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1

Jancic, Davor. "The French Parliament: A European Scrutineer or National Actor?" European Public Law 19, Issue 1 (March 1, 2013): 129–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2013007.

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With the Treaty of Lisbon in force, the expectation for national parliaments to democratize EU decision making has risen tangibly. This raises the question of the relationship between them and the European Parliament, as two channels of EU legitimation. The main argument of this article is that, in circumstances of high political salience of EU initiatives, national parliaments can be deemed to be European actors, performing their constitutional functions within a broader EU legal order as direct counterparts of EU institutions. To demonstrate this, we delve into the French Parliament's scrutiny of the Services Directive and the European External Action Service Decision, both of which have sparked strong reactions in many parliamentary corners of Europe. We focus on the role perceptions of the French MPs and senators in their ex ante monitoring of these two dossiers. The analysis reveals that political control is not always directed only at the Government, but that EU institutions can be addressees of national parliamentary scrutiny.
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2

Dominioni, Goran, Alberto Quintavalla, and Alessandro Romano. "Trust spillovers among national and European institutions." European Union Politics 21, no. 2 (January 17, 2020): 276–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116519897835.

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In this article, we study spillovers in political trust between the national parliaments of 15 Member States and the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the period 2000–2015. We show that in most instances spillovers between the national parliaments and the European Commission and the European Parliament are bidirectional, asymmetric, and change over time and place. A corollary of these findings is that simultaneously achieving high level of trust in institutions at different levels of governance may require a deeper understanding of the complex inter-institutional relationships that exist in the EU multilevel governance setting.
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3

Jensen, Mads Dagnis, and Dorte Martinsen. "Out of Time? National Parliaments and Early Decision-Making in the European Union." Government and Opposition 50, no. 2 (August 7, 2014): 240–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.20.

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Co-decisions between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are increasingly adopted as early agreements. Recent EU studies have pinpointed how this informal turn in EU governance has altered the existing balance of power between EU actors and within EU institutions. However, the implications of accelerated EU decision-making are expected to have repercussions beyond the EU system and in other institutions impinging on the role of national parliaments. This study examines the implications of an alteration of EU political time on national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize their executives in EU affairs. A mixed method approach has been applied. This strategy combines survey data on national parliaments’ scrutiny process and response to early agreements for 26 EU countries with a case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark, the UK and Germany. The burgeoning research agenda on EU timescapes is applied. This study finds that the clocks of most national parliaments are out of time with the EU decision-mode of early agreements, which severely hampers the national parliaments’ ability to scrutinize national governments.
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Czachór, Zbigniew, and Janusz Ruszkowski. "Proces wzmacniania kompetencji Parlamentu Europejskiego a nowa pozycja parlamentów narodowych w systemie politycznym Unii Europejskiej." Przegląd Sejmowy 5(166) (2021): 9–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.31268/ps.2021.58.

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The authors attempt to examine two parallel and often treated as incomplete processes of strengthening the competences of the European Parliament and at the same time defining a place of national parliaments of Member States in the political system of the EU. The parallelism of these phenomena may seem paradoxical, since it can be assumed that despite competency competition between the EP and the national parliaments, strengthening the competences of the former does not preclude maximising the competences of the latter. The system of unification and harmonisation present in the European Union does not have to weaken national parliaments. The more so that the parliaments of the Member States try to neutralise the autonomy of EU institutions, which “appropriate” their current field of play. The analysis was made based on a research sample consisting of methods for strengthening the EP and methods for maximising the parliaments of the Member States.
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5

Louis, Jean-Victor. "The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish ‘No’.: National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity – Legal Options and Practical Limits." European Constitutional Law Review 4, no. 3 (October 2008): 429–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s157401960800429x.

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Winner: national parliaments or European Parliament? – Differences between Lisbon Treaty and Constitutional Treaty – Latent rivalry – Lisbon innovation – National parliaments now actors in the Union? – Early warning mechanism as solution of compromise – Dual system of the two protocols: yellow and orange cards – Review – Compliance – Interparliamentary co-operation – Complexity of COSAC's involvement – Link between proportionality and subsidiarity – Conception of representative democracy – Position of the Court of Justice
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6

Neunreither, Karlheinz. "The European Parliament and National Parliaments: Conflict or cooperation?" Journal of Legislative Studies 11, no. 3-4 (October 2005): 466–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330500273802.

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7

Perkowski, Maciej, and Jakub A. Farhan. "Strengthening the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union – What for and How?" Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 59, no. 1 (September 1, 2019): 123–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2019-0033.

