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Journal articles on the topic 'Nationalisme – Balkans'
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1
Politis, Alexis. "La différenciation du comportement grec vis-à-vis des Bulgares vers le milieu du XIXe siècle –Problèmes de nationalismes–." Historical Review/La Revue Historique 4 (November 20, 2008): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/hr.210.
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<p>L'intelligentsia grecque découvre et codifie pour la première fois les revendications nationales du peuple bulgare assez tard, dans les années qui suivent la guerre de Crimée, à une époque où elle rêvait d'un empire national grec, et toute revendication territoriale lui paraissait hostile. Comme la nationalité grecque était la première à se manifester dans les Balkans, et comme la Guerre de l'Indépendance en 1821 avait attiré plusieurs Bulgares combattants -à cause de la religion commune et à cause du prestige de la langue et de l'éducation grecque pendant quatre siècles- les Grecs avaient de la difficulté à saisir le nationalisme de leurs voisins dans le cadre de nouvelles conditions historiques. Ils l'ont considéré comme provenant de leurs fautes: si les Grecs avaient manipulé mieux leur politique, le nationalisme bulgare n'aurait pas eu lieu. Les Grecs ont alors essayé de rappeler aux Bulgares les traits qui unissaient les deux races. En vain; car vers la fin du siècle les antagonismes nationaux devenaient encore plus durs: jamais un nationalisme n'a pu se réaliser sans donner lieu à des conflits violents avec son voisinage, jamais les adversaires n'ont limité leur champ de bataille à la théorie ou la littérature.</p><p> </p><p> </p>
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Asaturov, Sergey, and Andrei Martynov. "THE RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM: THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA." EUREKA: Social and Humanities, no. 5 (October 11, 2020): 39–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.21303/2504-5571.2020.001440.
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The choice between modern nation-building and integration into supranational European and Euro-Atlantic structures remains a strategic challenge for the Balkan countries. Success in solving this problem of predominantly mono-ethnic Croatia and Slovenia has not yet become a model to follow. Serbian and Albanian national issues cannot be resolved. Serbia's defeat in the Balkan wars of 1991–1999 over the creation of a "Greater Serbia" led to the country's territorial fragmentation. Two Albanian national states emerged in the Balkans. Attempts to create a union of Kosovo and Albania could turn the region into a whirlpool of ultra-nationalist contradictions. The European Union has started accession negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The success of these negotiations depends on the readiness of the EU and the ability of these Balkan states to adopt European norms and rules. The accession of all Balkan nation-states to the European Union must finally close the "Balkan window" of the vulnerability of the united Europe. Nation-building in the Balkans on the basis of ethnic nationalism sharply contradicts the purpose and current values of the European integration process. For more than three decades, the EU has been pursuing a policy of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and economic development in the Balkans. The region remains vulnerable to the influences of non-European geopolitical powers: the United States, Russia, Turkey, and China. The further scenario of the great Balkan geopolitical game mainly depends on the pro-European national consolidation of the Balkan peoples and the effectiveness of the European Union's strategy in the Balkans.
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Pennanen, Risto. "Lost in scales: Balkan folk music research and the ottoman legacy." Muzikologija, no. 8 (2008): 127–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/muz0808127p.
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Balkan folk music researchers have articulated various views on what they have considered Oriental or Turkish musical legacy. The discourses the article analyses are nationalism, Orientalism, Occidentalism and Balkanism. Scholars have handled the awkward Ottoman issue in several manners: They have represented 'Oriental' musical characteristics as domestic, claimed that Ottoman Turks merely imitated Arab and Persian culture, and viewed Indian classical raga scales as sources for Oriental scales in the Balkans. In addition, some scholars have viewed the 'Oriental' characteristics as stemming from ancient Greece. The treatment of the Seg?h family of Ottoman makams in theories and analyses reveals several features of folk music research in the Balkans, the most important of which are the use of Western concepts and the exclusive dependence on printed sources. The strategies for handling the Orient within have meandered between Occidentalism and Orientalism, creating an ambiguity which is called Balkanism.
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LILA, Fejzi. "Rising Nationalism in the Balkans." European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 4, no. 4 (January 21, 2017): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/ejms.v4i4.p31-35.
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Balkans consists of the geographic and demographic diversity of the complex, with division of the region into new states, with local antagonisms. Balkan leaders, the Great Powers would urge the expansion of national states where and when he wanted interest and would not ignore claims it was one nation over another. The process of developing the nationalist movements and the state - forming in the Balkans, starting with the Patriarchies autonomous movements within the Ottoman Empire, involves the movement of Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians and Albanians. The fall of Bonaparte in 1815, was accompanied by significant changes in Europe in the system of international relations, the diplomacy of the Great Powers. Europe was thrown into the system the concert of Europe, after that of Vienna, while the Ottoman Empire was beginning its stagnation, other European powers had begun to feel the threat of Russia's interests in the Middle East. During this period of time the nationalist movement took place in the region. The nationalism confronted Concert of Vienna principles provoking the First World War.
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Nikiforov, Konstantin. "Modernization mixed with nationalism." Balcanica, no. 45 (2014): 443–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc1445443n.
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This essay reflects on a particular manner in which modernisation have taken place in the Balkans in modern history, from the 1878 Berlin Congress onwards. The Balkan countries faced twofold difficulties in their development: they had to overcome their backwardness stemming from the centuries of the Ottoman yoke and catch up with modern Western Europe, and resolve their numerous mutual territorial and political disputes. The latter task was especially difficult due to the constant interference in Balkan affairs on the part of Great Powers. This interference further aggravated nationalistic tensions between the Balkan states. The peculiar mixture of modernisation efforts and nationalism remains to this day when the entire region strives to join the European Union.
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Babuna, Aydin. "The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians: Islam and Nationalism." Nationalities Papers 32, no. 2 (June 2004): 287–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0090599042000230250.
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The drastic changes in the Balkans in the 1990s and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in particular have resulted in a large number of publications attempting to explain the break-up of this country and the political developments in the Balkans. Some of these publications deal partly with the local Muslims who were engaged in the Balkan conflicts but, with some exceptions, they are focused mainly on recent developments, with less attention paid to the historical contexts in which the Muslim nationalist movements were shaped.
