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Journal articles on the topic 'Nationalist elites'
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1
Zhou, Luyang. "Nationalism and Communism as Foes and Friends." European Journal of Sociology 60, no. 3 (December 2019): 313–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975619000158.
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AbstractSociologists have noted that the ideological inclusiveness of nationalism varies. By comparing the Bolshevik and Chinese communist revolutionary elites, this article explains that such variation depends on the social strength of nationalism. A strong nationalism is (a) undergirded by a widely diffused national culture that can socialize most radical elites into the nation; (b) kept institutionally open to broad social strata so that lower classes can form a nationalist identity through participation; and (c) universally believed to be a geopolitically feasible anti-colonial revolution so that radical elites can think of engagement as worthwhile and necessary. Using a comparative biographical method probing both nationalists and communists, this article demonstrates that nationalism in Tsarist Russia was far weaker than in post-imperial China. In the former, the nationalist movement excluded communists while, in the latter, communists were incorporated. Therefore, the two communist parties had different understandings of Marxism.
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Kocher, Matthew Adam, Adria K. Lawrence, and Nuno P. Monteiro. "Nationalism, Collaboration, and Resistance: France under Nazi Occupation." International Security 43, no. 2 (November 2018): 117–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00329.
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Does nationalism produce resistance to foreign military occupation? The existing literature suggests that it does. Nationalism, however, also can lead to acquiescence and even to active collaboration with foreign conquerors. Nationalism can produce a variety of responses to occupation because political leaders connect nationalist motivations to other political goals. A detailed case study of the German occupation of France during World War II demonstrates these claims. In this highly nationalistic setting, Vichy France entered into collaboration with Germany despite opportunities to continue fighting in 1940 or defect from the German orbit later. Collaboration with Germany was widely supported by French elites and passively accommodated by the mass of nationalistic French citizens. Because both resisters and collaborators were French nationalists, nationalism cannot explain why collaboration was the dominant French response or why a relatively small number of French citizens resisted. Variation in who resisted and when resistance occurred can be explained by the international context and domestic political competition. Expecting a German victory in the war, French right-wing nationalists chose collaboration with the Nazis as a means to suppress and persecute their political opponents, the French Left. In doing so, they fostered resistance. This case suggests the need for a broader reexamination of the role of nationalism in explaining reactions to foreign intervention.
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Rudling, Per A. "Multiculturalism, memory, and ritualization: Ukrainian nationalist monuments in Edmonton, Alberta." Nationalities Papers 39, no. 5 (September 2011): 733–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2011.599375.
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Canadians of Ukrainian descent constitute a significant part of the population of the Albertan capital. Among other things, their presence is felt in the public space as Ukrainian monuments constitute a part of the landscape. The article studies three key monuments, physical manifestations of the ideology of local Ukrainian nationalist elites in Edmonton: a 1973 monument to nationalist leader Roman Shukhevych, a 1976 memorial constructed by the Ukrainian Waffen-SS in Edmonton, and a 1983 memorial to the 1932–1933 famine in the Ukrainian SSR. Representing a narrative of suffering, resistance, and redemption, all three monuments were organized by the same activists and are representative for the selective memory of an “ethnic” elite, which presents nationalist ideology as authentic Ukrainian cultural heritage. The narrative is based partly upon an uncritical cult of totalitarian, anti-Semitic, and terroristic political figures, whose war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and collaboration with Nazi Germany the nationalists deny and obfuscate. The article argues that government support and direct public funding has strengthened the radicals within the community and helped promulgate their mythology. In the case of the Ukrainian Canadian political elite, official multiculturalism underwrites a narrative at odds with the liberal democratic values it was intended to promote. The failure to deconstruct the “ethnic” building blocks of Canadian multiculturalism and the willingness to accept at face value the primordial claims and nationalist myths of “ethnic” groups has given Canadian multiculturalism the character of multi-nationalism.
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Edwards, Mark. "From a Christian World Community to a Christian America: Ecumenical Protestant Internationalism as a Source of Christian Nationalist Renewal." Genealogy 3, no. 2 (May 30, 2019): 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/genealogy3020030.
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Christian nationalism in the United States has neither been singular nor stable. The country has seen several Christian nationalist ventures come and go throughout its history. Historians are currently busy documenting the plurality of Christian nationalisms, understanding them more as deliberate projects rather than as components of a suprahistorical secularization process. This essay joins in that work. Its focus is the World War II and early Cold War era, one of the heydays of Christian nationalist enthusiasm in America—and the one that shaped our ongoing culture wars between “evangelical” conservatives and “godless” liberals. One forgotten and admittedly paradoxical pathway to wartime Christian nationalism was the world ecumenical movement (“ecumenical” here meaning intra-Protestant). Protestant ecumenism curated the transformation of 1920s and 1930s Christian internationalism into wartime Christian Americanism. They involved many political and intellectual elites along the way. In pioneering many of the geopolitical concerns of Cold War evangelicals, ecumenical Protestants aided and abetted the Christian conservative ascendancy that wields power even into the present.
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Molchanov, Mikhail A. "Post-Communist Nationalism as A Power Resource: A Russia-Ukraine Comparison." Nationalities Papers 28, no. 2 (June 2000): 263–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713687473.
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The end of communism brought hopes for a wholesale liberal-democratic transformation to the republics of the former Soviet Union. However, bitter disenchantment soon followed, as resurrected nationalism undermined the republics' stability and threatened democracy. Mass nationalist movements in these countries were not observed until the regime's initial liberalization. In most cases, the high phase of nationalist mobilization was reached only after the postcommunist state elites endorsed nationalism as an official policy of the state. In each instance, nationalist strategies of the state were defined in a complex interplay of domestic and international factors. Ethnicity became politicized as a resource for political action when other resources proved inadequate or insufficient. In addition, exogenous factors often played a leading role in this development.
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Lee, Dong Sun. "Democratization and the US-South Korean Alliance." Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 3 (December 2007): 469–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800002599.
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This article explains why, in the wake of South Korea's democratization, the US-Republic of Korea alliance has suffered a steady decline while avoiding an abrupt collapse. The author argues that democratization weakened this asymmetric alliance by increasing the political influence of nationalism in South Korea. New South Korean democratic elites, subscribing to nationalist ideals, demanded an autonomous, equal relationship with the United States regardless of the de facto power disparity between the two countries. These elites also deemphasized the security threat from North Korea—with which they perceived a shared national identity—and adopted an unconditional engagement policy with that nation. The United States, in turn, resented the apparently unrealistic policies of these elites and showed a decreased interest in the alliance. Democratization, however, did not cause an abrupt end to the alliance, for two reasons. First, North Korea's military strength preserved a significant strategic need in South Korea for allied support. Second, as the result of a measured transition process, old pro-alliance elites in South Korea retained enough political clout to proscribe a radical shift in foreign policy away from the alliance with the United States, while new elites had opportunities to reconcile their nationalist ideals with strategic realities.
