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1
Brunschvicg, Leon. "Rozwój świadomości w filozofii zachodniej." Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, no. 14 (January 1, 2001): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.14.05.
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Cette traduction d'un fragment du livre de L. Brunschvicg, expert et critique reconnu de la philosophie de Descartes, et de sa part un tentative de créer une synthèse de la pensée carthésienne si complexe et si conflictuelle intérieurement. Descartes y est présenté comme savant, mathématician et philosophe dont la contribution a l'évolution de la pensée philosophique européenne de la crise (qui s'est traduit par la confrontation entre l'aristotélisme et la naturalisme modern) est devenue aujourd’hui l'héritage de tout l'humanité. Brunschvicg décrit l'etendue et les conséquences de cette revolution mathématique et philosophique après une étude approfondie de toutes les plus grandes œuvres de Descartes et sa correspondence.
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Calcaterra, Rosa M. "Le naturalisme de William James." Archives de Philosophie Tome 87, no. 2 (April 9, 2024): 11–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.872.0009.
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Dans cet article, l’auteur examine le naturalisme de James comme un exemple des intersections entre la biologie, la psychologie et la philosophie. L’article reconstruit les principaux arguments épistémologiques, éthiques et métaphysiques de James pour montrer comment sa philosophie s’inscrit dans la biologie de Darwin. Ainsi, le contingentisme de James devient cohérent avec sa critique de l’interprétation du principe darwinien de la « sélection naturelle » et avec l’idée de Darwin de l’ambiguïté comme marque de la réalité physique et humaine.
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Hanly, Charles. "La psychanalyse et les fondements de la morale." Dialogue 26, no. 4 (1987): 669–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300018254.
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La philosophie morale, pas moins que les autres branches de la philosophie, est caractérisée par des contradictions et des dichotomies (par exemple, le déterminisme versus la liberté, le naturalisme versus l'antinaturalisme, l'émotion versus la raison) qui aboutissent à des discussions sans fin. On garde l'impression que l'expérience morale doit être extrêmement individualisée; sans cela, comment des philosophes, également, sinon exceptionnellement, doués intellectuellement, en arrivent-ils à des conclusions aussi diverses quand ils réfléchissent à la question? Et le problème est plus qu'un problème intellectuel. La valeur de l'existence humaine et l'existence humaine elle-même dépendent de valeurs morales et d'impératifs selon lesquels l'homme dirige sa vie. Comprendre de façon cohérente et réaliste la moralité constitue un besoin perpétuellement urgent que la philosophie jusqu'à maintenant, du moins, n'a pu satisfaire.
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Grassl, Fabian F. "Atheism? A Critical Analysis Stephen E. Parrish." European Journal of Theology 30, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 232–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ejt2021.1.024.gras.
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Summary Parrish offers a fine in-depth analysis of the arguably strongest worldview in the West, naturalism. He puts its philosophical underpinnings to the test and finds its answers to life’s biggest questions considerably wanting. Written for a non-specialist audience, this book is an excellent overview over the pressing issues in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethics and aesthetics. It provides substantial and yet lucid reasons for the rational superiority of Christian perspectives on life. Zusammenfassung Parrish bietet eine hervorragende, in die Tiefe gehende Analyse der im Westen wohl am stärksten vertretenen Weltanschauung, des Naturalismus. Er stellt dessen philosophischen Unterbau auf den Prüfstand und findet, dass dessen Antworten auf die bedeutendsten Lebensfragen sich als sehr unzulänglich erweisen. Das Buch, das für eine allgemeine Leserschaft geschrieben ist, bietet einen ausgezeichneten Überblick über die vordringlichen Anliegen in der Metaphysik, der Philosophie des Geistes, der Ethik und Ästhetik. Es liefert grundlegende und dabei einleuchtende Gründe für die rationale Überlegenheit von christlichen Lebensperspektiven. Résumé Parrish offre une belle analyse en profondeur du naturalisme, la vision du monde qui, c’est incontestable, domine en Occident. Il en teste les fondements philosophiques et conclut à la très grande faiblesse des réponses proposées aux principales questions existentielles. Écrit pour un public non averti, ce livre est un excellent survol des questions essentielles qui se posent en matière de métaphysique, de philosophie de l’esprit, d’éthique et d’esthétique. Il présente des arguments substantiels, mais clairs, asseyant la supériorité rationnelle des conceptions chrétiennes de la vie.
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Doat, David, and Olivier Sartenaer. "John Dewey, Lloyd Morgan et l’avènement d’un nouveau naturalisme pragmatico-émergentiste." Varia 41, no. 1 (June 25, 2014): 127–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1025726ar.
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Peut-on raisonnablement penser qu’un même phénomène naturel, comme l’esprit par exemple, puisse en même temps être continu et discontinu avec les processus physico-chimiques qui conditionnent son advenue au monde ? Autrement dit, est-il possible de construire une philosophie de la nature qui rejette simultanément la dichotomie métaphysique et la pure identité, c’est-à-dire qui se situe sans contradiction sur la ligne de séparation entre le dualisme et le matérialisme ? En y répondant par l’affirmative, John Dewey et Lloyd Morgan, deux pionniers respectifs du pragmatisme et de l’émergentisme au siècle dernier, ouvrirent la voie d’un nouveau naturalisme antiréductionniste. L’objectif de cet article est, d’une part, de montrer comment ces deux auteurs cherchèrent à relever ce défi en mobilisant le concept d’émergence ; d’autre part de préciser la nature des divergences d’interprétation et d’usage du concept chez Morgan et Dewey.
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Hegarty, Michael J. "A dilemma for naturalistic theories of intentionality." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 59–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.07.