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Malešević, Siniša. "Wars that Make States and Wars that Make Nations: Organised Violence, Nationalism and State Formation in the Balkans." European Journal of Sociology 53, no. 1 (April 2012): 31–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975612000021.
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AbstractSince the beginning of the 19th century the Balkans has been a synonym for aggressive nationalism and unbridled violence; the two phenomena traditionally understood to be the key obstacles for its social development. This paper contests such views by arguing that it was the absence of protracted warfare and coherent nationalist doctrines that distinguishes the history of South Eastern Europe from the rest of the continent. Drawing critically on bellicose historical sociology and modernist theories of nationalism - with a spotlight on the work of Charles Tilly and Ernest Gellner. Drawing critically on bellicose historical sociology and modernists theories of nationalism the paper makes a case that it was not the abundance of nationalism and organised violence but rather their historical scarcity that proved decisive for the slow pace of social development in the Balkans.
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Mihas, D. E. M. "Romania between Balkan Nationalism and Democratic Transition." Politics 17, no. 3 (September 1997): 175–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00050.
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This article deals with certain aspects of nationalism, minorities and transition politics in the post-communist Balkans with particular reference to Romania. After attempting to explain why nationalism constitutes a dominant feature of Balkan and as – a consequence – of Romanian political culture, it argues that the involvement of Romania's Hungarian minority in the collapse of the communist regime has been disproportionately exaggerated. Furthermore, it argues that the communist legacy is still shaping Romanian politics, emphasising the lack of substantial political reforms in a genuine liberal-democratic West European direction and arguing that Romania's transition politics does not necessarily mean democratic politics.
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Archer, Rory. "Assessing Turbofolk Controversies: Popular Music between the Nation and the Balkans." Southeastern Europe 36, no. 2 (2012): 178–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633312x642103.
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This article explores controversies provoked by the Serbian pop-folk musical style “turbofolk” which emerged in the 1990s. Turbofolk has been accused of being a lever of the Milošević regime – an inherently nationalist cultural phenomenon which developed due to the specific socio-political conditions of Serbia in the 1990s. In addition to criticism of turbofolk on the basis of nationalism and war-mongering, it is commonly claimed to be “trash,” “banal,” “pornographic,” “(semi-)rural,” “oriental” and “Balkan.” In order to better understand the socio-political dimensions of this phenomenon, I consider other Yugoslav musical styles which predate turbofolk and make reference to pop-folk musical controversies in other Balkan states to help inform upon the issues at stake with regard to turbofolk. I argue that rather than being understood as a singular phenomena specific to Serbia under Milošević, turbofolk can be understood as a Serbian manifestation of a Balkan-wide post-socialist trend. Balkan pop-folk styles can be understood as occupying a liminal space – an Ottoman cultural legacy – located between (and often in conflict with) the imagined political poles of liberal pro-European and conservative nationalist orientations. Understanding turbofolk as a value category imbued with symbolic meaning rather than a clear cut musical genre, I link discussions of it to the wider discourse of Balkanism. Turbofolk and other pop-folk styles are commonly imagined and articulated in terms of violence, eroticism, barbarity and otherness the Balkan stereotype promises. These pop-folk styles form a frame of reference often used as a discursive means of marginalisation or exclusion. An eastern “other” is represented locally by pop-folk performers due to oriental stylistics in their music and/or ethnic minority origins. For detractors, pop-folk styles pose a danger to the autochthonous national culture as well as the possibility of a “European” and cosmopolitan future. Correspondingly I demonstrate that such Balkan stereotypes are invoked and subverted by many turbofolk performers who positively mark alleged Balkan characteristics and negotiate and invert the meaning of “Balkan” in lyrical texts.
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Jezernik, Božidar. "Western perceptions of Turkish towns in the Balkans." Urban History 25, no. 2 (August 1998): 211–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s096392680000081x.
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ABSTRACTThe article was conceived as a guided tour through the Balkan Peninsula including descriptions of two selected towns from Hungary, Croatia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It gives a summary of Western perceptions of the Balkan towns as noted by Western Europeans who visited the area in different periods from the seventeenth century onwards. The civilization they found and described there was a part of an entity encompassing the material and spiritual culture of urban life in the Near East. During the nineteenth century the Balkans underwent major political changes and contemporary travellers' reports were rich with observations about the process of ‘Europeanization’ of the Balkan towns. During the process which meant nationalism and fragmentation in what had been a fairly uniform culture area, paradoxically, ‘Balkanization’ was the final result.
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Jovanović, Srđan. "Discursive Historical Continuities: Serbian Nationalist Discourse in the Printed Media on the Brink of the First Balkan War (1912) in Comparison with Today." Supplement 9, no. 1 (July 24, 2021): 48–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.37710/plural.v9i1s_4.
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This article explores the 1912 print media in Serbia in their relation to the Balkan Wars, comparing the nationalist topoi with the contemporary age and contemporary national groups. It analyzes the content of several articles printed in papers such as Illustrated War Chronicle (Ilustrovana ratna kronika) and the Serbian newspaper (Srpske novine), juxtaposing their discourse with contemporary Serbian nationalism. The primary sources from 1912 have not been discussed in scholarship, except a few mentions. It shows that after a century since the Balkan Wars has passed, the nationalist discourse has remained more than similar, using the same historical pathos of victimhood and “othering” of the Enemy
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Cohen, Lenard J. "Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation." Nationalities Papers 25, no. 3 (September 1997): 481–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999708408520.
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The role of historical and cultural influences in recent Balkan warfare has been the subject of considerable debate among commentators both within and outside the former Yugoslavia. For example, some observers, who might be considered members of the primordial hatred school, have emphasized the cyclical role of “ancient enmities” and atavistic impulses in the Balkans. In contrast, another group of analysts, who have subscribed to the paradise lost approach, focus on the long periods during which populations of different languages, religions, and other facets of Balkan ethnic identity, managed to peacefully co-exist. This second perspective downplays historical factors and attributes the violence and savagery of recent years to nationalist leaders who whipped up antagonisms to suit their own political agendas.
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Drapac, Vesna. "The End of Yugoslavia." Contemporary European History 10, no. 2 (July 2001): 317–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777301002089.
