Academic literature on the topic 'National Board for Prices and Incomes'

Abstract: National income of any country is the total amount of income that is accrued by it through various economic activates in one year national income consists of a collection of different types of goods and services of different types. National income is defined in different ways accommodating for subsidies, taxes, depreciation, exports and imports. The current study is about the trend of the national income in India over the last 70 years, in detail, The estimates of national and per capita income are taken at some constant base year prices for the purpose of comparing national Income and per capita Incomes over different years. Because the national income at current prices is influenced by both the increase in production of goods and services and the rise in prices. In order to make the national income figures comparable, these figures are deflated of constant prices just for eliminating the effect of any change in the price level of the country. This paper describes he major trends in national income in India since 1950-51. This trend in national income also reflects on the standard of living of the people in India.

This study discusses the implementation of murabahah contracts on mortgage financing in the Parepare Islamic state savings bank. That the BTN Syariah bank is a unit of conventional Bank BTN which raises doubts about mortgage financing, whether or not it has implemented murabahah contracts in mortgage financing or not. As recommended by the DSN fatwa and Indonesian banks. This study aims to determine the implementation of the murabahah contract on mortgage financing at the Parepare Syariah State Savings Bank. The results of this study indicate that: (1) the financing mechanism for mortgages at Bank BTN Syariah Parepare is in accordance with the rules of banks and government, the rules governed by the government are the rules regarding subsidized mortgages stipulated in PermenPUPR Number 21 / PRT / M / 2016 concerning convenience and or assistance in obtaining houses for low income people. PermenPUPR Number 26 / PRT / M / 2016 concerning changes to the ministerial regulations on public works and public housing number 21 / PRT / M / 2016 and PermenPUPR Republic of Indonesia Number 425 / KPTS / M / 2015 concerning limits on house selling prices that can be obtained through credit or financing of prosperous home ownership. (2) Implementation of murabahah contract at BTN Syariah Parepare bank, terms and conditions are in accordance with the principle of murabahah contract, murabahah contract has not implemented well on mortgage products at BTN Syariah Parepare bank due to the existence of murabahah contract elements which are not in accordance with the fatwa of the board national sharia-MUI. The element of the murabahah contract that is not in accordance with the DSN-MUI fatwa is the down payment and rescheduling. The elements of the murabahah contract are in accordance with the DSN-MUI fatwa, namely discounts, settlement of accounts receivable, fines and accelerated repayments.

<abstract> <p>The year 2022 is characterized by a generalized energy crisis, which leads to steadily increasing electricity prices around the world, while the corresponding salaries remain stable. Therefore, examining trends in electricity prices relative to existing income levels can provide valuable insights into the overpricing/underpricing of energy consumption. In this article, we examine the tendencies of 35 European countries according to their national kWh prices and the average household incomes. We use a series of established clustering methods that leverage available information to reveal price and income patterns across Europe. We obtain important information on the balance between family earnings and electricity prices in each European country and are able to identify countries and regions that offer the most and least favorable economic conditions based on these two characteristics studied. Our analysis reveals the existence of four price and income patterns that reflect geographical differences across Europe. Countries such as Iceland, Norway, and Luxembourg exhibit the most favorable balance between prices and earnings. Conversely, electricity prices appear to be overpriced in many southern and eastern countries, with Portugal being the most prominent example of this phenomenon. In general, average household incomes become more satisfactory for European citizens as we move from east to west and south to north. In contrast, the respective national electricity prices do not follow this geographical pattern, leading to notable imbalances. After identifying significant cases of inflated prices, we investigate the respective causes of the observed situation with the aim of explaining this extreme behavior with exogenous factors. Finally, it becomes clear that the recent increase in energy prices should not be considered as a completely unexpected event, but rather as a phenomenon that has occurred and developed gradually over the years.</p> </abstract>

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the structure of Ukrainian GDP is studied, with summing up the causes of impact occurrence and mechanisms of manifestation. The peculiarities of the pandemic’s impact on the institutional and industrial structure of economy in the specific conditions of Ukraine are revealed. The dynamics of the structure of the domestic GDP in the conditions of pandemic is analyzed. The contribution of the sectors of non-financial corporations, households, financial corporations and government in the Ukrainian GDP is highlighted. It is shown that the increased economic activity of non-financial sector resulted in a growth in dividends, royalties and other components of the property income. However, financial corporations, general government and households were losing property incomes, first of all due to the decreased interest rate of the National Bank of Ukraine, which reduced incomes of financial corporations in form of interests on loans, bond yields of the government, and deposit incomes of households. Problems of redistribution of primary incomes of sectors by the financial system are discussed. Emphasis is made on the banking sector. With the pandemic shattering the financial health of banks, they started to increase the commission fees to compensate the losses. This process is expected to go on in the forthcoming months. At the initial period of the economy freezing, banks did not feel its outcomes as severely as sectors like tourism, transport or culture. The dynamics of GDP structure by economic activity is analyzed by three dimensions given the available national accounts data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. The analysis covers, first, the dynamics of GDP structure by economic activity in absolute terms, second, the dynamics of GDP structure in current prices, and, third, the dynamics of GDP structure in last year prices, thus eliminating the price effect for the dynamics of GDP. The adverse impact of the dynamics of prices occurred in the following sectors: manufacturing; health care and social aid; education; water supply, sanitation, waste treatment; transport; storage facilities; postal and courier activities; temporary accommodation and public catering. While the grown prices for these sectors’ products increased their weight in GDP in current prices, this weight was smaller in comparable prices. The study was conducted on the basis of research publications and material of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and professional organizations. Desk research method was used in the process, i. e. analysis of available data, involving extraction and exploration of the already available information, which is the basis for producing new data in line of the author’s research objective.