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Abstract In the debate on the European Union’s problems, the concept of “democracy deficit” has been present from its very beginning. This term is applied in a quite vast manner and, apart from the asymmetry of the relation between the European Parliament and the Council, it also concerns the overly limited role of national parliaments in the European Union. In this regard, inadequacy in the national position of individual parliaments is observed. On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasise their uneven activity on their European aspirations. At the time when the European dispute on the rule of law in Poland has polarized attitudes and language in statements on both sides – despite irresponsible trends – it is worth to examine the participation of national parliaments (including the Polish parliament) in the European inter-parliamentary dialogue and, consequently, to determine whether and how its constructive impact on the European Union and its law functions.
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8

Öberg, Jacob. "National Parliaments and Political Control of EU Competences: A Sufficient Safeguard of Federalism?" European Public Law 24, Issue 4 (December 1, 2018): 695–731. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2018040.

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It is clear that the formal inclusion of the national parliament as a political actor within the EU decision-making process has been one of the most important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. Their role, however, remains controversial. It is on the one hand disputed whether national parliaments enjoy sufficient powers to tame ‘competence creep’. On the other hand, it is contested to what extent it is desirable that they should become involved as a legislative actor in the EU’s decision-making procedure. This essay contributes to these debates by critically examining to what extent national parliaments can contribute to the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle. The article contends that national parliaments by having taken a too expansive view of their remit under Protocol No 2 appears to have ‘misunderstood’ their role within the EU- decision making procedure. Notwithstanding this, it is sustained that national parliaments could, in the absence of other trustworthy safeguards of federalism, be seen as a promising avenue for legitimate political control of the exercise of EU competences
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9

Esentürk, N. Nevra. "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Role of the TGNA: Cases of Syria (and Iraq) Motions." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 44, no. 1 (February 2019): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0304375419844634.

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The study aims to explore the role of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Turkish foreign policy with respect to the cases of the Syria (and Iraq) motions. In the academic literature, there is considerable research arguing that parliaments do not influence parliamentary democracies’ foreign policies. However, the existing literature does not provide examples or case studies that go beyond the limited role of legislatures in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Parliaments, as the primary institutions for representative and participatory democracy, have limited but complementary role(s) in foreign policy, even under the circumstances where it is least likely for the parliaments to have influence on foreign policy affairs. Turkey’s decisions on the Syria (and Iraq) motions illustrate how parliament can play complementary roles in foreign affairs, which is significant in the effective functioning of the foreign policy decision. What are the specific effects of the complementary role of the parliament? What is the position of the political opposition, intraparty dynamics, and public opinion in the parliament’s playing that role? To elaborate on these questions, primary data are gathered from the proceedings of the TGNA during plenary sessions (covering the 24th, 25th, and 26th parliaments) to examine the deliberations and positions of political parties voting on the motions. In addition, the domestic context in the related terms is examined, elaborating on the state of political parties in the TGNA, single party, and intraparty dynamics. The primary data are supported by interviews. The findings of the study give significant insights that go beyond the limited role of parliaments in foreign policy and explore the complementary role of the legislature in foreign policy in terms of parliamentary legitimacy and the parliament as a venue for the opposition.
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10

Maurer, Andreas. "The European Parliament, the national parliaments and the EU Conventions." Politique européenne 9, no. 1 (2003): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/poeu.009.0076.

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11

Neuhold, Christine, and Guri Rosén. "Introduction to “Out of the Shadows, Into the Limelight: Parliaments and Politicisation”." Politics and Governance 7, no. 3 (September 27, 2019): 220–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i3.2443.

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The Lisbon Treaty gave the European Parliament extensive new powers and its consent is now required for the vast majority of EU international agreements. At the same time, national parliaments—and even regional ones—are increasingly asserting their powers over areas of European governance that were traditionally dominated by the executive. Exerting influence and conducting oversight is time-consuming, however. Particularly at the EU-level parliaments cannot influence or scrutinise every policy dossier with equal rigour. A key factor directing parliamentary attention seems to be the ‘politicisation’ of an issue. In other words, the amount of contestation and attention given to a particular issue seems to affect parliamentary activity. This thematic issue seeks to assess <em>how</em> politicisation affects the role parliaments play within the system of EU governance. In particular, the contributions aim to answer the over-arching question of whether politicisation has an impact on how parliaments seek to influence policy-making and hold the EU executives to account. Furthermore, we raise the question of whether and how politicisation affects the role of parliaments as arenas for contestation and communication of different political interests. Jointly, the findings provide the empirical foundations for a more comprehensive debate regarding the democratic implications of politicisation. Politicisation puts pressure on parliaments to act, but parliamentarians themselves may also find it in their interest to instigate contestation. This thematic issue addresses these questions by shedding light on both the European Parliament and national parliaments and examines different policy-fields reaching from climate change and trade, to financial affairs and the Common Fisheries Policy.
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12

Strezhneva, M. "The Role of National Parliaments in Governing the European Union." World Economy and International Relations, no. 1 (2015): 52–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2015-1-52-62.