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Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 288 pp., $35.00, ISBN 0-8133-2096-8. Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 230 pp., $17.95, ISBN 0-271-01958-1. Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 246 pp., $40, ISBN 0-271-01629-9. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Monographs, 1996), 436 pp., £35.00, ISBN 0-19-829200-7. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, trans. Sabrina Petra Ramet (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 279 pp., £16.99, ISBN 0-415-18596-3. Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 2nd edn (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000), 243 pp., £42.50, ISBN 0-312-23084-2. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 354 pp., $30.00, ISBN 0-8133-2559-5. Richard H. Ullman, ed., The World and Yugoslavia's Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 230 pp., $18.95, ISBN 0-87609-191-5. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 536 pp., $16.95, ISBN 0-8157-9513-0.
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Hagen, William W. "The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms." Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049364.
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Kucukcan, Talip. "Nationalism and Religion." American Journal of Islam and Society 13, no. 3 (October 1, 1996): 424–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v13i3.2308.
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Following the spectacular disintegration of the Soviet Union, popularand academic interest in nationalism and religion gathered momentum. Inaddition to recent ethnic clashes and religious conflicts in many parts of theworld, particularly the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, and manyAfrican states, questions have been raised about the relation betweennationalism and religion. What, if any, is the relationship between nationalismand religion? To what extent can religion influence the emergenceand maintenance of nationalism? Can religious beliefs and sentiments legitimizea nationalist ideology? What is meant by “religious nationalism,” andhow is it related to nation-states, resistance, and violence? These questionswere addressed during a one-day conference held at the London School ofEconomics, University of London on 22 March 1996. The well-attendedconference was organized by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity andNationalism, which was established in 1990 and has published the journalNations and Nationalism since March 1995.The first paper at the Nationalism and Religion conference was presentedby Bruce Kapferer (University College of London, London, UK).In his paper “Religious and Historical Metaphors in the Context ofNationalist Violence,” he addressed political action, the force of ideologies,and the relevance of mythological schemes to religious and ritual practiceby means of a case study of Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka and theevents of 1989-90. In his own words, his focus was “the dynamics ofremythologization, or the process . . . whereby current political and economicforces are totalized within mythological schemes constructed in historicalperiods relatively independent of the circumstances of contemporarynationalism” and “the force of such ideological remythologizations, that is,how such remythologizations can became a passionate dimension of politicalactivity and give it direction.”According to Kapferer, the relation of mythologization to routine religiousbeliefs and ritual practice is significant. In his paper, he argued that“nationalism is the creation of modernism and it is of a continuous dynamicnature whose power is embedded in and sanctified by the culture that hasoriginated in the rituals of religion which provide a cosmology for nationalism.Cosmology of religion as diverse as nationalism itself that is far fromuniversal claims but exists in diversity.” Kapferer’s theorization is based onhis research in Sri Lanka where, he thinks, continuing conflict is related tonationalism based on cosmologies. The case of Sri Lanka provides anSeminars, Conferences, Addresses 425excellent example of how the construction of state ideology is influencedby religious forces, in this case Buddhism. Kapferer asserted that religionhad a deep territorialization aspect and that nationalism, in this sense, mighthave functioned as reterritorialization of a particular land and postcolonialstate. One can discern from his statements that, in the construction of stateideology in Sri Lanka, myths written by monks and religious rituals wereused to create a nationalist movement that eventually developed into a violentand destructive force in the context of Sri Lanka. Kapferer believes thatthe hierarchical order of the Sri Lankan state is embedded in the cosmologyof ancient religious chronicles.Christopher Cviic (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,UK) analyzed another phenomenon taking place in WesternEurope. His paper, “Chosen Peoples and Sacred Territories: TheBalkans,” discussed the relationship between religion, nation, and statein the Balkans throughout history and analyzed how these forces haveplayed themselves out in current events. According to Cviic, historicaldevelopments in the Balkans can provide important clues to understandingthe ongoing Balkan crisis, in which the Orthodox Church hasassumed the status of a nationalist institution representing the Serbiannation. The roots of these developments and the creation of a mythical“chosen” Serbian nation legitimized by religion can be traced to thedefeat and fall of medieval Serbia at Kosova by the Ottomans. Thisdefeat meant that they lost the land.However, under the Ottoman millet system, non-Muslim communitieswere allowed to organize their religious life and legal and educationalinstitutions. This allowed the Serbs to preserve and develop their ethnicand religious identities under the leadership of the Orthodox Church.Thus, religion and identity became inextricably linked, and the OrthodoxChurch assumed an extremely important role in the public life of individualBalkan nations. Cviic pointed out that “in the case of the Serbs, theirOrthodox Church played an important role in the formation of the modemSerbian nation-state by nurturing the myth of Kosova, named after theKosova Polje defeat by the Turks. Essential to that myth was the view thatby choosing to fight at Kosova Polje, the Serbs had opted for the Kingdomof Heaven. Later on the myth grew into a broader one, representing theSerbs as the martyr/victim people with a sacred mission of wresting theirHoly Territory of Kosova from the infidel Muslims to whom it had fallen.A later variant of that myth defined Serbia in terms of wherever Serbiangraves were to be found.” ...
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Martynov, A. "Balkan in the Current European System of International Relationship." Problems of World History, no. 7 (March 14, 2019): 101–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2019-7-8.
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The historical period after the beginning of the global economic crisis has accelerated the transformation of the Balkan subsystem of the European system of international relations. In a strategic sense, the European Union faces a complex dilemma: to Europeanize the Balkans, or to risk the balkanization of Europe. The European Union, together with the United States, has overcome the scenario of European balkanization. Symbols for this were the completion of the process of joining NATO Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia. It is critically important to overcome the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. Russia is trying to maintain its influence in Serbia, which remains the last Russian outpost in the Balkans. Serbian society remains divided into a liberal pro-European segment focused on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and a nationalist segment that hopes to reestablish the "Great Serbia" project on the verge of the 21st century. The peace in the Balkans can only bring the completion of the process of including this region into the system of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
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Ashbrook, John. "Politicization of identity in a European borderland: Istria, Croatia, and authenticity, 1990–2003." Nationalities Papers 39, no. 6 (November 2011): 871–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2011.614225.
