colonized and the minority- the Muslims in southern Philippines) and use the perspective of a social science practitioner not only in my analysis and interpretation but also in coming up with a “Model for Third Party Intervention” (please refer to the Framework). In view of this model, this article proceeds with an evaluation of the effectiveness of cross border solutions to a national problem. In the end, a clearer picture of how the countries in the Middle East and Asia interact with each other and with the other countries of the world in responding to the Muslim problem in Mindanao should have been provided.
19
Beaumont, Mark. "Christian Defence of Free Will in Debate with Muslims in the Early Islamic Period." Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 36, no. 3 (2019): 149–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0265378819852269.
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Two Christian theologians writing in Arabic in the early ninth century argued that God had created humanity to freely choose good or evil actions, a belief shared universally by previous Christian writers in Greek and Syriac no matter the denomination they came from. They were debating with Muslim intellectuals who held that God created all human actions before they were acquired by humans, so that God had already decided which actions a particular human being would choose, whether good or evil. Theodore Abū Qurra and ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī developed dialogues with determinist Muslims in the hope that they might influence these determinist Muslims to adopt earlier Muslim beliefs that the Qurʾan taught that God would judge humans for the choices that they freely made for good or evil. However, the trend towards determinism was so strong that by the end of the ninth century the mainstream Sunni view would be that God decreed all human actions before they were acquired by humans.
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Moore, Kathleen. "The Case for Muslim Constitutional Interpretive Activity." American Journal of Islam and Society 7, no. 1 (1990): 69–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v7i1.2667.
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Muslim Involvement: The Court Record 1.Prisoners' RightsCan we rely upon the courts to protect Islam and Muslims from discriminatory treatment? Have the courts considered Islam to be a 'religion' worthy of constitutional protection? The issue of First Amendment protection of Muslim beliefs and practices has arisen most often in cases brought by African-American Muslims who are incarcerated. In fact, the area of law to which Muslims have made their most substantial contribution to date is the area of prisoners' rights litigation. African-American Muslim inmates have been responsible for establishing prisoners' constitutional rights to worship. Cases brought by Muslims have established that prisoners have the right to assemble for religious services; to consult a cleric of their faith; to possess religious publications and to subscribe to religious literature; to wear unobstrusive religious symbols such as medallions; to have prepared a special diet required by their religion; and to correspond with their spiritual leaders. The court record demonstrates that Muslim inmates' religious liberty claims, challenging prison regulations that impinge on the free exercise of the Islamic faith, have been accepted only under certain circumstances. In brief, the responsiveness of the courts to Muslim inmates' claims has turned on a number of factors including: (1) the issue of equality of treatment of all religious groups in prison; (2) the courts' reticence to reverse the decisions of prison officials; (3) the degree to which the inmates' challenges would undermine the fundamental interests of the state (e.g. in prison security and administrative efficiency); and (4) the showing that Islam is parallel in significant ways to the conventional Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths.Constitutional protection of Islamic practices in prison and elsewhere, however, has not been automatic. Many Muslim organizations, the Nation of Islam in particular, have been treated as cults, or suspect and dangerous groups, due in part to the perception that Muslims teach racial hatred, and have not been regarded in the same respect as 'mainline' religious groups. It has been argued before the courts that Muslim doctrine contains political aspirations and economic goals as well as racial prejudice and should be suppressed in the interest of society. The gist of this argument is that certain Muslim groups are primarily political and not religious associations and thus ...
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Hussain, Amir. "A Muslim Perspective on Interfaith Dialogue with Christians." Review & Expositor 105, no. 1 (2008): 53–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/003463730810500106.
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This essay will be an introduction to interfaith dialogue between Muslims and Christians. It will begin with autobiographical information about how the author, a Canadian Muslim of Pakistani origins, came to be a professor of theology in a Jesuit university in Southern California. It will then move to a discussion of problematic verses in the Qur'an that would seem to discourage interfaith dialogue, and then discuss those verses that promote alliance between Muslims and Christians. Next, I will discuss inclusive and exclusive views in both Islam and Christianity with reference to Jesus as a focal point for dialogue between Muslims and Christians. The essay will end with a discussion of pluralism.
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Amin, Muhammadiyah. "Kontekstualisasi Pemahaman Hadîth dan Rekonstruksi Epistemologi Ikhtilâf dalam Fiqh al-Hadîth." ISLAMICA: Jurnal Studi Keislaman 5, no. 2 (2014): 256. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2011.5.2.256-268.
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Hadith, a prophetic saying has been a living tradition for the Muslims. In their plea to live a better live, Muslims would turn to either the Qur’an or the hadith. It has in other words served as a source for all aspects of the lives of Muslims. As an object of academic study, hadith has also been subjected into a serious investigation both to prove its authenticity in its narration and message, and to elaborate certain points of importance. Critical studies of hadith have been common in academic circles in the Muslim world and in the Western universities, one of which focuses on the contextual meaning of it. It is toward this end that this paper is aimed at. It is an attempt to make a contribution in the contextual analysis of hadith. By contextual analysis we mean a study that puts a lot of stressing on the meaning of a hadith by looking at the context from which it was said or reported. This way of studying hadith would help to understand it better in line with the dynamic nature of Islam. The paper argues that a hadith cannot be understood in isolation from its context. It also maintains that understanding its context would mean that one would be able to unveil and even reconstruct the hadith epistemology. Since the epistemology of a hadith lies in its meaning, the re-interpretation of a hadith according to its context would mean rediscovering the new dimension of the epistemology.
