Journal articles on the topic 'New Zionist Organization'

The emergence of World Zionist Organization at the end of 19th century and the increasing sympathy of world Jewry for political Zionism have strengthened the sense of the need to obtain a Jewish national home in Palestine. In a positive way, the end of the First World War and the decision of the League of Nations to place Palestine under British mandate favored regional development, especially of the Jewish community living there. Under the foreign administration, the Jewish people borrowed the proper aspects of the British model of parliamentary democracy and adapted them to the needs of the Yishuv, at a time when Jewish ideal enjoyed support and admiration, due in particular to Zionist diplomacy in Western Europe and the United States. Trying to maintain a good relationship with the British administration in order to fulfill its interests, the Jewish community in Palestine has thrived in various areas such as: political-institutional organization, economy, defence and demography, rapidly reaching a high level of development. These factors contributed tremendously to the birth of a modern democratic Jewish state. The reality of the simultaneous operation in Palestine of the three sets of institutions, those of the Yishuv, those of the Zionist Organization and those of the British administration represented a unique and remarkable fact. After Israel gained independence, the attempt to provide continuity to pre-state institutions represented a reality that was reflected in the flawless formula of the permanent institutions, in order to meet the needs of the new state in a situation of internal and international crisis.

AbstractThe paper discusses historical lessons offered by the experience of two leftwing movements, the pre-1948 Palestinian Communist Party, and the post-1948 Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen). The focus of discussion is the relationship between class and nation as principles of organization.The Palestinian Communist Party was shaped by forces that shaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: British rule, Zionist ideology and settlement practices, and Arab nationalism. At intensified conflict periods it was torn apart by the pressures of competing nationalisms. By the end of the period, its factions agreed on one principle: the need to treat members of both national groups equally, whether as individuals or as groups entitled to self-determination. This position was rejected by both national movements as incompatible with their quest for control.In the post-1948 period, Matzpen epitomized the radical critique of Zionism. It was the clearest voice speaking against the 1967 occupation and for restoration of Palestinian rights. However, it never moved beyond the political margins, and its organization failed to provide members with a sustainable mode of activism. It was replaced by a new mode, mobilizing people around specific issues instead of presenting an overall program.The paper concludes with suggestions on how the Left may use these lessons to develop a strategy to focus on the quest for social justice and human rights.

The study sheds light on the German role in boosting immigration and building Zionist settlements in Palestine between (1860-1942). Since the acceleration of the German political, religious and cultural penetration in Palestine and the announcement of the emergence of a strict German religious fundamentalists in 1861, the first colonial settlement projects established in Palestine. In parallel with World War II, the political German perspective changed towards the Middle East region, and a new historical stage had begun in the German policy with Jewish issue. The study indicates the Christian-Zionist roots in Germany in which an ideological tendency of Jewish colonization in the Palestinian territories has appeared. German missionaries were sent to Palestinian territories, which supported and expanded the Jewish immigration and resettlement. Moreover, it detects the cooperation between the German government with the Zionist organization by providing the needed support and protection for settlers.

AbstractThis article analyses the intersection between cosmopolitanism and racist ideologies in the faith healing practices of the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion. Originally from Illinois, USA, this organization was the period's most influential divine healing group. Black and white members, under the leadership of the charismatic John Alexander Dowie, eschewed medical assistance and proclaimed God's power to heal physical affliction. In affirming the deity's capacity to remake human bodies, church members also insisted that God could refashion biological race into a capacious spiritual ethnicity: a global human race they referred to as the “Adamic” race. Zionist universalist teachings were adopted by dispossessed and newly urbanized Boer ex-farmers in Johannesburg, Transvaal, before spreading to the soldiers of the British regiments recently arrived to fight the Boer states in the war of 1899–1902. Zionism equipped these estranged white “races” with a vocabulary to articulate political reconciliation and a precarious unity. But divine healing was most enthusiastically received among the Transvaal's rural Africans. Amidst the period's hardening segregation, Africans seized upon divine healing's innovative racial teachings, but both Boers and Africans found disappointment amid Zion's cosmopolitan promises. Boers were marginalized within the new racial regimes of the Edwardian empire in South Africa, and white South Africans had always been ambivalent about divine healing's incorporations of black Africans into a unitary race. This early history of Zionism in the Transvaal reveals the constriction of cosmopolitan aspirations amidst fast-narrowing horizons of race, nation, and empire in early twentieth-century South Africa.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not existed since the beginning of time. Hatem Bazian explores the roots of the conflict, locating the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project under the tutelage of British colonial efforts. Bazian’s text is a look at and beyond first-hand accounts, an investigation of and critical analysis of settler practice in relation to similar texts such as Sari Nusseibeh’s Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life, Alan Dowty’s Israel/Palestine, and Ari Shavit’s My Promised Land. Hatem Bazian’s Palestine…it is something colonial is not an introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Readers should possess a basic understanding of the conflict and history of the region over the last century. Nor does this text provide the reader with an unbiased look at the timeline of events since the inception of the Zionist movement. Palestine…it is something colonial instead is a rich critique of the Zionist movement and British colonialism. It investigates the way British colonialism influenced Zionism and how Zionism adopted colonial ideas and practices. Bazian locates Zionism as a settler colonialist movement still at work today, which historically planned and systematically executed the removal of Palestinians from their land, with the aid of the United Kingdom and (later) the United States. Bazian examines Ottoman collapse, the colonization of Palestine by the British, Israel’s biblical theology of dispossession, as well as British colonial incubation of Zionism, Zionism as a Eurocentric episteme, the building of Israel through ethnic cleansing, and the Nakba, all of these culminating in legalized dispossession. Throughout the text, Bazian is able to tie each chapter to the present state of affairs and remind the audience of the trauma of a people forcibly removed. Bazian opens with the straightforward assertion that “Palestine is the last settler-colonial project to be commissioned in the late 19th early 20th centuries and still unfolding in the 21st century with no end in sight” (17). In chapter one, “Dissecting the Ottomans and Colonizing Palestine,” Bazian navigates the biased historiography of the fall of the Ottoman empire, linking the collapse of the empire to the colonizing forces of Europe which sought to ensure access to the newly discovered oil in the region as well as to Asia and Africa. Bazian masterfully steers the reader through the history of European intervention, and in particular on behalf of Christians as ethnic minorities in the Middle East. Europe is historically anti-Jewish; at the turn of the century, Zionism was determined to solve Europe’s “Jewish Problem” and maintain a stronghold in the Middle East, he writes. In chapter two, “Israel’s Biblical Theology of Dispossession,” Bazian explores the biblical roots of Zionist ideology. The chapter opens with a discussion of a contemporary Bedouin tribe being expelled in the Negev. Bazian writes that “the biblical text gets transformed into policy by the Zionist state, by which it then normalizes or makes legal the wholesale theft of Palestinian lands and expulsion of the population”(57) using legal documents such as the Levy Report. These policies create “facts on the ground” which lead to “legalized expulsions.” The Bible was central to the historical development of the European Christian supremacist idea of the Holy Land. The loss of the territory conquered during the Crusades ruptured this notion, a break “fixed” through Zionism. In chapter three, “British Colonialism and Incubation of Zionism,”Bazian begins to address British colonialism and Zionism as complementary. Bazian uses primary texts from British political actors of the time, such as Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Balfour, to establish the anti-Semiticinspiration for British actions of the time. Bazian also successfully uses the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement to establish the double dealings of the British in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. Bazian uses many primary texts in this chapter effectively, though their organization could leave readers confused. Chapter four, “Zionism: Eurocentric Colonial Epistemic,” continues the themes of the prior chapter as the colonial influence is cemented. In this chapter, Bazian explores the subterfuge and the genius propaganda selling Palestine as “a land without a people for a people without a land” along with “making the desert bloom”—as if the indigenous Arab people were not there. Bazian frames this chapter within the Zionist ideology of the peoples living in the land being only a barrier to a Jewish state in Palestine. Bazian uses primary sources (e.g., Herzl) to defend the assertion that the removal of the Palestinian people was always a piece of the Zionist plan. Bazian also includes Jewish critical voices (e.g., excerpts from the reporter Ella Shohat) to establish the European Jewish bias against the indigenous Arab peoples, including Sephardic Jews. Bazian that these biases and the effort to remove Palestinians from their land defined the early Zionist movement and the creation of the state of Israel in chapter five, “Building a State and Ethnic Cleansing.” This chapter draws extensively on primary sources: correspondence, reports, declarations, agreements, commissions, and maps. Bazian struggles to organize these rich resources in a clear fashion; however, his analysis matches the richness of the sources. These sources establish the “legalized” systematic removal of the Palestinians from the land by the Israelis in 1948. In chapter six, “The Nakba,” Bazian uses further legal documents and first-hand accounts to trace the forced removal of Palestinians. He pays homage to the trauma while critically dissecting the process of legalizing ethnic cleansing and peddling the innocence of the Israelis to the rest of the world. Bazian profoundly concludes his chapter with the story of a Palestinian boy who witnessed the mass executions of men and women of his village and marched away from his home. The boy, now a man, closed his story with poignant words that capture the horror of the Nakba: “The road to Ramallah had become an open cemetery” (241). After the land was emptied the new state of Israel needed to legally take possession of the Palestinian-owned property. Chapter seven, “Colonial Machination,” elaborates this process: “the State of Israel is structured to give maximum attention to fulfillment of the settler-colonial project and the state apparatus is directed toward achieving this criminal enterprise” (243). The name “Palestine” is erased as a name for the land and the peoples; former colonial and Ottoman laws were twisted to support a systematic theft of the land. Bazian concludes his book with a look to the future: “What is the way forward and Palestine’s de-colonial horizon?” (276). He lays out the options available for true and lasting peace, discounting out of hand the twostate solution as impossible due to the extent of the settlements in the West Bank. He also dismisses both the options of the removal of Palestinians and the removal of the Jewish people. He instead posits a way forward through a one-state solution, leaving how this is to be done to the reader and the people of Israel/Palestine to determine. Bazian has contributed a full-bodied analysis of primary sources to defend his assertion that Zionism has always been a settler colonial movement with its goal being a land devoid of the indigenous people. The organization of the text, the lack of sectioning in the chapters, and the technical insertion and citation of primary sources could be improved for clearer reading. Bazian thoroughly defends his thesis with tangible evidence that Zionism is something colonial, and has been something colonial from the start. This is a text that complicates the narrative of what colonialism is, what the State of Israel is, and who and what Palestine is, together establishing the book as required reading for understanding nuances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Shelby Perez Master’s Divinity Candidate Chicago Theological Seminary

