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Journal articles on the topic 'Nash-bargaining model'

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Published: 21 December 2024

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1

Maude-Griffin, Roland, Roger Feldman *, and Douglas Wholey *. "Nash bargaining model of HMO premiums." Applied Economics 36, no. 12 (2004): 1329–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0003684042000238938.

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2

Chan, Kenneth S. "Trade negotiations in a Nash bargaining model." Journal of International Economics 25, no. 3-4 (1988): 353–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(88)90060-8.

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3

Hema, P., N. R. Rejin Paul, Lenka Čepová, Bhola Khan, Kailash Kumar, and Vladimira Schindlerova. "Complexity and Monitoring of Economic Operations Using a Game-Theoretic Model for Cloud Computing." Systems 11, no. 2 (2023): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems11020050.

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In this study, a model is presented for allocating cloud computing resources based on economic considerations using tools from game theory. The model, called the Non-Cooperative Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (NCGRAA), is designed to achieve the optimum stage in cloud computing. In addition, the Bargaining Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (BGRAA) is introduced to the existing system to develop the billing process within the constraints of availability and fairness. This system-based algorithm implements methods for converging on and improving the Nash Equilibrium and Nash Bargaining solu

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Feng, Zhongwei, Fangning Li, and Chunqiao Tan. "Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns." Behavioral Sciences 13, no. 2 (2023): 124. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs13020124.

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The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of fairness concerns in the alternating-offer bargaining game. Alternating-offer bargaining with fairness concerns is developed. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium and show its uniqueness. Then, it is shown that players’ payoffs in the subgame perfect equilibrium are positively related to their own fairness concern coefficient and bargaining power and

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Bastianello, Lorenzo, and Marco LiCalzi. "The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining." Econometrica 87, no. 3 (2019): 837–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13673.

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We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.

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6

Demougin, Dominique, and Carsten Helm. "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power." German Economic Review 7, no. 4 (2006): 463–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x.

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Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the

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L.A, Papakonstantinidis. "The “Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model”: from Social Welfare’s Philosophy towards a Rural Development Concept by Rural Tourism Approach: The WERT Case Study." INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3, no. 1 (2017): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/ijied.1849-7551-7020.2015.35.2001.

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The article is dealing with two interconnected problems based on the conjectures: a) social welfare is a condition for rural development and not the prerequisite for it; b) shape a new landscape (the “win-win-win”) based on critique of the “Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1951) through the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, John 1950). Specifically, this article discusses and analyses social welfare and rural development objectives integrating elements from the impossibility theorem, the bargaining theory, and the theory of agency by (a) reviewing the literature on coordination “social welfa

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Wang, Meiqiang, and Yongjun Li. "Supplier evaluation based on Nash bargaining game model." Expert Systems with Applications 41, no. 9 (2014): 4181–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2013.12.044.

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9

Braun, Norman, and Thomas Gautschi. "A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks." Social Networks 28, no. 1 (2006): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2004.11.011.

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10

Fallahnejad, Reza, Mohammad Reza Mozaffari, Peter Fernandes Wanke, and Yong Tan. "Nash Bargaining Game Enhanced Global Malmquist Productivity Index for Cross-Productivity Index." Games 15, no. 1 (2024): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g15010003.

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The Global Malmquist Productivity Index (GMPI) stands as an evolution of the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI), emphasizing global technology to incorporate all-time versions of Decision-Making Units (DMUs). This paper introduces a novel approach, integrating the Nash Bargaining Game model with GMPI to establish a Cross-Productivity Index. Our primary objective is to develop a comprehensive framework utilizing the Nash Bargaining Game model to derive equitable common weights for different time versions of DMUs. These weights serve as a fundamental component for cross-evaluation based on GMPI,

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Zhang, Jin, Cungang Hu, Changbao Zheng, Tao Rui, Weixiang Shen, and Bo Wang. "Distributed Peer-to-Peer Electricity Trading Considering Network Loss in a Distribution System." Energies 12, no. 22 (2019): 4318. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en12224318.