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I argue that a dilemma arises for naturalistic philosophers of mind in the naturalised semantics tradition. Giving a naturalistic account of the mind is a pressing problem. Brentano’s Thesis — that a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived representational content — provides an attractive route to naturalising the mental. If true, Brentano’s Thesis means that naturalising representation is sufficient for naturalising the mental. But a naturalist who accepts Brentano’s Thesis thus commits to an eliminativism about the category of the mental. This is because naturalistic theories of representation are reductive, and so over-generalise by applying to patently non-mental states. According to these theories, it has been argued, phenomena like tree rings and saliva come out as representational. Only proposing further Naturalistic conditions on representation could avoid the eliminativist conclusion. But this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress towards naturalising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then she gives up on a clear link between representation and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the mental. This, again, shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mental.Keywords: Intentionality, representation, physicalism, eliminativism, Brentano, materialism, naturalism.
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Debourdeau, Ariane. "Aux origines de la pensée écologique : Ernst Haeckel, du naturalisme à la philosophie de l’Oikos." Revue Française d'Histoire des Idées Politiques N° 44, no. 2 (2016): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rfhip1.044.0033.
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Sherman, David. "Nietzsche Contra the Naturalists." Journal of Nietzsche Studies 55, no. 1 (March 2024): 67–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.55.1.0067.
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Abstract Even among scholars who emphasize Nietzsche’s naturalism (“the naturalists”), what it actually involves is disputed. This article identifies the foundations of Nietzsche’s naturalism and then elaborates on these foundations through a critical analysis of the works of those naturalists who also identify them. Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist, who, epistemically, is a reliabilist, and while he acknowledges the innate limitations of our cognitive inheritance, which is reflected in his perspectivism, he sees no reason to conclude that we cannot grasp the natural world truly. As to the primary issue in scientific explanation, causation, Nietzsche adopts a regularity theory as early as The Gay Science, and, on the basis of this theory, rejects determinism. One consequence of this analysis is that Nietzsche’s naturalism is not as restrictive as the naturalists tend to portray it, and this opens up new possibilities for interpreting many of his other commitments.
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Moberger, Victor. "Hume’s Dictum and Metaethics." Philosophical Quarterly 70, no. 279 (September 14, 2019): 328–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz058.
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Abstract This paper explores the metaethical ramifications of a coarse-grained criterion of property identity, sometimes referred to as Hume's dictum. According to Hume's dictum, properties are identical if and only if they are necessarily co-extensive. Assuming the supervenience of the normative on the natural, this criterion threatens the non-naturalist view that there are instantiable normative properties which are distinct from natural properties. In response, non-naturalists typically point to various counterintuitive implications of Hume's dictum. The paper clarifies this strategy and defends it against objections by Bart Streumer and Ralf Bader. In addition, it is argued that proponents of naturalist and supernaturalist views, along with proponents of a certain kind of nihilism, should also reject Hume's dictum. This shows that non-naturalists can also attack the criterion indirectly, by pointing to partners in guilt. Also, it shows that not just any opponent of non-naturalism can appeal to Hume's dictum. Only certain nihilists can.
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FitzPatrick, William J. "Representing ethical reality: a guide for worldly non-naturalists." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3-4 (2018): 548–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1432396.
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AbstractEthical realists hold (i) that our ethical concepts, thoughts, and claims are in the business of representing ethical reality, by representing evaluative or normative properties and facts as aspects of reality, and (ii) that such representations are at least sometimes accurate. Non-naturalist realists add the further claim that ethical properties and facts are ultimately non-natural, though they are nonetheless worldly. My aim is threefold: to elucidate the sort of representation involved in ethical evaluation on realist views; to clarify what exactly is represented and how non-naturalism comes into the picture for non-naturalists; and to defend worldly non-naturalism against some objections. The first question addressed is how we should model evaluation on any realist view, which should in turn guide the identification of which properties and facts are credibly regarded as ‘evaluative’ ones. Then the question is: what role might non-natural properties and facts play, and how are they related to what is represented in ethical evaluation? Once that is clear, we will be in a position to answer certain objections to non-naturalist realism from Jackson, Gibbard, Bedke, and Dreier. I argue that the objections all mischaracterize the role played by non-natural properties and facts on plausible versions of non-naturalist realism.
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Pérez Marcos, Moisés. "El naturalismo cientificista como pseudorreligión y anti-teología natural." Scientia et Fides 10, no. 1 (March 3, 2022): 73–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.004.
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Tras exponer las ideas básicas de la cosmovisión naturalista (apartados 1, 2 y 3) se intenta mostrar que el naturalismo es una interpretación de la ciencia que posee una ineludible dimensión “mitológica”, en el sentido que Midgley da a esta expresión (apartado 5), lo que no lo desacredita por principio, pero hace que no podamos aceparlo acríticamente por el mero hecho de que apele a las ciencias naturales para justificar su validez. Se defiende, después, que el compromiso central de los naturalistas es la afirmación del ateísmo. De hecho, los naturalismos contemporáneos más radicales pueden ser interpretados como un intento de hacer imposible toda teología natural, es decir, buscan destruir los asideros en los que la razón se apoya clásicamente para afirmar la existencia de Dios. Se defiende que el naturalismo no tiene por qué gozar de superioridad epistemológica a priori con respecto al teísmo.
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J. Boongaling, Pamela Ann. "Is Quinean naturalism dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics?" Discusiones Filosóficas 21, no. 36 (January 1, 2020): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.4.
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I will demonstrate that Quinean naturalism must accommodate a priori truths in its epistemology if it aims to retain its naturalist stance. This happens becausethe laws of first-order logic which it uses in the regimentation of scientific theories are best perceived as metaphysical principles rather than logical laws. To support this position, I will demonstrate that since our best scientific theories are dependent on the meta-language of first-order logic and since the meta-language of first-order logic is included in the metametalanguage of metaphysics, science is also dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics.Hence, the cogency of Quinean naturalism’s account of our best scientific theories must explain how science is dependent on the metametalanguage of metaphysics.