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not existed since the beginning of time. Hatem Bazian explores the roots of the conflict, locating the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project under the tutelage of British colonial efforts. Bazian’s text is a look at and beyond first-hand accounts, an investigation of and critical analysis of settler practice in relation to similar texts such as Sari Nusseibeh’s Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life, Alan Dowty’s Israel/Palestine, and Ari Shavit’s My Promised Land. Hatem Bazian’s Palestine…it is something colonial is not an introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Readers should possess a basic understanding of the conflict and history of the region over the last century. Nor does this text provide the reader with an unbiased look at the timeline of events since the inception of the Zionist movement. Palestine…it is something colonial instead is a rich critique of the Zionist movement and British colonialism. It investigates the way British colonialism influenced Zionism and how Zionism adopted colonial ideas and practices. Bazian locates Zionism as a settler colonialist movement still at work today, which historically planned and systematically executed the removal of Palestinians from their land, with the aid of the United Kingdom and (later) the United States. Bazian examines Ottoman collapse, the colonization of Palestine by the British, Israel’s biblical theology of dispossession, as well as British colonial incubation of Zionism, Zionism as a Eurocentric episteme, the building of Israel through ethnic cleansing, and the Nakba, all of these culminating in legalized dispossession. Throughout the text, Bazian is able to tie each chapter to the present state of affairs and remind the audience of the trauma of a people forcibly removed. Bazian opens with the straightforward assertion that “Palestine is the last settler-colonial project to be commissioned in the late 19th early 20th centuries and still unfolding in the 21st century with no end in sight” (17). In chapter one, “Dissecting the Ottomans and Colonizing Palestine,” Bazian navigates the biased historiography of the fall of the Ottoman empire, linking the collapse of the empire to the colonizing forces of Europe which sought to ensure access to the newly discovered oil in the region as well as to Asia and Africa. Bazian masterfully steers the reader through the history of European intervention, and in particular on behalf of Christians as ethnic minorities in the Middle East. Europe is historically anti-Jewish; at the turn of the century, Zionism was determined to solve Europe’s “Jewish Problem” and maintain a stronghold in the Middle East, he writes. In chapter two, “Israel’s Biblical Theology of Dispossession,” Bazian explores the biblical roots of Zionist ideology. The chapter opens with a discussion of a contemporary Bedouin tribe being expelled in the Negev. Bazian writes that “the biblical text gets transformed into policy by the Zionist state, by which it then normalizes or makes legal the wholesale theft of Palestinian lands and expulsion of the population”(57) using legal documents such as the Levy Report. These policies create “facts on the ground” which lead to “legalized expulsions.” The Bible was central to the historical development of the European Christian supremacist idea of the Holy Land. The loss of the territory conquered during the Crusades ruptured this notion, a break “fixed” through Zionism. In chapter three, “British Colonialism and Incubation of Zionism,”Bazian begins to address British colonialism and Zionism as complementary. Bazian uses primary texts from British political actors of the time, such as Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Balfour, to establish the anti-Semiticinspiration for British actions of the time. Bazian also successfully uses the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement to establish the double dealings of the British in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. Bazian uses many primary texts in this chapter effectively, though their organization could leave readers confused. Chapter four, “Zionism: Eurocentric Colonial Epistemic,” continues the themes of the prior chapter as the colonial influence is cemented. In this chapter, Bazian explores the subterfuge and the genius propaganda selling Palestine as “a land without a people for a people without a land” along with “making the desert bloom”—as if the indigenous Arab people were not there. Bazian frames this chapter within the Zionist ideology of the peoples living in the land being only a barrier to a Jewish state in Palestine. Bazian uses primary sources (e.g., Herzl) to defend the assertion that the removal of the Palestinian people was always a piece of the Zionist plan. Bazian also includes Jewish critical voices (e.g., excerpts from the reporter Ella Shohat) to establish the European Jewish bias against the indigenous Arab peoples, including Sephardic Jews. Bazian that these biases and the effort to remove Palestinians from their land defined the early Zionist movement and the creation of the state of Israel in chapter five, “Building a State and Ethnic Cleansing.” This chapter draws extensively on primary sources: correspondence, reports, declarations, agreements, commissions, and maps. Bazian struggles to organize these rich resources in a clear fashion; however, his analysis matches the richness of the sources. These sources establish the “legalized” systematic removal of the Palestinians from the land by the Israelis in 1948. In chapter six, “The Nakba,” Bazian uses further legal documents and first-hand accounts to trace the forced removal of Palestinians. He pays homage to the trauma while critically dissecting the process of legalizing ethnic cleansing and peddling the innocence of the Israelis to the rest of the world. Bazian profoundly concludes his chapter with the story of a Palestinian boy who witnessed the mass executions of men and women of his village and marched away from his home. The boy, now a man, closed his story with poignant words that capture the horror of the Nakba: “The road to Ramallah had become an open cemetery” (241). After the land was emptied the new state of Israel needed to legally take possession of the Palestinian-owned property. Chapter seven, “Colonial Machination,” elaborates this process: “the State of Israel is structured to give maximum attention to fulfillment of the settler-colonial project and the state apparatus is directed toward achieving this criminal enterprise” (243). The name “Palestine” is erased as a name for the land and the peoples; former colonial and Ottoman laws were twisted to support a systematic theft of the land. Bazian concludes his book with a look to the future: “What is the way forward and Palestine’s de-colonial horizon?” (276). He lays out the options available for true and lasting peace, discounting out of hand the twostate solution as impossible due to the extent of the settlements in the West Bank. He also dismisses both the options of the removal of Palestinians and the removal of the Jewish people. He instead posits a way forward through a one-state solution, leaving how this is to be done to the reader and the people of Israel/Palestine to determine. Bazian has contributed a full-bodied analysis of primary sources to defend his assertion that Zionism has always been a settler colonial movement with its goal being a land devoid of the indigenous people. The organization of the text, the lack of sectioning in the chapters, and the technical insertion and citation of primary sources could be improved for clearer reading. Bazian thoroughly defends his thesis with tangible evidence that Zionism is something colonial, and has been something colonial from the start. This is a text that complicates the narrative of what colonialism is, what the State of Israel is, and who and what Palestine is, together establishing the book as required reading for understanding nuances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Shelby Perez Master’s Divinity Candidate Chicago Theological Seminary

AbstractThe ninetieth anniversary of the World Union enables us to highlight our achievements. In 1973 we moved the international headquarters from New York to Jerusalem and built a magnificent cultural/educational centre there. We pioneered the development of a dynamic Reform/Progressive movement in Israel consisting of congregations, kibbutzim, an Israel religious action centre and educational, cultural and youth programmes. We became active leaders in the Jewish Agency for Israel and the World Zionist Organization. We established synagogues and educational programmes in the Former Soviet Union, Europe, Latin America and the Far East, thus fulfilling our mandate to perpetuate Jewish life wherever Jews live. We formulated an ideology of Reform Zionism as an antidote to the contracting Jewish identity induced by contemporary diaspora conditions. Whereas we encourage aliyah for Jews who want to live in Israel, we are adamantly opposed to those who advocate aliyah as a positive response to anti-Semitism. Instead, we demand that European democracies guarantee equal rights and full security to Jews as well as to all other groups in society.

In his new bestseller, Black Earth, Thimoty Snyder spotlights the covert relationship at the end 1930s between the Polish Government and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, the Jewish underground formation in Palestine affiliated with Vladimir Jabotinsky’s New Zionist Organization. One of the most important figures in that affair was the Irgun representative in Poland, Henryk Strasman, a Warsaw assistant public prosecutor who was later murdered by the NKVD in Kharkov in April 1940, together with other Polish officers in Soviet captivity. Ably aided by his wife, Alicja Strasman (née Friedberg), and in close cooperation with the shadowy Abraham Stern, he sought to acquire arms and ammunition and to secure the training of the Irgun cadres by the Polish army. Strasman was also involved in the establishment of a militant Polish- -language bi-weekly (Jerozolima Wyzwolone) and another paper (Di Tat) in Yiddish to popularize the cause of the insurgency in Palestine among the Jewish public in Poland. In December 1938, Strasman briefed the American ambassador to Poland, A.J. Biddle, on his undertakings. Biddle’s report to Secretary of State Cordell Hull about that meeting adds to our knowledge of clandestine Zionist activity in Poland and illuminates Strasman’s tragic and little-known story.

L. L. Zamenhof saw the creation of his proposed international language, Esperanto, as a process of construction, rather like the building of a city. This new city of words would replace the walls of language difference that had previously separated the nations. His poems imagined a new “foundation” replacing the Tower of Babel and destroying the walls of Jericho. Unlike most other projectors of international languages, Zamenhof saw the creation of a community of Esperanto speakers, who could claim ownership of the language, as crucially important. The language began as text, but soon, as a result of its growing community of users, became a spoken language. The language owed its popularity to the emergence of an urban European middle class, eager to travel and learn about the world — at a time when the modern city was also emerging, its sense of identity defined above all by shared text and a common narrative. A common narrative and a shared text were also generated among the speakers of Esperanto, who were imbued with faith in technological progress and a corresponding belief in the achievement of common values. They developed common symbols and common modes of organization reflecting those that they found around them, notably the holding of annual international congresses in European cities, and other city-based activities. Zamenhof’s own beliefs were driven above all by his experience as a Central European Jew and by his exposure to early manifestations of the Zionist movement, which led him to dream of a kind of post-Zionist universalism embracing all creeds and races. Sadly, this was not to be: he could not put an end to anti-Semitism, nor bring about the kind of ecumenism of which he dreamed. That vision was lost in the rise of nationalism in World War I and beyond.

The American Jewish Congress began its activities as an organization established to represent all Jews living in the United States during the Congress in Philadelphia. On December 15–18, 1918, a meeting of 400 delegates representing all Jewish political parties and social groups in the USA took place. It aroused great hopes because new opportunities were opening up for the Jews to resolve the Palestinian question, the main Zionist project, and to guarantee equal rights for Jewish minorities in East-Central Europe. The article answers questions about how the American Jewish Congress was convened. How did the main political groups of Jews in the USA respond to it? What was the subject of the debate? What decisions were made? And then how were they implemented and what was the future of the initiative launched in Philadelphia? Answers to these questions will allow us to draw a conclusion as to the importance of the December congress in the history of Jews in the USA and whether it fulfilled its tasks.