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In most studies of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, identity politics focuses on nationalism. Unfortunately, very few examine regional identities and how they too are politicized in similar ways for similar reasons. Istria provides a good example of how identity is politicized and how and why individuals adapt it to both internal and external influences. While in the past local and regional identities were politicized in response to colonization, more recently national divisions became more prominent. However, in the very recent past, Istrian identity again became politicized as many natives drew lines between themselves and what they saw as an external national influence emanating from Zagreb. In the 1990s, a renewed Croatian national movement competed with an Istrian regional movement. Istrian regionalists, seeking to justify taking and maintaining regional power and hoping to more quickly bring Croatia into the European Union, used this new political tactic against the nationalizing Croatian government. While both the nationalists and the regionalists claimed the other side's ideology was foreign to Istria, in actuality both have historical roots in the region. Though the competition was not as virulent as in past episodes of nationalist tension between Italians and Croats, it does fit a pattern of continuity in the region.
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Sohrabi, Nader. "Reluctant Nationalists, Imperial Nation-State, and Neo-Ottomanism: Turks, Albanians, and the Antinomies of the End of Empire." Social Science History 42, no. 4 (2018): 835–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2018.4.
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Nationalism's role in the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire is re-examined. Traditionalists blamed the breakdown on the extreme nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) while today's orthodoxy attributes it to the external contingency of the Balkan Wars and World War I instead. This article looks at the onerous state-building and mild nation-building demands put forth by the CUP toward the Albanians. The Albanian resistance created unstable coalitions that broadened to include north and south, and tempered religion in favor of ethnicity, but fell short of demanding independence. The First Balkan War forced a vulnerable Albania to reluctantly declare independence for which it had made contingent plans. The Ottoman center refused to change course and its pursuit of an imperial nation-state prompted other populations to think and act more ethnically than ever before and draw up their own contingent plans. The concept of ethnicity without groups (Brubaker) and the causal connection between state-building and nationalism (Hechter) are critically assessed in the Ottoman context.
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Iliadis, Christos. "Nationalism and Minorities in the Ottoman Balkans: Greek Discourses on the Eastern Crisis (1875–1878)." Historical Review/La Revue Historique 15, no. 1 (May 20, 2019): 210. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/hr.20450.
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This article focuses on how the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 and the Slavic revolts were interpreted in Greece, given its national aspirations and its relationship with the Orthodox people of the Balkans. The analysis draws on the Athenian press and parliamentary minutes of the time, and rather than focusing on the diplomatic developments follows instead the social discourses on and dominant interpretations of the Slavs and Bulgarians after the Balkan uprisings as well as the dilemmas faced by Greece. It explores a moment in the discursive shift, which introduced an ethno-racial language within the Greek kingdom that began to replace the portrayal of Hellenism as an ecumenical ideology with one of a more exclusive and nationalistic character. It thus shows how the events sharpened the division between Hellenism and Slavism.
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Stokes, Gale. "Containing Nationalism: Solutions in the Balkans." Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 4 (July 1999): 3–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10758216.1999.11655840.
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Yakovina, Tvtrko. "CROATIAN POLITICS: SYMBOLS AND INACTIVITY." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 2 (2021): 101–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2021.02.05.
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The article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Croatia in close connection with its domestic policy. The author examines the balance of political forces in the country on the eve, during and after the presidential elections in 2019/2020, as well as the elections to Sabor (parliament) in July 2020. He describes in detail the situation in the party that won the elections to Sabor, - the Croatian Democratic Union, - and the internal party struggle between representatives of the centrist and right-wing nationalist groups. Largely thanks to the current leader and prime minister of Croatia A. Plenković, it ended in 2020 with the victory of the centrists. At the same time, the presidential elections in December 2019 - January 2020 were won by the candidate of the left-center - Social Democrat Z. Milanović, who defeated the CDU representative K. Grabar-Kitarović, who held this post. The author believes that in Croatia, as a result of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019/2020, a situation has developed in which the president and the prime minister, representatives of the left and the right centers respectively, can, through joint efforts, pursuing their own political goals, update Croatia’s domestic and foreign policy, including in the Balkan / South-Eastern Europe region. The previous policy of Croatia, according to the author, was unsuccessful. The previous leadership of Croatia, using as a basis the ideology of nationalism and fearing that Croatia would be historically associated with Yugoslavia and the Balkans, pursued a policy of self-isolation in the very region in which Croatia could play an important role. The balance of power formed in Croatia in 2020 makes it possible to intensify Croatia’s policy in the region, on the basis of a possible normalization of relations with the Serbian community of the country as well as through the process of improving relations with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without this transformation, the final stabilization in the Balkans / South-Eastern Europe region is impossible.
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Deets, Stephen. "Constitutionalism and Identity in Eastern Europe: Uncovering Philosophical Fragments." Nationalities Papers 33, no. 4 (December 2005): 489–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990500353956.
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Despite the euphoria surrounding the 1989 revolutions, over the past 15 years voices have warned that resurgent nationalism may bring “democracy in dark times” (Isaacs, 1998; Tismaneanu, 1998; Ramet, 1997). Reflecting this fear, a stream of articles has asserted that nationalism in the East is different from the more civic nationalism of the West (Vujacic, 1996; Bunce, 2001; Schöpflin, 2003). If true, these sentiments should be reflected in the constitutions, documents that define the polity and the foundational values of the state in addition to creating the basic institutional order. Debates over religious references in the European Union constitution and the focus on constitutional change by Albanian forces in Macedonia in 2000 serve as reminders of the centrality of constitutions in contention over identity. However, as all constitutions in East Central Europe and the Balkans set out a democratic structure informed by a tangle of national and liberal ideas, they cannot be neatly divided between those which are nationalist and those which are civic, between those which respect minority rights and those which do not. In fact, what is striking about the constitutions is how they combine ideas of liberal individualism, strong democracy, and pluralism.
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Swimelar, Safia. "LGBT Rights in Bosnia: The Challenge of Nationalism in the Context of Europeanization." Nationalities Papers 48, no. 4 (September 12, 2019): 768–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.65.