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OKUTAN, Muhammet Erdal. "The European Union and First Years AKP: Popular Nationalism in Turkey." International Journal of Social, Political and Economic Research 7, no. 4 (December 23, 2020): 1090–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.46291/ijospervol7iss4pp1090-1109.
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Nationalism is one of the important ideologies; it is too difficult to express what nationalism is in one sentence, because it is a multidimensional, debatable ideology. In Turkey, nationalism is also an important issue because of its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure. Moreover elites have an important roles on constructing a type of nationalism, especially popular nationalism. Critiques and opposition of the political and intellectual elites against the governmental policies indicated the escalated atmosphere in nationalist discourse in Turkey until 2010. Therefore, this work empowered the theories of popular nationalism, which contribute the relationship between the elites and nationalism to the body of theoretical knowledge. However, some other issues may escalate the popular nationalism in Turkey. Turkish public thinks on that way; 29 percentages of the sample group think that the cause of escalating nationalism in Turkey is PKK terrorism, and secondly 17 percentages of the sample group suggested that EU demands led the increase. On the other hand some may claim that even those issues are interrelated.
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Blank, Stephen. "The Return of the Repressed? Post-1989 Nationalism in the “New” Eastern Europe." Nationalities Papers 22, no. 2 (1994): 405–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999408408336.
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The intractable war in Yugoslavia, the breakup of Czechslovakia, the nationalist rumblings in Hungary and Romania, and manifestations of imperial and nationalist longings in Russian politics signify nationalism's enduring potency in Central and Eastern Europe. While some foreign observers worried about this potency, the new elites largely believed that liberalism in power could overcome those forces. Liberal democracy's triumph supposedly meant the end of History,inter alia,aggressive nationalism in Eastern Europe. They believed that these national liberation movements had cooperative, mutually supportive relationships that would flower after Communism ended. Nationalist discords were due to Eastern Europe's previous historical post-1914 nightmares, but the new post-1989 states would have amicable relations with their neighbors. Ostensibly, nationalism, once freed from Soviet repression, would bring an end to Soviet rule and usher in a new ‘springtime of nations.'
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Deegan-Krause, Kevin. "Uniting the Enemy: Politics and the Convergence of Nationalisms in Slovakia." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 18, no. 4 (November 2004): 651–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325404269596.
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Although aggregate popular support for particular nationalisms in Slovakia showed little change during the 1990s, relationships between nationalisms changed significantly. This article uses categories of nationalism derived from the relational typologies of Brubaker and Hechter to analyze surveys of postcommunist Slovak public opinion and demonstrate that popular nationalisms against Czechs, Hungarians, the West, and nonnationalist Slovaks bore little relationship to one another at the time of Slovakia’s independence but converged over time. With the encouragement of nationalist political elites, a large share of the Slovak population became convinced that Slovakia faced threats from all sides and that the country’s enemies were actually working together to undermine its sovereignty. The example of Slovakia thus provides an important case study for understanding how the complex and interactions between distinct nationalisms creates opportunities for the influence of political leadership.
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Kuo, Huei-Ying. "Rescuing Businesses through Transnationalism: Embedded Chinese Enterprise and Nationalist Activities in Singapore in the 1930s Great Depression." Enterprise & Society 7, no. 1 (March 2006): 98–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s146722270000375x.
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This article argues that the embeddedness of Chinese enterprises in Singapore society explains the limited success of the nationalist movement in Singapore. To respond to the economic crisis in the 1930s, Chinese business elites employed nationalist rhetoric to appeal to their compatriots in the British colony to support Chinese “national products.” With dual allegiance to both British rule and Chinese national identity, Chinese business nationalists took a transnational approach. Because Chinese business communities in Singapore were organized along subethnic lines, Chinese transnationalism failed to surmount these social divisions.
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CHACKO, PRIYA. "MarketizingHindutva: The state, society, and markets in Hindu nationalism." Modern Asian Studies 53, no. 2 (October 26, 2018): 377–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x17000051.
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AbstractThe embrace of markets and globalization by radical political parties is often taken as reflecting and facilitating the moderation of their ideologies. This article considers the case of Hindu nationalism, orHindutva, in India. It is argued that, rather than resulting in the moderation of Hindu nationalism, mainstream economic ideas are adopted and adapted by its proponents to further theHindutvaproject. Hence, until the 1990s, the Hindu nationalist political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its earlier incarnation, the Jana Sangh, and the grass-roots organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), adopted and adapted mainstream ideas by emphasizing the state as the protector of (Hindu) society against markets and as a tool of societal transformation for its Hindu nationalist support base. Since the 1990s, Indian bureaucratic and political elites, including in the BJP, have adopted a view of the market as the main driver of societal transformations. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, in particular, the BJP has sought to consolidate a broader support base and stimulate economic growth and job creation by bolstering the corporate sector and recreating the middle and ‘neo-middle’ classes as ‘virtuous market citizens’ who view themselves as entrepreneurs and consumers but whose behaviour is regulated by the framework of Hindu nationalism. These policies, however, remain contested within the Hindu nationalist movement and in Indian society generally. The BJP's discourse against ‘anti-nationals’ and the use of legal sanctions against dissent is an attempt to curb these challenges.
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GILLINGHAM, PAUL. "The Emperor of Ixcateopan: Fraud, Nationalism and Memory in Modern Mexico." Journal of Latin American Studies 37, no. 3 (July 29, 2005): 561–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x05009466.
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This article analyses the forgery and discovery of the purported tomb of Cuauhtémoc, the last Mexica emperor. An eclectic collection of contemporary sources outlines a subtle interplay between elites, cultural managers and peasants, who alternately collaborated and competed in manipulating the would-be invention. Groups traditionally undervalued in studies of nationalism, namely villagers and petty bureaucrats, went far beyond the mimesis of elites to significantly reshape parts of the national narrative. Their entrepreneurial success in manipulating nationalist symbols demonstrates that the instrumentalist use of the past is a cross-class activity.
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Davis, Sacha E. "Hospitality networks, British travel writers, and the dissemination of competing Transylvanian claims to civilization, 1830s–1930s." Nationalities Papers 46, no. 4 (July 2018): 612–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2018.1448375.
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Hungarian, Saxon, and Romanian nationalist activists in Transylvania disseminated competing claims to “Westernness” by swaying visiting British travel writers' descriptions through hospitality networks that guided what writers saw and heard, assuring that travelers favored the nationalists' classifications of the region's ethnicities. Although the qualities British travelers valued varied depending on individual differences and intellectual currents such as enlightened reform, scientific racism, and the romantic revival, travelers consistently ascribed the qualities they best favored to the nationality on whose hospitality they relied. Wealth and time of travel determined which hospitality networks travelers favored. The Hungarian noble elites hosted most travelers until 1918, when the newly dominant Romanian nobility replaced them. Throughout, peasant voices especially remained marginalized.