Higher national incomes are correlated with political stability. Is this relationship causal? We test three theories linking income to conflict with new data on export price shocks. Price shocks have no effect on new conflict, even large shocks in high-risk nations. Rising prices, however, weakly lead to shorter, less deadly wars. This evidence contradicts the theory that rising state revenues incentivize state capture, but supports the idea that rising revenues improve counter-insurgency capacity and reduce individual incentives to fight in existing conflicts. Conflict onset and continuation follow different processes. Ignoring this time dependence generates mistaken conclusions about income and instability. (JEL D72, D74, O13, O17, O19, Q02, Q34)

The New York Yankees donated their financial records to the National Baseball Hall of Fame. These records provide a rare glimpse into the business of professional team sports. I use these records to examine how the Yankees' management reacted to the Great Depression. Since the team possessed both price-setting power over ticket prices andmonopsony power over player salaries, how did the team adjust ticket prices and salaries in response to the falling incomes of its customers and general deflation of the early 1930s? How did the team's response differ from other teams in Major League Baseball?

Few periods in South American history have so captured the imagination and begged the attention of scholars as the Amazon rubber boom. For fifty years, the extraction of wild rubber from the jungles of the Amazon fueled unprecedented economic expansion in the region: per capita incomes in the Brazilian Amazon climbed by 800 percent; the regional population increased by more than 400 percent; urban centers and secondary towns blossomed along the river banks; and the vast Amazonian forest lands were integrated into national political spheres and the international market economy. But when low-cost rubber from British plantations in Asia flooded world markets in the 1910s, rubber prices plummeted, sharply curtailing financial returns from wild rubber extraction. The price shock drove scores of traders and export houses into bankruptcy when they were unable to collect debts that were based on the future value of rubber. Urban real estate prices crashed, and service industries withered along with their customers' incomes. By the early 1920s, the boom was over, and per capita income levels had shrunk to pre-boom levels. Today, nearly a century later, such incomes (in real terms) have yet to return to boom levels in many areas despite massive state investment in Amazonia.

Abstract. Under conditions of persistent trade balance deficit, there activates a search for ways of export increase and, consequently, of currency incomes of Ukraine. The goal of this article is to evaluate the state of Ukraine’s export, its dynamics, development of extended classification of the factors influencing the formation of export incomes, detecting the problems in this sphere, development of recommendations concerning the growth of export and increase in currency incomes of Ukraine. The methods of research applied are analysis and synthesis, system approach, comparison, generalization, scientific abstracting, and statistical method. This work contains a substantial analysis of the current state and dynamics of foreign trade of Ukraine in general and its exports in particular. There has been developed an extended classification of factors influencing the formation of export incomes, sum total of which falls into two groups: the factors determining the quantity of exported goods, and the factors determining their prices. The first group includes the following: availability of export potential, export potential realization, state of the market regarding consumers. The second group comprises the following: production costs level, existence of trade obstacles, currency exchange rate. The influence of all mentioned factors on Ukraine’s export has been analyzed. There have been disclosed the main problems in this sphere, such as imperfect export structure, high expenditure level and the share of import in export, unfavorable market environment for development of export-oriented enterprises. There have been given recommendations concerning an increase in export and currency incomes of Ukraine, including efficient utilizing of both home and foreign resources, optimizing export structure, creating a favorable market environment, taking into consideration elasticity of demand on national exported goods and elasticity of supply from foreign countries to gain competitive advantage, introduction of new technologies, production modernizing, utilizing the advantages of economic integration, and ensuring devaluation effect. Keywords: export incomes, export, import, export potential, elasticity of national export’s demand and supply, trade barriers, currency incomes, currency exchange rate. JEL Classification F19, F31, F49 Formulas: 0; fig.: 3; tabl.: 0; bibl.: 15.

Regional differences in the cost of living distort the estimates of monetary components of living standards and resource requirements, which are necessary for implementing measures to reduce income inequality as a cause of social injustice and unrest. Thus, we propose a methodology for calculating nominal household income using rouble purchasing power parity to assess its influence on national inequality. This approach measures inequality based on individual data on household income, disregarding the territorial differentiation of consumer prices. Then, the influence of regional price differences on the national income inequality was assessed by comparing Gini coefficients calculated for the same sample of households using two criteria: nominal per capita income and per capita income adjusted for purchasing power in various regions. The study revealed that the difference in nominal incomes is reduced by regional disparities in the cost of living. Simultaneously, the distribution of household incomes adjusted for regional purchasing power parities is more even. The research findings can be used to develop policy measures aimed at reducing regional welfare disparities and poverty.