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In this paper, a distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading model was proposed to study economic interactions between load aggregators (LAs) and microgrid operators (MGOs) considering network losses in a distribution system. In this model, the economic interactions among market participants were formulated as a Nash bargaining game, where LAs and MGOs can bargain with each other on the trading volume of electricity and payment. To achieve the Nash bargaining solution, the game was divided into two sub-problems: social welfare maximization and payment bargaining. Then, the alternating d

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Zhang, Weizhong, Yuchen Zhang, Ping Gu, et al. "Coordinated operation optimization strategy for multiple microgrids considering uncertainties in renewable energy output." Journal of Physics: Conference Series 2814, no. 1 (2024): 012054. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2814/1/012054.

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Abstract In the process of constructing a new power system with a focus on new energy sources, microgrids will be vigorously developed as an effective means of accommodating renewable resources. The synergistic operation of multiple microgrids, merging into a multi-stakeholder framework, is a method to strengthen the overall effectiveness of the system. However, existing Nash bargaining models consider relatively fewer influencing factors. To enhance the reliability and economic viability of microgrids, this paper effectively proposes a model that combines Nash bargaining with two-stage robust

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Chang, Tian Tian, Li Li Wang, Ji Hui Zhang, and Qing Yue Ma. "Bargaining Based Supply Chain Scheduling." Applied Mechanics and Materials 220-223 (November 2012): 299–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.220-223.299.

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Coordination across the supply chain improves the manufacturing efficiency a lot. To provide a rational cooperation mechanism for supply chain scheduling, a bargaining model was established on the basis of the Nash bargaining theory. The solution of the model draws forth a new scheduling problem with multi-objective product. A polynomial heuristic was designed to find the near-optimal bargaining solution under the assembly circumstance.

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Yao, Mingzhu, and Donggen Wang. "Modeling household relocation choice: An egalitarian bargaining approach and a comparative study." Journal of Transport and Land Use 14, no. 1 (2021): 625–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5198/jtlu.2021.1733.

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Accompanying the rapid urban expansion and fast population growth is a progressive trend of residential relocation in developing countries, which necessitates a thorough understanding of households’ relocation decisions. Previous studies generally treated home relocation as an individual or unitary household decision, ignoring the interactive and collaborative decision-making mechanisms that household members may adopt when making group decisions. In view of this research gap, this study examines the feasibility of applying the egalitarian bargaining approach to simulating households’ group de

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Zhu, Bao Lin, and Shou Feng Ji. "The Master Production Scheduling Model for Buyer and Vendor Based on Bargaining Game." Advanced Materials Research 860-863 (December 2013): 3073–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.860-863.3073.

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Master production scheduling plays an important role in planning levels. The scheduling without coordination will lead to an unsatisfied result. In this paper, the master production scheduling model based on bargaining game between buyer and vendor is established to realize integrated management. The improved solution of Nash equilibrium is achieved by the bargaining game. The simulation results verified the model and algorithms effectiveness.

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16

Schofield, Norman, and Robert Parks. "Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining." Mathematical Social Sciences 39, no. 2 (2000): 133–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00027-x.

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17

SHOKOOHI, ZEINAB, AMIR HOSSEIN CHIZARI, and MAHDI ASGARI. "INVESTIGATING BARGAINING POWER OF FARMERS AND PROCESSORS IN IRAN'S DAIRY MARKET." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 51, no. 1 (2018): 126–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aae.2018.26.

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AbstractThe farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for f

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18

Gauthier, David. "Bargaining and Justice." Social Philosophy and Policy 2, no. 2 (1985): 29–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003204.

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My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

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19

Qin, Jianan, Xiang Fu, Shaoming Peng, Yuni Xu, Jie Huang, and Sha Huang. "Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 10 (2019): 1733. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16101733.

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Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents’ powers, as deter

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20

KÖHLER, WOLFGANG R. "UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX." International Game Theory Review 08, no. 03 (2006): 469–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906001028.