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Bertelsen, Olga. "Political Affinities and Maneuvering of Soviet Political Elites: Heorhii Shevel and Ukraine’s Ministry of Strange Affairs in the 1970s." Nationalities Papers 47, no. 3 (May 2019): 394–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.51.
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AbstractThis article examines the goals and practices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ukraine in the 1970s, a Soviet institution that functioned as an ideological organ fighting against Ukrainian nationalists domestically and abroad. The central figure of this article is Heorhii Shevel who governed the Ministry from 1970 to 1980 and whose tactics, strategies, and practices reveal the existence of a distinct phenomenon in the Soviet Union—the nationally conscious political elite with double loyalties who, by action or inaction, expanded the space of nationalism in Ukraine. This research illuminates a paradox of pervasive Soviet power, which produced an institution that supported and reinforced Soviet “anti-nationalist” ideology, simultaneously creating an environment where heterodox views or sentiments were stimulated and nurtured.
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Van Ginderachter, Maarten. "'Nationale onverschillgheid', de Habsburgmonarchie en België. Een review van recente literatuur." WT. Tijdschrift over de geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging 74, no. 4 (December 23, 2015): 197–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/wt.v74i4.12083.
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Het begrip ‘national indifference’ is sinds 2000 in zwang bij historici die onderzoek doen naar Centraal-Europa (vooral naar de Oostenrijkse helft van de Dubbelmonarchie). Ze betogen dat het Habsburgse rijk niet gedoemd was om ten onder te gaan aan het nationaliteitenconflict. De meerderheid van de bevolking was immers ‘nationaal onverschillig’ in drie betekenissen: ze wezen al dan niet bewust nationale denkcategorieën af, ze veranderden hun nationale loyauteit opportunistisch en verwierpen de claims van nationalisten door bijvoorbeeld vast te houden aan meertaligheidspraktijken. Nationale onverschilligheid is expliciet geen pre-modern relict, maar integendeel een zeer moderne reactie op de (nationalistische) massapolitiek.In dit artikel introduceer ik het begrip en analyseer ik de toepasbaarheid ervan voor de Belgische casus. Hoewel ik enkele cruciale punten van kritiek formuleer, blijf ik overtuigd van het nut en het bestaansrecht van het begrip. De belangrijkste reden is dat ‘national indifference’ toelaat om een van de cruciale vraagstukken binnen het natie- en nationalismeonderzoek te thematiseren, met name de vraag in welke mate nationalistische vertogen vanwege elites, overheden of sociale bewegingen uit de middenklasse weerklank vinden aan de basis van de samenleving. De onderzoekstraditie van het banale nationalisme gaat ervan uit dat de intensiteit van deze vertogen recht evenredig is met de interiorisatie ervan door het geïntendeerde publiek. Het paradigma van de nationale onverschilligheid vertrekt van een tegengestelde inschatting, namelijk het idee dat hevige nationalistische vertogen in feite een zwaktebod zijn die verhullen dat het gewone volk zich bewust of onbewust verzet.________
“National Indifference,” the Habsburg Monarchy, and Belgium. A Review of Recent LiteratureSince 2000, the concept of ‘national indifference’ has been fashionable among historians of Central Europe (above all the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy). They argue that the Habsburg Empire was not doomed to fail because of nationalities conflict. The majority of the population was still ‘nationally indifferent’ in three senses: they rejected national(ist) categories, they changed their national loyalty opportunistically, and they repudiated the claims of nationalists by, for example, holding on to multilingualism. National indifference is explicitly not a premodern relic, but on the contrary a very modern reaction to (nationalist) mass politics.In this article I introduce this concept and analyse its applicability for the Belgian case. While I formulate a few crucial points of criticism, I remain convinced of its usefulness. The most important reason is that ‘national indifferences’ allows us to thematize one of the crucial questions in research on nations and nationalism, namely the question of to what extent nationalist displays on the part of elites, governments, or middle-class social movements found an echo among the common people. The research tradition of ‘banal nationalism’ assumes that the intensity of these displays is directly proportional to the extent to which the intended public internalizes them. The paradigm of national indifference proceeds from an opposing assumption, namely the idea that intense nationalist displays are a show of weakness which hide the fact that the common people consciously or unconsciously resist them.
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Wade, Peter. "Music, blackness and national identity: three moments in Colombian history." Popular Music 17, no. 1 (January 1998): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0261143000000465.
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The study of music and national identity has been limited, in my view, by some underlying assumptions. The first is connected to some influential ideas on nationalism, while the second has to do with long-standing ideas about the relation between music and identity. On nationalism, many approaches place too much emphasis on the homogenising tendencies of nationalist discourse, whereas, in my view, homogenisation exists in a complex and ambivalent relationship with the construction of difference by the same nationalist forces that create homogeneity. In a related fashion, with respect to music and identity, several studies of Latin American musical styles and their socio-political context – for example, ones focusing on the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Brazil – display a tendency to set up a model of homogenising elites versus diversifying and resistant minorities.
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Tuminez, Astrid S. "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union." Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (September 2003): 81–136. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039703322483765.
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Nationalism and ethnic pressures contributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union, but they were not the primary cause. A qualified exception to this argument is Russian elite separatist nationalism, led by Boris Yeltsin, which had a direct impact on Soviet disintegration. This article provides an overview of Soviet policy vis-à-vis nationalities, discusses the surge of nationalism and ethnic pressures in the Soviet Union in 1988–1991, and shows how ethnic unrest and separatist movements weakened the Soviet state. It also emphasizes that the demise of the Soviet Union resulted mainly from three other key factors: 1) Mikhail Gorbachev's failure to establish a viable compact between center and periphery in the early years of his rule; 2) Gorbachev's general unwillingness to use decisive force to quell ethnic and nationalist challenges; and 3) the defection of a core group of Russian elites from the Soviet regime.
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Salmoni, Barak A. "Women in the Nationalist-Educational Prism: Turkish and Egyptian Pedagogues and their Gendered Agenda, 1920–1952." History of Education Quarterly 43, no. 4 (2003): 483–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5959.2003.tb00132.x.