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Institutional structures and decision-making processes, which have been established in the European Union, fall beyond the scope of national rules for the functioning of parliamentary government. National parliaments of the EU member states have not succeeded in acquiring solid positions in the multilevel constellation within the Union. Yet nowadays they are assigned an important mission in their efforts to overcome, alongside the European Parliament (EP), the growing democratic deficit at both the European and national levels. The article is meant to assess the potential of national parliaments in capitalizing on the Lisbon Treaty provisions and on new forms of their engagement with supranational institutions (the European Council, the European Commission and the EP in particular), aimed at enhancing their legitimizing influence. General paradigm for the analysis is determined by the multilevel governance concept (MLG). It allows for a picture of European decision-making, which is shared by actors placed at different levels of the governance structure. National parliaments are supposed to be provided with multiple access points to the political process in the European Union as well. But the MLG vision doesn't contradict the fact that the key role within the EU belongs to those who occupy the highest executive power positions at the national level. Three directions for the national parliaments to intensify their involvement are put into spotlight: parliamentary control over national executives; control of compliance with the subsidiarity principle in European legislative proposals and supranational decisions; political dialogue with the European Commission and interparliamentary cooperation. The analysis proves that conditions are ripe for more active stance of national parliaments in the EU affairs. The “system of early warning” of the subsidiarity principle violations, provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, seems most promising. But national parliaments themselves will still have to demonstrate more persistence when using new instruments. Acknowledgment. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Foundation for Humanities (RFH). Project № 14-07-00050.
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13

Stockemer, Daniel, and Aksel Sundström. "Age representation in parliaments: Can institutions pave the way for the young?" European Political Science Review 10, no. 3 (March 19, 2018): 467–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773918000048.

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Middle-aged to senior men of the ethnic majority and higher income groups are generally overrepresented in parliaments. While research on group representation has examined issues of gender, economic standing, and, more recently, ethnicity, few studies examine age groups. We argue that the design of political institutions influences the share of young adults in parliaments across nations and hypothesize that the electoral system type, age candidacy requirements, and quotas influence the share of younger deputies in national parliaments. Analyzing an original data set with a global cross-national sample, we find that proportional representation and giving candidates the right to stand in elections as early as possible (i.e. at the age of 18) matter. In contrast, quota provisions for youths are currently too selectively applied to increase the percentage of young deputies in parliament.
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14

Meissner, Katharina Luise. "Brexit under Scrutiny in EU Member States: What Role for National Parliaments in Austria and Germany?" Politics and Governance 7, no. 3 (September 27, 2019): 279–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i3.2007.

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Among national parliaments (NPs) in the EU, the Austrian Nationalrat and the German Bundestag stand out as strong legislatures in EU affairs. Both parliaments have used their rights to great extent in recent EU negotiations on international agreements such as the one with Canada on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Yet, in the negotiations with the UK their involvement varies. Why is this so? Scholarly work on Brexit so far focused on the European Parliament or the UK parliament, while attention to NPs in the EU27 is scarce. This article fills this void in research by tracing the Austrian and German parliaments’ activities in the Brexit negotiations. Despite similar institutional strength I find that the German Bundestag is more extensively involved, particularly on an informal level, compared to the Austrian Nationalrat. The reason for this is Brexit’s varying saliency in these two countries given their different levels of exposure to the UK’s withdrawal. As saliency of a policy issue is considered a major explanatory factor for why NPs engage in EU affairs, the results of this article confirm this expectation within the realm of EU international negotiations.
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15

Papier, Hans Jürgen. "The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish ‘No’.: Europe's New Realism: The Treaty of Lisbon." European Constitutional Law Review 4, no. 3 (October 2008): 421–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019608004215.

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Institutional reforms – The principle of democracy: the European Parliament and the national parliaments – Bypassing unpleasant national debates by taking the European route – Reinforcement of protection of the subsidiarity principle: most valuable reform – Doubts on the effectiveness – Crucial weakness: creeping transfers of competences still possible
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16

Raunio, Tapio. "Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union." Government and Opposition 34, no. 2 (April 1999): 180–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1999.tb00477.x.

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NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ARE CENTRAL ACTORS IN THE SCRUTINY AND implementation of European Union (EU) legislation. Member state legislatures provide a channel for incorporating public opinion into the governance of the Union. Their importance has become more evident during the 1990s as debate has focused on the democratic deficit and deparliamentarization of European governance.National parliaments are involved in EU decision-making in three ways: they 1) participate in national policy formulation on Union legislation; 2) monitor the behaviour of member state representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Council; and 3) have functions specifically regulated in the treaties, such as ratification of treaty amendments and implementation of directives. The third function differs from the first two as the treaties impose rights and duties on the national parliaments, whereas there is no EU law on national policy formulation on Union legislation or on the scrutiny of ministers. During the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (ICC) the member states saw no need for such European-level regulation. Thus it is up to each national parliament – within the limits set by member state constitutions and other constraints – to decide how it deals with the challenges brought by EU membership.
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17

Kreilinger, Valentin. "From procedural disagreement to joint scrutiny? The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance." Perspectives on Federalism 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 155–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pof-2018-0035.

