Academic literature on the topic 'Nicolas de Cusa, Hasard'

Nicolau de Cusa é conhecido por suas teorias a respeito do conhecimento, principalmente por sua obra A douta ignorância. Nela e em outras, sempre dentro de uma visão medieval, vê-se que a.sabedoria cusana é uma tentativa de alcançar incansavelmente o inalcançável. Para tanto são de grande importância os símbolos matemáticos.

L’opuscule La Vision en Dieu constitue le point de départ pour une lecture plus élargie de la philosophie de Nicolas de Cues en tant que theorèse de l’Absolu, lequel, nonobstant son inconnaissance dernière, néanmoins se réfléchit en quelque façon dans la pluralité de la pensée humaine, qui dans et à partir du monde cherche à l’atteindre. Nous présentons dans ses principaux moments le processus gnosique de la pensée dans sa dialéctique de ascensus-descensus entre l’intelligible et le sensible, l’un et le multiple, sans oublier ni le côté mystique ni le côté déjà bien moderne de cette philosophie. Ainsi, nous exposons soit la méthodologie conduisant à l’intuition noétique de l’Absolu, soit les instruments conceptuels qui permettent à l’homme de se construire, en tant que microcosmos, sa représentation du monde. Pour conclure, nous soulignons le caractère déjà bien moderne de l’anthropologie du Cardinal, qui nous révéle bien le lieu historial de sa philosophie, à demi chemin entre le Moyen-Âge et la Modernité.

AbstractNicolas of Cusa’s fifteenth-century textDe Visione Deirepresents his most far-reaching illustration of communication between finite “quantum” vision and the infinite spherical vision of God. Written to accompany a visual experiment, the text instructs the monks of Tegernsee to circumambulate an all-seeing icon of God. Developing the concept of infinite space that had found a geometrical representation in the vanishing point, Cusa places it within God’s eye, which retains its medieval and religious function by gazing out of the painting at the monk according to inverse perspective. This text thus constructs a veritable sociology of belief, in which believing the word of the other, of the community, is necessary for each individual’s understanding of God. In this sense, there can be no unmediated experience of the divine, for God, as infinite and absolute, cannot be reduced to a single perspective. Cusa’s experiment shows us that we cannot live together in a community based upon what we see, for what we see cannot be shared. It is only our trust in the word of others that can testify to an invisible and universal meaning. Sharing this meaning in language effectively founds the social order.

Resumo: A pesquisa propõe seguir a via simbólica do pensamento de Nicolau de Cusa (1401-1464) e pensá-la como um caminho para o ensino-aprendizagem da filosofia. Para tanto, toma como impulso a sugestão que o Cardeal de Cusa deixa na sua obra De coniecturis (Parte I, n. 4): “É oportuno atrair, em certo sentido guiando-os pela mão, os mais jovens, privados da luz da experiência, à manifestação do que se oculta, de tal maneira que possam elevar-se gradualmente ao que é mais ignorado”. A “condução” cusana será pela via dos símbolos e a pesquisa se concentrará, principalmente, sobre duas obras em que a “condução pela mão” aparece: o Livro I do De docta ignorantia e partes do De visione dei. Tanto na primeira quanto na segunda obra o “procedimento” para se conhecer o “mais ignorado” é basicamente o mesmo, embora os símbolos utilizados na “condução” sejam diferentes: a matemática na primeira obra e na segunda um quadro pintado ou o ícone de Deus. Inicialmente, a pesquisa entende que cabe ao professor-filósofo “atrair” e “guiar pela mão” os mais jovens para a filosofia. Depois, apresenta a perspectiva de Nicolau de Cusa sobre o “conduzir pela mão” confrontando-o com as críticas de Jacques Rancière, em O mestre ignorante, a “condução” socrática. Em seguida, busca explicitar o conceito de “douta ignorância” em Nicolau de Cusa para depois explicitar a “condução pela mão” em A douta ignorância e em A visão de Deus. Por fim, embora considere que talvez Nicolau não seja “o mestre ignorante” de Rancière, considera também que a partir da filosofia cusana, pode-se pensar um caminho para o ensino da filosofia que não seja mera transmissão, mas um exercício de aprendizagem por parte do aluno. Palavras-chave: Manuductio. Transsumptio. Símbolo. Ensino-Aprendizagem. Filosofia. Abstract: The enquiry proposes to follow the symbolic path of the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) and to think of it as a way for the teaching and learning of philosophy. For this purpose it takes impulse in the suggestion made by the Cardinal of Cusa in his work De coniecturis (Part I, n. 4): “It is useful to attract, in a sense leading them by hand, the younger, deprived from the light of experience, to the manifestation of what is hidden, in such a way that they can gradually rise toward what is most ignored”. The Cusanus' “lead” shall be through the path of the symbols, and the research will focus, mainly, on two works in which the “leading by hand” theme appears: Book I of De docta ignorantia and some parts of De visione dei. Both in the former and the latter the “procedure” to cognize the “most ignored” is basically tge same, although the symbols deployed in the “leading” are different: mathematics in the former and, in the latter, a painted picture or God's icon. Initially, the enquiry assumes the understanding that it is up to the teacher-philosopher to “attract” and “guide by the hand” the younger to philosophy. Later on, it presents Nicholas of Cusa's perspective on the “leading by hand” in confrontation with the criticisms issued by Jacques Rancière, in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, to the Socratic “lead”. Then, the concept of “learned ignorance” in Nicholas of Cusa is to be made explicit in order to make thenceforth explicit the doctrine of “leading by hand” in On Learned Ignorance and The Vision of God. Finally, although considering that perhaps Nicholas is not Rancière's “learned schoolmaster”, it is also comsidered that, departing from the philosophy of the Cusanus, a way of teaching philosophy can be thought that is not sheer transmission, but rather an exercise of learning by the student. Keywords: Manuductio. Transsumptio. Symbol. Teaching and Learning. Philosophy. REFERÊNCIAS ANDRÉ, João Maria. Sentido, Simbolismo e Interpretação no Discurso Filosófico de Nicolau de Cusa. Coimbra, 1997. ANDRÉ, João Maria. Coincidentia oppositorum: concórdia e o sentido existencial da transsumptio em Nicolas de Cusa. In: ANDRÉ, João Maria; ÁLVAREZ GÓMEZ, Mariano. (Org.). Coincidência dos opostos e concórdia: caminhos do pensamento em Nicolau de Cusa. Actas do Congresso Internacional realizado em Coimbra e Salamanca nos dias 5 a 9 de Novembro de 2001. Tomo I. Coimbra: Faculdade de Letras, 2001. p. 213-243. ANDRÉ, João Maria. Introdução. In. NICOLAU DE CUSA. A douta ignorância. Tradução, introdução e notas de João Maria André. Lisboa/Portugal: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2010. ANDRÉ, João Maria. Introdução. In. NICOLAU DE CUSA. A visão de Deus. Tradução e introdução de João Maria André; prefácio de Miguel Baptista Pereira. 4ª Edição Revista. Lisboa/Portugal: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2012, p. 79-131. BOAVIDA, João. Por uma didática para a filosofia – análise de algumas razões. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra – nº 9 (1996), p. 091-110. BOMBASSARO, Luiz Carlos. IMAGEM E CONCEITO: a metáfora da caça na filosofia da renascença. Rev. Filos. Aurora, v. 19, n. 24, p. 11-33, jan./jun. 2007. Disponível em: https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/2170/2089. Acesso em: 06 de junho de 2019. CARVALHO, Marcelo; CORNELLI, Gabriele. Ensinar Filosofia (Volume 2). Cuiabá, MT: Central do Texto, 2013. CERLETTI, Alejandro. O ensino de filosofia como problema filosófico. Tradução de Ingrid Muller Xavier. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, 2009. D’AMICO, Claudia. El idiota de Nicolás de Cusa: Acerca de la posibilidad de un saber ignorante. Revista Sul-Americana de Filosofia e Educação – RESAFE, Brasília, p. 111-117, n. 11, nov./abr. 2008. FAVARETTO, Celso F. Sobre o ensino de filosofia. R. Fac. Educ., São Paulo, v. 19, n. 1, p. 97-102, jan./jun. 1993. GALLO, S.; KOHAN, W. Crítica de alguns lugares-comuns ao se pensar a Filosofia no Ensino Médio. In: GALLO, S.; KOHAN, W. (Org.). Filosofia no Ensino Médio. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes, 2000, p. 174-196. GALLO, Silvio. O ensino da filosofia e o pensamento conceitual. In: CARVALHO, Marcelo; CORNELLI, Gabriele. Filosofia e Formação (Volume 1). Cuiabá, MT: Central do Texto, 2013, p. 204-215. GELAMO, R. P. O ensino da filosofia no limiar da contemporaneidade: o que faz o filósofo quando seu ofício é ser professor de filosofia? São Paulo: Cultura Acadêmica, 2009. GUENDELMAN, Constanza Kaliks. Desejo e percurso na construção do conhecimento: aspectos pedagógicos na obra de Nicolau de Cusa. São Paulo: FEUSP, 2014. 216 f. Tese (Doutorado em Educação) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação, Faculdade de Educação da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2014. GHISALBERTI, Alessandro. As raízes medievais do pensamento moderno. Tradução Sivar Hoeppner Ferreira. 2ª Ed. São Paulo: Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia e Ciência “Raimundo Lúlio” (Ramon Llull), 2011. HADOT, Pierre. Exercícios espirituais e filosofia antiga. Trad. Flavio Fontenelle Loque e Loraine Oliveira. São Paulo: É realizações, 2014. HEIDEGGER, Martin. O que é isto – A filosofia? In: HEIDEGGER, Martin. Que é isto – A filosofia: Identidade e diferença. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades, 2006, p. 13-34. KOHAN, Walter Omar. Três lições sobre filosofia da educação. Educ. Soc., Campinas, vol. 24, n. 82, p. 221-228, abril 2003 Disponível em http://www.cedes.unicamp.br. KOHAN, Walter Omar. Sócrates & a Educação. O enigma da filosofia. Tradução Ingrid Müller Xavier. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica Editora, 2011. KOHAN, Walter Omar. Como ensinar que é preciso aprender? Filosofia: uma oficina de pensamento. In: CARVALHO, Marcelo; CORNELLI, Gabriele. Ensinar Filosofia (Volume 2). Cuiabá, MT: Central do Texto, 2013, p. 75-83. NICOLAI DE CUSA. De coniecturis. Texto latino disponível em: http://www.cusanus-portal.de/. Acesso em 04 de agosto de 2019. NICOLAU DE CUSA. A douta ignorância. Tradução, introdução e notas de João Maria André. Lisboa/Portugal: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2010. NICOLAU DE CUSA. A visão de Deus. Tradução e introdução de João Maria André; prefácio de Miguel Baptista Pereira. 3ª Edição Revista. Lisboa/Portugal: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2010. NICOLAU DE CUSA. O não-outro – De non aliud. Edição bilíngue latim-português. Introdução, tradução e notas por João Maria André. Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento, 2012. NICOLAUS CUSANUS. Lettera a Nicolò Albergati. In: MORRA, Gianfranco (A cura di). Nicolò Cusano. La vita e la morte. Forli, It: Ethica 5, 1966, p. 55-98. NOGUEIRA, Maria Simone Marinho. Conhecer e amar na Carta a Albergati de Nicolau de Cusa. Revista Territórios & Fronteiras, Cuiabá, v. 5, n. 1, jul-dez., 2011. RAMOS, Daniel Rodrigue. A aprendizagem da filosofia e a impossibilidade de ensinar filosofia. Revista portuguesa de educação, 31 (2), pp. 37-53. RANCIÈRE, Jacque. O mestre ignorante: Cinco lições sobre a emancipação intelectual. Trad. Lilian do Valle. 3ª Edição. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2011. SANTINELLO, Giovanni. Introduzione a Niccolò Cusano. 2ª Edizione con aggiornamento bibliografico. Roma-Bari/Italia: Laterza, 1987. SANTINELLO, Giovanni. L’uomo „ad imaginem et similitudinem“ nel Cusano. Estrato da Doctor Seraphicus. Nº XXXVII, Marzo 1990, p. 85-97 – Bollettino d’informazioni del Centro di studi Bonaventuriani – Bognoregio (Viterbo). SANTOS, Boaventura Souza. A filosofia à venda, a douta ignorância e a aposta de Pascal. Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, 80, Março 2008: 11-43 SOUZA, Klédson Tiago Alves de; TEIXEIRA NETO, José. A transsumptio e o uso de enigmas como “saída” para um discurso sobre o divino em De docta ignorantia (1440) de Nicolau de Cusa. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia, Natal, v. 24, n. 43, jan.-abr. 2017. SVERSUTTI, William Davidans. Infinitas finiens e infinitas finibilis: a infinidade de deus e do universo no De principio de Nicolau de Cusa. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá, Centro de Ciências Humanas, Letras e Artes, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2019. TEIXEIRA NETO, José. Nexus: da relacionalidade do princípio à metafísica do inominável em Nicolau de Cusa. Natal: EDUFRN, 2017. TOMAZETTI, Elisete M. Formação de Professor de Filosofia para o Ensino Médio: entre políticas e práticas, entre universidade e escola. In: MATOS, Junot Cornélio; COSTA, Marcos Roberto Nunes. Ensino de Filosofia: questões fundamentais. Recife: Ed. Universitária UFPE, 2014, p. 31-42.

