Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Napolean Wars'

History
Ph.D.
This dissertation explores the influence of late eighteenth-century British imperial and global paradigms of thought on the formation of British policy and strategy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It argues that British imperial interests exerted a consistent influence on British strategic decision making through the personal advocacy of political leaders, institutional memory within the British government, and in the form of a traditional strain of a widely-embraced British imperial-maritime ideology that became more vehement as the conflict progressed. The work can be broken into two basic sections. The first section focuses on the formation of strategy within the British government of William Pitt the Younger during the French Revolutionary Wars from the declaration of war in February 1793 until early 1801. During this phase of the Anglo-French conflict, British ministers struggled to come to terms with the nature of the threat posed by revolutionary ideology in France, and lacked strategic consistency due to acute cabinet-level debates over continental versus imperial strategies. The latter half of the work assesses Britain’s response to the challenges presented by Napoleonic France. Beginning with the debates surrounding Anglo-French peace negotiations in late 1801, the British increasingly came to define Napoleonic France as a regime harboring imperial aspirations that represented an explicit threat to British imperial interests. By defining the Napoleonic regime as an aspirational imperial power, British opponents of the Peace of Amiens provided the intellectual framework for the hegemonic struggle between land and sea powers that would define the Anglo-French struggle until its conclusion in June 1815. While Britain ultimately proved successful in defeating France in Europe, the expanse of the conflict also exposed the strengths and weaknesses of British force projection outside of Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Temple University--Theses

Existing studies of popular culture and popular politics in the long eighteenth century over-favour either the ‘culture’ or the ‘politics’. This thesis contributes to debates on the making of both national and class identity in Britain via intensive analysis of popular song culture, in the context of the Napoleonic Wars. Portrayals of Napoleon himself are used to shape the thesis’ source material and the forms of discussion. It argues for the necessity of sympathetic, informed contextualisation of political issues within contemporary cultural processes: that an understanding of the composition/production and performance/ consumption of song is a prerequisite of determining songs’ relevance and reception. In so doing, it uncovers a nuanced array of attitudes towards both Napoleon and British patriotism, of unsuspected breadth, assertiveness, and idiosyncrasy. The thesis is divided into two stages of argument. Part I consists of a close and contextualised reading of songs as literary and musical objects. Chapter One, after close historiographical engagement that moves to a focus on Colley’s Britons and revisionist arguments about British society, discusses those songs originating after Waterloo. Chapter Two considers songs from 1797-1805. Chapter Three considers songs from 1806-15. Part II builds upon the themes and conclusions of Part I by situating these songs within a lived context. Chapter Four looks at the role of songwriters and printers; Chapter Five at singers; Chapter Six at audiences and reception. Chapter Seven elaborates the overall argument in a synoptic case study of Newcastle. The conclusion is followed by an appendix, listing the songs most pertinent to the thesis, giving additional bibliographical information. A hard copy (USB) of recordings of a representative selection of these songs is also included. These appendices reinforce the thesis’ methodology: to consider songs, not as passive evidence of expression, but as active, dynamic objects.

The Austrian army played a crucial role in Napoleon's decisive defeat during the War of the Sixth Coalition. Often considered a staid, hidebound institution, the army showed considerable adaptation in a time that witnessed a revolution in the art of war. In particular, changes made after defeat in the War of the Fifth Coalition demonstrate the modernity of the army. It embraced the key features of the new revolutionary way of war, including mass mobilization, a strategy of annihilation, and tactics based on deep echelonment, mobility, and the flexible use of varied formations. While the Austrians did not achieve the compromise peace they desired in 1814, this represented a political failing rather than a military one. Nevertheless, the Austrian army was critical in securing the century of general European peace that lasted until the dawn of the Great War.