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Abubakar, Zuwaira, Isa Muhammad Maishanu, and Shehu Abdul-Rahman Aboki. "Islamic Principles of Success: A Review of Literature." ‘Abqari Journal 23, no. 1 (2020): 174–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.33102/abqari.vol23no1.235.
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The current backwardness of many Muslim communities across the world in different fields (e.g. academic, economics etc.) raises the question whether Islam presents comprehensive principles compliance to which assures not only spiritual but also material success. The aim of this paper is to review Islamic literature on the principles associated with success as well as explore the evidence of achievements and successes of the Noble Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and early Muslims from historical and biographical records. Findings of the review revealed that Islam has prescribed systemic and pragmatic principles that assure sustainable worldly success. This fact is testified by the well documented spectacular achievements of the Noble Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and early Muslim generations. Observance of the prescribed Islamic principles is crucial to overcoming the currently prevalent economic, political and academic backwardness of The Contemporary Muslim Society.
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Constable, Olivia Remie. "Regulating Religious Noise: The Council of Vienne, the Mosque Call and Muslim Pilgrimage in the Late Medieval Mediterranean World." Medieval Encounters 16, no. 1 (2010): 64–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/138078510x12535199002677.
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AbstractThis paper examines the issue of religious noise in the later middle ages, in those areas of the western Mediterranean, especially in the Crown of Aragón, where Muslims and Christians lived in close proximity. In particular, it considers the role of the Council of Vienne (1311) in shifting and reflecting contemporary Christian attitudes toward public and audible Muslim religious observance, including the call to prayer (adhān) and local pilgrimage (ziyāra). This article will place the Vienne rulings in a wider context, first discussing the regulation of religious noise until the end of the thirteenth century, then examining data from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As will become evident, although the Council of Vienne did mark a turning point in the Christian effort to control the religious acoustic environment, its legislation was neither as original nor as effective as is often believed. Nevertheless, the Council marked a shift in contemporary thinking about religious noise, signaling increased awareness of noise as a problem and adding authority to prohibitions on public Muslim religious expression. Parallel concerns expressed by both Muslims and Christians about the religious noise and public rituals of minority communities (whether the mosque call, the ringing of bells, or local pilgrimage) demonstrate inter-religious tensions in the Mediterranean World at the turn of the fourteenth century.
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Kaplan, Lisabeth, and Paul Roochnik. "The Jewish Obligation to Stand Up against Islamophobia in the United States." American Journal of Islam and Society 21, no. 3 (2004): 175–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i3.1788.
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First they came for the communists, and I did not speak out –because I was not a communist;Then they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out –because I was not a socialist;Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out –because I was not a trade unionist;Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out –because I was not a Jew;Then they came for me –and there was no one left to speak out for me.The German anti-Nazi Protestant minister, Martin Niemoeller, spoke thesepoignant words following the end of World War II. Pastor Niemoellerreminds us that whenever society singles out a specific minority for abuse,the rest of society must resist. What folly it is to believe that during a timeof insecurity and suspicion, any minority – religious, ethnic, or political –can long enjoy immunity from oppression. The Jewish people, perhapsmore than other minorities, has an intimate familiarity with the plight ofthe scapegoat, a 2,000 year history of diaspora and minority status, withall the cruelty and violence that has accompanied this experience. In thiswork, we will cite Biblical sources, cultural traditions, and rabbinic teachings to express the inescapable obligation of Jews to stand in solidaritywith Muslims in their time of need.Make no mistake about it: Muslims now confront unprecedented discriminationand harassment in the United States. In a recent report, theAmerican-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) reports a significantincrease in the frequency of hate crimes and acts of discriminationperpetrated against Arabs (both Muslims and Christians) and non-ArabMuslims.1 The list includes hundreds of acts of physical violence, some 60incidents of Arab or Muslim passengers being prevented from traveling onairlines simply because of their “profile,” several hundred employmentdiscrimination cases, and serious concerns arising from the USA PatriotAct. Tabloid media and bigoted radio talk show hosts contribute to anatmosphere of Islamophobia, and some Americans associate the word“Muslim” or “Arab” with “terrorist.” Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, conservativepundit Ann Coulter, commenting on Arab and Muslim countries,suggested that “we should invade their countries, kill their leaders andconvert them to Christianity.”2 An Islamophobic atmosphere has takenhold in the United States, targeting Muslims not for any crime, but merelyfor being Muslims ...
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AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A. "From Islamization of Knowledge to Islamization of Education." American Journal of Islam and Society 16, no. 2 (1999): v—ix. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v16i2.2117.
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Any Muslim intellectual who has a serious concern for the relativelydeteriorating condition of the Muslim Ummah with respect to the WesternWorld would be depressed and confused. However, the recent history of theMuslim World shows how many determined reformist movements playeda positive role in changing the Muslim condition. But these movements metwith partial or limited success.It was in the late seventeenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries,an ascendant Europe undermined and overran much of the UthmaniDuwlah (Ottoman Empire) and finally put an end to it, much to the shockand dismay of the Muslim World. The powerful European challenge andthis drastic event elicited two contrasting responses from the Muslim eliteand the masses. While many of them resorted to superficial imitation andinitiated capricious copycat reform movements, some harnessed the risingawareness and the attendant spirit of resistance to launch more genuineefforts and reform movements. Understandably, these efforts were conflicting,emotional, and limited in their scope but they eventually helpedMuslim societies to gain political independence in the post-World War IIera. At the heart of these reforms and political liberation was the Muslimpeoples’ desire to realize their Islamic, national, and cultural aspirationsalong with the hope of enjoying a standard of living comparable to that ofthe West.Unfortunately, these hopes were not achieved and the cultural reformscontinued to be emotional, arbitrary, and patchwork (talfiq). The conditionof the Muslim people continued to deteriorate and the gap between theWestern world and the Muslim world continued to widen. The former continuedto dominate and exploit that latter. All this proved that arbitrary,emotional, superficial, and limited patchwork reforms would not have aserious impact on the conditions of the Muslim people and will fail to realizetheir national or Islamic aspirations ...