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Abstract The provision of Article 13 TSCG to create an Interparliamentary Conference was the starting point for long discussions after which national parliaments and the European Parliament eventually reached a compromise. This article pursues a two-fold objective: It first examines the different phases of interparliamentary negotiations from 2012 to 2015. On the basis of a distinction between three competing models for interparliamentary cooperation, the article shows that the two models of EP-led scrutiny and creating a collective parliamentary counterweight did not prevail: Parliaments agreed that the new Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (SECG) would follow the ‘standard’ interparliamentary conference (COSAC model). In terms of national parliaments’ actual participation, the lowest common denominator compromise has not changed the numbers of participating MPs: Attendance records are stable over time, the size of national delegations continues to vary and participating MPs are still twice as likely to be members of Budget or Finance committees than to be members of European affairs committees.
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18

Judge, David. "The failure of national parliaments?" West European Politics 18, no. 3 (July 1995): 79–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402389508425092.

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19

Hofmann, Herwig C. H. "Parliamentary Representation in Europe's System of Multi-Layer Constitutions: A Case Study of Germany." Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 10, no. 1 (March 2003): 39–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1023263x0301000103.

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This article uses a case study of Germany to analyse conditions for the participation of national and sub-national parliaments in the EU system of multi-layered parliamentarism. The analysis illustrates that national and sub-national parliaments can enhance their roles in policy formulation and implementation in EU affairs by creating structures of close cooperation and networking – vertically, between parliaments of different levels (European, national, subnational), and horizontally, between the national and sub-national parliaments. Even without a direct representation of national parliamentarians in European decision making on the EU level, national and sub-national parliaments have ways of influencing and controlling the European policy process and thereby adding to the legitimacy of European governance.
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20

Schade, Daniel. "Parlamentarische Kontrolle durch Vernetzung? Eine kritische Analyse der Rolle der Interparlamentarischen Konferenz für die GASP/GSVP." integration 42, no. 2 (2019): 118–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0720-5120-2019-2-118.

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The Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (IPC) is a new parliamentary body set up after the Treaty of Lisbon which allows to create interlinkages between parliaments in the European Union (EU). It is part of an ongoing process which aims to challenge the executive dominance in EU policy-making in general and in the EU’s foreign and security policy in particular. Considering its sessions and the experiences of members of parliaments partaking in the Interparliamentary Conference to date, this article analyses its value-added to this overarching goal. The experiences so far suggest that the IPC faces significant practical challenges in contributing to the parliamentary scrutiny of the policy areas concerned despite the fact that the format of interparliamentary gatherings is a significant innovation in its own right. These challenges arise primarily out of a conflict between the European Parliament and national parliaments in the EU, the diversity of national parliamentarism, as well as the differing moti⁠v­a⁠tions and skills of the participating members of parliaments.
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21

Leino, Päivi, and Janne Salminen. "The Euro Crisis and Its Constitutional Consequences for Finland: Is There Room for National Politics in EU Decision-Making?" European Constitutional Law Review 9, no. 3 (November 5, 2013): 451–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019612001241.

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Economic crisis, constitutional crisis – Finnish constitutional requirements and solutions – National parliaments' European constitutional function – Finnish parliament's rights – Development of economic and monetary union – Economic and monetary union and development of it as the ‘Union matter’ in Finland – Stabilisation – European Financial Stability Facility – European Stability Mechanism – Economic governance – National, European, political, constitutional
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22

Kiiver, Philipp. "The Composite Case for National Parliaments in the European Union: Who Profits from Enhanced Involvement." European Constitutional Law Review 2, no. 2 (June 2006): 227–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019606002276.

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National parliaments near-universally endorsed in the European Union constitution-building process – Case for national parliaments a composite one: different scholarly approaches and national and European institutions support a greater role for national parliaments for different reasons – The overall endorsement of national parliaments remains a balancing act between competing agendas – Future reforms and treaty-drafting efforts most likely will continue to favour approaches of open-ended political content – No risk for the national governments nor Union institutions.
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23

WESTLAKE, MARTIN. "THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE." Political Quarterly 66, no. 1 (January 1995): 59–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.1995.tb00453.x.

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24

Haroche, Pierre. "The inter-parliamentary alliance: how national parliaments empowered the European Parliament." Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 7 (March 29, 2018): 1010–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1423508.

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25

König, Sarah. "The gdpr’s Application and Supervisory Authorities’ Remit on National Parliaments’ Data Processing in Parliamentary Core Activities." International Journal of Parliamentary Studies 2, no. 1 (February 15, 2022): 99–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26668912-bja10035.