Regional differences in the cost of living distort the estimates of monetary components of living standards and resource requirements, which are necessary for implementing measures to reduce income inequality as a cause of social injustice and unrest. Thus, we propose a methodology for calculating nominal household income using rouble purchasing power parity to assess its influence on national inequality. This approach measures inequality based on individual data on household income, disregarding the territorial differentiation of consumer prices. Then, the influence of regional price differences on the national income inequality was assessed by comparing Gini coefficients calculated for the same sample of households using two criteria: nominal per capita income and per capita income adjusted for purchasing power in various regions. The study revealed that the difference in nominal incomes is reduced by regional disparities in the cost of living. Simultaneously, the distribution of household incomes adjusted for regional purchasing power parities is more even. The research findings can be used to develop policy measures aimed at reducing regional welfare disparities and poverty.

AbstractAction Track 1 of the Food Systems Summit offers an opportunity to bring together the crucial elements of food safety, nutrition, poverty and inequalities in the framework of food systems within the context of climate and environmental change to ensure that all people have access to a safe and nutritious diet. Achieving Action Track 1’s goal is essential to achieving the goals of the other Action Tracks. With less than a decade left to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), most countries are not on a course to hit either the World Health Organisation’s nutrition targets or the SDG 2 targets. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated malnutrition and highlighted the need for food safety. The pandemic has also exposed the deep inequalities in both food systems and societies as a whole. Nonetheless, future food systems can address many of these failings and ensure safe and nutritious food for all. However, structural change is necessary to address the socio-economic drivers behind malnutrition, inequalities and the climate and environmental impacts of food. Adopting a whole-system approach in policy, research and monitoring and evaluation is crucial for managing trade-off and externalities from farm-level to national scales and across multiple sectors and agencies. Supply chain failures will need to be overcome and technology solutions adopted and adapted to specific contexts. A transformation of food systems requires coordinating changes in supply and demand in differentiated ways across world regions: bridging yield gaps and improving livestock feed conversion, largely through agro-ecological practices, deploying soil carbon sequestration and greenhouse gas mitigation at scale, and reducing food loss and waste, as well as addressing over-nourishment and shifting the diets of wealthy populations. The sustainability of global food systems also requires halting the expansion of agriculture into fragile ecosystems, while restoring degraded forests, fisheries, rangelands, peatlands and wetlands. Shifting to more sustainable consumption and production patterns within planetary boundaries will require efforts to influence food demand and diets, diversify food systems, and develop careful land-use planning and management. Integrative policies need to ensure that food prices reflect real costs (including major externalities caused by climate change, land degradation and biodiversity loss, and the public health impacts of malnutrition), reduce food waste and, at the same time, ensure the affordability of safe and healthy food and decent incomes and wages for farmers and food system workers. The harnessing of science and technology solutions and the sharing of actionable knowledge with all players in the food system offer many opportunities. Greater coordination of food system stakeholders is crucial for greater inclusion, greater transparency and more accountability. Sharing lessons and experiences will foster adaptive learning and responsive actions. Careful consideration of the trade-offs, externalities and costs of not acting is needed to ensure that the changes we make benefit all, and especially the most vulnerable in society.

This chapter presents national estimates of incomes and inequality for 2007 and 2013. It begins with discussion of the CHIP datasets and measurement issues. It then reports core estimates of income and inequality, which indicate a modest decline in inequality during this period. Estimates are reported separately for formal urban residents, rural residents, and rural-to-urban migrants, with discussion of the effects of migration on inequality. Incomes and inequality are decomposed among the different sources of income; the urban/rural and regional income gaps are investigated. Alternative estimates of national inequality—using different income definitions, inequality indexes, and prices—are reported, as well as estimates that adjust for the underrepresentation of incomes in the top tail of the income distribution. The estimated decline in national inequality survives some but not all of these alternative calculations and thus raises questions about the magnitude and long-term sustainability of the inequality decline.

Abstract This chapter compares the economic well-being of the Japanese today with that of their own forbears and people of other nations. It shows how the national income and product accounts can be used to measure changes over time in the contribution to Japanese well-being of goods produced and traded in the market. The principle of revealed preference is invoked to compare the contribution of market goods to economic well-being in Japan and in other countries. Contributions of nonmarket goods—household production, leisure, environmental amenities—are also shown to be large in Japan, based on their shadow prices. The distribution of income also matters in cross-country comparisons of income person. The more concentrated is the distribution of income, the higher is average income per person relative to the expected income of a person randomly drawn from the population. And income is less concentrated in Japan than in most other nations. Finally, the underground economy—the economic activity beyond the purview of government authorities, and not recorded—is a source of error in the national accounts of Japan as elsewhere.

American unions and companies did not reach a grand accord after World War II, as many historians claimed in the 1960s and 1970s, nor did corporations continuously maneuver to undermine unions after the war ended, as labor historians began arguing in the 1990s. Relations were more complex than that. Compromises were reached at thousands of firms, mediated by the former staff of the National War Labor Board, whom companies and unions hired as their principals arbitrators. This chapters offers three illustrations: Harry Shulman at the Ford Motor Company, John T. Dunlop in the construction industry, and Sylvester Garrett in the steel industry. The compromises depended on slowly rising inflation in wages and prices, a factor that only a few of the intermediaries acknowledged.