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AbstractNationalism has been one of the domestic constraints to progress on lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, especially in the Balkans that are dealing with multiple postwar transition realities. Ethno-nationalist challenges, often influenced by religion, have been significant in Bosnia-Herzegovina given weak state identity and democracy, competing institutionalized ethno-national identities, and slow Europeanization. Through the lenses of gendered nationalism, the societal security dilemma, and political homophobia, this article analyzes how the politics and discourse of LGBT rights during the past decade in Bosnia reveal tensions between competing and multiple identities and narratives—European, multiethnic, ethno-nationalist, and religious—using the violent response to the 2008 Queer Sarajevo Festival as a key illustration. However, in the past decade, LGBT rights have progressed and antigay backlash to LGBT visibility (in addition to stronger external leverage and other factors) has resulted in stronger activism and change. The public discourse and response to the announcement of Bosnia’s first Pride Parade represents another turning point in LGBT visibility that seems to reveal that ethno-nationalist challenges may be lessening as LGBT rights norms gain strength.
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Shadan, Dr Khaled Salman. "Sami Frashri and his role in the Albanian national renaissance." ALUSTATH JOURNAL FOR HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 227, no. 2 (December 9, 2018): 257–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.36473/ujhss.v227i2.718.
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In the midst of the rise of nationalist movements in Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Balkan countries, which had been under Ottoman administration for centuries, were not isolated from this constant movement. One of the most important Balkan countries that experienced a rise in national mobility was Albania, although it was a multi- But it was able to unite its forces and voice in all areas and forums, all thanks to the presence of a group of national Albanians who demanded national and national rights all regardless of religion and nationalism, led by Sami Farashri, who contributed with his colleagues in the statement and the consolidation of milk rights for the To achieve full independence. For these and other reasons, Sami Frashri was the focus of this study, which came under the title (Sami Frashri and his role in the Albanian national renaissance).
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Swimelar, Safia. "Nationalism and Europeanization in LGBT Rights and Politics: A Comparative Study of Croatia and Serbia." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 33, no. 3 (November 29, 2018): 603–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325418805135.
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LGBT rights have come to be seen as allied with the idea of “Europe” and a European identity, particularly in the process of European Union enlargement to the East. Scholars have examined the ways in which external norms interact with more local, often “traditional” norms and identities. In this process, nationalism and conceptions of national identity and gender/sexuality norms can be seen as important factors that influence the domestic adoption of LGBT rights, particularly in the post-war Balkans. Croatia and Serbia (from approximately 2000 to 2014) present two interesting and different cases to analyze how discourses and dynamics of national and state identity construction, nationalism, and LGBT rights relate to discourses of “Europeanness” and European identity and how these affect the political dynamics of LGBT rights. This article finds that in Croatia, national identity was constructed in terms of convergence with European norms and identity, homonationalism was used to distinguish themselves from a “Balkan” identity, and there was a lower threat perception of the LGBT community framed primarily as a “threat to the family.” In Serbia, state and national identity was constructed in opposition to Europe and homosexuality had stronger threat perception, framed primarily as “threat to the nation.” In short, nationalism and national identity were less disadvantageous as a domestic constraint to LGBT rights in Croatia than in Serbia. The dynamics between nationalism and LGBT rights played out, for example, in the politics of the marriage referendum, Pride Parades, and public discourse more generally. This research contributes to the scholarship on LGBT rights and nationalism by empirically analyzing the different ways that nationalism, gender/sexuality, and European identity interrelate and influence LGBT rights change in a changing post-war identity landscape and how domestic constraints affect human rights norm diffusion.
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Biserko, Sonya. "HEGEMONIC NATIONALIST MATRICES OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF THE BALKANS." Urgent Problems of Europe, no. 2 (2021): 84–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/ape/2021.02.04.
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The article examines the features of public attitudes, national consciousness and foreign policy of Serbia in the context of its relationship with the countries of the Western Balkans. On the basis of modern Serbian scientific literature and opinion piece, the author analyzes the current crisis state of Serbian society, which was the result of the policy of S. Milošević and the heirs of the ideas of Serbian nationalism. The main attention is paid to Serbia’s relations with the newly formed states after the collapse of the SFRY - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia - from the point of view of the problem of joining of these countries the EU and NATO. The author analyzes the political and psychological atmosphere in Serbian society, the moods and plans of the authorities of modern Serbia, as well as the views of the right-wing nationalist politicians and scientists in relation to neighboring states. The study acquaints the reader with Serbia’s foreign policy plans and their results in the context of the formation of a new national identity based on the «Saint Sava myth», Serbian Orthodoxy and Serbian ethnic nationalism. An important place in the formation of Serbian identity is occupied by the revision of the concept of the history of Yugoslavia, which leads to the deformation of historical consciousness and the dominance of ethno-national identity over all other types of identity, and above all, over civic identity. The author believes that the new identity now being formed in Serbia leads to the rejection of modern reforms based on the rule of law, human rights, pluralism and tolerance. The author concludes that for stabilization in the Balkans it is necessary to find a point of integration common to all peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of their nationality. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a key link in the process of stabilizing the region. But all the other states of the Western Balkans are facing the same task. The researcher examines the role of Russia in the domestic life and foreign policy of Serbia and, in general, in the Western Balkans region, which has not yet resolved the problems of the transition period.
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Herzfeld, Michael. "Les enjeux du sang : la production officielle des stéréotypes dans les Balkans. Le cas de la Grèce." Anthropologie et Sociétés 19, no. 3 (September 10, 2003): 37–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/015368ar.
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Résumé Les enjeux du sang : la production officielle des stéréotypes dans les Balkans Le cas de la Grèce Cet article s'intéresse aux enjeux du sang et à leur symbolique dans la construction de l'identité ethnique et nationale en Grèce. Le phénomène nationaliste n'est pas réductible à la « mentalité » qui, comme le sang, est une cosmologie idéologique et rhétorique constitutive de la discursivité nationaliste et de sa transmission. La logique de la segmentante sous-jacente à ces enjeux du sang est elle-même consubstantielle, fût-elle déguisée, au discours étatique. Cette logique nationaliste induit chez des groupes minoritaires une « conscience ethnique » essentialisée, mimétique, de celle des majoritaires qui en refusent cependant l'existence et la légitimité. La métaphore du sang pourrait donc raviver des tendances inquiétantes déjà à l'œuvre dans les Balkans.
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Markovich, Slobodan. "Patterns of national identity development among the Balkan orthodox Christians during the nineteenth century." Balcanica, no. 44 (2013): 209–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc1344209m.