The topic of Zionist movement history in Russia is still controversial and has not been sufficiently studied. In this regard, the work is intended to fill in the gaps, clarify a number of issues on the topic and expand its historiography. In preparing the publication, historical-genetic and historical-systemic methods of research were applied. The novelty of the issue lies in the fact that each publication provides a new opportunity for an objective research of the issue, since for many years the term “Zionism” had negative connotations in our country and was equated with racism, and the works containing a different view started appearing relatively recently with the opening of archives. Unlike many parties in Soviet Russia, which were recognized as counter-revolutionary, the Zionist organizations attracted significant numbers of young people including teenagers, and that became a unique feature of the movement, whose goal was to raise a healthy generation capable of building a new state. The study of those aspects will make it possible to draw parallels between various anti-Soviet parties and organizations in Russia, to isolate the main milestones in the development of the Zionist youth movement, to come to the conclusion that one of the peculiarities of youth movements was that some part of them was created by the youth and did not depend on the older generation parties, while others, in order to expand influence, were formed on the basis of those parties that had already existed. The article was prepared on the basis of Russian and foreign archival documents, whose introduction into scientific circulation will replenish the source base on the Zionist movement history in Soviet Russia.

Abstract Ever since the concept of Jewish Orthodoxy emerged in the early-19th century, and especially after Jews were awarded equal civic rights in the 1860s, several religious leaders sought to establish Orthodox organizations. They, however, faced two main obstacles: first, the concept of an Orthodox organization was new to Jewish history and conservative rabbis automatically opposed anything new and condemned it as “modern.” Second, an Orthodox organization meant a religious jurisdiction superior to that of the local rabbis who were reluctant to give up the full authority they enjoyed. Following a long period of deterioration in the power and influence of the rabbis, local Orthodox organizations were established in Hungary, Galicia and Germany. In 1912, after the establishment of international movements by Reform rabbis, Maskilim, Jewish socialists, and finally the Zionists, leading Orthodox figures decided to establish the international Orthodox organization titled Agudat Israel. Recognizing its critical role in preserving traditional Judaism, individual rabbis and local Orthodox organizations from many countries joined Agudat Israel. The only country whose rabbis refused to join was Hungary. There, Jewish Orthodoxy enjoyed a special civil status and had its own separate communities. Seeking to maintain their distinct status, Hungarian leaders demanded that Agudat Israel declare itself an Orthodox organization and refrain from accepting Jews who belonged to non-Orthodox communities, who were lax in their religious conduct, or who supported Zionism. After deliberating the pros and cons, Agudat Israel decided to decline the “Hungarian demand” and, instead, to accept every Jew who wanted to join. Consequently, most Hungarian rabbis banned the organization. Nevertheless, the political and social circumstances following World War I drove some Hungarian rabbis and their communities to join Agudat Israel.

It is a common assumption in the international media that the fundamentalist Christian Right suddenly appeared on the US political scene following the 11 September 2001 tragedy, and that it became a major force in shaping US policy in the Middle East. While it is true that fundamentalist Christians have exercised considerable influence during the George W. Bush administration, their ascendance is neither new nor surprising. The movement has demonstrated political influence in the US and England intermittently for more than a hundred years, particularly in the formation of Middle East policy. This article focuses on the unique theology and historical development of Christian Zionism, noting its essential beliefs, its emergence in England during the nineteenth century, and how it grew to gain prominence in the US. The alliance of the pro-Israel lobby, the neo-conservative movement, and several Christian Zionist organizations in the US represents a formidable source of support for the more maximalist views of Israel's Likud Party. In the run-up to the 2004 US presidential elections this alliance could potentially thwart any progress on an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan in the near future. Moreover, Likud ideology is increasingly evident in US Middle East policy as a result of this alliance.

This article focuses on the immediate repercussions of a reconstituted Jewish State after “2,000 years” on its relations with Diaspora Jewry and its diplomatic relations epitomized by American and Anglo Jewry. The Jewish Agency and Zionist organizations, once effective and indispensable former “retailers” were inexorably and painfully usurped by the new “wholesaler”, the Government of Israel and its diplomats who now appealed directly to all willing to contribute to strengthening Israel, irrespective of their past or present affiliations with the Zionist movement. Israeli diplomats viewed the Zionist organizations as the board of a company, which had been nationalized, had much goodwill, an immense pool of experience, some capital, but no clear idea about what to do with themselves. The path to reach a modus vivendi on delegating and authorizing responsibilities on public relations and Israel advocacy was acrimonious.

The main components of the Israel lobby in the United States were organized in the spring of 1954, six years after the State of Israel declared independence, in response to a crisis in U.S.–Israel diplomacy that erupted in October 1953. Israeli soldiers had massacred more than sixty Palestinian villagers in Qibya, on the West Bank, eliciting widespread condemnation; American Jews, in reply, mobilized to defend Israel in new ways. The American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (later renamed AIPAC) and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, established at this time, displayed two outstanding features. They were Jewish united front organizations that brought together Zionist with “non-Zionist” groups. They also emerged from transnational contacts with Israeli leaders and realities. A staunch near-consensus in defense of Israel in the most trying circumstances established a lasting framework in American Jewish life.

AbstractFollowing the liberation of Poland 1945, the childrens organization of the Jewish-Socialdemocratic "Bund" SKIF formed itself anew and remained in existence until the communists' ban of social democratic organizations. Starting with the first post-war conference of the International of social democratic children and youth education in October 1945 until the mid-sixties the SKIF played a recognizable role within these international structures of the "Falcons" movement. In the late forties the SKIF simultaneously existed in Paris, where a successor organization is still active, and in Brussels. During the seventies and eighties a "SKIF-ist" holiday colony existed in New York and from 1950 until this day further groups exist in Melbourne. Since 1945 the SKIF has existed primarily as an organization of survivors and their children. Later it managed to develop a new function and to offer an educational model for the following generations of Jewish children, which lies beyond religion and Zionism.

The current willingness of major American Jewish organizations and leaders to dismiss the threat from white supremacists in the name of supporting Israel represents a new stage in the shifting relationship of U.S. Jews toward Zionism. In the first stage, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the majority of U.S. Jews did not take to Zionism, as its goals seemed antithetical to their aspirations to join mainstream American society. In a second stage, attitudes toward Zionism grew more positive as conditions for European Jews worsened, and Jewish settlement in Palestine grew substantially. Following Israeli statehood in 1948, U.S. Jews began gradually to support Israel. Jewish groups and leaders increasingly characterized criticism of Zionism as inherently anti-Semitic and attacked Israel's critics. In a third and most recent stage, many major Jewish organizations and leaders have subordinated the traditional U.S. Jewish interest in combatting white supremacy and bigotry when it comes into conflict with support for Israel and Zionism.

In the spring and summer of 1915, during World War I, nearly half a million (and by some estimates, up to one million) Jewish civilians fled or were expelled by the Russian Army from front zones in Polish and Lithuanian territories. This article examines questions connected with the idea, proposed by the leaders of Jewish relief organizations in Petrograd, and by the economist B. D. Brutskus in particular, to resettle Jewish refugees in Siberia. The so-called “Brutskus Plan” and reactions to it shows that, first, Russian Jewish intellectuals thought within an explicitly imperial framework; second, negative reactions to the plan on the part of Siberian Jews themselves shed light on the tremendous geographic diversity and heterogeneity of the empire’s Jewish population; and third, opponents to the Siberian plan exposed internal conflicts within the Jewish national movement (chiefly between Zionists and non-Zionists) in regard to migration and settlement.

Abstract: It is often assumed that the 1967 Arab-Israeli War led to the "wholesale conversion of the Jews to Zionism," as Norman Podhoretz famously phrased it. This "conversion" is equally, if often less explicitly, said to coincide with the end of the era of Jewish marginality in the U.S. and West more broadly, as Jews of European descent were half-included, half-conscripted, into normative structures of whiteness, class ascension, and citizenship. While this epochal shift in Jewish racial formation and political allegiance is undeniable especially in the context of large Jewish secular and religious institutions, at the time this "conversion" was seen as anything but inevitable. Many Jewish liberals, including Irving Howe, Seymour Lipset, and Nathan Glazer, and reactionaries such as Meir Kahane, saw Jewish overrepresentation and hypervisibility in New Left organizations such as Students for a Democratic Society, the Youth International Party, and the Socialist Workers Party as a sign that Jewish youth rejected Zionism as well as the Jewish rise into the middle class. That retrospectively we see Jewish racial formation and political alignment after 1967 as a fait accompli often relies on the erasure not only of mass Jewish participation in the New Left, but also the erasure of the New Left's anti-imperialist political commitments, including critique of expansive Israeli militarism and the settler colonial assumptions underlying Zionism. Looking at memoirs, pamphlets, histories, and original interviews with Jewish participants in the New Left, this article excavates the political alignments of Jewish New Left activists, exploring opposition to the U.S.'s new support of the Israeli state as well as the changing Ashkenazi Jewish racial assignment. Rather than finding Third World and Black Power critiques of Israel antisemitic, it was precisely the Jewish New Left's politics of international and multiracial solidarity that encouraged their support for Black Power critiques of Zionism. In this way, Jewish members of the New Left also attempted to critically challenge their own whiteness, aligning support for Israel after 1967 with support for the racial and economic structures of militarism and capitalism at home.

Abstract This article investigates how the French antiracist movement and its main organizations dealt with Zionism and the Middle East conflict from the liberation of France until the early 1970s. Their generally positive view of Israel and their concern for Arab interests at the end of the 1940s demonstrate these republican organizations' desire to recognize ethnic identities. During the 1950s an ideological split between left-wing antiracism and Zionism began to develop, and by the end of the 1960s a number of new antiracist associations questioned the very foundation of the Jewish state. Overall, the study argues that antiracist organizations' stances on and statements about Zionism and the Middle East conflict influenced Jewish-Arab relations during the postwar period and played an important role for both Jews and Arabs. Cet article examine comment le mouvement antiraciste français et ses principales organisations ont abordé le sionisme et le conflit au Moyen-Orient depuis la Libération jusqu'au début des années 1970. Leur opinion surtout positive d'Israël ainsi qu'un souci pour les intérêts arabes à la fin des années 1940 montrent un certain désir par ces organisations républicaines de reconnaître les identités ethniques. Pendant les années 1950, une fracture idéologique entre l'antiracisme de gauche et le sionisme commence à se développer, et dès la fin des années 1960 un activisme plus poussé a amené de nouvelles associations antiracistes à remettre en question les fondements mêmes de l'Etat juif. Dans l'ensemble, l'étude montre que les organisations antiracistes ont été impliquées dans l'élaboration des relations judéo-arabes après la guerre à travers leurs positions et déclarations sur le sionisme et le Moyen-Orient, des questions qui jouent un rôle important pour les Juifs et les Arabes.