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Bell, Martin, and Marie McGinn. "Naturalism and Scepticism." Philosophy 65, no. 254 (October 1990): 399–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064652.
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In this paper we argue that a dominant view of Humean naturalism involves a fundamental misconception of Hume's naturalist project. We shall show that the naturalist project as Hume conceives it is philosophically much more interesting than the form of naturalism commonly attributed to him. We shall also argue, however, that Hume's commitment to principles of empiricist epistemology prevented him from bringing his naturalist project to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, we shall suggest that Wittgenstein shares Hume's conception of a philosophically satisfactory form of naturalism, and that, unencumbered by empiricist doctrines, Wittgenstein was able to provide the sort of undogmatic unravelling of the sceptical problem that eluded Hume.
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Cavaillé, Jean-Pierre. "Antonio Rocco, Alcibiade enfant à l’école. Clandestinité, irréligion et sodomie." Tangence, no. 81 (April 24, 2007): 15–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/014959ar.
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L’article est consacré à la fois à l’histoire de la publication clandestine d’Alcibiade enfant à l’école, du xviie siècle à nos jours, et à l’analyse de son dispositif fictionnel et de ses ressources argumentatives. L’ouvrage relate en effet l’entreprise de séduction amoureuse et sexuelle d’un maître de philosophie sur son jeune élève, Alcibiade, fondée sur la persuasion et l’efficacité d’une argumentation idoine, où la philosophie joue un rôle déterminant : un rationalisme foncièrement naturaliste au service d’une éthique résolument hédoniste. Par l’étroite association d’une initiation sexuelle et d’un apprentissage philosophique, ce livre contribue ainsi à la constitution d’un genre qui trouvera une expression ultérieure dans la Satire sotadique de Chorier (ou Académie des dames), Thérèse philosophe et les romans de Sade. On se propose ici de réfléchir sur le sens de la clandestinité de cette oeuvre envisagée au premier chef dans sa composition même, comme discours puissamment transgressif, tout à la fois du fait de ses modes d’écriture, de sa représentation des moeurs et des idées exprimées, et rendu attractif pour ces raisons, mais contenant aussi en lui-même les modalités de son acceptabilité restreinte, comme un livret inoffensif de simple divertissement.
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Forrest, Peter. "Methodological Naturalism Undercuts Ontological Naturalism." American Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 99–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.1.08.
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Abstract Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominalism, but methodological naturalists should either reject it or at very least treat it, and hence ontological naturalism, as a speculation.
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Teruel, Pedro Jesús. "Critical Naturalism." Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica 77, Extra 295 (November 30, 2021): 467–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.14422/pen.v77.i295.y2021.002.
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In this paper I map the conceptual framework of naturalism, its ontological implications and its current projection in the field of neurophilosophy. I show how critical naturalism formally differs from radical ontological naturalisms, both global and sectoral, in order to become a critical instance. Its theoretical implications lead to a definition of natural causality from the emergentist perspective and to metaphysical scenarios ranging from ontological pluralism to noumenal monism.
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JEWETT, ANDREW. "CANONIZING DEWEY: NATURALISM, LOGICAL EMPIRICISM, AND THE IDEA OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY." Modern Intellectual History 8, no. 1 (March 3, 2011): 91–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244311000060.
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Between World War I and World War II, the students of Columbia University's John Dewey and Frederick J. E. Woodbridge built up a school of philosophical naturalism sharply critical of claims to value-neutrality. In the 1930s and 1940s, the second-generation Columbia naturalists (John Herman Randall Jr, Herbert W. Schneider, Irwin Edman, Horace L. Friess, and James Gutmann) and their students who later joined the department (Charles Frankel, Joseph L. Blau, Albert Hofstadter, and Justus Buchler) reacted with dismay to the arrival on American shores of logical empiricism and other analytic modes of philosophy. These figures undermined their colleague Ernest Nagel's attempt to build an alliance with the logical empiricists, accusing them of ignoring the scholar's primary role as a public critic. After the war, the prestige of analytic approaches and a tendency to label philosophies either “analytic” or “Continental” eclipsed the Columbia philosophers’ normatively inflected naturalism. Yet in their efforts to resist logical empiricism, the Columbia naturalists helped to construct a sturdy, canonical portrait of “American philosophy” that proponents still hold up as a third way between analytic and Continental approaches.
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Bouvier, Hernán G. "Naturaleza y ética: Comentarios a Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates (2012)." Análisis Filosófico 32, no. 2 (November 1, 2012): 197–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2012.101.
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La importancia de las ciencias naturales para la vida y el pensamiento contemporáneos es reconocida ampliamente. En ética y metaética la relevancia de las ciencias naturales se encuentra estrechamente vinculada con la concepción conocida como Naturalismo ético. A pesar de que existe una vasta literatura sobre Naturalismo y Naturalismo ético no es fácil encontrar un libro que recopile lo que diferentes autores relevantes tiene para decir sobre tal tópico. El libro Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates (2012) ha venido a llenar tal laguna. Este trabajo presenta el tema general del libro y analiza y critica algunas de las ideas allí desarrolladas. El propósito central es hacer algunas observaciones generales a la empresa del Naturalismo ético considerado globalmente y al mismo tiempo algunas observaciones que son relevantes sólo para algunas de las intervenciones que forman parte de la colección.
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Ehrsam, Raphaël. "La métaphysique est politique." Archives de Philosophie Tome 87, no. 3 (June 21, 2023): 131–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.863.0131.