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I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the payoff set that guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining model. The conditions encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. Roughly speaking, the equilibrium is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.

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21

Madden, Paul. "Collective Bargaining in a Basic North American Sports League Model With Broadcasting Revenue." Journal of Sports Economics 20, no. 8 (2019): 1088–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002519851156.

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The general firm/trade union bargaining literature is brought to bear on a specific North American sports league model, where talent supply is perfectly inelastic and profit-maximizing clubs receive local (gate) revenue plus an equal share of league broadcasting revenue. Club and player representatives negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on the levels of local revenue sharing, salary cap, and salary floor. Results characterize the set of efficient bargains and the Nash bargaining solution and show how they are affected by increases in broadcasting market size, focusing on player

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22

Yi, Wentao, and Chunqiao Tan. "Bertrand Game with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concern." Complexity 2019 (August 19, 2019): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1253092.

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The classical Bertrand game is assumed that players are perfectly rational. However, many empirical researches indicate that people have bounded rational behavior with fairness concern, which is important in the two-person game and has attracted much attention. In this paper, fairness concern is incorporated into the Bertrand game with two homogeneous products and the effect of fairness concern on this extended Bertrand game is explored. Nash bargaining solution of player is applied to be his own fairness reference point. Then, a Bertrand game model with fairness concern is established, and it

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23

Wang, Hanwen, Xiang Li, Haojun Hu, and Yizhou Zhou. "Distributed Dispatch and Profit Allocation for Parks Using Co-Operative Game Theory and the Generalized Nash Bargaining Approach." Energies 17, no. 23 (2024): 6143. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17236143.

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To improve the regulatory capacity of distributed resources within the park and enhance the flexibility of market transactions, this paper introduces a distributed dispatch and profit allocation method grounded in cooperative game theory and the generalized Nash bargaining framework. Initially, models for individual park equipment are established. Subsequently, a distributed dispatch model is constructed, followed by the development of a profit allocation strategy based on contribution levels, using the generalized Nash bargaining method. The model is solved using the alternating direction met

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Ambrus, Attila, and Shih En Lu. "A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, no. 1 (2015): 208–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20100029.

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We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics; and (ii) MPE are the only subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discrete-time bargaining models. We investigate the limit MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity and players get infinitely patient. In convex games, we establish that the set of these limit

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25

Liu, Wei, Mengxing Huang, and Wenlong Feng. "Optimized Profit Allocation Model for Service Alliance Transactions Considering Risk." Electronics 13, no. 23 (2024): 4648. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234648.

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In service alliances, where multiple service providers collaborate to complete service transactions, the equitable allocation of profits based on their respective contributions and risk-bearing capacities is paramount. This paper introduces an optimized profit allocation game model that integrates risk considerations into the Nash bargaining framework. Initially, the study established a service alliance transaction model that considered the interactions among multiple participants, providing a robust theoretical foundation for cooperation. Subsequently, the concept of marginal risk was introdu

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Pan, Chih-Min. "Research Note: A Nash Bargaining Model for Average Daily Rates." Tourism Economics 12, no. 3 (2006): 469–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5367/000000006778493655.

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27

Boonen, Tim J., Ken Seng Tan, and Sheng Chao Zhuang. "PRICING IN REINSURANCE BARGAINING WITH COMONOTONIC ADDITIVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS." ASTIN Bulletin 46, no. 2 (2016): 507–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asb.2016.8.

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AbstractOptimal reinsurance indemnities have widely been studied in the literature, yet the bargaining for optimal prices has remained relatively unexplored. Therefore, the key objective of this paper is to analyze the price of reinsurance contracts. We use a novel way to model the bargaining powers of the insurer and reinsurer, which allows us to generalize the contracts according to the Nash bargaining solution, indifference pricing and the equilibrium contracts. We illustrate these pricing functions by means of inverse-Sshaped distortion functions for the insurer and the Value-at-Risk for t

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Al-Najjar, Nabil I., and Robert J. Gary-Bobo. "Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15, no. 3 (2023): 387–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210392.