Scholars working on Jewish communities in the Middle East are in the midst of an important historiographical moment, in which the major categories, historical narratives, and key assumptions within the field are undergoing radical changes. A cluster of books and articles written by scholars trained in history, anthropology, and area studies departments, and published in Middle East studies rather than Jewish studies book series and journals, suggests that the study of Middle Eastern Jewish communities in the American academy is undergoing a change which might be termed “the Middle Eastern turn.” For such scholars, the history of Jews in Muslim lands, as modern subjects and citizens, is typified by a multiplicity of categories related to their identities—Ottoman, Sephardi, Mizrahi, Arab-Jewish, and local-patriotic—which they explore by looking at the political organizations and social and cultural institutions that enabled the integration of modern Jews into new imperial and national frameworks. This new scholarly wave is transnational, as it illustrates the importance of Jewish networks and Jewish languages in the Middle East, and likewise seeks to draw comparisons between Jews and other transregional and religious minorities, such as Armenians and Greek Orthodox Christians. It is interdisciplinary, as it attempts to incorporate the insights of sociologists, anthropologists, and literary scholars. Finally, it is postcolonial, in its critiques of national elites, national narratives, and nationalist histories. These new accounts uncover how processes which affected the entire Middle East, like Ottoman and Egyptian reform politics and the rise of nation-states, shaped modern Jewish lives.

On 1 May 2017, Hamas released its “Document of General Principles and Policies” following years of periodic speculation that the movement was working on a new political platform. Heralded by some as a significant milestone in Hamas's political thought and practice, the document reiterates longstanding positions but also lays out some new ones. Given the timing of its release, as well as its contents and possible implications, the document could be considered Hamas's new charter: it details the organization's views on the struggle against “the Zionist project” and Israel and outlines its strategies to counter that project. This essay aims to provide a fine-grained analysis of the substance, context, and ramifications of the recently released document. The discussion starts with an overview highlighting aspects of the document that could be considered departures from Hamas's original 1988 charter, and pointing to changes in the movement's discourse, both in form and substance. A contextual analysis then probes the regional, international, and internal impetuses behind the issuance of the document. Finally, the discussion concludes with a look at the possible implications for the movement itself, as well as for the Palestinians and for Israel.

There is a common belief that Israeli women have achieved gender equality over and above that attained in America and European countries. Evidence cited to support this is the fact that women routinely serve in the Israeli army and the country elected a woman, Golda Meir, as prime minister. Equality between men and women is claimed to date back to the days at the beginning of the century when both sexes worked shoulder to shoulder in road construction and land reclamation (Bernstein, 1992: 2). The years 1904–14 and 1919–23, known in Zionist history as the Second and Third Aliyah (waves of immigration), were indeed formative times during which the dominant values of the society were shaped and the infrastructure of future organizations was laid (Eisenstadt, 1967; Izraeli, 1981). The immigrants who arrived during this period, known as halutzim (male pioneers) and halutzot (female pioneers) were idealistic nationalists from Eastern Europe. They were young and single, and came with the express purpose of rebuilding Zion and creating a new type of egalitarian and labor-oriented society.

The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of the construction of a Palestinian political field after it collapsed in 1948, when, with the British government’s support of the Zionist movement, which succeeded in establishing the state of Israel, the Palestinian national movement was crushed. This article focuses mainly on the Palestinian political field as it developed in the 1960s and 1970s, the beginnings of its fragmentation in the 1990s, and its almost complete collapse in the first decade of this century. It was developed on a structure characterized by the dominance of a center where the political leadership functioned. The center, however, was established outside historic Palestine. This paper examines the components and dynamics of the relationship between the center and the peripheries, and the causes of the decline of this center and its eventual disappearance, leaving the constituents of the Palestinian people under local political leadership following the collapse of the national representation institutions, that is, the political, organizational, military, cultural institutions and sectorial organizations (women, workers, students, etc.) that made up the PLO and its frameworks. The paper suggests that the decline of the political field as a national field does not mean the disintegration of the cultural field. There are, in fact, indications that the cultural field has a new vitality that deserves much more attention than it is currently assigned.

Abstract: The article analyzes the reasons that prompted the Arab states to consolidate their efforts and create the League of Arab States. Attention is focused on the deep differences that existed between the states that came forward with the idea of strengthening Arab unity and determined the nature of this regional organization and the features of its charter, which provided its members with the opportunity to preserve their political system, sovereignty and the specifics of foreign policy.The heterogeneous nature of LAS had an impact on its the goals and objectives. The focus of this organization was to protect pan-Arab interests and support all Arab states in achieving political independence.The aggravation of the situation in Palestine after the Second World War became a central item on the agenda of all the Arab League meetings. This organization indicated its position on the Palestinian issue in the preparatory period for its official proclamation. The article discusses the activities of the Arab League, aimed at introducing a complete boycott of Israel, which, amid expansion of the Arab League, other Arab states also joined. The Arab-Israeli conflict, due to the targeted efforts of the Arab League, consolidated the Arab geopolitical community and contributed to the formation of a national Arab identity. The LAS in its documents built a common Arab narrative, having two underpinnings: the recognition of the Palestinian Arab people as a victim of the Western powers and Zionists, as well as foreign policy of Israel.The article traces the relationship between the activities of the Arab League and the changes that have occurred in the regional and international environment. The gradual transition of the Arab League to the search for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was influenced by the emergence of a new balance of power in the Middle East region, as well as the gradual transformations of a new system of international relations.The further demarcation of the Arab countries that occurred after the mass protests in 2011 influenced the activities of the Arab League, which tried to maintain Arab unity by using the traditional tool – the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. The LAS member-states should have taken a pan-Arab stance on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to preserve national identity. The refusal of all Arab League members to accept the American settlement plan, proposed by D. Trump administration in early 2020, was a confirmation that this regional organization retains its position as a defender of Arab unity and pan-Arab interests.

The article proposes a view of the history of Russian neopaganism as a gradual emergence and coexistence of three waves of movement. Each of them has its own characteristics in ideology and political, activist and religious practice. The first wave of neopaganism was represented by such publicists as A. M. Ivanov, V. N. Emelyanov and A. A. Dobrovolsky and laid the foundations of the worldview, as well as formulated the major claims against Christianity and Judaism. These claims, formulated in the form of anti-Semitic and anti-Christian conspiracy narrative, considered by the author as an element of the “scapegoat mechanism” described by the anthropologist R. Girard. Two other fundamental elements of the worldview were ethnic primordialism and esoteric religiosity. The second wave was represented by the leaders of religious groups and popular writers such as I. G. Cherkasov, N. N. Speransky, L. R. Prozorov, A. Yu. Khinevich and focused on the “invention of tradition” (in the terminology of the historian E. Hobsbawm). Within this wave, two trends can be distinguished — traditionalist and modernist. The trends differ from each other in their approach to the invention of tradition. The third wave was associated with youth right-wing extremism and originated among former neo-Nazi skinheads, such as members of the Combat Terrorist Organization D. A. Borovikov and A. M. Voevodin. Ideologically, it had continuity from the first wave, but was more radical in practice. Representatives of this wave tended to be critical of their own nation, which does not follow the young right-wing radicals in their uprising against the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG).

<p>Tiny by physical size, the State of Israel retains some of the world’s most important cultural treasures, along with many other great cultural institutions. Archeological treasures have yielded much information as far as biblical history and have been well adapted to a Zionist narrative by both the Jewish press and international news organizations, such as the New York Times whose archives are replete with reports of Jewish history being dug up by the Jewish people. Once the State of Israel gained independence in 1948, the course was set for the development of historical museums whose discourse would reflect the most significant events in Jewish history, most especially the Holocaust and the state of constant warfare that continues to imbue the cultural consciousness of its citizens. In this paper we outline, through categorization, the various historical museums, which are currently operating. Furthermore, this article hopes to shed some light upon the cultural sensibilities conveyed through these institutions. This paper is about Israeli culture, mythology, and collective needs, as formed by and informed through a variety of historical museums. The working assumption is that in a historical museum culture is partially formed and at the same time the culture is influencing the contents and narratives on display inside the museum. It should be clear from the start that the discussion is held about Israeli museums as viewed by a Jewish population and created by and for Jews. Notwithstanding the multifaceted collective of Israeli society, this work is confined to and circumscribed by this demarcation. In the following sections, I intend to provide an explanation for this viewpoint from a historical perspective and also provide a framework of what constitutes a historical museum and justify the methodology of its employ. This will be followed by a discussion of the main categorical types of historical museums present in Israel, and finally a detailed accounting of specific museums.</p>

The formation of social democracy in the Russian Empire was another stage in the «Russian reception» of the Western models of the socialist movement, the result of certain ideological contradictions on the Russian ground. Given the semi-feudal society of the Russian Empire, the paternalism of autocratic power, the absence of deep traditions of liberal culture, the Russian social democratic movement could hardly count on obvious success without a deep revolutionary renewal of the entire socio-economic and political system of the Russian state. Since Jews were an urban ethnic group, it is not surprising that the provinces of the Jewish Pale in the late 19th century proved to be the epicentre of the revolutionary energy concentration.Thus, in the late 19th century the processes of formation and development of not the Russian, but the Jewish social-democratic movement continued on the territory of the Jewish Pale, the prominent centres of which were the Belarusian and Ukrainian cities of the Russian Empire. Despite the low level of the industrial development in the north-western part of the Russian Empire, as well as police persecution, imprisonment, and exile of many activists, the Jewish Social Democratic movement grew qualitatively and quantitatively, got loyal supporters, and spread to other cities such as Minsk, Grodno, Bialystok and Warsaw. The Bund (the Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) played a key role in organizing the Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) on March 1-3, 1898, at which the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) was founded which was supposed to unite revolutionary Marxist groups of the empire, regardless of their ethnicity. The processes of formation of the organizational and personnel structure of the Russian Social-Democracy continued during the First Russian Revolution. Jews took an active part in these processes. Their role in the organization of Russian social-democratic movement and in its staffing is difficult to overestimate. In particular, S. Dikstein, H.S. Khurgin, E.A. Abramovich, I.A. Gurvich, E.A. Gurvich, O. Belakh, L. Berkovich and many other Jewish activists found themselves at the origins of Russian social-democratic movement, and such distinguished Jewish figures of Russian social democracy as P. Axelrod and Yu. Martov in the early 19th century headed the Menshevik wing of the RSDLP.The author noted that until 1917 the model for the development of the social democratic movement in the Russian Empire was the European Social Democracy, among the recognized authorities of which were also Jews (F. Lassall, E. Bernstein, V. Adler, O. Bauer). Eventually, the Jewish origin of Marx, the founder of «scientific» socialism, canonized his doctrine in the mass consciousness of the urban Jewry of the Russian Empire, which awaited a new messiah who would «bring» them out of the ghetto of the Jewish Pale.At the same time, the theory of self-liberation of the Jewish proletariat, adopted by the Jewish Social Democrats of Vilno, Minsk, and Kyiv as opposed to the seemingly utopian ideas of the Zionists from Basel, Switzerland, became the leading ideology of the Russia’s first political organization of Jewish proletarian – the Bund, which emerged in the same 1897, when the First World Congress of Zionists took place.Thus, the intensification of state anti-Semitism, the Jewish pogroms, and the escalation of the political crisis in the Russian Empire on the eve of the First Russian Revolution pushed Russian and Jewish Social-Democracy to develop a common position on the proletariat’s participation in future revolutionary events, optimized the search for overcoming the internal party crisis that arose after the withdrawal of the Bund from the RSDLP. For the first time in its history, the Jewish Social Democrats tried to ignite the fire of the Russian revolution on the «Jewish street» and prove the political significance of the powerful revolutionary potential of the Jewish masses in the Jewish Pale for the all-Russian social democratic movement.

