Relevant bibliographies by topics / Nearly single-peaked preferences

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Book chapters
  4. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Nearly single-peaked preferences'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 25 May 2024
Last updated: 31 July 2025

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Nearly single-peaked preferences.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Nearly single-peaked preferences"

1

Ma, Mengfan, Mingyu Xiao, Tian Bai, and Bakh Khoussainov. "Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37, no. 5 (2023): 5797–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25719.

Full text
Abstract:
The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we consider a novel model where each facility charges an entrance fee, which is a function of the facility's location. Thus, in our model, the cost of each agent is the sum of the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. The generalized model captures more real-life scenarios. In our model, the entrance fee function can be an arbitrary function, and the corresponding preferences of agents m
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Elkind, Edith, and Martin Lackner. "On Detecting Nearly Structured Preference Profiles." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 28, no. 1 (2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v28i1.8823.

Full text
Abstract:
Structured preference domains, such as, for example, the domains of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences, are known to admit efficient algorithms for many problems in computational social choice. Some of these algorithms extend to preferences that are close to having the respective structural property, i.e., can be made to enjoy this property by performing minor changes to voters' preferences, such as deleting a small number of voters or candidates. However, it has recently been shown that finding the optimal number of voters or candidates to delete in order to achieve the desired str
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Menon, Vijay, and Kate Larson. "Reinstating Combinatorial Protections for Manipulation and Bribery in Single-Peaked and Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 30, no. 1 (2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10026.

Full text
Abstract:
Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past two decades. A recent body of work, however, has shown that many of the NP-hardness shields, previously obtained, vanish when the electorate has single-peaked or nearly single-peaked preferences. In light of these results, we investigate whether it is possible to reimpose NP-hardness shields for such electorates by allowing the voters to specify partial preferences instead of insisting they cast complete ballots. In par
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Nearly single-peaked preferences"

1

Tydrichová, Magdaléna. "Structural and algorithmic aspects of preference domain restrictions in collective decision making : contributions to the study of single-peaked and Euclidean preferences." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023SORUS048.

Full text
Abstract:
Cette thèse étudie des aspects structurels et algorithmiques des restrictions de domaines de préférences, en se focalisant sur les préférences unimodales et les préférences Euclidiennes. Dans la première partie de la thèse, nous introduisons d'abord une généralisation des préférences unimodales sur des graphes quelconques, en se focalisant sur des aspects algorithmiques, notamment le problème de reconnaissance. Dans un deuxième temps, nous nous intéressons aux préférences presque unimodales. Plus précisément, nous proposons une nouvelle métrique d'unimodalité approchée et nous étudions ses pro
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Nearly single-peaked preferences"

1

Chen, Jiehua, Christian Hatschka, and Sofia Simola. "Efficient Algorithms for Monroe and CC Rules in Multi-Winner Elections with (Nearly) Structured Preferences." In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/faia230296.

Full text
Abstract:
We investigate winner determination for two popular proportional representation systems: the Monroe and Chamberlin-Courant (abbrv. CC) systems. Our study focuses on (nearly) single-peaked resp. single-crossing preferences. We show that for single-crossing approval preferences, winner determination of the Monroe rule is polynomial, and for both rules, winner determination mostly admits FPT algorithms with respect to the number of voters to delete to obtain single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. Our results answer some complexity questions from the literature [19, 29, 22].
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Yang Yongjie. "On the Complexity of Constructive Control Under Nearly Single-Peaked Preferences." In Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.3233/faia200099.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Nearly single-peaked preferences"

1

Sornat, Krzysztof, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, and Yinzhan Xu. "Near-Tight Algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant and Thiele Voting Rules." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/69.

Full text
Abstract:
We present an almost optimal algorithm for the classic Chamberlin-Courant multiwinner voting rule (CC) on single-peaked preference profiles. Given n voters and m candidates, it runs in almost linear time in the input size improving the previous best O(nm^2) time algorithm. We also study multiwinner voting rules on nearly single-peaked preference profiles in terms of the candidate-deletion operation. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for CC where a given candidate-deletion set D has logarithmic size. Actually, our algorithm runs in 2^|D| * poly(n,m) time and the base of the power cannot be im
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography