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Dr., Marios Kyriakidis. "" NATO Intelligence and Greek Military Strategy: Past, Present, and Future Developments in European Security"." ISRG Journal of Arts Humanities & Social Sciences (ISRGJAHSS) III, no. III (2025): 184–200. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15479825.
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<em>Greece's military intelligence has played a crucial yet often overlooked role within NATO’s strategic framework. As a NATO member since 1952, Greece has navigated complex geopolitical challenges while integrating into the alliance’s evolving intelligence structures. This study examines the historical evolution, contemporary significance, and future trajectory of NATO intelligence and Greek military strategy, analyzing Greece’s intelligence contributions in Cold War operations, post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts, and modern cybersecurity threats. The research also explores Greece’s dual role within NATO and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), highlighting the intelligence-sharing dilemmas between the two institutions.</em> <em>By assessing key intelligence operations - ranging from Cold War counterintelligence efforts to NATO’s recent intelligence fusion strategies - this study investigates Greece’s role in regional security, countering Russian influence in the Balkans, managing Turkish tensions, and participating in NATO-led intelligence missions. The research further examines Greece’s contributions to NATO cyber defense initiatives and the growing importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in modern intelligence warfare.</em> <em>Using a multidisciplinary approach that includes historical analysis, security studies, and intelligence theory, this study provides a prototype-level examination of Greece’s position in NATO intelligence. The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how Greece navigates intelligence-sharing complexities, geopolitical constraints, and emerging security threats within NATO and the EU. The study concludes with policy recommendations on strengthening Greece’s intelligence infrastructure and its strategic alignment in European security.</em>
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Hanna, Michael, David Granzow, Bjorn Bolte, and Andrew Alvarado. "NATO Intelligence and Information Sharing: Improving NATO Strategy for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 16, no. 4 (2017): 5–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.16.4.01.
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Bedubourg, Gabriel, H. Wiik, B. Queyriaux, P. Lausund, and J.-B. Meynard. "Collection and sharing of medical information and medical intelligence (M2I) in NATO: a transversal survey." Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 164, no. 4 (2018): 271–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jramc-2017-000849.
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IntroductionThere is a requirement for adequate medical expertise to be available throughout the range of potential future operations involving members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The aim of this study was to assess the collection and sharing of medical intelligence and medical information (M2I) by NATO Nations, Partner Nations and NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure Headquarters (NCS/NFS HQs).Materials and methodsA transversal survey was conducted between December 2014 and March 2015 using a survey form on M2I sent to NATO Nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Nations as well as NCS/NFS HQs.ResultsCorrectly completed responses were received from 15/40 (37.5%) of the possible NATO and PfP Nations (37.5%) and 7/8 (87.5%) of the NCS/NFS HQs (100.0%). Deficiencies in the collection of M2I data were found due to lack of specific doctrines, networks, tools, structures and organisation.ConclusionsThe survey provided an indication even though the participation rate was low for Nations. Part of the problem is thought to be that medical information and medical intelligence often lie in different chains of command. Future directions for this research could include studying the possibilities of a new specific information technology (IT) system to collect and to share M2I. Collection and sharing of M2I within the NATO/PfP community requires facilitation in order to strengthen the basis for decision-making and force health protection. The development of a dedicated NATO IT system may be a precondition for the implementation of an efficient M2I network.
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NOMIKOS, JOHN M. "ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THREATS IN GREECE: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS." NOVA VLOGA OBOROŽENIH SIL KOT ODZIV NA ASIMETRIČNE GROŽNJE/THE NEW ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIC THREATS, VOLUME 2020, ISSUE 22/3 (September 30, 2020): 107–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.22.3.6.
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Povzetek Eden največjih izzivov današnjega časa je naraščanje asimetričnih groženj. Nato in EU sta tarča politično motiviranih nedržavnih in razvitejših državnih akterjev ter združenj, ki se ukvarjajo s kibernetskim kriminalom. Sovražna kibernetska kazniva dejanja spodkopavajo vse družbene ravni v državah Nata in EU ter ogrožajo politično, gospodarsko, civilno in vojaško varnost. S podobnimi grožnjami se spoprijema tudi Grčija. V članku so preučeni grška strategija kibernetske varnosti ter vzroki in posledice organiziranih terorističnih združb za nezakonite migracije v Grčiji. Prav tako je izpostavljen pomen izmenjave obveščevalnih podatkov med grško varnostno in obveščevalno skupnostjo. Ključne besede Grčija, asimetrično bojevanje, kibernetska varnost, trgovina z ljudmi, migracije. Abstract One of the biggest challenges of our time is the rise of asymmetric warfare threats. NATO and the EU are targeted by cybercrime syndicates, politically motivated non-state actors, and sophisticated state actors. Hostile cybercrime undermines all levels of society in NATO and the EU states, threatening political, economic, civil, and military security. Greece faces similar threats. This article focuses on the Greek cybersecurity strategy and analyses the causes and consequences of the terrorism-organized, illegal immigration nexus in Greece, and how essential it is to highlight the importance of collective intelligence sharing among the Greek security and intelligence community. Key words Greece, asymmetric warfare, cyber-security, human trafficking, migration
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ČRNČEC, DAMIR, and JANEZ URBANC. "STREAMLINING THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY STRUCTURES IN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION." CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES, VOLUME 2014/ ISSUE 16/3 (September 30, 2014): 63–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179//bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.16.3.4.
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Just like every other organisation, NATO and the EU are more or less constantly changing and organisationally adapting to new challenges and related new priorities and tasks. The intelligence and security structures of both organisations are no exception and although radical or major organisational changes, mainly due to the consensus mode, are not very frequent and require more time, minor changes and adjustments occur constantly. In recent years, the field of intelligence and security in both organisations has not witnessed any major organisational changes. Nevertheless, especially within NATO, the intelligence structure has significantly increased in quality due to the extra effort to include, in addition to military and defence, civil intelligence and security structures of Member States to play a more active role in the exchange of intelligence with the Alliance. Similarly, although less obviously, a similar trend took place in the context of the intelligence and security structures within the EU. In parallel with the termination of operations in Afghanistan, with a slow stabilisation of the situation in the Western Balkans, and mainly as a result of the new/old challenges posed by the situation in relation to Ukraine, there is no doubt that the intelligence and security structures of both organisations, especially NATO, will be further modified and upgraded over the coming years. The aim of this paper is thus, in addition to outlining the current organisation of the intelligence and security structures in both organisations, to indicate the future trends in the field of intelligence and security. Kot vsaka organizacija se tudi zveza Nato in EU bolj ali manj stalno spreminjata ter organizacijsko prilagajata novim izzivom in posledično novim prednostim ter nalogam. Obveščevalno-varnostni deli obeh organizacij niso izjema in čeprav radikalne oziroma večje organizacijske spremembe, predvsem zaradi konsenzualnega načina delovanja, niso zelo pogoste ter zahtevajo več časa, se manjše spremembe nenehno dogajajo. V zadnjem času se sicer na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju v obeh organizacijah niso zgodile večje organizacijske spremembe, kljub temu pa se je predvsem znotraj Nata struktura na obveščevalnem področju pomembno kvalitativno dopolnila. Dopolnitev se je zgodila zato, da se k bolj aktivni vlogi pri izmenjavi obveščevalnih podatkov z zavezništvom (še močneje kot v preteklosti) vključijo poleg vojaških oziroma obrambnih tudi civilne obveščevalno-varnostne strukture držav članic. Podoben, čeprav manj očiten, trend je potekal tudi v okviru obveščevalno-varnostnih struktur EU. Vzporedno z zaključevanjem operacij v Afganistanu, s počasnim stabiliziranjem razmer na Zahodnem Balkanu, predvsem pa kot posledica novih/starih izzivov, ki jih povzročajo razmere v povezavi z Ukrajino, postane jasno, da se bo obveščevalno-varnostna struktura v obeh organizacijah, zlasti pa v Natu, v naslednjih letih dodatno spreminjala in izpopolnjevala. Cilj prispevka je poleg prikaza trenutne organiziranosti obveščevalno-varnostne strukture v obeh organizacijah napovedati prihodnje usmeritve na obveščevalno-varnostnem področju.