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Pour Lagneau, la philosophie coïncide avec la métaphysique. Cette thèse, Lagneau la veut solidaire de l’idée selon laquelle le travail philosophique fondamental pourrait et devrait être indépendant de tout engagement politique. À rebours, le présent article vise à promouvoir une lecture matérialiste et critique de l’histoire de la métaphysique ; il étudie les réflexions cosmologiques, psychologiques et théologiques de Lagneau afin de faire apparaître leur solidarité avec le positionnement naturaliste, « libéral-conservateur », paternaliste et antidémocratique de la métaphysique de Lagneau.
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Rouse, Joseph. "Barad's Feminist Naturalism." Hypatia 19, no. 1 (2004): 142–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb01272.x.
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Philosophical naturalism is ambiguous between conjoining philosophy with science or with nature understood scientifically. Reconciliation of this ambiguity is necessary but rarely attempted. Feminist science studies often endorse the former naturalism but criticize the second. Karen Barad's agential realism, however, constructively reconciles both senses. Barad then challenges traditional metaphysical naturalisms as not adequately accountable to science. She also contributes distinctively to feminist reinterpretations of objectivity as agential responsibility, and of agency as embodied, worldly, and intra-active.
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Whyman, Tom. "Radical ethical naturalism." Philosophy & Social Criticism 44, no. 2 (November 5, 2017): 159–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453717723192.
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In this article, I identify – and clear up – two problems for contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism. The first I call the problem of alienation; the second the problem of conservatism. I argue that these problems will persist, both for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of ethical naturalism, unless ethical naturalists adopt what I call ‘Practical Realism’ about essential human form. Such a Practical Realism leaves open the possibility of radical social and political criticism – I therefore suggest that contemporary ethical naturalists ought to be more interested in exploring the affinities their view shares with Marxist political thought.
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Kuukkanen, Jouni-Matti. "Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity: The Case of Historiography." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49, no. 5 (April 23, 2019): 331–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393119842787.
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This article tackles the problem of normativity in naturalism and considers it in the context of the philosophy of historiography. I argue that strong naturalism is inconsistent with genuine normativity. The strong naturalist faces a difficult dilemma. If he rejects any reliance on conceptual intuitions, his epistemic inquiries will not get off the ground. As a consequence, his analyses of historiography are, in effect, normatively irrelevant: any practice is epistemically as valuable as any other. Another option for the strong naturalist is to relax methodological requirements and accept that epistemic inquiries may begin with nonempirical conceptual reflection or a priori reasoning.
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GANSSLE, GREGORY E. "Fine tuning and the varieties of naturalism." Religious Studies 47, no. 1 (April 6, 2010): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000090.
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AbstractNaturalism has been characterized both as a claim about what exists (claim naturalism) and as a commitment to a certain methodology (method naturalism). The fine-tuning argument for God's existence presents a significant challenge to each way of characterizing naturalism. The claim naturalist faces the fact that the best response to the fine-tuning argument (the many-world hypothesis) requires the existence of many universes that are not clearly naturalistic themselves. Method naturalism faces the challenge that it does not have the resources to ground the preference of the many-world hypothesis to the designer hypothesis.
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Özbe, Ufuk. "Logical Aliens? Eine Verallgemeinerung und Verteidigung der Psychologismus-Kritik Freges gegen Wittgensteins Naturalismus." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 76, no. 4 (December 15, 2022): 580–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433022836164996.
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The fundamental laws of logic hold independently of us. Thus, if there were beings who thought in contradiction to these laws, they would be in error. The paper defends this stance of Frege's against Wittgenstein's combination of logical constitutivism and logical naturalism. Frege's arguments against psychologism are more general than his usual wording suggests and are, at their core, directed against the whole of logical naturalism. Contrary to prevailing opinions on this subject, I argue that constitutivism alone cannot deflect Frege's attack. Rather, constitutivism is neutral to the opposition between logical realism and logical naturalism. The later Wittgenstein was not only a constitutivist, but, as will be explained, also a logical naturalist. By shedding new light on the logical alien problem, I attempt to apply Frege's generalized arguments to Wittgensteinian naturalism. This naturalism inevitably leads to a radical and self-undermining relativism.
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Rozema, David. "Naturalism." Theology Today 75, no. 3 (October 2018): 330–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040573618791731.
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In May of 1947, C. S. Lewis’s book Miracles was published, the third chapter of which was entitled, “The Self-contradiction of Naturalism.” In this chapter, Lewis presented a reductio argument, concluding that the metaphysical theory of Naturalism, if assumed to be true, undermines itself. Lewis’s main aim in giving this argument against naturalism is to leave us with the only alternative to naturalism: supernaturalism. This argument for the existence of the supernatural (i.e., God) has come to be known as “the Argument from Reason.” It has become a staple argument among present-day Christian apologists. Rather than offering either a defense or a refutation of the argument, in this article I wish to do a preliminary examination of what those who argue about naturalism might mean by the term. The aim of such an examination is to determine if the debates over naturalism can even get off the ground. I use the 1948 “debate” between C. S. Lewis and Elizabeth Anscombe, along with a little-known paper (“Naturalism”) by the American philosopher O. K. Bouwsma, to show how the arguments dissolve upon grammatical investigation, and a more sensible understanding of the naturalist “hypothesis” is to take it as a mandate. Finally, I take up a third possible interpretation of naturalism, suggested by Lewis himself, that its appeal is strongest when it is couched in mythical terms.
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Leščak, Oleg, Jurij Sitko, Elena Simonato, and Patrick Sériot. "Les considérations onto-gnoséologiques de Marr du point de vue de la méthodologie pragmatico-fonctionnelle." Cahiers du Centre de Linguistique et des Sciences du Langage, no. 20 (April 9, 2022): 177–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.26034/la.cdclsl.2005.1513.