A smoothly functioning freight transportation network is part of the nation’s critical infrastructure and is essential to the operation of the U.S. economy. Rail is a significant component of this infrastructure. There are serious threats to American’s freight rail system caused in large part by intrusion of incompatible land uses, especially in America’s burgeoning megapolitans. Population growth, rising incomes, and other aspects of economic growth have all led to increased competition for the land resources around the freight rail network. Incompatible land uses around freight rail corridors and facilities often results in conflicts between those uses and barriers to efficient freight transportation. This paper discusses the research results from Transportation Research Board (TRB) Project NCFRP 24 that developed a website, www.EnvisionFreight.com, and a report outlining tools and strategies for better planning and design of residential and other structures in proximity to freight corridors and facilities. The paper initially discusses the benefits and importance of an integrated multimodal freight system, and the value of a smoothly functioning freight transportation network. This includes discussion of the freight rail network’s part in the nation’s critical freight transportation infrastructure. The paper then reviews the conflicts and barriers that often occur between incompatible land uses and freight rail assets. Case studies that were conducted during the research are also utilized to show current practices in planning for freight. Finally the paper discusses strategies for preserving and evolving the network of freight rail corridors and access points, which requires foreseeing future areas of conflict and acting proactively in an economically rational manner. Our research found four areas of tools and preservation and protection strategies to minimize and resolve conflicts between freight and other land uses: long-range planning, zoning and design, mitigation, and education and outreach. The research found that tremendous potential exists to significantly affect decision making that impacts freight. With the likely emergence of freight mega-regions that do not respect state or even national boundaries, a new planning dialogue is required to prepare for the next generation freight system to support these regions. Planning decisions that will be made over the next decade will be critical to our future transportation system efficiencies and regional competitiveness. Local and regional freight planning in this context will require highly skilled freight transportation planners, new planning strategies and tools, community support, longer-term regional visioning, and legislative authority.