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The use of schooling to support various societal agendas has attracted much attention among the last generation of global education scholars. Whether as a neo-Marxian “ideological state apparatus,” through which societal elites seek to preserve socioeconomic inequity, or as a means for regimes to acquire sociopolitical legitimacy, the dynamics of education's unique socializing role have proven quite intriguing. In particular, new states espousing nationalist modernization consciously deploy national educational systems as central to broad projects of political socialization. Here, as officials, teachers, or pedagogical scholars, those affiliated with national education become conceptualizers, interpreters, and implementers of particular national visions. Academic theorists of nationalism have thus rightfully labeled these individuals “nationalist educator intellectuals,” capturing the pedagogical corps’ self-perception and the special, often understudied contribution educators make to the formation of nationalist ideologies. Indeed, interpreting the purview of education quite broadly, educators have seen it as their duty to think and write programmatically on the whole gamut of issues affecting their environments.
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Vigne, Randolph. "Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan." Journal of Southern African Studies 41, no. 2 (March 4, 2015): 427–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2015.1011924.
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Zink, Jesse. "Mandela’s Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid’s First Bantustan." Round Table 104, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 521–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2015.1064594.
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Graham, Matthew. "Mandela’s Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid’s First Bantustan." Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines 50, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 343–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2016.1195056.
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Tokarev, A. A. "Institutionalization of Ukrainian Nationalism: Difference of "Svoboda" ("Liberty") and "Praviy Sektor" ("Right Ssector") Ideology." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 6(39) (December 28, 2014): 144–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-6-39-144-152.
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The article examines the history of the formation of Ukrainian nationalist parties "Svoboda" and "Praviy sektor". First, that they express a structured nationalism and Russophobia in Ukrainian political space. Secondly, in Russia it has become customary to identify one with another. The paper gives an overview of the basic civil identities in Ukraine, Eastern and Western. The author postulates that their conflict lies at the heart of the growing popularity of both nationalist parties. In addition, this process was provoked by the reunion of Crimea and Russia and by the civil war in the south-east of Ukraine. Before the Crimean crisis Ukrainian nationalism had primarily historical roots, and in many respects it was created by attitude of empire elites (the Russian and Soviet Empires) to Ukrainians and their nation-state formations. After March-2014 it began to acquire a geopolitical indication exactly - Russia is perceived as an enemy. Two of the most famous actors of the Ukrainian nationalists and anarchists parties in modern Russia are "Svoboda" and "Praviy sektor". They have fundamentally different origins. "Svoboda" is a systematic force in Ukrainian politics for almost 20 years. Unlike it "Praviy sektor" was established like a party only in December 2013 within a framework of the Euromaidan. Due to the inability to compare the electoral history of both parties the author pays attention to the comparative analysis of their ideologies. Specific manifestations of extremism of "Svoboda" and "Praviy sektor" are not subjects of this research.
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Iveson, Mandie. "Gendered dimensions of Catalan nationalism and identity construction on Twitter." Discourse & Communication 11, no. 1 (January 22, 2017): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1750481316683293.
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Support for independence in Catalonia has been rapidly increasing since 2010. Civil organisations have been instrumental in the secessionist movement and have used social media to mobilise the Catalan public and raise national consciousness. Drawing on theories of national identity, gender and nation, and the discursive construction of national identity, this article examines constructions of national identity and the gendered dimensions of these constructions in a Twitter corpus collected in the week up to the public consultation on independence held in Catalonia in November 2014. Analysis of the contrasting representations of men and women found in the data suggests that, among both the elites and the public, the contemporary Catalan nationalist project continues to be built on traditional gender normative models of nationalism. The study concludes that this type of nationalism has now become so banal that it has been naturalised and suggests that a more inclusive approach may be needed in future campaigns or in the Catalan nationalist project as a whole.
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Abdelal, Rawi. "Memories of Nations and States: Institutional History and National Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia." Nationalities Papers 30, no. 3 (September 2002): 459–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0090599022000011714.
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The national identities of post-Soviet societies profoundly influenced the politics and economics of Eurasia during the 1990s. These identities varied along two distinct but related dimensions: their content and contestation. Nationalist movements throughout post-Soviet Eurasia invoked their nations in support of specific purposes, which frequently cast Russia as the nation's most important “other” and the state from which autonomy and security must be sought. Nationalists therefore offered specific proposals for the content of their societies’ collective identities. But not everyone in these societies shared the priorities of their nationalist movements. Indeed, the international relations among post-Soviet states often revolved around one central question: did post-Soviet societies and politicians agree with their nationalists or not? The former Communists played a decisive role in contesting the content of national identity. One of the defining differences among post-Soviet states during the 1990s was the political and ideological relationship in each one between the formerly Communist elites and the nationalists—whether the former Communists marginalized the nationalists, arrested them, coopted them, bargained with them, or even tried to become like them. These different relationships revealed different degrees and kinds of societal consensus about national identity after Soviet rule.
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Agnew, Hugh LeCaine. "Noble Natio and Modern Nation: The Czech Case." Austrian History Yearbook 23 (January 1992): 50–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0067237800002885.
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Czech nationalism differs in one important respect from its Polish and Hungarian counterparts: the Czech nation did not have a “national” aristocracy. As a result, so the conventional wisdom goes, when the modern Czech nationalist movement emerged, even its leading elites were only a few generations removed from the countryside, giving it a supposedly more egalitarian and bourgeois coloring. This affected its ideology and political program, and by extension, helped account for the relative stability of the interwar Czechoslovak democracy, the most successful of the “successor states.”
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Scholte, Jan Aart, Soetkin Verhaegen, and Jonas Tallberg. "Elite attitudes and the future of global governance." International Affairs 97, no. 3 (May 2021): 861–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab034.
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Abstract This article examines what contemporary elites think about global governance and what these attitudes might bode for the future of global institutions. Evidence comes from a unique survey conducted in 2017–19 across six elite sectors (business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, research) in six countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, the United States) and a global group. Bearing in mind some notable variation between countries, elite types, issue-areas and institutions, three main interconnected findings emerge. First, in principle, contemporary leaders in politics and society hold considerable readiness to pursue global-scale governance. Today's elites are not generally in a nationalist-protectionist-sovereigntist mood. Second, in practice, these elites on average hold medium-level confidence towards fourteen current global governance institutions. This evidence suggests that, while there is at present no legitimacy crisis of global governance among elites (as might encourage its decline), neither is there a legitimacy boom (as could spur its expansion). Third, if we probe what elites prioritize when they evaluate global governance, the surveyed leaders generally most underline democracy in the procedures of these bodies and effectiveness in their performance. This finding suggests that, to raise elites' future confidence in global governance, the institutions would do well to become more transparent in their operations and more impactful problem-solvers in their outcomes.
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Bauman, Zygmunt. "Soil, Blood and Identity." Sociological Review 40, no. 4 (November 1992): 675–701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.1992.tb00407.x.