Philosophy and all the academic disciplines are sensitive to the aim of sound reasoning – except for the dialectical tradition which sanctions contradictions and antinomies (Heraclitus, Nicolas of Cusa, Hegel, Marx, Vaihinger, Simmel, Rex, and Dahrendorf). A brief overview is presented of conflicting theoretical stances within the various academic disciplines before an assessment is given of the positive and negative meaning of ‘reductionism.’ Against the background of historical lines of development the multiple terms employed in this context are mentioned and eventually positioned within the context of the normativity holding for logical thinking. It is argued that the logical contrary between logical and illogical serves as the foundation of other normative contraries, such as legal and illegal and moral and immoral. Through the discovery of irrational numbers the initial Pythagorean conviction that everything is number reverted to a geometrical perspective that generated a static metaphysics of being which challenged the ideas of plurality and motion. This development uncovered the problem of primitive terms in scientific discourse as an alternative for those theoretical attempts aimed at reducing whatever there is to one single mode of explanation. Zeno’s paradoxes are used to demonstrate an alternative understanding of the difference between the potential and the actual infinite as well as the nature of (theoretical) antinomies. It is argued that genuine antinomies are inter-modal in nature (such as is found in the attempt to reduce movement to static positions in space) and therefore differ from logical contradictions (such as a ‘square circle’ which merely confuses two figures within one modal aspect). Although every antinomy does entail logical contradictions, the latter do not necessarily presuppose an antinomy. The implication is that logic itself has an ontic foundation – as is seen from the nature of the principle of sufficient reason (ground) and the principle of the excluded antinomy – and therefore only acquires meaning on the basis of a non-reductionist ontology. When the method of immanent critique unveils genuine antinomies, the way is opened for meaningful intellectual interaction between different philosophical stances. In distinguishing between contradiction and antinomy philosophers are actually challenged to contemplate the implications of a non-reductionist ontology, such as avoiding the stance of monistic isms.

N. De cues invente le principe de coincidence des opposes d'apres lequel, dans le domaine de l'infini, les opposes se rejoignent. Pour eprouver ce principe, il decide de l'utiliser dans le probleme de la quadrature du cercle. De 1445 a 1459, il cherche en vain a << transmuer >> le courbe en droit, a partir de quelques propositions simples qui s'averent fausses ou infondees. Tous les commentateurs soulignent | l'importance des mathematiques dans la philosophie du cusain, et pourtant, aucun ne s'est avise d'aller lire ses textes mathematiques. Il y a donc une lacune dans la lecture de l'oeuvre cusaine que ce travail de recherche vise a combler : il s'agit de reconstituer les liens des mathematiques et de la metaphysique dans le corpus des oeuvres mathematiques. Au terme de cette etude, on decouvre que ce n'est ni par ignorance, ni par maladresse que n. De cues echoue. Mais pourquoi n'a-t-il pas vu qu'il ne pouvait pas resoudre son probleme ? il faut comprendre son erreur << de l'interieur >>, et etudier ses concepts comme autant d'obstacles epistemologiques, car il soumet les mathematiques a une metaphysique neoplatonicienne heritee de proclus. Cette etude montre comment le dogme de la trinite interdit de considerer l'un comme un nombre, comment l'assimilation de l'infini a un maximum absolu empeche de comprendre l'infini mathematique, comment la recherche d'une proportion entre le droit et le courbe est limitee a la recherche d'une proportion continue et rectiligne. L'oeuvre cusaine doit etre reevaluee : son apport a consiste a rompre avec l'aristotelisme dominant par une sortede nouvelle logique, qui ne permettait cependant pas de construire la trigonometrie necessaire a la revolution astronomique.

