Academic literature on the topic 'National Institutes of Health (U.S.). Office of Research on Women's Health'

The NrtR family of bacterial transcription factors is characterized by an N-terminal Nudix hydrolase-like effector binding domain and a C-terminal DNA binding domain. A bioinformatics analysis of the NrtR family represented by uncharacterized protein BT0354 in Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron suggests that these regulators control the catabolic pathways for L-arabinose. Many bacteria use L-arabinose as the sole source of carbon energy. The L-arabinose utilization pathway and its transcriptional regulation have been studied for a long time in several model microorganisms. Here we provide biochemical and structural characterization of the novel arabinose-responsive regulator of NrtR family protein BT0354, L-arabinose regulator from B. thetaiotaomicron (BtAraR). The BtAraR DNA binding and the role of effector molecule L-arabinose were confirmed using electrophoretic mobility shift assays. We have solved the crystal structures of BtAraR for two apo forms, and complexes with L-arabinose and double-stranded DNA target. The apo-1 form was solved as two dimers/AU in the R3 space group at 2.35 Å, while the apo-2 form was solved as one monomer/AU in the I213 space group at 2.56 Å resolution. The L-arabinose and DNA complex structures were solved as a dimer/AU in the P21 space group at 1.95 Å resolution and the P23 space group at 3.05 Å resolution, respectively. The biological unit of this protein is a dimer while the N-terminal ligand binding domain of the monomer adopts a Nudix hydrolase-like fold and the C-terminal DNA binding domain is a winged helix-turn-helix. The DNA binding-releasing mechanism can be rationalized through the comparison and analyses of these structures. The apo and DNA bound structures are more similar compared to the L-arabinose-bound structure. The r.m.s. deviation for the apo and DNA bound structures is 1.13 Å, while that for apo and the L-arabinose-bound structures is 4.54 Å. Details about the DNA binding mode, L-arabinose binding and L-arabinose induced structural change will be presented. This work was supported by National Institutes of Health grant GM094585 and by the U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Biological and Environmental Research, under contract DE-AC02-06CH11357.

Precise tuning of gene expression by transcriptional regulators determines the response to internal and external chemical signals and adjusts the metabolic machinery for many cellular processes. As a part of ongoing efforts by the Midwest Center for Structural Genomics, a number of transcription factors were selected to study protein-ligand and protein-DNA interactions. HcaR, a new member of the MarR/SlyA family of transcription regulators from soil bacteria Acinetobacter sp. ADP1, is an evolutionarily atypical regulator and represses hydroxycinnamate (hca) catabolic genes. Hydroxycinnamates containing an aromatic ring play diverse, critical roles in plant architecture and defense. HcaR regulates the expression of the hca catabolic operon, allowing this and related bacterial strains to utilize hydroxycinnamates: ferulate, p-coumarate, and caffeate as sole sources of carbon and energy. HcaR appears to be capable of responding to multiple aromatic ligands. These aromatic compounds bind to HcaR and reduce its affinity to the specific DNA sites. As a result, the transcription of genes encoding several catabolic enzymes is up-regulated. The HcaR structures of the apo-form and in a complex with several ligands: ferulic acid, 3,4 dihydroxybenzoic acid, vanillin and p-coumaric acid have been determined to understand how HcaR accommodates various aromatic compounds using the same binding pocket. We also have identified a potential DNA site for HcaR in the regulatory region upstream of the genes of the hca catabolic operon in Acinetobacter sp. ADP1 and have confirmed DNA binding by EMSA. The co-crystal structure of HcaR and palindromic 24-mer DNA has been determined for this DNA site. The crystal structures of HcaR, the apo-form, ligand-bound forms, and the specific DNA-bound form provide critical structural basis of protein-ligand (substrates or product) and protein-DNA interactions to understand the regulation of the expression of hydroxycinnamate (hca) catabolic genes. Our studies allow for better understanding of DNA-binding and regulation by this important group of transcription factors belonging to the MarR/SlyA families. This work was supported by National Institutes of Health grant GM094585 and by the U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Biological and Environmental Research, under contract DE-AC02-06CH11357.

The UP Manila Health Policy Development Hub recognizes the invaluable contribution of the participants in theseries of roundtable discussions listed below: RTD: Beyond Hospital Beds: Equity,quality, and service1. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, UP Manila2. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, UP Manila3. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, UP Manila4. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, UP Manila HealthPolicy Development Hub; Director, Institute of HealthPolicy and Development Studies, University of thePhilippines Manila5. Irma L. Asuncion, MHA, CESO III, Director IV,Bureau of Local Health Systems Development,Department of Health6. Renely Pangilinan-Tungol, MD, CFP, MPM-HSD,Municipal Health Officer, San Fernando, Pampanga7. Salome F. Arinduque, MD, Galing-Pook AwardeeRepresentative, Municipal Health Officer, San Felipe,Zambales8. Carmelita C. Canila, MD, MPH, Faculty, College ofPublic Health, University of the Philippines Manila9. Lester M. Tan, MD, MPH, Division Chief, Bureau ofLocal Health System Development, Department ofHealth10. Anthony Rosendo G. Faraon, MD, Vice President,Zuellig Family Foundation (ZFF)11. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization12. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, MD, FPSO-HNS, AssociateDirector, Medical and Regulatory Affairs, AsianHospital and Medical Center13. Christian Edward L. Nuevo, Health Policy and SystemsResearch Fellow, Health Policy Development andPlanning Bureau, Department of Health14. Paolo Victor N. Medina, MD, Assistant Professor 4,College of Medicine, University of the PhilippinesManila15. Jose Rafael A. Marfori, MD, Special Assistant to theDirector, Philippine General Hospital16. Maria Teresa U. Bagaman, Committee Chair, PhilippineSociety for Quality, Inc.17. Maria Theresa G. Vera, MSc, MHA, CESO III, DirectorIV, Health Facility Development Bureau, Departmentof Health18. Ana Melissa F. Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean for Planning & Development, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila19. Fevi Rose C. Paro, Faculty, Department of Communityand Environmental Resource Planning, University ofthe Philippines Los Baños20. Maria Rosa C. Abad, MD, Medical Specialist III,Standard Development Division, Health Facilities andServices Regulation21. Yolanda R. Robles, RPh, PhD, Faculty, College ofPharmacy, University of the Philippines Manila22. Jaya P. Ebuen, RN, Development Manager Officer,CHDMM, Department of Health23. Josephine E. Cariaso, MA, RN, Assistant Professor,College of Nursing, University of the Philippines Manila24. Diana Van Daele, Programme Manager, CooperationSection, European Union25. Maria Paz de Sagun, Project Management Specialist,USAID26. Christopher Muñoz, Member, Yellow Warriors SocietyPhilippinesRTD: Health services and financingroles: Population based- andindividual-based1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the PhilippinesManila5. Mario C. Villaverde, Undersecretary, Health Policyand Development Systems and Development Team,Department of Health6. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan, MD, Former Secretary, Department of Health7. Marvin C. Galvez, MD, OIC Division Chief, BenefitsDevelopment and Research Department, PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation8. Alvin B. Caballes, MD, MPE, MPP, Faculty, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila9. Carlos D. Da Silva, Executive Director, Association ofMunicipal Health Maintenance Organization of thePhilippines, Inc.10. Anthony Rosendo G. Faraon, MD, Vice President,Zuellig Family Foundation (ZFF) 11. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization12. Salome F. Arinduque, MD, Galing-Pook AwardeeRepresentative, Municipal Health Officer, San Felipe,Zambales13. Michael Ralph M. Abrigo, PhD, Research Fellow,Philippine Institute for Developmental Studies14. Oscar D. Tinio, MD, Committee Chair, Legislation,Philippine Medical Association15. Rogelio V. Dazo, Jr., MD, FPCOM, Legislation,Philippine Medical Association16. Ligaya V. Catadman, MM, Officer-in-charge, HealthPolicy Development and Planning Bureau, Department of Health17. Maria Fatima Garcia-Lorenzo, President, PhilippineAlliance of Patients Organization18. Tomasito P. Javate, Jr, Supervising Economic DevelopmentSpecialist, Health Nutrition and Population Division,National Economic and Development Authority19. Josefina Isidro-Lapena, MD, National Board ofDirector, Philippine Academy of Family Physicians20. Maria Eliza Ruiz-Aguila, MPhty, PhD, Dean, Collegeof Allied Medical Professions, University of thePhilippines Manila21. Ana Melissa F. Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean for Planning & Development, College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines Manila22. Maria Paz P. Corrales, MD, MHA, MPA, Director III,Department of Health-National Capital Region23. Karin Estepa Garcia, MD, Executive Secretary, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians24. Adeline A. Mesina, MD, Medical Specialist III,Philippine Health Insurance Corporation25. Glorey Ann P. Alde, RN, MPH, Research Fellow,Department of HealthRTD: Moving towards provincelevel integration throughUniversal Health Care Act1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the PhilippinesManila5. Mario C. Villaverde, Undersecretary of Health, HealthPolicy and Development Systems and DevelopmentTeam, Department of Health6. Ferdinand A. Pecson, Undersecretary and ExecutiveDirector, Public Private Partnership Center7. Rosanna M. Buccahan, MD, Provincial Health Officer,Bataan Provincial Office8. Lester M. Tan, MD, Division Chief, Bureau of LocalHealth System Development, Department of Health9. Ernesto O. Domingo, MD, FPCP, FPSF, FormerChancellor, University of the Philippines Manila10. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization11. Leslie Ann L. Luces, MD, Provincial Health Officer,Aklan12. Rene C. Catan, MD, Provincial Health Officer, Cebu13. Anthony Rosendo G. Faraon, MD, Vice President,Zuellig Family Foundation14. Jose Rafael A. Marfori, MD, Special Assistant to theDirector, Philippine General Hospital15. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, MD, FPSO-HNS, Consultant,Asian Hospital and Medical Center16. Ramon Paterno, MD, Member, Universal Health CareStudy Group, University of the Philippines Manila17. Mayor Eunice U. Babalcon, Mayor, Paranas, Samar18. Zorayda E. Leopando, MD, Former President,Philippine Academy of Family Physicians19. Madeleine de Rosas-Valera, MD, MScIH, SeniorTechnical Consultant, World Bank20. Arlene C. Sebastian, MD, Municipal Health Officer,Sta. Monica, Siargao Island, Mindanao21. Rizza Majella L. Herrera, MD, Acting Senior Manager,Accreditation Department, Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation22. Alvin B. Caballes, MD, MPE, MPP, Faculty, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila23. Pres. Policarpio B. Joves, MD, MPH, MOH, FPAFP,President, Philippine Academy of Family Physicians24. Leilanie A. Nicodemus, MD, Board of Director,Philippine Academy of Family Physicians25. Maria Paz P. Corrales, MD, MHA, MPA, Director III,National Capital Region Office, Department of Health26. Dir. Irma L. Asuncion, MD, MHA, CESO III, DirectorIV, Bureau of Local Health Systems Development,Department of Health27. Bernard B. Argamosa, MD, Mental Health Representative, National Center for Mental Health28. Flerida Chan, Chief, Poverty Reduction Section, JapanInternational Cooperation Agency29. Raul R. Alamis, Chief Health Program Officer, ServiceDelivery Network, Department of Health30. Mary Anne Milliscent B. Castro, Supervising HealthProgram Officer, Department of Health 31. Marikris Florenz N. Garcia, Project Manager, PublicPrivate Partnership Center32. Mary Grace G. Darunday, Supervising