In Colombia, as well as in the rest of the world, the Covid-19 pandemic has seriously damaged the health and well-being of the people. In order to limit the damage, local and national authorities have had to order large sectors of the population to be confined at their homes for long periods of time. An inevitable consequence of isolation has been the collapse of economic activity, expenditure, and employment, a phenomenon that has hit many countries of the world affected by the disease. It is an unprecedented crisis in modern times, not so much for its intensity (which is undoubtedly immense), but because its origin is not economic. That is what makes it so unpredictable and difficult to manage. Naturally, its economic consequences are enormous. Governments and central banks from all over the world are struggling to mitigate them, but the final solution is not in the hands of the economic authorities. Only science can provide a way out. In the meantime, the economic indicators in Colombia and in the rest of the world cause concern. The output falls, the massive loss of jobs, and the closure of businesses of all sizes have become daily news. Added to this, there is the deterioration in global financial conditions and the increase in the risk indicators. Financial volatility has increased and stock indexes have fallen. In the face of the lower global demand, export prices of raw materials have fallen, affecting the terms of trade for producing countries. Workers’ remittances have declined due to the increase of unemployment in developed countries. This crisis has also generated a strong reduction of global trade of goods and services, and effects on the global value chains. Central banks around the world have reacted decisively and quickly with strong liquidity injections and significant cuts to their interest rates. By mid-July, such determined response had succeeded to revert much of the initial deterioration in global financial conditions. The stock exchanges stopped their fall, and showed significant recovery in several countries. Risk premia, which at the beginning of the crisis took an unusual leap, recorded substantial corrections. Something similar happened with the volatility indexes of global financial markets, which exhibited significant improvement. Flexibilization of confinement measures in some economies, broad global liquidity, and fiscal policy measures have also contributed to improve global external financial conditions, albeit with indicators that still do not return to their pre-Covid levels.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary In September, headline inflation (11.4% annually) and the average of core inflation indicators (8.6% annually) continued on a rising trend, and higher increases than expected were recorded. Forecasts increased again, and inflation expectations remained above 3%. Inflationary surprises in the third quarter were significant and widespread, and they are the result of several shocks. On the one hand, international cost and price shocks, which have mainly affected goods and foods, continue to exert upwards pressure on national inflation. In addition to these external supply shocks, domestic supply shocks have also affected foods. On the other hand, the strong recovery of aggregate demand, especially for private consumption and for machinery and equipment, as well as a higher accumulated depreciation of the Colombian peso and its pass-through to domestic prices also explain the rise in inflation. Indexation also contributes, both through the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and through the Producer Price Index (PPI), which continues to have a significant impact on electricity prices and, to a lesser degree, on other public utilities and rent. In comparison with July’s report, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items) is higher in the forecast horizon, mainly due to exchange rate pressures, higher excess demand, and indexation at higher inflation rates, but it maintains a trend of convergence towards the target. In the case of food, a good domestic supply of perishable foods and some moderation in international processed food prices are still expected. However, the technical staff estimates higher pressures on this group’s prices from labor costs, raw material prices, and exchange rates. In terms of the CPI for regulated items, the new forecast supposes reductions in electricity prices at the end of the year, but the effects of indexation at higher inflation rates and the expected rises in fuel prices would continue to push this CPI group. Therefore, the new projection suggests that, in December, inflation would reach 11.3% and would decrease throughout 2023 and 2024, closing the year at 7.1% and 3.5%, respectively. These forecasts have a high level of uncertainty, due especially to the future behavior of international financial conditions, external price and cost shocks, the persistence of depreciation of the Colombian peso, the pace of adjustment of domestic demand, the indexation degree of nominal contracts, and the decisions that would be made regarding domestic fuel and electricity prices. Economic activity continues to surprise on the upside, and the projection of growth for 2022 rose from 6.9% to 7.9% but lowered for 2023 from 1.1% to 0.5%. Thus, excess demand is higher than estimated in the previous report, and it would diminish in 2023. Economic growth in the second quarterwas higher than estimated in July due to stronger domestic demand, mainly because of private consumption. Economic activity indicators for the third quarter suggest that the GDP would stay at a high level, above its potential, with an annual change of 6.4%, and 0.6% higher than observed in the second quarter. Nevertheless, these numbers reflect deceleration in its quarterly and annual growth. Domestic demand would show similar behavior, with a high value, higher than that of output. This can be explained partly by the