La philosophie de Nicolas de Cues connaît un tournant essentiel avec les Conjectures, conduisant à une reconfiguration générale de l’œuvre. Cela tient à la nouvelle compréhension cusaine de l’altérité sur la base du caractère symbolique des conjectures : saisies de la vérité dans une altérité indépassable, celles-ci introduisent à une philosophie positive du reste. Mettant en cause la tradition théologico-philosophique, les Conjectures proposent, selon une expression lullienne, un art général des conjectures, ou une méthode pour les arts d’investigation. Privilégiant la modélisation de l’objet mathématique et l’organisme vivant, elles amorcent une révolution gnoséologique. Ce mouvement est fondé sur une réflexion théologique. Comment la vérité en soi qu’est Dieu – pensée comme inatteignable dans son exactitude – peut-elle fonder mon savoir comme savoir d’une vérité inexacte, conceptualisée comme vérité dans l’altérité, sans en invalider la prétention de savoir ? Cette question conduit à des élaborations successives du rapport entre vérité et altérité. Des Conjectures émerge une philosophie de l’esprit. Car l’exactitude ne pouvant être atteinte, c’est dans le déploiement du sens que la conjecture peut être plus ou moins vraie. Chacun fraie là son chemin singulier en déployant les dimensions de son humanité. L’agir humain se mesure à la capacité singulière de l’individu à se (re)connaître comme mens et à développer concrètement sa propre créativité mentale. Les Conjectures montrent que la relation essentielle entre vérité et altérité permet d’explorer et de fonder les différents savoirs positifs. Elles ouvrent sur une philosophie de la tolérance, qui n’est pas sans apories
The Conjectures of Nicolas de Cues are at the turning point of his philosophy. They reorganize all his work with a new conception of alterity, on the basis of their symbolic features: the grips of truth in an impassable alterity, which introduce to a positive philosophy of the rest. By reconsidering the theologico-philosophical tradition, the Conjectures put forward, following a Lullian expression, a general art of the conjectures, namely a new method for the investigative arts. The Conjectures favour the modelization of the mathematical object and the living organism. They initiate then a gnoseological revolution. This approach is based on a theological reflection. How can the truth in itself which is God – truth thought as unreachable in his rightness – found my knowledge as knowledge of an inaccurate truth, conceptualized as a truth in alterity, without invalidating its claim to know? This issue will be the object of successive drawing up of the relation between truth and alterity. A philosophy of mind emerges from the Conjectures. As the rightness is out of reach it is in the development of the sense that the conjecture may be more or less true. Each one clears one’s single way by displaying the dimensions of his humanity. The human acting is measured in the singular capacity of the individual to know or to recognize himself as mens and in doing so to develop practically its own creative mind. The interest of The Conjectures is then to show that the essential relation between truth and alterity allows to explore and found the different positive knowledges. The Conjectures lead to an enlarged philosophy of tolerance whose general layout does nevertheless generate aporia

Le premier tome de cet ouvrage s’efforce de comprendre, à partir du commentaire détaillé de la « Docte ignorance » pourquoi l’évangélisme français du Cercle de Meaux a pu se réclamer de Nicolas de Cues. Sans doute est-ce parce qu’en renversant la hiérarchie habituelle, qui place la théologie mystique et la voie d’éminence au terme de l’ascension de l’âme vers Dieu, le Cusain prépare la voie à ceux qui mettront le Christ et la Croix au principe de cette élévation. Une preuve en est donnée par la reprise par Lefèvre d’Etaples, et après lui par Luther et Calvin, de la thèse audacieuse de Cues qui considère que le Christ a enduré sur la Croix les souffrances « infernales » des damnés. Le deuxième tome propose une nouvelle traduction de la ‘Docte Ignorance’ ainsi qu’une traduction de l’’Ecriture inconnue’ (De ignota litteratura) de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg, qui attaque l’ouvrage du Cusain au nom de la philosophie de l’Ecole
The first volume of this work, beginning with a detailed commentary of the ‘Learned Ignorance’, tries to understand why the French evangelism from the Circle of Meaux could claim the intellectual inheritance of Nicholas of Cusa. This was probably because the Cusanus inverted the usual hierarchy which placed the mystical theology and the way of eminence at the end of the rise of souls towards God ; by doing that, he prepared the way for those who put Christ and the Cross at the principle of this elevation. One proof is given with the recovery by Lefèvre of Etaples, and after him by Luther and Calvin, of the audacious thesis that consederes the Christ has endured on the Cross the “infernal”sufferings of the damneds. The second volume proposes a new translation of the ‘Learned Ignorance’ as well as a translation of the Unknown Scripture (De Ignota litteratura) by Johannes Wenck of Herrenberg, who tackles the work of the Cusanus in the name of the philosophy of the School