Budget andManagement Specialist, Budget and Management Bureaufor the Human Development Sector, Department ofBudget and Management33. Belinda Cater, Senior Budget and Management Specialist,Department of Budget and Management34. Sheryl N. Macalipay, LGU Officer IV, Bureau of LocalGovernment and Development, Department of Interiorand Local Government35. Kristel Faye M. Roderos, OTRP, Representative,College of Allied Medical Professions, University ofthe Philippines Manila36. Jeffrey I. Manalo, Director III, Policy Formulation,Project Evaluation and Monitoring Service, PublicPrivate Partnership Center37. Atty. Phebean Belle A. Ramos-Lacuna, Division Chief,Policy Formulation Division, Public Private PartnershipCenter38. Ricardo Benjamin D. Osorio, Planning Officer, PolicyFormulation, Project Evaluation and MonitoringService, Public Private Partnership Center39. Gladys Rabacal, Program Officer, Japan InternationalCooperation Agency40. Michael Angelo Baluyot, Nurse, Bataan Provincial Office41. Jonna Jane Javier Austria, Nurse, Bataan Provincial Office42. Heidee Buenaventura, MD, Associate Director, ZuelligFamily Foundation43. Dominique L. Monido, Policy Associate, Zuellig FamilyFoundation44. Rosa Nene De Lima-Estellana, RN, MD, Medical OfficerIII, Department of Interior and Local Government45. Ma Lourdes Sangalang-Yap, MD, FPCR, Medical OfficerIV, Department of Interior and Local Government46. Ana Melissa F. Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean for Planning & Development, College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines Manila47. Colleen T. Francisco, Representative, Department ofBudget and Management48. Kristine Galamgam, Representative, Department ofHealth49. Fides S. Basco, Officer-in-charge, Chief Budget andManagement Specialist, Development of Budget andManagementRTD: Health financing: Co-paymentsand Personnel1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the Philippines Manila5. Ernesto O. Domingo, MD, Professor Emeritus,University of the Philippines Manila6. Irma L. Asuncion, MHA, CESO III, Director IV,Bureau of Local Health Systems Development,Department of Health7. Lester M. Tan, MD, MPH, Division Chief, Bureau ofLocal Health System Development, Department ofHealth8. Marvin C. Galvez, MD, OIC Division Chief, BenefitsDevelopment and Research Department, PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation9. Adeline A. Mesina, MD, Medical Specialist III, BenefitsDepartment and Research Department, PhilippineHealth Insurance Corporation10. Carlos D. Da Silva, Executive Director, Association ofHealth Maintenance Organization of the Philippines,Inc.11. Ma. Margarita Lat-Luna, MD, Deputy Director, FiscalServices, Philippine General Hospital12. Waldemar V. Galindo, MD, Chief of Clinics, Ospital ngMaynila13. Albert Francis E. Domingo, MD, Consultant, HealthSystem strengthening through Public Policy andRegulation, World Health Organization14. Rogelio V. Dazo, Jr., MD, Member, Commission onLegislation, Philippine Medical Association15. Aileen R. Espina, MD, Board Member, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians16. Anthony R. Faraon, MD, Vice President, Zuellig FamilyFoundation17. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, Associate Director, Medical andRegulatory Affairs, Asian Hospital and Medical Center18. Jared Martin Clarianes, Technical Officer, Union of LocalAuthorities of the Philippines19. Leslie Ann L. Luces, MD, Provincial Health Officer,Aklan20. Rosa Nene De Lima-Estellana, MD, Medical OfficerIII, Department of the Interior and Local Government21. Ma. Lourdes Sangalang-Yap, MD, Medical Officer V,Department of the Interior and Local Government 22. Dominique L. Monido, Policy Associate, Zuellig FamilyFoundation23. Krisch Trine D. Ramos, MD, Medical Officer, PhilippineCharity Sweepstakes Office24. Larry R. Cedro, MD, Assistant General Manager, CharitySector, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office25. Margarita