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Usov, Dmytro. "Analysis of national security threats by NATO intelligence agencies: trends and experience." Political Science and Security Studies Journal 5, no. 4 (2024): 90–95. https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2024.5.4.8.
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This article analyzes the approaches of NATO member states intelligence agencies towards assessing threats that have a destructive impact on their and Ukraine's national security, considering the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the consequences of Russian aggression, and changes in the international policies of leading countries. It has been proved that special services of the above-mentioned states prioritize the following destabilizing factors of influence: unlawful interference in the country's internal affairs, sponsorship of extremism and terrorism, numerous cyberattacks on various information structures and networks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and influence operations, etc. It has been determined that a particular danger to the national security of NATO member states is primarily the intelligence and subversive activities of Russian and Chinese special services as an integral part of the state security architecture of these countries. NATO member states special services also take into consideration the destructive influence on national security caused by the intelligence services of Iran and Turkey since these countries support the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in the international political arena.
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Jacobsen, Jeppe T. "Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities." International Affairs 97, no. 3 (2021): 703–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab010.
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Abstract As a response to the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO returned to the core military concepts of deterrence and collective defence. This NATO adaption has recently come to include attempts to integrate offensive cyber effects into NATO force structure and response doctrine. The article argues—counter to what is publicly declared—that such an integration does little to strengthen NATO's deterrence posture and is unlikely to deter non-military, hybrid cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence. The article identifies several practical challenges to the current integration effort, which include the temporal dimension of developing exploits, battle damage assessment and deconfliction. With these challenges in mind, the article suggests that deploying minor and less resourceful cyber effects that cause persistent ‘cyber annoyances’ holds an unappreciated potential as they can drain opponent resources, disturb vital IT-systems and complicate decision-making. The article ends by arguing that NATO should not adapt its collective defence clause to cyberspace. A more active NATO in cyberspace risks undermining the cyber-intelligence norm that so far has prevented escalation and thereby increasing the likelihood that Russia misinterprets intelligence and active cyber defence activities as military preparation, armament or an attack in the making.
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M., N. O. Sadiku, R. Nelatury S., and Musa S.M. "Artificial Intelligence in Military." Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research 8, no. 1 (2021): 106–12. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10552275.
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<strong>Abstract</strong> Artificial intelligence (AI) has done remarkable things such as defeating human experts at various games. AI is a technology that the military and defense world cannot ignore because the military cannot afford to miss out on the opportunities it brings. AI is one of the disruptive technologies that promise to change the face of warfare for years to come. It has become a critical part of modern warfare. It could cause drastic changes in hybrid warfare, which is a major concern for NATO. The paper examines various applications of artificial intelligence in the military and defense.
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Usov, Dmytro. "Threats to national security assessed by NATO member states: the Chinese factor." Political Science and Security Studies Journal 5, no. 1 (2024): 48–52. https://doi.org/10.33445/psssj.2024.5.1.6.
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The role of China as a key factor in assessing threats to national security, carried out by the special services of NATO member states, is investigated. NATO's activities on threats are analysed, mainly through increased intelligence activities, ensuring cybersecurity, investment control and cooperation with partner countries. Recommendations are proposed for forming a single NATO strategy to respond to threats related to China effectively.
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Kulyk, T. "JOINT INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE AS A PRIORITY AREA OF NATO TRANSFORMATION." Bulletin of Mariupol State University Series History Political Studies 13, no. 35-36 (2023): 100–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.34079/2226-2830-2023-13-35-36-100-110.
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Russia's horrific war against Ukraine has radically changed international security. NATO will need to continue bolstering its Deterrence and Defence Posture, which is essential to ensuring the collective defense of Allies and to continue investing in crisis management and cooperative security while adapting these tasks to meet its changing security needs and globally integrated hybrid environment. The Alliance should pay a strong emphasis on retaining and strengthening technological edge, in particular, improving strategic forecasting and situational awareness, the ability to understanding, monitoring and prediction the actions of potential adversaries using means of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance based on comprehensive agreements in this sphere. The purpose of the study is to analyze the development, improvement and application experience of NATO's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) as a priority area of the Alliance's transformation in terms of improving capabilities, as well as the significance for future operations and the decision-making process There were determined definitions, content, main components and means of the system of NATO's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Conceptual and doctrinal documents for the implementation of NATO's obligations in this area have been studied. The security conditions, the process of formation based on experience and best practices, vulnerabilities and key areas of the system, which combines the potential of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance based on phased approach were analysed. There were considered the projects that provide gather of data and information, which JISR brings together, such as NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft and national JISR assets from the space, air, land and maritime domains/ Highlighted are the key aspects of the process of interpretation and analysis of information, requirements for the professional level of experts and the importance of the final product for the decision-making process. There were indicated further development and improvement of JISR capabilities in training and education, doctrine and procedures and networking environment spheres. Considered are methods to practice and evaluate technical and operational concepts for conducting NATO`s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. An overview of the possibilities of applying Ukrainian innovative developments tested in combat conditions in terms of situational awareness as well as Ukraine's cooperation with NATO in this field was made. The result of the research is conclusions on the development and improvement of JISR capability to facilitate rapid decision-making in several main areas, including the Readiness Action Plan, enhanced Forward Presence, the hybrid warfare strategy, and the overall Deterrence and Defence Posture. Keywords: NATO, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, situational awareness, NATO Ground Surveillance System, Airborne Early Warning and Control System, Deterrence and Defence Posture, enhanced Forward Presence, decision-making process, operation and mission.
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Мех, Ю. В., та О. О. Гуренко. "Структурна модель побудови служби зовнішньої розвідки України за зразком НАТО". Форум права 70, № 5 (2021): 18–23. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5529521.