La pensée de Nicolas de Cues opère la rencontre problématique entre la théologie de l’infinité divine et l’affirmation de la puissance créatrice de l’esprit humain. La mystique rhénane se transporte dans la Florence du Quattrocento. Avec la doctrine de la docte ignorance et l’art des conjectures, Nicolas de Cues élabore une synthèse permettant d’intégrer la force constructive de l’esprit humain à la puissance infinie du Principe divin. Fondement ontologique et idéal de connaissance, le Principe prête sa puissance à l’efficience des créatures spirituelles. A l’image du Dieu infini, l’homme est le dieu créateur de son monde de notions, ou conjectures. Mais un problème se pose : comment faire valoir l’autonomie et la consistance de ce monde humain (« mundus humanus ») en regard d’un Principe illimité ? Comment concilier la puissance respective des deux dieux créateurs ? Le problème de l’affirmation de l’homme trouve sa scène métaphysique
Nicolas of Cusa’s theory enables a problematic encounter between the theory of divine infinity and the assertion of the human mind’s creative power. Hence, the Rhenish mysticism blends itself in the Quattrocento Florentine spirit. A synthesis, integrating the constructive strengths of the human mind to the infinite power of the Divine Principle, is elaborated by Nicolas of Cusa, with the help of the doctrine of the learned ignorance and the art of conjectures. The Divine Principle, understood as an ontological ground and the ideal of knowledge, is therefore lending its force to the efficiency of spiritual creatures. In the image of the Infinite God, man is the creating god of his own world of notions, that is to say, conjectures. A problematic issue nevertheless appears: how shall we understand the autonomy and consistency of the humane world (“mundus humanus”) with respect to an Unlimited Principle? How shall we reconcile both powers of Creators? A metaphysical scene is set, staging man’s assertion issues

La notion d'altérité, rare dans la philosophie médiévale de langue latine, se trouve paradoxalement au centre d'enjeux métaphysiques importants : à partir de Boèce, elle intervient dans le cadre du transfert des catégories aristotéliciennes aux réalités théologiques (translatio in divinis), dans le double contexte de la théologie trinitaire et de la théologie de la création. Elle connaît alors une fortune contrastée dans les divers commentaires des Opuscula sacra de Boèce, tantôt admise dans la pensée des réalités divines, tantôt rejetée hors de Dieu pour caractériser en propre les seules créatures. La raison de cet usage tient à une hésitation entre deux tendances de la métaphysique présentes dans les textes de Boèce et leur commentaires, une ontologie de la relation d'origine aristotélicienne et une hénologie de l'assimilation d'origine platonicienne. Nicolas de Cues, principal auteur de cette étude, se trouve accentuer particulièrement la seconde de ces tendances : il invente ainsi le terme non-autre (non-aliud) pour nommer Dieu, faisant de celui-ci le principe de l'être et de la connaissance qui assimile toutes choses à soi. Ce coup de force métaphysique et conceptuel a des conséquences majeures sur la pensée de la création : l'altérité des créatures est un fait contingent et ambivalent. Elle se rapporte moins à l'originalité et à l'autonomie de l'individu qu'à sa dépendance envers son principe, l'unité divine, dans l'ordre de l'être et du connaître
The notions of otherness, which is rare in mediaeval philosophy in the latin language, is paradoxically central to some important metaphysical issues : Boethius used it to transfer Aristotelian categories into theological realities (translatio in divinis), in the context of the trinitarian and creational theologies. In the various commentaries to the Opuscula sacra by Boethius, it had mixed fate : it was either included in reflections on divine realities, or considered as being external to God and used to characterize his creatures only. This two-fold use has its origin in a tension between two metaphysical trends that are present in Boethian texts and their commentaries : an ontology of relation that has an Aristotelian origin and a henology of assimilation which is borrowed from the neo-Platonists. Nicholas of Cusa, the main author in our study, was instrumental in developing the second tendency : he invented the expression "not-other" (non-aliud) to call God, thus making him the principle of being and knowledge which assimilates everything to himself. This metaphysical and conceptual innovation hat great consequences on how creation was conceived : the creatures' otherness was a contingent and ambivalent fact, which referred not so much to the originality and autonomy of the individual as to his dependence on his principle, divine unity