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A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts’ disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits underreaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on th

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Kalinowski, Sławomir. "Alternative bargaining solutions in asymmetric tariff rates negotiations." Economics and Business Review 7, no. 2 (2007): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2007.2.539.

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The article was dedicated to the application of cooperative games tools to the particular bargaining problem. The bargaining is about tariffrates between two countries. Analysis was performed on the framework of simple market model with perfect competition within countries and bilateral monopoly relation between them. There were two bargaining schemes applied in order to calculate cooperative solutions. First was Nash bargaining solution, the second was Kalai and Smorodinsky proposition. Both methods successfully indicated cooperative solutions. Application of chosen bargaining schemes brought

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Janjua, Shahmir, Muhammad Umair Ali, Karam Dad Kallu, et al. "An Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Natural-Gas Distribution." Applied Sciences 12, no. 11 (2022): 5677. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app12115677.

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For the sustainable socio-economic growth, the energy supply is one of the foundations for any country. The gas shortage is one of the most significant impediments to any emerging country’s economic progress, making it a contested and disputed resource. In the middle of a supply–demand mismatch, distributing limited available gas across administrative units/provinces with competing requirements is a key challenge. In this work, an asymmetric gas allocation bargaining model is proposed under gas shortage to resolve natural gas-related disputes among Pakistan’s administrative units/provinces. Ea

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Laengle, Sigifredo. "Articulating bargaining theories: movement, chance, and necessity as descriptive principles." Central European Journal of Operations Research 29, no. 1 (2021): 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10100-020-00729-y.

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AbstractThe Nash Demand Game (NDG) has been one of the first models (Nash in Econometrica 21(1):128–140, 1953. 10.2307/1906951) that has tried to describe the process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. This model has had enormous repercussions and has leveraged basic and applied research on bargaining processes. Therefore, we wonder whether it is possible to articulate extensive and multiple developments into a single unifying framework. The Viability Theory has this inclusive approach. Thus, we investigate the NDG under this point of view, and, carrying out this work, we find that

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Prasertsri, Peerapon, and Richard L. Kilmer. "The Bargaining Strength of a Milk Marketing Cooperative." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 37, no. 2 (2008): 204–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500003002.

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As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained w

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Solow, John L., and Anthony C. Krautmann. "A Nash Bargaining Model of the Salaries of Elite Free Agents." Journal of Sports Economics 12, no. 3 (2011): 309–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002511404781.

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DINAR, ARIEL. "SCALE AND EQUITY IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: A NASH BARGAINING MODEL." Natural Resource Modeling 14, no. 4 (2008): 477–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2001.tb00070.x.

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NAKAMOTO, Kunihiro, Yasuo KONISHI, Katsuya KONDO, and Hiroyuki ISHIGAKI. "Control Optimization for a Designer's Intention Through the Nash Bargaining Model." Transactions of the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers Series C 66, no. 644 (2000): 1223–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1299/kikaic.66.1223.

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Zhao, Qian, Zhengkai Wang, and Kaiming Zheng. "Order or Collaborate? Manufacturers Utilize 3D-Printed Parts to Sustainably Facilitate Increased Product Variety." Sustainability 16, no. 13 (2024): 5561. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su16135561.

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3D printing (3DP) has garnered significant attention from industries, prompting traditional manufacturers to adopt 3DP to sustainably facilitate increased product variety. Observing manufacturers’ two adoption strategies, ordering parts and collaboratively printing 3DP parts, in a real-world setting, we utilize a wholesale price contract and a Nash Bargaining contract to describe these two strategies and then develop a supply-chain model including a 3DP supplier (Supplier) and a traditional manufacturer (Manufacturer). Further, we employ backward induction to solve the subgame-perfect Nash equ

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Liu, Tao, Shou Xu Song, Hai Hong Huang, and Guang Fu Liu. "A Bargaining Theory-Based Conflict Resolution Method in Design for Remanufacturing." Advanced Materials Research 443-444 (January 2012): 643–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.443-444.643.