strong behavior of private consumption and investment in machinery and equipment. In the third quarter, investment in construction would have continued with mediocre performance, which would still place it at levels lower than those observed before the pandemic. The trade deficit would have widened due to high imports with a stronger trend than that for exports. It is expected that, in the forecast horizon, consumption would decrease from its current high levels, partly as a consequence of tighter domestic financial conditions, lower repressed demand, higher exchange rate pressures on imported goods prices, and the deterioration of actual income due to the rise in inflation. Investment would continue to lag behind, without reaching the levels observed before the pandemic, in a context of high financing costs and high uncertainty. A lower projected behavior in domestic demand and the high levels of prices for oil and other basic goods that the country exports would be reflected in a reduction in the trade deficit. Due to all of this, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would be 7.9%, 0.5%, and 1.3%, respectively. Expected excess demand (measured via the output gap) is estimated to be higher than contemplated in the previous report; it would diminish in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024. These estimates remain subject to a high degree of uncertainty related to global political tension, a rise in international interest rates, and the effects of this rise on demand and financial conditions abroad. In the domestic context, the evolution of fiscal policy as well as future measures regarding economic policy and their possible effects on macroeconomic imbalances in the country, among others, are factors that generate uncertainty and affect risk premia, the exchange rate, investment, and the country’s economic activity. Interest rates at several of the world’s main central banks continue to rise, some at a pace higher than expected by the market. This is in response to the high levels of inflation and their inflation expectations, which continue to exceed the targets. Thus, global growth projections are still being moderated, risk premia have risen, and the dollar continues to gain strength against other main currencies. International pressures on global inflation have heightened. In the United States, core inflation has not receded, pressured by the behavior of the CPI for services and a tight labor market. Consequently, the U.S. Federal Reserve continued to increase the policy interest rate at a strong pace. This rate is expected to now reach higher levels than projected in the previous quarter. Other developed and emerging economies have also increased their policy interest rates. Thus, international financial conditions have tightened significantly, which reflects in a widespread strengthening of the dollar, increases in worldwide risk premia, and the devaluation of risky assets. Recently, these effects have been stronger in Colombia than in the majority of its peers in the region. Considering all of the aforementioned, the technical staff of the bank increased its assumption regarding the U.S. Federal Reserve’s interest rate, reduced the country’s external demand growth forecast, and raised the projected trajectory for the risk premium. The latter remains elevated at higher levels than its historical average, within a context of high local uncertainty and of extensive financing needs from the foreign sector and the public sector. All of this results in higher inflationary pressures associated to the depreciation of the Colombian peso. The uncertainty regarding external forecasts and its impact on the country remain elevated, given the unforeseeable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, of geopolitical tensions, and of the tightening of external financial conditions, among others. A macroeconomic context of high inflation, inflation expectations and forecasts above 3%, and a positive output gap suggests the need for contractionary monetary policy, compatible with the macroeconomic adjustment necessary to eliminate excess demand, mitigate the risk of unanchoring in inflation expectations, and guarantee convergence of inflation at the target. In comparison with the July report forecasts, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed output level that surpasses the economy’s productive capacity. Headline and core inflation have registered surprising rises, associated with the effects of domestic and external price shocks that were more persistent than anticipated, with excess demand and indexation processes in some CPI groups. The country’s risk premium and the observed and expected international interest rates increased. As a consequence of this, inflationary pressures from the exchange rate rose, and in this report, the probability of the neutral real interest rate being higher than estimated increased. In general, inflation expectations for all terms and the bank’s technical staff inflation forecast for 2023 increased again and continue to stray from 3%. All of the aforementioned elevated the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could heighten widespread indexation processes that push inflation away from the target for a longer time. In this context, it is necessary to consolidate a contractionary monetary policy that tends towards convergence of inflation at the target in the forecast horizon and towards the reduction of excess demand in order to guarantee a sustainable output level trajectory. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its September and October of 2022 meetings, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. In September, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to raise the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps), and in its October meeting, unanimously, by 100bps. Therefore, the rate is at 11.0%. Boxes 1 Food inflation: a comparison with other countries