The article introduces one of the documentary sources on the history and ethnography of the Georgian Jews stored in the archive of the Russian Ethnographic Museum – field materials collected by I. M. Pulner in his expeditions to Georgia in 1926, 1928, and 1929. The introductory part of the article provides a brief summary of the main stages of his professional activity, wherein his study of the Georgian Jews ethnography dates back to his student years. The expeditions he carried out at that time were the first experience of purposeful ethnographic study of this Jewish ethnic group. Pulner's field materials accrue special scientific value as they contain real facts and people’s statements, as well as ethnographer’s direct observations, which give a fairly objective idea of everyday culture and socio-economic conditions of the Georgian Jews in the second half of the 1920s. The documents of the archive include expedition journal and report, as well as separate notes on various areas of Georgian Jewish culture. Most notes date from Pulner’s first trip to Kutaisi; in the following two years, he mostly visited villages where the Georgian Jews lived, but the archive of the Museum contains only several his recordings of weather wisdom, culinary recipes, and song lyrics written down in these trips. The article chiefly analyses Pulner’s Kutaisi materials. Drawing on them, methods and peculiarities of his ethnographic work among the local Jews are revealed; areas in which he collected his data are described; certain information is cited concerning occupation, material situation, organization of religious life, specificity of religious rituals performed in synagogue, Sabbath celebration, state of Jewish education following the closure of Jewish schools during the Soviet era, attitude to the ideas of Zionism among the youth, relations (including matrimony) between the mountain Jews, Ashkenazi, and Georgians Jews, traditional dwelling and its decoration, festive and everyday food, clothing, folk sayings, wedding ceremonial rites, etc. Among all occupations, Pulner underscored trade, which remained the main occupation of the Jews of Kutaisi, although it fell into decay under the Soviet rule, forcing Jews to master new professions of porters and water sellers, which were considered lowly occupations in Georgia. Talking about the synagogue, he drew attention to the fact that among the Georgian Jews it was not just a place for performing religious rites, but also the center of the Jewish quarter residents’ social life; he noted the leading role of cantor in synagogue service and detailed its procedure. There are interesting materials about relationship between the Georgian Jews and the Jews of other ethnic groups (mountain, Ashkenazi) demonstrating their distancing, as well as materials on their close cooperation with the Georgians in everyday life. Information on material culture is brief and concerns mainly clothing worn by men and women. Of the wedding rituals, Pulner managed to record only matchmaking rites. He did not succeed in continuing a full-scale study the eorgian Jews, and those materials he collected during his student expeditions remain rare evidence of the Georgian Jews in the Soviet era.

"Jasenovac - the Right to Remembrance" was the first exhibition of the Republic of Serbia about Jasenovac in the UN, but also the first one with the topic of Jasenovac after the Second World War and, with 7 tons of equipment and exhibits, the most monumental exhibition in the history of the United Nations. It was held in the UN in New York's East River, from 26 January to 2 February 2018. The director of this exhibition was Professor Gideon Greif, PhD, a world-renowned historian of the Holocaust and an expert for death camps in the Second World War and the Head of the International Expert Group of Historians "GH7 - Stop to Revisionism", while the coordinator of the Serbian-Jewish academic cooperation and all the segments of the exhibition preparation was Ambassador Ljiljana Nikšić, PhD. The exhibition was opened by First Vice-President of the Government of Serbia and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ivica Dačić, in the presence of the children-survivors of Jasenovac and other children camps in the ISC, who spoke for the first time after the Second World War in the United Nations. The Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its full capacity, through all international organizations and in all possible ways tried to stop the exhibition, also by sending a diplomatic protest to the UN Commission, the State Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel and the EU. The Republic of Croatia based its protests (unsuccessfully) on the "territorial principle", since Jasenovac is situated in its territory. The United Nations took the side of the Republic of Serbia, accepting its argument that the purpose of the exhibition was the remembrance of the victims of Nazism and fascism, and that it was a matter of preserving the culture of remembrance related to the victims of the death camps in the Second World War, to whom the International Holocaust Remembrance Day is dedicated, taking place in the United Nations every year. The Croatian diplomacy conducted a persistent campaign with the UN Commission, with the condition that "negotiations should be initiated between Belgrade and Zagreb" about the exhibition, and that the Serbian ambassador to Zagreb should "receive the approval" from the relevant bodies in the Republic of Croatia, and only afterwards discuss it in the UN. This was followed by the protest of the Serbian side. The exhibition was the product of the Serbian-Jewish academic project. World agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, Deutsche Welle, Washington Post and others, reported about the protest of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also wrote in detail about the exhibition and about the camp in Jasenovac, as well as about 57 methods of brutal killing that had been applied in the camp, which placed the exhibition in the focus of the worldwide attention. Immediately after the exhibition opening, on the margins of the OSCE Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism in Rome, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs had a meeting with Pope Francis, but also with the President of the World Jewish Congress, using the occasion to familiarize them with Serbia's attitudes against the initiative of the Republic of Croatia for the canonization of Ustasha vicar and arch-bishop Aloysius Stepinac, and expressing his concern over Neo-Ustashism in Croatia. The exhibition "Jasenovac - the Right to Remembrance" in the UN brought about significant changes in the approach to Jasenovac, and resulted in the first official visit of a president of Israel. In July 2018, Reuven Rivlin was the first President of Israel who visited Belgrade and Zagreb and, on that occasion, also visited the Memorial Complex of Jasenovac and paid respects to the great martyrs of Jasenovac. During his visit to Belgrade, together with President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić, he unveiled the plaque with the name of the street dedicated to the founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, whose father and grandfather were born in Zemun. Moreover, the result of the exhibition was also the Appeal of the World Jewish Congress to Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković to adopt the Law on the Prohibition of the Use of Ustasha Greeting "Ready for the Homeland" and to remove the memorial plaque of the Croatian Defence Forces with the engraved inscription "Ready for the Homeland" from Jasenovac.

The question of Palestine (and the city of Jerusalem) is a core issue that remains at the centre of the Muslim mind in our time. This is because most Muslims feel that the Zionist Movement created the State of Israel in Palestine after World War II by depriving the local population of their fundamental right to exist in their ancestral homeland. The global Zionist Movement conspired, resorted to terrorist tactics and executed an ethnic cleansing campaign to create the State of Israel. The Zionists first secured the support of British politicians and then the American leaders in favour of their search for an exclusive Jewish state covering the entirety of the former British Mandate of Palestine. Although the Palestinians – like Muslims in various parts of the world – quickly developed a national consciousness in the inter-war period and tried to protect their fundamental rights, they were no match for the Zionists who had already secured the support of major powers of the globe (e.g. Britain and the US). Later, Israel managed to obtain UN membership in its third attempt with the commitment to allow all Palestinians to return to their ancestral home. But in practice, Israel has ignored all UN resolutions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel has gradually developed a legal framework to deny the citizenship rights of the original population of Palestine and continues to build new Jewish settlements by demolishing Palestinian homes. While the Palestinians continue to suffer under Israeli repression, the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and most Muslim governments have largely abandoned the Palestinian cause of liberation. This, in turn, frustrates much of the Muslim youth around the world – fuelling fundamentalism and extremism.

It is frequently claimed that a chief miracle that characterized the politics of the pre-Israeli Zionist community and the Israeli one was the setting up of a Zionist–Socialist political elite which headed it for decades. Yet another great miracle – less discussed among scholars – is the fact that the extremist territorialist ostracized ``Revisionist camp" – the socialist's major rival – succeeded with time to become the Israeli new governing elite. It established most of the Israeli governments in the years 1977-2006. The current research shows that though the Revisionists and their successors (mostly the parties of Herut / Gahal / Likud) were considered extremely radical, from their earliest days, they understood that in order to move ahead they must show pragmatism alongside their radicalism. Thus, pragmatism was manifested on all fronts: ideology, identity, organization, recruiting of members and the character of their elite – an ``open elite". It was true before the creation of Israel and afterwards, and it has been the case since 1977. Nevertheless, when certain elements in this formula are abandoned, the party loses support, becomes damaged and banished to the ranks of the opposition. What is more, once all of those elements of success disappear, as was the case in 2006, the party collapses.

This essay describes the ideological conflicts and disputes within the Ashkenazi community in Mexico City from 1938 to 1951, spurred by various party-like communal organizations and their leaders attempting to gain control of as yet undefined parameters of political life. I undertake to show the process by which a pattem of political unidimensionality took root in this community and discuss the consequences of such a political reality. In other words, political conflicts exist in all societies, and there is always someone that becomes a winner while another may become a loser. However, not all confrontations produce either/or situations. In fact, in most cases, especially in societies that incorporate democratic values, the loser is not expected to just disappear. Neither is it expected - regardless of the desires of the competing agents- that he or she should alter his/her views and be prepared to align with the new power structure and the groups that maintain it. However, in the case analyzed here, this is precisely what evolved. When Communists, Bundists and others lost to Zionists, the political fights between these party-like groups had clearly become fights for control - who could speak, what could be said, and how should it be said -, foreclosing, so to speak, all non-aligned options. This was not just a matter of language. There was a clear attempt to impose a pattem of total allegiance to the dominating party. Zionism, becoming the central political power in Eretz Israel and aiming to secure support in the Diaspora, pursued political exclusivity in the community without the choice of political and cultural diversity that might have been expected given the history of the community and Diaspora conditions, which differed from the Israeli ones. In other words, once a group won, there were no concessions made to any of the losing contenders, no matter what and whom they represented, so that a process of political and cultural unidimensionality remained the only available option in this community that had seen diversity and plurality in abundance. The newly- defined political line of behavior became the essential test for measuring loyalty to the ethnic group.

