Academic literature on the topic 'National Sufi Council (Pakistan)'

Sufi shrines are in large number in Pakistan with having a colossal impact on economic, cultural and social aspects. In the rural areas of Pakistan, mostly people are poor and less educated or uneducated with strong belief and devotion to Sajjada Nasheen. In this context, this study essentially aims to investigate the socio-economic and cultural influence of Sufi shrines in the rural areas of Mitthan Kot (upper Indus basin). This study follows the qualitative research strategy by employing in-depth interviews from different stakeholders. Thematic analysis has been used to analyze the data. The findings of the study also manifest that the local community is closely inter-connected with shrines encompassing different facets. A large chunk of rural population in the proximity of shrines is entirely dependents on shrines for their earnings and engaged in jobs like garments shops, catering services, transportation system etc. All of these employment activities boost up the local economy as well as the national economy. In the same fashion, people also enjoy cultural festivals like Urs and Mela which is a great source of spiritual happiness and entertainment. Besides all of this, various medical facilities like free eye camp and literacy conventions also play a vital role in the betterment of poor people. So there is a dire need for further development, improvement and regulation in the functioning of shrines and money generation thereof for proper incorporation in national economy.

The military has always played a dominant role in Pakistan for the last seventy years or so. From an administrative and political point of view, Pakistan has inherited a highly imbalanced institutional development. It was working with strong and organized civil and military bureaucracies and disorganized political parties led by self-seeker politicians. The main reason for this institutional imbalance was factional-ridden politics which weakened the political rule in Pakistan. The civilian control of the military is managed in Pakistan if the ruling political group is ready in sharing power and responsibility with the military elites. Since Pakistan is a developing country and the military cannot be an exit from the decision-making process. The sharing of power on particular subjects can take the military away from any direct intervention. The sharing of power and responsibilities can be managed with the application of the convergence theory of Morris Janowitz and the National Security Council is an ideal forum for the interconnectedness of the two main pillars: the civilian and military elites.

Abstract Pakistani hijra/khwaja siras make up structured communities of feminine-identified gender-variant persons who have long but marginalized traditions of performing religious-cultural roles. Supreme Court rulings in 2009, promising rights to marginalized khwaja siras, have led to increased backlash against these performances and the community structures on which they rest. This article explores these traditional performance practices, within the Sufi shrine and in homes, as well as in explicit activism as khwaja siras contested their place in the national 2013 elections. These assertions of piety, drawn creatively from Sufi and Shi'a modes and often performed on the fringes or lower rungs of developmental activism, offer an embodied outlet for negotiating multiple axes of exclusion. While recent scholarship has claimed that in the context of reformist Islamic movements khwaja siras are turning away from the spaces of legitimacy that Sufism once offered and toward the liberal language of human rights to make claims for recognition, the author argues that these pious performances continue to provide a potent force for transgender activism in Pakistan.

The paper compares and contrasts the situation of young people in Pakistan with broader global trends drawing on data from both the recent US National Research Council report, Growing up Global: the Changing Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries, and from the national survey of adolescents and youth in Pakistan (AYP) 18 months earlier [Sathar, et al. (2003)]. The paper begins with some demographic background, and a discussion of how recent trends in schooling in Pakistan compare with broader trends in all developing countries as a group as well as in South Asia. It then follows the broad outlines of the National Research Council’s report in exploring transitions to adult work and family roles in a comparative perspective. The concluding section of the paper draws on the NRC panel’s programme and policy recommendations which were developed after a careful review of lessons learned from recent policy research and programme intervention research from around the world, all of which are relevant in some form in the Pakistani context.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
 AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

One third of the world's population is engaged in agriculture sector that makes it the second largest source of employment worldwide including the female population. In developing countries, the agriculture holds 44% of employment share. While agriculture sector in South Asia employs 40% of the people. Livestock workers have to be in close contact with animals and different types of the machinery resulting in high risks of accidents and occupational hazards/ diseases. Environmental factors are also not optimal. Ergonomic difficulties are common i.e. bad working postures, repetitive movements and forceful exertions. A National Occupational Safety and Health Council could be established to protect the health of working folk by legislation and its implementation throughout the country.