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Abstract Since the entry into force of the gdpr, national Parliaments within the EU have adopted varying legal opinions on its material scope of application and, inter alia, (national) data protection authorities’ supervisory jurisdiction concerning data processing in parliamentary core areas. This article summarizes the findings of a European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ecprd) network survey conducted in early 2021 – that is, after the cjeu’s decision Land Hessen of 9 July 2020, C-272/19. It shows that the judgement had an ambiguous effect on parliaments’ legal viewpoints and briefly points out key issues influencing the minority opinion – amongst them the Austrian Parliament’s position – that parliamentary core activities’ data processing is exempted from the gdpr’s scope of application.
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Beqiraj (Mihani), Pranvera. "The Evolution of the Role of the National Parliaments in the Treaties of the Europian Union." European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 3, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/ejms.v3i1.p38-43.

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This paper elaborates the evolving role of national parliaments in the different stages of the European integration process. The Review begins with the first stage (the foundation of the European Union) where national parliaments showed no or little interest in the matters of Community, and then the impact of Single European Act, following the first changes in the Maastricht Treaty, through the two Declarations attached to it and then the Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Finally the paper focuses on the changes and innovations presented in the Lisbon Treaty which will enhance the role of national parliaments in the European Union governance. For this purpose, the paper analyzes chronologically the rights that national parliaments had before the Lisbon Treaty and the new role of national parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty came into force.
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27

Pratt, Timothy. "The Role of National Parliaments in the Making of European Law." Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1 (1998): 217–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1528887000001154.

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While the Community Treaties provided the institutional framework for the European Community, much of what now makes up the constitution of the European Union was not provided for in those Treaties, but evolved within that framework. This is certainly true of the role of national parliaments. There is nothing about the role of national parliaments in any of the Treaties concluded prior to the Maastricht Treaty, and even then the references appear not in the body of the Treaty, but only in two Declarations annexed to it, one on the role of national parliaments in the European Union and the other on the Conference of the Parliaments. While the former states that it is important to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union, it gives no indication of what that involvement should be. The Treaty of Amsterdam goes a step further. It includes a protocol on the role of national parliaments. This is important in that, for the first time, it gives substantive treaty recognition to their involvement in European Union activities. But, while it is markedly more supportive than the Maastricht Declarations, it does not confer any specific powers on national parliaments, nor does it attempt to define their functions.
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Högenauer, Anna-Lena. "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Brexit in the EU-27." International Journal of Parliamentary Studies 1, no. 2 (November 2, 2021): 270–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26668912-bja10024.

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Abstract Concerns about a democratic deficit in the European Union reached new heights in recent years, as the organization has had to address a number of highly politicized challenges. In this context, the question of how much oversight should be exercised by the European Parliament (ep) and national parliaments individually or collectively becomes increasingly salient. Against this background, this article argues that on the issue of Brexit the ep has been quick to carve out a role for itself. However, unlike in previous trade negotiations, national parliaments took a backseat on Brexit despite its potential impact on member states. This is largely due to the similarity of national and party positions on Brexit. In addition, the way the different interparliamentary bodies addressed Brexit reveals the limitations of these bodies in terms of their powers and the depth of their discussions.
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29

Pratt, Timothy. "11 The Role of National Parliaments in the Making of European Law." Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1 (1998): 217–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/152888712802821016.

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While the Community Treaties provided the institutional framework for the European Community, much of what now makes up the constitution of the European Union was not provided for in those Treaties, but evolved within that framework. This is certainly true of the role of national parliaments. There is nothing about the role of national parliaments in any of the Treaties concluded prior to the Maastricht Treaty, and even then the references appear not in the body of the Treaty, but only in two Declarations annexed to it, one on the role of national parliaments in the European Union and the other on the Conference of the Parliaments. While the former states that it is important to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union, it gives no indication of what that involvement should be. The Treaty of Amsterdam goes a step further. It includes a protocol on the role of national parliaments. This is important in that, for the first time, it gives substantive treaty recognition to their involvement in European Union activities. But, while it is markedly more supportive than the Maastricht Declarations, it does not confer any specific powers on national parliaments, nor does it attempt to define their functions.
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30

Butler, Fiona. "National parliaments and the European Union." International Affairs 73, no. 1 (January 1997): 187. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2623597.

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31

Ghosh, Sourabh. "Women in National Parliaments: An Overview." Journal of Politics and Governance 6, no. 1 (2017): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/2456-8023.2017.00006.7.

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32

Peters, Jit. "National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice." European Constitutional Law Review 1, no. 1 (October 12, 2004): 68–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019605000684.

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It is a popular misunderstanding that European citizens' lack of interest in the European Union has to do with the powers of the European Parliament. These powers have been constantly strengthened over the years, but that did not enhance voters' interest in European affairs. Even with the granting of European citizenship and the introduction of the euro, voters did not get interested, as the low turnout at the elections of members of the European Parliament on June 2004 (less than 45 %) attests. These elections even saw the rise of anti-European parties in several Member States, like the Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. These elections, however, dealt more with national issues and the confidence in national governments than with European issues.
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33

Raunio, Tapio. "Does OMC Really Benefit National Parliaments?" European Law Journal 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 130–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2006.00310.x.