This article examines trends in Modern Orthodoxy in North America in the 1940s. Canadian and American Orthodox rabbis and laypeople belonged to the same organizations, such as the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America and the Rabbinic Council of America (RCA). The major Orthodox rabbinic seminaries were located in the United States, and many Canadian rabbis were trained there. One of the issues the article addresses is Modern Orthodoxy’s issues with Traditional Orthodoxy, which - while newer on the scene in the 1940s - was beginning to make its mark. Orthodox leaders also took an active role in the war effort; the role of Orthodoxy was enhanced on the American scene by the contributions that the RCA made in the area of military chaplaincy. Orthodox leaders also took on a major role in the attempt to rescue European Jewry. Finally, just as there was a new role for America in Modern Orthodoxy, there was a new role for Zionism and Eretz Yisrael.

AbstractAt the end of World War II Allied soldiers found an unexpected amount of looted cultural property on German territory, property that had originally belonged to Jewish institutions and private owners from all over Europe. To take care of this precious booty the American Military Government for Germany organized an unprecedented initiative in cultural restitution. However, since most of the Jewish treasures found were heirless, traditional legislation based on bilateral intergovernmental regulations was insufficient for the task of finding just restitution solutions and meeting Jewish collective interests. In 1949, after complex legal negotiations, the New York based corporation Jewish Cultural Reconstruction (JCR) was officially installed to act as trustee for heirless Jewish cultural property found in the American Zone of Occupation. Not only was it extraordinary that the major Jewish organizations of the time – representing Palestine/Israel as well as the Diaspora – worked together via JCR, this was also the first time that international law recognized a legal representative of the Jewish collective. This paper explores the history of JCR, focusing, in particular, on the manifold and conflicting perceptions of the future of Jewish existence post-1945 that informed its work. On the one hand, the reestablished Jewish communities of Europe, especially the one in Germany, strongly contested JCR’s goal of distributing the rescued material to Jewish centers outside of Europe. Unlike JCR, they believed in a new Jewish beginning on the war-torn continent. On the other hand, Zionist- versus Diaspora-centered views also led to internal conflicts within JCR regarding the rightful ownership and appropriate relocation of European Jewish cultural heritage. JCR’s history reveals significant facets of Jewish agency and future planning in the early postwar years while reflecting the new topography of Jewish existence after the Holocaust.

In 2016 Prime Minister of Israel Benyamin Netanyahu declared its comeback to Africa and Africa’s return to the Jewish state. The key reason for a new Israeli-African cooperation (especially between Israel and East African countries) seems to be an intent to regulate crisis with illegal immigrants from Africa in Israel. The author examines the drivers of the big inflow of African asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan trying to find ‘safe heaven’ in the Jewish State. Netanyahu prefers to treat these African asylum seekers as economic migrants. He often stresses that Israel is too small to accept everyone who is afflicted. In the Israeli society negative sentiments towards African asylum seekers are generally prevailing. However, there are some grassroots initiatives aimed at protecting Africans and their rights. Opposition parties, Zionist Union and Meretz, are not united and have not succeeded in challenging the government’s course. The main goal of this research is to evaluate the Israeli government’s approaches, including deportation of immigrants to ‘third countries’ like Rwanda and Uganda, aimed at resolving the crisis. The deportation of African asylum seekers provoked some new debates about rights of socially vulnerable groups in Israel and, moreover, its democratic character. The critique of the Netanyahu’s policies spread well beyond the borders of the State of Israel. The United Nations tried to resolve the crisis by offering a deal that would relocate Africans from Israel to different countries, but the head of the Jewish state, first agreed to sign it, but later changed his mind. Special attention is paid to the role of the American Jewish organizations in stopping the deportation of Africans from Israel. The American liberal progressive groups, for example J street, have been openly protesting against Netanyahu’s policies. The conclusion is drawn that the way out of the crisis lays in elaborating a long-term comprehensive migration strategy.

Necmettin Erbakan, supported in Turkey by those who considered themselves as more conservative and religious, had the opportunity to serve the people of Turkey in the capacity of Deputy Prime Minister before 1980. Erbakan's new discourse had won him the favor of the public; however, in the wake of the 1980 military coup, his party was closed down and he, along with most of his close colleagues, was banned from politics. After his party, which was a party with a cause rather than an ordinary one, was closed down, he tried to keep his sympathizers united and active by developing various arguments in order to preserve his electorate in the newly developing conditions. In conjunction with the transition from martial law to democracy, the National Vision Movement continued its course in the political arena with the Welfare Party. Necmettin Erbakan cultivated a new discourse in politics with the motto of "Fair Order" by successfully analyzing the economic developments in the world after 1980. His promise to make Turkey a strong and prominent country, his ideals of Islamic unity, his discourse of nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism were accepted by the public. Additionally, his more comprehensive and Pan-Islamist stance compared to the religious jamaats and sects, and the fact that he undertook to be the voice of the people who suffered in the slums following rural-to-urban migration, strengthened the movement. The Motherland Party, founded by Turgut Ozal, who had been the National Salvation Party's Izmir candidate for the parliament before 1980, faced some difficulties while coming into power after 1980, following the military administration. Erbakan surpassed those difficulties, acquired a position in the government as the prime minister of the coalition in 1996 and served the nation. This study explores the establishment and structuring of the Welfare Party, a continuation of the National Vision Movement, in Giresun, as well as the process of its coming to power and later being removed from it. The first elections the Welfare Party took part in were the local elections of 1984, and although the votes it received were below the country average that year, the party increased its vote rates in all subsequent elections and received more votes than the Turkey average in Giresun. The reasons behind this success are that women, who had not been active in politics before 1980, began to participate more, the media was used more effectively, and Giresun was not affected by the conflict between religious sects and politics. This study will examine the efforts of the National Youth Foundation, established as the youth organization of the movement, and other non-governmental organizations during and after the February 28, 1997 post-modern coup process in the context of Giresun.