Macroeconomic summary Several factors contributed to an increase in projected inflation on the forecast horizon, keeping it above the target rate. These included inflation in December that surpassed expectations (5.62%), indexation to higher inflation rates for various baskets in the consumer price index (CPI), a significant real increase in the legal minimum wage, persistent external and domestic inflationary supply shocks, and heightened exchange rate pressures. The CPI for foods was affected by the persistence of external and domestic supply shocks and was the most significant contributor to unexpectedly high inflation in the fourth quarter. Price adjustments for fuels and certain utilities can explain the acceleration in inflation for regulated items, which was more significant than anticipated. Prices in the CPI for goods excluding food and regulated items also rose more than expected. This was partly due to a smaller effect on prices from the national government’s VAT-free day than anticipated by the technical staff and more persistent external pressures, including via peso depreciation. By contrast, the CPI for services excluding food and regulated items accelerated less than expected, partly reflecting strong competition in the communications sector. This was the only major CPI basket for which prices increased below the target inflation rate. The technical staff revised its inflation forecast upward in response to certain external shocks (prices, costs, and depreciation) and domestic shocks (e.g., on meat products) that were stronger and more persistent than anticipated in the previous report. Observed inflation and a real increase in the legal minimum wage also exceeded expectations, which would boost inflation by affecting price indexation, labor costs, and inflation expectations. The technical staff now expects year-end headline inflation of 4.3% in 2022 and 3.4% in 2023; core inflation is projected to be 4.5% and 3.6%, respectively. These forecasts consider the lapse of certain price relief measures associated with the COVID-19 health emergency, which would contribute to temporarily keeping inflation above the target on the forecast horizon. It is important to note that these estimates continue to contain a significant degree of uncertainty, mainly related to the development of external and domestic supply shocks and their ultimate effects on prices. Other contributing factors include high price volatility and measurement uncertainty related to the extension of Colombia’s health emergency and tax relief measures (such as the VAT-free days) associated with the Social Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Social). The as-yet uncertain magnitude of the effects of a recent real increase in the legal minimum wage (that was high by historical standards) and high observed and expected inflation, are additional factors weighing on the overall uncertainty of the estimates in this report. The size of excess productive capacity remaining in the economy and the degree to which it is closing are also uncertain, as the evolution of the pandemic continues to represent a significant forecast risk. margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. The technical staff revised its GDP growth projection for 2022 from 4.7% to 4.3% (Graph 1.3). This revision accounts for the likelihood that a larger portion of the recent positive dynamic in private consumption would be transitory than previously expected. This estimate also contemplates less dynamic investment behavior than forecast in the previous report amid less favorable financial conditions and a highly uncertain investment environment. Third-quarter GDP growth (12.9%), which was similar to projections from the October report, and the fourth-quarter growth forecast (8.7%) reflect a positive consumption trend, which has been revised upward. This dynamic has been driven by both public and private spending. Investment growth, meanwhile, has been weaker than forecast. Available fourth-quarter data suggest that consumption spending for the period would have exceeded estimates from October, thanks to three consecutive months that included VAT-free days, a relatively low COVID-19 caseload, and mobility indicators similar to their pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, the most recently available figures on new housing developments and machinery and equipment imports suggest that investment, while continuing to rise, is growing at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. The trade deficit is expected to have widened, as imports would have grown at a high level and outpaced exports. Given the above, the technical staff now expects fourth-quarter economic growth of 8.7%, with overall growth for 2021 of 9.9%. Several factors should continue to contribute to output recovery in 2022, though some of these may be less significant than previously forecast. International financial conditions are expected to be less favorable, though external demand should continue to recover and terms of trade continue to increase amid higher projected oil prices. Lower unemployment rates and subsequent positive effects on household income, despite increased inflation, would also boost output recovery, as would progress in the national vaccination campaign. The technical staff expects that the conditions that have favored recent high levels of consumption would be, in large part, transitory. Consumption spending is expected to grow at a slower rate in 2022. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) would continue to recover, approaching its pre-pandemic level, though at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. This would be due to lower observed GFCF levels and the potential impact of political and fiscal uncertainty. Meanwhile, the policy interest rate would be less expansionary as the process of monetary policy normalization continues. Given the above, growth in 2022 is forecast to decelerate to 4.3% (previously 4.7%). In 2023, that figure (3.1%) is projected to converge to levels closer to the potential growth rate. In this case, excess productive capacity would be expected to tighten at a similar rate as projected in the previous report. The trade deficit would tighten more than previously projected on the forecast horizon, due to expectations of an improved export dynamic and moderation in imports. The growth forecast for 2022 considers a low basis of comparison from the first half of 2021. However, there remain significant downside risks to this forecast. The current projection does not, for example, account for any additional effects on economic activity resulting from further waves of COVID-19. High private consumption levels, which have already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. External demand for Colombian goods and services should continue to recover amid significant global inflation pressures, high oil prices, and less favorable international financial conditions than those estimated in October. Economic activity among Colombia’s major trade partners recovered in 2021 amid countries reopening and ample international liquidity. However, that growth has been somewhat restricted by global supply chain disruptions and new outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff has revised its growth forecast for Colombia’s main trade partners from 6.3% to 6.9% for 2021, and from 3.4% to 3.3% for 2022; trade partner economies are expected to grow 2.6% in 2023. Colombia’s annual terms of trade increased in 2021, largely on higher oil, coffee, and coal prices. This improvement came despite increased prices for goods and services imports. The expected oil price trajectory has been revised upward, partly to supply restrictions and lagging investment in the sector that would offset reduced growth forecasts in some major economies. Elevated freight and raw materials costs and supply chain disruptions continue to affect global goods production, and have led to increases in global prices. Coupled with the recovery in global demand, this has put upward pressure on external inflation. Several emerging market economies have continued to normalize monetary policy in this context. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve has anticipated an end to its asset buying program. U.S. inflation in December (7.0%) was again surprisingly high and market average inflation forecasts for 2022 have increased. The Fed is expected to increase its policy rate during the first quarter of 2022, with quarterly increases anticipated over the rest of the year. For its part, Colombia’s sovereign risk premium has increased and is forecast to remain on a higher path, to levels above the 15-year-average, on the forecast horizon. This would be partly due to the effects of a less expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia. Given the above, international financial conditions are projected to be less favorable than anticipated in the October report. The increase in Colombia’s external financing costs could be more significant if upward pressures on inflation in the United States persist and monetary policy is normalized more quickly than contemplated in this report. As detailed in Section 2.3, uncertainty surrounding international financial conditions continues to be unusually high. Along with other considerations, recent concerns over the potential effects of new COVID-19 variants, the persistence of global supply chain disruptions, energy crises in certain countries, growing geopolitical tensions, and a more significant deceleration in China are all factors underlying this uncertainty. The changing macroeconomic environment toward greater inflation and unanchoring risks on inflation expectations imply a reduction in the space available for monetary policy stimulus. Recovery in domestic demand and a reduction in excess productive capacity have come in line with the technical staff’s expectations from the October report. Some upside risks to inflation have materialized, while medium-term inflation expectations have increased and are above the 3% target. Monetary policy remains expansionary. Significant global inflationary pressures and the unexpected increase in the CPI in December point to more persistent effects from recent supply shocks. Core inflation is trending upward, but remains below the 3% target. Headline and core inflation projections have increased on the forecast horizon and are above the target rate through the end of 2023. Meanwhile, the expected dynamism of domestic demand would be in line with low levels of excess productive capacity. An accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia and the increased likelihood of a faster normalization of monetary policy in the United States would put upward pressure on sovereign risk perceptions in a more persistent manner, with implications for the exchange rate and the natural rate of interest. Persistent disruptions to international supply chains, a high real increase in the legal minimum wage, and the indexation of various baskets in the CPI to higher inflation rates could affect price expectations and push inflation above the target more persistently. These factors suggest that the space to maintain monetary stimulus has continued to diminish, though monetary policy remains expansionary. 1.2 Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s board of directors (BDBR) in its meetings in December 2021 and January 2022 voted to continue normalizing monetary policy. The BDBR voted by a majority in these two meetings to increase the benchmark interest rate by 50 and 100 basis points, respectively, bringing the policy rate to 4.0%.