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34

Jančić, Davor. "National Parliaments and EU Fiscal Integration." European Law Journal 22, no. 2 (March 2016): 225–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12172.

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35

Norton, Philip. "National parliaments and the European Union." Managerial Law 45, no. 5/6 (December 15, 2003): 5–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090550310770983.

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36

Lupo, Nicola. "The Commission’s Power to Withdraw Legislative Proposals and its ‘Parliamentarisation’, Between Technical and Political Grounds." European Constitutional Law Review 14, no. 2 (June 2018): 311–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019618000226.

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European Commission – Monopoly on legislative initiative – Power to withdraw legislative proposals, as recognised and limited by the Court of Justice – Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making – European Parliament Rules of Procedure – Interinstitutional programming procedures – Technical and political usages of the withdrawal – Question of confidence in national parliamentary systems – National Parliaments and Early Warning System – Parliamentarisation of the decision to withdraw – Principle of institutional balance
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37

Fromage, Diane. "National parliaments fighting back? Institutional engineering as a successful means to become active actors in EU affairs." Perspectives on Federalism 8, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): E—69—E—86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pof-2016-0017.

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Abstract The European integration process has long been characterised by the predominance of national executive powers. National parliaments were recognised as European actors after several decades only, in the Maastricht Treaty first and to an even larger extent in the Lisbon Treaty. Parliaments were hence long dependent on national constitutional, legal and administrative arrangements to be able to participate in EU affairs. This paper analyses how national parliaments (and their members) have reacted to the challenge the European integration process has represented for them while it also takes due account of the role other institutions, such as constitutional courts, have played in this field. It is argued that while these arrangements may have been successful in allowing national parliaments to play a greater role in this field, they should remain temporary for they are characterised by uncertainty and instability and make it generally difficult for citizens to follow up on national parliaments’ actions and to be fully informed.
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Zaslavskaya, Natalia. "Appointment of the European Commission as an indicator of European integration development." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations 14, no. 2 (2021): 182–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2021.204.

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The article examines the evolution of the European Commission appointment procedure in the context of the institutional balance between the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the European Commission. The growing influence of the European Parliament on the appointment of the Commission and the nomination of its President is described as an indicator of the development of integration because it demonstrates how the EU supranational institutional system moves closer to the institutional systems of nation states. The European Parliament has gained power similar to national parliaments. The European elections’ results are taken into account during appointment of the European Commission. Despite remaining existing differences between the EU institutional system and national institutions, the author attempts to apply the Sartori concept in order to examine the dynamics of the EU institutional balance. As Sartori described, interaction between parties in national parliaments and governments and gradual transformation towards party government, similar tendencies could be found on the European level. The analysis of the theoretical interpretations, legal basis and practical experience of the European Commission’s appointment enables the author to determine the increased role of the European Parliament vis-à-vis other institutions and the growing importance of the European parties. The current procedure demonstrates a shift from the technocratic functional approach to an ideological approach leading to a growing importance of European politics.
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Ott, Andrea. "The European Parliament's Role in EU Treaty-Making." Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23, no. 6 (December 2016): 1009–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1023263x1602300606.

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The European Parliament's role in EU external relations and treaty-making has increased over the years through constitutional practice and Treaty amendments. Finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament's constitutional rights in treaty-making establish – in the words of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) – ‘symmetry between legislation-making and treaty-making in compliance with institutional balance provided for by the Treaties’. In a comparative overview, the European Parliament has ascertained more extensive powers over treaty-making compared to the majority of national parliaments which are only involved in politically important international treaties. This contribution addresses the consequences of this symmetry or parallelism and asks whether it leads to structural symmetry or even procedural symmetry which synchronizes the acts of legislating and treaty-making with each other. This contribution analyses the role of the European Parliament in the different phases of international treaty-making against the backdrop of this constitutional practice. This constitutional practice is shaped by intergovernmental agreements, bilateral arrangements and European Parliament resolutions and is influenced by the mounting case law of the CJEU. It also assesses the European Parliament's role in concluding international administrative agreements concluded by the Commission and Europol and how far the constitutional practice is in line with EU primary law.
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Granat, Katarzyna, and Federico Fabbrini. "“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike." Common Market Law Review 50, Issue 1 (February 1, 2013): 115–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2013006.