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Modern nations are products of nationalism, and can be defined only as such, rather than by their own distinctive traits – which anyway vary over an extremely wide range. Nationalism was, sociologically, an attempt made by the modern elites to recapture the allegiance (in the form of cultural hegemony) of the ‘masses’ produced by the early modern transformations and particularly by the cultural rupture between the elites and the rest of the population by the ‘civilizing process’, whose substance was the self-constitution and the self-separation of new elites legitimizing their status by reference to superior culture and knowledge. In the same way in which the modern state needed nationalism for the ‘primitive accumulation’ of authority, nationalism needed coercive powers of the state to promote the postulated dissolution of communal identities in the uniform identity of the nation. In the practice of both, there was an unallayed tension between the ‘inclusivist’ and ‘exclusivists’ prongs of the nation-state project; hence the never fully effaced link between nationalism and racism, nationalism being the racism of the intellectuals, and racism -the nationalism of the masses. Currently our part of the world undergoes the process of the separation between state and nation, effected by lesser reliance of state power on culturalist legitimation and a degree of de-territorialization of communal affiliations, which fills the efforts of nation-building, invention of heritage, tribal integration etc. with a new urgency and may lead to the sharpening of either of the two prongs of the nationalist project.
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Vujačić, Veljko. "Elites, Narratives, and Nationalist Mobilization in the Former Yugoslavia." Comparative Politics 40, no. 1 (October 1, 2007): 103–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041507x12911361134514.
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Kuzio, Taras. "Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, no. 3 (August 23, 2011): 221–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.07.006.
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Conspiracy theories in Ukraine draw on inherited Soviet political culture and political technology imported from Russia where such ideas had gained ascendancy under President Vladimir Putin. Eastern Ukrainian and Russian elites believed that the US was behind the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer, 2003 Georgian Rose and 2004 Orange democratic revolutions. The Kuchmagate crisis, impending succession crisis, 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution – all of which took up most of Leonid Kuchma’s second term in office – were the first significant domestic threats to Ukraine’s new, post-communist ruling elites and in response Ukraine’s elites revived Soviet style theories of conspiracies and ideological tirades against the US and Ukrainian nationalism. Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko became the focal point against which the conspiracies and tirades were launched because his support base lay in ‘nationalist’ Western Ukraine and he has a Ukrainian-American spouse. The revival of Soviet style conspiracy theories has become important since Viktor Yanukovyc’s election as Ukrainian president in 2010 because this political culture permeates his administration, government and Party of Regions determining their worldview and influencing their domestic and foreign policies.
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Howard, Joshua H. "Chongqing's Most Wanted: Worker Mobility and Resistance in China's Nationalist Arsenals, 1937–1945." Modern Asian Studies 37, no. 4 (October 2003): 955–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x03004098.
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Historians of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) have concentrated on rural China to explain how the Communists mobilized the peasantry as a revolutionary force. Although clarifying the CCP's ascension to power in 1949, this focus has impeded our understanding of social change and conflict in the Nationalist controlled territories, especially the wartime capital of Chongqing. Thus, it is difficult to understand how the Nationalists exacerbated the alienation of urban social groups during the 1940s or how the CCP began to find consensus in the cities after 1946. Even standard explanations for the Nationalist collapse—government factionalism, hyperinflation, military blunders, and malfeasance—with their focus on government elites and institutions have rendered invisible the role of social classes as agents of historical change. The few studies of wartime labor have instead emphasized the patriotic contributions of workers and their relative passivity under the four-class bloc envisioned by the united front.
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Davis, Sacha E. "Competitive Civilizing Missions: Hungarian Germans, Modernization, and Ethnographic Descriptions of theZigeunerbefore World War I." Central European History 50, no. 1 (March 2017): 6–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938917000012.
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AbstractThis article examines writings on theZigeuner(“Gypsies”) by three prominent Hungarian-German scholars—Johann Schwicker, Anton Herrmann, and Heinrich von Wlislocki—as responses to Magyarization pressures, which divided Hungarian-Germans by threatening the traditional privileges of some while offering others opportunities for social advancement. Hungarian and German elites alike castZigeuneras primitiveNaturvölkerin an effort to legitimize reform efforts. By writing about theZigeuner, scholars asserted competing Magyar and German models for modernization and reform. Passionate German nationalist Johann Schwicker called for theZigeunerto assimilate into Hungarian and Romanian culture, arguing that Germanization was beyond their reach, thereby asserting German culture's supposedly superior status as an elite culture. By contrast, Hungarian nationalist Anton Herrmann urged the Magyarization of theZigeunerto strengthen the Hungarian nation-state, denigrating the role of German and Romanian culture. Finally, Heinrich Wlislocki rejected all nationalist modernizing efforts, presenting theZigeuneras a romantic symbol of the premodern age. In all three cases, Schwicker's, Herrmann's, and Wlislocki'sZigeunerbore very limited resemblance to Romani lived experience. Collectively, the writings of these three scholars illustrate both the range of Hungarian-German responses to nationalist modernization, as well as the role of national disputes in shapingZigeunerkunde(“Gypsy Studies”).
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Kuzio, Taras. "Russian and Ukrainian elites: A comparative study of different identities and alternative transitions." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 51, no. 4 (October 23, 2018): 337–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.10.001.
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The deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations heightened in 2014 but did not begin then and has deeper roots. Both Russian presidents have had troubled relations with all five Ukrainian presidents irrespective if they were described as ‘nationalist’ or ‘pro-Russian.’ This article is the first to explain why the roots of the crisis go deeper and it does this by investigating three areas. The first is the different sources of elites in 1991 when independent Russia captured Soviet institutions and undertook top-down state building while Ukraine inherited far less and set course with bottom up state-building. The second is divergent Russian and Ukrainian national identities. The third is the resultant different transitions with Russia reverting to great power imperial nationalism and Ukraine quadruple and post-colonial transitions.
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Chen, Cheng. "The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 17, no. 2 (May 2003): 166–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325403017002002.
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This article is a study of the dynamics behind “illiberal nationalism” in post-Leninist Romania. It seeks to provide a historical institutionalist explanation for the extent to which universalist liberal political principles have proven compatible with nationalist projects in post-Leninist Romania. The author's hypothesis is that the “illiberal” character of nationalism in contemporary Romania can be traced back to the nation-building project adopted by the Leninist regime in Romania. This nation-building project sought to engineer the reconciliation between nationalism and the universalist ideology of Leninism in much the same way that nationalism and liberalism have been reconciled in the West. Paradoxically, the more successful this Leninist nation building was, the more difficult it would be for post-Leninist elites to define a liberal variant of nationalism, given how deeply Leninist principles became embedded or fused with the nation's self-image. This counterintuitive logic partially accounts for the illiberal features of nationalism in post-Leninist Romania.
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McCord, Edward A. "Militia Command and Control in the Chinese National Revolution, Hunan 1926-1927." Journal of Chinese Military History 7, no. 2 (October 16, 2018): 203–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22127453-12341332.