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In order to solve the potential conflict problem of product design factor optimization in design for remanufacturing, an idea to transform design conflict problem into mathematical model based on game theory was proposed. In the process of design for remanufacturing, a bargaining theory-based conflict resolution method was established by improving the theory of Nash-Zesen bargaining. Energy consumption and cost were analyzed by the given conflict resolution method, and the validity of the method was verified.

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Huo, Hong, Dan Luo, Zhanghua Yan, and Hao He. "Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain considering Different Fairness Preferences and Low-Carbon Advertising Level." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2022 (September 20, 2022): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4589681.

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Countries around the world advocate low-carbon, green, and environmentally friendly lifestyles to combat climate change, which provides clear direction for enterprise decisions. This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain based on behavioral economics, incentive theory, and optimization models to better formulate pricing decisions. This paper constructs a fair and neutral decentralized decision-making model (FNDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering Nash bargaining fairness concerns (NBFDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering absolute fairness concer

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Fan, Bo, Hui Tian, Yuan Zhang, and Xiao Yan. "Resource Allocation in a Generalized Framework for Virtualized Heterogeneous Wireless Network." Mobile Information Systems 2016 (2016): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8570568.

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As a prevailing concept in 5G, virtualization provides efficient coordination among multiple radio access technologies (RATs) and enables multiple service providers (SPs) to share different RATs’ infrastructure. This paper proposes a generic framework for virtualizing heterogeneous wireless network with different RATs. A novel “VMAC” (virtualized medium access control) concept is introduced to converge different RAT protocols and perform inter-RAT resource allocation. To suit the proposed framework, a virtualization based resource allocation scheme is devised. We formulate the problem as a mix

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Liu, Jinbo, Lijuan Duan, Jian Chen, Jingan Shang, Bin Wang, and Zhaoguang Pan. "A Cooperative Operation Strategy for Multi-Energy Systems Based on the Power Dispatch Meta-Universe Platform." Electronics 13, no. 15 (2024): 3015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics13153015.

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To meet the challenges of renewable energy consumption and improve the efficiency of energy systems, we propose an intelligent distributed energy dispatch strategy for multi-energy systems based on Nash bargaining by utilizing the power dispatch meta-universe platform. First, the operational framework of the multi-energy system, including wind park (WP), photovoltaic power plant (PVPP), and energy storage (ES), is described. Using the power dispatch meta-universe platform, the models of WP, PVPP, and ES are constructed and analyzed. Then, a Nash bargaining model of the multi-energy system is b

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PAUWELS, WILFRIED, PETER M. KORT, and EVE VANHAECHT. "R&D INVESTMENTS AS PREBARGAINING STRATEGIES." International Game Theory Review 16, no. 03 (2014): 1450003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914500030.

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This paper analyzes a semicollusive, differentiated duopoly. Firms first compete in cost reducing R&D and then cooperate on the output market. The sharing of the joint profit on the output market is modeled as a Nash bargaining game. We study an asymmetric setting in which one firm has a lower unit cost of production than the other firm, before any R&D expenditures. If firms do not agree on how to share their joint profit, they play a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Assuming linear demand functions, we show that the Nash bargaining outcome is independent of whether firms play a Courno

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Malik, Asif Iqbal, and Biswajit Sarkar. "Coordination Supply Chain Management Under Flexible Manufacturing, Stochastic Leadtime Demand, and Mixture of Inventory." Mathematics 8, no. 6 (2020): 911. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8060911.