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The article analyses the role of the national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol, taking the recent Commission proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to strike and the reaction of national Parliaments as a case study. In this case, for the first time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, national Parliaments activated the "yellow card" procedure set up by Protocol No. 2 to ensure compliance by the EU institutions with the principle of subsidiarity. The article claims, however, that the Commission proposal was sanctioned with a "yellow card" without having committed any foul. The article analyses the role of national Parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and - on the basis of textual, structural and functional reasons - advances the argument that the review of national Parliaments should focus exclusively on violations of the principle of subsidiarity and should not extend to the evaluation of the proportionality, legal basis or political merits of a draft EU legislative proposal. The article then outlines the context and the content of the Commission proposal and examines the reasoned opinions of the national Parliaments against the draft regulation. By testing the previously developed framework, the article explains that in the present case national Parliaments have gone beyond their role, failing to identify any subsidiarity violation in the draft regulation. The article concludes by maintaining that the Commission proposal, in fact, was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity and suggests that the draft regulation may have been the most appropriate tool to strike a new balance between free movement and social rights in the EU. Because of the decision of the Commission to withdraw its proposal, nevertheless, the article warns that the Commission may have inadvertently encouraged a misuse of the subsidiarity review by the national Parliaments with potentially negative effects on the delicate balance of powers between the States and the EU.
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Knutelská, Viera. "National Parliaments as New Actors in the Decision-making Process at the European Level." Journal of Contemporary European Research 7, no. 3 (August 17, 2011): 327–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v7i3.260.

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National parliaments have two basic ways of influencing the outcomes of the European decision-making process. First, they influence national input legitimacy at the national level on European issues through influencing and controlling their respective national governments. Second, they influence national input legitimacy at the European level on European issues through directly entering into the European decision-making and interacting with the European institutions participating in it. To be able to make use of this second possibility, national parliaments have to devise instruments of cooperation and coordination and learn to use them effectively. The first steps have already been made: national parliaments exchange information on their scrutiny of European legislation and other activities through their permanent representatives in Brussels, the IPEX database and other channels. This article examines the cooperation, or, at least, information exchange among national parliaments on a number of legislative proposals - those chosen for coordinated tests of subsidiarity by national parliaments themselves, those most voted on in the Council of the European Union (EU) and those subjected to three readings in the co-decision procedure - discussed between May 2004 and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It shows that national parliaments face difficulties caused by the high costs of such cooperation, including the need for flexibility and speed of their own decision-making, as well as administrative costs, whilst they increasingly use the cooperation channels available to them.
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Dulak, Michał. "Politologiczna analiza stosowania unijnego mechanizmu wczesnego ostrzegania przez Sejm i Senat RP w latach 2010–2016." Przegląd europejski 2 (November 19, 2019): 85–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.5824.

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Main argument raised against EU early warning mechanism is its low utility. Yellow card procedure has been launched three times so far, whereas orange card procedure not even once. This indicates that the potential of political instrument which is early-warning mechanism is not fully explored. Nonetheless after seven years since the Lisbon Treaty came into force we can collect enough data in order to asses not only the mechanism itself but also the influence of this instrument on the national parliament scrutiny and engagement in the EU affairs. The aim of this article is: to research how the Sejm and Senate use the early warning mechanism, describe what is its impact on general competences of the Polish parliament regarding subsidiarity control and to confront this assessment with the activity of other national parliaments. Thus, the author will propose the set of indicators according to which will be possible to evaluate the activity and eventually the effectiveness of national parliaments while using the early warning mechanism. There will be also presented the results of the empirical study measuring the activity of Sejm and Senate in mentioned area in the years 2010-2016.
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43

Auel, Katrin, Olga Eisele, and Lucy Kinski. "What Happens in Parliament Stays in Parliament? Newspaper Coverage of National Parliaments in EU Affairs." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no. 3 (November 26, 2017): 628–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12685.

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44

Kennedy, Mark E. "Legislation, Foreign Policy, and the “Proper Business” of the Parliament of 1624." Albion 23, no. 1 (1991): 41–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4050541.

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A dozen years ago Conrad Russell initiated a major historiographical debate when he rejected the traditional interpretation of seventeenth-century parliamentary history expounded in the classic studies of S. R. Gardiner and Wallace Notestein, whose work on early Stuart parliaments dominated the field for three quarters of a century. According to Russell, Gardiner's and Notestein's conviction that Jacobean and Caroline parliaments were the scene of escalating constitutional conflicts between the Crown and the House of Commons was the result of the two historians' failure to understand either the nature of early Stuart politics or seventeenth-century notions of Parliament's proper functions. Politics in general and parliamentary politics in particular were devoid of ideological content, and the provincial gentry who filled the benches of the House of Commons were as certain as the rest of their countrymen that the “proper business” of Parliament was the passing of bills, not the debating of issues of national or constitutional significance. Russell, of course, did not suggest that the conflicts so crucial to the traditional interpretation were made out of whole cloth, but he did deny that disagreements between Crown and Parliament were due to the emergence of a constitutional opposition. Instead, such disagreements were the inevitable product of the pervasive tension that marked the relationship between the royal government in London and the local communities in the provinces. During the reigns of James I and Charles I, the Crown's incompetent parliamentary management made it more difficult than usual for local gentlemen to reconcile their obligations to their king with their loyalties to their communities. The result was some remarkably unhappy parliaments, but since no important issue of principle divided parliamentary leaders from privy councilors or officers of state, there could be no organized, ideologically based opposition, no constitutional crisis leading inexorably to civil war.
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45