V. Hing, Officer in Charge, ManagementDivision, Financial Management Service Sector,Department of Health26. Dr. Carlo Irwin Panelo, Associate Professor, College ofMedicine, University of the Philippines Manila27. Dr. Angelita V. Larin, Faculty, College of Public Health,University of the Philippines Manila28. Dr. Abdel Jeffri A. Abdulla, Chair, RegionalizationProgram, University of the Philippines Manila29. Christopher S. Muñoz, Member, Philippine Alliance ofPatients Organization30. Gemma R. Macatangay, LGOO V, Department ofInterior and Local Government – Bureau of LocalGovernment Development31. Dr. Narisa Portia J. Sugay, Acting Vice President, QualityAssurance Group, Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation32. Maria Eliza R. Aguila, Dean, College of Allied MedicalProfessions, University of the Philippines Manila33. Angeli A. Comia, Manager, Zuellig Family Foundation34. Leo Alcantara, Union of Local Authorities of thePhilippines35. Dr. Zorayda E. Leopando, Former President, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians36. Dr. Emerito Jose Faraon, Faculty, College of PublicHealth, University of the Philippines Manila37. Dr. Carmelita C. Canila, Faculty, College of PublicHealth, University of the Philippines ManilaRTD: Moving towards third partyaccreditation for health facilities1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD,Faculty, College of Public Health, University of thePhilippines Manila3. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, Dean,College of Arts and Sciences, University of thePhilippines Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, MM, Faculty,College of Dentistry, University of the PhilippinesManila5. Rizza Majella L. Herrera, MD, Acting SeniorManager, Accreditation Department, Philippine HealthInsurance Corporation6. Bernadette C. Hogar-Manlapat, MD, FPBA, FPSA,FPSQua, MMPA, President and Board of Trustee,Philippine Society for Quality in Healthcare, Inc.7. Waldemar V. Galindo, MD, Chief of Clinics, Ospital ngMaynila8. Amor. F. Lahoz, Division Chief, Promotion andDocumentation Division, Department of Trade andIndustry – Philippine Accreditation Bureau9. Jenebert P. Opinion, Development Specialist, Department of Trade and Industry – Philippine AccreditationBureau10. Maria Linda G. Buhat, President, Association ofNursing Service Administrators of the Philippines, Inc.11. Bernardino A. Vicente, MD, FPPA, MHA, CESOIV, President, Philippine Tripartite Accreditation forHealth Facilities, Inc.12. Atty. Bu C. Castro, MD, Board Member, PhilippineHospital Association13. Cristina Lagao-Caalim, RN, MAN, MHA, ImmediatePast President and Board of Trustee, Philippine Societyfor Quality in Healthcare, Inc.14. Manuel E. Villegas Jr., MD, Vice Treasurer and Board ofTrustee, Philippine Society for Quality in Healthcare,Inc.15. Michelle A. Arban, Treasurer and Board of Trustee,Philippine Society for Quality in Healthcare, Inc.16. Joselito R. Chavez, MD, FPCP, FPCCP, FACCP,CESE, Deputy Executive Director, Medical Services,National Kidney and Transplant Institute17. Blesilda A. Gutierrez, CPA, MBA, Deputy ExecutiveDirector, Administrative Services, National Kidney andTransplant Institute18. Eulalia C. Magpusao, MD, Associate Director, Qualityand Patient Safety, St. Luke’s Medical Centre GlobalCity19. Clemencia D. Bondoc, MD, Auditor, Association ofMunicipal Health Officers of the Philippines20. Jesus Randy O. Cañal, MD, FPSO-HNS, AssociateDirector, Medical and Regulatory Affairs, Asian Hospitaland Medical Center21. Maria Fatima Garcia-Lorenzo, President, PhilippineAlliance of Patient Organizations22. Leilanie A. Nicodemus, MD, Board of Directors,Philippine Academy of Family Physicians23. Policarpio B. Joves Jr., MD, President, PhilippineAcademy of Family Physicians24. Kristel Faye Roderos, Faculty, College of Allied MedicalProfessions, University of the Philippines Manila25. Ana