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Hartmann, Noga. "Globalized Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 23, no. 2 (2006): 100–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v23i2.1625.
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This book analyzes core issues of Islamic thought in the modern era byexamining Islam as both the dominant religion in the Middle East and aminority religion in the West. By considering a wide range of ideological, spiritual, and non-violent or violent events, Roy posits that contrary to popular(and erroneous) assumptions, Islamic fundamentalism derives fromglobalization, not from a clash of civilizations or religions.Roy claims that both liberalism and fundamentalism arise from globalizationand deterritorialization (i.e., the spread of Muslims and Islam beyondthe traditional Muslim world). He views neo-fundamentalists, Islamists,born-again Muslims, and radical violent groups as bit players in Islam’s continuingefforts to come to terms with western values. For example, Islamicmovements in Europe seem to be fundamentalist on the surface; but uponcloser examination, they display western values (e.g., individualization, selfrealization,spirituality, and the weakening of traditional ties and sources ofauthority). With one-third of all Muslims living outside Muslim-majoritylands, Roy believes that modern manifestations of Islam in the West (e.g.,radicalism, neo-fundamentalism, Sufism, nationalism, re-Islamization, neo-Islamic brotherhoods, and anti-westernism) evolve from globalizationinstead of a desire to return to orthodox religious practices or the allegedly“pure” Islam of an earlier time. He tells us that Islam is no longer only thetraditional faith of the Salaf (i.e., the three first and most pious generationsof Muslims), but also a mixture of modern sociological and cultural – evenwestern – elements, regardless of what modern-day Salafis claim ...
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Bature Darma, Dikko. "Exploring the Theological and Practical Implications of Contextualization Among Muslims." Journal of Usuluddin 49, no. 1 (2021): 199–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/usuluddin.vol49no1.8.
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The greatest missionary challenge throughout the church history is ministering to the Muslims. Previously, different approaches have been employed by the church with different settings; however, they yield little or no results at all. The need to address the challenge of Islam is ardent among Christian missionaries: therefore, in their struggle to propagate Christianity among Muslims as well as to maintain its diminishing number of followers, missionaries have been in search of new methods for Muslim outreach. Their newest discovery is the contextual approach that has been much debated in so many theological books and journals that explain its theological and practical implications. However, the methods of contextualization are said to have been successfully employed for missionary activities in some parts of the Muslim world and it has imparted to the Christian mission further significance and validity. To this end, at some level contextualization was rather accepted in regards to outreach to Muslims. This paper attempts to discuss the theological and practical implications of this new method of ‘contextualization’ in its various approaches and to see the element, if any, that distinguishes it from the former missiological methodologies of ‘Inculturation,’ ‘Identification,’ ‘Indigenization’ or ‘Vernacularization’ etc.
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Adeel, M. Ashraf. "Modernity and Muslims." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 28, no. 1 (2011): 1–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v28i1.345.
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This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical acquiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the interaction between these societies and the contemporary Western powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of the world is a manifestation of this fright. The central concern of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards the end.
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Adeel, M. Ashraf. "Modernity and Muslims." American Journal of Islam and Society 28, no. 1 (2011): 1–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v28i1.345.
Full textAbstract:
This article is focused on some conditions in today’s world of globalized media, which are producing either an uncritical acquiescence or fright in Muslim societies as a result of the interaction between these societies and the contemporary Western powers that represent modernity and postmodernity on the global stage. The rise of fundamentalism, a tendency toward returning to the roots and stringently insisting upon some pure and literal interpretation of them, in almost all the religions of the world is a manifestation of this fright. The central concern of this article is to suggest that fundamentalism is neither the only nor the most reasonable response for Muslim societies in the face of contemporary modernity. Muslims need to adopt an independent and critical attitude toward modernity and reshape their societies in the light of the ethics of the Qur’an, keeping in view the historical link between Islam and science in as much as Islamic culture paved the way for emergence of modern science during European Renaissance. The necessity of a pluralistic or contextualized modernization of Muslim societies is discussed along with the need for the removal of cultural duplicity in the role of the West in relation to Muslim societies. All this leads to an overall proposal for modernization which is given towards the end.
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Khan, Saad Omar. "The “Caliphate Question”." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24, no. 4 (2007): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v24i4.427.
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This paper examines British approaches to the caliphate from the beginning of the First World War to the aftermath of its dissolution in 1924. Background will be given as to how the Islamic conception of the caliphate shifted over time. British use of the caliphate as a political tool in the nineteenth century is also examined, especially with regards to how strong British-Ottoman ties prior to the First World War affected India’s Muslims. The primary focus, however, will be on British ties with King Hussein of the Hejaz. British suggestions of an Arab caliphate encouraged the idea that Hussein should assume the title of caliph, which would later be a cause of agitation and concern for British policy in the British Empire. This is especially true with regards to India, as fear of Indo-Muslim opinion would deeply influence British policy when it came to the Ottoman Empire’s position in the post-bellum period. With the creation of the Turkish Republic and the subsequent disestablishment of the Ottoman caliphate, Hussein, sharif of the Hejaz, would officially announce his claim to the title. This dismayed the British foreign policy establishment, which strove to avoid suggestions of complicity lest further anti-British activity be encouraged in India. Eventually, the end of Hussein would come from Ibn Saud, his principle rival in the Arab world. Despite Hussein’s status as a British ally, the widespread anger against him in the Islamic world over the caliphate would persuade the British to distance themselves from him and his religious pretensions.