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<strong>Постановка проблеми. </strong>Служба зовнішньої розвідки України – це спеціальна служба, головним завданням якої є здійснення розвідувальної та контррозвідувальної діяльності. Водночас у сучасних реаліях неможливо й надалі ефективно користуватись чинною моделлю побудови розвідки, так як увесь світ зазнав кардинальних змін, пов’язаних з розвитком і впровадженням у повсякденне життя технологій, розповсюдженню злочинів пов’язаних з тероризмом, появою нового поняття – кібератаки. У зв’язку з цим виникає необхідність перебудови моделі Служби зовнішньої розвідки за сучасним ефективним зразком, яким, на наш погляд, є НАТО. <strong>Методи. </strong>Для вирішення задач дослідження використано низку методів наукового пізнання. Аналіз конкретних підрозділів як прийом соціологічної методології використовувався для виявлення проблем Служби зовнішньої розвідки, визначення ефективності діяльності розвідки України і НАТО. Порівняльний метод дав змогу розглянути чинну українську модель і модель НАТО, переваги і недоліки кожної; метод моніторингу дозволив визначити сучасний стан Служби зовнішньої розвідки і шляхи подальшого вдосконалення чинної системи. <strong>Метою</strong> роботи є поглиблений аналіз проблем діяльності Служби зовнішньої розвідки, характеристика розвідки НАТО, її окремих підрозділів, знаходження переваг і недоліків структурної моделі розвідки НАТО і України. <strong>Результати. </strong>Встановлено, що наразі Служба зовнішньої розвідки має застарілу структурну модель побудови, яка не може надалі ефективно виконувати свої завдання, внаслідок чого призводити до погіршення зовнішньої безпеки держави і громадян. Це породжує необхідність реформування згідно чинної світової моделі, яка вже показала результативність на світовій арені. Різні підрозділи розвідки НАТО, на нашу думку, повинні стати підґрунтям подальшого реформування Служби зовнішньої розвідки і основою перебудови моделі Служби зовнішньої розвідки України. <strong>Висновки.</strong> Обґрунтовано, що деякі з структурних елементів Служби зовнішньої розвідки побудовані за аналогією до таких підрозділів НАТО, як: ID, NOS, але їх перевага полягає в кращому технологічному забезпеченні, принципах діяльності, та існуванні як окремого елементу розвідки. Запропоновані приклади чинних реформ, проведених НАТО, які показали високу результативність на світовій арені. Висунута пропозиція провести на території України аналогічні зміни згідно з моделлю розвідки НАТО, таких як JISR і JISD, які на сьогодні широко застосовуються державами-членами Альянсу. <strong>Problem statement. </strong>The<strong> </strong>Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine is a special service, the main task of which is to carry out intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. Nowadays, it is not possible to use effectively the standard model of the organization of the distribution, because the whole world has been affected by cardinal changes, due to the development and introduction of technology into everyday life, the spread of terrorism-related crimes, and the emergence of a new concept – cyber-attacks. As a result, there is a need to restructure the model of counter-terrorism, which in our view is NATO. <strong>Methods. </strong>Low methods of scientific knowledge were used to solve the tasks of the research. The analysis of specific divisions as a method of sociological methodology was used to identify the problems of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, to determine the efficiency of Ukrainian and NATO disarmament activity. The comparative method made it possible to look at the current Ukrainian and NATO models, the advantages and disadvantages of each; the monitoring method allowed us to identify the current state of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine and the ways for further improvement of the current system. The <strong>purpose</strong> of the work is to make an in-depth analysis of problems of Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine activity, to characterize the NATO division, its particular divisions, to find advantages and disadvantages of the structural model of NATO and Ukrainian division. <strong>Results. </strong>It was found that nowadays the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine has an outdated structural model of construction, which can not continue to effectively carry out its tasks, as a result of which it leads to deterioration of external security of the state and the people. This makes it necessary to reform according to the current world model, which has already shown effectiveness in the world arena. In our opinion, the various NATO Disarmament Detachments should be the basis for further reform of the NRW and the restructuring of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service model. <strong>Conclusions. </strong>It is substantiated that some of the structural elements of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine are built similarly to such NATO divisions as ID, NOS, but their advantage is better technological support, principles of operation, and their existence as an independent element of intelligence. Examples of current reforms carried out by NATO, which have shown high performance on the world stage, are provided. The proposal was made to conduct on the territory of Ukraine similar changes according to the NATO model of disengagement, such as JISR and JISD, which are now widely used by the member states of the Alliance.
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Goode, Robert. "Planning the introduction of IPv6 in NATO." Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, no. 3 (September 30, 2006): 33–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.26636/jtit.2006.3.381.
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The NATO wide area network provides secure IP services to NATO commands and agencies, and offers information exchange gateways to nations and coalition operations. The IP services support the NATO-wide deployment of core automated information systems (AIS), and the placement of specific functional area services (e.g., intelligence, logistics, C2IS for the services, etc.) at commands. To maintain and improve interoperability within NATO and with partners, NATO will transition from version four of the Internet Protocol (IPv4) to version six (IPv6). The transition to IPv6 will involve the IP network, the information exchange gateways, the core AIS, the functional area services, and the supporting CIS infrastructure. The IPv6 naming and addressing plan being developed supports the NATO command structure and interoperability with NATO partners. The critical issue in the planning process is to support the incremental introduction of IPv6 whilst maintaining network security and reliable interworking with existing IPv4 systems and limiting increases in operations and maintenance costs. To minimise costs and maximise effectiveness NATO is planning the transition in a timescale that is commensurate with commercial adoption in NATO countries, the technology refreshment points for major systems, and the availability of IPv6 security components. New NATO projects will prepare for the transition by detailing their IPv6 upgrade path and procuring dual stack (IPv4 and IPv6) equipment. NATO will develop and adopt standardised approaches for IPv6 protocols and network design.
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Maksimenko, Yu A., V. V. Mamich, S. A. Popov, and D. Yu Sharshatkin. "ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE NATO ANALYTICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM." Collection of scientific works of the Military Institute of Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University, no. 77 (2022): 66–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2519-481x/2022/77-06.
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For the successful conduct of a modern battle, according to the views of modern military scientists, it is necessary, first of all, to know the enemy, his forces, means and nature of actions. In order to provide commanders and staffs of all levels with this data, there is the most important type of combat support for military operations - intelligence. The experience of conducting military operations shows that only where reconnaissance is conducted actively and purposefully, combat tasks are solved successfully and with the least losses. On the contrary, poorly organized intelligence has always been the main cause of unsuccessful military operations. Nowadays, the volume of tasks solved by intelligence has grown significantly. Instead, the terms of their implementation were significantly reduced. The requirements for the time of data transmission and the accuracy of determining the coordinates of enemy objects (targets) have increased. Analytical intelligence is a component of intelligence activity, consisting of detection, assessment, forecasting of various social processes, events, activities based on information, mainly obtained from open sources, as well as obtained by intelligence of other types (agency, technical, etc.). Analytical intelligence is divided into operational (which serves current needs) and strategic (which forms stable insights). Proactively investigates short-term phenomena (occurring, recent or soon expected) to ensure appropriate immediate action. Strategic reveals what is extremely unobvious, does not come soon, changes slowly, requires long-term, large-scale measures. Aspects of analytical intelligence: collection and comparison of various information in order to identify trends, contradictions, misinformation, misinterpretation, manipulative measures, implicit events, hidden activities, as well as the formation of general ideas about various significant subjects and phenomena; assessment of subjects, events, actions, intentions; forecasting events, actions, intentions; planning of activities, events. Information provision of specific open and secret operations; participation in the development of strategies for ensuring national security, national development, and global development. Wide implementation of modern information technologies has become an urgent issue today, according to scientists, it is an absolute requirement of modern warfare.
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Seagle, Adriana N. "Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 3 (2015): 557–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2015.1022468.
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Stan, Lavinia, and Marian Zulean. "Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: A Scorecard." Surveillance & Society 16, no. 3 (2018): 298–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.24908/ss.v16i3.6880.
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Since 1989, reforms have sought to align the Romanian post-communist intelligence community with its counterparts in established democracies. Enacted reluctantly and belatedly at the pressure of civil society actors eager to curb the mass surveillance of communist times and international partners wishing to rein in Romania’s foreign espionage and cut its ties to intelligence services of non-NATO countries, these reforms have revamped legislation on state security, retrained secret agents, and allowed for participation in NATO operations, but paid less attention to oversight and respect for human rights. Drawing on democratization, transitional justice, and security studies, this article evaluates the capacity of the Romanian post-communist intelligence reforms to break with communist security practices of unchecked surveillance and repression and to adopt democratic values of oversight and respect for human rights. We discuss the presence of communist traits after 1989 (seen as continuity) and their absence (seen as discontinuity) by offering a wealth of examples. The article is the first to evaluate security reforms in post-communist Romania in terms of their capacity to not only overhaul the personnel and operations inherited from the Securitate and strengthen oversight by elected officials, but also make intelligence services respectful of basic human rights.
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Ханна, Михаэль, Дэвид Гранзоу, Бьорн Болте та Эндрю Алварадо. "Обмен разведывательными данными и информацией в рамках НАТО: усовершенствование стратегии НАТО для операций по стабилизации и восстановлению". Connections: The Quarterly Journal 16, № 4 (2017): 5–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/connections.rus.16.4.01.