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Les conceptions ontologiques de N. Marr ne s'accordaient pas vraiment avec ses conceptions gnoséologiques, ni ces dernières avec sa méthode de recherche. L'analyse pragmatico-fonctionnelle de la philosophie du langage de Marr permet de faire apparaître des échos des théories de W. von Humboldt, de H. Steinthal, des néo-platoniciens russes, de même que des fondateurs du fonctionnalisme et du pragmatisme en linguistique : A. Potebnja, H. Schuchardt, E. Cassirer, J. Baudouin de Courtenay, F. de Saussure, L. Ščerba, V. Mathesius, N. Troubetzkoy, etc. On a pu ainsi mettre en évidence certaines positions-clés de la philosophie du langage chez Marr :
Dans son ontologie : un psychosociologisme métaphysique (« de classe »), un dualisme transcendental, une combinaison de réalisme socio-économique et d'idéalisme ethno-sociologique, un activisme historique, un téléologisme objectif et un préformisme socio-ethnique, un organicisme, un émergentisme, un globalisme prospectif, un pluralisme et un empirisme rétrospectifs, un verbalisme, un sémanticisme, un aposteriorisme linguo-génétique et un antinaturalisme.
Dans sa gnoséologie : un objectivisme et un maximalisme, un phénoménologisme, un eïdétisme, une approche explicative, un herméneutisme, un diachronisme dynamique, un holisme, un anti-scientisme, anti-rationalisme et antiintellectualisme, un factualisme naturaliste.
Des deux points de vue, les conceptions de Marr sont totalement éclectiques. Une bonne partie des malentendus suscités par les jugements sur Marr proviennent de la non-compréhension de ses conceptions méthodologiques et de la tentative de les interpréter à partir de positions scientifiques, et non philosophico-méthodologiques. Marr n'était pas un linguiste, mais un philosophe du langage.
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Scheopner, Cynthia. "Subversive Spirituality: the Feminism of Emilia Pardo Bazán (1851–1921)." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 50, no. 4 (March 4, 2024): 393–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340124.
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Abstract Emilia Pardo Bazán challenged French naturalist writers in the 19th century who maintained that our lives are completely determined by inheritance/background, environment, and the historical moment. She maintained that naturalism as materialism misses the spiritual component of human existence, which is captured in her theory of realism. Against descriptions of her “Catholic Naturalism” as a sort of weakened compromise, I argue that she weaponized Church doctrines to forge a strong feminist philosophy firmly rooted in Spanish Roman Catholicism.
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Stuhr, John. "American Philosophic Naturalism." Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 23, no. 71 (1995): 41–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/saap1995237120.
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Van Doorn, Maarten. "A Tension in Some Non-Naturalistic Explanations of Moral Truths." Croatian journal of philosophy 23, no. 68 (October 17, 2023): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.68.4.
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Recently, there has been some excitement about the potential explanatory payoffs the newish metaphysical notion of grounding seems to have for metaethical non-naturalism. There has also been a recent upsurge in the debate about whether non-naturalism is implausibly committed to some acts being wrong because of some sui generis piece of ontology. It has, in response, been claimed that once we have a clear enough picture of the grounding role of moral laws on non-naturalism, this is not (objectionably) so. This move, I argue, is inconsistent with certain constraints on what non-naturalist-friendly moral laws must be for them to do the explanatory work non-naturalism requires of them elsewhere. In other words, there is tension between the grounding reply to the supervenience objection and the grounding structure implied by some responses to the normative objection.
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Gide, Benoît. "Liberté et nécessité chez Hume." Archives de Philosophie Tome 87, no. 3 (June 21, 2023): 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.863.0047.
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En quel sens le scepticisme causal de Hume permet-il la solution qu’il revendique au problème de la liberté et de la nécessité ? D’abord, on soutient qu’une interprétation épistémologique (et non sémantique) de ce scepticisme suffit au nécessitarisme proposé. Ensuite, on soutient que, parce qu’il s’accompagne d’une explication naturaliste de l’inférence, ce scepticisme rend raison de l’imputation morale requise par la défense d’un compatibilisme. Le caractère sceptique de ce naturalisme permet de qualifier l’ensemble du propos humien de solution sceptique de réconciliation.
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Zargar, Zahra, Ebrahim Azadegan, and Lotfollah Nabavi. "Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?" Journal for General Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (July 17, 2019): 185–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09464-8.
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Corrales Pavía, Heraclio. "Cómo hacer frente a las acusaciones de falacia naturalista." Isegoría, no. 69 (December 12, 2023): e06. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/isegoria.2023.69.06.
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Dada la relevancia filosófica y la existencia de acaloradas discusiones sobre falacia naturalista, es obligado para cualquier sistema de ética naturalista dar alguna respuesta sobre el modo en que supera las potenciales imputaciones de falacia naturalista. En este punto se pueden usar dos estrategias para defenderse del cargo de falacia: una es argumentar contra la pertinencia de la acusación en general, mostrando que la descripción de la falacia falla al señalar algo problemático en los argumentos naturalistas en general y otra que consiste en mostrar que la propuesta de naturalismo a favor de la que se argumenta no se ve afectada por las acusaciones de falacia. En este artículo se ofrecerá un análisis de las distintas concepciones de falacias naturalistas que se han descrito y se adoptarán ambas vías para defender la propuesta propia de cada tipo de falacia naturalista reconocida.
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Guersenzvaig, Ariel, and David Casacuberta. "Presentación de la sección sobre Inteligencia artificial, datos y objetividad. ¿El regreso del naturalismo dataísta?" Daimon, no. 90 (September 1, 2023): 7–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.576781.
