Academic literature on the topic 'Neo-classical school'

The textbook presents the course of history of economic doctrines in accordance with the General plan of previous editions. Discusses the economic doctrine of the era of pre-market economy (including the economic thought of the Ancient world and middle Ages), mercantilism, classical political economy, socio-economic reform projects of economic romanticism, utopian socialism, German historical school, marginalism. To the era of regulated market relations are covered in the textbook socio-institutional direction, the theory of market with imperfect competition, Keynesian Economics, neoliberalism

The textbook systematically combines topical issues of methodological and philosophical foundations of economics, taking into account the achievements of classical political economy, the German historical school, institutionalism and non-economic disciplines (history, political science, sociology, cybernetics, biology, psychology, law, etc.). The main methodological principles of interdisciplinary communication are consistency, focus on achieving social balance and morality. The instruments of scientific research are adapted to the cultural traditions of Russia by taking into account the insti

Abstract Adam Smith makes three references to Aristotle in The Wealth of Nations, none of which concerns the economic writings, Nicomachean Ethics, 5. 5 and Politics, 1. 8–10. The references deal with political or historical points, and they seem to have been drawn from Smith’s reading of Pufendorf and Montesquieu rather than from a study of Aristotle himself. Ricardo, in the Principles, makes no reference to Aristotle at all. The first examination of Aristotle’s inquiries subsequent to the rise of economics was Marx’s, offered originally in the Contribution and then eight years later in Capital itself.1 Marx did not claim that Aristotle was an economist, or that he was the father of any school of economics, even Marx’s own, but understandably his endorsement of most of Aristotle’s conclusions was construed as a claim of Aristotelian paternity on behalf of his own theory.2 Marx had inaugurated a contest, and in time subsequent orthodoxies in economics sought to establish Aristotelian paternity too.

‘The reorientation of the Confucian tradition after 1000 ce’ discusses the “school” of Confucianism referred to as Neo-Confucianism, which came to dominate Chinese intellectual and political life from the eleventh century and that guided the Chinese imperial government and the foundation of the civil service examination systems until the early twentieth century. Neo-Confucianism upholds the values and ethics of classical Confucianism, but reorients it in two important ways: (1) it grounds the values and ethics of classical Confucianism in an elaborate system of metaphysics generated over the eleventh and twelfth centuries; and (2) it creates a structured program of self-cultivation, a step-by-step template for “becoming a sage.” But why did Neo-Confucianism emerge at this particular time?