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The paper analyses the development of national identities among Balkan Orthodox Christians from the 1780s to 1914. It points to pre-modern political subsystems in which many Balkan Orthodox peasants lived in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Serbian and Greek uprisings/revolutions are analyzed in the context of the intellectual climate of the Enlightenment. Various modes of penetration of the ideas of the Age of Revolution are analyzed as well as the ways in which new concepts influenced proto-national identities of Serbs and Romans/Greeks. The author accepts Hobsbawm?s concept of proto-national identities and identifies their ethno-religious identity as the main element of Balkan Christian Orthodox proto-nations. The role of the Orthodox Church in the formation of ethno-religious proto-national identity and in its development into national identity during the nineteenth century is analyzed in the cases of Serbs, Romans/ Greeks, Vlachs/Romanians and Bulgarians. Three of the four Balkan national movements fully developed their respective national identities through their own ethnic states, and the fourth (Bulgarian) developed partially through its ethnic state. All four analyzed identities reached the stage of mass nationalism by the time of the Balkan Wars. By the beginning of the twentieth century, only Macedonian Slavs kept their proto-national ethno-religious identity to a substantial degree. Various analyzed patterns indicate that nascent national identities coexisted with fluid and shifting protonational identities within the same religious background. Occasional supremacy of social over ethnic identities has also been identified. Ethnification of the Orthodox Church, in the period 1831-1872, is viewed as very important for the development of national movements of Balkan Orthodox Christians. A new three-stage model of national identity development among Balkan Orthodox Christians has been proposed. It is based on specific aspects in the development of these nations, including: the insufficient development of capitalist society, the emergence of ethnic states before nationalism developed in three out of four analyzed cases, and an inappropriate social structure with a bureaucratic class serving the same role as the middle class had in more developed European nationalisms. The three phases posed three different questions to Balkan Christian Orthodox national activists. Phase 1: Who are we?; Phase 2: What to do with our non-liberated compatriots; and Phase 3: Has the mission of national unification been fulfilled?
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Groen, Basilius J. "Nationalism and reconciliation: Orthodoxy in the Balkans∗." Religion, State and Society 26, no. 2 (June 1998): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637499808431814.
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Livanios, Dimitris. "Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 2, no. 2 (May 2002): 165–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683850208454696.
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Katsikas, Stefanos, and Sakis Dimitriadis. "Muslim Converts to Orthodox Christianity during the Greek War of Independence, 1821–1832." European History Quarterly 51, no. 3 (July 2021): 299–323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02656914211025378.
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This article explores the conversion of Muslims to Orthodox Christianity during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1832) and the first post-independence years as a case study which shows that religious boundaries in the Balkans do not seem to have been as insurmountable as one might think. The bonds between people of different religious affiliations, including Christians and Muslims, were not so loose in the chaotic period of the nineteenth century. Even though religious differences have always existed in South-eastern Europe, the inhabitants of that region have not always seen fellow humans with different religious affiliations as estranged others. Muslim converts to Christianity were ready to compromise their Islamic faith in exchange for security, social status, and well-being in the changed political and social environment created by Greek nationalism, with a view to advancing their professional opportunities and material interests in the new state. The Greek case is not unique. Religious conversions from Islam to Christianity occurred elsewhere in the region during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet, while Balkan historiographical literature has focused on the Islamization of Christians in the region during the Ottoman period, it has paid little attention to the inverse processes of Christianization of Muslims in the age of nationalism.
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Drezgic, Rada, and Dubravka Zarkov. "Feminist troubles with the Balkans." Sociologija 47, no. 4 (2005): 289–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc0504289d.
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The paper analyses writings of Slavenka Drakulic and certain number of other feminist writers from ex-Yugoslavia aiming to answer to the following questions: first, how much and in what way the discourses on ex-Yugoslavia Balkans, (post)socialism, nationalism and war have been produced by local feminists and/or imported from the West; second, have these discourses been overlapping with local feminist discourses about masculinity and femininity and how.
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Robertson, James. "Imagining the Balkans as a Space of Revolution: The Federalist Vision of Serbian Socialism, 1870–1914." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 31, no. 2 (April 4, 2017): 402–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325417701815.
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Between the years 1870 and 1914, leftist intellectuals in the Kingdom of Serbia theorized and promoted a project of Balkan Federation as a strategic priority in the social, economic, and political transformation of the region. This article offers a genealogy of these federalist ideas and places them in dialogue with rival projects of regional unification in the Balkans and Eastern Europe during the long nineteenth century. It begins by developing a typology of federalist projects in Europe, categorizing these according to the underlying models of sovereignty upon which they were founded. I identify four categories: revolutionary-republican, imperial-reformist, imperial-irredentist, and revolutionary-social. Instead of organizing these federalisms according to their authors’ ideological commitments (socialist, nationalist, pan-Slavic) or their geographic scope (Balkan, Danubian), the article argues that examining their respective models of sovereignty offers intellectual historians a more productive approach to identify the unexpected convergences and divergences of federalist projects during this period. The article then moves into a discussion of the development of Serbian socialist ideas of Balkan Federation, beginning first with the work of Svetozar Marković (1846–1875) and then turning to the writings of the fin de siècle Social Democratic Party in the decade before World War I. Situating this genealogy of socialist Balkan federalism in its broader European intellectual milieu, I use the above typology to identify the ways in which Serbian socialists converged and diverged from contemporary federalist projects, including the reformist ideas of the Austro-Marxists, the irredentist strategy of the Serbian Progressive Party, and the republican ideas of Karel Kautsky.
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Bjelić, Dušan. "The Balkans Geo-psychoanalysis." Janus Head 19, no. 1 (2021): 109–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jh20211918.
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In the 1990s, Julija Kristeva and Slavoj Žižek developed a unique discourse within psychoanalysis - the psychoanalysis of the Balkans. Their cultural and political analysis represented the Balkans as a pathological region of nations suffering from the syndrome of an “archaic mother.” They propose in their different ways that the subject (nation) must radically separate from oedipal attachment to the attachment to nationalism as unemancipated Oedipus and subordinate to the authority of the symbolic father, that is, to the West. At the heart of such an approach is a conservative policy of labeling the Balkans as primitive behind Kristeva and Žižek loom self-orientalization and geopolitical de-identification with the Balkans as a precondition for their cosmopolitan and universalist identity.
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Prica, Bogdan. "Nationalism among the Croats." Zbornik Matice srpske za drustvene nauke, no. 116-117 (2004): 103–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/zmsdn0417103p.