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Abstract This article uses a case study of Hunan province to examine the role of militia in the struggle for the control of local society during the 1926-1927 National Revolution. Although the Nationalist and Communist Parties both agreed on the need eliminate militia leadership by “local bullies and evil gentry,” differences quickly arose over how to reconstruct militia following this action. Nationalist Party activists tended to favor a “statist” approach that would replace abusive militia leaders with “upright” local elites but place them under stricter and more direct official control. Communist Party activists in contrast sought a “popular” mass militia free of elite influence and controlled by new peasant and worker unions. As such, this struggle over militia command and control became a key component in the broader political competition between the two parties and their alternative revolutionary visions.
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Korkut, Umut. "Nationalism versus Internationalism: The Roles of Political and Cultural Elites in Interwar and Communist Romania." Nationalities Papers 34, no. 2 (May 2006): 131–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990600617698.
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This paper has two main goals. First, it illuminates continuities between the ideas of “true Romanian-ness” as held by both the Romanian cultural elite and the Romanian political regimes in the interwar and communist periods. A manufactured definition of a “true” Romanian—as a Romanian Orthodox Christian, natively Romanian-speaking, and ethnically Romanian—formed the core of Romanian nationalism, regardless of the ruling ideology. This definition did not include the Roman and Greek Catholics of Romanian ethnicity on the grounds that they were not Orthodox Christians. It goes without saying that these criteria also excluded Hungarians, Germans and other ethnic minorities on the basis of ethnicity, language and religion. Second, the paper demonstrates that the principal ideas of Romanian nationalism developed in overt contrast to the internationalist ideological movements of both periods. Both the liberals and the Marxists misunderstood nationalism, claimed Ernest Gellner in 1964: liberals assumed that nationalism was a doomed legacy of outmoded irrationalism, superstition and savagery, and Marxists considered it a necessary but temporary stage in the path to global socialism. Gellner's comments are evidently appropriate to Romania, where nationalist responses developed first to the Westernization of the interwar period and second to communist internationalism after 1948.
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Filippov, Sergey. "Conditions of the National Elites Loyalty towards the Central Government in the Soviet Period of Russian History." Ideas and Ideals 12, no. 4-1 (December 23, 2020): 230–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2020-12.4.1-230-248.
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The article deals with the analysis of the Soviet national policy from a historical perspective with a focus on investigating into conditions of the loyalty of national elites towards the central government in the last period of the USSR existence. The indicators of the low level loyalty are as follows: supporting the ideas of national sovereignty and independence, participating in the national movement by ruling cadres, influential intellectuals and population. The author shows low sympathy of both groups of representatives: elites and broad population to nationalist ideas. The analysis is based on comparing contrastive cases – the Soviet elites of the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) and Belorussia in their interactions with the central government as well as local population in the period from 1945 to 1991. These republics, their population and elites were similar regarding some important aspects such as historical and cultural as well as demographic characteristics in the case of Belorussia and Lithuania; some important features of the industry (big export-oriented enterprises) regarding Estonia, Latvia and Belorussia. At the same time, these cases showed a different level of the loyalty towards the Union center, namely, relatively high among the Belorussian Soviet ruling cadres and population and relatively low in the Baltic republics by the end of 1980s. The important aspect of the Soviet national policy was establishing new national elites, educational and cultural institutions preserving their native languages as well as the promotion of native cadres into the positions of power in the regional administration. In some respects, this policy was similar to the “indirect rule” implemented in the imperial period of Russian history and consisted in the cooperation between the central government and local elites as the main approach to administrating a multinational state. However, in comparison with the previous practice tending to include national elites in the imperial nobility, the post revolutionary approach considered the creation of national elites through promoting local cultural and educational institutions that offer quite prestigious but specific positions occupied mostly by representatives of the respective ethnic group. Creating local elites reduced the competition for “universal” positions since socialization and career of “national staff” were oriented towards national institutes. However, increasing numbers of “national staff” with limited positions for them had negative social consequences (elite overproduction). Intra-elite tension increased due to the migration from other regions (in the case of Latvia and Estonia). The other reason of this phenomenon was pursuing socialization strategies oriented to the places of origin (in the case of Lithuania). The attractiveness of the Baltic republics both for local population and migrants from other regions of the USSR was caused by a relatively high level of living standards in these union republics. Location of big export-oriented enterprises in the territory of Belorussia created conditions for preferring socialization strategies oriented towards integration with the Soviet Union economy and, therefore, enhanced loyalty towards the USSR center from both elites and population. Besides, the administrative apparatus of the Soviet Belorussia was recruited extensively among participants of the Soviet partisan movement 1941–1944 what explains the devotion of the Belorussian elite to the Soviet symbols and values. At the same time, the base of the legitimization of the Soviet Lithuanian elite was its ability to control the anti-Soviet (nationalist) movement as well supporting national culture and language.
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CALLACI, EMILY. "DANCEHALL POLITICS: MOBILITY, SEXUALITY, AND SPECTACLES OF RACIAL RESPECTABILITY IN LATE COLONIAL TANGANYIKA, 1930s–1961." Journal of African History 52, no. 3 (November 2011): 365–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021853711000478.
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ABSTRACTThis article explores the relationship between understandings of youth sexuality and mobility, and racial nationalism in late colonial Tanganyika through a history of dansi: a dance mode first popularized by Tanganyikan youth in the 1930s. Dansi's heterosocial choreography and cosmopolitan connotations provoked widespread anxieties among rural elders and urban elites over the mobility, economic autonomy, and sexual agency of youth. In urban commercial dancehalls in the 1950s, dansi staged emerging cultural solidarities among migrant youth, while also making visible social divisions based on class and gender. At the same time, nationalist intellectuals attempted to reform dansi according to an emerging political rhetoric of racial respectability.
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Torre, Domenico. "Islam, Impero ottomano e nazionalismo nell’opera di Muṣṭafà Kāmil. Un equilibrio impossibile." Oriente Moderno 97, no. 1 (March 30, 2017): 36–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22138617-12340138.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the complex balance between nationalist tendencies and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire in the works of the Egyptian politician Muṣṭafà Kāmil (1874-1908). More specifically, this analysis tries to understand how the young author, despite the controversial aspects of his experience as activist, managed to establish one of the most powerful theories in early Egyptian nationalism. Islam and patriotism, Western influences and chauvinism—all these elements blended together in a totally new approach to that debate on communal identity which involved the Arab world from the last decades of 19th century, modifying also the political vocabulary used by Egypt’s intellectual elites.
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Vermeersch, Peter. "Victimhood as victory: The role of memory politics in the process of de-Europeanisation in East-Central Europe." Global Discourse 9, no. 1 (January 29, 2019): 113–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/204378918x15453934506003.