The term ‘neo-Kantianism’ indicates various attempts at a renewal of Kant’s philosophy in the modern context. It began with the rehabilitation of Kant to overcome the speculative turn of classical German idealism and ground philosophy in the investigation of the conditions of knowledge. In this sense, the origins of neo-Kantianism are sometimes dated back to figures opposing speculative idealism in the early nineteenth-century philosophical landscape, including Johann Friedrich Herbart, Jakob Friedrich Fries, Friedrich Eduard Beneke (Beiser 2014). Philosophers from the next generation sharing the commitment to a Kantian theory of knowledge also include Kuno Fischer, Eduard Zeller, Otto Liebmann, Jürgen Bona Meyer, Friedrich Albert Lange. More specifically, ‘neo-Kantianism’ is used to indicate a philosophical movement developed beginning in the 1870s with the intent to shed light on the basic tenets of Kant’s work and face challenges to traditional philosophy coming from nineteenth-century scientific advancements in the spirit of Kant’s critical philosophy (see, e.g., Köhnke 1991; Patton 2005; Luft 2015). The neo-Kantian movement started with Hermann Cohen’s seminal interpretation of Kant (Cohen 1871a; 1877; 1885), and subsequently flourished in German universities, with two main centres in Marburg, where Cohen was appointed lecturer in 1873, and in South West Germany. The development of experimental methods in nineteenth-century life sciences offered important insights for the theory of knowledge, but also raised the question about the possibility of reducing cognitive processes to physical ones. Kant’s critical philosophy offered a powerful argument against materialism, by limiting the validity of causal explanations to the realm of appearances rather than replacing them with metaphysical explanations. In conjunction with the materialism controversy, the 1860s saw a resurgence of interest in classical interpretative issues concerning Kant, including the assumption of a thing in itself, its relation to the sensibility, the status of a priori elements of knowledge. Following a suggestion first made by the physiologist and physicist Hermann von Helmholtz, some of those who argued for a return to Kant believed that Kant’s a priori forms deserved an empirical explanation. In contrast with this, Cohen emphasized that the individuation of a priori elements of knowledge requires a meta-level inquiry into the presuppositions of the sciences, that is, what Kant identified as the transcendental cognition. Cohen took Kant to imply that experience is given in the fact of science, and the transcendental task is to derive the preconditions for the possibility of this fact by regressive analysis. This formulation allowed Cohen to address the controversial issues raised in the Kant scholarship by emphasizing the logical structure of experience, while considering part of Kant’s considerations about the natural sources of knowledge to be a remainder of his reliance on empirical psychology in the precritical period. At the same time, Cohen’s interpretation of Kant set the task of a novel investigation of the historically documented facts of science and culture in the wake of the transcendental method. Cohen’s interpretation set a standard, not only for its contribution to the historical reconstruction of the development of Kant’s thought, but also for the idea of a fruitful correlation between interpretation and philosophical theorizing. In this sense, the revival of Kant’s critical philosophy involved also the idea of a constant renewal of it. Over the next decade, other influential interpretations were developed with various theoretical purposes, from the attempt to integrate the Kantian theory of a priori cognition with insights derived from the empiricist theory of knowledge (Riehl 1876; 1879) to the appreciation of Kant’s attempt to account for the application of universal rules of thought outside the domain of the mathematical science of nature in the third Critique (Windelband 1878–80). The Marburg School formed in the wake of Cohen’s characterization of the transcendental method. Its main representatives were Paul Natorp, who became Cohen’s colleague at Marburg in 1885, and Ernst Cassirer, who studied there from 1896 to 1899, and continued to subscribe to the methodology of his Marburg teachers throughout his intellectual career. The South West German School developed around Wilhelm Windelband’s teaching at the universities of Freiburg from 1877 to 1882, Strasbourg from 1882 to 1903, and Heidelberg from 1903 to 1915. Other leading figures of this school were Heinrich Rickert and his student Emil Lask. There were also neo-Kantians who did not strictly belong to a school or combined neo-Kantianism with other philosophical traditions. This includes, for example, Alois Riehl, Jonas Cohn, Richard Hönigswald. Each school focused on some common themes. Marburg neo-Kantians gradually broadened the scope of their research from Kant to the philosophical and scientific roots of what they called a critical or scientific form of idealism, according to which the objects of experience are constructed by scientific concepts. They sought to provide an account for the various spheres of human experience by extending the transcendental inquiry from the fact of science to the facts of culture. South West German neo-Kantians focused on the question concerning the grounds for relating unconditionally valid values to contingent experience. This led them to engage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century debate about the possibility of an autonomous foundation of the human sciences. They pursued the project of a philosophy of culture offering a unitary account of the various human activities from the standpoint of the theory of values. These commonalities notwithstanding, neo-Kantianism was a complex movement, with internal debates and major developments within the same school, as well as connections between different schools and traditions. Neo-Kantianism dominated the philosophical scene until the early 1910s, and remained in the background of the main philosophical innovations in the German-speaking world for the next two decades until the rise of Nazism. It is considered to have made lasting contribution in epistemology, philosophy of science, history of philosophy and philosophy of culture (see, e.g., Luft and Makkreel 2010; De Warren and Staiti 2015; Edgar and Patton 2018; Kinzel and Patton 2021).

Abstract In the 1970s Kaldor’s thought came to the end of a long process of evolution that had begun in the 1930s with his membership-albeit only for a few years-of the Austrian school and his endorsement of the deductive method of neo-classical equilibrium. In his ‘The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics’, Kaldor denounced neo-classical equilibrium theory as an intellectual exercise condemned to infinite regression because it was incapable of becoming a scientific theory-meaning by that term a set of theorems derived from observable phenomena. From Walras to Debreu the theory had been constantly reworked; but because the problem of its verification had been ignored, rather than remove the theory’s scaffolding of unreal basic assumptions, this constant elaboration had only made it thicker and more impenetrable. And if abstract mathematical models were empirically barren, so too, Kaldor believed, was econometrics: sophisticated methods of statistical inference could not fill the void created by the absence of any theory on how the economy really works.

Abstract In the clash of law with the “Chicago” or Neo-Classical School of Economics there is turbulence because the assumptions (moral and factual) and the methodology or reasoning process of the one do not conform with those of the other. [T]he unthinking blend of law and social sciences can contaminate the rhetoric and methodology of both disciplines, and the resulting turbulence can obscure rather than advance our understanding of reality and search for the truth.