A la rupture de la paix d’Amiens, le Premier Consul retient en otage les Britanniques présents sur le sol de la France en réponse au gouvernement britannique qui détient aussi des Français. Mais la raison est avant tout économique. Les Anglais sont séparés des autres prisonniers de guerre et ne servent que dans les domaines où ils excellent comme les filatures. Leur dénombrement s’avère difficile, à cause de documents incomplets ou de mutations trop fréquentes. Les dépôts, au nombre de quatre en 1803, passent à douze en 1810, puis à quinze à de la fin des hostilités.La vie en société s’organise et les prisonniers ont tendance à recréer la vie « à l’anglaise » particulièrement festive dans divers dépôts. Mais les jeux d’argent sèment la discorde et entraînent les duels et les dettes. Les évasions nombreuses provoquent la colère du Ministère de la guerre. Les échanges sont rares et blessés et invalides font l’objet de tractations pour les échanges.La santé reste un problème majeur, la qualité de la nourriture est douteuse. La mortalité est importante.Hormis les mariages et les naissances, ils ont laissé peu de choses puisqu’ils n’ont rien bâti mais demeure le souvenir
After the breaking off of the Peace of Amiens, the Premier Consul keeps the British who were present on the French ground as hostages as a reply to the British Government who keeps also French prisoners. But the true reason is more economical. The British prisoners are treated differently from prisoners of war and are only used in what is useful, such as spinning factories.Having a precise census of the British population in the depots was difficult: the documents are incomplete and the transfers from depot to depot too often. There were four depots at the beginning but it went to twelve in 1810 and 15 by the end of the war.Social life is organized and the prisoners tend to recreate the “British way of life” with much rejoicing in the various depots. But money games bring quarrels and debts. Escapes arises hunger in the French War Ministry. Exchanges are seldom and wounded and disabled men are part of these exchanges. Health remains a major problem and food is of poor quality. Death rate is severe. Except weddings and births, they have not left anything as they did not build but remembrance is still there

Thesis (M.A.)--Cleveland State University, 2008.
Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Apr. 16, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 48-50). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center. Also available in print.

Napoleon’s defeat in 1813 generates a number of explanations from historians regarding why he lost this epic campaign which ultimately resulted in France losing control over the German states. Scholars discussing the French marshalate of the Napoleonic era frequently assert that these generals could not win battles without the emperor present. Accustomed to assuming a subordinate role under Bonaparte’s direct supervision, these commanders faltered when deprived of the strong hand of the master. This thesis contributes to this historiographical argument by positing that the pre-professional nature of Napoleon’s marshalate precluded them from adapting to the evolving nature of warfare during the First French Empire. Emerging from non-military backgrounds and deriving their capabilities solely from practical experience, the marshals failed to succeed at endeavors outside of their capacity. An examination of the military administration of the Old Regime, the effects of the French Revolution on the French generalate, and the circumstances under which Bonaparte labored when creating the imperial marshalate demonstrates that issues systemic to the French high command contributed to French defeat in 1813. This thesis also provides evidence that Napoleon understood this problem and attempted to better prepare his marshals for independent command by instructing them in his way of war during the 1813 campaign.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo desenvolver uma análise comparada da representação de Napoleão Bonaparte por meio do estudo da obra de Lev Tolstói, Guerra e paz, e dos exemplares da Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro. Para tanto, foi realizado o mapeamento de tais escritos com a finalidade de identificar as referências à figura de Napoleão e o contexto em que estão inseridas. Desta maneira, foi possível identificar as aproximações e os afastamentos entre os dois tipos de representações de Napoleão e a dimensão do mito napoleônico no imaginário de russos e luso-brasileiros.
This work aims to develop a comparative analysis of Napoleon Bonaparte representation through the study of Lev Tolstoys work, War and Peace, and Gazeta do Rio de Janeiros issues. Therefore, the mapping of such writings was done in order to find references to Napoleons figure and the context in which they are inserted. Thus, it was possible to identify the approaches and departures between two types of Napoleons representations and the size of Napoleonic myth in the minds of Russians and Portuguese-Brazilians.