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These are the three lectures about Croatian nationalism presented in the Serbian Culture Club in 1940. They review the history of the Croato-Serbian relations in a specific way, from the time when the Serbs settled in the regions of the former Croatian medieval state, after the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, after the fall of Bosnia in 1463 and after the Moh?cs Battle in 1526, till the period preceding World War II. Comparing Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the author points out that nationalism among the Croats appeared relatively late, that it did not have deeper folk roots and that at first it was the nationalism of the upper class. It was a feudal-estate nationalism but later there also appeared Austro-Catholic nationalism of the lower class in the regions under the Habsburgs. Enmity, hatred towards the Serbs and Serbophobia were the common features of these two nationalisms. The author points out that the feudal-estate nationalism of the upper class was caused by the state-legal and agrarian-legal regulation in the regions of the former Croatian kingdom settled by the Serbs. These regions, under the name of Military Border, were granted a special legal system. As for their state-legal status, the Serbs were completely excluded from the rule of the Croatian Ban the Croatian Assembly, and were under the jurisdiction of the Austrian military commanders ? therefore, directly under Vienna. As for the agrarian-legal status, Vienna completely freed the inhabitants of the Border from all taxes for the Croatian gentry, who had owned these regions before the Turkish offensive; the reason was to motivate the Serbs for permanent military service at the Border and to use these regulations to lure new Serbs-solders from the neighbouring Turkish Empire. And the dynastic-catholic nationalism of the lower class clashed with the Serbs, inhabitants of the Border, primarily because of the religious intolerance, of the irresistable desire to convert the Serbs into Catholicism. In addition, envy towards the Serbs in the Border area ? warriors and free men ? began to develop more and more among the Croatian peasants in the Ban?s Croatia, in the so-called provincial, who still remained the serfs of their gentry. The author underlines that the Croatian Serbophobias have deep historical and social roots, and points to the typical historical facts which confirm that. Croatian nationalism withdrew only sporadically before the Illyrian Yugoslavism, which saw several rises and falls in Croatia. Yugoslavism was strengthened only when the pressure from Vienna, Pest or the Italians was stronger and, secondly, it worked only when there were chances to realize it from Zagreb, not from Belgrade. As soon as one of these two conditions was not met, Croatian spirit exclusively prevailed. The author disagrees with those who believed that the Croatian nationalism could have been neutralized by decentralization, federalization and democratization of the common state. He thinks that the Croatian nationalist movement did not want a just arrangement of the relations with the Serbs, but Croatia with the border on the Drina, in which the Serbian nation would be stifled with the use of "modern" methods. Therefore, he believes that only a resolute resistance of the Serbs in the defence of their interests could stop Croatian chauvinism.
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Legascon, Jean-Simon. "L'Europe face au défi nationaliste dans les Balkans." Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains 217, no. 1 (2005): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gmcc.217.0061.
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Groen, Basilius J. "Eastern Orthodoxy in the Balkans, Nationalism and Reconciliation." Exchange 27, no. 2 (1998): 121–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157254398x00033.
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Leustean, Lucian N. "“For the Glory of Romanians”: Orthodoxy and Nationalism in Greater Romania, 1918–1945*." Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (September 2007): 717–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990701475111.
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The relationship between Orthodox Christianity and national identity has been one of the most contended issues in modern nationalism. The dominant religion in the Balkans, Orthodoxy has transported the identity of ethnic groups into the modern era and political leaders have employed religious institutions according to their own political agendas in the construction of “imagined communities.” Orthodoxy has a particular perception of the political field. Based on the concept of symphonia, which dates back to the Byzantine Empire, the Church claims that religious and political offices are equal and have similar responsibilities. Religious and political rulers have the mission to guide the people and the Church and state should collaborate harmoniously in fostering identity. Political leaders refer to the nationalist discourse of the Church in order to induce national cohesion. From this perspective, the relationship between religion and the construction of the nation in the Orthodox space differs from that in the Catholic or Protestant world where Churches are supranational or sub-national institutions.
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Djukanovic, Dragan. "The Western Balkans: The fate of an European periphery." Medjunarodni problemi 67, no. 4 (2015): 349–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp1504349d.
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The paper analyzes what is the current position of the Western Balkans in the context of contemporary European trends and events. The author considers the European and Euro-Atlantic integration a certain attempt to ?relocate? the whole region of the Western Balkans from an obvious periphery to a semi-periphery position. The focus of analysis is on numerous problems such as continued revitalization of the local ethno-nationalisms, structural economic crisis, the presence of high levels of organized crime and corruption. The author points out that, so far, numerous attempts of the most influential members of the international community primarily the United States and the European Union have failed to promote the improvement of the relations between new-formed countries and to establish a sort of regional identity. The author argues that the creation of the antagonistic identities of the states and nations of the Western Balkans during the breakup of the former Yugoslav federation was the main obstacle to the creation of the common identity. The author concludes that, in view of the new growing trends of ethnic nationalisms and certain forms of extremism and radicalism, the ?relocation? of the Western Balkans from European periphery to the semi-periphery will not be short-term or easy, as evidenced by numerous internal problems and problems in bilateral relations.
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Gruenwald, Oskar. "Belgrade Student Demonstrations, 1996-97." Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 13, no. 1 (2001): 155–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis2001131/29.
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Belgrade University student demonstrations, 1996-97, represent a turning point in the emergence of a democratic civic culture and civil society in the former Yugoslavia. Large-scale student demonstrations were triggered by the regimens cancellation of the November 1996 municipal election victories by the united opposition, Zajedno, in more than a dozen cities throughout Serbia, Demonstrating independently of political parties, student demands concerned not only narrow issues of university education, funding and governance, but also much larger society-wide issues concerning democratic prospects for Serbia Student demonstrations helped achieve several important goals, including the reinstatement of the 1996 opposition victories, and hastened Milošević's departure. Belgrade students sought consciously to transcend Serbian nationalism, effectively challenging the regime, while distancing themselves from all political parties. Crucial in terms of overcoming the virulent nationalisms, exploited by political leaderships throughout the Balkans in the 1990s, was the students' quest for universal human rights, democracy, pluralism, tolerance, and an open society. Following Milošević's demise, the studem movement became institutionalized in Otpor as a genuine civil society public-interest group and unofficial watchdog.