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Presentation of the section on Artificial Intelligence, Data and Objectivity: The Return of Data Naturalism? in the Monograph on Artificial Intelligence of Daimon - International Journal of Philosophy. Nº 90 (September - December 2023). Presentación de la sección sobre Inteligencia artificial, datos y objetividad. ¿El regreso del naturalismo dataista? en el Monográfico sobre Inteligencia Artificial de Daimon - Revista Internacional de Filosofía. Nº 90 (septiembre - Diciembre 2023).
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Torrente, Luca. "L’influence de l’environnement durant l’embryogenèse chez Aristote. Les effets sur la vertu naturelle." Les Études philosophiques N° 146, no. 3 (August 2, 2023): 93–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/leph.233.0093.
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Cet article traite de la relation problématique que l’on trouve chez Aristote entre la vertu naturelle (φυσικὴ ἀρετή) et l’environnement. Il s’agira tout d’abord de déterminer le concept de vertu naturelle, son rapport avec la sagesse pratique (φρόνησις) et de rechercher ses liens avec la constitution matérielle du corps, notamment avec les différentes qualités du sang. Celui-ci se révélera être pour tout animal sanguin le véritable principe d’individuation des propriétés psychiques, et donc aussi de l’éthos. Dans la partie finale de cet article, l’influence de l’environnement sur la constitution physiologique, mais aussi psychologique, du vivant sera mise en question. On verra que la période où l’environnement peut exercer l’action la plus forte est celle de l’embryogenèse. Dès que l’individu vivant naît, les influences extérieures sont négligeables. L’éthique d’Aristote écarte ainsi deux positions extrêmes, le naturalisme déterministe d’un côté et l’intellectualisme socratique de l’autre, aboutissant à une philosophie pratique qui tient compte de la nature tout en affirmant que l’éthique est aussi autre chose que la nature, c’est-à-dire habitude et sagesse pratique.
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Yrigoyen Carpintero, Elena. "Fracaso y experiencia del límite. Naturalismo metodológico y crisis escéptica en el Tratado de D. Hume." Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 28, no. 3 (February 1, 2023): 9–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/contrastescontrastes.v28i3.15339.
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¿Qué significa "fracasar" para un naturalista metodológico? ¿Está éste abocado al escepticismo, y es este un fracaso? Para responder a estas preguntas, realizaré (1) un análisis de lo que se considera "naturalismo" en Hume, desde el que analizaré (2) la crisis escéptica narrada en la conclusión del Libro I del Tratado. Allí defenderé que la metafórica utilizada, engarzada con el concepto de fracaso, permite dos lecturas: una que une necesariamente naturalismo metodológico y escepticismo mitigado, y otra que no. No obstante, concluiré que en ambos casos se dibuja una misma experiencia de límite que permite construir ciencia y filosofía no-excepcionalistas.
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Meeker, Kevin. "Is Hume's Epistemology Internalist or Externalist?" Dialogue 40, no. 1 (2001): 125–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300049088.
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RésuméLes philosophes distinguent souvent entre les théories internalistes et externalistes de la connaissance. Après avoir expliqué cette distinction, je défends l'idée que la théorie de la connaissance de Hume doit préférablement être vue comme étant de type internaliste. En outre, je soutiens que la version humienne de l'internalisme consolide une interprétation sceptique de Hume plutôt qu'une interprétation naturaliste. Mon objectif n'est pas seulement d'adresser un nouveau défi aux interprétations naturalistes de Hume, mais aussi d'inviter à une étude plus approfondie de plusieurs questions qui méritent l'attention si nous devons développer une compréhension adéquate de la théorie de la connaissance de cet auteur.
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Tetens, Holm. "Der Gott der Philosophen Überlegungen zur Natürlichen Theologie." Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 57, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2015-0001.
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ZusammenfassungSchon länger ist in der Philosophie die Frage nach Gott völlig an den Rand gedrückt. Für die überwältigende Mehrheit der Philosophen hat sich das Thema Gott vollständig erledigt. Der Aufsatz fragt, wie sich das Projekt einer Philosophischen Theologie wiederbeleben lässt. Im Mittelpunkt steht die These: Philosophische Theologie hat nur als Metakritik an der auch in weiten Teilen der christlichen Theologie beliebten generellen Metaphysikkritik und zugleich und vor allem inhaltlich als Kritik an der gegenwärtig vorherrschenden Metaphysik des Naturalismus eine Chance zur Erneuerung.
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Watson, Jamie Carlin. "DILEMMA ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATURALISM." Episteme 11, no. 2 (November 4, 2013): 229–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.41.
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AbstractAlbert Casullo (2000, 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo's and Oakley's criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma arguments presuppose a meta-justificatory demand that naturalists provide non-circular support for their basic sources of evidence. I argue that this assumption is not necessary for the force of dilemma arguments, and I construct a version that avoids this misreading. I conclude that, although there remain strategies for responding to dilemma arguments, they constitute a challenge naturalists must take seriously.
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Hasker, William. "What Is Naturalism? And Should We Be Naturalists?" Philosophia Christi 15, no. 1 (2013): 21–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20131514.
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GIROUX, ÉLODIE. "Philosopher sur les concepts de santé : de l’Essai de Georges Canguilhem au débat anglo-américain." Dialogue 52, no. 4 (December 2013): 673–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217314000122.
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Cet article a pour but de proposer une lecture comparative de l’analyse philosophique initiée par Georges Canguilhem dans son Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique, publié en 1943, et du débat qui s’est développé dans les milieux philosophiques de langue anglaise, depuis les années 1970, entre naturalistes et normativistes. À première vue, cette comparaison a tout pour illustrer l’opposition de traditions entre «style français» historique et épistémologique et philosophie des sciences anglo-américaine. Je relativise cette opposition en montrant d’importantes continuités et en insistant sur d’autres déplacements.