Officier de cavalerie originaire de la noblesse picarde, Armand de Caulaincourt (1773-1827) gravit rapidement tous les échelons de la cour consulaire puis impériale, devenant en 1804 grand-écuyer de l’Empire. Mais, malgré l’importance de ses fonctions curiales, Napoléon le destine à une carrière de diplomate. Après différentes missions, il le nomme ambassadeur de France en Russie, à la fin de l’année 1807. Fervent partisan de l’alliance de Tilsit, Caulaincourt participe à toutes les grandes négociations franco-russes mais doit assister à la lente dégradation des relations entre les deux empires. À son retour à Paris en 1811, son bilan politique est maigre. Sa défense opiniâtre du tsar Alexandre, mais surtout son opposition à la campagne militaire qui se prépare, irritent Napoléon. Elles lui permettent toutefois d’acquérir une nouvelle stature après le désastre de Russie : pour ses contemporains Caulaincourt devient l’« homme de la paix ». Une image que Napoléon réutilise lorsqu’il le charge de le représenter aux congrès de Prague (1813) et de Châtillon (1814). Le duc de Vicence, devenu ministre des Relations extérieures, ne parvient pas à faire accepter la paix ; il lui faut finalement négocier l’abdication de Napoléon et renoncer, après les Cent-Jours, à toute carrière politique. Cette étude, qui s’appuie sur les archives personnelles de Caulaincourt et ses célèbres Mémoires, entend redonner toute son importance à cette figure majeure du Premier Empire, en insistant sur son action et sa pensée dans le domaine de la diplomatie. L’exemple de ce parcours devant permettre de contribuer à reconsidérer et réévaluer le rôle du personnel diplomatique napoléonien
A cavalry officer born into Picardy's landed gentry, Armand de Caulaincourt rose rapidly through the ranks of the consular, and later the imperial court, to become in 1804 Grand Squire of the Empire. However, notwithstanding the importance of his curial functions, Napoleon destined him to a diplomatic career. After several missions, he was appointed as Ambassador of France to Russia (1807). Caulaincourt took part in all the major negotiations between France and Russia, but was forced to witness a slow breakdown in relations between the two Empires. At the time of his return to Paris in 1811, his political accomplishments were unimpressive. His stalwart defense of Tsar Alexander, and especially his opposition to the upcoming military campaign, were an irritation to Napoleon. Nevertheless, these stances allowed him to gain new stature after the disaster in Russia : in the eyes of his contemporaries, he became the “Peacemaker”, an image Napoleon used to his advantage by appointing him his representative at the congresses in Prague (1813) and in Châtillon (1814). The Duke of Vicenza, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not, however, broker an agreement in favour of peace : he was forced to negotiate Napoleon's abdication and to give up any hope of political career after the Hundred Days. This study, based on Caulaincourt's personal records and famous Memoirs, aims at restoring a major figure of the First French Empire to his due importance, while focusing on his action and thought in the field of diplomacy. The exemplary value of his career should also allow historians to reconsider and reevaluate the role of Napoleon's diplomatic personnel