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Khan, Saad Omar. "The “Caliphate Question”." American Journal of Islam and Society 24, no. 4 (2007): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v24i4.427.
Full textAbstract:
This paper examines British approaches to the caliphate from the beginning of the First World War to the aftermath of its dissolution in 1924. Background will be given as to how the Islamic conception of the caliphate shifted over time. British use of the caliphate as a political tool in the nineteenth century is also examined, especially with regards to how strong British-Ottoman ties prior to the First World War affected India’s Muslims. The primary focus, however, will be on British ties with King Hussein of the Hejaz. British suggestions of an Arab caliphate encouraged the idea that Hussein should assume the title of caliph, which would later be a cause of agitation and concern for British policy in the British Empire. This is especially true with regards to India, as fear of Indo-Muslim opinion would deeply influence British policy when it came to the Ottoman Empire’s position in the post-bellum period. With the creation of the Turkish Republic and the subsequent disestablishment of the Ottoman caliphate, Hussein, sharif of the Hejaz, would officially announce his claim to the title. This dismayed the British foreign policy establishment, which strove to avoid suggestions of complicity lest further anti-British activity be encouraged in India. Eventually, the end of Hussein would come from Ibn Saud, his principle rival in the Arab world. Despite Hussein’s status as a British ally, the widespread anger against him in the Islamic world over the caliphate would persuade the British to distance themselves from him and his religious pretensions.
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Haque, Amber. "Fear and Anxiety in the Arab World." American Journal of Islam and Society 21, no. 3 (2004): 142–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i3.1775.
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The title is certainly catchy, as not much has been written on fears and anxietiesin the Arab world. Much, however, has been written on Muslims andIslam post-9/11. While some writers genuinely try to understand the variousIslamic ideologies and Muslim cultures, others seek to paint a rather dim anddepressing picture of Muslim societies. This book attempts to describeArabs, as well as their fears and anxieties, in the garb of “interdisciplinaryresearch.” It is divided into seven chapters and contains a section on notes,a bibliography, and an index. The chapters address issues related to Arabpolitics (e.g., political identity, nationalism, and minority issues) and moregeneral areas (e.g., religion and Arab culture). The author is a professor ofpolitical science and diplomacy at the Notre Dame University in Lebanon.In the preface and opening chapter, Nehme introduces the growingfield of political psychology, which draws upon various psychological theoriesto interpret human political behavior. Although he admits that thebest results can be obtained through collaborative research betweenexperts in each discipline, he dares to make an independent attempt to analyzeArab fears and anxieties from a Freudian perspective.The book’s first few pages are quite a turn-off, as many preposterousstatements are made. Playing psychologist, Nehme asserts that worldevents are themselves natural experiments and, therefore, his assumptionsare “empirically based” (p. 2). He diagnoses the problem of violenceamong Arabs as resulting from a “built-in consistency of anxiety” (p. 3),“most Arabs no longer appeal to God … instead, they call on their governmentsfor relief” (p. 4), “they are afraid of everything” (p. 7), “Arab menare afraid that their wives will be sexually attracted to other men if theyleave home to work” (p. 8), and so on. He goes on to characterize suicidaltendencies among Arabs as a “death wish” that is not new in Arab history,as it develops their inner power … through acquiring weapons, and states ...
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Mirkova, Anna M. "“Population Politics” at the End of Empire: Migration and Sovereignty in Ottoman Eastern Rumelia, 1877–1886." Comparative Studies in Society and History 55, no. 4 (2013): 955–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417513000479.
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AbstractThis article explores the migrations of Turkish Muslims after the 1878 Peace Treaty of Berlin, which severed much of the Balkans from the Ottoman Empire as fully independent nation-states or as nominally dependent polities in the borderlands of the empire. I focus on one such polity—the administratively autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia—which, in wrestling to reconcile liberal principles of equality and political representation understood in ethno-religious terms, prompted emigration of Turkish Muslims while enabling Bulgarian Christian hegemony. Scholars have studied Muslim emigration from the Balkans as the Ottoman Empire gradually lost hold of the region, emphasizing deleterious effects of nationalism and aggressive state-building in the region. Here I look at migration at empire's end, and more specifically at the management of migration as constitutive of sovereignty. The Ottoman government asserted its suzerainty by claiming to protect the rights of Eastern Rumelia's Muslims. The Bulgarian dominated administration of Eastern Rumelia claimed not only administrative but also political autonomy by trying to contain the grievances of Turkish Muslims as a domestic issue abused by ill-meaning outsiders, all the while insisting that the province protected the rights of all subjects. Ultimately, a “corporatist” model of subjecthood obtained in Eastern Rumelia, which fused the traditional religious categorization of Ottoman subjects with an ethnic one under the umbrella of representative government. The tension between group belonging and individual politicization that began unfolding in Eastern Rumelia became a major dilemma of the post-Ottoman world and other post-imperial societies after World War I.