de León, Sergio Alonso. "Regions and Subsidiarity in the European Union: A Look at the Role of the Spanish and other Regional Parliaments in the Monitoring of Compliance with the Principle of Subsidiarity." European Public Law 18, Issue 2 (June 1, 2012): 305–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2012017.

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European regions have had a limited involvement in the European Union decision-making process, despite having an important role in the implementation of EU acts. The principle of subsidiarity, as established in the Treaty of Lisbon, has acquired an important regional dimension, which results in the possibility of the regional parliaments playing a role in the law-making process in the European Union for the first time. However, the internal mechanism set up in Spain narrows the possible scope of involvement of the regional parliaments, subordinating it to the national Parliament's will and even placing the regional governments in a similar position as the legislatures.
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46

Woźnicki, Tomasz. "Współpraca międzyparlamentarna w świetle art. 13. Traktatu o stabilności, koordynacji i zarządzaniu w Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej." Przegląd Europejski, no. 3-2015 (January 31, 2016): 132–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/1641-2478pe.3.15.7.

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The article presents the most important changes which were made to the EU inter-parliamentary cooperation by article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (so-called Fiscal Compact). Author analyses the decision made by the Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments in April 2013 in Nicosia establishing the new conference under article 13 of the Treaty and presents conclusions from the first two years of the functioning of the conference. In particular, the author refers to the relations between national parliaments and European Parliament in the context of the creation of this new inter-parliamentary body.
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Matei, Ani, and Adrian Stelian Dumitru. "The Subsidiarity Principle and National Parliaments Role: From Formal Need to Real Use of Powers." Administrative Sciences 10, no. 2 (April 20, 2020): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/admsci10020024.

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Subsidiarity constitutes a guiding principle of the EU exercising power and the idea of involving national parliaments in the EU legislative procedure was seen as the best solution to increase democracy and transparency of the EU decision-making process at the European Convention established in 2001. Such a mechanism enables national parliaments to ensure the correct application of the principle of subsidiarity by the institutions taking part in the legislative process. This article examines how this principle is implemented by the national parliaments and EU responsible institutions. What is the novelty derived from the Treaty of Lisbon? Do national parliaments participate actively in the implementation of subsidiarity? If yes, what are the tools at their disposal? To answer all of these questions we try to shape a framework for understanding the phenomenon.
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Auel, Katrin. "Eurosceptics into the Limelight? Eurosceptic Parliamentary Actors and Media Bias in EU Affairs." Politics and Governance 7, no. 3 (September 27, 2019): 248–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i3.2159.

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In the spotlight for some time now, the potential of national parliaments to legitimise EU politics has become even more salient given the growing politicisation and public contestation of EU issues. Their ability to realise this potential depends, however, vitally on citizens being actually aware of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. Academic as well as political attention has therefore more recently turned to the communication function of parliaments, and here the media play a crucial role. Important is not only whether EU parliamentary affairs are covered in the media, but also <em>who</em> within parliament gets the opportunity to raise European issues in the media. In the context of this thematic issue, the question of media visibility is of particular interest with regard to Eurosceptic parliamentary party groups and their members. Do Eurosceptics in parliament get to dominate parliamentary EU news in the media and thus to take ownership of EU issues—or do the media freeze parliamentary Eurosceptics out of the coverage? Both would seriously undermine the legitimising potential of national parliaments. The article therefore analyses to what extent we can find a visibility bias in the print media coverage of Eurosceptic parliamentary actors and explores the factors that contribute to such bias. For the analysis, it draws on a quantitative dataset of all newspaper articles covering parliamentary EU affairs in six member states (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Poland and the UK) over a period of four years (2010 to 2013).
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Jaroszyński, Tomasz. "National Parliaments’ Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity: Reasoned Opinions 2014–2019." European Constitutional Law Review 16, no. 1 (March 2020): 91–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019620000048.

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Principle of subsidiarity – Early Warning Mechanism – Protocol No. 2 on Proportionality and Subsidiarity – The scope of the principle of subsidiarity – The role of national parliaments in the EU – National parliaments’ reasoned opinions – Principle of proportionality – Principle of conferral – National sovereignty in the EU – National identity in the EU – Justification of draft legislation acts
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Marszałek–Kawa, Joanna. "Relations between European Parliament with the national parliaments of the EU member states." Polish Political Science Yearbook 39, no. 1 (December 31, 2010): 4–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2010003.

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