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To a large extent, the traditional narrative of EU integration has revolved around reconciliation and peace-building after the Second World War. This article examines how current memory work in nationalist movements in East-Central Europe subverts this moral story and uses it as the basis for a politics of backlash against the EU. Recent developments in national commemoration and remembrance practices in the region have enabled not only the glorification of the national past but also the suppression of 'heretical' interpretations of specific traumatic historical episodes. The fault lines of national belonging are now often used to eclipse stories of post-war state reconciliation in Europe and focus directly on the victimised population. As a result, commemorations carry strong normative and moral overtones related to justice and culpability. Nationalism in this context has received moral connotation and, vice versa, questions of morality become questions of nationhood. The 'we' of this distinguishing work embodies a subject of immaculate historical innocence and victimhood; by extension, the 'others' always bear responsibility and guilt. This nationalist moral classification work changes and reframes the moral underpinnings of the EU enlargement. The victim theme has adhered a strong potential to garner solidarity among various social groups in East-Central Europe against the EU. The role of victimiser is easily projected onto both the abstract notion of the 'European elites' and the supposed allies of those elites: the internal 'others'.
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Zhao, Suisheng. "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (September 1, 1998): 287–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00009-9.
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The decline of Communism after the end of the post-Cold War has seen the rise of nationalism in many parts of the former Communist world. In countries such as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, nationalism was pursued largely from the bottom up as ethnic and separatist movements. Some observers also take this bottom-up approach to find the major cause of Chinese nationalism and believe that “the nationalist wave in China is a spontaneous public reaction to a series of international events, not a government propaganda.” (Zhang, M. (1997) The new thinking of Sino–US relations. Journal of Contemporary China, 6(14), 117–123). They see Chinese nationalism as “a belated response to the talk of containing China among journalists and politicians” in the United States and “a public protest against the mistreatment from the US in the last several years.” (Li, H. (1997) China talks back: anti-Americanism or nationalism? Journal of Contemporary China, 6(14), 153–160). This position concurs with the authors of nationalistic books in China, such as The China That Can Say No: Political and Sentimental Choice in the Post-Cold War Era (Song, Q., Zhang Z., Qiao B. (1996) Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu (The China That Can Say No). Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe. Beijing), which called upon Chinese political elites to say no to the US, and argue that the rise of nationalism was not a result of the official propaganda but a reflection of the state of mind of a new generation of Chinese intelligentsia in response to the foreign pressures in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Chinese nationalism was mainly reactive sentiments to foreign suppressions in modern history, and this new wave of nationalist sentiment also harbored a sense of wounded national pride and an anti-foreign (particularly the US and Japan) resentment. Many Chinese intellectuals gave voice to a rising nationalistic discourse in the 1990s (Zhao, S. (1997) Chinese intellectuals' quest for national greatness and nationalistic writing in the 1990s. The China Quarterly, 152, 725–745). However, Chinese nationalism in the 1990s was also constructed and enacted from the top by the Communist state. There were no major military threats to China's security after the end of the Cold War. Instead, the internal legitimacy crisis became a grave concern of the Chinese Communist regime because of the rapid decay of Communist ideology. In response, the Communist regime substituted performance legitimacy provided by surging economic development and nationalist legitimacy provided by invocation of the distinctive characteristics of Chinese culture in place of Marxist–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. As one of the most important maneuvers to enact Chinese nationalism, the Communist government launched an extensive propaganda campaign of patriotic education after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The patriotic education campaign was well-engineered and appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to many domestic discontents. The Communist regime, striving to maintain authoritarian control while Communist ideology was becoming obsolete in the post-Cold War era, warned of the existence of hostile international forces in the world perpetuating imperialist insult to Chinese pride. The patriotic education campaign was a state-led nationalist movement, which redefined the legitimacy of the post-Tiananmen leadership in a way that would permit the Communist Party's rule to continue on the basis of a non-Communist ideology. Patriotism was thus used to bolster CCP power in a country that was portrayed as besieged and embattled. The dependence on patriotism to build support for the government and the patriotic education campaign by the Communist propagandists were directly responsible for the nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese people in the mid-1990s. This paper focuses on the Communist state as the architect of nationalism in China and seeks to understand the rise of Chinese nationalism by examining the patriotic education campaign. It begins with an analysis of how nationalism took the place of the official ideology as the coalescing force in the post-Tiananmen years. It then goes on to examine the process, contents, methods and effectiveness of the patriotic education campaign. The conclusion offers a perspective on the instrumental aspect of state-led nationalism.
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Bruchhausen, Sarah. "Book review: Mandela’s Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites & Apartheid’s First Bantustan." Journal of Asian and African Studies 51, no. 1 (December 2014): 119–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909614558757.
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Curry, Dawne Y. "Timothy Gibbs. Mandela's Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid's First Bantustan." American Historical Review 120, no. 1 (February 2015): 377–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ahr/120.1.377.
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Eversberg, Dennis. "Innerimperiale Kämpfe." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 48, no. 190 (May 16, 2018): 43–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v48i190.31.
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Dennis Eversberg: A conflict within the empire. Three theses on the relation between authoritarian nationalism and the imperial mode of living. The article analyses the success of authoritarian nationalist party „Alternative für Deutschland“ (AfD). Firstly, it is argued that voting for the AfD was not a ‘displaced’ form of reaction to actual or feared experiences of economic disadvantage or relegation. In fact, the AfD’s voter voted for the party because they support its authoritarian nationalist ideas. Secondly, authoritarian nationalism’s character as a vertical class alliance between parts of the elites on the one and segments of the middle and lower classes on the other hand is highlighted – an alliance that wants to reverse the transformation from post-war organized capitalism to the contemporary flexible capitalist regime. Thirdly, it is argued that the current conflict between “progressive neoliberalism” (Fraser) and authoritarian nationalism takes place on the firm ground of a shared consensus about the imperial mode of living. It is a conflict about the modernization of this mode of living and about how to best defend it. A critique of the global injustices it causes and perpetuates, or credible demands for overcoming it, can only be articulated from a globally solidary position that rejects this bipolar discursive constellation altogether.
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Sasaki, Yu. "Content with Failure? Cultural Consolidation and the Absence of Nationalist Mobilization in the Case of the Occitans in France." Social Science History 43, no. 02 (2019): 213–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2019.6.
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Does cultural consolidation among ethnic groups lead to nationalist mobilization? Extant research in the study of nationalism suggests a tight connection between the two. My article addresses this question by operationalizing cultural consolidation through language standardization and by providing an empirical analysis. I argue that not all ethnic groups that consolidate their culture build institutions toward sovereignty and propose that cases that fail to invest in institutions make strong contributions to the existing framework in the literature. Following a brief survey on the Bulgarians as a case of successful mobilization, I document evidence from an in-depth study on the Occitans, a minority ethnic group in France, as a failed case. Findings from a process-tracing approach indicate that although the Occitans standardized their language by 1900, their leading intellectuals grew content became content with the situation and failed to make the next move. I contribute by operationalizing cultural consolidation and by introducing “institution-building” as a crucial outcome between cultural consolidation and state-building. My article suggests that decisions of ethnic elites matter to understand why some groups start nationalist mobilization.