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Rada, Josef. "Smart defence: Joint geospatial support in NATO." GeoScape 13, no. 2 (2019): 98–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/geosc-2019-0009.
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Abstract Smart defence in NATO may in its very nature represent not only automated remote solutions for battle activities, but harmonized and efficient system of geospatial support of deployed units as well. The objective of this study is to uncover the essence of allied geospatial support mechanism, determine critical spots and propose appropriate system enhancements. Wealth of experience of members of the Armed forces of the Czech Republic was utilized to summarize the state of geospatial support in NATO. It is preferentially experience from foreign operations ISAF and KFOR, cooperation with NATO Headquarters SHAPE and from participation in Multinational Geospatial Support Group. Presented proposals for improvements of geospatial support might have significant impact on intelligence service and military units themselves. Highlights for public administration, management and planning: • Multinational Geospatial Support Group will become a single complex executive component of NATO geospatial support for foreign operations. • Financial and capacity means for geospatial support must be centralized directly within NATO structure to reach maximum efficiency. • Production of standardized-only scale set maps covering territory of NATO and areas of interest is to be obligatorily for all member nations. • Access to the web service CoreGIS should be granted for all NATO nations at a national level.
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Boda, József. "The Situation of National Security Studies." Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle 10, no. 3 (2022): 13–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.32561/nsz.2022.3.2.
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The author provides an overview of the national security and intelligence studies of some international organisations and some countries. The main focus of the article is on the development of national security and intelligence education in the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and China, Romania, Russia, the United State of America (USA), the United Kingdom, Singapore and Australia.
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Pešek, Karel, Jozef Vojtek, and Libor Kutěj. "Crowdsourcing as an Element of Strategic-Operational Intelligence. How NATO Used it and Changed the Game." Vojenské rozhledy 33, no. 1 (2024): 84–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.3849/2336-2995.33.2024.01.084-104.
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The article focuses on the concept of crowdsourcing in the social networking environment as a new phenomenon involving civilians in the intelligence process, enabling the use of their intelligence potential during armed conflict. Crowdsourcing of the civilian population is introduced by the example of NATO intervention during the first civil war in Libya. The article presents its use during the intelligence process at the strategic-operational level of command and control of the armed forces. It establishes its possible definition as a collection method of the intelligence process, and as a collection method which is disjunctively separable from similar intelligence collection methods.
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KOVAČ KREMŽAR, TANJA. "VOJAŠKOMEDICINSKA OBVEŠČEVALNA DEJAVNOST Z OMEJENIMI VIRI NA PRIMERU MAJHNIH DRŽAV." CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES, VOLUME 2014/ISSUE 16/4 (October 30, 2014): 105–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.16.4.6.
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Slovenska vojska poleg nacionalne obrambe opravlja naloge v mednarodnih operacijah in na misijah v zahtevnih podnebnih in geografskih razmerah zunaj območja držav članic Nata in EU. Zavezniške sile, ki opravljajo svoje poslanstvo na ozemljih zunaj Natovega območja, so lahko izpostavljene različnim dejavnikom tveganja, ki vplivajo na njihovo zdravje. Za njihovo ustrezno zdravstveno zaščito je treba sprejeti in izvajati učinkovit program, ki naj bo namenjen tako zdravstvenemu osebju kot poveljnikom. Strokovno zdravstveno osebje pridobiva zdravstvene podatke, na primer ocenjuje okoljske in zdravstvene vire ogrožanja, prepozna tveganja in izdela analizo groženj, ter jih vključuje v upravljanje tveganj. MEDINT ima pomembno vlogo v razmerju med zdravstvenim sistemom in krovno obveščevalno dejavnostjo, uporablja zakonitosti njenega obveščevalnega ciklusa, saj se na nekaterih stopnjah obveščevalni ciklus MEDINT vključuje v obveščevalni ciklus krovne obveščevalne dejavnosti. Končni obveščevalni proizvod MEDINT, ki temelji na oceni zdravstvene ogroženosti, podpira poveljnikov namen in operacijo. In addition to providing for national defence, the Slovenian Armed Forces perform tasks in demanding climatic and geographical conditions in international operations and missions outside the territory of NATO and EU Member States. Allied forces performing their mission in the territories outside the NATO area may be exposed to various threats that affect their health. For the protection of the forces` health, it is necessary to adopt and implement an effective program, which should be aimed, both, at healthcare personnel as well as commanders. Professional medical staff obtains medical data, assesses environmental and medical threats, identifies the risks, carries out threat analysis and implements them in risk management. Medical intelligence (MEDINT) plays an important role in the relation between the health system and intelligence activities. It also uses the intelligence cycle to ensure that all available information for making assessments is processed. To be fully efficient MEDINT requires the cooperation of experts from different natural science disciplines (medical, scientific or bio-engineering). The final MEDINT product based on the health threat assessment supports the commander’s intent and the operation as such.
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Balogh, Péter. "In the focus: NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance System." Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science 12, no. 2 (2013): 165–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.32565/aarms.2013.2.1.
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NATO plans to acquire an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO’s operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya showed how important such a capability is. A group of Allies intends to acquire five unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and their associated command and control base stations. NATO will then operate and maintain them on behalf of all 28 Allies. At the May 2012 NATO Chicago Summit there were several important topics discussed. The broader public learned the Smart Defence and Alliance Ground Sur- veillance System (AGS) expressions as frequently repeated issues in the politico– military environment. This paper shall highlight the AGS’s necessity, to be set up as a Joint NATO capability giving historical background as well as creating a state of the art Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Aquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) solution for the Alliance.
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Melnyk, Serhii, and Olexandr Cherviakov. "Implementation of NATO standards in the training system for the Security Service of Ukraine." Problems of Legality, no. 153 (June 16, 2021): 8–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.21564/2414-990x.153.231555.
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Incorporation of North Atlantic Alliance standards into domestic legislation, that governs relations in the security and defense sector is one of the key requirements for Ukraine to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan and further deepen Euro-Atlantic integration with a view to acquiring Alliance membership. An Important condition for these tasks is the implementation of NATO standards and procedures in the legislation governing military education. In the process of standardizing and achieving the state of compatibility of the security and defense sector of Ukraine with the relevant NATO forces, the specificity of the application of standards in improving the system of training specialists for the Security Service of Ukraine should be highlighted separately. According to this development course, military education today includes formal and informal (general training) components, and the improvement of professional competence (special training). Professional training of military specialist according to NATO standards is carried out at the appropriate levels of management: operational, tactical, strategic. It remains compulsory for officers to have received a higher education in the relevant educational programs. Taking into account the specific nature of the professional activities of the members of the special service, the tasks assigned to them and the functions performed for that purpose, namely, countering intelligence and subversive activities, combating terrorism, counter-intelligence and defending national statehood, Ensuring the security of the State in cyberspace, etc., the training system for the Security Service may be differentiated according to its functional direction and institutionalized in the military education system or outside it. At the same time, an important basis for the development of the educational component in the Security Service of Ukraine will remain the recruitment of teaching staff from among persons with practical experience. Despite the format of the model chosen, training for the security forces should be based on NATO standards, with a conceptually new piece of legislation.
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Melnyk, Serhii, and Olexandr Cherviakov. "Implementation of NATO standards in the training system for the Security Service of Ukraine." Problems of Legality 2021, no. 153 (2021): 8–17. https://doi.org/10.21564/2414-990X.153.231555.