Introduction Jerusalema, a song from Mzansi — an informal isiZulu name for South Africa — became a global hit during the Covid-19 pandemic. Set to a repetitive, slow four-to-a-bar beat characteristic of South African house music, the gospel-influenced song was released through Open Mic Productions in 2019 by the DJ and record producer Kgaogelo Moagi, popularly known as ‘Master KG’. The production resulted from a collaboration between Master KG, the music producer Charmza The DJ, who composed the music, and the vocalist Nomcebo Zikode, who wrote the lyrics and performed the song for the master recording. Jerusalema immediately trended on social media and, as a “soundtrack of the pandemic” (Modise), became one of the most popular songs of 2020. Soon, it reached no. 1 on the music charts in Belgium, Romania, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland, while going triple platinum in Italy and double platinum in Spain (Hissong). By September 2020, Jerusalema was the most Shazammed song in history. To date, it has generated more than half a billion views on YouTube. After its initial success as a music video, the song’s influence was catapulted to a global cultural phenomenon by the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge video posted by the Angolan dance troupe Fenómenos do Semba in 2020, featuring exquisite dance steps that inspired a viral social media challenge. Some observed that footwork in several of the videos posted, suggested dance types associated with pantsula jive and kwaito music, both of which originated from the black townships of South Africa during the apartheid era. Yet, the leader of the Angolan dance troupe Fenómenos do Semba, Adilson Maiza claimed that the group’s choreography mixed kuduro dance steps (derived from the Angolan Portuguese term “cu duro” or “hard ass”) and Afro-beat. According to Master KG, indeed, the choreography made famous by the Angolan dancers conveyed an Angolan touch, described by Maiza as signature ginga e banga Angolana (Angolan sway and swag; Kabir). As a “counter-contagion” in the age of Coronavirus (Kabir), groups of individuals, ranging from school learners and teachers, police officers, and nursing staff in Africa to priests and nuns in Europe and Palestinians in the Old City of Jerusalem were posting Jerusalema dance videos. Famous efforts came from Vietnam, Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, and Morocco. Numerous videos of healthcare workers became a source of hope for patients with COVID-19 (Chingono). Following the thought of Zygmunt Bauman, in this article I interpret Jerusalema as a “re-enchantment” of a disenchanted world. Focussing on the song’s “magic”, I interrogate why this music video could take on such special meaning for millions of individuals and inspire a viral dance craze. My understanding of “magic” draws on the writings of Patrick Curry, who, in turn, bases his definition of the term on the thought of J.R.R. Tolkien. Curry (5) cites Tolkien in differentiating between two ways in which the word “magic” is generally used: “one to mean enchantment, as in: ‘It was magic!’ and the other to denote a paranormal means to an end, as in: ‘to use magic’”. The argument in this article draws on the first of these explications. As a global media sensation, Jerusalema placed a spotlight on the paucity of a “de-spiritualized, de-animated world,” a world “waging war against mystery and magic” (Baumann x-xi). However, contexts of production and reception, as outlined in Burns and Hawkins (2ff.), warrant consideration of social and cultural values and ideologies masked by the music video’s idealised representation of everyday South African life and its glamourised expression of faith. Thus, while referring to the millennia-old Jerusalem trope and its ensuing mythologies via an intertextual reading, I shall also consider the song alongside the South African-produced epic gangster action film Jerusalema (2008; Orange) while furthermore reflecting on the contexts of its production. Why Jerusalema — Why Its “Magic”? The global fame attained by Master KG’s Jerusalema brought to the fore questions of what made the song and its ensuing dance challenge so exceptional and what lay behind its “magic” (Ndzuta). The song’s simple yet deeply spiritual words appeal to God to take the singer to the heavenly city. In an abbreviated form, as translated from the original isiZulu, the words mean, “Jerusalem is my home, guard me, walk with me, do not leave me here — Jerusalem is my home, my place is not here, my kingdom is not here” (“Jerusalema Lyrics in English”). These words speak of the yearning for salvation, home, and togetherness, with Jerusalem as its spiritual embodiment. As Ndzuta notes, few South African songs have achieved the kind of global status attained by “Jerusalema”. A prominent earlier example is Miriam Makeba’s dance hit Pata Pata, released in the 1960s during the apartheid era. The song’s global impact was enabled by Makeba’s fame and talent as a singer and her political activism against the apartheid regime (Ndzuta). Similarly, the South African hits included on Paul Simon’s Graceland album (1986) — like Ladysmith Black Mambazo’s Homeless — emanated from a specific politico-historical moment that, despite critique against Simon for violating the cultural boycott against South Africa at the time, facilitated their international impact and dissemination (Denselow). Jerusalema’s fame was not tied to political activism but derived from the turbulent times of the COVID-19 pandemic, which, according to statistics published by the World Health Organization, by the end of 2020 had claimed more than 3 million lives globally (“True Death Toll of Covid-19”). Within this context, the song’s message of divine guidance and the protection of a spiritual home was particularly relevant as it lifted global spirits darkened by the pandemic and the many losses it incurred. Likewise, the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge brought joy and feelings of togetherness during these challenging times, as was evidenced by the countless videos posted online. The Magic of the Myth Central to the lyrics of Jerusalema is the city of Jerusalem, which has, as Hees (95) notes, for millennia been “an intense marker of personal, social and religious identity and aspirations in words and music”. Nevertheless, Master KG’s Jerusalema differs from other “Jerusalem songs” in that it encompasses dense layering of “enchantment”. In contrast to Ladysmith Black Mambazo’s Awu Jerusalema, for instance, with its solemn, hymn-like structure and close harmonic vocal delivery, Master KG’s Jerusalema features Nomcebo’s sensuous and versatile voice in a gripping version of the South African house/gospel style known affectionately as the “Amapiano sound” — a raw hybrid of deep house, jazz and lounge music characterised by the use of synthesizers and wide percussive basslines (Seroto). In the original music video, in combination with Nomcebo’s soulful rendition, visuals featuring everyday scenes from South African township life take on alluring, if not poetic dimensions — a magical sensory mix, to which an almost imperceptible slow-motion camera effect adds the impression of “time slowing down”, simultaneously “softening” images of poverty and decay. Fig. 1: “Enchantment” and the joy of the dance. Still from the video “Jerusalema”. From a philosophical perspective, Zygmunt Bauman (xi) contends that “it is against a dis-enchanted world that the postmodern re-enchantment is aimed”. Yet, in a more critical vein, he also argues that, within the postmodern condition, humanity has been left alone with its fears and with an existential void that is “here to stay”: “postmodernity has not allayed the fears that modernity injected into humanity; postmodernity only privatized these fears”. For this reason, Bauman believes, postmodernity “had to become an age of imagined communities” (xviii-xxix). Furthermore, he deems that it is because of its extreme vulnerability that community provides the focus of postmodern concerns in attracting so much intellectual and “real-world” attention (Bauman xxix). Most notably, and relevant to the phenomenon of the media craze, as discussed in this article, Bauman defines the imagined community by way of the cogito “I am seen, therefore I exist” (xix). Not only does Bauman’s line of thought explain the mass and media appeal of populist ideologies of postmodernity that strive to “fill the void”, like Sharon Blackie’s The Enchanted Life — Unlocking the Magic of the Everyday, or Mattie James’s acclaimed Everyday Magic: The Joy of Not Being Everything and Still Being More than Enough; it also illuminates the immense collective appeal of the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge. Here, Bauman’s thought on the power of shared experience — in this case, mass-mediated experience — is, again, of particular relevance: “having no other … anchors except the affections of their ‘members’, imagined communities exist solely through … occasional outbursts of togetherness” (xix). Among these, he lists “demonstrations, marches, festivals, riots” (xix). Indeed, the joyous shared expression of the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge videos posted online during the COVID-19 pandemic may well sort under similar festive public “outbursts”. As a ceremonial dance that tells the story of shared experiences and longings, Jerusalema may be seen as one such collective celebration. True to African dance tradition, more than being merely entertainment for the masses, each in its own way, the dance videos recount history, convey emotion, celebrate rites of passage, and help unify communities in one of the darkest periods of the recent global past. An Intertextual Context for Reading “Jerusalema” However, historical dimensions of the “Jerusalem trope” suggest that Jerusalema might also be understood from a more critical perspective. As Hees (92) notes, the trope of the loss of and longing for the city of Jerusalem represents a merging of mythologies through the ages, embodied in Hebrew, Roman, Christian, Muslim, and Zionist religious cultures. Still, many Jerusalem narratives refrain from referring to its historical legacy, which fuelled hostility between the West and the Muslim world still prevalent today. Thus, the historical realities of fraud, deceit, greed, betrayal, massacres, and even cannibalism are often shunned so that Jerusalem — one of the holiest yet most blood-soaked cities in the world (Hees 92, 95) — is elevated as a symbol of the Heavenly City. In this respect, the South African crime epic Gangster Paradise: Jerusalema, which premiered at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2008 and was later submitted to the Academy Awards for consideration to qualify as a nominee for Best Foreign Language Film (De Jager), stands in stark contrast to the divine connotations of Master KG’s Jerusalema. According to its director Ralph Ziman (Stecker), the film, inspired by a true story, offers a raw look into post-apartheid crime and corruption in the South African city of Johannesburg (De Villiers 8). Its storyline provides a sharp critique of the economic inequalities that torment South Africa in post-apartheid democracy, capturing the dissatisfaction and the “wave of violent crimes that resulted from the economic realities at its root” (Azuawusiefe 102). The irony of the narrative resides in the fact that the main protagonist, Lucky Kunene, at first reluctant to resort to a life of crime, turns to car hijacking and then to hijacking derelict, over-crowded buildings in the inner-city centre of Hillbrow (Hees 90). Having become a wealthy crime boss, Johannesburg, for him, becomes symbolic of a New Jerusalem (“Jerusalem Entjha”; Azuawusiefe 103; Hees 91-92). Entangled in the criminal underbelly of the city and arrested for murder, Kunene escapes from prison, relocating to the coastal city of Durban where, again, he envisages “Jerusalem Enthjha” (which, supposedly, once more implies a life of crime). As a portrayal of inner-city life in Johannesburg, this narrative takes on particular relevance for the current state of affairs in the country. In September this year, an uncontainable fire at a derelict, overcrowded hijacked building owned by Johannesburg municipal authorities claimed the lives of 73 people — a tragic event reported on by all major TV networks worldwide. While the events and economic actualities pictured in the film thus offer a realistic view of the adversities of current South African life, visual content in Master KG’s Jerusalema sublimates everyday South African scenes. Though the deprivation, decay, and poverty among which the majority of South Africans live is acknowledged in the video, its message of a yearning for salvation and a “better home” is foregrounded while explicit critique is shunned. This means that Jerusalema’s plea for divine deliverance is marked by an ambivalence that may weaken an understanding of the video as “pure magic”. Fig. 2: Still from the video Jerusalema showing decrepit living conditions in the background. “Jerusalema” as Layers of Meaning From Bauman’s perspective, Jerusalema — both as a music video and the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge — may represent a more profound human longing for imagined communal celebration beyond mass-mediated entertainment. From such a viewpoint, it may be seen as one specific representation of the millennia-old trope of a heavenly, transcendent Jerusalem in the biblical tradition, the celestial city providing a dwelling for the divine to enter this world (Thompson 647). Nevertheless, in Patrick Curry’s terms, as a media frenzy, the song and its ensuing dance challenge may also be understood as “enchantment enslaved by magic”; that is, enchantment in the service of mass-mediated glamour (7). This implies that Jerusalema is not exempt from underlying ideologised conditions of production, or an endorsement of materialistic values. The video exhibits many of the characteristics of a prototypical music video that guarantee commercial success — a memorable song, the incorporation of noteworthy dance routines, the showcasing of a celebrated artist, striking relations between music and image, and flashy visuals, all of which are skilfully put together (compare Korsgaard). Auslander observes, for instance, that in current music video production the appearance and behaviour of artists are the basic units of communication from which genre-specific personae are constructed (100). In this regard, the setting of a video is crucial for ensuring coherence with the constructed persona (Vernallis 87). These aspects come to the fore in Master KG’s video rendition of Jerusalema. The vocalist Nomcebo Zikode is showcased in settings that serve as a favourable backdrop to the spiritual appeal of the lyrics, either by way of slightly filtered scenes of nature or scenes of worshippers or seekers of spiritual blessing. In addition, following the gospel genre type, her gestures often suggest divine adoration. Fig. 3: Vocalist Nomcebo Zikode in a still from the video Jerusalema. However, again some ambiguity of meaning may be noted. First, the fashionable outfits featured by the singer are in stark contrast with scenes of poverty and deprivation later in the video. The impression of affluence is strengthened by her stylish make-up and haircut and the fact that she changes into different outfits during the song. This points to a glamorisation of religious worship and an idealisation of township life that disregards South Africa’s dire economic situation, which existed even before COVID-19, due to massive corruption and state capture in which the African National Congress is fully implicated (Momoniat). Furthermore, according to media reportage, Jerusalema’s context of production was not without controversy. Though the video worked its magic in the hearts of millions of viewers and listeners worldwide, the song’s celebration as a global hit was marred by legal battles over copyright and remuneration issues. First, it came to light that singer-songwriter Nomcebo Zikode had for a considerable period not been paid for her contribution to the production following Jerusalema’s commercial release in 2019 (Modise). Therefore, she resorted to a legal dispute. Also, it was alleged that Master KG was not the original owner of the music and was not even present when the song was created. Thus, the South African artists Charmza The DJ (Presley Ledwaba) and Biblos (Ntimela Chauke), who claimed to be the original creators of the track, also instituted legal action against Kgaogelo Moagi, his record label Open Mic Productions, and distributor Africori SA whose majority shareholder is the Warner Music Group (Madibogo). The Magic of the Dance Despite these moral and material ambiguities, Jerusalema’s influence as a global cultural phenomenon during the era of COVID spoke to a more profound yearning for the human condition, one that was not necessarily based on religious conviction (Shoki). Perhaps this was vested foremost in the simplicity and authenticity that transpired from the original dance challenge video and its countless pursuals posted online at the time. These prohibit reading the Jerusalema phenomenon as pseudo-enchantment driven only by a profit motive. As a wholly unforeseen, unifying force of hope and joy, the dance challenge sparked a global trend that fostered optimism among millions. Fig. 4: The Angolan dance troupe Fenómenos do Semba. (Still from the original #JerusalemaDanceChallenge video.) As stated earlier, Jerusalema did not originate from political activism. Yet, Professor of English literature Ananya Kabir uncovers a layer of meaning associated with the dance challenge, which she calls “alegropolitics” or a “politics of joy” — the joy of the dance ­­— that she links on the one hand with the Jerusalem trope and its history of trauma and dehumanisation, and, on the other, with Afro-Atlantic expressive culture as associated with enslavement, colonialism, and commodification. In her reading of the countless videos posted, their “gift to the world” is “the secret of moving collectively”. By way of individual responses to “poly-rhythmic Africanist aesthetic principles … held together by a master-structure”, Kabir interprets this communal dance as “resistance, incorporating kinetic and rhythmic principles that circulated initially around the Atlantic rim (including the Americas, Europe, the Caribbean, and Africa)”. For her, the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge is “an example of how dance enables convivencia (living together)”; “it is a line dance (animation in French, animação in Portuguese, animación in Spanish) that enlivens parties through simple choreography that makes people dance together”. In this sense, the routine’s syncopated steps allow more and more people to join as each repetition unfolds — indeed, a celebratory example of Bauman’s imagined community that exists through an “outburst of togetherness” (xix). Such a collective “fest” demonstrates how, in dance leader Maiza’s words, “it is possible to be happy with little: we party with very little” (Kabir). Accordingly, as part of a globally mediated community, with just the resources of the body (Kabir), the locked-down world partied, too, for the duration of the magical song. Whether seen as a representation of the millennia-old trope of a heavenly, transcendent Jerusalem, or, in Curry’s understanding, as enchantment in the service of mass-mediated glamour, Jerusalema and its ensuing dance challenge form an undeniable part of recent global history involving the COVID-19 pandemic. As a media frenzy, it contributed to the existing body of “Jerusalem songs”, and lifted global spirits clouded by the pandemic and its emotional and material losses. Likewise, the #JerusalemaDanceChallenge was symbolic of an imagined global community engaging in “the joy of the dance” during one of the most challenging periods in humanity’s recent past. References Auslander, Philip. “Framing Personae in Music Videos.” The Bloomsbury Handbook of Popular Music Video Analysis. Eds. Loria A. Burns and Stan Hawkins. London: Bloomsbury, 2019. 92-109. 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Allen. “Ralph Ziman Talks Gangster's Paradise: Jerusalema [Exclusive].” Movieweb 2010. 15 July 2023 <https://movieweb.com/exclusive-ralph-ziman-talks-gangsters-paradise-jerusalema/>. Seroto, Butchie. “Amapiano: What Is It All About?” Music in Africa 30 Sep. 2020. 15 June 2023 <https://www.musicinafrica.net/magazine/amapiano-what-it-all-about>. Shoki, William. “‘Jerusalema’ Is about Self-Determination.” Jacobin 10 Dec. 2020. 30 June 2023 <https://jacobin.com/2020/10/jerusalema-south-africa-coronavirus-covid>. Stecker, Joshua. “Gangster’s Paradise: Jerusalema – Q & A with Writer/Director Ralph Ziman.” Script 11 June 2010. 30 June 2023 <https://scriptmag.com/features/gangsters-paradise-jerusalema-qa-with-writerdirector-ralph-ziman>. Thompson, Thomas L. “Jerusalem as the City of God's Kingdom: Common Tropes in the Bible and the Ancient Near East.” Islamic Studies 40.3-4 (2001): 631-647. Vernallis, Carol. Experiencing Music Video: Aesthetics and Cultural Context. New York: Columbia UP, 2004. World Health Organisation. “The True Death Toll of Covid-19.” N.d. 15 July 2023 <https://www.who.int/data/stories/the-true-death-toll-of-covid-19-estimating-global-excess-mortality>.