Officier de cavalerie originaire de la noblesse picarde, Armand de Caulaincourt (1773-1827) gravit rapidement tous les échelons de la cour consulaire puis impériale, devenant en 1804 grand-écuyer de l’Empire. Mais, malgré l’importance de ses fonctions curiales, Napoléon le destine à une carrière de diplomate. Après différentes missions, il le nomme ambassadeur de France en Russie, à la fin de l’année 1807. Fervent partisan de l’alliance de Tilsit, Caulaincourt participe à toutes les grandes négociations franco-russes mais doit assister à la lente dégradation des relations entre les deux empires. À son retour à Paris en 1811, son bilan politique est maigre. Sa défense opiniâtre du tsar Alexandre, mais surtout son opposition à la campagne militaire qui se prépare, irritent Napoléon. Elles lui permettent toutefois d’acquérir une nouvelle stature après le désastre de Russie : pour ses contemporains Caulaincourt devient l’« homme de la paix ». Une image que Napoléon réutilise lorsqu’il le charge de le représenter aux congrès de Prague (1813) et de Châtillon (1814). Le duc de Vicence, devenu ministre des Relations extérieures, ne parvient pas à faire accepter la paix ; il lui faut finalement négocier l’abdication de Napoléon et renoncer, après les Cent-Jours, à toute carrière politique. Cette étude, qui s’appuie sur les archives personnelles de Caulaincourt et ses célèbres Mémoires, entend redonner toute son importance à cette figure majeure du Premier Empire, en insistant sur son action et sa pensée dans le domaine de la diplomatie. L’exemple de ce parcours devant permettre de contribuer à reconsidérer et réévaluer le rôle du personnel diplomatique napoléonien
A cavalry officer born into Picardy's landed gentry, Armand de Caulaincourt rose rapidly through the ranks of the consular, and later the imperial court, to become in 1804 Grand Squire of the Empire. However, notwithstanding the importance of his curial functions, Napoleon destined him to a diplomatic career. After several missions, he was appointed as Ambassador of France to Russia (1807). Caulaincourt took part in all the major negotiations between France and Russia, but was forced to witness a slow breakdown in relations between the two Empires. At the time of his return to Paris in 1811, his political accomplishments were unimpressive. His stalwart defense of Tsar Alexander, and especially his opposition to the upcoming military campaign, were an irritation to Napoleon. Nevertheless, these stances allowed him to gain new stature after the disaster in Russia : in the eyes of his contemporaries, he became the “Peacemaker”, an image Napoleon used to his advantage by appointing him his representative at the congresses in Prague (1813) and in Châtillon (1814). The Duke of Vicenza, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not, however, broker an agreement in favour of peace : he was forced to negotiate Napoleon's abdication and to give up any hope of political career after the Hundred Days. This study, based on Caulaincourt's personal records and famous Memoirs, aims at restoring a major figure of the First French Empire to his due importance, while focusing on his action and thought in the field of diplomacy. The exemplary value of his career should also allow historians to reconsider and reevaluate the role of Napoleon's diplomatic personnel

On 1 February 1793, the National Convention of Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands, expanding the list of France's enemies in the War of the First Coalition. Although British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had predicted fifteen years of peace one year earlier, the French declaration of war initiated nearly a quarter century of war between Britain and France with only a brief respite during the Peace of Amiens. Britain entered the war amid both a nadir in British diplomacy and internal political divisions over the direction of British foreign policy. After becoming prime minister in 1783 in the aftermath of the War of American Independence, Pitt pursued financial and naval reform to recover British strength and cautious interventionism to end Britain's diplomatic isolation in Europe. He hoped to create a collective security system based on the principles of the territorial status quo, trade agreements, neutral rights, and resolution of diplomatic disputes through mediation - armed mediation if necessary. While his domestic measures largely met with success, Pitt's foreign policy suffered from a paucity of like-minded allies, contradictions between traditional hostility to France and emergent opposition to Russian expansion, Britain's limited ability to project power on the continent, and the even more limited will of Parliament to support such interventionism. Nevertheless, Pitt's collective security goal continued to shape British strategy in the War of the First Coalition, and the same challenges continued to plague the British war effort. This led to failure in the war and left the British fighting on alone after the Treaty of Campo Formio secured peace between France and its last continental foe, Austria, on 18 October 1797.

During the Peninsular War (1808-1814) the Spanish launched an unprecedented guerrilla insurgency that undermined Napoleon’s grip on that state. The advent of this novel and illegal “system” of warfare ushered in an era of military studies on the use of unconventional strategies in military campaigns – and changed the modern rules of war. A generation later during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), Henry Halleck and Winfield Scott used the knowledge from the Peninsular War to implement an innovative “conciliatory” counterinsurgency program directed at the Mexican people – which set the U.S. doctrinal standard informing an international consensus on the proper conduct for occupation. The Spanish war against the French influenced both belligerents in Mexico: the Mexicans tried to mount a guerrilla war modeled along Spanish lines, and the Americans adapted their tactics, rules, and laws of war between 1808 to 1848 to avoid the disastrous imperial overreach exemplified by the French in Spain.
Durante la Guerra de la Independencia (1808-1814), los españoles lanzaron una insurgencia guerrillera sin precedentes que socavó el control de Napoleón sobre ese estado. El advenimiento de este “sistema” de guerra novedoso e ilegal marcó el comienzo de una era de estudios militares sobre el uso de estrategias no convencionales en campañas militares, y cambió las reglas modernas de la guerra. Una generación más tarde, durante la Guerra México-Estadounidense (1846-1848), Henry Halleck y Winfield Scott utilizaron el conocimiento de la Guerra Peninsular para implementar un innovador programa de contrainsurgencia "conciliador" dirigido al pueblo mexicano, que estableció el estándar doctrinal de los Estados Unidos informando a un consenso internacional sobre la conducta adecuada para la ocupación. La guerra española contra los franceses influyó en ambos beligerantes en México: los mexicanos intentaron montar una guerra de guerrillas siguiendo el modelo español, y los estadounidenses adaptaron sus tácticas, reglas y leyes de guerra entre 1808 y 1848 para evitar la desastrosa extralimitación imperial ejemplificada por los franceses en españa.