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Daulay, Syaripuddin. "PERGUMULAN ISLAM DAN KOLONIALISME ABAD KE 18 DAN 19." Jurnal Bilqolam Pendidikan Islam 2, no. 1 (2021): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.51672/jbpi.v2i1.49.
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Since the 16th century the colonizers came to Indonesia one after another. Starting with the Portuguese, then moving on to the Netherlands and ending with the Japanese. After that, actually there was colonialism carried out by the British before Indonesia's independence. Although briefly, but enough to swallow many victims and various losses. Indeed, until the end of the 19th century colonialism was still visible in various parts of the world. This paper is qualitative, with a library research approach. The struggle of Muslims with colonialism in the field of education was when the Dutch discriminated against Islamic educational institutions (pesantren). In the field of the Dutch economy managed to make the Muslim economy slumped. At first the Muslim profession was located in the center of trade but was taken over by the Dutch by spreading false Hadith that "it is better to linger in the mosque than in the market. In the Dutch political sector, two methods were used to colonize Muslims. These methods are the method of ethical politics (reciprocity) and the politics of fighting sheep (devide et impera). Many Muslims, especially kings and sultans, chose the "safe way" to join the Netherlands because they considered the Dutch to have done a great job
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Bullock, Katherine. "Editorial." American Journal of Islam and Society 21, no. 3 (2004): i—iv. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v21i3.1769.
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This special issue was suggested to us by a reader during my term as AJISSbook review editor. Soon after 9/11, many bookstores and popular websites,among them www.amazon.com, stocked up on Islam-bashing books whosemain arguments were that Islam posed numerous threats to the United States,in particular, and to the West in general. Authors took umbrage with PresidentBush’s claim that the “war on terror” was not a war on Islam, and that, indeed,it was Islam that was the problem and the enemy of the modern age. Howabout making some scholarly responses to these books, our reader asked.I was initially of two minds, for these books were not academic treatises.Should an academic journal spend time on non-academic books? Onthe other hand, given how important these books were (and are) in shapingpublic opinion about Islam and the presence of Muslims in the West, itseemed essential that Muslim intellectuals should respond. To do nothing inthe face of the barrage of negative and hostile arguments ultimately seemedirresponsible. The Muslim community was under attack – spiritually andphysically. If there were no intellectual counter-arguments from a Muslimperspective, what could an uninformed and curious reader rely on to hearfrom the other side? A non-response by Muslims would count as affirmation,because the reader would have no alternative sources with which to thinkabout the issues being raised. Thus, we decided to provide scholarlyresponses to the Islam-bashing books from Muslim intellectuals (or non-Muslim scholars empathetic with Islam) that would do more than say “thesebooks are inflammatory” by providing reasoned analysis and argumentationas to why such books were not only wrong and misguided, but also that theywere actually inciting hatred toward Muslims.Not everyone agreed with our thinking, and some Muslim academicsfelt it would be a waste of their time to review (hence give unwarranted credenceto) nonacademic populist diatribes against Islam and Muslims. Othersembraced the project with enthusiasm. A few reviewers who had initiallyconsented found that in the end, they were unable to complete their assignmentsbecause they could not stomach such biased and non-academic books.When I became editor of AJISS, we decided to devote an entire issue toIslamophobia and not just review a few influential Islam-bashing books. Bythis stage, enough time had passed for it to become obvious that ...
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Diakov, Nikolai. "Islam in the Colonial Policy of France: from the Origins to the Fifth Republic." ISTORIYA 12, no. 5 (103) (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840015901-0.
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History of relations between France and the Islamic world goes back to the first centuries of Hijra, when the Franks first faced the Caliphate and its troops in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean. On the eve of the New times Paris had already developed its numerous contacts with Turkey, Iran and the Arab West — the Maghreb area. The conquest of Algeria (from 1830) formed a basis of the French colonial empire in Africa and Asia with the growing role of Islam in political activities and ambitions of Paris. Millions of Muslims in French colonies contributed to growth of political and economic progress of their metropoly with its pretensions to become a great Muslim power. Meanwhile, thousands of them lost their lives during two great world wars of the 20th century. Waves of immigration gave birth to an impressive Islamic community (‘umma), in France, reaching about a million of residents by the middle of the 20th century. With the growth of Muslim immigration from Africa and the Middle East a number of Muslims among the natives of France also augmented. By the end of the last century the Muslims formed as much as about 10 % of the whole population of France. The “French Islam” born at the dawn of the 20th century. after a century of its evolution became an important civilizational reality of Europe, at times more attractive for the local youth than traditional Christian values, or the new ideals, brought with the winds of globalism, multiculturalism and a “non-stop consumerism”.
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Ahmed, Ghyasuddin. "Causes and Consequences of Western Extreme Negativism against Islam Will Such Negativism Ever End? How? Why or Why Not?" IIUC Studies 9 (July 10, 2015): 161–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/iiucs.v9i0.24019.