Melissa Hilvano-Cabungcal, MD, AssistantAssociate Dean, College of Medicine, University of thePhilippines Manila26. Christopher Malorre Calaquian, MD, Faculty, Collegeof Medicine, University of the Philippines Manila27. Emerito Jose C. Faraon, MD, Faculty, College ofPublic Health, University of the Philippines Manila 28. Carmelita Canila, Faculty, College of Public Health,University of the Philippines Manila29. Oscar D. Tinio, MD, Representative, Philippine MedicalAssociation30. Farrah Rocamora, Member, Philippine Society forQuality in Healthcare, IncRTD: RA 11036 (Mental Health Act):Addressing Mental Health Needs ofOverseas Filipino Workers1. Hilton Y. Lam, MHA, PhD, Chair, University of thePhilippines Manila Health Policy Development Hub;Director, Institute of Health Policy and DevelopmentStudies, University of the Philippines Manila2. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., MCD, MPH, PhD, UPManila Health Policy Development Hub; College ofArts and Sciences, UP Manila3. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, MPAf, MSPPM, PhD, UPManila Health Policy Development Hub; College ofPublic Health, UP Manila4. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, DDM, UP ManilaHealth Policy Development Hub; College of Dentistry,UP Manila5. Frances Prescilla L. Cuevas, RN, MAN, Director,Essential Non-Communicable Diseases Division,Department of Health6. Maria Teresa D. De los Santos, Workers Education andMonitoring Division, Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration7. Andrelyn R. Gregorio, Policy Program and Development Office,Overseas Workers Welfare Administration8. Sally D. Bongalonta, MA, Institute of Family Life &Children Studies, Philippine Women’s University9. Consul Ferdinand P. Flores, Department of ForeignAffairs10. Jerome Alcantara, BLAS OPLE Policy Center andTraining Institute11. Andrea Luisa C. Anolin, Commission on FilipinoOverseas12. Bernard B. Argamosa, MD, DSBPP, National Centerfor Mental Health13. Agnes Joy L. Casino, MD, DSBPP, National Centerfor Mental Health14. Ryan Roberto E. Delos Reyes, Employment Promotionand Workers Welfare Division, Department of Laborand Employment15. Sheralee Bondad, Legal and International AffairsCluster, Department of Labor and Employment16. Rhodora A. Abano, Center for Migrant Advocacy17. Nina Evita Q. Guzman, Ugnayan at Tulong para saMaralitang Pamilya (UGAT) Foundation, Inc.18. Katrina S. Ching, Ugnayan at Tulong para sa MaralitangPamilya (UGAT) Foundation, Inc.RTD: (Bitter) Sweet Smile of Filipinos1. Dr. Hilton Y. Lam, Institute of Health Policy andDevelopment Studies, NIH2. Dr. Leonardo R. Estacio, Jr., College of Arts andSciences, UP Manila3. Dr. Ma. Esmeralda C. Silva, College of Public Health,UP Manila4. Dr. Michael Antonio F. Mendoza, College of Dentistry,UP Manila5. Dr. Ma. Susan T. Yanga-Mabunga, Department ofHealth Policy & Administration, UP Manila6. Dr. Danilo L. Magtanong, College of Dentistry, UPManila7. Dr. Alvin Munoz Laxamana, Philippine DentalAssociation8. Dr. Fina Lopez, Philippine Pediatric Dental Society, Inc9. Dr. Artemio Licos, Jr.,Department of Health NationalAssociation of Dentists10. Dr. Maria Jona D. Godoy, Professional RegulationCommission11. Ms. Anna Liza De Leon, Philippine Health InsuranceCorporation12. Ms. Nicole Sigmuend, GIZ Fit for School13. Ms. Lita Orbillo, Disease Prevention and Control Bureau14. Mr. Raymond Oxcena Akap sa Bata Philippines15. Dr. Jessica Rebueno-Santos, Department of CommunityDentistry, UP Manila16. Ms. Maria Olivine M. Contreras, Bureau of LocalGovernment Supervision, DILG17. Ms. Janel Christine Mendoza, Philippine DentalStudents Association18. Mr. Eric Raymund Yu, UP College of DentistryStudent Council19. Dr. Joy Memorando, Philippine Pediatric Society20. Dr. Sharon Alvarez, Philippine Association of DentalColleges

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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