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Borisov, A. V. "Discussions on the Russian Humanitarian Policy Perspectives in the Post-Soviet Space." Post-Soviet Issues 8, no. 2 (August 19, 2021): 192–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2021-8-2-192-206.
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The choice of the audience and content of Russia's humanitarian message calls into question the effectiveness of domestic humanitarian policy in the post-Soviet space. In domestic strategic planning documents, the target audience is the ruling elites of the post-Soviet states, compatriots, and the "Russian world". The choice of the elite as the addressee leads to the fact that Russia's humanitarian policy forms the dependence of interstate relations on maintaining the positions of the ruling elite, which forces us to sacrifice resources and, possibly, reputation to hold the status of a politician declaring a "pro-Russian" position. The appeal to compatriots, in turn, problematizes inter-elite interaction, arousing the concern of the post-Soviet elites, whose efforts to build nations and assert their legitimacy on a nationalist basis. The target audience's choice is reflected in the content of the humanitarian message, which seems situational and internally contradictory due to the specifics of the addressees. Overcoming these contradictions, according to the author, is only possible if the choice of the final addressees and the humanitarian message's content is revised, which requires a clear definition of the goals, forms, and methods of Russia's humanitarian policy in the post-Soviet space.
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Tešan, Jesenko, and Joan Davison. "Leadership Amidst Transition and Liminality: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslavia." Advances in Politics and Economics 3, no. 2 (March 30, 2020): p16. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/ape.v3n2p16.
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A history of empires and communism created a liminality in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). When leaders throughout the Soviet Bloc began to discredit communism, an opportunity opened for the leadership of B&H to unify the popular will and transition to democracy. Yet, the appropriate leadership, a master of ceremonies from van Gennep and Turner’s perspectives, a philosopher from Plato’s view was absent. Politicians instead repackaged themselves as nationalists and supported extremists and divisive actions, culminating in war. Subsequently, the mechanisms associated with the Dayton Peace Accords conceived to return B&H to normalcy instead made the divisive liminality a new normal as power sharing elites benefitted if they held to nationalist claims and ignored societal reintegration. This, study examines the reasoning and tactics of elites who rejected the mantle of good leadership and now abuse the spirit of the constitutional and institutional power sharing mechanisms to maintain the schizophrenic division and conflict. It also introduces the type of virtuous leader states needed for transition.
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Talbot, Michael. "“Jews, Be Ottomans!” Zionism, Ottomanism, and Ottomanisation in the Hebrew-Language Press, 1890–1914." Die Welt des Islams 56, no. 3-4 (November 28, 2016): 359–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700607-05634p05.
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In recent years the study of national and civic identities in the later Ottoman period has revealed huge degrees of complexity among previously homogenised groups, none more so that the Jewish population of the Sublime State. Those Jews who moved to the Ottoman Empire from the 1880s as part of a burgeoning expression of Jewish nationalism developed a complex relationship with an Ottomanist identity that requires further consideration. Through an examination of the Hebrew-language press in Palestine, run largely by immigrant Zionist Jews, complemented by the archival records of the Ottoman state and parliament, this paper aims to show the complexities of the engagement between Ottoman and Jewish national identities. The development of Jewish nationalism by largely foreign Jews came with an increase in suspicion from the Ottoman elites, sometimes manifesting itself in outright anti-Semitism, and strong expressions of nationalism in the Hebrew press were denounced both by Ottoman and non- and anti-nationalist Jewish populations. The controversy over immigrant Jewish land purchases in Palestine from the 1890s led to a number of discussions over how far foreign Jews could and should embrace an Ottoman cultural and political identity, with cultural, labour, and political Zionists taking different positions. The issue of Ottomanisation should also be taken in the context of the post-1908 political landscape in the Ottoman Empire, with separatist nationalisms increasingly under the spotlight, and the debates among the different forms of Jewish nationalism increasingly focusing on the limits of performative and civic Ottoman nationalism.
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Hetemi, Atdhe. "Student movements in Kosova (1981): academic or nationalist?" Nationalities Papers 46, no. 4 (July 2018): 685–703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1371683.
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The 1980s caught Albanians in Kosova in interesting social, political, and psychological circumstances. Two diametrically opposed dogmatic dilemmas took shape: “illegal groups” – considerably supported by students – demanded the proclamation of the Republic of Kosova and/or Kosova's unification with Albania. On the other side of the spectrum, “modernists” – gathering, among others, the political and academic elites – pushed for the improvement of rights of Kosovars guaranteed under the “brotherhood and unity” concept advocated within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This paper outlines the nature of demonstrations that took place in March and April 1981 and the corresponding responses of political and academic elites. Stretching beyond symbolic academic reasons – demands for better food and dormitory conditions – the study points to the intense commitment of the students to their demands, often articulated in nationalistic terms. Was it inevitable that the structure of the SFRY would lead to those living in Kosova as a non-Slavic majority in a federation of “Southern Slavs” to articulate demands for national self-rule? It is necessary to highlight these political and social complexities through analytical approaches in order to track the students' goals and to reexamine assumptions behind the “modernist” agenda. In that vein, the paper analyzes the conceptual connections and differences between student reactions and modernists' positions during the historical period under discussion here.
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Choiruzzad, Shofwan Al Banna. "ASEAN in the Age of Anti-Globalization: Compartmentalized Regionalism(s) and Three Trajectories." IKAT : The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (July 31, 2017): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/ikat.v1i1.27464.
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This essay attempts to examine the prospect of ASEAN integration in the age of anti-globalization by understanding ASEAN as a compartmentalized regionalism. It argues that discussions on the prospect of ASEAN are actually discussions on the trajectories of two separate regional projects: economic regionalism and political security regionalism. It must be noted that we often have difficulties separating the two because their evolution has so far been marked by centripetal movement towards liberal tradition in the two regional projects. However, since we are entering the age of anti-globalization, this is changing. To make an educated guess on the future of ASEAN regionalism(s), I argue that we should focus our attention to three main indicators: (1) Structural: will the international system be cooperative or competitive multipolar system? (2) National elite orientation: will the liberal elites and technocracy in ASEAN countries remain liberal, or will nationalist elites take charge?; and (3) Public sentiment: how big is the positive or negative sentiment towards economic liberalization?
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Westaway, Ashley. "Mandela’s Kinsmen: nationalist elites and apartheid’s first bantustan by Timothy Gibbs." Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 87, no. 1 (2015): 178–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/trn.2015.0000.
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