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Human bad manners of blame games, corruptions, crimes, deceptions, dislikes, greed, hate and turns and twists divide people and create most problems in the society. Since the beginning of industrialization human bad manners have increased many folds in recent years and perhaps reached the highest level resulting in the demise of Soviet communism in early 1990s and the free market economy or capitalism in 2008. After communism Islam became the undeclared enemy of the West that led to the tragic events of terrorism on September 11, 2001. No doubt such heinous acts are absolutely unacceptable and unjust, these gave the few most influential and powerful people in the West to demonize Islam and dehumanize the Muslims for their vested interests. These are the tiny invisible interest groups of who come from different sectors of the society and they always benefit from societal chaos, conflicts, confusions and even wars. Justifiably the West went to war to punish and eliminate the terrorists ignoring totally the other side of story that made Muslim world hostile with the West the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. This is the major cause of Muslim dissatisfaction around the world. To show their anger and dissatisfaction with the USA we saw people dancing and showing their happiness and joy on the streets in the Middle East immediately after destruction of the Twin Towers after the 911 attacks! The truth on Muslim anger was best enumerated by the Pew Research Centers and in a few interviews to the media by a top ranking ex-CIA agent, Michael Scheuer who was assigned to monitor and track bin Laden. In one interview he says, We have yet to find a politician who is willing to tell the American people the truth on the causes that divide the Muslims and the West. Instead of seriously trying to resolve the differences between the Muslims and the West, those tiny but most powerful interest groups are heavily engaged more openly in slandering and smearing Islam and have launched propagandas 24/7 to destroy any good images and names that Islam ever had. This paper discusses the causes and consequences of the prevalence of extreme negativism against Islam in the West through a theory that he calls the Residual Rules. Two systemic models have also been developed to show the various linkages that led to such extreme negativism against Islam. President Clintons recent remark on the Middle East Conflict that Netanyahu killed the peace process and a large section of evangelical US Congressmen are making it impossible to end the conflict. The paper also raised many important issues and suggested few measures to improve relationships between the Muslims and the West.IIUC Studies Vol.9 December 2012: 161-186
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Kobeisy, Ahmed Nezar. "Portrait of the Islamic Scholar." American Journal of Islam and Society 16, no. 3 (1999): 65–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v16i3.2103.
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With the. growth in the number of departments, institutions, publicationsand scholarships dating to Islam and Muslims, concerns areincreasing over bias and misrepresentation of the Islamic faith and itssubscribers. Muslims tend to attribute this to two factors: Americaninstitutions rely mostly on non-Muslims to provide crucial informationpertaining to Islam; and most institutions are secular, so it is againsttheir policies and regulations to advocate that any religion holds theabsolute truth.Although these factors pose a real threat to the spread of correctIslamic knowledge, they by no means stand alone. While it is naturalfor Muslims to object to the idea of non-Muslims teaching Islambecause they lack familiarity with it, one is emmusly led to believethat the resolution of the. problem is in Muslims taking the task of teachingtheii religion into theii own bands. Two myths must be dispelled:first, that all Muslims a~ qualified to teach their religion; and second,proficiency in Islamic knowledge sufficiently qualifies a Muslim forthe challenging role of accurately transferring this knowledge to thosewhose perception is so different from hidher own.This article shows the diversity of the fields of study in which Islamand Muslims may be involved. either directly or indirectly. It thenexamines the. criteria set forth by many educational institutions fordetermining the qualifications for teaching in these fields. Becausehigher degrees awarded in pehent departments in American institutionsare not sufficiently educating theii recipients in Islamic knowledge,the majority of non-Muslim candidates are unqualified to tacklethe issues that involve Islam and Muslims. In an ever-changing world,the qualifications required to teach about Islam and Muslims must notbe merely based on Islamic knowledge. but must also encompass a proficiencyin global affairs. This immediately disqualifies the typicalMuslim scholar. A presenter of Islam must be capable of responding to the challenges of the time, place, and people, without violating the policiesand secular nature of the institution and without distorting or alteringthe religion.Since a real lasting solution is not presently in sight, some Islamiccommunities, in an attempt to put an end to bias and misrepresentation,have come up with quick fixes. This article describes how Muslimcommunities in Youngstown, Ohio, and Syracuse, New York, havebecome involved in educating their non-Muslim neighbors by responsiblycooperating with various local academic institutions. The authorhopes that this study will prove helpful to other communities ofMuslims and non-Muslims in their attempt to reach out to each other.
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Albarrán, Javier. "Holy War in Ibn Khaldūn." Journal of Medieval Worlds 1, no. 1 (2019): 55–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jmw.2019.100004.
Full textAbstract:
This article aims to compare the different conceptions of holy war in Islam and Christianity by way of its depiction by Muslim sources, and to examine if the Islamic context would have conceived of a war carried out by Christians, and therefore infidels, as a holy one. This leads to analysis of whether the Islamic idea of holy war could be understood as a transcultural one or if, on the contrary, its sole conception was limited to those actions carried out by Muslims. To that end, Ibn Khaldūn’s (d. 1406) Kitāb al-‘Ibar will be used as a case study, in which his famous Muqaddima serves as its introduction. The choice of this source is based on two considerations: it is one of the most important and influential historiographical works of the Islamic world; and Ibn Khaldūn maintains a universalist vision of history and its processes, and therefore specifically aims to be cross-cultural.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.465.
Full textAbstract:
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Esposito, John L. "Moderate Muslims." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (2005): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.465.
Full textAbstract:
The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.
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Klorman, Bat-Zion Eraqi. "Jewish and Muslim Messianism in Yemen." International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 2 (1990): 201–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800033389.