The armed forces had a predominant role in the Turkish polity until 2002. During 1960 and 2002, the military had staged direct coups, i.e. 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 and maintained an indirect role in internal and external politics through various institutions such as National Security Council (NSC), National Unity Command (NUC), Military courts, Military corporations (OYAK), and Military Pension Fund (MPF). However, the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has replaced the hitherto predominance of the army in Turkish polity. This research paper highlights that AKP has been successful in disengaging the military from politics with mass support, continuous successes in elections, and managing internal and external threats. Further, the manuscript explored the quest of Turkey to become a member of the European Union, great powers support to Tayyab Erdogan on ensuring human rights, and the principle of republicanism have contributed to the AKP project of civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

Based on the data of three national surveys, 1984-85 Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (PCPS), 1990-91 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS), and 1994-95 Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (PCPS), the hypothesis of shy/silent users is tested. These surveys were undertaken with the collaboration of the Westing House, IRD/Macro International and Local Office in Islamabad of the Population Council, New York respectively. The concept of shy/silent users is defined as those respondents who, at the time of interview, did not divulge that they were users of contraceptive methods or traditional ways of preventing conception or birth due to cultural reasons. All three surveys show substantial numbers of shy/silent users. If these numbers are included, the Current Prevalence Rate (CPR) of each survey rises significantly. But the CPR inspite of including shy users, is still far lower than most developing and neighbouring countries.

Human health resource is the core component of any health system. Pakistan’s health system faces a critical shortage of qualified healthcare professionals such as physicians, dentists, nurses, pharmacists and allied healthcare workers1. Pakistan has one of the fastest growing populations and is ranked as the fifth largest population in the globe2. The health system of Pakistan is confronted with the challenge to cater to the unmet healthcare needs of this rapidly growing human population. The health system of Pakistan is facing multiple challenges and among these, one of the key challenges is the production of quality human resource for health. Pakistan has recently focused much on uplifting the standards of medical schools; to produce competent physicians, however, uplifting and streamlining nursing education still remains a big challenge. Currently, there are approximately 90,000 nurses registered with Pakistan nursing council3. In 2018, the Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination made a thorough assessment of the existing human health resource and as per the report published Pakistan needs 0.8 million nurses by the year 20304. There is also an imbalance in the current workforce with more physicians onboard as compared to nurses in the system. Pakistan is thus confronted to upscale the production of nurses to meet Universal Health Coverage goal by year 2030 as well as to maintain the minimum standards of nursing workforce development. To uplift the standards of nursing education, Pakistan has embarked on graduate nursing education as entry into practice qualification from the year 2018 and onwards. This has shifted nursing education pre-dominantly from associate diploma regulated by nursing examination boards to baccalaureate degree program run by the universities. Maintaining standards in the production of quality nursing workforce is a big challenge for Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination and Pakistan Nursing Council. Pakistan has though shifted onto a baccalaureate degree program in nursing its faculty is not fully prepared in modern day educational pedagogies, assessment methods, curriculum development and evaluation, educational psychology and educational leadership and management5. There is an acute need to train nursing faculty in basic teaching competencies for effectively teaching at BS nursing level. Such trainings shall be mandatory for everyone who aspires to teach in nursing colleges. The Pakistan nursing council shall make such trainings mandatory for all nursing faculty who is involved in teaching to nursing students.