L’esercito italiano e la conquista della Catalogna (1808-1811) Uno studio di Military Effectiveness nell’Europa napoleonica Settori scientifico-disciplinari SPS/03 – M-STO/02 La ricerca ha lo scopo di ricostruire e valutare l’effettività militare dell’esercito italiano al servizio di Napoleone I. In primo luogo attraverso un’analisi statistica e strategica della costruzione, e del successivo impiego, dell’istituzione militare del Regno d’Italia durante gli anni della sua esistenza (1805-14); successivamente, è stato scelto un caso di studi particolarmente significativo, come la campagna di Catalogna (1808-11, nel contesto della guerra di Indipendenza spagnola), per poter valutare il contributo operazionale e tattico dei corpi inviati dal governo di Milano e la loro integrazione con l’apparato militare complessivo del Primo Impero. La tesi ha voluto rispondere alla mancanza di studi sul comportamento in guerra dell’esercito italiano e, allo stesso tempo, introdurre nella storiografia militare italiana la metodologia di studi, d’origine anglosassone e ormai di tradizione trentennale, di Military Effectiveness. La ricerca si è primariamente basata, oltre che sulla copiosa memorialistica a stampa italiana e francese, sulla documentazione d’archivio della Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales di Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Parigi), del Ministère de la Guerre francese (Service historique de la Défence, di Vincennes, Parigi) e del Ministero della Guerra del Regno d’Italia (Archivio di Stato di Milano). Dal punto di vista dei risultati è stato possibile verificare come l’esercito italiano abbia rappresentato, per Bonaparte, uno strumento duttile e di facile impiego, pur in un contesto di sostanziale marginalità numerica complessiva di fronte alle altre (e cospicue) forze messe in campo da parte dell’Impero e dei suoi altri Stati satellite e alleati. Per quanto riguarda la campagna di conquista della Catalogna è stato invece possibile appurare il fondamentale contributo dato dal contingente italiano, sotto i punti di vista operazionale e tattico, per la buona riuscita dell’invasione; questo primariamente grazie alle elevate caratteristiche generali mostrate dallo stesso, ma anche per peculiarità disciplinari e organizzative che resero i corpi italiani adatti a operazioni particolarmente aggressive.
The Italian Army and the Conquest of Catalonia (1808-1811) A Study of Military Effectiveness in Napoleonic Europe Academic Fields and Disciplines SPS/03 – M-STO/02 The research has the purpose of reconstruct and evaluate the military effectiveness of the Italian Army existed under the reign of Napoleon I. Firstly through a statistic and strategic analysis of the development, and the following deployment, of the military institution of the Kingdom of Italy in the years of its existence (1805-14). Afterwards, a particularly significant case study was chosen, as the campaign of Catalonia (1808-11, in the context of the Peninsular War), in order to assess the operational and tactical contribution of the regiments sent by the Government of Milan and their integration in the overall military apparatus of the First Empire. The thesis wanted to respond to the lack of studies on the Italian army’s behavior in war and, at the same time, to introduce the methodology of the Military Effectiveness Studies (of British and American origin and, by now, enriched by a thirty-year old tradition) in the Italian historiography. The research is primarily based, besides the numerous memoirs of the Italian and French veterans, on the archive documentation of the Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales of Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris), of the French Ministère de la Guerre (Service historique de la Défence, of Vincennes, Paris) and of the Italian Ministero della Guerra (Archivio di Stato di Milano). About the results, it has been verified how the Italian army has become a flexible and suitable instrument for Bonaparte, albeit in a context of substantial overall numerical marginality in comparison to the heterogeneous forces available to the Empire and its others satellites and allied states. Regarding the campaign of Catalonia, instead, it was possible to ascertain the fundamental contribution of the Italian regiments, in an operational and tactical perspective, for the success of the invasion. This was primarily due to the excellent general characteristics shown by the expeditionary force, but also to disciplinary and organizational peculiarities that have made the Italian corps suitable for particularly aggressive operations.