Full textAbstract:
The last three messianic claimants to appear in the Jewish diaspora appeared in Yemen in the 19th century. At this time and place the mutual influences of Jews and Muslims were notable both in messianic movements and in literary expression. Muslim society in Yemen was aware of the messianic tension among the Jews, and individual Muslims even took part in each of the known messianic movements. Conversely—and this is the subject of this article—Jewish society, at least on the popular level, was receptive to Muslim apocalyptic ideas and beliefs and integrated them into Jewish apocalyptic anticipations.The belief in messianism and the sharing of ideas on redemption or of the golden age in the eschatological era (i.e., at the End of Time) have long been maintained by the Jews. Some of the concepts that served as paradigms for later messianic speculations were derived from the Bible. For instance, the concept of rescue—the rescue by God of the Israelites from slavery in Egypt—became the example of God's intervention to help his people and mirrored the rescue at the End of Days. Likewise, the Davidic kingdom was believed to be the fulfillment of an ancient covenant between God and the Israelites—and, therefore, the Davidic kingdom became in the history of Jewish messianism the paradigm for how the future kingdom would be, how the covenant would be fulfilled. Also, the term “messiah” (mashiah)—i.e., the anointed one—was originally the official title for the Davidic kings and the early root for the later messiah; hence, it would be a Davidic descendant who would lead the Jews into the messianic age.
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Tottoli, Roberto. "The Oxford Handbook of American Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 32, no. 4 (2015): 97–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v32i4.1005.
Full textAbstract:
Shortly after publishing Jocelyne Cesari’s edited Handbook of European Islam(Oxford University Press: 2014), Oxford University Press more or less roundsoff the topic of Muslims in the western world with this volume on the UnitedStates. The editors, Yvonne Y. Haddad and Jane I Smith, have made amplecontributions on this topic during the last twenty years at least. This volume,to some extent, updates their previous works that have followed the evolutionand changes seen by the country’s Muslim communities (e.g., Muslim Communitiesin North America [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994], edited by both, andThe Muslims of America [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], editedby Haddad). This may not be the last step in this direction, but it is certainlythe most comprehensive and ambitious one so far.The titles of their previous works, and indeed of this volume, touch on apreliminary problem. As a matter of fact, the volume should have borne thetitle Islam in the USA, since Central and Latin America and even Canada arenot mentioned. Many reasons, in any case, justify this circumscribed focus.As rightly pointed out in the “Introduction” (p. 4), American Islam is the mostheterogeneous in the world and no doubt constitutes the main issue when dealingwith Islam in North, Central, and South America. It is also the most heterogeneousand the most complex. As a matter of fact, these complex lines ofevolution of the West’s Islamic communities are exemplified by a simple comparisonbetween the two handbooks. Whereas Cesari’s edited European Islamwas described with an extensive first part that introduced the history and evolutionof Muslim communities in European countries plus some thematicchapters, in this book the approach is different.The thirty chapters deal with a number of specific topics identified assignificant, not to say fundamental, and are, furthermore, organized in three ...
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CAMP, KATHRYN. "ANA ECHEVARRÍA, The Fortress of Faith: The Attitudes Towards Muslims in Fifteenth Century Spain, Medieval Iberian Peninsula, vol. 12 (Leiden, Boston, Cologne: E. J. Brill 1999). Pp. 254. $108 cloth." International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 3 (2001): 450–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074380122306x.
Full textAbstract:
In The Fortress of Faith: The Attitudes Towards Muslims in Fifteenth Century Spain, Ana Echevarría presents a study of four mid-15th-century texts and argues that their polemical tone toward the Muslim world was inspired by contemporary historical events and revealed a Christian Spain preparing itself to end Muslim rule on the Iberian Peninsula. She argues that the events of 1450–70 are key to understanding Fernando and Isabel's renewed march against Granada in 1474 and that ecclesiastical literature of this time—as a manifestation of a “frontier church”—can provide a glimpse of the ideas common at court and among the clergy. At the center of her book are the works of three theologians (Juan de Segovia, Alonso de Espina, and Juan de Torquemada) and one layman (the Aragonese Pedro de Cavallería)—all written between 1450 and 1461—and Echevarría juxtaposes these texts with a wide selection of similar treatises written in Spain and elsewhere since the Muslim invasion of Iberia in 711. For each of her four primary texts, she provides the historical context of the author's life as well as an analysis of each work's style, sources, symbolism, and mode of argumentation against Islam (which, in general, involved allegations about the illegitimacy of the Muslim Prophet, holy text, or tenets). She then compares the views of these authors with the legal norms governing interactions among Muslims, Christians, and Jews in 15th-century Spain and concludes that both reveal an “evolution towards intolerance and violence which was common to the society and its rulers” and that impelled the eventually successful conquest of Granada.
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Rominger, Chris. "Debating the “Jewish Question” in Tunisia." Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 46, no. 3 (2020): 31–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/hrrh.2020.460303.
Full textAbstract:
In Tunisia, the end of World War I and the return of Muslims and European settlers from the front brought attacks against local Jews who had been exempt from conscription under French colonial rule. French commentators spoke of a “Jewish question” fueled by Muslim fanaticism and Jewish profiteering, obscuring their own divisive attitudes and policies. Colonial archives and the popular press, however, reveal that this was far from a monolithic sectarian concern. Jews responded to violence with a variety of transnational political visions. I explore how some Jews reaffirmed their loyalty to France, while others highlighted colonial hypocrisies. Others turned to solutions such as US protection or the Zionist movement. This Tunisian story, with its unique colonial arrangement and legal ambiguities, foregrounds an oft-overlooked North African perspective on the global questions of identity, nationalisms, and minority politics at the end of World War I.
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El-Awaisi, Khalid, and Cuma Yavuz. "The Future of Al-Aqsa Mosque In the Light Of Trump’s Deal of the Century." Transformation of Turkey’s Defense Industry: Causes, Context and Consequences 22, Summer 2020 (2020): 215–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.25253/99.2020223.12.