Full textAbstract:
Incorporation of North Atlantic Alliance standards into domestic legislation, that governs relations in the security and defense sector is one of the key requirements for Ukraine to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan and further deepen Euro-Atlantic integration with a view to acquiring Alliance membership. An Important condition for these tasks is the implementation of NATO standards and procedures in the legislation governing military education. In the process of standardizing and achieving the state of compatibility of the security and defense sector of Ukraine with the relevant NATO forces, the specificity of the application of standards in improving the system of training specialists for the Security Service of Ukraine should be highlighted separately. According to this development course, military education today includes formal and informal (general training) components, and the improvement of professional competence (special training). Professional training of military specialist according to NATO standards is carried out at the appropriate levels of management: operational, tactical, strategic. It remains compulsory for officers to have received a higher education in the relevant educational programs. Taking into account the specific nature of the professional activities of the members of the special service, the tasks assigned to them and the functions performed for that purpose, namely, countering intelligence and subversive activities, combating terrorism, counter-intelligence and defending national statehood, Ensuring the security of the State in cyberspace, etc., the training system for the Security Service may be differentiated according to its functional direction and institutionalized in the military education system or outside it. At the same time, an important basis for the development of the educational component in the Security Service of Ukraine will remain the recruitment of teaching staff from among persons with practical experience. Despite the format of the model chosen, training for the security forces should be based on NATO standards, with a conceptually new piece of legislation.
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Surma, Ivan V. "The role of information and psychological operations in the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis." Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba (Diplomatic Service), no. 3 (June 7, 2022): 204–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/vne-01-2203-04.
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The article shows the importance and increasing role of the information and psychological warfare factor as the Ukrainian crisis escalates. The role of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine in the informational and psychological confrontation is noted. The structure and functionality of the 16th, 72nd, 74th and 83rd centers of information and psychological operations of the Special operations Forces of Ukraine are considered. The main functions of these centers are shown, such as intelligence and subversive activities, identification of internal opponents, disinformation of the population, information terrorism, demoralization of citizens of Donbass, etc. The tools used by the centers of information and psychological operations in their activities are considered, in addition to the official media, several thousand Internet resources, information and news sites, coordinated groups of users of social networks and individual "platforms" in social networks are used. The role of the NATO Coordination Center for Responding to Computer Incidents (NCIRC — NATO Computer Incident Response Capability), the NATO Center of Excellence for Joint Cyber Defense (NATO CCD COE — NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence — Tallinn) and the cyber operations center in Mons (Belgium) is noted.
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Gunn, Christopher. "The 1960 Coup in Turkey: A U.S. Intelligence Failure or a Successful Intervention?" Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 2 (2015): 103–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00550.
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Coups d’état were a relatively common means of regime change during the Cold War. From 1945 through 1985, 357 attempted coups d’état occurred in the Third World, and 183 succeeded. The high frequency of coups during this period is unsurprising, especially considering the advantageous position of the military during the rapid and destabilizing pace of modernization and decolonization in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Coups d’état were not exclusive to the Third World, however. They also occurred in members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Surprisingly, however, few scholars have explored why these extra-constitutional regime changes were tolerated, or how they were even possible, within NATO. This article attempts to answer these questions within the context of the 1960 coup in Turkey by closely evaluating the notion that the United States had no knowledge or warning that a coup was about to unfold.
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Gyarmati, István. "Quo Vadis NATO?" Hadtudomány 32, no. 3 (2022): 19–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17047/hadtud.2022.32.3.19.
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NATO held its third summit this year. That in itself is remarkable, but the real sensation isthat this summit produced, no exaggeration, historic results. It was about time. The Alliancehas wasted a number of years, largely because of the complexity and rapidity of the situation,but also due to indecision, internal divisions and let us say it openly, cowardice.The international security situation, including the European security situation, has changedradically since the last strategic concept was adopted in 2010. Both in political-security terms andin military-technical terms. And NATO has been hesitant to respond.By way of indication, Russia’s departure from the path of cooperation in 2007 wasobvious and open. Even before then, it was not sincere in its efforts to democratise andintegrate into the European security system, but after 2007 it was clear that it had theopposite ambitions: see Putin’s Munich Speech, the attack on Georgia and the annexation ofpart of its territory, its heavy-handed intervention in the Syrian war, its support for NorthKorea and, of course, its de facto occupation of Crimea and two provinces of Eastern Ukraine.Nor has NATO adequately responded to the new challenge posed by China. We could goon incessantly about the inadequate response to Iran’s nuclear weaponization and others.But this is also true in the military-technological field, where cyber warfare, drones, hybridwarfare, artificial intelligence and others have emerged, again only indicatively.However, the unprecedented Russian aggression against Ukraine has had an impact. TheAlliance got not only the opportunity, but the very urgent need to take stock of where itstands. The world has radically changed in the past decade and the change was multiplied bythe Russian aggression against Ukraine and the war that is still going on with little hope ofending any time soon, as we speak.NATO has “woken up” from its “brain dead” state and has responded to these challengeswith surprising strength. This reaction is clearly visible in the Communiqué adopted at theSummit and in the new Strategic Concept.
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Gaiser, Laris. "NATO - EU Collaboration on Hybrid Threats." National security and the future 20, no. 1-2 (2020): 13–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.37458/nstf.20.1-2.3.
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This article analyzes the current state of collaboration between NATO and the EU, with particular reference to the hybrid conflict sector. There has always existed a close relationship of interdependence between the two organizations. In 2016, this interdependence experienced a collaborative surge with the signing of a joint declaration at the Warsaw Summit. Since then,NATO and the European Union have actively collaborated in various sectors, including hybrid warfare. In the future, both organizations will need to improve the exchange of information and intelligence collaboration. However, this analysis aims to point out that NATO and the EU, if they wish to limit the scope of their opponents’ manoeuvrability, since hybrid conflict tends to develop below the threshold of what is generally accepted as the definition of armed conflict, will have to work together to outline a new legal framework that redefines the definition of armed conflict.
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Skripka, Ivan. "Norwegian-Finnish relations in the sphere of defense and security." Analytical papers of the Institute of Europe RAS, no. 4 (2024): 84–91. https://doi.org/10.15211/analytics43320248491.
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The article examines key aspects of Norwegian-Finnish cooperation in the field of defense and security in the context of modern geopolitical changes, including Finland's accession to NATO and militarization of Northern Europe. The role of joint military exercises, intelligence sharing and protection of critical infrastructure in strengthening bilateral cooperation is emphasized. The article analyzes the challenges for Russia associated with the strengthening of NATO's military infrastructure in the Arctic and Baltic region and assesses the prospects for further cooperation between Finland and Norway within NATO and the EU. The author concludes that it is necessary to adapt Russia's strategy to maintain stability in the region.
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Mieliekiestsev, Kyrylo. "Between Moscow and Washington: information influences on early dialogue with NATO in Poland and Ukraine (1991–1994)." Pomiędzy Polonistyczno-Ukrainoznawcze Studia Naukowe 9, no. 2 (2023): 19–26. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppusi.2023.02.02.
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The research covers the early years of Ukraine’s and Poland’s cooperation in their bilateral relations in the context of building up security policies between the NATO and the CSTO in 1991–1994. Various information influences from state and non-state actors, internal and external, made it so the processes of the search for security guarantees ended up quite different between the two neighboring countries. Covering sources and literature that provide evidence for influences from sources such as the Kremlin, the non-lustrated “old guard” former Communist party functionaries in Ukraine, and the former opposition in Poland, the research shows how the two countries’ relations with the NATO differed, and why, though both countries joined the Partnership for Peace program at roughly the same time, Poland managed to start active Euro-Atlantic integration much earlier than Ukraine did. Using sources such as the text of the treaties, the establishing documents and legislature guidebooks of organization, public writings of diplomats and former policy makers, the research shows what exactly were the risks that the NATO assessed in the joining of former Eastern Bloc countries (with the unstated reasons for the small number of contacts of those countries with NATO in the 1991–1994 relevant to the West’s suspicion of post-Soviet intelligence and military), and which points of the first Ukraine-NATO proved “too much” for the former. Furthermore, Ukraine’s early success with the number of NATO exercises it partook in during the first years of the Partnership for Peace became an example to other Eastern Europe countries seeking better relations with NATO and defense sector reforms, including the Republic of Poland. The paper also highlights the tendencies of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the context of NATO enlargement and the various aspects of Atlantic integration. The most important among them was cooperation in security and defense, both bilateral and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.