No
Napoleon: The End of Glory tells the story of the dramatic two years that led to Napoleon's abdication in April 1814. Though crucial to European history, they remain strangely neglected, lying between the two much better-known landmarks of the retreat from Moscow and the battle of Waterloo. Yet this short period saw both Napoleon's loss of his European empire, and of his control over France itself. In 1813 the massive battle of Leipzig - the bloodiest in modern history before the first day of the Somme - forced his armies back to the Rhine. The next year, after a brilliant campaign against overwhelming odds, Napoleon was forced to abdicate and exiled to Elba. He regained his throne the following year, for just a hundred days, in a doomed adventure whose defeat at Waterloo was predictable. The most fascinating - and least-known - aspect of these years is that at several key points Napoleon's enemies offered him peace terms that would have allowed him to keep his throne, if not his empire, a policy inspired by the brilliant and devious Austrian foreign minister Metternich. Napoleon: The End of Glory sheds fascinating new light on Napoleon, Metternich, and many other key figures and events in this dramatic period of European history, drawing on previously unused archives in France, Austria, and the Czech Republic. Through these it seeks to answer the most important question of all - why, instead of accepting a compromise, Napoleon chose to gamble on total victory at the risk of utter defeat?
Leverhulme Trust

No
Joseph Lainé contribua de façon remarquable à la chute du Premier Empire – et à deux reprises. Premièrement, il dénonça la politique guerrière de Napoléon et prôna la paix immédiate comme député au Corps législatif en décembre 1813. Deuxièmement, ayant en conséquence encouru la fureur de l’empereur et revenu à sa Gironde natale, il collabora activement à la Déclaration de Bordeaux en faveur des Bourbons en mars 1814. Il faut constater, cependant, que l’action de Lainé en 1814 n’eut pas l’importance de premier plan que celle du comte Lynch et des Chevaliers de la Foi ; sa contribution vint après, avec l’organisation de la nouvelle administration royaliste dans la ville et dans le département. Ce que je soulignerai ici, par contre, c’est l’opposition très significative et bien courageuse de Lainé à Napoléon au sein du Corps législatif l’année précédente, qui marqua une étape majeure dans l’écroulement du régime impérial.

no
The eight-hour meeting at Dresden between Napoleon and Metternich on 26th June 1813 is a famous moment in modern French and European history. It marked a decisive stage in Austria’s tortuous path from ally to enemy of France, and thus played a crucial part in Napoleon’s downfall. Yet it still remains unclear exactly what transpired during the interview—the three published accounts, two by Metternich himself and one by Napoleon’s secretary Baron Fain, are contradictory and incomplete. There are, however, two further accounts of the Dresden meeting, one unpublished, the other almost completely neglected since its publication in 1933. The first is a revealing letter from Metternich to his wife Eleonore two days after the interview. The second is a narrative of the meeting taken down from Napoleon’s own words by his Grand Equerry Caulaincourt just a few hours after it ended. This sheds important new light on some of the key issues discussed. In particular, it clarifies the central question of whether or not Metternich offered concrete peace terms to Napoleon. Finally, the question of how far, if at all, the wider French public supported Napoleon’s determination not to conclude a ‘dishonourable’ peace in 1813 is examined.