Since the mid-19th century, the thinkers of historical school challenged the deductive, abstractive, and decisive methods of neo-classical economics. According to historical school, social terms have been changed within space and time. Therefore, they defended that the economic theories could not be universal but could only be relative. Instead of professing laws with universal validity, it is more important to reveal the changing structure of society with the extensive studies of economic history. The inductive method of German historical school brought a new perspective into economic theory with theorems such as to consider society as an organism beyond the individuals who would only seek their benefits and the necessity of historical followings in the economic events. From this point of view, it is possible to observe the traces of historical school in the old institutional economics literature.

The 1980s were marked by two seemingly antithetical tendencies in theorizing about states. On the one hand, a strong neo-liberal current connected with the rise of Thatcherism–Reaganism—which was deeply imbued with neo-classical economic assumptions—called into question the power or competence of states, suggesting that the states which governed best were those which governed least. Advocates of this position who attended to Third World development issues were particularly convinced that the rise of East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs), such as South Korea and Taiwan, constituted evidence that states could best facilitate economic growth and development by maintaining open, export-oriented regimes in which markets were allowed to work unhindered (Balassa 1981; Little 1981; Bhagwati 1988). On the other hand, by the late 1980s, a school of neo-Weberian scholarship developed in direct response to this neo-liberal approach. Taking issue with the neo-liberals’ characterizations of East Asian economic growth, a series of these neo-Weberian scholars showed that state intervention in the economy was far more extensive than the neo-liberals had allowed, and that moreover such interventions seemed to have been successful in fomenting industrial transformation (Evans 1989; 1995; Amsden 1989; 1990; Wade 1990). The neo-Weberians raised telling arguments and evidence against the neo-liberal position, and it is perhaps a small but significant sign of their success that the World Bank grudgingly acknowledged not only the heavy presence of the state in East Asian industrialization but also some limited efficacy to that presence, especially in the financial sector (World Bank 1993; Amsden 1994; Wade 1996b). If this was a victory for the neo-Weberians, however, it may well prove pyrrhic now that the powerful East Asian growth dynamic has been slowed by forces that few states in the region appear willing or able to control. Indeed, and paradoxically perhaps, the more neoclassically inclined now seem to acknowledge the existence of ‘strong states’ in East Asia and use their existence not to explain economic success but rather to explain the economic crisis that spread through the region during 1997–8.

The effects of the government investments and private sector investments on the production, is an important academic argument subject between the Neo-classical school and the Keynesian school. Subject to the financing way of the government sector investments, accruing possibility of private sector investments decreases and crowding-out effect occurs with the behaviours of government sector which restricting the investment area of private sector or changing the investments plans. On the other hand Keynesian economist suggest that the economy is not always in the full employment level. By the hand of Keynesian multiplier mechanism which is increasing the public expenditures and decreasing the taxes, private sector would enhance its investments and crowding-in effect occurs. In this study, we aimed to test the existence of crowding out/in effects of the public sector investments on the private investments in the European Union and a candidate country Turkey with the panel causality tests, over the period 1970-2014.

This chapter explores the importance of free will and rational choice in the criminal justice system. It first explains the purpose of theory and how to interpret, test, and critically consider ideas in the context of criminological study before discussing classical theories which assert that people freely and rationally choose to offend and therefore can — and should — be punished or have their choices prevented (by, for example, reducing offending opportunities). It then considers the main theoretical schools in criminology including classicism, positivism, interpretivism, and critical criminology. It also looks at classical criminology and the key thinkers that shaped it, including John Locke and Jeremy Bentham, as well as the policies to which it gave rise. The chapter concludes with an analysis of neo-classical criminology, rational choice theory, routine activity theory, and situational crime prevention.

Liberal economic order, businesses efficiency, productivity and profitability, competition for work is present in accordance with the principles defended private property order. As sistematical the main foundations of economic liberalism created by Adam Smith. Then, his prenciples developed by evolving Classic School, continued to the sovereignty until the Great Depression of 1929. I.World War took place in an environment dominated by Classical Ekol During, and after the war, from the principles of Classical School had not doubt. In 1936, John Maynard Keynes, the basic assumptions of the class

In the world economy, since 1960s, countries, which are open and apply liberal policies succeeded higher economic growth and welfare. Therefore, liberal policies became more attractive. In that case, the transition, which has political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects, means moving from socialist-authoritarian structure to market based-liberal structures. In the literature, there are many studies which point out labor force and capital are not significant on the economic growth. In addition, the literature focuses on the importance of institutions on the economic growth. In this study, we