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The necessity of coordination among entities is essential for the success of any supply chain management (SCM). This paper focuses on coordination between two players and cost-sharing in an SCM that considers a vendor and a buyer. For random demand and complex product production, a flexible production system is recommended. The study aims to minimize the total SCM cost under stochastic conditions. In the flexible production systems, the production rate is introduced as the decision variable and the unit production cost is minimum at the obtained optimal value. The setup cost of flexible system

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Du, Shaofu, Tengfei Nie, Chengbin Chu, and Yugang Yu. "Newsvendor model for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns." International Journal of Production Research 52, no. 17 (2014): 5070–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2014.895446.

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Melendez, Kevin A., Tapas K. Das, and Changhyun Kwon. "A Nash-bargaining model for trading of electricity between aggregations of peers." International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems 123 (December 2020): 106185. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2020.106185.

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Peng, Shiyong, Qingren He, Fei Xu, and Wanhua Qiu. "Modeling Dynamic Bargaining and Stability in a Star-Shaped Trans-Shipment Network." Systems 12, no. 4 (2024): 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems12040108.

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The star-shaped trans-shipment network causes the retailer’s bargaining power to be different, which leads to the misalignment of trans-shipment profit. Aimed at this, we take retailers and the trans-shipment paths as the nodes and edges of the trans-shipment network. Based on this, we model the multilateral negotiations between the central retailer and the local retailer and adopt the Generalized Nash Bargaining game to derive the optimal solution of the value function for the incomplete trans-shipment network under the bargaining mechanism. Furthermore, we reveal the convexity of the optimal

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Li, Guoyan, Kaixin Li, Yi Liu, and Yuheng Pan. "An Efficient Dynamic Load Balancing Scheme Based on Nash Bargaining in SDN." Future Internet 11, no. 12 (2019): 252. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/fi11120252.

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Static multi-controller deployment architecture cannot adapt to the drastic changes of network traffic, which will lead to a load imbalance between controllers, resulting in a high packet loss rate, high latency, and other network performance degradation problems. In this paper, an efficient dynamic load balancing scheme based on Nash bargaining is proposed for a distributed software-defined network. Firstly, considering the connectivity of network nodes, the switch migration problem is transformed into a network mapping relationship reconstruction problem. Then, we establish the Nash bargaini

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Fanti, Luciano, and Luca Gori. "Codetermination, Price Competition and the Network Industry." German Economic Review 20, no. 4 (2019): e795-e830. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12190.

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Abstract This research develops a tractable two-stage non-cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price-setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity-setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price-sett

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Piluso, Nicolas, and Gabriel Colletis. "A Keynesian reformulation of the WS-PS model: Keynesian unemployment and Classical unemployment." Economia Politica 38, no. 2 (2021): 447–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40888-021-00222-y.

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AbstractThe orthodox theory of wage negotiations considers that the trade union monopoly causes a rigidity of real wages which is, itself, the cause of unemployment. The model of this negotiation ("Nash bargaining") only considers situations where negotiations between union and firm succeed. In this article, we attempt to read the WS-PS model from a Keynesian point of view. Our model reflects the fact that successful negotiation is only one case among other situations, including failure where the union expresses a claim that is not necessarily satisfied. Although, in situations close to full e

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Vanderschraaf, Peter. "LEARNING BARGAINING CONVENTIONS." Social Philosophy and Policy 35, no. 1 (2018): 237–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052518000110.

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Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to

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Li, Haitao, Jie Xiong, Jianhui Xie, Zhongbao Zhou, and Jinlong Zhang. "A Unified Approach to Efficiency Decomposition for a Two-Stage Network DEA Model with Application of Performance Evaluation in Banks and Sustainable Product Design." Sustainability 11, no. 16 (2019): 4401. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11164401.

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Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a data-driven tool for performance evaluation, benchmarking and multiple-criteria decision-making. This article investigates efficiency decomposition in a two-stage network DEA model. Three major methods for efficiency decomposition have been proposed: uniform efficiency decomposition, Nash bargaining game decomposition, and priority decomposition. These models were developed on the basis of different assumptions that led to different efficiency decompositions and thus confusion among researchers. The current paper attempts to reconcile these differences by r

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