This diploma thesis studies in depth the progress and endings of both Napoleon's reigns in 1814 and 1815. The first chapter deals with belligerent campaigns in the beginning of 1814, with the first Napoleon's abdication and his deportation to Elba. His exile there is examined in the second chapter which shows his living on a small island in the Mediterranean sea. The third chapter takes place on the Continent again and describes Bonaparte's escape and his sequential armament within France including the view on Allies' forces and problems in Naples. The fourth chapter is genuinely military for it examines number of forces on both sides and mentions all three important battles. The last, fifth, chapter looks at the second Napoleon's abdication, at interlude since his departure for the South, entrance of Allies into Francie and return of Louis XVIII until Bonaparte's final embarking on a British vessel and his deportation to the island of Saint Helena. Key words: Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor, abdication, Elba island, The Congress of Vienna, Quatre Bras, Ligny, Waterloo, Gebhard von Blücher, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, Joseph Fouché, Louis XVIII

Le peintre, soldat et mémorialiste Louis-François Lejeune (1775-1848) entendait faire de son corpus de peintures de bataille et de ses Souvenirs d’un officier de l’Empire (1851) des témoignages historiques de la période napoléonienne, destinés à la postérité. Or, cette conjugaison entre peintures et mémoires renvoie aussi à la dualité médiale de la propagande napoléonienne, qui diffuse un récit unique des événements militaires à l’aide d’organes d’information inédits tels que les Bulletins de la Grande Armée. Ce récit, déjà médiatisé comme étant historique, est repris en images par le mécénat impérial. Ce mémoire vise à démontrer comment Lejeune contribue à ce récit historicisant, d’abord à un niveau individuel en construisant son identité par rapport à sa participation aux guerres napoléoniennes, puis aussi à un niveau étatique. Son Bivouac d’Austerlitz, présenté au Salon de 1808, est une commande du gouvernement. Il sera question de la façon dont ce tableau de Lejeune s’insère d’abord dans sa carrière, ensuite dans son corpus de peintures de bataille, puis finalement dans le récit napoléonien sur Austerlitz. La forme épisodique du tableau, empruntée à la ligne narrative du 30e bulletin de la Grande Armée, où Napoléon rapporte la victoire d’Austerlitz, peut s’expliquer par la complémentarité voulue entre récit textuel et visuel. Ce tableau contribue ainsi à la construction historique de la bataille. Au milieu des transformations profondes du monde académique et de la hiérarchie des genres, la dualité peintre-soldat de Lejeune répond en tous points à la vocation historique attribuée à la peinture sous Napoléon.
Painter, soldier, and memorialist Louis-François Lejeune (1775-1848) conceived his battle paintings and his memoirs, Souvenirs d’un officier de l’Empire (1851), as historical testimonies of the Napoleonic period, destined for posterity. This twinning of paintings and memoirs mirrors the duality of Napoleonic propaganda as a whole, which disseminates a single version of military events with the help of unprecedented information tools such as the Bulletins de la Grande Armée. This written narrative, already thought of as historical, is picked up again in the paintings commissioned by the government. This master’s thesis argues that Lejeune contributes in a unique way to this historical narrative, first at an individual level by constructing his identity from his participation in the Napoleonic wars, and also at a state level. His Bivouac d’Austerlitz, presented at the 1808 Salon, was commissioned by the government as part of a larger order. It is shown that this painting fits first into Lejeune’s career, then into his cycle of battle paintings, and finally into the narrative of Austerlitz that Napoleon himself promoted. The episodic form of this painting can be explained by the deliberate pairing of written and pictorial narratives, which borrows from the 30th bulletin de la Grande Armée where Napoleon recounts the victory at Austerlitz. This painting thus contributes to the historical construction of the battle. As deep transformations threatened the academic genre hierarchy at the turn of the nineteenth century, the duality of Lejeune’s persona as soldier and painter helped promote the historical function given to paintings under Napoleon.