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Pilgaard Petersen, Nikolaj. "Toward a Broader Conception of “Liberal Naturalism”: Widening the Perspective." Synthesis philosophica 36, no. 2 (January 20, 2022): 443–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.21464/sp36210.
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Izraz naturalizam često se koristi za označavanje reduktivnog naturalizma i stoga je usko povezan s fizikalizmom. Različiti oblici liberalnog naturalizma razvijeni su kao alternativa reduktivnom naturalizmu. U ovom se radu tvrdi da je daljnje proširenje pojma naturalizma od pomoći. Zagovara se »široki« liberalni naturalizam, u kojem kriterij naturalizma nije vezan za premisu specifične metafizike, nego za ono što nedvojbeno čini naturalizam kao takav: prisutnost univerzalnih temeljnih načela o tome kako svijet funkcionira i pravilnosti ili zakoni prirode koji opisuju konkretno ponašanje svijeta. Ova vrsta naturalizma dopušta uključivanje nematerijalističke metafizike, poput oblika dualizma i idealizma. Ovaj je nalaz značajan zato što fizikalističko stajalište pada na nekoliko problema, a ponajviše u odgovarajućem tretmanu problema svijesti. S obzirom na pozitivnu konotaciju predikata naturalistički, takvo se uključivanje čini korisnim u legitimiranju potencijalno plodonosnog istraživanja manje konvencionalnih alternativa fizikalizmu i materijalizmu. Nadalje, to bi se moglo pokazati vrijednim ne samo iz teorijske ili akademske perspektive nego i iz egzistencijalne.
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Van Cleave, Kendra. "“The Desire to Banish Any Constraint in Clothing”." French Historical Studies 43, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 197–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00161071-8018469.
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Abstract Led by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Enlightenment concerns about the negative consequences of luxury and artifice, as well as clothing's physical and moral effects, meant that by the late eighteenth century naturalism, simplicity, comfort, health, and morality had become the bywords of dress. In the newly invented French fashion press, editors adopted philosophes' arguments to resolve potential conflicts between consumption and Enlightenment ideas. However, they did so primarily with Ottoman-inspired French fashions rather than with the English styles that have thus far been the primary scholarly concern. Turquerie—Turkish-focused Orientalism—allowed the creators of these magazines to connect fashion to Enlightenment principles while reinforcing consumption through more subtle promotions of luxury; moreover, unlike the democratically linked English-inspired styles that followed, turquerie did not challenge France's autocratic monarchy. Dans la seconde moitié du dix-huitième siècle, le mouvement des Lumières a eu des effets considérables sur la culture française, notamment sur l'habillement et l'apparence. Soulevées par le philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau, les préoccupations des Lumières au sujet des méfaits du luxe et de l'artifice, ainsi que les conséquences physiques et morales du port du vêtement, ont fait du naturalisme, de la simplicité, du confort, de la santé et de la moralité les maîtres mots du vêtement à la fin du dix-huitième siècle. Dans la presse de mode française, nouvellement créée, les éditeurs adoptèrent les arguments des philosophes afin de résoudre les conflits potentiels entre la consommation et les idées des Lumières. Cependant, ils le firent principalement à travers la promotion des modes françaises d'inspiration ottomane, plutôt qu'avec les styles anglais qui jusque-là ont fait l'objet de nombreuses études. La turquerie—l'orientalisme turc—permit en effet aux éditeurs des journaux de réconcilier la mode avec les principes des Lumières tout en renforçant l'incitation à la consommation via la promotion du luxe par des moyens plus subtils. Contrairement aux styles d'inspiration anglaise liés à la démocratie qui s'en suivirent, la turquerie ne remettait pas en cause la monarchie autocratique française.
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Michaelian, Kourken. "Privileged Standpoints/Reliable Processes." Hypatia 23, no. 1 (March 2008): 65–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2008.tb01166.x.
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This article attempts to reconcile Sandra Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully can be construed as applications of process reliabilist first-order epistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory, reliabilism, and naturalism thus form a coherent package of views in metaepistemology, first-order epistemology, and applied epistemology.
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RECTENWALD, MICHAEL. "Secularism and the cultures of nineteenth-century scientific naturalism." British Journal for the History of Science 46, no. 2 (August 31, 2012): 231–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007087412000738.
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AbstractThis essay examines Secularism as developed by George Jacob Holyoake in 1851–1852. While historians have noted the importance of evolutionary thought for freethinking radicals from the 1840s, and others have traced the popularization of agnosticism and Darwinian evolution by later Victorian freethinkers, insufficient attention has been paid to mid-century Secularism as constitutive of the cultural and intellectual environment necessary for the promotion and relative success of scientific naturalism. I argue that Secularism was a significant source for the emerging new creed of scientific naturalism in the mid-nineteenth century. Not only did early Secularism help clear the way by fighting battles with the state and religious interlocutors, but it also served as a source for what Huxley, almost twenty years later, termed ‘agnosticism’. Holyoake modified freethought in the early 1850s, as he forged connections with middle-class literary radicals and budding scientific naturalists, some of whom met in a ‘Confidential Combination’ of freethinkers. Secularism became the new creed for this coterie. Later, Secularism promoted and received reciprocal support from the most prominent group of scientific naturalists, as Holyoake used Bradlaugh's atheism and neo-Malthusianism as a foil, and maintained relations with Huxley, Spencer and Tyndall through the end of the century. In Holyoake's Secularism we find the beginnings of the mutation of radical infidelity into the respectability necessary for the acceptance of scientific naturalism, and also the distancing of later forms of infidelity incompatible with it. Holyoake's Secularism represents an important early stage of scientific naturalism.
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Kirtiklis, Kęstas. "AR NATŪRALISTINIAI SOCIALINIAI MOKSLAI GALI BŪTI KRITINIAI?" Problemos 82 (January 1, 2012): 163–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2012.0.734.