Full textAbstract:
U.S. President Donald Trump declared his long-awaited and debated Middle East ‘peace plan,’ the so-called ‘deal of the century,’ in January 2020, standing alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He promised to keep Jerusalem as Israel's undivided and united capital with recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. With regards to al-Aqsa Mosque, the plan puts forth the Zionist prospect and point of view, while undermining the Islamic importance of the area. It reduces the area of al-Aqsa Mosque to one single building of the Mosque’s compound and in practical terms, it intends that the whole area of al-Aqsa Mosque (al-Haram al-Sharif) be transformed to allow open access for prayer for visitors of all faiths and thus to end Muslim control over the site of one of Islam’s holiest mosques. The plan would, in practice, lead to three main changes that would undo the centuries-old status quo completely: the transfer of the site to Israeli sovereignty, the repealing of Jordan's apparent custodianship over it, and the expiry of the ban on non-Muslim prayer. This, in turn, would give Israel full control over the site of al-Aqsa Mosque compound, something it could not achieve during the 1967 occupation of the city. Such changes would not only mean that Muslims lose further access to their mosque, but would also allow people of other faiths, particularly Jews, to share the site with Muslims in preparation for a full Jewish monopoly over the site and the building of a Jewish temple on its site.
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Bergholz, Max. "The Strange Silence." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 24, no. 3 (2010): 408–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325409360212.
Full textAbstract:
Newly available documentation from the State Archive of Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that the majority of sites where Muslim civilians were killed during the Second World War remained unmarked as late as the mid-1980s. The existing scholarship, most of which argues that Yugoslavia’s communist regime sought to “de-ethnicize” the remembrance of all of the interethnic violence of the war, has failed to notice and explain this apparent bias against Muslim civilian war victims. This article seeks to answer the question of why so many sites in Bosnia-Herzegovina where Muslim civilians were killed remained unmarked after the war. It does so through the reconstruction and analysis of the wartime and postwar history of Kulen Vakuf, a small town located in northwestern Bosnia. The analysis of the dynamics of mass killing in the region reveals that the communist-led Partisan movement absorbed large numbers of Serbian insurgents who had murdered Muslims earlier in the war. The transformation of the perpetrators of the massacres into Partisans created a postwar context in which the authorities, to avoid implicating insurgents-turned-Partisans as war criminals, and the Muslim survivors, out of fear of retribution and a desire to move on, agreed to stay silent about the killings. The end result was the absence of monuments for the victims.
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Salman, Syed Ahmed, Hafiz Majdi Ab. Rashid, and Sheila Nu Nu Htay. "The impact of internal forces on acceptance of takaful by insurance policy-holders in India." Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research 9, no. 5 (2018): 673–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jiabr-03-2016-0027.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose Insurance is a modern risk-management tool. Although the idea is novel, its practice is not free of interest, uncertainty and elements of gambling. Takaful has been introduced as an alternative to modern insurance. India has an established insurance industry, and although the country has the second largest Muslim population in the world, takaful has not been introduced there. Moreover, no research has examined how internal forces affect policy-holders to buy new insurance products such as takaful in India. This study aims to examine whether internal factors influence individual insurance policy-holders to open up to takaful. As internal factors reflect the innovative nature of policy-holders, this paper seeks to determine whether there is significant difference in the innovative nature of two independent sample groups (e.g. between Muslims and non-Muslims) in participating in takaful. Design/methodology/approach New product adoption theory is used in developing the hypotheses and a questionnaire. Snowball sampling method is used in this survey, with a sample size of 909 respondents, including Muslim and non-Muslim policy-holders. The internal forces that encourage potential policy-holders to participate in takaful is the independent variable here, while the respondents’ actual willingness to participate in takaful is the dependent variable. Religion and level of education are used as control variables, and regression and T-tests are performed to analyze the data. Findings Results show that the internal factors have significant impact at 1 per cent on the acceptance of takaful by policy-holders. There is also a significant difference in the innovative nature between Muslims and non-Muslims. Mean values from the T-test show that Muslims are more innovative than non-Muslims in India, offering a good sign for India to start offering takaful, as Muslims could be the core customer base. Research limitations/implications This study focuses on internal factors influencing individual policy-holders’ willingness to participate in takaful. The findings can be the starting point for future research exploring the influence of external factors on such willingness to participate with potential benefits to local authorities, investors, insurance companies and the public in India. Originality/value This study provides crucial information about the demand side of takaful in India. The innovative nature of Indian policy-holders signals positive potential for operators to offer takaful in India and to concerned regulatory bodies to expedite its introduction to the market.
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Afroz, Sultana. "The Role of Islam in the Abolition of Slavery and in the Development of British Capitalism." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 29, no. 1 (2012): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v29i1.326.
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West Indian scholars have overlooked the role played by the Muslim leadership in West Africa in bringing an end to the transatlantic trade in Africans. The jihād movements in West Africa in the late eighteenth century gave political unity to West Africa challenging the collaboration of European trade in Africans with the pagan slave traders. West Indian historiography, while emphasizing European abolitionist movements, ignores the Islamic unity (tawhīd) of humankind, which brought together many ethnically heterogeneous enslaved African Muslims to successfully challenge the West Indian plantation system. The exploitation of the human resources and the immense wealth of the then Moghul India and Imperial China by British colonialism helped develop the British industrial capitalism, which controlled most of the world until the end of World War II. The security of the British industrial capitalist complex could no longer depend on the small-scale West Indian plantation economies but on the large-scale economies of Asia protected by the British imperial forces under the British imperial flag.