Дисертацію присвячено французько-австрійському воєнно-політичному суперництву епохи наполеонівських війн в контексті польського питання. В дисертації представлено документально обгрунтовану концепцію, яка пояснює причини непослідовної й суперечливої політики Наполеона Бонапарта щодо польського питання. Ця політика розглядається в складній ієрархічній системі зовнішньополітичних інтересів Франції. Показано, що підтримка польського визвольного руху практично ніколи не була самометою для Франції, а підпорядковувалася її пріорітетним стосункам з державами, що поділили Польщу, зокрема — з імперією Габсбургів.
The dissertation is devoted to French-Austrian military-political rivalry during the Napoleon’s wars in the context of the Polish question. The auther outlines a new conception which was documentary confirmed. It accounts for the reasons for inconsistent and contradictory Napoleon Bonapart’s politics regarding the Polish question. This politics considered in the view of the difficult hierarchy of the international interest of France. It was shown that the support of the Polish liberation movement was never the aim in itself for France and was subordinated to its priority relations with the nations, that divided Poland, the Habsburg’s Empire being among them.

W połowie XVIII w. rozpoczął się proces modernizacji wojsk Rzeczpospolitej. Sformowane zostały pierwsze oddziały inżynieryjne i Korpus Inżynierów, a w 1765 r. powstała Szkoła Rycerska – uczelnia wojskowa kształcąca inżynierów wojskowych. Wojska inżynieryjne odrodziły się w okresie napoleońskim, w powstałej wówczas armii Księstwa Warszawskiego. Wojska te były zorganizowane na wzór francuski i cały czas rozbudowywane. Największą liczebność osiągnęły przed kampanią rosyjską w 1812 r. W tym okresie Korpus Inżynierów realizował wiele prac na zlecenie Napoleona, m. in. budował twierdzę w Modlinie i prowadził szczegółowe prace kartograficzne. W 1809 r. powołano Szkołę Aplikacyjnę Artylerii i Inżynierów wzorowaną na paryskiej École polytechnique. Jej uczniami było wielu wybitnych inżynierów jak gen. I. Prądzyński i F. Pancer.W okresie 1815-1830 r. Królestwo Polskie było zależne od Rosji, co spowodowało, że jego armia była wzorowana była na rosyjskiej. Powołanie w tym czasie do życia Kwatermistrzostwa Generalnego sprawiło, że przejęło ono wiele obowiązków i najzdolniejszych oficerów Korpusu Inżynierów.Podczas Powstania (1830-31) wojska inżynieryjne odegrały znaczną rolę, budując wiele mostów polowych i fortyfikacji. Najtrudniejszym zadaniem było w tym czasie ufortyfikowanie Warszawy, niestety nie udało się tego skutecznie wykonać. Po upadku Powstania i likwidacji armii w tym również wojsk inżynieryjnych, wielu żołnierzy i oficerów udało się na emigrację ale większość pozostała w Kraju stanowiąc zaczątek polskiej inteligencji technicznej.
In mid-1700s, the armed forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entered a process of modernisation. The first engineering units and the Corps of Engineers were organised and the year 1765 marked the establishment of the School of Chivalry - a military university training military engineers. The engineering corps was recreated with the formation of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw during the Napoleonic era. The Corps was organised based on the French model and continually developed, reaching its highest numbers in 1812. During that time, the Corps of Engineers carried out a number of projects commissioned by Napoleon, such as detailed mapping or the construction of the Modlin fortress. The Artillery and Engineering School, established in 1809 and designed after the French École polytechnique in Paris, trained many prominent engineers, such as General Ignacy Prądzyński and Feliks Pancer.During the era of the Russian-dominated Congress Kingdom of Poland (1815-1830), the Polish armed forces followed the organisation of the Russian Army. The General Logistics Department set up during that time, took over many of the responsibilities and most talented officers from the Corps of Engineers.The engineering corps played a key role in the November Uprising of 1830, constructing a number of field bridges and fortifications. Unfortunately, the most difficult task at the time, the fortification of Warsaw, was never completed. After the fall of the Uprising and the disbandment of the army, including the engineering corps, many soldiers and officers went into exile; still most remained in the Country and those who did became the nucleus of the Polish technology intelligentsia.