Abstract On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered four terrorist attacks on its soil by a group later identified as Al-Qaeda. The attacks, the worst in US history, resulted in immense destruction and loss of life. For the United States, and for a number of countries around the world, 9/11 constituted a major historical turning point which prompted a series of responses aimed at countering terrorism. For Pakistan, the pragmatic decision to join the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan immediately transformed the nation into a front-line state in the ‘war on terror’ being waged on its western border. In the years that followed, Pakistan experienced an escalation in terrorist-related incidents and fatalities across all four of its provinces and in the tribal areas. The rise in religious extremism and violence made Pakistan progressively less safe for its many citizens. Moreover, amidst media reports of ongoing terrorism in a nuclear-capable Pakistan, western audiences increasingly viewed Pakistan, and Islam, as synonymous with intolerance, militancy, and terrorism. Within the climate of extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism, a new type of discourse began to emanate from the political leadership in Pakistan. For President Musharraf, the formation of a cohesive national identity was central to the establishment of political legitimacy and hegemony without the need for physical force. He believed this would allow effective revenue extraction, which could be reinvested in much-needed social and economic development. This in turn would result in a peaceful and prosperous civil society, and reverse negative world opinion of Pakistan. Following this Gramscian assumption, after 9/11 President Musharraf attempted to construct an enlightened and moderate identity for Pakistan by promoting the ethical and peace-building aspects found within Islam. By 2006, he had established the National Council for the Promotion of Sufism. Three years later, in 2009, President Zardari reconstituted the council and renamed it the National Sufi Council. With its ostensible message of philosophical, spiritual, and social harmony, Sufism was posited by both administrations as the first and foremost symbol of national identity for Pakistan, as well as a global panacea to terrorism. In order to understand contemporary politics, and Islam, in Pakistan after 9/11, this thesis employed Critical Discourse Analysis as a theoretical framework and as a method for socio-political analysis. The main aim was to analyse and interpret government discourse on the subject of Sufism over a ten-year period following the attacks of 9/11 to demonstrate the ways in which Sufism was officially invoked and promoted. A further aim was to analyse and interpret the discourse of other political actors on the subject of Sufism during the same period to demonstrate the ways in which the official construction of Sufism was reproduced and resisted. Those narratives were then situated within the wider historical socio-political context. This approach was intended to allow a more nuanced understanding of the persistence of Islam as the first and foremost symbol of national identity, and of belonging, for Pakistani society despite the many theological differences that exist amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. It was also intended to reveal the complex and competing identity narratives which continue to hinder government efforts to create a single cohesive and shared national identity for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This thesis demonstrates that, whilst Islam has been the ultimate source of identity and legitimacy for Pakistan since before its creation in 1947, the many complex and competing interpretations of Islam that exist in the nation continue to divide it. Most crucially, the inability of Muslims to form a consensus with regard to Islam at a theological level has had a significant impact on the nation’s ability to establish a coherent ideology upon which to base a viable political system. Official attempts to construct a national identity through the lens of Sufism after 9/11 were a continuation of a wider, largely incomplete, and problematic struggle to build national unity in Pakistan. Ultimately, however, the turn to Sufism served to further complicate the issue rather than resolve it.

In Queer Companions Omar Kasmani theorizes saintly intimacy and the construction of queer social relations at Pakistan’s most important site of Sufi pilgrimage. Conjoining queer theory and the anthropology of Islam, Kasmani outlines the felt and enfleshed ways in which saintly affections bind individuals, society, and the state in Pakistan through a public architecture of intimacy. Islamic saints become lovers and queer companions just as a religious universe is made valuable to critical and queer forms of thinking. Focusing on the lives of ascetics known as fakirs in Pakistan, Kasmani shows how the affective bonds with the place’s patron saint, a thirteenth-century antinomian mystic, foster unstraight modes of living in the present. In a national context where religious shrines are entangled in the state’s infrastructures of governance, coming close to saints further entails a drawing near to more-than-official histories and public forms of affect. Through various fakir life stories, Kasmani contends that this intimacy offers a form of queer world making with saints.

Abstract This chapter assesses Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s increasing reliance on their improved relations with the Soviet Union and China. Ambassador Dobrynin suggests that his government will now assist the US in pressuring the North Vietnamese, while in fact it was secretly increasing its aid to Hanoi. The chapter describes the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan, and the administration’s indifference to the slaughter in East Pakistan. Once again State Department concerns are ignored. In their hostility to Indira Gandhi and one-sided support for Yahya Khan, it argues that Nixon and Kissinger made the crisis worse. Underpinning their moves was a desire to preserve Nixon’s Beijing trip, which was coming soon. Kissinger is severely criticized for his handling of the situation and pro-Pakistan stance. In investigating press “leaks” to reporter Jack Anderson, it emerges that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been spying on the National Security Council. Although Admiral Moorer seems culpable, Nixon decides to retain him.