In the second quarter, annual inflation (9.67%), the technical staff’s projections and its expectations continued to increase, remaining above the target. International cost shocks, accentuated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more persistent than projected, thus contributing to higher inflation. The effects of indexation, higher than estimated excess demand, a tighter labor market, inflation expectations that continue to rise and currently exceed 3%, and the exchange rate pressures add to those described above. High core inflation measures as well as in the producer price index (PPI) across all baskets confirm a significant spread in price increases. Compared to estimates presented in April, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation increased. This was partly the result of greater exchange rate pressure on prices, and a larger output gap, which is expected to remain positive for the remainder of 2022 and which is estimated to close towards yearend 2023. In addition, these trends take into account higher inflation rate indexation, more persistent above-target inflation expectations, a quickening of domestic fuel price increases due to the correction of lags versus the parity price and higher international oil price forecasts. The forecast supposes a good domestic supply of perishable foods, although it also considers that international prices of processed foods will remain high. In terms of the goods sub-basket, the end of the national health emergency implies a reversal of the value-added tax (VAT) refund applied to health and personal hygiene products, resulting in increases in the prices of these goods. Alternatively, the monetary policy adjustment process and the moderation of external shocks would help inflation and its expectations to begin to decrease over time and resume their alignment with the target. Thus, the new projection suggests that inflation could remain high for the second half of 2022, closing at 9.7%. However, it would begin to fall during 2023, closing the year at 5.7%. These forecasts are subject to significant uncertainty, especially regarding the future behavior of external cost shocks, the degree of indexation of nominal contracts and decisions made regarding the domestic price of fuels. Economic activity continues to outperform expectations, and the technical staff’s growth projections for 2022 have been revised upwards from 5% to 6.9%. The new forecasts suggest higher output levels that would continue to exceed the economy’s productive capacity for the remainder of 2022. Economic growth during the first quarter was above that estimated in April, while economic activity indicators for the second quarter suggest that the GDP could be expected to remain high, potentially above that of the first quarter. Domestic demand is expected to maintain a positive dynamic, in particular, due to the household consumption quarterly growth, as suggested by vehicle registrations, retail sales, credit card purchases and consumer loan disbursement figures. A slowdown in the machinery and equipment imports from the levels observed in March contrasts with the positive performance of sales and housing construction licenses, which indicates an investment level similar to that registered for the first three months of the year. International trade data suggests the trade deficit would be reduced as a consequence of import levels that would be lesser than those observed in the first quarter, and stable export levels. For the remainder of the year and 2023, a deceleration in consumption is expected from the high levels seen during the first half of the year, partially as a result of lower repressed demand, tighter domestic financial conditions and household available income deterioration due to increased inflation. Investment is expected to continue its slow recovery while remaining below pre-pandemic levels. The trade deficit is expected to tighten due to projected lower domestic demand dynamics, and high prices of oil and other basic goods exported by the country. Given the above, economic growth in the second quarter of 2022 would be 11.5%, and for 2022 and 2023 an annual growth of 6.9% and 1.1% is expected, respectively. Currently, and for the remainder of 2022, the output gap would be positive and greater than that estimated in April, and prices would be affected by demand pressures. These projections continue to be affected by significant uncertainty associated with global political tensions, the expected adjustment of monetary policy in developed countries, external demand behavior, changes in country risk outlook, and the future developments in domestic fiscal policy, among others. The high inflation levels and respective expectations, which exceed the target of the world's main central banks, largely explain the observed and anticipated increase in their monetary policy interest rates. This environment has tempered the growth forecast for external demand. Disruptions in value chains, rising international food and energy prices, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to the rise in inflation and above-target expectations seen by several of Colombia’s main trading partners. These cost and price shocks, heightened by the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more prevalent than expected and have taken place within a set of output and employment recovery, variables that in some countries currently equal or exceed their projected long-term levels. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve accelerated the pace of the benchmark interest rate increase and rapidly reduced liquidity levels in the money market. Financial market actors expect this behavior to continue and, consequently, significantly increase their expectations of the average path of the Fed's benchmark interest rate. In this setting, the U.S. dollar appreciated versus the peso in the second quarter and emerging market risk measures increased, a behavior that intensified for Colombia. Given the aforementioned, for the remainder of 2022 and 2023, the Bank's technical staff increased the forecast trajectory for the Fed's interest rate and reduced the country's external demand growth forecast. The projected oil price was revised upward over the forecast horizon, specifically due to greater supply restrictions and the interruption of hydrocarbon trade between the European Union and Russia. Global geopolitical tensions, a tightening of monetary policy in developed economies, the increase in risk perception for emerging markets and the macroeconomic imbalances in the country explain the increase in the projected trajectory of the risk premium, its trend level and the neutral real interest rate1. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their consequent impact on the country's macroeconomic scenario remains high, given the unpredictable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, the degree of the global economic slowdown and the effect the response to recent outbreaks of the pandemic in some Asian countries may have on the world economy. This macroeconomic scenario that includes high inflation, inflation forecasts, and expectations above 3% and a positive output gap suggests the need for a contractionary monetary policy that mitigates the risk of the persistent unanchoring of inflation expectations. In contrast to the forecasts of the April report, the increase in the risk premium trend implies a higher neutral real interest rate and a greater prevailing monetary stimulus than previously estimated. For its part, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed and expected output level that exceeds the economy’s productive capacity. The surprising accelerations in the headline and core inflation reflect stronger and more persistent external shocks, which, in combination with the strength of aggregate demand, indexation, higher inflation expectations and exchange rate pressures, explain the upward projected inflation trajectory at levels that exceed the target over the next two years. This is corroborated by the inflation expectations of economic analysts and those derived from the public debt market, which continued to climb and currently exceed 3%. All of the above increase the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could generate widespread indexation processes that may push inflation away from the target for longer. This new macroeconomic scenario suggests that the interest rate adjustment should continue towards a contractionary monetary policy landscape. 1.2. Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR), at its meetings in June and July 2022, decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. At its June meeting, the BDBR decided to increase the monetary policy rate by 150 basis points (b.p.) and its July meeting by majority vote, on a 150 b.p. increase thereof at its July meeting. Consequently, the monetary policy interest rate currently stands at 9.0% . 1 The neutral real interest rate refers to the real interest rate level that is neither stimulative nor contractionary for aggregate demand and, therefore, does not generate pressures that lead to the close of the output gap. In a small, open economy like Colombia, this rate depends on the external neutral real interest rate, medium-term components of the country risk premium, and expected depreciation. Box 1: A Weekly Indicator of Economic Activity for Colombia Juan Pablo Cote Carlos Daniel Rojas Nicol Rodriguez Box 2: Common Inflationary Trends in Colombia Carlos D. Rojas-Martínez Nicolás Martínez-Cortés Franky Juliano Galeano-Ramírez Box 3: Shock Decomposition of 2021 Forecast Errors Nicolás Moreno Arias