Teesid: Artikli eesmärgiks on avada eesti paremäärmuslaste tähendusloomet hüpermeedias. Roger Griffini teooria järgi iseloomustab paremäärmuslaste võrgusuhtluse väikeste mitteparteiliste üksuste – grupuskulite (nt veebilehed, blogid) paljusus ja suhteline marginaalsus, rahulolematus praeguse maailmakorraga, ideede revolutsioonilisus ning risoomne ehk mitte-hierarhiline kommunikatsioonistruktuur. Täiendame Griffini teooriat kultuurisemiootika ideedega. Semiosfääri kontseptsioon võimaldab paremini analüüsida grupuskulite kommunikatsiooni eripära ja seal tekkivaid tähendushierarhiaid. Koodteksti mõiste selgitab aga, miks, vaatamata hüpermeedias kättesaadavale arvamuste paljususele, domineerivad grupuskulaarses kommunikatsioonis väga kindlad tähendusloome viisid. S U M M A R YThe purpose of this article is to create a conceptual framework which would aid in the understanding of the characteristic ways the Estonian extreme right has created the prevalent identities and meanings that are currently in circulation in the media. The analysis is based on non-participant observation, by means of which we have attempted to isolate the main foci and dominant practices of self-description found in web communications among members of the Estonian extreme right. Based on the number of visitors to sites, the concentration of topics posted and frequency of citation, we take the following as representatives of extreme right positions: the blogs „The Nationalist“ („Rahvuslane“), „NS“, and „Nationalist“ („Rahvuslik“), and the alternative web pages „Be Aware“ („Ole Teadlik“) and „BHR Ruzzland“. Markers of the extreme right were present in the pages we examined at different levels of intensity; in fact, not every post to these pages clearly, not every page could be labelled as extreme right. Yet the general tonality of the webpages we examined included the following: an urgent need to conserve „core Estonianness“ and protect it from foreign influences; the belief that the world order (including Estonian power structures) are controlled by a secret alliance between Zionists and Masonic orders; the danger of mixing races and cultures; the need to exert strong state control over a range of areas of life; euroskepticism. According to the authors of this article non-institutionalized extreme right movements operating in hypermedia have been most extensively examined by Roger Griffin’s research. Griffin has developed the concept of the groupuscule, which can be defined as small, political, (though almost never directly partypolitical) unit in the context of contemporary extreme right-wing politics, and which strive toward revolutionary, ideological, organizational, and activist goals, the overall purpose of which is to overcome the decadence of the liberal democratic system. Groupuscules can have diverse physical manifestations: webpages, magazines, and why not also underground meetings of extreme-right cell groups. Indeed, according to Griffin, groupuscules can be treated as non-nuclear cellular networks without a leader. The communication of groupuscules reflects the characteristics of hypermedia itself: nonhierarchical or network-like structure, internal multiplicity, the lack of a centre or a central axis of organization, fluidity, and temporariness, all of which are most often connected with the abstract textuality of the hypermedia environment. In our view, the main limitation of Griffin’s account of groupuscules is the undertheorization of communication both within and among groupuscules. Too little attention has been directed to the primary mechanisms of meaning-creation, which organize navigation on the groupuscular information field and the development of hierarchies. In this article we aim to supplement Griffin’s theory of the groupsucule by means of a cultural-semiotic approach, particularly through the concepts of the semiosphere and the code text. Focusing on meaning-creation by the groupuscular extreme right, one can examine groupuscules communicating in the internet environments as different semiotic wholes, or semiospheres: these can be specific posts, popular discussion topics, or the network as a whole. The semiotic wholeness of a groupuscule is guaranteed by a boundary. By means of the boundary, a groupuscule can distinguish itself from its semiotic other, filter information from outside, and restate this in its own language. Groupuscules of the extreme right bring those people together who use the web medium both for the formation and the confirmation of their personal racial/ethnic identity. Their relatively marginal status as a „public voice“ can be explained by the fact that on the webpages we examined, a dominant strategy for identity formation was creating the image of an extreme rightist as a sufferer or victim. They often presented themselves as persecuted and unjustly excluded from public discussions. In the communications of the Estonian extreme right, the designated antagonists are the mainstream media, the European Union, and its corrupt politicians. In terms of its internal structure, the groupuscular extreme right is heterogeneous. When a specific groupuscule enters interaction with other extreme right cells, it is no longer identical with itself, since its identity is largely determined by connecting with other groupuscules; that is, its particularity only emerges through communication with other groupuscules. The Estonian extreme right groupuscules we studied are relatively well known publicly in the so-called local counterculture; some of their articles are frequently commented and cited (on the pages we studied, reciprocal reference and quotation was frequent). However, in every semiotic whole, dominants or nuclei develop, which, compared to more marginal semiotic units are usually more rigidly structured. Similar nuclear structures also play an important role in groupuscular identity formation, where, in the course of communication, certain topics become major themes that unify many groupuscules, and begin to determine the meaning-formation of the semiotic units that belong to it. For example, in the case of the topic of ratification of ACTA (The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement), a reference to extensive corruption among various administrative units of the European Union percolates through the Estonian groupuscules (on a broader level, a reference to the decadence of liberalism and the new world order). On another level, opinion leaders emerge on the groupuscular field; their postings are read most often, and their ideas are referenced most often. On the Estonian groupuscular field, the most cited sources are the blogs „DeCivitate“ and „The Nationalist“. It seems that if Griffin points out that groupuscular information networks lack a „center-periphery“ relation, then he bases that claim on 1) the technological characteristics that structure the web environment. However, he does not take into account 2) the relativity of the centre-periphery opposition and 3) the hierarchical nature of the processes of signification themselves and their role in organizing groupuscules. We attempt to explain groupuscules’ relatively hermetic meaning-creation by using the cultural-semiotic term code text, which is an invariant system of connections originating in the shared memory of a community, the role of which is conceptualizing specific fragments of information and locating them in habitual patterns of meaning. The self-descriptions of right-wing groupuscules are largely built around the code text of a conspiracy theory, which allows the representation of one’s ideological opponents as extremely ill-intentioned or ignorant, and themselves, by contrast, as moral and heroic. The code text that narrates the decline of the liberal-democratic world constellates narratives of a conspiratorial world system, in which the cause of every event can be explained by the „evil“ intent of the conspirators. Groupuscules do not limit themselves to passive complaining about the decadence of the prevailing world order; often ideas are expressed of radically reforming this decadent world order, which should in turn lead to the rebirth of nation-states. The specificity of the code text leads participants in the extreme right to perceive causal connections between events that have occurred in different places at different times, and which seem totally unconnectable in the eyes of outsiders. Those phenomena that do not fit the code text, and which could make way for other explanations for sociocultural realities are virtually invisible in the self-descriptions of gropusucules, and are relegated to the periphery as unimportant.