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A, Shevchenko. "Regarding the draft Strategy Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine 2022 – 2030." Artificial Intelligence 27, jai2022.27(1) (2022): 8–157. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/jai2022.01.008.
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In the article, the project of the Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine for the 2022-2030 years, which was created by the Institute of Artificial Intelligence Problems of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, this proposed for discussion and suggestions. The project takes into account the strategies for the development of artificial intelligence of various countries of the world, in particular the Strategy for NATO on Artificial Intelligence (2021), the Concept of the Development of Artificial Intelligence in Ukraine (approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of December 2, 2020 No. 1556-r), as well as the long-term development of domestic scientific structures. The elements of the texts of the participants in the discussion of the Strategy project are provided separately in order to detail its individual provisions.
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Tkach, М., and V. Tkachenko. "THE DEFENCE SECTOR OF UKRAINE: ITS FORMATION, CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS." Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки 20, no. 2 (2024): 129–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.37701/dndivsovt.20.2024.17.
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The article describes the defense sector of Ukraine as a set of military, law enforcement and intelligence organizations and structures responsible for the defense of the country. The relevance of the article lies in the fact that the modernization and technological development of the defense sector of Ukraine are important tasks for ensuring national security and the effectiveness of the country's defense system. A review and comparison of the features of the defense sectors of Ukraine and NATO member countries will help determine the directions of development and implementation of new technologies in the defense sector of Ukraine. The article highlights four main stages of the formation of the defense sector, starting with independence in 1991 and up to the present, including the full-scale unprovoked armed aggression by the russian federation. This text provides information on scientists and experts who research various aspects of the defense sector, including geopolitical analysis and strategic planning, military doctrine and military policy, technological development and specialized development of military science, national security issues and defense security strategies, socio-economic aspects of defense. Active reform and modernization of the defense sector, cooperation with international partners such as NATO, and the current structure of the defense sector are also noted. The main functions of the defense sector are defined, including the protection of territorial integrity, national interests, defense readiness, development of military equipment and threat intelligence. The authors of the article conducted a comparative analysis of the defense sector of Ukraine and NATO member countries. It was found that NATO member countries have a higher level of development, greater financial resources and are based on the principles of collective defense. At the same time, Ukraine actively cooperates with NATO in the partnership format. The article also points to the importance of modernization and technological development of the defense sector of Ukraine to ensure national security and the effectiveness of the defense system. Reforming the defense sector is aimed at strategic adaptation to new security challenges, ensuring efficient use of resources and increasing the professionalism of military personnel. In addition, the reform aims to support Ukraine's integration into the international defense community, in particular, into NATO. In general, reforming the defense sector is a necessary step to ensure the efficiency and competitiveness of the Ukrainian defense system.
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Дяков, Святослав, Василь Геник та Юрій Кирильчук. "ПІДГОТОВКА МАЙБУТНІХ ОФІЦЕРІВ РОЗВІДНИКІВ ДО ПРОФЕСІЙНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ В УМОВАХ ЗМІШАНОГО НАВЧАННЯ ЗАСОБАМИ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ОСВІТНЬОГО СЕРЕДОВИЩА". Педагогічні науки: теорія, історія, інноваційні технології 4, № 138 (2024): 312–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24139/2312-5993/2024.04/312-322.
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The article analyzes scientific works, the regulatory and legal framework and the content of educational and methodological documentation regarding the organization of professional training of future intelligence officers. Modern approaches related to distance learning and digitalization of professional training of future specialists of the national security and defense sector of Ukraine, as well as the European Union, have been identified. The results of previous studies have been summarized. It has been established that the professional training of future intelligence officers in the conditions of pandemics and full-scale war can be carried out in the format of blended learning using the means of a specially created informational and educational environment. It is substantiated that blended learning of future military intelligence officers consists of the educational activity in two forms: in form of training sessions in specialized classrooms under the direct supervision of the scientific and pedagogical workers and in form of independent work with electronic resources of a specially created information and educational environment. Varieties of blended learning models in the conditions of pandemic and full-scale war are distinguished, namely "rotational model", "flexible model", "person-oriented model" and "enriched virtual environment model". Pedagogical components of information and educational environment tools for blended learning of future intelligence officers have been developed, which include: independent study of new educational material, independent study of material using elements of creativity, independent improvement of theoretical knowledge and practical skills in conditions of quasi-professional activity, and independent in-depth study of material. The introduction of innovative forms, methods and means of obtaining intelligence information into the professional training of future intelligence officers in the format of blended learning by means of the information and educational environment is proposed. The experience of conducting military intelligence acquired by the intelligence units of the armies of NATO member countries and the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the de-occupation of the territories of sovereign Ukraine captured by Russian-terrorist forces is considered as part of the blended learning. Standards of individual and collective training of future intelligence officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and NATO are applied. Key words: future intelligence officers, blended learning, blended learning models, information and educational environment tools, pedagogical components of information and educational environment tools.
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Schiller, Mark. "Nato Multinational Brigade Interoperability: Issues, Mitigating Solutions and is it Time for a Nato Multinational Brigade Doctrine?" Journal on Baltic Security 2, no. 1 (2016): 102–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jobs-2016-0032.
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Abstract Multinational Brigade Operations involving NATO and its European Partners are the norm in the post-Cold War Era. Commonplace today are Multinational Brigades, composed of staffs and subordinate units representing almost every NATO Country and Partner, participating in training exercises or actual operations in both the European and Southwest Asian Theatres. Leadership challenges are prevalent for the Multinational Brigade Commander and his staff, especially those challenges they face in achieving an effective level of brigade interoperability in order to conduct successful operations in NATO’s present and future operating environments. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine the major interoperability obstacles a multinational brigade commander and his staff are likely to encounter during the planning and execution of brigade operations; and, to recommend actions and measures a multinational brigade commander and his staff can implement to facilitate interoperability in a multinational brigade operating environment. Several key interoperability topics considered integral to effective multinational brigade operations will be examined and analysed to include understanding partner unit capabilities and limitations facilitated by an integration plan, appropriate command and support relationships, compatible communications, synchronized intelligence and information collection, establishing effective liaison, and fratricide prevention. The paper conclusion will urge for a NATO land brigade doctrine considering doctrine’s critical importance to effective brigade command and control interoperability and the expected missions a land brigade will encounter in future NATO operating environments as part of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).
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Török, Péter. "NATO-tagországok hadseregeiben rendszeresített digitáliskatonarendszerek C4I alrendszereinek bemutatása." Hadmérnök 16, no. 4 (2021): 183–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.32567/hm.2021.4.14.
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A mai fegyveres konfliktusok irányítását a hálózatközpontú hadviselés jellemzi. Ebben a megközelítésben az információkat szerző érzékelő hálózatok, a döntéshozói hálózat és a végrehajtói hálózat egy közös rendszerben integrálódik. Így a végrehajtó katonák hozzáférnek más felderítési forrásból származó információkhoz. A katonák által használt eszközrendszerben a C4I (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, vezetés, irányítás, híradás, informatika és hírszerzés) rendszerek azok az elemek, amelyekkel ez megvalósul. Ezek a rendszerek szolgáltatnak harctéri információkat a parancsnokok számára a döntések meghozatalához és a katonai erők ellenőrzéséhez, a küldetések végrehajtásához. Ebben a cikkben a NATO-(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) tagországok hadseregeiben már rendszeresített DSS-(Dismounted Soldier System) program C4I rendszereit mutatom be.