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Straipsnyje nagrinėjama kritinių socialinių mokslų samprata ir jų vieta platesnėse metodologinėse šiuolaikinės socialinių mokslų filosofijos diskusijose (ypač diskusijose dėl natūralizmo). Analizuojami du pamatiniai kritinių socialinių mokslų bruožai – metodologinis antinatūralizmas ir kritinė vertybinė nuostata. Straipsnyje tvirtinama, jog kritinė vertybinė nuostata numato itin siaurą vertybių sampratą (suprantant vertybes kaip nuostatas, nurodančias tyrimo tikslus), kurios laikydamiesi kritinių socialinių mokslų filosofai nepajėgia įrodyti būtino ryšio tarp kritinės vertybinės pozicijos ir konkrečios metodologinės pozicijos. Todėl kritinę vertybinę nuostatą įmanoma sieti tiek su natūralistine, tiek su interpretacine metodologija.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: kritiniai socialiniai mokslai, natūralizmas, interpretacinė prieiga, vertybinis neutralumas socialiniuose moksluose.Are Critical Naturalist Social Sciences Possible?Kęstas KirtiklisSummaryThe article deals with the conception of critical social sciences and their place in the wider context of methodological debates, particularly in the naturalism debate in contemporary philosophy of social sciences. The article analyzes two basic characteristics of critical social sciences – methodological antinaturalism and critical axiological position. It is argued that because of excessively narrow notion of values (values as research-directing attitudes) implied by the critical axiological position philosophers of critical social sciences fail to demonstrate a necessary link between critical axiological attitude and particular methodology. Therefore, it is possible to relate critical axiology with naturalist as well as with interpretive methodology.Keywords: critical social sciences, naturalism, interpretivism, value-neutrality in social sciences.
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De Caro, Mario. "The indispensability of the manifest image." Philosophy & Social Criticism 46, no. 2 (February 11, 2019): 162–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453719826615.
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It is very contentious whether the features of the manifest image have a place in the world as it is described by natural science. For the advocates of strict (or scientific) naturalism, this is a serious problem, which has been labelled ‘placement problem’. In this light, some of them try to show that those features are reducible to scientifically acceptable ones. Others, instead, argue that the features of the manifest image are mere illusions and, consequently, have to be eliminated from our ontology. In brief, the two options that are open to strict naturalists for solving the placement problem are ontological reductionism and eliminativism. Other advocates of naturalist philosophy, however, claim that both these strategies fail and, consequently, opt for ‘mysterianism’, the view according to which we cannot give up the recalcitrant features of the manifest image even if we are not able to understand the ways (which certainly exist) in which they could be reduced to the scientific features. Mysterianism has the merit of facing the difficulties that whoever wants to explain reductively, or explain away, the features of the manifest image encounters. It is also a defeatist philosophical view, though, since it considers the most important philosophical problems as unsolvable mysteries. For this reason, I argue that mysterianism can also be taken as a reductio of strict naturalism, given its presumption that all phenomena are either explainable by the natural sciences or to be rejected as illusory. In this article, it is argued that the failures of reductionism, eliminativism and mysterianism should teach us that both the scientific image and the manifest image of the world are essential and mutually irreducible but not incompatible with each other. To support this claim, in the second part of the article, the case of free will is discussed.
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Reichenberger, Andrea. "Principes mathématiques de la philosophie naturelle. La traduction française des Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no. 4 (December 22, 2016): 837–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1261273.
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Oliveira, Nythamar H. de. "A decolonial critical theory of artificial intelligence." Filosofia Unisinos 25, no. 1 (March 26, 2024): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2024.251.14.
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In this paper, I argue for a normative reconstruction, from a decolonial perspective of critical theory in Brazil and Latin America, of a democratic ethos that despite its weaknesses and normative deficits is capable of fostering an increasingly deliberative, participatory, and egalitarian democracy by making extensive use of new digital technologies (comprising both AI systems and digital governance). Its argumentative core boils down to the promotion of intersectional egalitarianism (socio-economic, gender, racial-ethnic, environmental) through digital inclusion, which seems only feasible to us from a perspective capable of accommodating the normative claims of a critical decolonial theory combined with a naturalistic view of sustainability, within a research program that I dubbed “mitigated social constructionism” in response to the phenomenological deficit of normative and naturalistic theories (including critical theory and neurophilosophy). If what matters is normativity, then to avoid the divide between naturalism and non-naturalist normativity one nonfoundationalist alternative is to resort to hermeneutical and procedural accounts of normativity as helpful clues to making sense of the naturalism-normativity problem, avoiding reductionist interpretations of both naturalism (Churchland) and normativism (Parfit).
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Bengson, John, Terence Cuneo, and Andrew Reisner. "The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism." Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, no. 5 (October 14, 2020): 471–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20202934.
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Abstract The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.
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PEELS, RIK. "Are naturalism and moral realism incompatible?" Religious Studies 50, no. 1 (May 23, 2013): 77–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412513000206.
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AbstractIn a recent paper, Alvin Plantinga has argued that there is good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are incompatible. He has done so by arguing that the most important argument for the compatibility of these two theses, which has been provided by Frank Jackson, fails and that any other argument that serves the same purpose is likely to fail for the same reason. His argument against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, then, isindirect: he argues against it by refuting the most important argument for it. In this article, I argue that Plantinga's argument is unconvincing for at least two reasons. First, Jackson's argument can be revised in such a way that it meets Plantinga's worry. Second, there is another way of arguing for the compatibility of two propositions which Plantinga does not consider. If the naturalist takes this alternative route, she does not face the problem identified by Plantinga. I thus show not only that Plantinga's argument does not count against the compatibility of naturalism and moral realism, but that there is even good reason to think that naturalism and moral realism are in fact compatible.