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Tesser, Lynn M. "Identity, Contingency, and Interaction: Historical Research and Social Science Analysis of Nation-State Proliferation." Nationalities Papers 47, no. 3 (May 2019): 412–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.33.
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AbstractScholars of nation-building and secession tend to prioritize elite or broader nationalist activism when explaining the proliferation of nation-states. Yet, recent historical research reveals a major finding: the influence of great powers tended to eclipse nationalist mobilization for new states in Latin America, the Balkans, Anatolia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on recent trends in historical research largely unknown in other fields, this article examines context, timing, and event sequencing to provide a new approach to multi-case research on nation-state proliferation. Major power recognition of new states in the Balkans also emerges as transformational for the post-World War I replacement of dynastic empires with nation-states in Europe. These findings suggest a shift of focus to the interplay of nationalist activism and great power policy for explaining the spread of nation-states.
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Rogoś, Agata. "Antiquization processes in the Macedonian, Kazakh and Turkmen National Narratives: Visual constructs that shape political conceptions." Open Political Science 1, no. 1 (November 1, 2018): 111–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/openps-2018-0008.
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AbstractThe goal of this chapter is to conduct the analysis of the national symbols systems in the public space of Skopje (Macedonia), Astana (Kazakhstan) and Aşgabat (Turkmenistan) that are being represented in national political discourses along with a wide interpretation and contextualization in the framework of the postsocialist process of reconstruction of national symbolism in order to indicate identity and restoration structures and development of the actual national discourse in Macedonia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In the actual process of reconstruction of national symbols system in analyzed cultural traditions it is important to underline the influence of nationalist ideology, which both in the Balkans and Central Asia has appeared in the form of ethno-nationalisms, where such factors as: language, history, culture and religion have been of crucial importance for construction of the idea of community that defined particular ethnos. One of the most influential tools of national ideology is taking the advantage of historical arguments aiming to expose the previous control over certain territory through the power structure, introduced by the present day nation.
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Stankovič, Peter. "Appropriating `Balkan': Rock and Nationalism in Slovenia." Critical Sociology 27, no. 3 (May 2001): 98–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/08969205010270030501.
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Christofis, Nikos. "Balkan nationalism(s) and the Ottoman empire." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 18, no. 4 (July 29, 2018): 605–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2018.1503082.
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Stankovič, Peter. "APPROPRIATING 'BALKAN': ROCK AND NATIONALISM IN SLOVENIA." Critical Sociology 27, no. 3 (October 1, 2001): 98–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916301320250303.
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Perica, Vjekoslav. "United They Stood, Divided They Fell: Nationalism and the Yugoslav School of Basketball, 1968–2000." Nationalities Papers 29, no. 2 (June 2001): 267–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990120053746.
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Both Yugoslav wars and Yugoslav basketball were conspicuous in Western media in the 1990s. While CNN transmitted scenes of horror from battlefields of Bosnia and Kosovo, several dozen professional athletes of Yugoslav background could be seen in action on U. S. sport channels. Yugoslavs, by far the most numerous among foreign players in the strongest basketball league in the world—the American professional basketball league (NBA)—sparked the audience's curiosity about their background and the peculiar Yugoslav style of basketball. The literature concerning the Yugoslav crisis and Balkan wars noted sporadic outbursts of ethnic hatred in sport arenas, but did not provide any detailed information on the otherwise important role of sport in Yugoslav history and society. Not even highly competent volumes such as Beyond Yugoslavia, which highlighted the country's culture, arts, religion, economy, and military, paid attention to what Yugoslavs called “the most important secondary issue in the world”—sport. Yet sport reveals not merely the pastimes of the Yugoslav peoples, but also the varieties of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, including probably the most neglected of all local nationalisms: the official communist-era patriotic ideology of interethnic “brotherhood and unity.” The goal of this article is to highlight this type of nationalism manifested via state-directed sport using as a case study the most successful basketball program outside the United States.
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ALBANESE, PATRICIA. "Nationalism, War, and Archaization of Gender Relations in the Balkans." Violence Against Women 7, no. 9 (September 2001): 999–1023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10778010122182875.
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Zinaić, Rade. "Twilight of the Proletariat: Reading Critical Balkanology as Liberal Ideology." New Perspectives 25, no. 1 (February 2017): 19–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2336825x1702500102.
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Critical Balkanology is a sub-discipline of Central and East European Studies that deconstructs and renders arbitrary the claims of ethnic nationalisms and Western “colonial” representations of the Balkans. Yet, this critical and nominally anti-racist project is parasitic on a hegemonic Euro-Atlantic liberal ideology in that it cannot see beyond the singular individual as victim and vanguard, thereby obscuring and/or effacing an awareness of class inequality. Tomislav Longinović's Vampire Nation: Violence as Cultural Imaginary (2011) is emblematic of this project. I place this text under an immanent critique and a contrapuntal reading as an example of how one can rescue class consciousness from this literature and push the limits of its politics while, in Longinović's case, reading it against the socioeconomic contradictions of post-MiloŠević Serbia. Longinović's tracing of the vampire metaphor as a way of understanding the consumptive nature of both ethnic nationalism and Western imperialism reveals a politics that stigmatizes Serbia's plebeian history in favour of a Westernized and urban middle class youth cult of techno-culture, rock music, and the disembodied voices of (male) intellectuals – a form of epistemic violence that parallels processes of privatization, social cleansing, and class oppression consuming the bodies of (sub)proletarians.
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Bugajski, Janusz. "Balkan vortex: states, territories, and minorities." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 1, no. 3 (1993): 171–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181193x00149.
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AbstractWith the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the unravelling of centralized Communist controls, numerous points of conflict over territories, minorities, and resources were regenerated in the Balkans. In some instances, former Communist forces have adopted nationalist programs and tried to exploit social and ethnic cleavages to preserve their positions and privileges. In other cases, radical populists and ultra-nationalist groupings have endeavored to capitalize on deteriorating economic conditions and continuing political instability by deliberately exacerbating cultural, religious, regional, and nationality frictions. Simultaneously, minority communities in several countries have raised their political aspirations for cultural autonomy and territorial self-government. Such demands have, in turn, heightened tensions with majority populations and with some neighboring states concerned over the fate of their co-ethnics.
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Legvold, Robert, and Vjekoslav Perica. "Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (2003): 172. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033473.
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