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Juraev, Shakhboz. "Artificial Intelligence Weapons Lead to Recapitalization of Europe and Undermine NATO Structure." IR Scientists' Herald 2, no. 12 (2020): 115–21. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10608360.
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Stefanović, Zoran. "Between the heroic cultural model and a possible intelligence doctrine." Napredak 4, no. 3 (2023): 93–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/napredak4-48320.
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The breakup of the ideologically repressive and antinational security apparatus of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia created a system directed towards the revival of Serbian statehood in Serbia and Serbian countries in the 1990s. Based on the new monograph book by Karan and Kajtez, this article analyzes the activities of Jovan Milanović, Serbian intelligence officer in Brussels, the NATO headquarters, which protected the Republic Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the war. By studying personal characteristics, it is concluded that the essence of Serbian strategic culture is primarily related to Serbian cultural codes and ethos, and not only to the implied security, military and geopolitical aspects.
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Shin, Hongjung. "An Analysis of Drivers and Constraints in NATO’s AI Strategy: Focusing on Walt’s Balance of Threat-Based Alliance Theory." Korea Research Institute for Strategy 32, no. 1 (2025): 317–62. https://doi.org/10.46226/jss.2025.3.32..1.317.
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NATO has identified artificial intelligence as a key for Emerging Disruptive Technology (EDT) and is pursuing an AI-driven military transformation. After releasing an ‘AI strategy’ in 2021 and publishing a revised version in 2024, NATO is refining its plans. In addition, it has launched DIANA as a platform to accelerate military innovation along with an action plan for weapon system autonomy. NATO member states and industries are focusing on achieving the AI strategy. One of the most influential scholars in the realist school of thought, Stephen Walt, has insisted that NATO was formed with a balance-of-threat logic against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As Walt develops his argument that the alliance has not always been smoothly cruised, he lists the factors that have contributed to its endurance or decline of alliances. Factors that sustain alliances include hegemonic leadership, preservation of trust, domestic politics and elite issues, the impact of institutionalization, and a security community based on ideological cohesion and shared identity. On the other hand, decline factors include changing threat perceptions, declining trust, and shifting domestic politics. This paper evaluates whether NATO's AI strategy would cruise based on Walt's alliance endurance and decline factors. NATO's declared AI strategy faces challenges that are unlike the policy's idealized goals. On the one hand, it seems hopeful that the AI strategy will provide a foundation for NATO members to innovate their militaries systematically. As NATO's experience has strategic implications, it will be instructive in considering South Korea's dilemma of joining AUKUS - Pillar 2.
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Krasznay, Csaba. "Hacktivists, Proxy Groups, Cyber Volunteers." Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science 23, no. 3 (2024): 107–24. https://doi.org/10.32565/aarms.2024.3.6.
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This paper explores the involvement of hacktivists, cyber volunteers and proxy groups in military cyber operations, with a particular focus on their roles in the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war. The research aims to analyse the participation of these non-state actors, their legal implications, and how their involvement could influence the strategic, operational and tactical practices of small and medium-sized NATO member states, such as Hungary. Drawing from case studies, literature review and in-depth interviews with Hungarian military intelligence and public administration leaders, the paper formulates two hypotheses: 1. Hacktivist groups, unless integrated into a state’s cyber strategy, hinder tactical objectives and raise significant international legal concerns; and 2. Such groups pose a strategic threat to small NATO countries, including Hungary. The findings emphasise the necessity for NATO states to consider how to engage and regulate cyber volunteers effectively, while minimising the risks posed by hacktivist and proxy groups. Additionally, the research underscores the lack of a unified legal framework governing the use of these non-state actors, which complicates their regulation and control in cyberspace conflicts. The paper concludes with recommendations for how NATO states can leverage the openness of civilians to participate in cyber defence while maintaining legal and operational oversight, supporting the involvement of various cyber groups within the framework of international law.
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Tănase, Tiberiu. "Puncte de vedere privind tipologia serviciilor de intelligence din unele state ale NATO." Intelligence Info 1, no. 2 (2022): 47–54. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8271252.
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Serviciile de informații interne, externe și militare, serviciile de securitate și alte departamente de informații și protecție realizează cunoașterea, prevenirea, contracararea sau înlăturarea, după caz, a amenințărilor la adresa securității naționale. În asigurarea stării de securitate, un rol fundamental îl reprezintă cunoașterea disfuncționalităților, vulnerabilităților, factorilor de risc, amenințărilor și pericolelor la adresa acesteia, care se realizează prin identificarea/transmiterea de către alte organe competente, a priorităților informaționale, căutarea și obținerea de informații Pentru securitate, analiza/prelucrarea acestora și transmiterea/diseminarea acestora către factorii de decizie împuterniciți din punct de vedere legal pentru prevenirea și contracararea deciziilor. Acest obiectiv se realizează prin acțiunile operative specifice structurilor de informații, instituțiilor statului, integrate organic în administrația statului, pe baza unui suport juridic adecvat, a responsabilității depline a autorităților politice și a controlului parlamentar.
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Șandor, Andrei. "An Intelligence Perspective on Privacy and Data Protection Risks in Social Media." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 26, no. 1 (2020): 151–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2020-0023.
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AbstractSince the emergence of Internet and social media, new Intelligence branches have flourished, like CYBERINT (Cyber Intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) or SOCMINT (Social Media Intelligence), with the aim to exploit different dimensions of the virtual world. These Intelligence-related disciplines may inquire personal information, statements and conversations posted voluntarily on websites or social platforms in order to profile people, identify social networks and organizational structures, and uncover vulnerabilities and threats/risks that can jeopardize the security of individuals or organizations. In this respect, the Internet - as environment - can provide valuable information from both technical and social side. This is why the World Wide Web is and will remain an important place to search for data and information that can be processed into Intelligence, and represents the reason why people working in sensitive domains (e.g. Intelligence) should be aware of their vulnerabilities and the risks and threats posed by this environment.DISCLAIMER: This paper expresses the views, interpretations, and independent position of the authors. It should not be regarded as an official document, nor expressing formal opinions or policies, of NATO or the HUMINT Centre of Excellence.
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Mastny, Vojtech. "How Able Was “Able Archer”?: Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (2009): 108–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.1.108.
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A sharp increase in East-West tensions in the early 1980s sparked a genuine, if unwarranted, war scare in the USSR which the Soviet leader Yurii Andropov tried to exploit for political purposes. Soviet intelligence officials, however, were sufficiently informed about the enemy's true intentions that they did not sound the alarm in November 1983 when NATO conducted its “Able Archer” exercise, which has been retrospectively misinterpreted as having been capable of provoking nuclear escalation. The increased awareness of the risks inherent in the accumulation of nuclear weaponry, though not that particular incident, spurred President Ronald Reagan to take steps to reassure Moscow that the United States wanted peace—steps that eventually helped defuse the East-West confrontation
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HAFTARCZYK, Karolina. "SECRET SERVICE AS PART OF NATIONAL SECURITY." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 161, no. 3 (2011): 194–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3063.
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Recent years mark a period of profound redefinition of threats and dangers to national security, also in Poland. The end of the Cold War, stabilization in Polish-German relations, normalization of the situation in the other neighbouring countries and an averted threat of the so- called ‘Russian military generals rebellion’ scenario – so popular with some Hollywood screenwriters in the past – finally, Poland’s accession to NATO, significantly cut the risk of an open, direct outside aggression. The term ‘intelligence services’ refers to governmental agencies involved both in the collection of confidential information and in counter-intelligence activities. Intelligence agencies are devoted to gathering and protecting information crucial to national security, both domestic and external.In democratic countries their operations occasionally raise issues of ministerial control and accountability to parliamentary procedures. Intelligence agencies carrying out national security operations abroad sometimes break local law. The intelligence agencies of totalitarian regimes and non-democratic states sometimes employ various practices and techniques prohibited by their own law, such as bribery, blackmail, treacherous assassination, illegal weapons and drugs trade.
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Négyesi, Imre. "The Potential of Cognitive Artificial Intelligence for Mission-Oriented Military Decision-Making." Land Forces Academy Review 29, no. 4 (2024): 473–80. https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2024-0049.
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Abstract Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are rapidly evolving and have already had a significant impact on military capabilities, enabling the deployment of new types of assets and tactics. At the same time, there is a need to explore how AI can help commanders make faster and possibly more accurate decisions. The topic of this publication was the exploration of the potential of cognitive AI for mission-oriented command and control. NATO uses the original, well-established term Mission Command in its doctrines, instead of which the author has used the term mission-oriented command method, which is identical in content to the one used in this article.
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Skalický, Pavel, and Tibor Palasiewicz. "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield as a Part of Knowledge Development." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 23, no. 1 (2017): 276–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2017-0045.
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Abstract The aim of this article is to introduce an approach to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as a part of knowledge development in conditions of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR). Numerous of NATO publications and Stanags has been analyzed as well as Czech national documents. Based on results of the analyses and personal experience of authors, the current state of IPB applied in ACR has been outlined and main imperfections of this process have been emphasized such as a disregard of dynamic changes of terrain in time and so on. It the closing section of the article a few possible ways of IPB development have been suggested. Those suggestions show possible form of this process for needs in 21st century.
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Poptchev, Peter. "NATO-EU Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Cyber Defence Offers Unrivalled Advantages." Information & Security: An International Journal 45 (2020): 35–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/isij.4503.
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The article identifies the trends as well as documented instances of adversarial cyberattacks and hybrid warfare against NATO and EU Member States. It illustrates how these adversarial activities impact on the broader aspects of national security and defence, the socio-economic stability and the democratic order of the states affected, including on the cohesion of their respective societies. Cyberattacks by foreign actors—state and non-state—including state-sponsored attacks against democratic institutions, critical infrastructure and other governmental, military, economic, academic, social and corporate systems of both EU and NATO Member States have noticeably multiplied and have become more sophisticated, more destructive, more expensive and often indiscriminate. The cyber and hybrid threats are increasingly seen as a strategic challenge. The article presents some salient topics such as the nexus between cyberattacks and hybrid operations; the game-changing artificial intelligence dimension of the cyber threat; and the viability of public attributions in cases of cyberattacks. On the basis of analysis of the conceptual thinking and policy guide-lines of NATO, the European Union and of the U.S., the author makes the case that a resolute Trans-Atlantic cooperation in the cyber domain is good for the security of the countries involved and essential for the stability of today’s cyber-reliant world.
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NICOARĂ, Gabriela-Florina, and Gergonia-Cristiana BOGĂȚEANU. "ASPECTS REGARDING THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN IMPROVING DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT." STRATEGIES XXI - Command and Staff College 17, no. 1 (2021): 323–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2668-2028-21-42.
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Abstract: Regarding the society evolution dominated by a high-level technology, we consider this article a constructive approach. The aim of the paper is to highlight a few activities/places/spots in which competences of humans/soldiers interfere with different elements of the artificial intelligence. We deem that the technological progress in the past few years has been impressive. Nowadays, thousands of activities that were mostly or exclusively executed by people can be done faster and often with greater precision using digital systems. In this instance and considering the achievement of functional compatibility between Romanian Army and forces from NATO as being a priority, the development of the technology based on artificial intelligence is vital within the defense resource management.
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Kaarbo, Juliet, Kai Oppermann, and Ryan K. Beasley. "What if? Counterfactual Trump and the western response to the war in Ukraine." International Affairs 99, no. 2 (2023): 605–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad030.
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Abstract Because of his personality, had Donald Trump won the 2020 election the remarkable and unexpected united response by NATO allies to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine would not have happened. Relying on leader personality research in foreign policy, we demonstrate this by using the counterfactual method of analysis. Specifying key differences between Biden's and Trump's personalities in terms of their experiences, traits and beliefs, we explicitly show that president Trump would have been very unlikely to share US intelligence, rally NATO allies in support of Ukraine or challenge Vladimir Putin. In contrast, these responses fit very well with Joe Biden's personality. We first present counterfactual analysis as a method before comparing Biden and Trump along personality characteristics known to significantly influence foreign-policy decisions. Through our case-study, we demonstrate the value of using systematic and theoretically grounded counterfactual methods for assessing the importance of individual differences between leaders and emphasizing their impact on international affairs.
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Zvozdetska, Oksana. "NATO’s new strategic concept in cybersecurity issues in the context of up-to-the date vulnerability and threat information." Mediaforum : Analytics, Forecasts, Information Management, no. 6 (December 17, 2018): 71–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mediaforum.2018.6.71-93.
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The focus of the article revolves around NATO’s roadmap of smart defense against cyber attacks as the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security. The author discloses NATO’S new policy and cutting-edge technical initiatives, aimed at focusing on countering global threats and cyber security challenges. It is stressed out, that new ideas towards a more synergetic approach between all the NATO Cyber Defense agencies should be explored to develop a shared framework for cybersecurity that might provide up-to-the date intelligence in order to ensure the development, acquisition and maintenance of the necessary military capabilities. The research highlights the core aspects of the 2010 Lisbon Summit that adopted NATO’s Strategic Concept ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Members of the North Atlantic. Treaty Organization’, that recognizes Cyber Defense as one of its strategic priorities. In particular, to foster Allied Nations’ cooperative efforts to counter terrorism, cyber attacks, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Reinforce energy security and environmental constraints. Develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of trategic assessments and contingency planning; In July 2011, NATO Defense Ministers adopted revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defense, which highlighted three areas: • The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which involve the assistance provided only upon request, in any other cases, the principle of selfresponsibility of sovereign states is applied; • Avoiding unnecessary duplication of the structures or capabilities and approaches on the international, regional and national levels; • Collaboration based on trust, with regard to the potential sensitivity and vulnerability of the system, the access to which has to be given. After the 2014 Wales Summit, in the revised NATO Cyber Defense Policy, cyber threats were identified as a potential prerequisite for collective defense under the Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Noteworthy, Cyber Security is responsible for providing the broad spectrum of services in the following specialist security areas: CIS Security, Cyber Defense, Information Assurance, and Computer & Communications Security. Cyber defense is provided by many Alliance bodies: any NATO response concerning collective defense against cyber attacks will be subordinated to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), The Cyber Defense Committee (CDC) – the leading advisory body of the NAC. The executive level is represented by The Cyber Defense Management Board (CDMB), NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), Cyber Security incorporates the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Technical Centre, providing specialist services to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from cyber security incidents.
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Tomescu, Tomiță Cătălin. "Is Russia That Powerful in Hybrid Warfare?" International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 23, no. 1 (2017): 317–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2017-0052.
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Abstract Short answer is yes. As it is stated in a NATO reference hybrid warfare actions can be applied to the full DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal) spectrum. This paper will demonstrate that Russia has significant elements which makes this country very well suited for this type of war and gives her some advantages on all DIMEFIL areas. In my view those elements are: current leadership, history and political mentality, size and geography, economic and financial power and military power.
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Ballast, Jan. "Merging Pillars, Changing Cultures: NATO and the Future of Intelligence Cooperation Within the Alliance." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 4 (2018): 720–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1488499.
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